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Is closing the game harder than pitching in the 7th? (1 Viewer)

Is closing games harder than pitching in the 7th?

  • Yes

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • No

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    0

Doctor Detroit

Please remove your headgear
I am in a debate on another site about closers. Here is what one guy said:

I just don't like the saves stat. The closer role is one of the easiest roles of the bullpen and I don't think they deserve special recognition. I'm more interested in the relievers we can bring in when runners are on base in a close game. Guys that can come in and strike batters out and strand baserunners. Those are the relievers I like to applaud. They mean far more to the team than a guy who comes in with nobody on base and often has a couple runs to work with and can get away with giving up a run or two just because it's the last inning of the game. That just doesn't impress me.
I basically said why wouldn't teams have their best bullpen guys come in in the 7th then? Also to me pitching the 9th inning with no one on and a two run lead is harder than pitching in the 7th up by two when inheriting two baserunners. I also offered the importance of Mariano Rivera and others helping their teams win and Mesa and Mitch Williams helping their teams lose championships. I think Mesa would have gotten the side out in the 7th. The 9th is loaded with pressure. What do you guys think?
 
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I basically said why wouldn't teams have their best bullpen guys come in in the 7th then?
:hifive: The later in a game you get, the more everything is magnified. One mistake and there is no time to make up for it. Just like football, not all defensive stops are the same. Stopping a 4th & 1 with 2 minutes left is more impressive than doing it in the 3rd quarter. :unsure:
 
One point of controversy was in handling the Red Sox' relief pitching. James had previously published several analyses of the use of the closer in baseball, and had concluded that the traditional use of the closer both overrated the abilities of that individual, and used him in suboptimal circumstances. Reportedly, James influenced a reorganization of the Boston bullpen, with several moderately talented relievers and no clear closer. When Boston lost a number of games due to bullpen failures, they were forced to acquire a traditional closer (Byung-Hyun Kim) in order to address the issue. Many writers considered this to be a rejection of James' ideas, and the signing of ace reliever Keith Foulke following the season further suggests this. Others, however, argue that the Boston pen was simply not very talented and that the outcome doesn't necessarily undermine James' arguments.It should be noted that Boston did not implement James' idea of the "relief ace". James did not suggest a "bullpen by committee"; rather, his studies showed that the relief ace should be used in close or tie games as early as the 7th inning, when the outcome of a ballgame is really decided. Boston had no relief ace in 2003. During the 2004 regular season Foulke was used primarily as a closer in the Tony La Russa model; however, Foulke's usage in the 2004 postseason was along the lines of a relief ace with multiple inning appearances at pivotal times of the game. Houston Astros manager Phil Garner also employed a relief ace model, perhaps unwittingly, with his use of Brad Lidge in the 2004 postseason, further demonstrating the efficacy of James's relief ace concept.
 
One point of controversy was in handling the Red Sox' relief pitching. James had previously published several analyses of the use of the closer in baseball, and had concluded that the traditional use of the closer both overrated the abilities of that individual, and used him in suboptimal circumstances. Reportedly, James influenced a reorganization of the Boston bullpen, with several moderately talented relievers and no clear closer. When Boston lost a number of games due to bullpen failures, they were forced to acquire a traditional closer (Byung-Hyun Kim) in order to address the issue. Many writers considered this to be a rejection of James' ideas, and the signing of ace reliever Keith Foulke following the season further suggests this. Others, however, argue that the Boston pen was simply not very talented and that the outcome doesn't necessarily undermine James' arguments.It should be noted that Boston did not implement James' idea of the "relief ace". James did not suggest a "bullpen by committee"; rather, his studies showed that the relief ace should be used in close or tie games as early as the 7th inning, when the outcome of a ballgame is really decided. Boston had no relief ace in 2003. During the 2004 regular season Foulke was used primarily as a closer in the Tony La Russa model; however, Foulke's usage in the 2004 postseason was along the lines of a relief ace with multiple inning appearances at pivotal times of the game. Houston Astros manager Phil Garner also employed a relief ace model, perhaps unwittingly, with his use of Brad Lidge in the 2004 postseason, further demonstrating the efficacy of James's relief ace concept.
Interesting. Thanks.
 
I think that the position of closer in the current sense is one of the more overrated positions in all of baseball and would much rather have a middle reliver who can come in with 2 on and 1 out and get out of the situation with no runs given up. Personally, I don't see what is so hard coming in in the 9th, noone on, with a lead and pitching to the worst part of the lineup as often as the best part.

