IDP 501 -- Discussing NFL Schemes (1 Viewer)

This will be the last thread in the series. Planning to discuss the 46 defense and some nickel variations in this thread, but I'm also going to bump the original signup thread to see if there's any interest in a Q&A.

Hope everyone has enjoyed it so far.

IDP 501 – The 46 Defense

Though he died just before the 46 defense peaked in Super Bowl 24, I can’t help but hear John Facenda’s voice whenever I read about Buddy Ryan and the “Monsters of the Midway” defense.
“Blitz is defined as a sudden, savage attack.

It is indeed all of this.

Send more defenders than the offense has blockers to absorb.

From the left side,

From the right side,

From up the middle they come.

All with blood in their eye.

All with one idea.

Get the quarterback.

Get “The Man.”

Most descriptions of the 46 defense talk about pressure. To Ryan, however, it was more than that. He was sending six defenders on almost every play. When he wasn't sending six, he was sending seven or eight. It was meant to be relentless, intimidating, destructive. In one season in Houston, Ryan’s Oiler defense knocked nine starting quarterbacks out of games with an injury or because of poor play. He punched offensive coordinators on national television, put bounties on the heads of opposing players and didn’t hesitate to butt heads with Mike Ditka.Despite all that, no one considers using the 46 as anything other than a changeup front in today’s NFL. Coordinators still believe in pressure, but rarely use the 46. Why? What was so great about the Bear 46, but couldn’t stand the test of time?

Well, let’s start with our old friend the “code” function and diagram the most common 46 alignment.

TE RT RG OC LG LT OLB OLB DE NT DT DE MLB SSPoints of interest:1. The 46 isn’t a 4-6 front. Ryan apparently was incapable of calling any of his players by name. He’d give them nicknames or just call them by their number. The 46 defense was named for Doug Plank, Bear SS and jersey number 46. The 46 is an eight man front with six men on the line.

2. Most think of the 46 as an exceptional pass rushing scheme. And it was. But the scheme was even more stingy against the run. Ryan put three monster linemen opposite the interior offensive linemen. One nose tackle aligned head up on the center, and two very solid end/tackle players were aligned in a 3-technique opposite both guards. If the line didn’t make the play, they effectively occupied enough blockers to keep both second line defenders (including HOF MLB Mike Singletary) free to hit whatever came through. It was all but impossible to run against the personnel the Bears had in the mid-1980s. Teams were forced to throw and throw often.

3. When they threw, they were forced to deal with pressure from anywhere and everywhere. While Ryan would sometimes choose to fall back in coverage from the 46, he usually brought the house. Both OLBs (Wilbur Marshall and Otis Wilson) were stud pass rushers and Richard Dent was aligned wide to crash down the weak side. Add in the interior pass rush of Steve McMichael and Dan Hampton, who flanked Refrigerator Perry, and there wasn’t a weak link anywhere on the six man front.

4. The strong safety came down in the box and played like a linebacker. Ryan frequently mixed up his 46 fronts by switching one OLB and the SS interchangeably.

The personnel was the key. Ryan started tinkering with the scheme in 1982, but it wasn’t until Dent exploded onto the scene in 1984 and Marshall and Perry began contributing in 1985 that the 46 really hit its stride. And the 1986 team, which wasn’t coordinated by Ryan, may have been even better than the team that flirted with perfection in 1985.

Ryan had very good personnel in Philadelphia and Houston. But the 46 gradually fell out of favor as teams began to exploit its primary weakness – an undermanned secondary. If you protected well enough or had a quarterback with a quick, accurate release – or both – you could get rid of the ball before the pressure got to the pocket. West Coast offenses and premier quarterbacks strafed the 46 with big plays. Even in its best seasons, the Bear 46 was giving up very high yards per completion numbers. The big plays eventually sunk the scheme as a base defense. Which isn’t to say that Ryan was just a one-hit wonder. He was instrumental in designing the Jet defense that was key in allowing Joe Namath to pull off the upset in SBIII and had a big role in the development of the Purple People Eater lines in Minnesota. The 46 just became too risky to play every down.

The 46 made a small comeback with Gregg Williams in Washington and Rex Ryan in Baltimore recently, but has again fallen back into its place as a change of pace. It still influences the schemes in Baltimore, Tennessee, Philadelphia and New York (Giants).

Sure was fun to watch while it lasted, though.

Next up: A quick discussion of some nickel defensive variants

Thanks for the history lesson. Tennessee also had a successful 46 when Gregg Williams was there.

IDP 501 – Nickel, Dime, Wolverine, Creep

Sounds like a horrible 70s Supergroup, doesn't it?

This is the era of specialization in the NFL. Slot wide receivers, third down running backs, goal line runners and pass catching tight ends are becoming more and more important of the success of today’s offenses. The defensive side of the ball is no different. Situational edge rushers and pass rushing defensive tackles, linebackers leaving the field on passing downs and, of course, nickel corners. Because NFL offenses are operating out of multiple wide receiver sets more than ever, NFL defenses are specializing on passing downs more often in response. Teams used to substitute a third corner (or fourth in the “dime”) for a linebacker on third downs and morph into a 4-2-5 (or 4-1-6) look. Today, there are as many exotic nickel packages as there are defensive fronts. So, how did we get here.

In what has becoming a running theme in this series, any number of defensive minds are credited with using and developing the nickel defense. George Allen is widely thought to have developed schemes that used five defensive backs, a natural extension of his complicated coverage schemes. But the first nickel defense may have been devised in Philadelphia, and a secondary coach who drew up the “Chicago Special” as a way to get a better covering defensive back on Bear TE Mike Ditka. Allen was a defensive assistant with Chicago in those days and may well have adapted that adjustment in later years for use as a base defense.

Those schemes were straightforward 4-2-5 looks. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, another defensive guru, Fritz Shurmur devised the “Big Nickel” (aka “Wolverine) 4-2-5 defense. Shurmur used the scheme to great success against the juggernaut 49ers, but often used it as a base defense in later years when his linebackers were beset by injury. The Big Nickel allowed Shurmur to get an extra safety-linebacker hybrid into the lineup. Depending on his personnel he could cover and pass rush with the secondary personnel, but still support the run, all while disguising which coverage his defense would play. The Big Nickel has made a comeback in recent seasons, particularly against stud receiving tight ends like Antonio Gates, Tony Gonzalez and Todd Heap.

Over the past few seasons, however, defensive coordinators have taken the nickel in different directions to disguise coverages and pass rush. A number of teams have gone to a 3-3-5 nickel package on passing downs recently, notably Arizona, Minnesota and some of the 3-4 teams. But the hottest wrinkle might be a defense Ron Jaworski has referred to as the “creep” package.

The “creep” puts only one or two lineman in a three point stance, usually over the center, leaving the rest of the six man front to wander around the line of scrimmage until shortly before the snap. Quarterbacks have no idea how to set their protection or get a pre-snap read. Offensive linemen struggle to call out assignments or plan blocking angles. At the snap, the “creep” essentially becomes a zone blitz concept without down linemen. Bill Belichick and **** LeBeau having been using similar packages for years, but Buffalo, Cincinnati and the New York Jets used similar schemes at times last year. The “creep” isn’t the best run defense for obvious reasons and has some of the same weaknesses that the zone blitz schemes have, but don’t be surprised to see more of it as the trend toward disguise continues in the multiple-front happy 21st century NFL.