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World War II (2 Viewers)
- Thread starter timschochet
- Start date
Ozymandias
Footballguy
On December 7/8, the Japanese did have one setback. Wake Island, where the Marines resisted tenaciously and repelled the initial invasion.
On December 8, 1941, the same day as the Attack on Pearl Harbor (Wake being on the opposite side of the International Date Line), at least 27 Japanese medium "Nell" bombers flown from bases on Kwajelein in the Marshall Island group attacked Wake Island, destroying eight of the 12 F4F Wildcat fighter aircraft belonging to Marine Corps fighter squadron VMF-211 on the ground. All of the Marine garrison's defensive emplacements were left intact by the raid, which primarily targeted the aircraft.
The garrison—supplemented by civilian volunteers—repelled several Japanese landing attempts. An American journalist reported that after the initial Japanese amphibious assault was beaten back with heavy losses, the American commander was asked by his superiors if he needed anything, to which the commander sent back the message "Send us more Japs!", a reply which became a popular legend. However, when Lt. Col. Devereux learned after the war that he was credited with that message he pointed out that he was not the commander, contrary to the reports, and denied sending that message: "As far as I know, it wasn't sent at all. None of us was that much of a damn fool. We already had more Japs than we could handle."
Winfield S. Cunningham, Commander, US Navy, was in charge of Wake Island. He had ordered coded messages be sent during operations and a junior officer had added "send us" and "more Japs" to the beginning and end of a message to confuse the Japanese code breakers. This was put back together at Pearl Harbor and became part of the lore of WWII. Cunningham and Deveraux each wrote books about the battle and the aftermaths and imprisonment.
Two weeks later, the garrison was eventually overwhelmed by the numerically superior Japanese invasion force. American casualties were 52 military personnel and approximately 70 civilians killed. Japanese losses exceeded 700 killed, with some estimates ranging as high as 1,000; in addition, the Japanese lost two destroyers, one submarine and 24 aircraft.
On December 8, 1941, the same day as the Attack on Pearl Harbor (Wake being on the opposite side of the International Date Line), at least 27 Japanese medium "Nell" bombers flown from bases on Kwajelein in the Marshall Island group attacked Wake Island, destroying eight of the 12 F4F Wildcat fighter aircraft belonging to Marine Corps fighter squadron VMF-211 on the ground. All of the Marine garrison's defensive emplacements were left intact by the raid, which primarily targeted the aircraft.
The garrison—supplemented by civilian volunteers—repelled several Japanese landing attempts. An American journalist reported that after the initial Japanese amphibious assault was beaten back with heavy losses, the American commander was asked by his superiors if he needed anything, to which the commander sent back the message "Send us more Japs!", a reply which became a popular legend. However, when Lt. Col. Devereux learned after the war that he was credited with that message he pointed out that he was not the commander, contrary to the reports, and denied sending that message: "As far as I know, it wasn't sent at all. None of us was that much of a damn fool. We already had more Japs than we could handle."
Winfield S. Cunningham, Commander, US Navy, was in charge of Wake Island. He had ordered coded messages be sent during operations and a junior officer had added "send us" and "more Japs" to the beginning and end of a message to confuse the Japanese code breakers. This was put back together at Pearl Harbor and became part of the lore of WWII. Cunningham and Deveraux each wrote books about the battle and the aftermaths and imprisonment.
Two weeks later, the garrison was eventually overwhelmed by the numerically superior Japanese invasion force. American casualties were 52 military personnel and approximately 70 civilians killed. Japanese losses exceeded 700 killed, with some estimates ranging as high as 1,000; in addition, the Japanese lost two destroyers, one submarine and 24 aircraft.
TwinTurbo
Footballguy
It is surprising to me that some of the American and British commanders did not appear to understand this mentality. Major General Edward King made the same decision when he went against the direct orders of General MacArthur and surrendered the Philippine-American forces on the Bataan Peninsula. This of course led to the Bataan death march.
timschochet
Footballguy
Great job on Wake Island, Ozymandius!
timschochet
Footballguy
The Wannsee Conference
On January 20, 1942, the leaders of the German SS, Gestapo, and SD met at a hotel in the Wannsee suburb of Berlin, to discuss what they termed "the Jewish question". This has become known in history as "The Wannsee Conference", and has also been the subject of much fiction and film, most notably the HBO movie "Conspiracy" featuring Kenneth Branaugh as Reinhard Heydrich.
