GreenNGold

Post here when coaches do something obviously stupid

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Tonight, Bruce Arians, head coach of the Arizona Cardinals chose to kick a field goal from the 4 yard line while down 18 points in the 4th quarter. I thought NFL coaches were supposed to understand the game? I mean, how do people who are so incompetent get these jobs that pay millions of dollars per year? I really feel like acts like this should be a fireable offense, similar to how John Fox cost the Broncos any chance in the playoffs last year (2012), yet he still has a job too.

I made a post similar to this in the Seahawks-Cardinals game thread tonight, but thought it could make a good thread.

Edited by GreenNGold

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Down by 18... you have two get 2 TDs and 1 FG.

You also need a 2pt conversion to tie.

Why is the FG so "obviously stupid"? Maybe "questionable" would be a better adjective.

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Down by 18... you have two get 2 TDs and 1 FG.

You also need a 2pt conversion to tie.

Why is the FG so "obviously stupid"? Maybe "questionable" would be a better adjective.

No, just no, there is nothing questionable about how stupid that was.

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Down by 18... you have two get 2 TDs and 1 FG.

You also need a 2pt conversion to tie.

Why is the FG so "obviously stupid"? Maybe "questionable" would be a better adjective.

No, just no, there is nothing questionable about how stupid that was.

I don't think so, anyway you shake it it's still a two-possession game with the two-point conversion being the only real difference.

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Down by 18... you have two get 2 TDs and 1 FG.

You also need a 2pt conversion to tie.

Why is the FG so "obviously stupid"? Maybe "questionable" would be a better adjective.

No, just no, there is nothing questionable about how stupid that was.

I don't think so, anyway you shake it it's still a two-possession game with the two-point conversion being the only real difference.

thank you.

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Down by 18... you have two get 2 TDs and 1 FG.

You also need a 2pt conversion to tie.

Why is the FG so "obviously stupid"? Maybe "questionable" would be a better adjective.

No, just no, there is nothing questionable about how stupid that was.

I don't think so, anyway you shake it it's still a two-possession game with the two-point conversion being the only real difference.

I agree the Cardinals had little chance, very little, at this point. That doesn't make the decision any better or excuse it.

Anyways, I did not create this thread to get in a huge argument over that one play call, and I apologize BigSteelThrill for my reply to you being overly-harsh, I should have explained more.

Edited by GreenNGold

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This thread will really grow some legs once the Falcons kick off.

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I'm right there with you GreenNGold. Kicking a FG in that situation without a doubt lowered their chances of winning the game...i.e. it was blatantly stupid.

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I'm right there with you GreenNGold. Kicking a FG in that situation without a doubt lowered their chances of winning the game...i.e. it was blatantly stupid.

No more than NOT CONVERTING on 4th Down. Take the guaranteed points.

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Bill Barnwell has turned this into a regular feature on Grantland called "Thank You for Not Coaching" (here's last week's: http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/78191/thank-you-for-not-coaching-week-6). I agree with the OP that Arians made the wrong call, and it will almost certainly make TYFNC next week, since he regularly rails against coaches who make that type of decision (and provides stats on expected win percentages to back it up).

The reason it's dumb is because when you have the ball that close to the goal line, your chances of scoring a TD are higher than they're likely to be on any subsequent drive. If you get the TD from the 4, then later on when you need a FG you only need to drive to the 30. But if you take the FG, then on your next drive you still need to go all the way down the field.

Of course, since I was facing the Seattle D, I didn't mind that Arians took the FG and cost my opponent 4 points. But from an NFL perspective, it was definitely a low-percentage move (yet one that's sadly far too common).

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The FG attempt was fine. Going for 2 down 12 was more questionable, since they could have kicked the XP on 4th down near the end to get within 8, and then could have at least given themselves a chance with the onside kick, a possible recovery, Hail Mary and then go for 2.

