Wildman
Footballguy
I'm evaluating college players for a publication you might have heard me talk about. I came across something I want to share with you while watching Texas Tech vs. Texas and thought it would just be something that might make good reading for some of you.
It underscores the details that separate a decent prospect from a great one. Details that are really quite fundamental.
Texas Tech as the ball on its opening drive of the game and the situation is a 3rd and 4 pass play. QB Graham Harrell is in the shotgun with three receivers in a bunch formation on the left and a fourth lone receiver on the right side of the field.
During this drive the Texas defense has been giving the Tech offense different looks with every snap. One of the common things they have done is threaten the safety blitz.
The defensive coordinator wants to force Harrell and this quick-strike offense into a bad decision. If he can make Harrell act too quickly, he wins one of two ways: Harrell settles for a shallow route for a minimal gain or he gets enough pressure on Harrell to force a sack or bad throw.
Harrell and the offensive line see the LOLB, the ROLB, and the safety threatening blitz. But well before the snap, the safety drops to a spot where it appears he will have enough time to get good depth in pass coverage if he's not coming for the QB. It's a deeper position than where he blitzed on the play before.
When Harrell takes the snap, he notices the safety making a beeline for the line of scrimmage. A quick decision maker, Harrell immediately looks right to check down to the single receiver running a quick slant. But the ROLB has dropped into a shallow zone and this eliminates the check-down and Harrell has to stop his delivery. To the casual observer it looks like he made a quick pump fake, but he's already in trouble.
As he stops, the left defensive end beats the tackle to the inside and is now a yard from Harrell. The QB sees the DE out of the corner of his eye as he's looking to his left where the slot receiver is running a crossing route with enough depth for the first down.
But Harrell has the DE is close to his throwing arm he has to slide left to avoid the sack. And by the time he avoids the DE and resets his feet to deliver the cross, the left defensive tackle is now at his legs. Harrell doesn't have enough balance to deliver the pass and he has to bring the ball down, taking the sack and forcing a punt on a promising opening drive.
Why didn't the play work? Was it the play call? No. Was it the performance of his receivers? Not at all. In fact, if we're projecting a quarterback for his skills as a pro football player, then we can't even blame the offensive line. He had enough time on this play to complete a pass. It would be the case if he were reviewing this play with an NFL coach. What determined Harrell's (or any quarterback's) success or failure in this situation actually comes down to one properly executed technique: executing a good drop..
Dropping back? Sounds a little too basic, doesn't it? But reading the defense correctly and seeing the field develop cannot happen unless a QB gives himself the room to not only see the field, but also act on what he finds. Here's why a well executed drop would have made all the difference on this play.
A basic three-step drop consists of one long step followed by two shorter crossover steps. The beauty of the shotgun formation is it allows the quarterback more time to see the field develop. It also gives the QB the chance to make the equivalent of a seven-step drop with only a three-step drop. The problem is many quarterbacks in the spread system never make it a point to take those three simple steps. This is where Graham Harrell's play I just described serves as a great example.
Harrell's drop consistent of one short step, and a hop into a set position to throw the ball. The distance he covered upon receiving the snap was the equivalent of an inadequate, 5-step drop. It's possible this was the drop he was instructed to take, but there are two problems with this idea. First, he didn't have enough depth in the pocket to make a quick throw on these routes. Plus there were two other receivers running deeper routes that he had no chance to hit with just a 5-step drop. The actual result of the play I just described speaks to this reason.
If Harrell took a 3-step drop from the shotgun with proper footwork, he would have seen the ROLB drop back before he considered throwing the football and he would have enough time to spot the crossing route from the left. By the time Harrell set his feet to throw the ball, he would have been able to complete a pass with at worst, a defender bearing down on him. At best, he'd have 2-3 yards of distance between himself and the pressure to comfortably complete the throw or at least slide away from the pressure with less urgency. Even that slant play would have developed to a point where the receiver would be past the zone of the ROLB. Instead, his shallow drop - even in the shotgun - forces him to read the slant too early and not have enough depth in the pocket to complete his second read.
Poor footwork is a common problem with many college quarterbacks entering the NFL. Kerry Collins and Matt Hasselbeck are good examples of players who needed to work on this very technique early in their careers. Quarterbacks don't always realize the connection between good footwork and the ability to see the field and gaining the necessary time for routes to develop.
An example of good footwork at the college level is Georgia quarterback Matthew Stafford. Although Georgia will use a shotgun set, their favorite set is the I-formation - a more demanding formation for a quarterback because it requires he has better timing and anticipation of his routes. He also has to do more to get greater depth in the pocket when under center. Stafford has developed good habits with this drops from both the shotgun and the I-formation. He executed this technique to perfection against LSU's defense which blitzed him frequently this year in their match up. .
Stafford might have a stronger arm and quicker release than Harrell, but it is his ability to get depth in the pocket and afford his receivers more time to develop their routes that made him consistently more effective against more sophisticated blitzes that both will have to handle well if they want to become NFL starters.