The meeting, which featured Heydrich, Eichmann, Heinrich Muller, and several other top brass and also German businessman, did not discuss the overall policy of what was to become of the Jews trapped in the New Order. That policy had already been laid down by verbal order from Adolf Hitler, direct to Eichmann and Goring, and direct from them to Heydrich: exterminate them all. Gone was the previous plan concieved the year before of sending all the Jews to Madagascar. Gone was the plan, instituted in early 1940, of rounding them up and placing them in ghettoes inside Poland with the hope that they would starve to death. Some Jews had starved, but the hardier among them were still alive in the Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, and Lublin ghettoes, and despite the fact that living conditions were miserable, the remaining Jews were simply not dying fast enough. Gone was the plan of having the Einsatzgruppen continue to execute new Jews as they found them- there were simply too many, and the expenditure of bullets was too costly.
The purpose of the meeting was restricted to the execution of Hitler's order. The estimate was that there were 10-14 million Jews living in all of Europe controlled by Nazi Germany. It was decided that a series of German concentration camps already in existence would have part of their buildings put aside for the purposes of mass extermination. 6 camps were chosen: Auschwitz, Treblinka, Belzec, Maidenek, Chelmno, and Sobibor. All of these were located in Poland. It would be Adolf Eichmann's job to remove the Jews from the rest of Europe, and put them on trains which could then be sent to the camps. Eichmann had lived in Palestine for several years, and actually spoke perfect Hebrew. It was thought that he understood the Jews, and would know how to hunt them down.
IG Farben, the great German chemical company, was asked to come up with a suitable means of exterminating the Jews on a quick, cost effective basis. The first solution was to use carbon dioxide. Special vans were created where the exhaust was pumped into the back. But this method would prove too costly and there were too many survivors. Eventually, the chemists came up with Zyklon B, an insecticide.
Heydrich, as head of the meeting, made two points very clear: first, this mission was given absolute priority for the Reich. No military movement would be allowed to interfere with the movement of the trains carrying Jews all over Europe to Poland. If the army protested, they would receive orders from Hitler or Himmler to desist. Second, it was vital that this plan be kept absolutely secret, upon pain of death. He then instructed them that they were performing heroic deeds for which someday they would be congratulated by all of mankind.
The Wannsee Conference was not kept secret; at least one of its participants leaked the information to western press sources. However, it was met with skepticism- the Nazis were certainly anti-Semitic, but even they were not insane enough to do take an action like this!
Of course, since the end of World War II, literary millions of words have been written trying to give reasons for this conference and the plan that it executed. Even with all of those words, it remains a mystery that a civilized, industrialized people, with moral instruction, could have carried out such a monstrous crime. It is so stunning a fact that a whole industry has been created around the idea that it never happened. For most of us who know it did, it is still a very difficult thing to grasp.
Later on I will try to relate some aspects of how the decisions made at the Wannsee Conference were carried out, if and when I can stomach it. I think this is enough for now.
On January 20, 1942, the leaders of the German SS, Gestapo, and SD met at a hotel in the Wannsee suburb of Berlin, to discuss what they termed "the Jewish question". This has become known in history as "The Wannsee Conference", and has also been the subject of much fiction and film, most notably the HBO movie "Conspiracy" featuring Kenneth Branaugh as Reinhard Heydrich.
The meeting, which featured Heydrich, Eichmann, Heinrich Muller, and several other top brass and also German businessman, did not discuss the overall policy of what was to become of the Jews trapped in the New Order. That policy had already been laid down by verbal order from Adolf Hitler, direct to Eichmann and Goring, and direct from them to Heydrich: exterminate them all. Gone was the previous plan concieved the year before of sending all the Jews to Madagascar. Gone was the plan, instituted in early 1940, of rounding them up and placing them in ghettoes inside Poland with the hope that they would starve to death. Some Jews had starved, but the hardier among them were still alive in the Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, and Lublin ghettoes, and despite the fact that living conditions were miserable, the remaining Jews were simply not dying fast enough. Gone was the plan of having the Einsatzgruppen continue to execute new Jews as they found them- there were simply too many, and the expenditure of bullets was too costly.
The purpose of the meeting was restricted to the execution of Hitler's order. The estimate was that there were 10-14 million Jews living in all of Europe controlled by Nazi Germany. It was decided that a series of German concentration camps already in existence would have part of their buildings put aside for the purposes of mass extermination. 6 camps were chosen: Auschwitz, Treblinka, Belzec, Maidenek, Chelmno, and Sobibor. All of these were located in Poland. It would be Adolf Eichmann's job to remove the Jews from the rest of Europe, and put them on trains which could then be sent to the camps. Eichmann had lived in Palestine for several years, and actually spoke perfect Hebrew. It was thought that he understood the Jews, and would know how to hunt them down.
IG Farben, the great German chemical company, was asked to come up with a suitable means of exterminating the Jews on a quick, cost effective basis. The first solution was to use carbon dioxide. Special vans were created where the exhaust was pumped into the back. But this method would prove too costly and there were too many survivors. Eventually, the chemists came up with Zyklon B, an insecticide.