 
I think that the position of closer in the current sense is one of the more overrated positions in all of baseball and would much rather have a middle reliver who can come in with 2 on and 1 out and get out of the situation with no runs given up. Personally, I don't see what is so hard coming in in the 9th, noone on, with a lead and pitching to the worst part of the lineup as often as the best part.
So do you think that in the future we will see 7th inning guys getting paid more than closers? IMO when Zumaya is 100 percent healthy next year I want him to stay in the 7th and 8th inning role or fall under the James philosophy. I think the Tigers can find someone else to close or just pitch Zumaya as the premier guy and have a guy like Linebrink for example, as the closer. So I see the theory but I still think pitching in the 9th is tougher in general.
 
I think that the position of closer in the current sense is one of the more overrated positions in all of baseball and would much rather have a middle reliver who can come in with 2 on and 1 out and get out of the situation with no runs given up. Personally, I don't see what is so hard coming in in the 9th, noone on, with a lead and pitching to the worst part of the lineup as often as the best part.
So do you think that in the future we will see 7th inning guys getting paid more than closers? IMO when Zumaya is 100 percent healthy next year I want him to stay in the 7th and 8th inning role or fall under the James philosophy. I think the Tigers can find someone else to close or just pitch Zumaya as the premier guy and have a guy like Linebrink for example, as the closer. So I see the theory but I still think pitching in the 9th is tougher in general.
Thats not at all the thing. &th or 8th inning guys are a byproduct of the closer role. In the relief ace model, you use your best relief pitcher in the toughest spots late in the game. So, if your up by 2 and the heart of the order is up in the 8th, you bring in the relief ace, if the game is tied or you're behind but close - same thing. Count me also among those that think the ways closers are used is extremely inefficient.
 
It is more difficult because how much you get paid is directly related to how well you pitch in the 9th, not the 7th or 8th. (unfortunately)

 
I think that the position of closer in the current sense is one of the more overrated positions in all of baseball and would much rather have a middle reliver who can come in with 2 on and 1 out and get out of the situation with no runs given up. Personally, I don't see what is so hard coming in in the 9th, noone on, with a lead and pitching to the worst part of the lineup as often as the best part.
So do you think that in the future we will see 7th inning guys getting paid more than closers? IMO when Zumaya is 100 percent healthy next year I want him to stay in the 7th and 8th inning role or fall under the James philosophy. I think the Tigers can find someone else to close or just pitch Zumaya as the premier guy and have a guy like Linebrink for example, as the closer. So I see the theory but I still think pitching in the 9th is tougher in general.
Count me also among those that think the ways closers are used is extremely inefficient.
The "LaRussa method." I actually hadn't heard of that or really read a lot on Bill James until today. Having a great conversation on a tigers board about this now.
 
The closer position is more difficult because a team facing the closer in the 9th inning is desperate to score runs, which leads to a greater offensive focus IMHO and also the increased use of pinch hitters and pinch runners which theoretically improve the offensive team's chances to score. The game becomes "sudden death" at that point, and as others have said, mistakes get magnified.

The idea behind a closer like Saito is that the Dodgers of course play nine inning games, but if they take a lead late in the game they want to effectively reduce the number of innings their opponent can use to score to eight via the dominance of the closer.

 
The 9th is loaded with pressure.
You have the answer right above.
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?I think you need to use your best pitcher in the most crucial moment of the game. That's not always the 9th. The Rays have had 20+ situations along these lines this year, where their best (really, only) reliable reliever (Reyes) should've came in pre-9th. But they stick to the old textbook and hold him out and the game ends at the hands of Casey Fossum or Shawn Camp. It's ridiculous. The reason managers stick with it today is not because the 9th is necessarily more loaded with pressure, but there is now 35 years of baseball 'tradition' and everybody is afraid to fly in the face of it despite it making the most sense. That and because closers get paid more because of a stupid statistic. I hate it, it really drives me nuts.Yea you have to have a guy to close out the 9th. But you have to get to the 9th first.
 