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Bill Barnwell has turned this into a regular feature on Grantland called "Thank You for Not Coaching" (here's last week's: http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/78191/thank-you-for-not-coaching-week-6). I agree with the OP that Arians made the wrong call, and it will almost certainly make TYFNC next week, since he regularly rails against coaches who make that type of decision (and provides stats on expected win percentages to back it up).

The reason it's dumb is because when you have the ball that close to the goal line, your chances of scoring a TD are higher than they're likely to be on any subsequent drive. If you get the TD from the 4, then later on when you need a FG you only need to drive to the 30. But if you take the FG, then on your next drive you still need to go all the way down the field.

Of course, since I was facing the Seattle D, I didn't mind that Arians took the FG and cost my opponent 4 points. But from an NFL perspective, it was definitely a low-percentage move (yet one that's sadly far too common).

Exactly. And on top of that, it's another example of taking the 2pt conversion for granted. Being down 15 points is not the same as being down 14 points. Being down 17 points in that situation, I STILL think you need to go for the touchdown, but being down 18 it should be an absolute no-brainer.

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The FG attempt was fine. Going for 2 down 12 was more questionable, since they could have kicked the XP on 4th down near the end to get within 8, and then could have at least given themselves a chance with the onside kick, a possible recovery, Hail Mary and then go for 2.

A failed 2pt conversion with 5 minutes left gives Arizona information. It informs them that they still need 2 TDs to win this thing and they can play accordingly. A failed 2pt conversion after a last second Hail Mary just ends the game. Strategy should be about maximizing your chances of actually winning the game...not keeping "hope" alive for as long as possible.

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The FG attempt was fine. Going for 2 down 12 was more questionable, since they could have kicked the XP on 4th down near the end to get within 8, and then could have at least given themselves a chance with the onside kick, a possible recovery, Hail Mary and then go for 2.

A failed 2pt conversion with 5 minutes left gives Arizona information. It informs them that they still need 2 TDs to win this thing and they can play accordingly. A failed 2pt conversion after a last second Hail Mary just ends the game. Strategy should be about maximizing your chances of actually winning the game...not keeping "hope" alive for as long as possible.

Exactly. :goodposting:

Edited by GreenNGold
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I'm right there with you GreenNGold. Kicking a FG in that situation without a doubt lowered their chances of winning the game...i.e. it was blatantly stupid.

There have been more failures by going for it on 4th down needing a TD or 2 & a FG than there have been by kicking the FG. Most of the time the team fails on 4th down and eliminates themselves right on the spot. Arizona gave themselves a chance by putting points on the board. It was easily the correct move.

It appears some of you have forgotten how often teams fail trying to go for it on 4th down.

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Tonight, Bruce Arians, head coach of the Arizona Cardinals chose to kick a field goal from the 4 yard line while down 18 points in the 4th quarter. I thought NFL coaches were supposed to understand the game? I mean, how do people who are so incompetent get these jobs that pay millions of dollars per year? I really feel like acts like this should be a fireable offense, similar to how John Fox cost the Broncos any chance in the playoffs last year (2012), yet he still has a job too.

I made a post similar to this in the Seahawks-Cardinals game thread tonight, but thought it could make a good thread.

I don't think you understand football at all. Or math.

18 pts - 3 (FG) = 15. 15 - 8 (TD, conversion) = 7. 7-7 (TD, xtra) = 0

0 = tie game, which is what you're hoping for when down 18 in the 4th quarter. Absolutely NOTHING wrong with Arians' decision here.

/thread

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That FG was a tough one. I'm sure people playing against the Cardinals kicker last night were especially upset over it.

I definitely see the logic of taking the points and being within two scores but you also must be realistic. Its obvious you aren't moving inside the 5 on anything remotely close to consistent basis so in this case I think you have to go for it and try to get a TD when you can.

So, I agree with the OP that was a bad call. If you don't score, at least you tried. Kicking a fg in that scenario prompted a lot of Cards fans to start leaving the game.