Heydrich, as head of the meeting, made two points very clear: first, this mission was given absolute priority for the Reich. No military movement would be allowed to interfere with the movement of the trains carrying Jews all over Europe to Poland. If the army protested, they would receive orders from Hitler or Himmler to desist. Second, it was vital that this plan be kept absolutely secret, upon pain of death. He then instructed them that they were performing heroic deeds for which someday they would be congratulated by all of mankind.
The Wannsee Conference was not kept secret; at least one of its participants leaked the information to western press sources. However, it was met with skepticism- the Nazis were certainly anti-Semitic, but even they were not insane enough to do take an action like this!
Of course, since the end of World War II, literary millions of words have been written trying to give reasons for this conference and the plan that it executed. Even with all of those words, it remains a mystery that a civilized, industrialized people, with moral instruction, could have carried out such a monstrous crime. It is so stunning a fact that a whole industry has been created around the idea that it never happened. For most of us who know it did, it is still a very difficult thing to grasp.
Later on I will try to relate some aspects of how the decisions made at the Wannsee Conference were carried out, if and when I can stomach it. I think this is enough for now.
timschochet
Footballguy
Oxymandius is going to handle the Battle of Midway. Here is a list of events I need to cover before we get to that battle:
The fall of the Phillipines
The advent of Dwight Eisenhower
The Russian counteroffensive of December 1941/January 1942
The Doolittle Raid
North Africa during the first 6 months of 1942
Executive Order 9066
The battle of the Coral Sea and preparations for Midway
Oxy, please wait until I am done with all these. If you or anyone else wants to write about any of this stuff, please feel free to do so.
Following the Battle of Midway, we will devote a great deal of time and narrative to discussing the four other key turning point events of World War II, all of which took place during the last months of 1942: Stalingrad, El Alemein, Torch, and Guadalcanal.
The fall of the Phillipines
The advent of Dwight Eisenhower
The Russian counteroffensive of December 1941/January 1942
The Doolittle Raid
North Africa during the first 6 months of 1942
Executive Order 9066
The battle of the Coral Sea and preparations for Midway
Oxy, please wait until I am done with all these. If you or anyone else wants to write about any of this stuff, please feel free to do so.
Following the Battle of Midway, we will devote a great deal of time and narrative to discussing the four other key turning point events of World War II, all of which took place during the last months of 1942: Stalingrad, El Alemein, Torch, and Guadalcanal.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
Fine. No problem, but let me handle the Coral Sea, because it is the prelude to Midway.One last thing, I don't care what you say about me, just so you spell my name right!
timschochet
Footballguy
The Phillippines Part One
In January of 1942, General George Marshall was beset with troubles, and the biggest was the Phillippines. MacArthur had expertly retreated into Bataan, and now he was bombarding Washington with demands for help. Marshall wanted to find someone who might deftly handle this situation. He asked his subordinates to recommend a man who was good at analyzing data and making the hard decision. The answer came back: Dwight David Eisenhower.
Ike had been fighting war games down south when he was ordered to return to Washington and see about saving his old boss. MacArthur and Eisenhower had had a tumultuous relationship in the past 10 years, but that did not matter at this moment. The key was whether or not the situation could be saved. Ike went right to work. For two months he directed all of his energy and skill towards this goal, working seven days a week, often sleeping in his office. As he wrote later, deep in his heart he knew it was an impossible task.
The main problem was, of course, getting supplies to MacArthur. Getting more men there was impossible.Japan's hold on the area was so strong and it's blockade so thorough that the Americans could get only a trickle of supplies into the archipelago. "Ships! Ships! All we need is ships!" he wrote in his diary. There were ships on the West Coast, of course, and two transports and 15 heavy bombers were sent from California to Brisbane, Australia. But shipping from Australia to the Phillipines seemed an impossible task. In desperation, Ike came up with a wild gamble: his men in Brisbane offered 1 million dollars to any private ship that would be willing to run the gamut of the blockade, make it to MacArthur, unload and return. There were few takers, however.
Meanwhile, MacArthur was making impossible demands. He continued to insist that the Navy send an armada to his aid. Ike patiently explained that, with Japanese control of Wake, Guam, the Gilberts and the Marshalls, it would be suicide for the Navy- any ships that tried would be sunk long before they could get there. MacArthur then accused Eisenhower of "deliberately sacrificing American lives". Eisenhower replied that MacArthur would simply have to fight on with what he had for as long as possible. There would be no more reinforcements and almost no supplies.
But MacArthur's men did fight on- showing amazing courage. By now their rations were severely reduced, and they looked like scarecrows. During the last week of January, 1942, a Japanese regiment had sneaked through the jungle to penetrate American-Filipino lines. They split into two groups which were trapped in the Big Pocket and the Little Pocket, and these forces were annihilated in the Battle of the Pockets. Four other Japanese forces which had landed in various points at Luzon were badly mauled in the Battle of the Points.
