World War II (5 Viewers)

[TidesofWar]

Tim, The South is always ready for a scrap, and deserves much credit for the expansion and preservation of these United States

 

[timschochet]

The third stunner for Hitler came from General Halder, chief of staff of the Wehrmacht. Franz Halder was one of three Generals closest to Der Fuehrer, but the other two, Jodl and Keitel, were generally sycophantic. Until he was fired in 1942 as a result of one disagreement after another with Hitler, Halder usually expressed his honest opinion, no matter how controversial it was.

In August of 1939, Halder told Hitler bluntly that the Wehrmacht could not both invade Poland and successfully defend the West Wall against the French. The Germans would be left with less than 30 divisions to defend against 100 divisions that the French could throw at them. If Paris was determined, they could be in Berlin and nothing the Germans could do would stop it. He therefore proposed a two year delay in invading Poland until further troops were ready.

(It's important to note here and later that the German Generals usually never protested the morality of Hitler's actions, only whether or not they would be successful. At no point does Halder ever question the invasion of a sovereign nation, only the timing.)

This advice, coming at the same day as the Mussolini letter and the Chamberlain letter, really gave Hitler pause. He decided that he would engage in a diplomatic flurry to see if he could sever Danzig from Poland and have another "Munich" like agreement with Britain and France.

You mean the German generals were subject to civilian control? Interesting.

I'm not sure what you mean by this question. Certainly the generals were subject to Hitler's control. They had all sworn an oath to obey Adolf Hitler in all things.

 

[timschochet]

Tim, The South is always ready for a scrap, and deserves much credit for the expansion and preservation of these United States

I think you're referring to my earlier commentary about the United States Army having lots of Southerners in it. This is absolutely true, and in World War II their contributions are ones you can be proud of.But perhaps not their statements at the time. For instance, in 1942 the state of South Carolina passed a unanimous resolution declaring that "This war is being fought in order to preserve white supremacy and Christianity." But they were brave, that's for sure.

 

[Ozymandias]

The third stunner for Hitler came from General Halder, chief of staff of the Wehrmacht. Franz Halder was one of three Generals closest to Der Fuehrer, but the other two, Jodl and Keitel, were generally sycophantic. Until he was fired in 1942 as a result of one disagreement after another with Hitler, Halder usually expressed his honest opinion, no matter how controversial it was.

In August of 1939, Halder told Hitler bluntly that the Wehrmacht could not both invade Poland and successfully defend the West Wall against the French. The Germans would be left with less than 30 divisions to defend against 100 divisions that the French could throw at them. If Paris was determined, they could be in Berlin and nothing the Germans could do would stop it. He therefore proposed a two year delay in invading Poland until further troops were ready.

(It's important to note here and later that the German Generals usually never protested the morality of Hitler's actions, only whether or not they would be successful. At no point does Halder ever question the invasion of a sovereign nation, only the timing.)

This advice, coming at the same day as the Mussolini letter and the Chamberlain letter, really gave Hitler pause. He decided that he would engage in a diplomatic flurry to see if he could sever Danzig from Poland and have another "Munich" like agreement with Britain and France.

You mean the German generals were subject to civilian control? Interesting.

I'm not sure what you mean by this question. Certainly the generals were subject to Hitler's control. They had all sworn an oath to obey Adolf Hitler in all things.

It was meant to be wry humor. Civilian control ain't always what it's cracked up to be.

 

[ceo3west]

 

[Chadstroma]

The Navy would have been at the mercy of the Luftwaffe in the channel in much the same way a German invasion fleet would have been at the mercy of the RAF. Not enough room to operate.

Yes, it would be devastating to the Royal Navy but with the lack of a surface fleet, it could/should have been very devastating to the invading fleet. Take, for instance, Leyte Gulf. If not for Taffy 3 and some heroic actions by Capt Evans leading the Johnston and some other destroyers and escort destroyers, the Japanese would have inflicted heavy losses on MacArthur's invasion forces. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are great examples of what could happen but they were hunting for the invasion force blindly. The narrow straight of the channel would mean that the Brits would know exactly where the German invasion fleet was. Before they took heavy losses from the air, I think they could have given heavy losses. I am open to being proven wrong though.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Navy would have been at the mercy of the Luftwaffe in the channel in much the same way a German invasion fleet would have been at the mercy of the RAF. Not enough room to operate.

Yes, it would be devastating to the Royal Navy but with the lack of a surface fleet, it could/should have been very devastating to the invading fleet. Take, for instance, Leyte Gulf. If not for Taffy 3 and some heroic actions by Capt Evans leading the Johnston and some other destroyers and escort destroyers, the Japanese would have inflicted heavy losses on MacArthur's invasion forces. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are great examples of what could happen but they were hunting for the invasion force blindly. The narrow straight of the channel would mean that the Brits would know exactly where the German invasion fleet was. Before they took heavy losses from the air, I think they could have given heavy losses. I am open to being proven wrong though.

In Leyte Gulf, the Americans not only had air superiority, but they had air supremacy. And Taffy 3 did have the aircraft, although they did it with smoke and mirrors. For the invasion, the Germans would have brought the Bismarck out (if it was ready--not sure about that). But the British would have had to detach a screen to protect against the Bismarck.

 

[Chadstroma]

The Navy would have been at the mercy of the Luftwaffe in the channel in much the same way a German invasion fleet would have been at the mercy of the RAF. Not enough room to operate.

Yes, it would be devastating to the Royal Navy but with the lack of a surface fleet, it could/should have been very devastating to the invading fleet. Take, for instance, Leyte Gulf. If not for Taffy 3 and some heroic actions by Capt Evans leading the Johnston and some other destroyers and escort destroyers, the Japanese would have inflicted heavy losses on MacArthur's invasion forces. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are great examples of what could happen but they were hunting for the invasion force blindly. The narrow straight of the channel would mean that the Brits would know exactly where the German invasion fleet was. Before they took heavy losses from the air, I think they could have given heavy losses. I am open to being proven wrong though.

In Leyte Gulf, the Americans not only had air superiority, but they had air supremacy. And Taffy 3 did have the aircraft, although they did it with smoke and mirrors. For the invasion, the Germans would have brought the Bismarck out (if it was ready--not sure about that). But the British would have had to detach a screen to protect against the Bismarck.

The Taffy 3 aircraft did not do the damage (granted, mostly because they were not equipped to attack ships but rather for ground support), it was the Johnston and the other Destroyers and Escort Destroyers that basically made suicide runs against the Japanese Center Force. After getting kicked in the face by these destroyers, the Japanese gave up. The escort carriers of Taffy 3 would have been destroyed if not for the heroism of the destroyers. A level of heroism that was far from being 'normal'. It was this uncommon valor that saved the invasion force and not the air power. If they did not happen on Taffy 3 or broke through them, they would have likely lost the whole of Center Force but they would have also significantly damaged the MacArthur's invasion force.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Navy would have been at the mercy of the Luftwaffe in the channel in much the same way a German invasion fleet would have been at the mercy of the RAF. Not enough room to operate.

