'Maurile Tremblay said:
My thoughts as I read through this . . .
Sham decertification.
1. I commented earlier in the thread that, while the players' intent (specifically, whether they intended decertification to be permanent) doesn't appear relevant to the issue of whether the decertification was a sham, even if it were relevant, the players would be able to produce uncontradicted declarations evidencing such an intent. I now take that back. The owners have collected plenty of quotes from both NFL players and NFLPA representatives suggesting that the players did not intend the decertification to be permanent. In the minds of at least some players (and union leaders), decertification was a negotiating tactic designed to lead to a more favorable CBA.
2. The owners have not, however, cited any authority supporting their argument that the players' subjective intent is relevant. (Indeed, it would be hard for the court to consider the subjective intent of more than a thousand players. What if 45% of the players intended the decertification to be permanent, 25% intended it to be temporary, and the remaining 20% didn't know what they intended?) The district court used an objective test, asking not what people
intended, but what they
did. That, to me, seems appropriate; and it seems to be consistent with the NLRB's previous guidance.
Jurisdiction.
3. The owners argue that the Norris-LaGuardia Act strictly limits injunctions in cases "involving or growing out of" a "labor dispute" and prohibits injunctions against lockouts altogether. The owners further argue that you don't need union involvement to have a labor dispute; but even if you do, this case at least
grows out of a dispute involving a union. The owners cite a few cases supporting their contentions — cases that the district court distinguished from this one. Going through all the cited cases would require more work than I'm willing to do; but just from the standpoint of what's reasonable, I come down on the players' side here. Employees have a right to be unionized or non-unionized: it's their choice. As long as they are unionized, they can resolve their substantive differences with the owners at the collective bargaining table (with some procedural help along the way from the NLRB). But when they are non-unionized, there is no collective bargaining table, and there are substantive restrictions on the terms that employers may legally implement — restrictions that must be enforced by courts. If courts can't enforce antitrust laws for some period of time after a union decertifies, during that period employers may threaten a lockout, but players may not threaten a strike. That's an imbalance I don't find sensible. If the players can't act with all the legal protections afforded by the existence of a union — and after decertifying, they cannot — then neither should the owners be able to. There should not be a waiting period after decertification during which the players have neither the protection of a union nor the protection of the law. When the union has been disclaimed, they should have access to the courts to enforce antitrust and other applicable laws, IMO.
4. The owners argue that even if the court doesn't lack jurisdiction because this is a "labor dispute," it still lacks jurisdiction because the central issue is whether the decertification was a sham, and that's something for the NLRB to decide. This is the "primary jurisdiction" argument, and I find it completely unpersuasive. A valid disclaimer is not an element of any of the plaintiffs' causes of action. The absence of a valid disclaimer is a
defense. The owners argue that the district court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether the defense is meritorious. The owners' position would leave district courts without jurisdiction in any case where the "sham decertification" defense was raised in the pleadings, whether or not that defense had any basis in fact (since the district court would lack jurisdiction to even evaluate whether it had any basis in fact). That's a bit crazy. In fact, it's so crazy that I must be misunderstanding the owners' argument. It's late. (It's also frustrating that after the district court held that the application of primary jurisdiction is discretionary, the owners neither concede as much nor offer contradictory authority. Was Judge Nelson right about that or not? It's impossible to tell from the owners' brief. On the whole, I think the owners did a really fantastic job on this brief; but I'm pretty underwhelmed by the section on primary jurisdiction.)
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption.
5. In general, stuff that's agreed to in a CBA is exempt from antitrust scrutiny. If the players agree to a salary cap, they can't sue the owners for implementing a salary cap. Makes sense. There's some question about when the exemption ends. It doesn't end as soon as the CBA expires; that wouldn't be fair to the owners. But how long does the exemption last? The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals said it ends upon decertification, but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to get that specific. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals is not bound by what the D.C. Circuit says. So it's a bit unclear in this case. Without reading the cases cited by each party (again, too much work!), I think reasonableness is on the players' side in this case. Whether or not the exemption extends beyond decertification in general, I don't think that a lockout should be exempt. I said above that, in general, stuff that's agreed to in a CBA is exempt — but a lockout was never agreed to in a CBA. If the owners want to keep the draft for a while, and restrictions on free agency, I think they have some good arguments. But to engage in a lockout? I come back to the fact that, after decertification, the players may no longer strike; the owners, therefore, should not be able to lock them out. Those two powers should stay reciprocal, IMO.
Irreparable Harm and Whatnot.
6. In determining whether to grant the requested preliminary injunction, the court should consider (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the players; (2) balancing this harm with any injury an injunction would inflict on the owners; (3) the probability that the players would succeed on the merits; and (4) the effect on the public interest. I don't think the players would be irreparably harmed by a lockout. For the most part, they'd merely be
reparably harmed. If the lockout is improper, they'll get treble damages. On the other hand, I don't see any great injury the owners would suffer if they can't do a lockout. Having a season is very likely better for the owners than not having a season. And anyway, what's wrong with scrambled eggs?? (Are the owners vegans or something?) I would expect the players to ultimately succeed on the merits, at least with respect to the lockout. And I think the public interest favors having a football season.
Overall, I would affirm the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the lockout.