By early February, General Homma's forces had suffered such severe losses from combat and disease that he suspended military action. Tokyo held him in disgrace. Homma had air dominance, and he was supposed to have defeated the Yankee pigs early in January, and yet these men who were starving were preventing the securing of the Phillipines! Angering Tokyo further, Homma decided to wait out the full month of February while he waited for reinforcements.
In the United States, now that Wake Island had fallen, MacArthur was the only American winning battles. He had always been popular with the American public, and overnight he became a legend. The White House was deluged with thousands of telegrams: HELP MACARTHUR! SAVE MACARTHUR! Enormous pressure was brought to bear on Eisenhower, but what could he do? There was no way to save these valiant troops. But the American public did not want to hear this.
In January of 1942, General George Marshall was beset with troubles, and the biggest was the Phillippines. MacArthur had expertly retreated into Bataan, and now he was bombarding Washington with demands for help. Marshall wanted to find someone who might deftly handle this situation. He asked his subordinates to recommend a man who was good at analyzing data and making the hard decision. The answer came back: Dwight David Eisenhower.
Ike had been fighting war games down south when he was ordered to return to Washington and see about saving his old boss. MacArthur and Eisenhower had had a tumultuous relationship in the past 10 years, but that did not matter at this moment. The key was whether or not the situation could be saved. Ike went right to work. For two months he directed all of his energy and skill towards this goal, working seven days a week, often sleeping in his office. As he wrote later, deep in his heart he knew it was an impossible task.
The main problem was, of course, getting supplies to MacArthur. Getting more men there was impossible.Japan's hold on the area was so strong and it's blockade so thorough that the Americans could get only a trickle of supplies into the archipelago. "Ships! Ships! All we need is ships!" he wrote in his diary. There were ships on the West Coast, of course, and two transports and 15 heavy bombers were sent from California to Brisbane, Australia. But shipping from Australia to the Phillipines seemed an impossible task. In desperation, Ike came up with a wild gamble: his men in Brisbane offered 1 million dollars to any private ship that would be willing to run the gamut of the blockade, make it to MacArthur, unload and return. There were few takers, however.
Meanwhile, MacArthur was making impossible demands. He continued to insist that the Navy send an armada to his aid. Ike patiently explained that, with Japanese control of Wake, Guam, the Gilberts and the Marshalls, it would be suicide for the Navy- any ships that tried would be sunk long before they could get there. MacArthur then accused Eisenhower of "deliberately sacrificing American lives". Eisenhower replied that MacArthur would simply have to fight on with what he had for as long as possible. There would be no more reinforcements and almost no supplies.
But MacArthur's men did fight on- showing amazing courage. By now their rations were severely reduced, and they looked like scarecrows. During the last week of January, 1942, a Japanese regiment had sneaked through the jungle to penetrate American-Filipino lines. They split into two groups which were trapped in the Big Pocket and the Little Pocket, and these forces were annihilated in the Battle of the Pockets. Four other Japanese forces which had landed in various points at Luzon were badly mauled in the Battle of the Points.
By early February, General Homma's forces had suffered such severe losses from combat and disease that he suspended military action. Tokyo held him in disgrace. Homma had air dominance, and he was supposed to have defeated the Yankee pigs early in January, and yet these men who were starving were preventing the securing of the Phillipines! Angering Tokyo further, Homma decided to wait out the full month of February while he waited for reinforcements.
In the United States, now that Wake Island had fallen, MacArthur was the only American winning battles. He had always been popular with the American public, and overnight he became a legend. The White House was deluged with thousands of telegrams: HELP MACARTHUR! SAVE MACARTHUR! Enormous pressure was brought to bear on Eisenhower, but what could he do? There was no way to save these valiant troops. But the American public did not want to hear this.
beer 30
Footballguy
Not trying to hijack this but I just finished Der Untergang or the Downfall. I had read many reviews that bashed the movie so I never watched it but figured I'd give it a shot this weekend. Anyone following this thread with earnest should watch this movie. There may be some historical leniency but I can't imagine it went down much differently than depicted.
I skipped over two pages of this thread to post this so carry on tim et al. I'll catch up shortly.
I skipped over two pages of this thread to post this so carry on tim et al. I'll catch up shortly.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
In the planning for the defense of the Philippines, it had been decided that Manila Bay was the strategic center and needed to be defended at all costs. And to do so, the American and Filipino armies had to hold Corregidor and the Bataan Peninsula.
Provision had to be made to supply troops during the initial phase of operations and to withdraw supplies into Bataan where a base would be established to support a prolonged defense. Supply officers estimated that they would probably require enough supplies for 31,000 men (the Bataan Defense Force)-later raised to 40,000 men-to last 180 days. The defense reserve already on hand, except for ammunition, was considered by the planners sufficient to supply such a force for the period required in a defensive situation. The bulk of the supplies was stored in the Manila area which lacked adequate protection from attacking aircraft. In the event it became necessary to move the supplies to Corregidor and Bataan, the enemy would have to be delayed long enough to carry out this operation.