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I'm right there with you GreenNGold. Kicking a FG in that situation without a doubt lowered their chances of winning the game...i.e. it was blatantly stupid.

No more than NOT CONVERTING on 4th Down. Take the guaranteed points.

This.

Much ado over nothing.

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Tonight, Bruce Arians, head coach of the Arizona Cardinals chose to kick a field goal from the 4 yard line while down 18 points in the 4th quarter. I thought NFL coaches were supposed to understand the game? I mean, how do people who are so incompetent get these jobs that pay millions of dollars per year? I really feel like acts like this should be a fireable offense, similar to how John Fox cost the Broncos any chance in the playoffs last year (2012), yet he still has a job too.

I made a post similar to this in the Seahawks-Cardinals game thread tonight, but thought it could make a good thread.

I don't think you understand football at all. Or math.

18 pts - 3 (FG) = 15. 15 - 8 (TD, conversion) = 7. 7-7 (TD, xtra) = 0

0 = tie game, which is what you're hoping for when down 18 in the 4th quarter. Absolutely NOTHING wrong with Arians' decision here.

/thread

You're assuming two TDs on (presumably) long drives when you aren't even expecting the team to be able to score a TD from 4 yards out. That's the issue.

As referenced before, Barnwell:

On Sunday, the Titans faced what seems to be becoming a weekly development: the choice to go for it down 10 points with a few minutes left in the fourth quarter. Here, the Titans faced fourth-and-3 from the Seattle 8-yard line down 10 with 2:21 to go. They chose to kick the field goal, and while Dan Dierdorf helpfully reminded us that the Titans had to come away with points there because the game would otherwise be over, Tennessee then kicked deep and never touched the football again.

This one isn't all that much different from Atlanta's choice to kick early two weeks ago. The issue of the game being over with a stuff is irrelevant: The game is over with a failed conversion either way. Tennessee's only chance of winning in regulation is by scoring two touchdowns, and if it wants to tie, it has to decide whether this drive will be more likely to produce a touchdown than the next one. Given how the Titans had struggled to move the ball on offense, it's pretty clear they needed to try to score a touchdown eight yards out of the end zone.

I heard from some folks who had qualms about them kicking deep after the field goal, but that doesn't bother me quite as much. The Titans still had three timeouts and the two-minute warning when they kicked deep, so they weren't really desperate enough to justify an expected onside kick, which succeeds only about 15 percent of the time. When they kicked the field goal, they were basically dependent upon preventing the Seahawks from picking up a first down, and if you're going to do that, you might as well do that deep and try to pick up better field position from the ensuing punt than you would with the unlikely-to-succeed onside kick.

And here's the analysis of that Atlanta choice which goes into greater detail:

As the East Coast reeled in the aftermath of Breaking Bad's finale, the Patriots and Falcons played out one of the more entertaining games of the year on Sunday Night Football, eventually won 30-23 by the Patriots after no small amount of uncertainty. That game involved a number of key coaching decisions from Atlanta coach Mike Smith, a regular in the Thank You for Not Coaching section over the past couple of years for late-game decisions both good and bad. While I'll get to most of Smith's work in the full-length TYFNC on Tuesday, I want to talk today about the decisions he made on that penultimate drive, with the Falcons down 10 and with the ball deep in New England territory. He got it wrong in a way that I think many other coaches would have in the same scenario by kicking a field goal too early.

To set the stage, that play came on fourth-and-1 with three minutes left in the game and the ball on the New England 7-yard line. Smith's Falcons trailed by 10 points, so while the team would obviously prefer a touchdown, a field goal would also help matters by making it a one-score game and extending Atlanta's chances of competing. As most coaches would in the same situation, Smith chose to kick the chip shot field goal, bringing the Falcons within those seven points. The Falcons failed on the ensuing onside kick but then held the Patriots on downs when Tom Brady fumbled the snap on a fourth-and-1 sneak attempt. Atlanta quickly drove the ball downfield, only to fail on a fourth-and-7 from the 10-yard line with 41 seconds left. As this game turned out, I think it's pretty clear Smith made the wrong call, since the fourth-and-1 he passed on was much easier to convert than the fourth-and-7 he was stuck trying later. That's just one outcome, but I think it's a clear case before the Falcons even knew that they would have to convert a fourth down to score a touchdown on the second drive.

