...and here is some more reality:
The suspected mastermind of this attack, has ties to Al Qaeda, and was a prisoner who was released from Gitmo.
My linkabu sufian ibrahim ahmed Hamouda JTF GTMO detainee assessment
I am truly surprised that Letterman didn't ask him about this.
Can you post the text instead of my browser wanting to download a pdf?
I am not sure I know how to do that; tell me how.
copy paste
S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 20300422DBPARTMENT OF DEF'ENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA
APO AE 09360
JTF GTMO-CG 22 Aprrl2005
MEMORANDUMF ORC ommandeUr,n itedS tatesS outhemC ommand3, 511N W 9lstA venue,
Miami .F L33172.
SUBJECT:U pdateR ecommendatiotno Transfert o the Controlo f AnotherC ountryf or
ContinuedD etention(T RCD)f or GuantanamDoe taineeI,S N: US9LY-000557D(PS )
JTF GTMOD etaineeA ssessment
1. (FOUOP) ersonaIln formation:
o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed
Hamouda
o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed
Hamuda Bin Oumu. Abu Mariam. Abdul Faris Al Libi. Abu Faris Al
Libi. Marwan. Al Hassari. Abdul Razzaq Hamad. Ibn Mabrukah
Hamad
o Place of Birth: Darna. Libya (LY)
o Date of Birth: 26 }une 1959
o Citizenship: Libya
o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9LY-000557DP
2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee has a non-specific personality disorder. He has no known drug
allergiesa nd is not on any chronic medications.D etaineeh as latentT uberculosisa nd refuses
treatment. He has no travel restrictions.
3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTFG TMO recommenddse taineeb e Transferretdo the
Controlo f AnotherC ountryf or ContinuedD etention( TRCD).
b. (S//NF)S ummary: JTFG TMO previouslya ssessedde taineeR etaini n DoD (DoD)o n
23 August2 003.B asedu poni nformationo btaineds inced etainee'psr eviousa ssessmenitt ,is
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5©
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300422
S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 20300422
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedD etention( TRCD) for GuantanamoD etainee,I SN: US9LY-000557DP( S)
now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued
Detention (TRCD) to his country of origin (Libya) if a satisfactory agreement can be reached
that allows access to detainee and/or access to exploited intelligence. If a satisfactory
agreement cannot be reached for his continued detention in Libya, he should be retained
under DoD control.
For this updater ecommendation,d etaineei s assesseda s a former member of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a probable member of Al Qaida, and a member of the North
African Extremist Network OIAEN). Detainee used his employment at the Wafa
Humanitarian Organization (AL-Wafa) as a front for extremist activities. It is assessedth is
detaineeis a MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatt o the US, its interests
and allies.
4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlesso therwisen oted,t he following
paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.
a. Prior History: Detainee served as a tank driver in the Libyan armed forces as a private.
The Libyan Govemment states he was addicted to illegal drugs/narcotics and had been
accused of a number of crimes including: murder, physical assault, armed assault, and
distributingn arcotics. He was sentencedto l0 yearsi n prison. In 1993,h e escapedfr om
prison and fled to Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan (AF) and trained at Usama Bin Laden's
(UBL) Torkham Camp. After participating in the Soviet jihad, he moved to Sudan (SU).
Detaineew orked as a truck driver for Wadi Al-'Aqiq, one of UBL's companiesin Suba,S U.
The Libyan Govemment funher stated detainee joined LIFG and was assigned to the military
committee. Under pressuref rom the Libyan and Sudaneseg ovemments,h e left Sudan
sometime in 1997, using a false Mauritanian passport. He traveled to Pakistan (PK), where
he resided in the area near the Al-Atariyah University/mosque (variants Al Yassir Al
Khayria, Athariya and Atharia) in Peshawar.
b. Training and Activities: In 1998, he withdrew from the LIFG and joined the Taliban
movement (this is likely a reference to Al-Qaida support to the Taliban). He moved to
Peshawawr here he lived with Abu Zayd Al-Tunisi (assessetdo be US9LY-000721). In
2000,h e lived in the tribal region of PeshawarP, K (This is anareau ndert ribal control,n ot
government control. UBL was known to have spent time in this area). He communicated
with likely extremist elements in Afghanistan via radio during this period, indicating a
position of leadership. Around August to November 2001, detainee worked for Al-Wafa in
Kabul, AF. Detainee fought with the Taliban against the Northem Alliance and was
wounded in the leg. He left Kabul around mid-November 2001. Khalid Mahmound Abdul
Al Wahad, US9JO-000589, stated detainee fled to Peshawar, where he likely assisted the
Qadhafi Foundation in relocating extremists and their families. Detainee arrived in Peshawar
1L
s E c R E T // NOFORN | | 20300422
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedD etention( TRCD) for GuantanamoD etainee,I SN: US9LY-000557DP( S)
no later than 4 December 2001, after transiting first through Logar, AF, and then Khowst,
AF.