Prior to the start of operations on Bataan, supplies were to be moved rapidly to the peninsula. At the same time the Corregidor reserves, set first at a 6-month supply for 7,000 men and then for 10,000 men, were to be brought up to the authorized allotment. All stocks in the Department, except those of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, would eventually be transferred to Bataan. As it happened, there were eventually 13,000 on Corregidor, and 80,000 in Bataan.
Nothing was said in the War Plans about what was to happen after the defenses on Bataan crumbled. Presumably by that time, estimated at six months, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have fought its way across the Pacific, won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and made secure the line of communications. The men and supplies collected on the west coast during that time would then begin to reach the Philippines in a steady stream. The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, could then counterattack and drive the enemy into the sea.
Actually, no one in a position of authority at that time (April 1941) believed that anything like this would happen. Informed naval opinion estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet to fight its way across the Pacific. There was no plan to concentrate men and supplies on the west coast and no schedule for their movement to the Philippines. Army planners in early 1941 believed that at the end of six months, if not sooner, supplies would be exhausted and the garrison would go down in defeat. The War Plans did not say this; instead they said nothing at all. And everyone hoped that when the time came something could be done, some plan improvised to relieve or rescue the men stranded 7,000 miles across the Pacific.
Provision had to be made to supply troops during the initial phase of operations and to withdraw supplies into Bataan where a base would be established to support a prolonged defense. Supply officers estimated that they would probably require enough supplies for 31,000 men (the Bataan Defense Force)-later raised to 40,000 men-to last 180 days. The defense reserve already on hand, except for ammunition, was considered by the planners sufficient to supply such a force for the period required in a defensive situation. The bulk of the supplies was stored in the Manila area which lacked adequate protection from attacking aircraft. In the event it became necessary to move the supplies to Corregidor and Bataan, the enemy would have to be delayed long enough to carry out this operation.
Prior to the start of operations on Bataan, supplies were to be moved rapidly to the peninsula. At the same time the Corregidor reserves, set first at a 6-month supply for 7,000 men and then for 10,000 men, were to be brought up to the authorized allotment. All stocks in the Department, except those of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, would eventually be transferred to Bataan. As it happened, there were eventually 13,000 on Corregidor, and 80,000 in Bataan.
Nothing was said in the War Plans about what was to happen after the defenses on Bataan crumbled. Presumably by that time, estimated at six months, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have fought its way across the Pacific, won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and made secure the line of communications. The men and supplies collected on the west coast during that time would then begin to reach the Philippines in a steady stream. The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, could then counterattack and drive the enemy into the sea.
Actually, no one in a position of authority at that time (April 1941) believed that anything like this would happen. Informed naval opinion estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet to fight its way across the Pacific. There was no plan to concentrate men and supplies on the west coast and no schedule for their movement to the Philippines. Army planners in early 1941 believed that at the end of six months, if not sooner, supplies would be exhausted and the garrison would go down in defeat. The War Plans did not say this; instead they said nothing at all. And everyone hoped that when the time came something could be done, some plan improvised to relieve or rescue the men stranded 7,000 miles across the Pacific.
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timschochet
Footballguy
The Phillipines Part Two
Despite their victories, the American and Filipino morale began to decline. MacArthur kept assuring them, "Help is on the way." At first they believed him. Daily their eager eyes searched the skies for signs of clouds of airplanes flying to their rescue. Since January, the rations for combat troops were halved, and on March 8, over the protest of General Jonathon Wainwright, MacArthur ordered it cut to 3/8ths. Many of the men were so weak by then that they could hardly crawl from their foxholes or even lift their rifles. Many troops lived off slaughtered horses, ponies, or carabao. Some dined on monkeys and lizards. Disease was rampant: dysentery, beriberi, dengue, hookworm and scurvy were so common that any man who could still walk was not considered ill. By March 12, at least 75% of the troops wre incapacitated in some way. There was rampant malaria, and no quinine. Water supplies were so inadequate that the thirst crazed men drank the filthy water of carabao wallows, which always resulted in more dysentery. It was not rare for a man to bathe and shave for an entire week in the same helmetful of water.
However, while the front line troops on Bataan starved and thirsted, the rear echelons had it much better. In Corregidor, MacArthur's staff and the troops closest to him were issued rations of 55 ounces a day, compared to 14 for the soldiers of Bataan. Sailors aboard US Navy ships at Mariveles Harbor traded a superabundance of food for the war sovenirs brought to them by gaunt fighting men. Naturally this situation caused great resentment, and many of the front line men came to hate the Corregidor tropps, and particularly MacArthur. The general seldom ventured from his headquarters on the "rock"; he later explained that he could not bear the sight of his wasted troops and read the despair in their eyes. Nevertheless, they hated him then, and even more so when they learned he had escaped for Australia.
