I'm taking a wild guess there's next to no one here that can have an intelligent discussion about this game. Someone would have to be at least 70 years old now to have had any idea what was taking place and display even the slightest objective analysis.
To have their own informed opinions, sure. But a lot of first-hand accounts have been written about a lot of things over the years, and we needn't have been alive when those accounts were written to have read them and be able to reference them.
According to
this book, Landry hadn't finally settled on Morton over Staubach until early October, but stuck with him in large part because the combination of Morton under center and Landry calling plays was 7-0. And it's easy to say that they should have played ball-control and hoped for a low-scoring game, but (A) Morton favored that approach more than the unpredictable Staubach, and (B) the Morton Cowboys had won games 45-21, 34-0, and 52-10 during that span.
So it sounds like it was a mix of "dance with the one that brung ya" and Morton being more predictable and less likely to leave the defense in a hole, (though with the benefit of hindsight, obviously that's exactly what happened). Another interesting footnote in that account I linked was that apparently, despite his success calling plays to that point in the season, Landry had let Morton run that final, ill-fated two-minute drill.
Very well said. Morton looked absolutely horrible in the Super Bowl and lost the game for them.
The Colts' seven turnovers are the most ever committed by a winning team in a Super Bowl. Adding insult to injury Chuck Howley is the only SB MVP from a losing team. Morton was 12 of 27 for 127 yds and 3 picks. You could say at some point in the Super Bowl Landry could have given Staubach a try.
When? Through 3 quarters, everything was going fine from Dallas' perspective. They were having trouble moving the ball on offense, but Morton hadn't turned the ball over. He'd thrown Dallas' only touchdown (on a short drive after a Unitas fumble). They'd scored another 3 points off a field goal after a Morton bomb to Bob Hayes. They were winning 13-6, and the 6 points they had given up were on one of the flukiest plays in superbowl history, a 75-yard touchdown pass that caromed off of two other players before settling in the hands of Mackey. And entering the fourth quarter, Unitas was already out for the game, and Baltimore was relying on Earl Morrall, who had famously melted down just two years prior in SB III (6/17 passing for 71 yards, 0 INTs, and 3 TDs). And then the first play of the fourth quarter was an interception from Morrall. Like I said, Dallas had to be feeling pretty good about where they stood there.
Then Dallas punted. Then Baltimore turned it over again. And then, with under ten minutes in the game, Craig Morton threw his first interception of the game, and Baltimore turned a very short field into a tying score. But what, are you going to bench your quarterback because he threw a single interception? Of course not. So they stuck with Morton and trusted that defense, which had been absolutely impenetrable to that point, to make something happen.
And then, after trading punts, disaster struck and Morton threw his second interception. And maybe now you consider benching Morton... but then again, by this point there's only one second left in the game. Maybe they should have brought Staubach in for the final hail mary? Seems like an awfully small thing to quibble over. And then Morton threw his final interception with no time left on the clock, which hardly seems like his fault.
The game plan going in was "have the game manager play things safe while we rely on our defense and special teams to win it", and for 50 minutes of game time, that's exactly how the script played out. Through the first 51:26 of game action, Craig Morton was turnover-free, the Dallas defense had just produced its 7th takeaway, and the Cowboys had a 13-6 lead that easily could have been 13-0. The Colts' future HoF QB had been knocked out of the game, and taking his place was a backup perhaps best known for his epic choke job in the Super Bowl two years prior.
Things really went off the rails over the final three drives for Dallas, with Morton throwing two back-breaking interceptions (and one meaningless intercepted hail-mary with a second left on the clock) in the final 8:31 of the game. But what, are we blaming Dallas for not knowing that was coming? Again, prior to that point, everything was going exactly to script. Are we blaming Dallas for not making the switch once the implosion was under way? Again, by the time it was apparent that Morton was falling apart, there was only one second left on the clock.
I really don't see what the mystery is, here. Dallas decided in early October that they were better off with Morton than Staubach, they made it to the Super Bowl with Morton and not with Staubach, and they dominated the first 50 minutes of said Super Bowl with Morton and not with Staubach. Criticising their decision at this point feels like the ultimate case of Monday Morning Quarterbacking. A couple thousand mondays removed.
Edit: Remember, too, we're looking back with the knowledge of how Staubach's career turned out. At the time, whether he was going to be good or not was still very much in doubt. 35 quarterbacks attempted at least 50 passes during the 1970 NFL season. Of those 35 players, Craig Morton's 89.8 passer rating stood as the 5th best. Roger Staubach? His 42.9 rating was the 5th worst.
Pro Football Reference tracks a stat called "Adjusted Net Yards per Attempt", (or ANY/A), which is basically Yards per Attempt factoring sacks, with a bonus for touchdowns and a penalty for interceptions. It correlates better with winning than any other simple statistic, and is probably the gold standard for measuring quarterback play, (outside of the much more complex "black box" algorithms like ESPN's QBR, Advanced Football Analytics EPA/WPA, or Football Outsiders' DVOA). Craig Morton's ANY/A was 7.22, which is phenomenal and actually ranked 2nd in the entire NFL. Staubach's ANY/A was 0.91, which is unfathomably bad, and ranked 3rd worst in 1970.
In addition to throwing interceptions at an obscene rate, Staubach also took a boatload of sacks in his first two seasons. From 1969-1970, Roger Staubach took 31 sacks on 129 attempts, which meant fully one out of every five times he dropped back to pass, (actually, 19.4% of the time), he wound up hitting the turf, instead. For context, when David Carr set the NFL sack record as a rookie, he was sacked on just 14.6% of his dropbacks. Morton, behind the exact same line, was sacked on just 8.9% of his dropbacks.
So in 1970, Dallas was facing a choice between Craig Morton, who led the NFL in yards per attempt and touchdown percentage, who had a top 5 passer rating... or Roger Staubach, a 2nd-year player who was twice as likely as Morton to get sacked, who was three times as likely as Morton to throw an interception, and who, quite frankly, wasn't very good at the time. Now, with hindsight we know that Staubach wound up turning out pretty decent in the end. But at the time? He was just bad in 1970. Not mediocre. Not so-so. We're talking "cover-your-eyes-awful". And Morton had a really strong regular season. Honestly, it really wasn't much of a choice.
Edit #2: Staubach also had 4 fumbles on 128 "action plays" in 1970, (passes + sacks + rushes- basically, the number of times he took the snap and didn't hand off). Morton had 1 fumble on 243 "action plays". Staubach was just a negative play machine- huge sack totals, huge turnover totals. He was awful in 1970. A.W.F.U.L.