c. (S) Gapture lnformation: The Pakistani police were tipped off as to detainee's
location by Libyan nationals from the Libyan Humanitarian Organization aka Qadhafi
Organization. In Peshawar,P K, Pakistani Police apprehendedd etaineea t the Plaza Hotel,
where he was staying. Detainee was then turned over to US forces. (Analyst note: The
Qadhafi Organization operated out of the Libyan Embassy and worked to secure
transportation to Libya for any Arab fleeing the region, including Al-Qaida members. There
appeared to have been an agreement between the governments of Libya and Pakistan that
allowed the Pakistanis to interview the Arabs before they left. Detainee was likely detained
by the Pakistani's and turned over to US forces against the Libyan govemment's wishes due
to discrepanciesin his story.)
d. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 5 May 2002
e. (S//NF)R easonsf or Transfert o JTF GTMO: Top rovidein formatioonn t he
following:
o The Al-Wafa Organization
o Al-Wafa officials
o Al-Qaida/Al Wafa relationship and financial operations
5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: It is assessetdh e detaineep osesa MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is
likely to posea threatt o the US, its interestsa nd allies.
b. (S//NF)R easonsf or ContinuedD etention:
. (S) Detaineeh as a long-terma ssociationw ith Islamic extremistj ihad and memberso f
Al-Qaida and other extremist groups. Detainee refuses to disclose complete information
regardingh is past,a ssociatesa, nd activities.
. (S//I{F) The Libyan Govemment considers detainee a "dangerous man with no
qualms about committing terrorist acts. He was known as one of the extremist
commanders of the Afghan Arabs." (Analyst note: "The Afghan Arabs" refers to Arab
Mujahideen that elected to stay in Afghanistan and Pakistan following the Soviet Jihad.
In this position detainee would be linked, at least indirectly, to the Taliban, Al-Qaida,
NAEN, and other extremiste lementsi n the region during the mid to late 1990's. He is
)
S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20300422
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedD etention( TRCD) for GuantanamoD etainee,I SN: US9LY-000557DP( S)
not assessedto have been a senior level commandera nd likely lost or surrenderedh is
leadership role when he left the LIFG community.)
. (S) Detaineei s an associateo f UBL's from Sudan. Al Sheikh,p ossiblya referencet o
Ibn SheikhA l Libi, recommendedd etaineet o UBL. UBL reportedlyk nows detainee's
brotherv ery well. Detaineed rove a truck for one of UBL's companiesw hile living in
Sudan.
. (S) Detaineeh ask nown or suspecteda ssociationsto the following NAEN or LIFG
members: (Analyst note: NAEN is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism Target defined as terrorist
groups which pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. The LIFG is
a Tier 1 Counterterrorism target defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state
support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or
interests.)
o Abdul Latif Al Turki, US9AF-000556
o AbuZar (variant Thar)
o Ashraf Salim Abd Al Sharif, US9LY 000263 (ISN 263)
o Umar Al Libi, US9LY 000695 (ISN 695)
o Abu Nasim Al Tunisi (NAEN Facilitator)
o Abd Al Karim Al Libi
o Abu Hazim Al Libi
o Abu Sulaiman Al Jazairi,
o Abu Tayyib
o Abd Al Latif Al Libi,
o HamzaAl Libi
o Saif Al Libi,
o Abu Za'ah, Abu Wathilh Al Libi.
o (S/AIF) Detaineeh as admitted or has alleged associationsw ith numerouse xtremist
elementsa nd personalitiest,o includet he following:
o Rida Walili, US9EG-000663(I SN 663)
o AbuZayed Al Tunisi (likely ISN 721)
o Ayyub Al Libi, Al-Qaida/LIFG facilitator
o Ansaf Sarraf
o Abu Al Munthir
o Abu Abdullah Al Sadiq
o (S/AIF) Abu Zubaydah, Al-Qaida facilitator, recognized detainee as a former member
of the LIFG. Abu Zubaydah stated he provided detainee with a false Iraqi passport at the
request of Abu Jaffar Al Iraqi in 1999. (Analyst note: Detainee has not acknowledged
these associations.)
. (S) Ibn Sheikh Al Libi, Khaldan camp director and Al-Qaida member, identified
detainee.
4
S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 20300422
S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT:U pdateR ecommendatiotno Transfert o the Controlo f AnotherC ountryf or
ContinuedD etention(T RCD)f or GuantanamDoe taineeI,S N: US9LY-000557D(PS )
o (S) Ibn Sheikh Al Libi noted detainee worked at the Wafa organization after
having financial difficulties. Abu Zubaydahmet detainee at Ibn Sheikh Al Libi's
guesthousein Kabul in 2000. (Analyst note: There is reporting detaineew as
ostracized from the Libyan community, at which time he came to Wafa seeking
employment. The financial difficulties may have arisen from detainee's falling from
favor in the Libyan community, which would result in losing the monthly stipends
noted in Al-Qaida documentsa nd a subsequennt eed for funds. There is no reporting
on the actual causeo f detainee'sd ecreasedr elations other than his links to Abu
Wathilh Al Libi's group. The need for funds may simply be an aspect of his cover
story to mislead intenogations.)
