Don't Toews Me
Footballguy
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2025
Vladimir Putin’s money machine is sputtering
Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion, likely operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, reported on April 27 that continuous technological innovations and battlefield adaptations have increasingly transformed the character of modern conventional warfare in Ukraine into a war that primarily features "long-range, remote combat" over meeting engagements between infantry and armored vehicles. The NCO noted that Ukrainian and Russian forces’ intensifying drone usage has expanded the area of contested gray zones and kill zones at the forward edge of the battle area. The NCO noted that in 2024, contested gray zones were roughly 500 meters to two kilometers in depth, but more intense drone usage since then has expanded the gray zone up to five to seven kilometers in some areas of the frontline. The NCO reported that Russian forces are improving and expanding their unmanned systems capabilities and emulating Ukrainian forces’ tactics of using drones to intercept enemy drones and conduct remote mining. Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged superior drone capabilities to defend critical sectors of the frontline while also mitigating manpower and materiel constraints.
Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline. The NCO in the Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion stated that Russian forces are increasingly using infantry assaults and motorized assaults on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and light vehicles to advance in areas where Ukrainian forces leverage drone usage to maintain frontline positions. The non-commissioned officer reported that Russian forces leverage motorcycles and other light vehicles to disperse forces to more easily avoid drone strikes. A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces have conducted 13 motorized assaults on motorcycles since March 20. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction cannot drive heavy armored vehicles to frontline positions due to disrupted Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), resulting in Russian forces shifting tactics to prioritize daily infantry assaults supported by motorcycles.
ISW has observed Russian forces throughout the entire theater struggling to operate heavy armored vehicles close to the line of fire without being struck by Ukrainian drones. Russian forces are likely leveraging the speed, maneuverability, and small profiles of motorcycles and other light civilian vehicles to mitigate the efficacy of Ukrainian drone capabilities and are likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and preparing to integrate motorcycle usage into Summer and Fall 2024 offensive operations. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and military command previously responded to Ukrainian drone innovations by attempting to formally integrate and centralize Russia’s drone operations and production. The Ukrainian and Russian defense industrial bases (DIBs) continue to compete in the innovation of new, cost-effective systems that enhance assault and battlefield capabilities and counter each other’s innovations. Russian forces likely see a tactical opportunity in leveraging motorcycles and civilian vehicles to advance and seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible despite Ukraine’s drone defenses.
Vladimir Putin’s money machine is sputtering
FROM KALININGRAD to Vladivostok, something has changed. A high-frequency index produced by Goldman Sachs, a bank, suggests that, since the end of last year, Russia’s annualised economic growth has fallen from around 5% to around zero (see chart). VEB, the Russian development bank, finds similar trends in its estimate of monthly growth. A high-frequency measure of business turnover compiled by Sberbank, Russia’s largest lender, has dipped. Although more circumspect, the government acknowledges that something is up. In early April the central bank noted that recently “a number of sectors recorded lower output because of plummeting…demand”.
Were that the whole story, perhaps Mr Putin would remain content. For Russia’s government, a small, gradual deceleration may be a price worth paying if that means taming inflation. The problem is that the slowdown is neither gradual nor small. This is because, in recent weeks, a third factor has come to dominate all others—external conditions have soured. As America’s trade war has escalated, global growth forecasts have plunged, and oil prices have followed. Economists are particularly concerned about China, the largest buyer of Russian oil. The IMF has cut its expectations of Chinese GDP growth in 2025 from 4.6% to 4%.
Falling oil prices are causing Russia all sorts of trouble. They have hit the stockmarket, where oil companies account for a quarter of capitalisation. The MOEX index, which tracks the share price of the top 50-odd listed firms, is down by a tenth from its recent peak. As export receipts decline, sliding oil prices directly affect the real economy, too. Already the government’s coffers are feeling the pinch: in March oil-and-gas tax revenue fell by 17% year on year. And on April 22nd Reuters reported, citing official documents, that the government is expecting a sharp slowdown in oil-and-gas sales this year.
USV shot down a $50 million Russian Su-30 fighter jet over the Black Sea, +500km from Odesa, using a reconfigured R-73 air-to-air missile
![[icon]](/data/avatars/s/5/5167.jpg?1660313464){kind=avatar}