On February 22, FDR ordered MacArthur to leave the Phillipines for Australia. Roosevelt's reasoning was that the general was simply too valuable to lose. It must be said that the public clamor may also have played a part in this decision. MacArthur later said that he wanted to refuse this order and resign his commision, and "join the Bataan force as a simple volunteer." But General Sutherland and other staff officers urged him that it was his duty to go; he could be of much more value to the Allied cause if he could get to Australia to take command of the new Southwest Pacific Theatre.
This last was certainly true; MacArthur was a military genius, and he WAS too valuable to lose. Yet I think anyone reading this is going to feel a certain amount of skepticism about the General's explanation, and it's probably well earned. One of the difficulties in evaluating MacArthur (for me anyway) is that this man's communiques and later explanations are so egotistical and full of praise of himself and his achievements that it's really hard to separate truth from fiction. For one thing, he often referred to himself in the third person: "General MacArthur wants you to know... General MacArthur is proud of American fighting men...etc." There is absolutely nothing wrong with MacArthur wanting to get out of this hopeless situation. But for him to claim that he fought with his staff, because he wanted to stay on as a common soldier- well, maybe it's true, but to me it rings a little hollow.
The problem now became, how to get MacArthur out?
Despite their victories, the American and Filipino morale began to decline. MacArthur kept assuring them, "Help is on the way." At first they believed him. Daily their eager eyes searched the skies for signs of clouds of airplanes flying to their rescue. Since January, the rations for combat troops were halved, and on March 8, over the protest of General Jonathon Wainwright, MacArthur ordered it cut to 3/8ths. Many of the men were so weak by then that they could hardly crawl from their foxholes or even lift their rifles. Many troops lived off slaughtered horses, ponies, or carabao. Some dined on monkeys and lizards. Disease was rampant: dysentery, beriberi, dengue, hookworm and scurvy were so common that any man who could still walk was not considered ill. By March 12, at least 75% of the troops wre incapacitated in some way. There was rampant malaria, and no quinine. Water supplies were so inadequate that the thirst crazed men drank the filthy water of carabao wallows, which always resulted in more dysentery. It was not rare for a man to bathe and shave for an entire week in the same helmetful of water.
However, while the front line troops on Bataan starved and thirsted, the rear echelons had it much better. In Corregidor, MacArthur's staff and the troops closest to him were issued rations of 55 ounces a day, compared to 14 for the soldiers of Bataan. Sailors aboard US Navy ships at Mariveles Harbor traded a superabundance of food for the war sovenirs brought to them by gaunt fighting men. Naturally this situation caused great resentment, and many of the front line men came to hate the Corregidor tropps, and particularly MacArthur. The general seldom ventured from his headquarters on the "rock"; he later explained that he could not bear the sight of his wasted troops and read the despair in their eyes. Nevertheless, they hated him then, and even more so when they learned he had escaped for Australia.
On February 22, FDR ordered MacArthur to leave the Phillipines for Australia. Roosevelt's reasoning was that the general was simply too valuable to lose. It must be said that the public clamor may also have played a part in this decision. MacArthur later said that he wanted to refuse this order and resign his commision, and "join the Bataan force as a simple volunteer." But General Sutherland and other staff officers urged him that it was his duty to go; he could be of much more value to the Allied cause if he could get to Australia to take command of the new Southwest Pacific Theatre.
This last was certainly true; MacArthur was a military genius, and he WAS too valuable to lose. Yet I think anyone reading this is going to feel a certain amount of skepticism about the General's explanation, and it's probably well earned. One of the difficulties in evaluating MacArthur (for me anyway) is that this man's communiques and later explanations are so egotistical and full of praise of himself and his achievements that it's really hard to separate truth from fiction. For one thing, he often referred to himself in the third person: "General MacArthur wants you to know... General MacArthur is proud of American fighting men...etc." There is absolutely nothing wrong with MacArthur wanting to get out of this hopeless situation. But for him to claim that he fought with his staff, because he wanted to stay on as a common soldier- well, maybe it's true, but to me it rings a little hollow.
The problem now became, how to get MacArthur out?
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
In 1935, the Philippines had become a Commonwealth, although still a dependency of the United States. In that year, they held a national presidential election, and elected a President, Manuel Quezon, who won 68% of the vote. He was reelected in 1941 with 82% of the vote. The US had pledged to give the Philippines complete independence by 1944. (Because of the war, it was delayed to 1946).
MacArthur declared Manila an “open city” to avoid destruction there, and the Japanese moved in on Jan2. President Quezon, his vice president Osmena and cabinet members retreated to Corregidor. President Roosevelt decided that they were too valuable to lose, and could be the rallying for the eventual return by the US to the Philippines. He therefore had them evacuated by submarine, first to Australia, and then to the USA. President Quezon died of tuberculosis while in New York.