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The 9th is loaded with pressure.
You have the answer right above.
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?I think you need to use your best pitcher in the most crucial moment of the game. That's not always the 9th. The Rays have had 20+ situations along these lines this year, where their best (really, only) reliable reliever (Reyes) should've came in pre-9th. But they stick to the old textbook and hold him out and the game ends at the hands of Casey Fossum or Shawn Camp. It's ridiculous. The reason managers stick with it today is not because the 9th is necessarily more loaded with pressure, but there is now 35 years of baseball 'tradition' and everybody is afraid to fly in the face of it despite it making the most sense. That and because closers get paid more because of a stupid statistic. I hate it, it really drives me nuts.Yea you have to have a guy to close out the 9th. But you have to get to the 9th first.
I agree with all of this. :sarcasm:I'd also add that there are lots of other factors that play into how you maximize the efficacy of your bullpen. For instance, let's say you're the manager of the Mets. You're on the road against Philadelphia, going into the bottom of the 8th up 4-2 with the pitcher's spot due to hit in the top of the 9th, and your two best relievers are Billy Wagner (L) and Aaron Heilman R, both of whom are fully rested.To start the 8th, you will face:Chase Utley (L)Ryan Howard (L)Aaron Rowand RAfter that:Burrell RWes Helms RCarlos Ruiz RPitcher's spotRyan Howard is a lifetime .321/.429/.676 hitter against righties, .232/.316/.468 against lefties. It is literally insane that you'd rather face the 1.100 OPS guy instead of the .784 one (for comparison's sake, Bill Hall has a .784 OPS this year, Alex Rodriguez is at 1.073). If anyone can justify why you'd use Heilman in the 8th and Wagner in the 9th in this situation, I'd love to hear it.And even if everyone involved in this situation is a righty, don't you want to put Wagner against the Phillies' best hitters and leave Heilman with the easier task of getting out the bottom of the order?ETA: I'm most disappointed that the A's haven't taken a more "non-traditional" approach to their bullpen, Beane knows better.
 
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The closer position is more difficult because a team facing the closer in the 9th inning is desperate to score runs, which leads to a greater offensive focus IMHO and also the increased use of pinch hitters and pinch runners which theoretically improve the offensive team's chances to score. The game becomes "sudden death" at that point, and as others have said, mistakes get magnified. The idea behind a closer like Saito is that the Dodgers of course play nine inning games, but if they take a lead late in the game they want to effectively reduce the number of innings their opponent can use to score to eight via the dominance of the closer.
So you are saying that teams aren't trying as hard to score in the 7th or 8th inning as they are in the 9th? I would think that if they were behind earlier in the game they would be trying to score just as hard then as they would in the 9th. Granted, there would be more of a sense of desperation, but that wouldn't necessarily make them more likely to score.
 
The 9th is loaded with pressure.
You have the answer right above.
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?I think you need to use your best pitcher in the most crucial moment of the game. That's not always the 9th. The Rays have had 20+ situations along these lines this year, where their best (really, only) reliable reliever (Reyes) should've came in pre-9th. But they stick to the old textbook and hold him out and the game ends at the hands of Casey Fossum or Shawn Camp. It's ridiculous. The reason managers stick with it today is not because the 9th is necessarily more loaded with pressure, but there is now 35 years of baseball 'tradition' and everybody is afraid to fly in the face of it despite it making the most sense. That and because closers get paid more because of a stupid statistic. I hate it, it really drives me nuts.Yea you have to have a guy to close out the 9th. But you have to get to the 9th first.
I agree with all of this. :(I'd also add that there are lots of other factors that play into how you maximize the efficacy of your bullpen. For instance, let's say you're the manager of the Mets. You're on the road against Philadelphia, going into the bottom of the 8th up 4-2 with the pitcher's spot due to hit in the top of the 9th, and your two best relievers are Billy Wagner (L) and Aaron Heilman R, both of whom are fully rested.To start the 8th, you will face:Chase Utley (L)Ryan Howard (L)Aaron Rowand RAfter that:Burrell RWes Helms RCarlos Ruiz RPitcher's spotRyan Howard is a lifetime .321/.429/.676 hitter against righties, .232/.316/.468 against lefties. It is literally insane that you'd rather face the 1.100 OPS guy instead of the .784 one (for comparison's sake, Bill Hall has a .784 OPS this year, Alex Rodriguez is at 1.073). If anyone can justify why you'd use Heilman in the 8th and Wagner in the 9th in this situation, I'd love to hear it.And even if everyone involved in this situation is a righty, don't you want to put Wagner against the Phillies' best hitters and leave Heilman with the easier task of getting out the bottom of the order?ETA: I'm most disappointed that the A's haven't taken a more "non-traditional" approach to their bullpen, Beane knows better.
well this is why the mets have another lefty in the bullpen, so they don't hurt wagner's feelings by using him in the eighth. after all, his contract is more important than winning games and if he pitches the eighth, he doesn't get the save and misses out on his bonuses.
 