Go back to that fourth-and-1 decision and weigh the different arguments. Let's keep things simple and say the Falcons will lose if they fail to score on this drive, which seems reasonable enough. By kicking, the Falcons guarantee they won't lose with three minutes to go. Reasonable enough. On the other hand, by kicking, the Falcons are creating a more difficult path to victory in a number of ways:

They lose if the Patriots score on their next drive. If the Falcons try an onside kick and fail to recover, as they did, the Patriots can try to run the clock out. If they get stuffed in field goal range, the Patriots can kick a field goal to go up 10 again and end the game. If the Falcons score a touchdown first, a Patriots field goal would put Atlanta down only six, giving it another opportunity to win the game with a touchdown drive.

They have to regain the yardage needed for a touchdown on the subsequent drive that they've already produced on this one. If the Falcons score a touchdown on this drive and need only a field goal to tie on the subsequent drive, they don't need to drive the full length of the field to score. Instead, they only need to drive the ball to about the 25-yard line for a comfortable field goal try. Since the ball is already on the New England 7-yard line, that's a minimum of 19 extra yards the Falcons will need to pick up on the subsequent drive to score a touchdown (since they'll need those six final yards on both drives), yards that take precious time off the clock.

The Falcons need to go for it on one of the two drives anyway, and a failure will be demoralizing regardless of when it comes. One of the common arguments against going for it early is that you end the game prematurely, which demoralizes your team by virtue of not extending the game for as long as possible and giving it a chance to win. It doesn't fit here. The Falcons can't tie this game by kicking field goals; their only hope is to score a touchdown on one drive and a minimum of a field goal on the other drive, which means they're going to need to score a touchdown at some point. Going for it on fourth-and-1 early, if anything, shows faith in your team. Had the Falcons gone for it then and failed, they would have been demoralized, of course. But do you think there was a single person in that home locker room after the game who wasn't demoralized? Was there anybody in that room who said, "Well, at least we kicked that field goal early, because it gave us a chance to tie the game up at the end?" Of course not.

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I'm right there with you GreenNGold. Kicking a FG in that situation without a doubt lowered their chances of winning the game...i.e. it was blatantly stupid.

No more than NOT CONVERTING on 4th Down. Take the guaranteed points.

Exactly.

Even if you convert, you still have to come up with 3 scores, 2 of which must be touchdowns and you burn more time. If you kick the FG, you only need 2 scores, both of which need to be touchdowns.

Down 18, a FG matters for the math. It's that simple.

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Bill Barnwell has turned this into a regular feature on Grantland called "Thank You for Not Coaching" (here's last week's: http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/78191/thank-you-for-not-coaching-week-6). I agree with the OP that Arians made the wrong call, and it will almost certainly make TYFNC next week, since he regularly rails against coaches who make that type of decision (and provides stats on expected win percentages to back it up).

The reason it's dumb is because when you have the ball that close to the goal line, your chances of scoring a TD are higher than they're likely to be on any subsequent drive. If you get the TD from the 4, then later on when you need a FG you only need to drive to the 30. But if you take the FG, then on your next drive you still need to go all the way down the field.

Of course, since I was facing the Seattle D, I didn't mind that Arians took the FG and cost my opponent 4 points. But from an NFL perspective, it was definitely a low-percentage move (yet one that's sadly far too common).

