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IDP 201 -- Discussing Defensive Schemes (1 Viewer)

Jene Bramel

Footballguy
IDP 201 – The 4-3 Front

If you'll forgive the brief history post, I think it’s interesting to consider how yesterday's defensive ideas morphed into today's schemes. Plus, it gives me an excuse to tease the next post. :cry:

The 4-3 defensive front, like so many innovations on the defensive side of the line of scrimmage, was borne out of necessity. The Giants’ Steve Owen and Tom Landry saw Paul Brown killing five and six man fronts with his spread backfields and passing schemes and drew up innovations to get three players off the line. The result – flexing their ends and creating a middle linebacker – gave them the ability to counter those passing offenses with better coverage schemes. When Sam Huff (who came to training camp as an offensive lineman) began wreaking havoc from the “middle linebacker” spot, the 4-3 became the defense of its day.

Today’s 4-3 schemes aren’t much like Landry’s original 4-3. Old school 4-3 fronts used a lot a 2-gap technique and began falling out of favor in the 1970s when offenses began outflanking it with speedy running backs and a variety of new passing attacks. We hinted at the “Stunt 4-3” of the Steel Curtain and the burgeoning Over/Under fronts in the late 1970s-early 1980s in the 101 thread, but the defenses of the 80s were mostly 3-4 fronts.

Around that time, a 4-3 revolution of sorts was happening in the college ranks. Simplicity was key. Size no longer mattered. Speed and aggressiveness ruled the day. The new 4-3 won multiple college national titles and, eventually, Super Bowls.

Next up: The ‘Miami’ (college) 4-3 Front Becomes The Next Defense du Jour
 
Great post as usual Jene.

Don't ever apologize for giving us a history lesson on this stuff. I find the history as interesting as the current technical stuff, and frankly knowing the roots of a lot of this stuff helps us understand why some of it works the way it does.

 
Great post as usual Jene.

Don't ever apologize for giving us a history lesson on this stuff. I find the history as interesting as the current technical stuff, and frankly knowing the roots of a lot of this stuff helps us understand why some of it works the way it does.
agreed...the perspective is a key component for those of us that are looking at emerging trends as part of our year to year strategy...
 
Be careful what you wish for. The 4-3 history is interesting, but a discussion of the 3-4 family tree and innovations could get extremely :nerd: .

;)

 
IDP 201 – The ‘Miami’ front

Okay, so it might be a stretch to call Jimmy Johnson the lone driving force of the move back to the 4-3 front in the 1990s. But the attacking style of defense he brought to the NFL from his days as a college coach continues to impact the league today.

One more quick bit of historical background then we’ll get back to :nerd:

Johnson knew he couldn’t recruit successfully against the big schools in his first head coaching gig at Oklahoma State. So he recruited athletes – football talent and size was nice if they had it, but speed and athleticism were what he wanted above all. He simplified the 4-3 scheme to a bare bones approach. No reading and reacting, no controlling your gap assignment. Attack, penetrate and swarm along the front seven with simple zone coverage in the secondary. He took safeties and made them linebackers and turned linebackers into defensive ends. Within ten years, a huge number of college coaches followed and turned out the players (and coaches) that would change the face of defensive football in the NFL.

So, what exactly is the ‘Miami’ aka college 4-3 front anyway?


Code:
“Miami” 4-3				   				  TE	   RT	   RG	   OC	   LG	   LT			   LDE				LT		  RT				 RDE						  SLB					MLB				   WLB
From a pure playbook perspective, it’s nothing special, exotic or complicated. Johnson assigned everyone in the front seven a gap to attack, aligned the defensive line in an over front with the SLB off the line of scrimmage, flared his defensive ends wider than the more traditional 2-gap 4-3s of the day (note the strong side end in a 9-technique), played a lot of Cover-2 in the secondary and only rarely blitzed.

It’s really the philosophy that’s the key.

Johnson wanted his athletic defenders exploding off the ball into their gaps. He had his front four crowd the neutral zone as much as possible without drawing penalties. The linemen were to make the offense react to them while they “read on the run” rather than simply controlling their gap then reading keys to decide what to do next. The wide alignment of the ends allowed them to get upfield quickly to get to the quarterback or disrupt a running play in the backfield. If they weren’t successful, they either forced the play back to the MLB shooting his gap or pushed the play out to the pursuit, where again a LB shooting his gap could make the play. Those smaller, speedier linebackers would theoretically be protected by a couple of massive, but still quick defensive tackles that were disruptive enough to keep the linebackers (and the MLB in particular) clean to stop the run and create negative plays. The edge rushing line and swarming Cover-2 shell was designed to create turnovers against the pass.