It's fascinating how such a small fundamental technique can have such a huge impact on the outcome of a play, isn't it?
It underscores the details that separate a decent prospect from a great one. Details that are really quite fundamental.
Texas Tech as the ball on its opening drive of the game and the situation is a 3rd and 4 pass play. QB Graham Harrell is in the shotgun with three receivers in a bunch formation on the left and a fourth lone receiver on the right side of the field.
During this drive the Texas defense has been giving the Tech offense different looks with every snap. One of the common things they have done is threaten the safety blitz.
The defensive coordinator wants to force Harrell and this quick-strike offense into a bad decision. If he can make Harrell act too quickly, he wins one of two ways: Harrell settles for a shallow route for a minimal gain or he gets enough pressure on Harrell to force a sack or bad throw.
Harrell and the offensive line see the LOLB, the ROLB, and the safety threatening blitz. But well before the snap, the safety drops to a spot where it appears he will have enough time to get good depth in pass coverage if he's not coming for the QB. It's a deeper position than where he blitzed on the play before.
When Harrell takes the snap, he notices the safety making a beeline for the line of scrimmage. A quick decision maker, Harrell immediately looks right to check down to the single receiver running a quick slant. But the ROLB has dropped into a shallow zone and this eliminates the check-down and Harrell has to stop his delivery. To the casual observer it looks like he made a quick pump fake, but he's already in trouble.
As he stops, the left defensive end beats the tackle to the inside and is now a yard from Harrell. The QB sees the DE out of the corner of his eye as he's looking to his left where the slot receiver is running a crossing route with enough depth for the first down.
But Harrell has the DE is close to his throwing arm he has to slide left to avoid the sack. And by the time he avoids the DE and resets his feet to deliver the cross, the left defensive tackle is now at his legs. Harrell doesn't have enough balance to deliver the pass and he has to bring the ball down, taking the sack and forcing a punt on a promising opening drive.
Why didn't the play work? Was it the play call? No. Was it the performance of his receivers? Not at all. In fact, if we're projecting a quarterback for his skills as a pro football player, then we can't even blame the offensive line. He had enough time on this play to complete a pass. It would be the case if he were reviewing this play with an NFL coach. What determined Harrell's (or any quarterback's) success or failure in this situation actually comes down to one properly executed technique: executing a good drop..
Dropping back? Sounds a little too basic, doesn't it? But reading the defense correctly and seeing the field develop cannot happen unless a QB gives himself the room to not only see the field, but also act on what he finds. Here's why a well executed drop would have made all the difference on this play.
A basic three-step drop consists of one long step followed by two shorter crossover steps. The beauty of the shotgun formation is it allows the quarterback more time to see the field develop. It also gives the QB the chance to make the equivalent of a seven-step drop with only a three-step drop. The problem is many quarterbacks in the spread system never make it a point to take those three simple steps. This is where Graham Harrell's play I just described serves as a great example.
Harrell's drop consistent of one short step, and a hop into a set position to throw the ball. The distance he covered upon receiving the snap was the equivalent of an inadequate, 5-step drop. It's possible this was the drop he was instructed to take, but there are two problems with this idea. First, he didn't have enough depth in the pocket to make a quick throw on these routes. Plus there were two other receivers running deeper routes that he had no chance to hit with just a 5-step drop. The actual result of the play I just described speaks to this reason.
If Harrell took a 3-step drop from the shotgun with proper footwork, he would have seen the ROLB drop back before he considered throwing the football and he would have enough time to spot the crossing route from the left. By the time Harrell set his feet to throw the ball, he would have been able to complete a pass with at worst, a defender bearing down on him. At best, he'd have 2-3 yards of distance between himself and the pressure to comfortably complete the throw or at least slide away from the pressure with less urgency. Even that slant play would have developed to a point where the receiver would be past the zone of the ROLB. Instead, his shallow drop - even in the shotgun - forces him to read the slant too early and not have enough depth in the pocket to complete his second read.
Poor footwork is a common problem with many college quarterbacks entering the NFL. Kerry Collins and Matt Hasselbeck are good examples of players who needed to work on this very technique early in their careers. Quarterbacks don't always realize the connection between good footwork and the ability to see the field and gaining the necessary time for routes to develop.
An example of good footwork at the college level is Georgia quarterback Matthew Stafford. Although Georgia will use a shotgun set, their favorite set is the I-formation - a more demanding formation for a quarterback because it requires he has better timing and anticipation of his routes. He also has to do more to get greater depth in the pocket when under center. Stafford has developed good habits with this drops from both the shotgun and the I-formation. He executed this technique to perfection against LSU's defense which blitzed him frequently this year in their match up. .
Stafford might have a stronger arm and quicker release than Harrell, but it is his ability to get depth in the pocket and afford his receivers more time to develop their routes that made him consistently more effective against more sophisticated blitzes that both will have to handle well if they want to become NFL starters.
It's fascinating how such a small fundamental technique can have such a huge impact on the outcome of a play, isn't it?