I don't know how anyone could (or would want to) read Barnwell. His writing style is so dry and he uses statistics in the place or reason a lot of the time. I'm not exaggerating when I say he could write (and regularly does) 2000 words on fumble recovery rates. That's fine for a site like pro football reference or whatever but not Grantland. He's so obviously out of place at Grantland it's kinda sad

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I'm right there with you GreenNGold. Kicking a FG in that situation without a doubt lowered their chances of winning the game...i.e. it was blatantly stupid.

There have been more failures by going for it on 4th down needing a TD or 2 & a FG than there have been by kicking the FG. Most of the time the team fails on 4th down and eliminates themselves right on the spot. Arizona gave themselves a chance by putting points on the board. It was easily the correct move.

It appears some of you have forgotten how often teams fail trying to go for it on 4th down.

Would it have been harder to score a TD from the 4 yard line on 4th down or score a TD starting from their own 40 yard line with 1:30 left?

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Bill Barnwell has turned this into a regular feature on Grantland called "Thank You for Not Coaching" (here's last week's: http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/78191/thank-you-for-not-coaching-week-6). I agree with the OP that Arians made the wrong call, and it will almost certainly make TYFNC next week, since he regularly rails against coaches who make that type of decision (and provides stats on expected win percentages to back it up).

The reason it's dumb is because when you have the ball that close to the goal line, your chances of scoring a TD are higher than they're likely to be on any subsequent drive. If you get the TD from the 4, then later on when you need a FG you only need to drive to the 30. But if you take the FG, then on your next drive you still need to go all the way down the field.

Of course, since I was facing the Seattle D, I didn't mind that Arians took the FG and cost my opponent 4 points. But from an NFL perspective, it was definitely a low-percentage move (yet one that's sadly far too common).

I don't know how anyone could (or would want to) read Barnwell. His writing style is so dry and he uses statistics in the place or reason a lot of the time. I'm not exaggerating when I say he could write (and regularly does) 2000 words on fumble recovery rates. That's fine for a site like pro football reference or whatever but not Grantland. He's so obviously out of place at Grantland it's kinda sad

Well, he is a former Football Outsiders writer.

Are you aware that they have more on that site than Bill Simmons and his "theories" and reality TV podcasts? He seems to fit in pretty perfectly next to great writers like Zach Lowe (NBA) and Jonah Keri (MLB).

Although I would be very happy if he gave up on his quest to squash the overreliance on momentum in sports.

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Seattle had a 94% win probability when Arizona lined up for the field goal. After the conversion, they had a 97% WP.

http://live.advancednflstats.com/

so the premise of this whole thread is calling the coach stupid for giving up 3%???

I don't think Bruce Arians is stupid, no. But that doesn't mean he can't make bad decisions.

To go back to the OP, these coaches get paid millions of dollars because they need to manage the roster, motivate players, devise gameplans, coach schemes, manage a staff, call effective plays, etc. But aspects of in-game management can easily fall through the cracks, like when it makes the most sense to go for it vs punt or kick a FG vs go for a TD. I'm not expecting coaches to be able to calculate win probability on the fly, but yes they should have a better understanding of some of these concepts.

And some are grasping it. Look at Ron Rivera. He spent a couple years punting/kicking FGs on 4th and short repeatedly despite having about $100 million in contracts in his backfield where virtually all the offensive talent on his team was. Now all of a sudden someone got to him or something clicked and he came out and said that he's basically going to be going for it on 4th and short every time.

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Burke's calculator suggests EP of 2.94 from going for it and 2.36 from kicking FG, so it seems like going for it would be the right call.

OTOH, according to the drive chart (I didn't watch the game), it seems like AZ couldn't even move the ball a yard with any regularity, so probability of them converting a 4th and 4 is probably (much) lower than teams historically.

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Burke's calculator suggests EP of 2.94 from going for it and 2.36 from kicking FG, so it seems like going for it would be the right call.

OTOH, according to the drive chart (I didn't watch the game), it seems like AZ couldn't even move the ball a yard with any regularity, so probability of them converting a 4th and 4 is probably (much) lower than teams historically.