Yes, it would be devastating to the Royal Navy but with the lack of a surface fleet, it could/should have been very devastating to the invading fleet. Take, for instance, Leyte Gulf. If not for Taffy 3 and some heroic actions by Capt Evans leading the Johnston and some other destroyers and escort destroyers, the Japanese would have inflicted heavy losses on MacArthur's invasion forces. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are great examples of what could happen but they were hunting for the invasion force blindly. The narrow straight of the channel would mean that the Brits would know exactly where the German invasion fleet was. Before they took heavy losses from the air, I think they could have given heavy losses. I am open to being proven wrong though.

In Leyte Gulf, the Americans not only had air superiority, but they had air supremacy. And Taffy 3 did have the aircraft, although they did it with smoke and mirrors. For the invasion, the Germans would have brought the Bismarck out (if it was ready--not sure about that). But the British would have had to detach a screen to protect against the Bismarck.

The Taffy 3 aircraft did not do the damage (granted, mostly because they were not equipped to attack ships but rather for ground support), it was the Johnston and the other Destroyers and Escort Destroyers that basically made suicide runs against the Japanese Center Force. After getting kicked in the face by these destroyers, the Japanese gave up. The escort carriers of Taffy 3 would have been destroyed if not for the heroism of the destroyers. A level of heroism that was far from being 'normal'. It was this uncommon valor that saved the invasion force and not the air power. If they did not happen on Taffy 3 or broke through them, they would have likely lost the whole of Center Force but they would have also significantly damaged the MacArthur's invasion force.

Not exactly immaterial:"The destroyer USS Johnston was the closest to the enemy. On his own initiative, Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans steered his hopelessly outclassed ship into the foe at flank speed. Seeing this, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's screening ships into the fray. Taffy 3's two other destroyers, Hoel and Heermann, and destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts, attacked with suicidal determination, drawing fire and disrupting the Japanese formation as ships turned to avoid their torpedoes.Meanwhile, Thomas Sprague ordered the sixteen carriers in his three task units to launch their aircraft equipped with whatever weapons they had available, even if these were only machine guns or depth charges. He had a total of some 450 aircraft at his disposal, mostly FM-2 Wildcat and TBM Avenger torpedo-bombers. The air counterattacks were almost unceasing, and some, especially several of the strikes launched from Stump's task unit 77.4.2, were relatively heavy."Admiral Kurita felt he was being overwhelmed by attacks coming from all directions, but was convinced that Taffy 3 could only be attacking that way if they were backed up by a major fleet, and so he decided to withdraw. Exceptional heroism on the part of the Americans, great leadership from Admiral Sprague avoided what could have been, as you said, a disaster.

 

[Chadstroma]

The Navy would have been at the mercy of the Luftwaffe in the channel in much the same way a German invasion fleet would have been at the mercy of the RAF. Not enough room to operate.

Yes, it would be devastating to the Royal Navy but with the lack of a surface fleet, it could/should have been very devastating to the invading fleet. Take, for instance, Leyte Gulf. If not for Taffy 3 and some heroic actions by Capt Evans leading the Johnston and some other destroyers and escort destroyers, the Japanese would have inflicted heavy losses on MacArthur's invasion forces. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are great examples of what could happen but they were hunting for the invasion force blindly. The narrow straight of the channel would mean that the Brits would know exactly where the German invasion fleet was. Before they took heavy losses from the air, I think they could have given heavy losses. I am open to being proven wrong though.

In Leyte Gulf, the Americans not only had air superiority, but they had air supremacy. And Taffy 3 did have the aircraft, although they did it with smoke and mirrors. For the invasion, the Germans would have brought the Bismarck out (if it was ready--not sure about that). But the British would have had to detach a screen to protect against the Bismarck.

The Taffy 3 aircraft did not do the damage (granted, mostly because they were not equipped to attack ships but rather for ground support), it was the Johnston and the other Destroyers and Escort Destroyers that basically made suicide runs against the Japanese Center Force. After getting kicked in the face by these destroyers, the Japanese gave up. The escort carriers of Taffy 3 would have been destroyed if not for the heroism of the destroyers. A level of heroism that was far from being 'normal'. It was this uncommon valor that saved the invasion force and not the air power. If they did not happen on Taffy 3 or broke through them, they would have likely lost the whole of Center Force but they would have also significantly damaged the MacArthur's invasion force.

Not exactly immaterial:"The destroyer USS Johnston was the closest to the enemy. On his own initiative, Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans steered his hopelessly outclassed ship into the foe at flank speed. Seeing this, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's screening ships into the fray. Taffy 3's two other destroyers, Hoel and Heermann, and destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts, attacked with suicidal determination, drawing fire and disrupting the Japanese formation as ships turned to avoid their torpedoes.Meanwhile, Thomas Sprague ordered the sixteen carriers in his three task units to launch their aircraft equipped with whatever weapons they had available, even if these were only machine guns or depth charges. He had a total of some 450 aircraft at his disposal, mostly FM-2 Wildcat and TBM Avenger torpedo-bombers. The air counterattacks were almost unceasing, and some, especially several of the strikes launched from Stump's task unit 77.4.2, were relatively heavy."Admiral Kurita felt he was being overwhelmed by attacks coming from all directions, but was convinced that Taffy 3 could only be attacking that way if they were backed up by a major fleet, and so he decided to withdraw. Exceptional heroism on the part of the Americans, great leadership from Admiral Sprague avoided what could have been, as you said, a disaster.

And that does not contradict my comments.

 

[timschochet]

Leyte Gulf has plenty of mysteries.

Why did Admiral Halsey send his entire main fleet north, and leave the San Bernardino Strait undefended?

Why did Admiral Kurita, after risking all to get into the strait, not even attempt to finish the mission he had been given?

The fog of battle is hard to see through, especially looking back after all these years.

 

[timschochet]

Admiral Kurita felt he was being overwhelmed by attacks coming from all directions, but was convinced that Taffy 3 could only be attacking that way if they were backed up by a major fleet, and so he decided to withdraw. Exceptional heroism on the part of the Americans, great leadership from Admiral Sprague avoided what could have been, as you said, a disaster.

The problem with this analysis is that Kurita risked all to get into the strait. He had to attack the shore, even if it meant the destruction of his entire fleet. That was his mission- it was planned from the beginning as a suicide mission. He had to try it, and he didn't.

 

[Ozymandias]

Admiral Kurita felt he was being overwhelmed by attacks coming from all directions, but was convinced that Taffy 3 could only be attacking that way if they were backed up by a major fleet, and so he decided to withdraw. Exceptional heroism on the part of the Americans, great leadership from Admiral Sprague avoided what could have been, as you said, a disaster.