[iDP ASIDE]
We pimped DJ Williams relentlessly last offseason after Jim Bates, who strongly favors ‘Miami’ principles, took over in Denver. Bates moved what he thought was his most disruptive linebacker, Williams, to the middle, and completely overhauled the defensive line. He drafted Jarvis Moss, an undersized edge rusher, and Marcus Thomas, a quick but big defensive tackle. He signed Sam Adams and traded for Jimmy Kennedy and after trying to get Dan Wilkinson, all big penetrating defensive tackles. The scheme struggled against the run, but the big boxscore tickets cashed. Edge rusher Elvis Dumervil had 12 sacks and garnered consideration for the Pro Bowl. Williams racked up 106 solo tackles (25 more than Al Wilson in 2006) despite struggling to remake himself as a true downhill player.

They followed in the footsteps of Charles Haley and Kabeer Gbaja-Bjamila and Zach Thomas among many others, who thrived on defenses built on Johnson’s scheme. Many argued that Williams was a lock to improve after moving to MLB. Not many predicted a 100+ solo tackle season ahead of time.

It cannot be understated. Understanding scheme is vital to projecting boxscores and IDP value.
[/iDP ASIDE]

As Johnson’s scheme succeeded, he was able to recruit better and better athletes and he eventually paved a path to the NFL. As so often happens, copycat programs in college churned out players who fit the scheme of the day. And the NFL became a 4-3 league again.

The Miami 4-3 has holes. The smaller ends and OLBs can be exploited by a good rush offense. Overpursuit can be an issue. Zone coverage is often a problem if you don’t have the athletes to rush the passer. As we’ll see with the Tampa-2 and the 3-4 in years to come, when everyone’s running the same scheme, finding enough talent to go around weakens the whole. Though there were a myriad of other reasons, those deficiencies partly account for why Johnson’s assistants never amounted to much as head coaches.

But the era of undersized defensive players succeeding in the 4-3 is still going strong. Its legacy will be directly traceable to the success of Jimmy Johnson and the ‘Miami’ 4-3.

Next up: All Modern 4-3s Are Not Alike
 
Great info Jene, thanks. Question - Has there ever been or do you think there ever will be a team that switches from a 3-4 to a 4-3 or other scheme week in and week out depending on the team they face? Has a defensive unit ever been that in tune with their craft to pull off such a feat?

Also - will you be explaining the 46 zone?

What would be a great tool is to have a list of all the teams and/or coaches and the defensive scheme they tend to run or favor. Going further, which teams tend to have success against each scheme? - just something to consider, but I know I would really be interested in seeing that all laid out.

 
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Great info Jene, thanks. Question - Has there ever been or do you think there ever will be a team that switches from a 3-4 to a 4-3 or other scheme week in and week out depending on the team they face? Has a defensive unit ever been that in tune with their craft to pull off such a feat?

Also - will you be explaining the 46 zone?

What would be a great tool is to have a list of all the teams and/or coaches and the defensive scheme they tend to run or favor. Going further, which teams tend to have success against each scheme? - just something to consider, but I know I would really be interested in seeing that all laid out.
Hey Jeff,We'll be talking about hybrids and multiple fronts in the 4th and 5th threads in this series. There have been a few that have been able to switch easily in past years, but the current Patriot and Raven (more 06 than 07) teams are good examples of teams that have the personnel to play different fronts at any time.

The 46 defense will be part of the 5th thread, too. And there's a thread pinned above that lists the current coaching staffs and defensive fronts. There's a link inside the first post in that thread to last season's thread. Both have some good discussion about the changes in each offseason.

I don't know if I've done a great job with it thus far, but I'll try to do better concentrate on the weaknesses of each front as we go to give a better idea of what type of offense would have more success against a given scheme.

The list of what I'm hoping to accomplish over the next few weeks is in a thread titled IDP 101 signups.