Saw those numbers too but didn't use them as 2.36 expected points on a marginally longer extra point seemed pretty low to me.

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Bill Barnwell has turned this into a regular feature on Grantland called "Thank You for Not Coaching" (here's last week's: http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/78191/thank-you-for-not-coaching-week-6). I agree with the OP that Arians made the wrong call, and it will almost certainly make TYFNC next week, since he regularly rails against coaches who make that type of decision (and provides stats on expected win percentages to back it up).

The reason it's dumb is because when you have the ball that close to the goal line, your chances of scoring a TD are higher than they're likely to be on any subsequent drive. If you get the TD from the 4, then later on when you need a FG you only need to drive to the 30. But if you take the FG, then on your next drive you still need to go all the way down the field.

Of course, since I was facing the Seattle D, I didn't mind that Arians took the FG and cost my opponent 4 points. But from an NFL perspective, it was definitely a low-percentage move (yet one that's sadly far too common).

I don't know how anyone could (or would want to) read Barnwell. His writing style is so dry and he uses statistics in the place or reason a lot of the time. I'm not exaggerating when I say he could write (and regularly does) 2000 words on fumble recovery rates. That's fine for a site like pro football reference or whatever but not Grantland. He's so obviously out of place at Grantland it's kinda sad

Well, he is a former Football Outsiders writer.

Are you aware that they have more on that site than Bill Simmons and his "theories" and reality TV podcasts? He seems to fit in pretty perfectly next to great writers like Zach Lowe (NBA) and Jonah Keri (MLB).

Although I would be very happy if he gave up on his quest to squash the overreliance on momentum in sports.

Oh absolutely. I am actually a huge fan of Zach Lowe, and to a lesser extent Keri. And I totally understand Barnwell is the NFL equivalent or Lowe and Keri..they're the Xs and Os sport specific writers. But still, it's not the same. Lowe is a basketball junkie who breaks down the how and why in a readable way. Barnwell is a statistician writing about football so much that Sharp and Simmons pick on him as a result.

Also, regarding their personalities and writing subjects. Could you see Barnwell doing anything as light as Lowe's offseason piece ranking the NBA mascots? Exactly. He doesn't belong at Grantland

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Bill Barnwell has turned this into a regular feature on Grantland called "Thank You for Not Coaching" (here's last week's: http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/78191/thank-you-for-not-coaching-week-6). I agree with the OP that Arians made the wrong call, and it will almost certainly make TYFNC next week, since he regularly rails against coaches who make that type of decision (and provides stats on expected win percentages to back it up).

The reason it's dumb is because when you have the ball that close to the goal line, your chances of scoring a TD are higher than they're likely to be on any subsequent drive. If you get the TD from the 4, then later on when you need a FG you only need to drive to the 30. But if you take the FG, then on your next drive you still need to go all the way down the field.

Of course, since I was facing the Seattle D, I didn't mind that Arians took the FG and cost my opponent 4 points. But from an NFL perspective, it was definitely a low-percentage move (yet one that's sadly far too common).

I don't know how anyone could (or would want to) read Barnwell. His writing style is so dry and he uses statistics in the place or reason a lot of the time. I'm not exaggerating when I say he could write (and regularly does) 2000 words on fumble recovery rates. That's fine for a site like pro football reference or whatever but not Grantland. He's so obviously out of place at Grantland it's kinda sad

Well, he is a former Football Outsiders writer.

Are you aware that they have more on that site than Bill Simmons and his "theories" and reality TV podcasts? He seems to fit in pretty perfectly next to great writers like Zach Lowe (NBA) and Jonah Keri (MLB).

Although I would be very happy if he gave up on his quest to squash the overreliance on momentum in sports.

Oh absolutely. I am actually a huge fan of Zach Lowe, and to a lesser extent Keri. And I totally understand Barnwell is the NFL equivalent or Lowe and Keri..they're the Xs and Os sport specific writers. But still, it's not the same. Lowe is a basketball junkie who breaks down the how and why in a readable way. Barnwell is a statistician writing about football so much that Sharp and Simmons pick on him as a result.