The problem with this analysis is that Kurita risked all to get into the strait. He had to attack the shore, even if it meant the destruction of his entire fleet. That was his mission- it was planned from the beginning as a suicide mission. He had to try it, and he didn't.

I don't see what the problem is. The relentless attacks caused him to abort his mission. He didn't carry out his objective, but that was his decision.

 

[timschochet]

Continuing the commentary of August, 1939:

For two days, between August 23-24, 1939, Hitler pondered. Per secret papers captured after the war, he finally concluded that it was worth the risk to invade Poland because he believed that France would never move beyond it's security of the Maginot Line. It must be said that Adolf Hitler had a brilliant intuitive understanding of the French. He understood them better than any other enemy, certainly better than either the English or Americans, which he did not understand at all. All the way to and even beyond September 1, he believed he could prevent England from declaring war, as he had so many times before.

Summoning Henderson to him, Hitler explained that it was really too bad that things had reached such a state. He had nothing but respect for the British Empire. In fact, once this question of Danzig was settled, he would offer a new peace settlement with England that would ensure "prosperity and good relations between the two nations for the next 100 years." And he solemnly pledged, "Danzig is my last territorial demand in Europe."

(Of course, this was a repeat of so many lies that Hitler had told over the years. The Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland, Prague, Memel- these had all been his "last territorial demand in Europe." And he had reached several "peace settlements" with England over the last few years, most notably at Munich, and had broken them all.)

Yet, according to official records, Henderson gushed with pleasure and agreed that all of this could be solved amiably, so long as force was not used (at which point Hitler growled, "That will be up to the Poles!"). Henderson eagerly agreed to deliver this message at once to Chamberlain and promised there would be a quick, favorable response.

 

[timschochet]

Back in England, Henderson's wire resulted in Chamberlain calling an emergency meeting of his cabinet. Chamberlain himself was eager to accept Hitler's message. Perhaps they could have another Munich style conference, in which Danzig would be awarded to Hitler, and peace would be assured. (He probably had dreams at this point of being welcomed home again as a hero, as he was the previous autumn.) Chamberlain was supported by his old friends Simon and Hoare, three of the famous appeasers that Fleet Street dubbed "The Big Four", the most powerful men in British government.

But the fourth member, Lord Halifax, hesitated at this crucial moment. He recognized that public opinion had reversed drastically since the time of Munich. The British public wanted no more concessions to Hitler, and this was reflected in the House of Commons. Perhaps Halifax saw the writing on the wall: if Chamberlain went forward with yet another compromise at this point, the government might fall. Halifax, backed up by Alexander Cadogan, said that the only response should be what was already in the letter they had sent a few days ago- a firm commitment to the Polish borders as they now stood. The cabinet broke up in disagreeement, with nothing resolved.

Meanwhile, Hermann Goering decided to make his own play for peace. Whether or not this was with the knowledge or agreement of Hitler, history does not record. He contacted a shady Swedish businessman named Birger Dahlerus and had him fly to London with this private message for Chamberlain: he, Goering, would do anything to preserve the peace between the two nations. What must be done?

For the next week, this unknown amateur Dahlerus would be at the very center of world politics, attempting to mediate between the two powers, and taken seriously on all sides.

 

[dickey moe]

Huge WWII fan. I can watch almost anything on the subject. In fact, I just watched episode one of the History Channel's documentary,"D-DAY" via Netflix.As much of a fan as I am, I know so little.I will say it is the most interesting war of them all imo. Everything from the mass collective effort put forth by the allies, to the amazingly evil/cool uniforms the Germans wore, the weapons, everything.One of the most intriguing aspects is the way everybody improvised on the fly. Just amazing if you really think about it.

Interesting that there will probably never be another World War that relies so much on simple manpower.

 

[timschochet]

In Germany, all the newspapers were controlled by Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda. There now in late August began a campaign of lies about Polish atrocities. Poles were accused daily of raping German women, sodomizing German children, and basically being brutal. And this headline:

"THIS PLAYING WITH FIRE GOING TO FAR- GERMAN PLANE FULL OF CIVILIANS SHOT DOWN OVER WARSAW!" According to the story that followed, the plane's survivors were dragged off and shot while Polish policeman looked on and laughed.

Of course, nothing of the sort was happening. In fact, Polish officials were on notice to handle all ethnic Germans then living in Poland with kid gloves, so as not to give the Nazis any excuse. As if it mattered.

Goebbels intended to incite the German public to an incredible rage so that they would support any move Hitler made. And yet...

It is a highly significant fact that the German public did not want war. Unlike 1914, when they celebrated the outbreak of war with parades and mass hysteria, they were highly reluctant this time around. It's true they supported and generally adored Adolf Hitler for all of his territorial gains, but these had been done peacefully. They despised the Poles and welcomed the chance for revenge of the Danzig question, but war with England and France? Another 4 years in the trenches? Despite Hitler and Goebbels assuring them it would not be that way this time around, strong anecdotal evidence from one interview after another with common Germans suggests that they didn't really believe it. And worst of all, at the back of their minds, was a single, simple fear: they could never defeat England, because in the end, the United States would not let that happen. When America stepped in last time, Germany was lost. If America stepped in this time, Germany would be lost. Therefore, it was suicide to go to war with England.

However, there was no question of revolt or rebellion among the German public at this time. They had given their souls to a mad, evil genius, and they would follow him over the precipice. But they were not enthusiastic about it.

 

[DCThunder]

2. Being Jewish, my whole family has always assumed that Charles Lindbergh was anti-Semtic. I myself am not so sure. He was certainly isolationist and very nearly pro-German. Henry Ford's views were not at all influential during the late 1930's. And Father Coughlin's day had passed around 1936. America in 1939 was not especially anti-Semitic, from what I've been able to raad.

From the Widipedia entry on Father Coughlin...On November 20, 1938, two weeks after Kristallnacht, when Jews across Germany were attacked and killed, and Jewish businesses, homes and synagogues burned, Coughlin said "Jewish persecution only followed after Christians first were persecuted."[17] After this speech, and as his programs became more antisemitic, some radio stations, including those in New York and Chicago, began refusing to air his speeches without pre-approved scripts; in New York, his programs were cancelled by WINS and WMCA, leaving Coughlin to broadcasting on the Newark part-time station WHBI. This made Coughlin a hero in Nazi Germany, where papers ran headlines claiming "America Is Not Allowed to Hear the Truth". On December 18, 1938 two thousand of Coughlin's followers marched in New York protesting potential asylum law changes that would allow more Jews (including refugees from Hitler's persecution) into the US, chanting, "Send Jews back where they came from in leaky boats!" and "Wait until Hitler comes over here!" The protests continued for several months. Donald Warren, using information from the FBI and German government archives, has also argued that Coughlin received indirect funding from Nazi Germany during this period.[18]

After 1936, Coughlin began supporting an organization called the Christian Front, which claimed him as an inspiration. In January 1940, the Christian Front was shut down when the FBI discovered the group was arming itself and "planning to murder Jews, communists, and 'a dozen Congressmen'"[19] and eventually establish, in J. Edgar Hoover's words, "a dictatorship, similar to the Hitler dictatorship in Germany". Coughlin publicly stated, after the plot was discovered, that he still did not "disassociate himself from the movement", and though he was never linked directly to the plot, his reputation suffered a fatal decline.[20]

 

[timschochet]

2. Being Jewish, my whole family has always assumed that Charles Lindbergh was anti-Semtic. I myself am not so sure. He was certainly isolationist and very nearly pro-German. Henry Ford's views were not at all influential during the late 1930's. And Father Coughlin's day had passed around 1936. America in 1939 was not especially anti-Semitic, from what I've been able to raad.