 
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IDP 201 -- All 4-3s Are Not Alike || Breaking Down Today’s Coordinators

Though I made a big deal about the ‘Miami’ front leading the trend back toward the 4-3 in the 1990s, today’s coordinators rarely stick with one 4-3 alignment. We hinted at some differences between gap attack and gap control (aka “read and react”) philosophies, but there are plenty of other variations in the four linemen, three backer front seven.

Some coordinators use more over/under fronts than more balanced fronts. Some coordinators play more man coverage and blitz frequently. Others use mostly zone concepts, including the Tampa-2 package. Some bring their SLB down to cover the TE at the line of scrimmage in a five man front of sorts, while others keep all three backers off the line in a stack formation.

Most coordinators, though, will have a variety front, blitz and coverage calls in the playbook and vary their usage based on their personnel and weekly matchup. There’s a pinned thread at the top of this forum with each team’s defensive coaching staffs and base alignments listed. Many of them are just listed as a catch-all 4-3 designation. But even those teams “pigeonholed” as Tampa-2 teams or multiple 4-3 front teams use other 4-3 fronts.

For those of you who want a little more flavor than the pinned thread, here are a few extra notes of the remainder of the 4-3 clubs. We’ll do the same for the 3-4 teams when we get to that thread.

Tony Dungy/Monte Kiffin tree
BUF **** Jauron/Perry Fewell 4-3/T2
IND Tony Dungy/Ron Meeks 4-3/T2
KC Herman Edwards/Gunther Cunningham 4-3/C2
CHI Lovie Smith/Bob Babich 4-3/T2
DET Rod Marinelli/Joe Barry 4-3/T2
MIN Brad Childress/Leslie Frazier 4-3/T2
TAM Jon Gruden/Monte Kiffin 4-3/T2


This group is easily the most expansive “family tree” of 4-3 defensive coaches in the league. We often refer to these teams as Tampa-2 teams, but some are more aggressive than others and some play fewer under fronts and more man coverage than you’d expect of a Tampa-2 team. Tony Dungy remains truest to his favored scheme and runs the least aggressive defense of this bunch. Monte Kiffin would have fallen into the more vanilla group, but has ramped up his aggressiveness over the past two seasons with more linebacker blitzes and even some 3-4 looks and unusual nickel packages. Currently, Rod Marinelli’s Lions are the only other team in the more vanilla Tampa-2 group. Herman Edwards would prefer a vanilla scheme, but some of Gunther Cunningham’s aggressive tendencies still make their way into the gameplan. Lovie Smith and Leslie Frazier are the two most aggressive Tampa-2 coaches. Frazier has been a very aggressive coach in each stop and probably runs fewer Cover-2/Tampa-2 than his colleagues. The Bills are an interesting mesh of Fewell’s aggressive tendencies and Jauron’s read-and-react preference. It’s also worth mentioning that a number of other defensive coordinators have begun to incorporate the Tampa-2, most notably ex-Redskin DC Gregg Williams, who’s likely to end up somewhere before the offseason ends.

Buddy Ryan tree
OAK Lane Kiffin/Rob Ryan 4-3
BAL OPEN/?Rex Ryan 4-3
TEN Jeff Fisher/Jim Schwartz 4-3


This is probably where Gregg Williams’ primary influence lies and it could be considered just as correct to place Leslie Frazier here as well. There’s a lot of cross-pollination among the current crop of head coaches and coordinators. Since the 46 front (which we’ll discuss in part five) is used only as a changeup type front against today’s offenses, these guys are more read-and-react, multiple front coordinators. When they have the personnel, they tend to be more aggressive, using a lot of linebacker blitzes and man coverage. They’re the chameleon’s of the league in many respects.

It gets harder to pigeonhole many of the other 4-3 philosophies in the league.

GB Mike McCarthy/Bob Sanders 4-3

Sanders, a protégé of Jim Bates, is a ‘Miami’ front disciple. His personnel allows him to use more man coverage than the traditional ‘Miami’ coaches and use more linebacker blitzes.

NYG Tom Coughlin/Steve Spagnuolo 4-3
PHI Andy Reid/Jim Johnson 4-3


Johnson and Spagnuolo are the most aggressive 4-3 coaches in the league. Rex Ryan belongs in the discussion, but the Ravens blitz less frequently than you’d think. Despite their solid front four, both Johnson and Spagnuolo will routinely blitz out of a read-and-react scheme, sending six in pass rush more often than any other 4-3 in the league.