The 9th is loaded with pressure.
You have the answer right above.
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?I think you need to use your best pitcher in the most crucial moment of the game. That's not always the 9th. The Rays have had 20+ situations along these lines this year, where their best (really, only) reliable reliever (Reyes) should've came in pre-9th. But they stick to the old textbook and hold him out and the game ends at the hands of Casey Fossum or Shawn Camp. It's ridiculous. The reason managers stick with it today is not because the 9th is necessarily more loaded with pressure, but there is now 35 years of baseball 'tradition' and everybody is afraid to fly in the face of it despite it making the most sense. That and because closers get paid more because of a stupid statistic. I hate it, it really drives me nuts.Yea you have to have a guy to close out the 9th. But you have to get to the 9th first.
They all are important, but if you screw the 9th up, you don't get the extra chances to win like you do for the 7th & 8th. That's where the extra pressure comes in.
 
The 9th is loaded with pressure.
You have the answer right above.
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?I think you need to use your best pitcher in the most crucial moment of the game. That's not always the 9th. The Rays have had 20+ situations along these lines this year, where their best (really, only) reliable reliever (Reyes) should've came in pre-9th. But they stick to the old textbook and hold him out and the game ends at the hands of Casey Fossum or Shawn Camp. It's ridiculous. The reason managers stick with it today is not because the 9th is necessarily more loaded with pressure, but there is now 35 years of baseball 'tradition' and everybody is afraid to fly in the face of it despite it making the most sense. That and because closers get paid more because of a stupid statistic. I hate it, it really drives me nuts.Yea you have to have a guy to close out the 9th. But you have to get to the 9th first.
I agree with all of this. :thumbup:I'd also add that there are lots of other factors that play into how you maximize the efficacy of your bullpen. For instance, let's say you're the manager of the Mets. You're on the road against Philadelphia, going into the bottom of the 8th up 4-2 with the pitcher's spot due to hit in the top of the 9th, and your two best relievers are Billy Wagner (L) and Aaron Heilman R, both of whom are fully rested.To start the 8th, you will face:Chase Utley (L)Ryan Howard (L)Aaron Rowand RAfter that:Burrell RWes Helms RCarlos Ruiz RPitcher's spotRyan Howard is a lifetime .321/.429/.676 hitter against righties, .232/.316/.468 against lefties. It is literally insane that you'd rather face the 1.100 OPS guy instead of the .784 one (for comparison's sake, Bill Hall has a .784 OPS this year, Alex Rodriguez is at 1.073). If anyone can justify why you'd use Heilman in the 8th and Wagner in the 9th in this situation, I'd love to hear it.And even if everyone involved in this situation is a righty, don't you want to put Wagner against the Phillies' best hitters and leave Heilman with the easier task of getting out the bottom of the order?ETA: I'm most disappointed that the A's haven't taken a more "non-traditional" approach to their bullpen, Beane knows better.
well this is why the mets have another lefty in the bullpen, so they don't hurt wagner's feelings by using him in the eighth. after all, his contract is more important than winning games and if he pitches the eighth, he doesn't get the save and misses out on his bonuses.
The infection runs deep. A team interested in winning extra games will need to sign contracts with ace relievers that mete out bonuses differently. Or rework contracts.
 
The 9th is loaded with pressure.
You have the answer right above.
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?I think you need to use your best pitcher in the most crucial moment of the game. That's not always the 9th. The Rays have had 20+ situations along these lines this year, where their best (really, only) reliable reliever (Reyes) should've came in pre-9th. But they stick to the old textbook and hold him out and the game ends at the hands of Casey Fossum or Shawn Camp. It's ridiculous. The reason managers stick with it today is not because the 9th is necessarily more loaded with pressure, but there is now 35 years of baseball 'tradition' and everybody is afraid to fly in the face of it despite it making the most sense. That and because closers get paid more because of a stupid statistic. I hate it, it really drives me nuts.Yea you have to have a guy to close out the 9th. But you have to get to the 9th first.
They all are important, but if you screw the 9th up, you don't get the extra chances to win like you do for the 7th & 8th. That's where the extra pressure comes in.
You say this as if a team with a 2-run lead just stops trying to score runs in the 7th and 8th inning.Look at the Mets/Phils scenario above. Would you really save Wagner to the 9th? Does that make any sense?
 
I think the poll is off-based. It is too narrow of an option.

Yes, pitching in the 9th is more difficult than pitching in the 7th under the same circumstances. It's a bigger moment.

But , if a guy comes in for relief with 2nd and 3rd with no one out.. that is the tougher task no matter what the situation is.

It is all relative to the situation...

 
so guys on 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th isn't?
Now you're inventing scenarios in order to reach the conclusion you want. Compare apples to apples. If you're 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 7th, you need to compare that to 2nd and 3rd with nobody out and you're up one run in the 9th. I still submit that the latter is more difficult because the game is at stake with no second chances for either team after that point.
 
I don't know if it is a matter of "harder" as much as it is a matter of different. For example, lets look at the Tigers of 06. Todd Jones was the closer and Joel Zumaya was the firefighter.