From the Widipedia entry on Father Coughlin...On November 20, 1938, two weeks after Kristallnacht, when Jews across Germany were attacked and killed, and Jewish businesses, homes and synagogues burned, Coughlin said "Jewish persecution only followed after Christians first were persecuted."[17] After this speech, and as his programs became more antisemitic, some radio stations, including those in New York and Chicago, began refusing to air his speeches without pre-approved scripts; in New York, his programs were cancelled by WINS and WMCA, leaving Coughlin to broadcasting on the Newark part-time station WHBI. This made Coughlin a hero in Nazi Germany, where papers ran headlines claiming "America Is Not Allowed to Hear the Truth". On December 18, 1938 two thousand of Coughlin's followers marched in New York protesting potential asylum law changes that would allow more Jews (including refugees from Hitler's persecution) into the US, chanting, "Send Jews back where they came from in leaky boats!" and "Wait until Hitler comes over here!" The protests continued for several months. Donald Warren, using information from the FBI and German government archives, has also argued that Coughlin received indirect funding from Nazi Germany during this period.[18]

After 1936, Coughlin began supporting an organization called the Christian Front, which claimed him as an inspiration. In January 1940, the Christian Front was shut down when the FBI discovered the group was arming itself and "planning to murder Jews, communists, and 'a dozen Congressmen'"[19] and eventually establish, in J. Edgar Hoover's words, "a dictatorship, similar to the Hitler dictatorship in Germany". Coughlin publicly stated, after the plot was discovered, that he still did not "disassociate himself from the movement", and though he was never linked directly to the plot, his reputation suffered a fatal decline.[20]

According to The Glory and The Dream, Coughlin's greatest level of popularity was between 1933-1936. He certainly did not wait until 1938 to be openly anti-Semitic. As early as 1935, he publicly referred to the New Deal as "The Jew Deal". In any case, by 1939 he was not considered an influential figure in American politics. Coughlin's greatest influence, IMO, was that he was the first demagogue to grasp how mass media was an instrument best used to spread populist ideas. Others to follow in American history would refine Coughlin's basic message, remove the extremism and anti-Semtism, but continue with the populism: Joe McCarthy, George Wallace, Spiro Agnew, and now Bill O'Reilly are all the heirs of Coughlin's basic design.

 

[jamny]

 

[PatsWillWin]

Let's step it up Tim.

 

[Christo]

Leyte Gulf has plenty of mysteries. Why did Admiral Halsey send his entire main fleet north, and leave the San Bernardino Strait undefended?

[Marko Ramius]I know this book. Your conclusions were all wrong, Ryan. Halsey acted stupidly.[/Marko Ramius]

 

[Christo]

WWII related trivia:

What happened on this day in 1934?

 

[Ozymandias]

Leyte Gulf has plenty of mysteries. Why did Admiral Halsey send his entire main fleet north, and leave the San Bernardino Strait undefended?

[Marko Ramius]I know this book. Your conclusions were all wrong, Ryan. Halsey acted stupidly.[/Marko Ramius]

Ramius knows stuff.However, to be fair to Halsey, part of the problem was divided command. The US Navy had one major objective: Find the Japanese fleet(s) and inflict major damage. The US Army had one major objective: land troops on Mindanao and begin the expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippines. Halsey failed to realize that for a few days, the Army's major objective was #1, and should be subordinate to the Navy's major objective. So he uncovered the landings in order to pursue the Japanese.

 

[Ozymandias]

So we're probably up to the time when Goebbels announces that Poland has invaded Nazi Germany, but the German troops are fighting a gallant defensive battle to stop them.

 

[timschochet]

So we're probably up to the time when Goebbels announces that Poland has invaded Nazi Germany, but the German troops are fighting a gallant defensive battle to stop them.

I was going to get to that later tonight. I'm trying to pace myself. First, to finish with Chamberlain, Dahlerus, and Henderson:Chamberlain enthusiastically welcomed Dahlerus but kept the visit secret from the rest of his cabinet, whom he must have felt he could no longer trust. Privately he put forth this question which he wanted Dahlerus to ask Hitler: if Poland simply surrendered control of the Danzig corridor, would that end this crisis? Dahlerus, speaking for Hitler, assured him that it would. Chamberlain, speaking for the Polish government, assured Dahlerus that this is what would happen. Eagerly Dahlerus flew back to Berlin, believing he had secured the peace.

The fact of this conversation is so difficult to believe that it boggles the mind 70 years later. How could Chamberlain believe a Swedish businessman, and not Hitler himself? How could Dahlerus, who had never even met Hitler, presume to speak for Der Fuehrer, who in any event was only using Danzig as an excuse to take out all of Poland? The one non surprise is that Chamberlain would presume to speak for the Polish government without consultation. He had previously done the same a year earlier with the Czech government.

Having given this answer to Dahlerus, Chamberlain then met with his cabinet again, and agreed to give a tough reply to Hitler: no concessions. If the Polish government wanted to have talks with the Germans, the British would welcome that. But the British would put no pressure on the Poles, and if Germany invaded, England would declare war. Chamberlain's main biographer, Keith Feeling, believes at this point that Chamberlain's about face was not so much deliberately deceptive as much as he simply couldn't make up his mind and swung violently between positions.

The message was sent to Henderson, who refused to deliver it. Instead, this Nazi lover visited Ribbentrop, and told him that the cabinet was hoping to make the Poles "shape up", and requested a formal list of demands for negotiaton.

 

[timschochet]

At the time that all of this was going on, Winston Churchill was out of power. He had been in the political wilderness since 1930 when he had resigned from the leadership of the Conservative Party over the issue of India. During the 1930's, Churchill had repeatedly warned against Germany, for rearmament and for strengthening of the League of Nations (his main battle cry was "Arms and the Covenant".) He wanted action when the Rhineland was occuppied. He had pleaded for intervention to stop the Anchluss of Austria, and he fought bitterly against Munich and for an alliance with the Soviet Union. Churchill had been proved right time and time again, and by this time Chamberlain detested him. Yet all knew that if England went to war, Churchill could not be kept out of the cabinet, because he was England's most able war minister. Even so, he was heavily distrusted by the public. They blamed him for the defeat at Gallilpoli (not really his fault) for the general strike of 1926 (somewhat his fault) and the Labor party blamed him for the police breakup of an early 20th century strike at Tonypandy. Churchill was considered brilliant but erratic. Yet people felt that here was someone who was not afraid of Hitler.