. (S) Detaineea ssociatedw ith (andw as likely a membero f) Abu Wathilh Al Libi's
group,w hich had splinteredf rom the LIFG due to disagreementsA. l Libi's group was
linked to Abu Zubaydah' s North African network of facilitators. Abu Wathilh Al Libi is
a reported alias for Abdul Latif Al Libi (variant Wathelal, possibly aka Khaled Al
Madaoui), a one-time senior member of the LIFG. Al Libi was known to attend the
Athariyah mosque at approximately the same time detainee is believed to have an
association with the mosque. The detainee introduced Al Libi to NAEN facilitator, Abu
Nasim. Al Libi, a UBL associateh, ad relocatedf rom Pakistant o Afghanistanb y August
2000.
o (S) In November 2000, Abdul Latif (Abu Wathilh Al Libi) was in Europe enroute
to the UK and appeared to have a working relationship with the North African
network in the UK. With the UK as his destination, Abdul Latif likely has
associations with the Doha group and personnel within the extremist mosques such as
Finsbury Park. (Analyst note: The Doha group was an extremist facilitation network
within the UK directedb y Abu Doha. Abu Doha is suspectedo f conspiracyt o
commit terrorist attacks against the US in association with convicted Millennium
plotter Ahmed Ressam.A bu Doha is also suspectedo f being the architect for an
Algerian terrorist network within Europe.)
o (S) Since members of the Algerian terrorist network passed through the mosque
and are known to have traveled to locations in which detainee resided, and since
detainee had a working association with Abdul Latil detainee likely has associations
with NAEN facilitators and recruits as well. The detainee likely served as a conduit
for the NAEN within Wafa.
o (S/A.{F)D etainee'sa liasi s found on a list of probableA l-Qaida personnelr eceiving
monthly stipends.H is aliasw as also found on Al-Qaida's 11 Septembera ttacksf inancier
Mustafa Al Hawsawi's laptop as an Al-Qaida member receiving family support.
Detainee's probable name was found in the pocket litter of Arab Mujahideen who entered
Croatia from Bosnra rn 1996. One of the mujahid who had his pocket litter confiscated
was Isa Muqrin, leader of the Al-Qaida Muqrin cell in Saudi Arabia responsible for the
beheading of US citizenPaul Johnson.
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422
S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
ContinuedD etention( TRCD) for GuantanamoD etainee,I SN: US9LY-000557DP( S)
o (S/NF) LIFG facilitator Abu Nisim, identified detainee as a neighbor who ran a
Libyan guesthousein Peshawar.
. (S) Detainee uses a variety of counter-interrogation techniques to guide intenogations
and prevent disclosure of information of an incriminating nature. Detainee has willingly
admitted to criminal activity such as drug use, probably in an attempt to show
cooperation,b ut is guardedw hen discussinga ssociatesa nd his activities. There are
numerous inconsistencies and timeline gaps in detainee's story, evident when compared
with other intelligence reporting.
c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior has been generally uncooperative
and aggressive. He has been cited numerous times for failure to comply, harassing guards,
and hostile/incitinga ctivity. Detaineeh ad one assaulto n27 July 2003. Detainee'sm ost
recenti ncident involved harassmenot n 7 March 2005.
6. (S//NF)D etaineeI ntelligenceV alueA ssessment:
a. (S) Assessment: JTFG TMOd eterminethdi sd etaineies of HIGHi ntelligencvea lue.
. (S) Detainee has information on Al-Qaida in Sudan and Central Asia. Additionally,
he has information on the facilities,c apabilities,p ersonnel,a nd operationso f the LIFG
and the NAEN.
b. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
o Al-Wafa NGO
o UBL commercial and militant activities in Sudan
o Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan
o Training - Torkham Camp, trainers, curriculum
o Athariyah Mosque - use by and support to extremist personnel
o Senior personnel - including Abu Zubaidah, Sheikh Isa, and Isa Muqrin and
relationship to extremist elements and terrorist operations
o LIFG and NAEN
o Personnel
o Facilities and locations - guesthousesP, eshawara nd Tribal Areas of support,
training and logistical facilities, Jalalabad and Kabul support structure
o United Kingdom - Personalities and recruiting operations
o Egressa ssistance- providedt o fleeing Al-Qaida and extremistm embersb y
indigenous and foreign parties including the Qadhafi organization and likely the
Lashkar E Tayyiba based on its historical support
6
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422
S E C RE T // NOFORN / I 20300422
JTF GTMO-CG
SUBJECT:U pdateR ecommendatiotno Transfert o the Controlo f AnotherC ountryf or
ContinuedD etention(T RCD)f or GuantanamDoe taineeI,S N: US9LY-000557D(PS )
7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'es nemyc ombatanstt atusw asr eassesseodn 2 Novembe2r 004,
andh e remainsa n enemyc ombatant.
7
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20300422