People in Detroit begged and pleaded for Zumaya to close games, but IMO that would have been a poor decision. Zumaya was more valuable coming in during the 7th, when there was 1 out and RISP. Joel has the ability get strike outs and prevent the opponents from advancing their runners. Todd Jones does not have that ability. He allows a lot of base-runners and does not get many Ks. To switch the two roles would greatly diminish the effectiveness of the bullpen. Jones is a veteran who can handle the immense pressure of the 9th. Zumaya has the natural talent to handle a 7th inning jam.

So, for Zumaya to close games- that might have been more difficult because the inexperience and the mental element involved. For Jones, coming in during a 7th inning jam certainly would be much harder then closing games.

 
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I actually just read the chapter in "Baseball Between the Numbers" (written by the Baseball Prospectus guys) called "Are Closers Being Wasted?" or something like that last night.

Basically, it starts by defining a statistic called "leverage" which calculates how valuable a run is in the course of the game. I don't remember how they normalize it, but it takes into account that a 3-run HR in the top of the first has a decent effect on your team's overall probability of winning the game (as defined by historical stats based on the "state" of the game: score, inning, outs, and baserunners), a 3 run shot when you're down two runs with two outs in the bottom of the ninth has a tremendous effect on your team's probability of winning (ensuring it), and a 3-run homer when you're up by 10 or even down by ten in the eighth inning usually means next to nothing.

Leverage, I think, can also be used to figure out when to sacrifice bunt, hit and run, or attempt steals with questionable runners.

Using historical data, they then run a lot of simulations, and find that the time to bring in your closer is any time after the 5th inning when the leverage exceeds 2.0-2.5 depending on a few things (how many days in a row can the pitcher pitch, did he pitch yesterday? What's the future schedule?), and almost always in the 9th if the leverage exceeds 1.66 or something.

This conforms with the old Bill James intuition. If you sense the other team has entered a situation in the latter half of the game where they have a great chance of getting back into the game (or of significantly strengthening their lead), bring in your best reliever right then and there. But your best reliever should be used as much as possible before degrading their ability, otherwise you might underutilize one of your best pitchers.

Of course, I do think there does exist some "ability to close." It just seems that too often guys become ineffective when they start games in the 9th (Byung Yun Kim comes to mind). I'm not sure what causes this, as I don't particularly believe in an underlying "ability to win" for pitchers, but at the same time, I've never looked particularly close at the data.

 
'84 Willie Hernandez > '84 Aurelio Lopez.
Except in game 5 when they won it.. Senior Smoke was throwing serious gas (IIRC, 19 strikes in 21 pitches) and Sparky still pulled him for the 9th and sent ole Willie in there. I just remember how ticked I was that Sparky didn't let Aurelio ride that one out the way he was throwing. Both pitchers were great for the Tigers that year.. Willie was out of his mind.
 
I actually just read the chapter in "Baseball Between the Numbers" (written by the Baseball Prospectus guys) called "Are Closers Being Wasted?" or something like that last night.Basically, it starts by defining a statistic called "leverage" which calculates how valuable a run is in the course of the game. I don't remember how they normalize it, but it takes into account that a 3-run HR in the top of the first has a decent effect on your team's overall probability of winning the game (as defined by historical stats based on the "state" of the game: score, inning, outs, and baserunners), a 3 run shot when you're down two runs with two outs in the bottom of the ninth has a tremendous effect on your team's probability of winning (ensuring it), and a 3-run homer when you're up by 10 or even down by ten in the eighth inning usually means next to nothing.Leverage, I think, can also be used to figure out when to sacrifice bunt, hit and run, or attempt steals with questionable runners.Using historical data, they then run a lot of simulations, and find that the time to bring in your closer is any time after the 5th inning when the leverage exceeds 2.0-2.5 depending on a few things (how many days in a row can the pitcher pitch, did he pitch yesterday? What's the future schedule?), and almost always in the 9th if the leverage exceeds 1.66 or something.This conforms with the old Bill James intuition. If you sense the other team has entered a situation in the latter half of the game where they have a great chance of getting back into the game (or of significantly strengthening their lead), bring in your best reliever right then and there. But your best reliever should be used as much as possible before degrading their ability, otherwise you might underutilize one of your best pitchers.Of course, I do think there does exist some "ability to close." It just seems that too often guys become ineffective when they start games in the 9th (Byung Yun Kim comes to mind). I'm not sure what causes this, as I don't particularly believe in an underlying "ability to win" for pitchers, but at the same time, I've never looked particularly close at the data.
Preach it. :topcat:
 

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