SEA Mike Holmgren/John Marshall 4-3

Marshall falls on the more aggressive side of the curve as well, blitzing more than many of his read-and-react colleagues.

CIN Marvin Lewis/Mike Zimmer 4-3
HOU Gary Kubiak/Richard Smith 4-3
JAX Jack Del Rio/OPEN 4-3
DEN Mike Shanahan/Bob Slowik 4-3
CAR John Fox/Mike Trgovac 4-3
NO Sean Payton/Gary Gibbs 4-3
STL Scott Linehan/Jim Haslett 4-3
ATL Mike Smith/Brian VanGorder 4-3
WAS OPEN/Greg Blache 4-3


This group is harder to pin down. All are more read-and-react than attacking, though Jim Haslett has used a lot of under fronts in St. Louis and has multiple front tendencies. Slowik favors a lot of zone coverage, running plenty of Cover-2 in past seasons despite having a man corner like Champ Bailey. Carolina and Jacksonville use stack formations less often than others, frequently aligning their SLB on the line of scrimmage. Expect Atlanta’s new scheme to do much of the same.

Next up: A discussion about “system players” with a IDP slant and tie-in to the Tampa-2 thread to follow
 
NYG Tom Coughlin/Steve Spagnuolo 4-3

PHI Andy Reid/Jim Johnson 4-3

Johnson and Spagnuolo are the most aggressive 4-3 coaches in the league. Rex Ryan belongs in the discussion, but the Ravens blitz less frequently than you’d think. Despite their solid front four, both Johnson and Spagnuolo will routinely blitz out of a read-and-react scheme, sending six in pass rush more often than any other 4-3 in the league.
As it happens, here's a great example of what you were talking about, Jene. On that infamous OT INT off of Favre that's been heavily discussed in the SP, the Giants gave a vanilla Cover-2 look but then blitzed two LB's out of it. The initial sideline shot shows the front seven and the vanilla look before the Mike, Pierce, broke right before the snap on the blitz; the Will followed right after the snap, stunting off of Pierce's blitz but with both going essentially right up the middle. All 3 LB's lined up inside the tackles, approximately three to four yards back from the LOS. The CB's are tight on their men in man coverage and what appears to be inside technique.

Freezing the shot at :25 into the video clearly shows the Cover-2 look, with both safeties lined up over 10 yards off the LOS at the snap, before breaking backwards as they read the receivers' routes.

It's a nice case in point.

 
NYG Tom Coughlin/Steve Spagnuolo 4-3

PHI Andy Reid/Jim Johnson 4-3

Johnson and Spagnuolo are the most aggressive 4-3 coaches in the league. Rex Ryan belongs in the discussion, but the Ravens blitz less frequently than you’d think. Despite their solid front four, both Johnson and Spagnuolo will routinely blitz out of a read-and-react scheme, sending six in pass rush more often than any other 4-3 in the league.
As it happens, here's a great example of what you were talking about, Jene. On that infamous OT INT off of Favre that's been heavily discussed in the SP, the Giants gave a vanilla Cover-2 look but then blitzed two LB's out of it. The initial sideline shot shows the front seven and the vanilla look before the Mike, Pierce, broke right before the snap on the blitz; the Will followed right after the snap, stunting off of Pierce's blitz but with both going essentially right up the middle. All 3 LB's lined up inside the tackles, approximately three to four yards back from the LOS. The CB's are tight on their men in man coverage and what appears to be inside technique.

Freezing the shot at :25 into the video clearly shows the Cover-2 look, with both safeties lined up over 10 yards off the LOS at the snap, before breaking backwards as they read the receivers' routes.

It's a nice case in point.
Nice !! its good to watch what we are learning :mellow:

 
Really good stuff Jean!!!

:bag:

Landry improved on the 4-3 in Dallas with his "flex" defense.

This is my understanding of Landry's "flex" defense:

They would line 2 of their 4 D-Lineman a yard off the LOS.

All of the front seven, except the mike, had 1 gap responsibilities. (enter and control the gap, sorta like a zone run defense).

Alot of responsibility was on the mike backer, you needed a coach-on-the-field type.

It was an extremely disciplined defense, and not easy to incorporate.

This sound about right?

 
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Really good stuff Jean!!!

:thumbup:

Landry improved on the 4-3 in Dallas with his "flex" defense.

This is my understanding of Landry's "flex" defense:

They would line 2 of their 4 D-Lineman a yard off the LOS.