In August 1939, Churchill spent the last weeks before the war furiously attempting to finish The History of the English Speaking Peoples, his magnum opus history. Though he toiled day and night from Chartwell (often reciting words to his secretary while performing somersalts in his bath) he would fail, and it would not be published until after the war.

 

[timschochet]

What Ozymandius referred to was an SS plan called "Canned Goods". It was originally conceived around August 25, and executed on August 31. The idea was Hitler's. He told Himmler that he needed a clear excuse for the invasion to use with the German people, especially if the result was war with England and France. Himmler ordered Heydrich to see to it, and this unsavory character, who would gain illfame as one of the great muderers in history, came up with a plan. Several Poles were captured, drugged, and placed in a radio station at Gleiwitz, on the border with Poland. The SS then shot all the Germans working at the radio station and shot the Poles as well. Goebbels went on the air and announced that Germany had been attacked by the Poles, and here was the proof!

Six years later at Nuremberg most of the German generals denied any knowledge of these actions by the SS. This may or may not be true. The whole question of how complicit the Wehrmacht was in SS and Gestapo activities is controversial to this day.

 

[timschochet]

Back to the narrative: Hitler got a report from Ribbentrop of Henderson's reply. A day later, he heard from Goering for the first time about Dahlerus and the Swede was invited in to meet Der Fuehrer. Dahlerus then made one concession after another to Hitler on behalf of the British and the Poles, going much farther than Chamberlain had ever agreed to and assuring Hitler that he spoke with the "full authority of the leadership of both countries." (Dahlerus had never been to Poland, nor had he ever met with a Polish official at any level.)

(After the war at Nuremberg, Birger Dahlerus testified that he had been forced to exxagerate his own influence slightly here but for a worthy effort: to prevent conflcit. The prosecutors there were skeptical of this.)

With this "information" in hand, the important question becomes did Hitler ever really consider trying to reach a Munich like compromise over Danzig at this juncture in history? We have no evidence to prove ths one way or another. We know that within 48 hours of his meeting with Dahlerus, he had irrevocably decided to invade Poland. The invasion for Poland had to begin no later than September 1; otherwise weather conditions might get in the way of the troop movements. But the knowledge that he possibly could have Danzig without a military invasion must have tempted him.

In the end, however, it was all an illusion and perhaps Hitler sensed this. Despite the dreams of Dahlerus, Henderson, and Chamberlain, the time for appeasement had passed. IMO, if Chamberlain had ever publicly proposed a settlement plan similar to Munich, he would have been thrown out of office by an uprising in the House of Commons, which is exactly what would happen to him the following April. The British public was determined at that point that there would be no more giving in to Hitler.

Even so, as we shall see, the Nazis attempted one last strategy to try and avoid war with England on the final day of peace...

 

[Chadstroma]

However, to be fair to Halsey, part of the problem was divided command. The US Navy had one major objective: Find the Japanese fleet(s) and inflict major damage. The US Army had one major objective: land troops on Mindanao and begin the expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippines. Halsey failed to realize that for a few days, the Army's major objective was #1, and should be subordinate to the Navy's major objective. So he uncovered the landings in order to pursue the Japanese.

It is a good point about the divided command. MacArthur had command of the invasion force and Kincaid reported to him. Hulsey reported to Nimitz who was all the way back at Pearl. Hulsey just wanted those carriers and went after them. Sure, he sunk the last carriers the Japanese Navy had but he almost gambled the entire invasion force of the Philippines away in the process. The only thing that kept Hulsey being one of the most hated commanders in US history is the brave efforts of Taffy 3 that eventually repulsed a ridiculously superior Japanese force that only withdrew because of the belief that such efforts had to mean they were backed by the larger American fleet.

 

[Ozymandias]

However, to be fair to Halsey, part of the problem was divided command. The US Navy had one major objective: Find the Japanese fleet(s) and inflict major damage. The US Army had one major objective: land troops on Mindanao and begin the expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippines. Halsey failed to realize that for a few days, the Army's major objective was #1, and should be subordinate to the Navy's major objective. So he uncovered the landings in order to pursue the Japanese.

It is a good point about the divided command. MacArthur had command of the invasion force and Kincaid reported to him. Hulsey reported to Nimitz who was all the way back at Pearl. Hulsey just wanted those carriers and went after them. Sure, he sunk the last carriers the Japanese Navy had but he almost gambled the entire invasion force of the Philippines away in the process. The only thing that kept Hulsey being one of the most hated commanders in US history is the brave efforts of Taffy 3 that eventually repulsed a ridiculously superior Japanese force that only withdrew because of the belief that such efforts had to mean they were backed by the larger American fleet.

Actually, Halsey pulled off a Duke of York maneuver, which was satirized in the ditty:The Grand old Duke of YorkHe had ten thousand menHe marched them up to the top of the hillAnd he marched them down again.Almost in range of Admiral Ozawa's force (which was a decoy), he turned his fleet back toward the battle at Samar (Taffy 3), arriving once it was all over. So he didn't get the carriers, and he almost was the cause of the greatest naval landing disaster in history. But, divided command and poor communications led to the misunderstandings.

 

[Chadstroma]

However, to be fair to Halsey, part of the problem was divided command. The US Navy had one major objective: Find the Japanese fleet(s) and inflict major damage. The US Army had one major objective: land troops on Mindanao and begin the expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippines. Halsey failed to realize that for a few days, the Army's major objective was #1, and should be subordinate to the Navy's major objective. So he uncovered the landings in order to pursue the Japanese.

It is a good point about the divided command. MacArthur had command of the invasion force and Kincaid reported to him. Hulsey reported to Nimitz who was all the way back at Pearl. Hulsey just wanted those carriers and went after them. Sure, he sunk the last carriers the Japanese Navy had but he almost gambled the entire invasion force of the Philippines away in the process. The only thing that kept Hulsey being one of the most hated commanders in US history is the brave efforts of Taffy 3 that eventually repulsed a ridiculously superior Japanese force that only withdrew because of the belief that such efforts had to mean they were backed by the larger American fleet.

Actually, Halsey pulled off a Duke of York maneuver, which was satirized in the ditty:The Grand old Duke of YorkHe had ten thousand menHe marched them up to the top of the hillAnd he marched them down again.Almost in range of Admiral Ozawa's force (which was a decoy), he turned his fleet back toward the battle at Samar (Taffy 3), arriving once it was all over. So he didn't get the carriers, and he almost was the cause of the greatest naval landing disaster in history. But, divided command and poor communications led to the misunderstandings.