(BTW Tim, President Quezon did allow Jewish refugees into the Philippines at a time when few places would take them).
MacArthur declared Manila an “open city” to avoid destruction there, and the Japanese moved in on Jan2. President Quezon, his vice president Osmena and cabinet members retreated to Corregidor. President Roosevelt decided that they were too valuable to lose, and could be the rallying for the eventual return by the US to the Philippines. He therefore had them evacuated by submarine, first to Australia, and then to the USA. President Quezon died of tuberculosis while in New York.
(BTW Tim, President Quezon did allow Jewish refugees into the Philippines at a time when few places would take them).
timschochet
Footballguy
This is true. I think there were at least 20,000 who escaped this way, and were actually treated well by the Japanese as well. I don't really know as much about this subject as I probably should.
timschochet
Footballguy
MacArtthur's Escape
On March 10, MacArthur called for Wainwright and told him of his intent to depart the following night, leaving the latter in command. It was an emotional farewell. MacArthur had lost 25 pounds and Wainwright was so emaciated he seemed like a walking skeleton. MacArthur said, "If I get through to Australia, I'll come back as soon as I can with as much as I can. In the meantime, you've got to hold." Neither man stated the obvious fact that MacArthur would never return in time to save the garrison.
At dusk the following night, MacArthur and his family, including his son's amah (Chinese nanny) Ah Cheu- 15 army officers, 2 navy officers and one seargeant boarded four battered torpedo boats. They successfully eluded the Japanese blockade during the night, but storms and engine failures separated them the next day. The four scattered boats were supposed to rendezvous at Taguauyan in the Cuyo Islands at the north end of the Sulu Sea a few days later. The skipper of the first boat to arrive there thought he saw an enemy destroyer approaching through the early morning fog and prepared to attack. In the last second, he decided to cautiously hold his fire until he could be sure- and it turned out to be MacArthur's boat. This boat was at the end of it's gasoline and had to be abandoned. Another 15 minutes or so and the General would not have made it.
These two boats resumed the voyage to Mindanao. From Mindanao two B-17's took the MacArthur party to an airfield near Darwin in Australia, and from there a C-47 transport flew them to the tiny frontier town of Alice Springs in the center of the island continent. From here they boarded a train for Melbourne. En route, MacArthur learned that to his despair that in all of Australia there were only 25,000 American troops, 250 combat aircraft, and one regular Australian division. He also learned for the first time that he had become a national hero in the United States, reaching the heights of Charles Lindbergh in the 1920's. When he stepped off the train in Melbourne, reporters surrounded him. He told them he had come to their country to build a base from which to launch the American counteroffensive against Japan and the recapture of the Phillipines. And then he said,
I came through, and I shall return.
On March 10, MacArthur called for Wainwright and told him of his intent to depart the following night, leaving the latter in command. It was an emotional farewell. MacArthur had lost 25 pounds and Wainwright was so emaciated he seemed like a walking skeleton. MacArthur said, "If I get through to Australia, I'll come back as soon as I can with as much as I can. In the meantime, you've got to hold." Neither man stated the obvious fact that MacArthur would never return in time to save the garrison.
At dusk the following night, MacArthur and his family, including his son's amah (Chinese nanny) Ah Cheu- 15 army officers, 2 navy officers and one seargeant boarded four battered torpedo boats. They successfully eluded the Japanese blockade during the night, but storms and engine failures separated them the next day. The four scattered boats were supposed to rendezvous at Taguauyan in the Cuyo Islands at the north end of the Sulu Sea a few days later. The skipper of the first boat to arrive there thought he saw an enemy destroyer approaching through the early morning fog and prepared to attack. In the last second, he decided to cautiously hold his fire until he could be sure- and it turned out to be MacArthur's boat. This boat was at the end of it's gasoline and had to be abandoned. Another 15 minutes or so and the General would not have made it.
These two boats resumed the voyage to Mindanao. From Mindanao two B-17's took the MacArthur party to an airfield near Darwin in Australia, and from there a C-47 transport flew them to the tiny frontier town of Alice Springs in the center of the island continent. From here they boarded a train for Melbourne. En route, MacArthur learned that to his despair that in all of Australia there were only 25,000 American troops, 250 combat aircraft, and one regular Australian division. He also learned for the first time that he had become a national hero in the United States, reaching the heights of Charles Lindbergh in the 1920's. When he stepped off the train in Melbourne, reporters surrounded him. He told them he had come to their country to build a base from which to launch the American counteroffensive against Japan and the recapture of the Phillipines. And then he said,
I came through, and I shall return.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Roosevelt's decision to send MacArthur to Australia was obviously the right one, but it put MacArthur, who was vulnerable to the charge that he thought mainly of himself, in a difficult position. By many of his troops, he was thought of as abandoning them, and running in the face of the enemy.