Also, regarding their personalities and writing subjects. Could you see Barnwell doing anything as light as Lowe's offseason piece ranking the NBA mascots? Exactly. He doesn't belong at Grantland

I enjoy Barnwell's pieces but you're right he could use some pizzazz in the writing department.

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Burke's calculator suggests EP of 2.94 from going for it and 2.36 from kicking FG, so it seems like going for it would be the right call.

OTOH, according to the drive chart (I didn't watch the game), it seems like AZ couldn't even move the ball a yard with any regularity, so probability of them converting a 4th and 4 is probably (much) lower than teams historically.

Saw those numbers too but didn't use them as 2.36 expected points on a marginally longer extra point seemed pretty low to me.

It's because after a FG, Seattle will get the ball back at like the 25 (or whatever the average FP is) vs. getting at the 4 or worse after the 4th down attempt. So Seattle's chances of scoring on the next possession go up, decreasing the value of the FG.

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Burke's calculator suggests EP of 2.94 from going for it and 2.36 from kicking FG, so it seems like going for it would be the right call.

OTOH, according to the drive chart (I didn't watch the game), it seems like AZ couldn't even move the ball a yard with any regularity, so probability of them converting a 4th and 4 is probably (much) lower than teams historically.

But that doesn't make sense. They need to score a TD (actually two), so if they're having trouble moving the ball, what's more likely? That they can gain 4 yards on a single play, or that they can put together a sustained drive all the way down the field from deep in their own territory? A struggling offense should absolutely prefer the former scenario.

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Brian Schottenheimer every time he has Tavon Austin run a 3 yard curl

Brian Schottenheimer every time he has Givens run a short slant

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Seattle had a 94% win probability when Arizona lined up for the field goal. After the conversion, they had a 97% WP.

http://live.advancednflstats.com/

Seattle had a 100% chance of winning if the go for it and fail. What's your point.

And what would Seattle's WP have been if Arizona went for it and succeeded? You can't base decisions entirely on the outcome. If it were only that easy...

You're making the same mistake referred to in the Grantland articles...you're placing all the importance on remaining alive as long as possible, instead of trying to put your team in the best position to actually win the game. Who gives a #### if the other team has clinched the game with 12 minutes left or with 10 seconds left? You lost. Maybe the Jaguars when they are 28 point underdogs.

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This thread is stupid.

:noted:

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A better discussion might begin by pointing out that most coaches in every sport feel compelled to go by the dreaded book. Doing so provides cover to all of their decisions and limits the postgame media swarm that is sure to follow when a coach deviates from conventional coach wisdom.

I think the "win percentage" angle is a good place to start challenging the current status quo for most NFL coaching decisions. I agree wholeheartedly with the idea that far too many coaches play to not lose rather than play to win. I also agree that the worry over "demoralizing" your team is highly overvalued. I expect many players enjoy the aggressive mentality of going all out to win and would embrace the notion once they see it used consistently.

I believe that it's hard for a lot of people to understand that there always comes a point when the game is on the line, and that having that time come earlier than the latest possible moment is not necessarily smart strategy. Coaches need to understand that taking a risk earlier may be the best chance to win the game even if failing at that opportunity all but guarantees a loss. Underdogs in particular need to understand that bucking conventional wisdom is the most likely way they can defeat a much stronger opponent.

Edited by The Jerk
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Seattle had a 94% win probability when Arizona lined up for the field goal. After the conversion, they had a 97% WP.

http://live.advancednflstats.com/

so the premise of this whole thread is calling the coach stupid for giving up 3%???

He cut his team's chance of winning in half by kicking a successful field goal. Think about that.

If the goal is to actually win the game, rather than try to "stay in the game" and make the final score look respectable, this is exactly the kind of decision you'd never make.

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