Ozawa's "Northern Force" comprised four aircraft carriers (Zuikaku — the last survivor of the six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 — the light carriers Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers (Hyūga and Ise — the two after turrets had been replaced by a hangar, aircraft handling deck and catapult, but neither battleship carried any aircraft in this battle), three light cruisers (Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. His force had only 108 aircraft.[3]Ozawa's force was not located until 16:40 on 24 October, largely because Sherman's Task Group 38.3, which as the northernmost of Halsey's groups was responsible for searches in this sector, had been too involved with attacking Kurita and defending itself against the air strikes from Luzon. On the evening of 24 October Ozawa intercepted an American signal describing Kurita's withdrawal. He therefore began to withdraw his force as well, but at 20:00 Soemu Toyoda ordered all forces to the attack, 'counting on divine assistance'. Ozawa therefore turned southwards again—towards Third Fleet.Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, and was determined to seize what he saw as an almost perfect opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Japanese Center Force had been neutralized by Third Fleet's air strikes on 24 October in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring to Brunei, Halsey radioed "Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn."[3]The force which Halsey was taking north with him — three groups of Mitscher's Task Force 38 — was overwhelmingly stronger than the Japanese Northern Force. Between them these groups had five large fleet carriers (Intrepid, Franklin, Lexington, Enterprise, and Essex), five light fleet carriers (Independence, Belleau Wood, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto), six battleships (Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington), eight cruisers (two heavy and six light), and more than forty destroyers. The air groups of the ten US carriers present contained a total of more than six hundred to one thousand aircraft.[3]At 02:40 on 25 October Halsey detached Task Force 34, built around the Third Fleet's six battleships and commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. As the dawn approached the ships of Task Force 34 drew ahead of the carrier groups. Halsey intended Mitscher to make air strikes followed by the heavy gunfire of Lee's battleships.[3]The crew of Zuikaku salute as the flag is lowered, and the Zuikaku ceases to be the flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy.Around dawn on 25 October Ozawa launched 75 aircraft to attack the Third Fleet. Most were shot down by American combat air patrols, and no damage was done to the US ships. A few Japanese planes survived and made their way to land bases on Luzon.During the night Halsey had passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Admiral Mitscher, who ordered the American carrier groups to launch their first strike wave, of 180 aircraft, at dawn—before the Northern Force had been located. When the search aircraft made contact at 07:10 this strike wave was orbiting ahead of the task force. At 08:00, as the attack went in, its escorting fighters destroyed Ozawa's combat air patrol of about 30 planes. The US air strikes continued until the evening, by which time Task Force 38 had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, sinking Zuikaku, the light carriers Chitose and Zuihō, and the destroyer Akitsuki. The light carrier Chiyoda and the cruiser Tama were crippled. Ozawa transferred his flag to the light cruiser Ōyodo.

 

[Ozymandias]

However, to be fair to Halsey, part of the problem was divided command. The US Navy had one major objective: Find the Japanese fleet(s) and inflict major damage. The US Army had one major objective: land troops on Mindanao and begin the expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippines. Halsey failed to realize that for a few days, the Army's major objective was #1, and should be subordinate to the Navy's major objective. So he uncovered the landings in order to pursue the Japanese.

It is a good point about the divided command. MacArthur had command of the invasion force and Kincaid reported to him. Hulsey reported to Nimitz who was all the way back at Pearl. Hulsey just wanted those carriers and went after them. Sure, he sunk the last carriers the Japanese Navy had but he almost gambled the entire invasion force of the Philippines away in the process. The only thing that kept Hulsey being one of the most hated commanders in US history is the brave efforts of Taffy 3 that eventually repulsed a ridiculously superior Japanese force that only withdrew because of the belief that such efforts had to mean they were backed by the larger American fleet.

Actually, Halsey pulled off a Duke of York maneuver, which was satirized in the ditty:The Grand old Duke of YorkHe had ten thousand menHe marched them up to the top of the hillAnd he marched them down again.Almost in range of Admiral Ozawa's force (which was a decoy), he turned his fleet back toward the battle at Samar (Taffy 3), arriving once it was all over. So he didn't get the carriers, and he almost was the cause of the greatest naval landing disaster in history. But, divided command and poor communications led to the misunderstandings.

Ozawa's "Northern Force" comprised four aircraft carriers (Zuikaku — the last survivor of the six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 — the light carriers Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers (Hyūga and Ise — the two after turrets had been replaced by a hangar, aircraft handling deck and catapult, but neither battleship carried any aircraft in this battle), three light cruisers (Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. His force had only 108 aircraft.[3]Ozawa's force was not located until 16:40 on 24 October, largely because Sherman's Task Group 38.3, which as the northernmost of Halsey's groups was responsible for searches in this sector, had been too involved with attacking Kurita and defending itself against the air strikes from Luzon. On the evening of 24 October Ozawa intercepted an American signal describing Kurita's withdrawal. He therefore began to withdraw his force as well, but at 20:00 Soemu Toyoda ordered all forces to the attack, 'counting on divine assistance'. Ozawa therefore turned southwards again—towards Third Fleet.Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, and was determined to seize what he saw as an almost perfect opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Japanese Center Force had been neutralized by Third Fleet's air strikes on 24 October in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring to Brunei, Halsey radioed "Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn."[3]The force which Halsey was taking north with him — three groups of Mitscher's Task Force 38 — was overwhelmingly stronger than the Japanese Northern Force. Between them these groups had five large fleet carriers (Intrepid, Franklin, Lexington, Enterprise, and Essex), five light fleet carriers (Independence, Belleau Wood, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto), six battleships (Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington), eight cruisers (two heavy and six light), and more than forty destroyers. The air groups of the ten US carriers present contained a total of more than six hundred to one thousand aircraft.[3]At 02:40 on 25 October Halsey detached Task Force 34, built around the Third Fleet's six battleships and commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. As the dawn approached the ships of Task Force 34 drew ahead of the carrier groups. Halsey intended Mitscher to make air strikes followed by the heavy gunfire of Lee's battleships.[3]The crew of Zuikaku salute as the flag is lowered, and the Zuikaku ceases to be the flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy.Around dawn on 25 October Ozawa launched 75 aircraft to attack the Third Fleet. Most were shot down by American combat air patrols, and no damage was done to the US ships. A few Japanese planes survived and made their way to land bases on Luzon.During the night Halsey had passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Admiral Mitscher, who ordered the American carrier groups to launch their first strike wave, of 180 aircraft, at dawn—before the Northern Force had been located. When the search aircraft made contact at 07:10 this strike wave was orbiting ahead of the task force. At 08:00, as the attack went in, its escorting fighters destroyed Ozawa's combat air patrol of about 30 planes. The US air strikes continued until the evening, by which time Task Force 38 had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, sinking Zuikaku, the light carriers Chitose and Zuihō, and the destroyer Akitsuki. The light carrier Chiyoda and the cruiser Tama were crippled. Ozawa transferred his flag to the light cruiser Ōyodo.