All of the front seven, except the mike, had 1 gap responsibilities. (enter and control the gap, sorta like a zone run defense).

Alot of responsibility was on the mike backer, you needed a coach-on-the-field type.

It was an extremely disciplined defense, and not easy to incorporate.

This sound about right?
That's my recollection -- I think it was detailed in a book Skip Bayless wrote about Landry a number of years ago. Yep...I love Google.

From "God's Coach" -- Skip Bayless [quoting Dextor Clinkscale]

The Flex is probably the simplest defense in the world because unless you're the middle linebacker, you have only one thing to do. You just have one gap to control. Of the front seven, the middle linebacker is the only one with two gaps. The object is to control every gap. There are only so many gaps an offensive line can create for a ball carrier, so by their initial movements, the center and two guards tell the middle linebacker where to go. They are his keys. The defensive linemen keep the offensive linemen off the middle linebacker so he can make the tackle. The middle linebacker has one gap and one "tango", usually to the weak side of the Flex. He can "tango" weak, meaning an immediate "scrape" by the middle linebacker to get an outside gap.

You see, it was necessary to set two of our four defensive linemen a yard off the line of scrimmage in a frog stance because this allowed them to sit back and see what was going on. They could read the actions of the offensive line, which would tell them which specific area they would control. You didn't control a man, you controlled an area. In the regular 4-3 [four linemen, three linebackers], you tried to control a man, but the Flex took away your natural instincts of pursuit. In effect, you held your ground and waited for the ball to come to you.

The purpose of all this was to counteract the "run to daylight" Packer offense. By flexing the linemen, Landry was able to keep the GB offensive linemen from engaging his previously two gap defenders and effectively "closed" the daylight.

 
IDP 201 – Cato June: Another Example of How Scheme Affects Production (An IDP Aside)

If you’ll allow me to recycle a blog post from July 2007, I think it efficiently drives home two very important concepts for IDP owners (other than the ubiquitous underlying theme of scheme matters) – (1) strong side linebackers in a 4-3 scheme are very rarely valuable IDP options and (2) certain groups of players may produce better than their scouting report might suggest should they land in a certain scheme.

Cato June: The importance of defensive scheme to IDP production

Long time IDP (Individual Defensive Player) owners know how important an understanding of the nuances of defensive schemes can be to reliably projecting a defender’s fantasy value. Still, you’d be surprised at how often something so simple is overlooked. While standing at the magazine rack last week examining the rankings of a few other IDP notables in the industry, one player consistently caught my attention. Nearly every cheat sheet had Tampa Bay linebacker Cato June as a top ten linebacker for 2007.

What’s the big deal, you ask? After all, June was a top ten linebacker by FBG standard scoring in 2006 and the Buccaneers run the same defensive scheme as June played in Indianapolis last year. The answer becomes clearly evident after examining June’s probable usage this year and past production as a Colt.

June played on the right side of the Colt defense last year, the side more often across from the weak side of the offensive formation, and was able to use his speed to pursue ball-carriers spilled back toward him rather than being forced to contend with blockers on most plays. In Tampa Bay, with Derrick Brooks entrenched as the pursuing WLB, June will move to the left side of the defense. The results will be disastrous to his fantasy production.

While June, a former college safety, excels in short and intermediate zone coverage, he has always struggled to elude blockers. Fans of ESPNs NFL Matchup show will recall analyst Ron Jaworski highlighting June’s inability to get off the blocks of Jacksonville WR Reggie Williams. June will face bigger and better blockers than Williams on the strong side in Tampa and will be regularly blocked at the point of attack, severely limiting his tackle production.

June has also been an inconsistent tackler during his career as a Colt, which kept him from reaching the lofty solo tackle stats of his predecessors in the favorable WLB position of Tony Dungy’s Tampa-2 scheme. Consider the tackle stats of the Colt ROLBs since 2002:

2002 Mike Peterson 103 solo tackles
2003 David Thornton 108 solo tackles
2004 Cato June 79 solo tackles
2005 Cato June 84 solo tackles (projected to 16 games)
2006 Cato June 96 solo tackles

Before you get too excited over the increase in production from 2004-05 to 2006, note that the Colts faced 519 rush attempts in 2006 (2nd most in the NFL) versus only 398 and 440 in 2004 and 2005, respectively. June’s relatively poor numbers in comparison to his predecessors isn’t due solely to improved MLB play from Gary Brackett either. Two other Tampa-2 WLB studs, Derrick Brooks and Lance Briggs, haven’t had trouble topping 100 solo tackles alongside steady tackling MLBs Shelton Quarles and Brian Urlacher. Even if June finds a way to elude a few more blockers this year, his questionable tackling will continue to hold his weekly production in check.

Cato June isn’t the only IDP likely to see a major change (positive or negative) to his box score production this year. There are a number of such cases every year. Taking a deeper look into the details of defensive scheme and responsibility will help you consistently identify the outliers. And, if the magazine racks this year are any indication, your ability to identify the outliers will have you outdrafting a good number of industry experts along the way.


Why is the average strong side backer such a poor IDP option? I’ll let the original guru of all things IDP answer. In the first (and most detailed) article published on the internet discussing schemes and IDP fake football, our own John Norton wrote:

It’s surprising how few people really understand the term "strong side". Every year I have someone ask me why a fantasy productive strong side linebacker is so rare and why then is a strong safety often is at the head of the DB class? Let's start with what determines the strong side of the offensive formation. The term "strong side" is meant to describe the side of the formation that has the most blockers, therefore that side presents the biggest threat for the defense on a running play.

At a glance it would make more sense that since teams run to the strong side more often, the strong side backer should make more plays. It all goes back to the description of formations. While it’s true that teams run to the strong side more often, the reason they do so is to take advantage of the additional blocker or blockers. A strong side backer often finds himself at the point of attack which means the offensive blocking scheme has accounted for him with at least one blocker, often a TE or fullback, but sometimes a pulling guard is responsible for taking him out. The main responsibility of this position against the run is to defeat or at least eliminate the blockers at the point of attack so that the runner has to alter his course by cutting up early or stringing out toward the sideline. On many teams the SLB in not one of their better coverage guys, thus is replaced by an extra DB in passing situations.
Why was Cato June, a player with no collegiate linebacker experience stuck at WLB, able to grace the top ten linebacker lists at any point in his career? To answer that question, we need to take a deeper look at the defensive scheme he played in his years as a Colt – the Tampa-2. Stay tuned :thumbup: , that’s the topic of our next thread – IDP 301.
 
Jene, with the Jags DC position open, which scheme/coordinator do you think would utilize their personnel to their fullest? Obviously their pass-rush is a big issue.

 
radiohead417 said:
Jene, with the Jags DC position open, which scheme/coordinator do you think would utilize their personnel to their fullest? Obviously their pass-rush is a big issue.
I think they can probably do whatever they want out of a 4-3. They'd do fine in a 'Miami' type scheme or a read-and-react style with multiple coverage concepts like Smith used. They've got four athletic linebackers, all of whom can cover. Peterson and Smith have shown they can rush a little bit, and the sky's the limit for Durant. I like Nelson as a ballhawking FS rather than a corner; it'd be nice to see the Jags improve their corner play behind Mathis, but that could be done with an improved pass rush too.I remember reading that Del Rio really liked the potential that Brian Smith had as an OLB pass rusher, but I think anything other than a token 3-4 is wasting the penetrating ability of Henderson and Stroud.
 
radiohead417 said:
Jene, with the Jags DC position open, which scheme/coordinator do you think would utilize their personnel to their fullest? Obviously their pass-rush is a big issue.
I think they can probably do whatever they want out of a 4-3. They'd do fine in a 'Miami' type scheme or a read-and-react style with multiple coverage concepts like Smith used. They've got four athletic linebackers, all of whom can cover. Peterson and Smith have shown they can rush a little bit, and the sky's the limit for Durant. I like Nelson as a ballhawking FS rather than a corner; it'd be nice to see the Jags improve their corner play behind Mathis, but that could be done with an improved pass rush too.I remember reading that Del Rio really liked the potential that Brian Smith had as an OLB pass rusher, but I think anything other than a token 3-4 is wasting the penetrating ability of Henderson and Stroud.
I think this defense is tailor made for Gregg Williams' scheme, don't you? After mediocre lines in Washington, he'll finally have a very good line that can generate its own pressure without needing to blitz.
 