I stand corrected. I was going on memory, and I though Ozawa had gotten away.

 

[Chadstroma]

I stand corrected. I was going on memory, and I though Ozawa had gotten away.

To be fair, I had to look up the details. All that I remembered was that the final 4 carriers were sunk during this engagement and that the carriers were used as bait as the Japanese had no air crews to make them useful anymore.

 

[Ozymandias]

I stand corrected. I was going on memory, and I though Ozawa had gotten away.

To be fair, I had to look up the details. All that I remembered was that the final 4 carriers were sunk during this engagement and that the carriers were used as bait as the Japanese had no air crews to make them useful anymore.

Yeah, the Marianas Turkey shoot had decimated their air crews. I understand that at this time, the US Navy had more ships than the Japanese had serviceable airplanes.

 

[timschochet]

August 24-28, 1939

The desperate week of diplomacy had acheived no results whatsoever. No reply had come from the Wilhelmstrasse regarding the idea that Hitler might accept Danzig peacefully. Nonetheless, the British were applying a ton of pressure on the Polish government to give up Danzig anyway, in the hope that this gesture would calm the Germans down. The Poles refused.

Was the Polish government brave? Obstinate? Foolhardy? Probably all of the above. They sincerely believed in the strength of their armed forces (though how they could possibly do so is difficult to fathom 70 years later.) They thought they were the military equal of Nazi Germany, and with France and England on their side, they could not lose. The Polish army mobilized. Three million men went to arms.

For the three and half million Jews who lived in Poland, there really was no choice. They were hated by their Christian neighbors and suffered terribly under anti-Semitic laws. They had lived through three centuries of mistreatment, and had never been accepted by the Poles as citizens. Yet, the Nazis were worse. The Jews willingly joined up- half a million were among those to now join the Polish army. There was no question Poland would fight for its freedom.

 

[timschochet]

August 29, 1939

Ribbentrop summoned Henderson to his office, and proceeded to inform him that the Reich government had decided to offer Poland a series of proposals to avoid war. To say that Henderson was relieved is understating it. Henderson, according to German records, gushed with happiness and said how much he admired Ribbentrop and Hitler and let it be known that whatever the demands were, he was sure they could be met. (Henderson does not mention these comments in his memoirs, appropriately titled Failure of a Mission).

Ribbentrop then stood up and proceeded to recite 16 separate demands, in an offhand manner, as fast as he could. One of these was the immediate appearance by tommorow of a Polish diplomat with full plenipotentary powers to negotiate. Of course, this was absurd and impossible. Henderson made no objection however, just listened, assuming he would be given the demands in writing. This did not happen.

The whole meeting was a final ruse by Hitler, an attempt to give the British a face-saving way out of declaring war once the invasion started. The idea was to make a series of demands that could not possibly be met, and then when they failed to comply it would be their own fault. (In his speech to the Reichstag the day of the invasion, Hitler referred to "several reasonable proposals" he had given the British and Poles, which had not been responded to. "I did everything I could to preserve the peace!" He cried.)

Henderson went to his offices, expecting to receive a copy of the demands. When these were not forthcoming, he desperately paced back and forth, trying to recall all of the different points. But within a few hours he saved, by- guess who? Birger Dahlerus, who just happened to have a copy of the 16 points in his hands.

Dahlerus was given the document by Goering, who broke Hitler's direct orders in an attempt to sabatoge his rival Ribbentrop, whom he couldn't stand. Goering was also playing a very dangerous game here which he would continue all through 1939 and part of 1940: In the event of a German defeat, he wanted to be thought of by the British as the one member of the current government who wanted peace. He hoped therefore to survive the fall of his Fuehrer.

Henderson immediately took the document to Joseph Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, who doubted they would be accepted by the Polish government. At this point, according to Lipski, Henderson committed what can only be termed treason to the British Empire. Without any consultation with his government, he informed Lipski that if the Poles did not agree, Britain would not feel bound to honor their guarantee of Poland. Shocked, Lipski replied he would contact Warsaw at once.

 

[Chadstroma]

I stand corrected. I was going on memory, and I though Ozawa had gotten away.

To be fair, I had to look up the details. All that I remembered was that the final 4 carriers were sunk during this engagement and that the carriers were used as bait as the Japanese had no air crews to make them useful anymore.

Yeah, the Marianas Turkey shoot had decimated their air crews. I understand that at this time, the US Navy had more ships than the Japanese had serviceable airplanes.

And even less qualified and experienced pilots to fly them.

 

[timschochet]

August 30, 1939

In Warsaw, the Polish government met in emergency session. They agreed to send a special diplomat to Berlin with full powers, but they did not agree to turn over Danzig, which of course was the basis of German demands. They issued a question to the French and British embassies: was Henderson telling the truth? Would France and England honor their agreements?

At this moment both governments responded in a shameful manner. The British Foreign Office under Lord Halifax acknowledged that Henderson had made his statement without any authority from the British Goverment. Yet when pressed to give an absolute assurance, he hesitated, and refused to do so. This despite the fact that England had signed a pact with Poland only a week before guaranteeing to declare war! All Halifax would say at this juncture is that England would act "as circumstances warranted."

Meanwhile, the French government under Bonnet, the foreign minister, told their ambassador in Warsaw to assure the Poles that the minute German troops entered Warsaw, the French would immediately counterattack the West Wall. This was a complete lie. General Gamelin had already informed the French government that such an attack would be "impossible and suicidal" (Much more on this later.) Bonnet had decided to lie to the Poles because, as he stated after the war, it would "pick up their spirits."

Under British pressure, the Poles decided to save time by making Ambassador Lipski the diplomat to negotiate with the Germans, as he was already in Berlin. The wire reached Lipski that afternoon and he immediately sought an audience with Ribbentrop. However, Ribbentrop stalled him, suggesting that "it could wait until the morning." This was despite the fact that one of the 16 demands was that the negotiator appear in Berlin on that very day.

 

[Mjolnirs]

Tim, The South is always ready for a scrap, and deserves much credit for the expansion and preservation of these United States

I think you're referring to my earlier commentary about the United States Army having lots of Southerners in it. This is absolutely true, and in World War II their contributions are ones you can be proud of.But perhaps not their statements at the time. For instance, in 1942 the state of South Carolina passed a unanimous resolution declaring that "This war is being fought in order to preserve white supremacy and Christianity."

But they were brave, that's for sure.

Wow, I've never heard this before. Source?

 

[Ozymandias]

Tim, The South is always ready for a scrap, and deserves much credit for the expansion and preservation of these United States

I think you're referring to my earlier commentary about the United States Army having lots of Southerners in it. This is absolutely true, and in World War II their contributions are ones you can be proud of.But perhaps not their statements at the time. For instance, in 1942 the state of South Carolina passed a unanimous resolution declaring that "This war is being fought in order to preserve white supremacy and Christianity."