radiohead417 said:
Jene, with the Jags DC position open, which scheme/coordinator do you think would utilize their personnel to their fullest? Obviously their pass-rush is a big issue.
I think they can probably do whatever they want out of a 4-3. They'd do fine in a 'Miami' type scheme or a read-and-react style with multiple coverage concepts like Smith used. They've got four athletic linebackers, all of whom can cover. Peterson and Smith have shown they can rush a little bit, and the sky's the limit for Durant. I like Nelson as a ballhawking FS rather than a corner; it'd be nice to see the Jags improve their corner play behind Mathis, but that could be done with an improved pass rush too.I remember reading that Del Rio really liked the potential that Brian Smith had as an OLB pass rusher, but I think anything other than a token 3-4 is wasting the penetrating ability of Henderson and Stroud.
I think this defense is tailor made for Gregg Williams' scheme, don't you? After mediocre lines in Washington, he'll finally have a very good line that can generate its own pressure without needing to blitz.
Whoever comes to Jax to be the DC will get the title but not neccessarily the authority that comes with. Del Rio is very "hands on".
 
Don't count on anything out of Stroud - maybe ever again. It's looking like his microfractured ankle is going to end his career - maybe not this year, but he'll never be the player he once was.

 
NYG Tom Coughlin/Steve Spagnuolo 4-3

PHI Andy Reid/Jim Johnson 4-3

Johnson and Spagnuolo are the most aggressive 4-3 coaches in the league. Rex Ryan belongs in the discussion, but the Ravens blitz less frequently than you’d think. Despite their solid front four, both Johnson and Spagnuolo will routinely blitz out of a read-and-react scheme, sending six in pass rush more often than any other 4-3 in the league.

If this was already brought up I apologize. But my question is why the free saftey is the better saftey in these schemes. Dawkins and Wilson seems to be head and shoulders above the the strong saftey.

 
NYG Tom Coughlin/Steve Spagnuolo 4-3

PHI Andy Reid/Jim Johnson 4-3

Johnson and Spagnuolo are the most aggressive 4-3 coaches in the league. Rex Ryan belongs in the discussion, but the Ravens blitz less frequently than you’d think. Despite their solid front four, both Johnson and Spagnuolo will routinely blitz out of a read-and-react scheme, sending six in pass rush more often than any other 4-3 in the league.

If this was already brought up I apologize. But my question is why the free saftey is the better saftey in these schemes. Dawkins and Wilson seems to be head and shoulders above the the strong saftey.
Over the past two seasons, yes, but it isn't always so clear.Philadelphia starting safeties 2004-2005

Michael Lewis >> 175 solos, 1 sack, 5 FF/FR, 3 INT, 20 PD

Brian Dawkins >> 132 solos, 6.5 sacks, 8 FF/FR, 7 INT, 36 PD

Over the past two seasons, Dawkins and Wilson have played alongside such luminaries as Sean Considine, Quentin Mikell, James Butler and Michael Johnson. Dawkins is a known Pro Bowl talent, and I've always been a fan of Wilson's on-field play despite numerous past offseason rumors that the team wasn't pleased -- may not sign him, may rotate him, etc. So I think a reasonable part of the difference in stats is due to the talent of the two players in question.

Some of it does have to do with the scheme though. There will be more big play opportunities in an aggressive scheme like this, and that tends to benefit the FS as much as any other position on the defense. Depending on scoring system, that may be a significant factor. Both Dawkins and Wilson are more dynamic players than their counterparts and are put in position to take advantage of that. Both are regularly used to blitz, both run blitzes and on passing downs, and both have the instincts in coverage to intercept passes caused by the increased pressure.

From an IDP perspective, there's not a lot within a scheme that helps determine whether a FS will be valuable. If you know that a team frequently uses a very traditional SS in the box, FS over the top in coverage scheme, it's easy to avoid that FS if you're in a tackle heavy system. If you know that the team uses an interchangeable FS/SS scheme that rotates either safety into the box based on the direction of the running play, you can give that FS a small bump in your rankings.

Really, though, the only FS with consistent yearly potential are those who are physical enough to make plays in run support and instinctive enough in coverage to make tackles and grab some stats in the coverage lines. Dawkins and Wilson fall into that category, as would guys like Sean Taylor or Madieu Williams. In past seasons, it was guys like Darren Sharper or Greg Wesley. All were guys that made plays in run support and coverage. It's extremely rare for a one-dimensional box score player like Brian Russell or Ed Reed to stay atop the rankings in the long term.

 

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