But they were brave, that's for sure.

Wow, I've never heard this before. Source?

Whether or not it is true, it is in keeping with generalized feeling in the South, particularly South Carolina. We all reflect the prejudices of our time. We just have different ones today than they did back then.

 

[timschochet]

Tim, The South is always ready for a scrap, and deserves much credit for the expansion and preservation of these United States

I think you're referring to my earlier commentary about the United States Army having lots of Southerners in it. This is absolutely true, and in World War II their contributions are ones you can be proud of.But perhaps not their statements at the time. For instance, in 1942 the state of South Carolina passed a unanimous resolution declaring that "This war is being fought in order to preserve white supremacy and Christianity."

But they were brave, that's for sure.

Wow, I've never heard this before. Source?

The Glory And The Dream by William Manchester

 

[timschochet]

August 31, 2009- The Last Day of Peace

There was a lull over most of Europe. The crisis had been going on for several days, and no one expected that it would end soon. But the news of Henderson and Lipski meeting with Ribbentrop was now all over the news in most capitals, so most people figured some sort of deal was in the works. In particular the Polish Army relaxed, clearly not expecting any sudden attack.

Meanwhile the SS plan I described earlier was in full operation. The Polish prisoners had already been captured and were en route to the radio station. And the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe already had their orders and would begin moving shortly after midnight. Only the direct word of Hitler could stop an attack now.

At ten that morning Lipski met with Ribbentrop, with Henderson there as well. Ribbentrop curtly asked Lipski if the Poles agreed to all of the demands. Lipski started to respond that the demands could form the basis for discussion, and Ribbentrop cut him off. "You have shown your unwillingness to work with us from the beginning!" he shouted. "The die is cast!" And two minutes after the meeting began, Ribbentrop left the room.

True to form, Henderson spent the rest of the day not warning his government that war was imminent, but instead begging Lipski to agree to the demands of the Germans. Lipski of course had no power to do so. Has there ever been a more incompetant ambassador as Nevile Henderson at such a key moment in world history?

Ribbentrop returned to Hitler and again assured him that the ploy was successful, and that England would never declare war. He told Der Fuehrer that he, Ribbentrop, understood the English. They were all cowards like this Henderson, and there was absolutely NO fear of reprisal. Reassured, Hitler relaxed. He thought he would have Poland and there would be no war.

 

[timschochet]

I have now completed my narration of the events of August, 1939. If anyone is bothering to read this, should I wait until next month to describe the events of September? Or should I simply continue now and not try to match this to 70 years ago month by month? Or is this just boring stuff nobody wants to read and I should just stop? Please let me know.

 

[Ozymandias]

The irony of this all is, of course, that Britain and France caved in to Hitler when they had a chance to stop him, and finally stood up to him when they had no chance to stop him without the expenditure of huge amounts of money and blood.

It worked out in the end; but what a monumental tragedy for millions.

 

[Mopap]

I have now completed my narration of the events of August, 1939. If anyone is bothering to read this, should I wait until next month to describe the events of September? Or should I simply continue now and not try to match this to 70 years ago month by month? Or is this just boring stuff nobody wants to read and I should just stop? Please let me know.

I, for one, am fansinated. Please continue. This has even gotten me to thinking about my fathers role during WWII about which he was very secretive. I know where he worked, but he never would say exactly what he did, brushing it off as "I trained some army engineers."

 

[Ozymandias]

I have now completed my narration of the events of August, 1939. If anyone is bothering to read this, should I wait until next month to describe the events of September? Or should I simply continue now and not try to match this to 70 years ago month by month? Or is this just boring stuff nobody wants to read and I should just stop? Please let me know.

I find it fascinating. But I suspect that an hour by hour recital of the next six years might take us almost six years to get through.

 

[Joseph]

I have now completed my narration of the events of August, 1939. If anyone is bothering to read this, should I wait until next month to describe the events of September? Or should I simply continue now and not try to match this to 70 years ago month by month? Or is this just boring stuff nobody wants to read and I should just stop? Please let me know.

I haven't chimed in yet, but I'm following along and am definitely enjoying the history lesson. As far as I'm concerned, keep going as long as you've got the initiative to do so. That said, if you'd rather stick to the month by month stuff, that's cool too, I'm going to follow along regardless.

 

[timschochet]

I have now completed my narration of the events of August, 1939. If anyone is bothering to read this, should I wait until next month to describe the events of September? Or should I simply continue now and not try to match this to 70 years ago month by month? Or is this just boring stuff nobody wants to read and I should just stop? Please let me know.

I find it fascinating. But I suspect that an hour by hour recital of the next six years might take us almost six years to get through.

It won't be a day by day thing for too much longer. But the days just before and just after the war began deserve special attention I think. I'm glad you guys find it interesting; I'll go ahead and continue with September 1 shortly.

 

[timschochet]

September 1-3, 1939 Part One

Before I get to the actual invasion of Poland, I want to continue the narrative from the British and French perspective, because it's a continuing testament to cowardice and incompetence, although there are a few exceptions which still shine brightly 70 years later:

The news that the Germans had invaded Poland hit the wires by the morning of September 1, and were flashed all around the world. Everyone expected the British and French to immediately declare war. But from London and Paris, there was silence.

Hitler that morning gave a speech to the Reichstag, in which he related in great detail the attack of the radio station. Working himself into a frenzy, he shouted, "But since this morning, we have returned bomb for bomb, measure for measure." Hitler was interrupted with joyous "Seig Heils!" all throughout this speech. He went on to explain how over the past few days he had attempted to negotiate with the Poles on very reasonable terms, but they had refused to even consider his requests. He castigated the British and French for being complicit in the Polish stubborness, but then said that it was unnecessary for them to declare war, as the Poles had attacked Germany first. He was giving the western powers the "out" they wanted.

And at least one man was willing to buy it. Henderson wired London that the Poles had attacked first. He bought the radio station sham hook, line, and sinker. Even Chamberlain was not this naive, but for a while he paused in giving Henderson any instructions.

The French cabinet met, and their first decision was to wait to see what the British would do. This was typical of all French decisions at this stage. They did ask Gamelin to mobilize the armed forces. and this incompetent soldier warned them it might take a month to do so.

In London the Polish ambassador informed Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary of the attack and asked when the declaration of war could be expected. Halifax refused to give any commitment. Meanwhile. Chamberlain called on Churchill, infomed him that the die was cast, and asked him to join the cabinet which would now be a war cabinet. Without comment, Churchill agreed. As he wrote in The Gathering Storm he was relieved that the waiting was over and that now Chamberlain would do his duty.

But as we shall see, Chamberlain was not at all yet resigned to war, and had a different idea in mind...