However, MacArthur was personally brave and was the second most decorated American officer during the First World War. During the war, he received two Distinguished Service Crosses, seven Silver Stars, a Distinguished Service Medal, and two Purple Hearts. Douglas MacArthur made it his policy to "lead... men from the front." Because of this policy, and the fact that he usually refused to wear a gas mask while the rest of his men would, he had respiratory problems the rest of his life.
The most decorated American officer in that war, Colonel "Wild" Bill Donovan (later to serve as head of the OSS) and MacArthur crossed paths under less than ideal circumstances during the Hundred Days Offensive. Donovan's battalion had been decimated in battle at the Ourcq. MacArthur arrived after the battle's close, as the wounded Donovan was being taken out by stretcher, and demanded an explanation of the battalion's heavy casualties.
(And here is an interesting sidelight) Donovan correctly explained that they had received no artillery support; whereupon MacArthur sought out and castigated the artillery commander responsible for the area - Captain Harry S Truman, the man who would one day relieve MacArthur of command for insubordination.
However, MacArthur was personally brave and was the second most decorated American officer during the First World War. During the war, he received two Distinguished Service Crosses, seven Silver Stars, a Distinguished Service Medal, and two Purple Hearts. Douglas MacArthur made it his policy to "lead... men from the front." Because of this policy, and the fact that he usually refused to wear a gas mask while the rest of his men would, he had respiratory problems the rest of his life.
The most decorated American officer in that war, Colonel "Wild" Bill Donovan (later to serve as head of the OSS) and MacArthur crossed paths under less than ideal circumstances during the Hundred Days Offensive. Donovan's battalion had been decimated in battle at the Ourcq. MacArthur arrived after the battle's close, as the wounded Donovan was being taken out by stretcher, and demanded an explanation of the battalion's heavy casualties.
(And here is an interesting sidelight) Donovan correctly explained that they had received no artillery support; whereupon MacArthur sought out and castigated the artillery commander responsible for the area - Captain Harry S Truman, the man who would one day relieve MacArthur of command for insubordination.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Phillipines surrender
We're the Battling Bastards of Bataan
No Mama, No Papa, No Uncle Sam
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces
This was a popular refrain sung by the soldiers who remained. Most of them were bitter about MacArthur and held him in contempt. "I came through, and I shall return." What about them? This resentment had been growing for some time. Out of 142 official communiques sent out by MacArthur during the struggle, 109 of them referred exclusively to "I" or "General MacArthur". When the troops were mentioned, it was invariably "General MacArthur's men". Also a source of resentment: although all service families had been sent home long ago, MacArthur had insisted on keeping his with him, and when they left in the four torpedo boats, they took spots that might have been reserved for other officers or soldiers.
To make matters worse, MacArthur spurned members of the military that were not Army (and therefore, not under his command). Two days before leaving for Australia, MacArthur recommended all units in Bataan and Corregidor for unit citations with the exception of the Marine and navy units. General Sutherland, MacArthur's crony, stated, "the Marines had gotten far too much unearned glory in the last war and would get no more in this one." This remark was remembered throughout the Pacific War; MacArthur was blamed for it, and he was not forgiven.
Still, the splendid scarecrows of Wainwright fought on, Gaunt, sour of heart and stomach, ragged and red-eyed, bombed by day and shelled by night, they fought on. From both FDR and MacArthur had come orders not to surrender, and MacArthur had ordered a desperation counterattack as a last resort. However, General King on Bataan saw that he had to either surrender or have his people killed piecemeal. King surrendered on April 9, 1942. We shall return to the fate of these soldiers shortly.
That left Corregidor. Under steady aerial bombardment, Wainwright managed to hold out another 4 weeks until the Japanese succeeded in landing there. On May 6, with the Japanese within yards of Malinta Tunnel, Wainwright's men spiked guns, smashed equipment, and burned codes. Wainwright composed his last, sad message to Roosevelt:
With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame, with profound regret and with continued pride in my gallant men, I go to meet the Japanese commander. Goodbye, Mr. President.
The defense of the Phillippines, though ultimately a failure, delayed the Japanese timetables for over four months. Because it was not a military victory, it isn't treated with the same regard as some other battles we will examine, at least not by non-military. But it should be. This battle demonstrated just how amazingly brave American soldiers can be, and how much they are willing to endure. The valor of these men would set a pattern that would be repeated again and again all throughout the Pacific War. All of us who enjoy our freedom in this great country are in their debt, forever and ever.
We're the Battling Bastards of Bataan
No Mama, No Papa, No Uncle Sam
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces
This was a popular refrain sung by the soldiers who remained. Most of them were bitter about MacArthur and held him in contempt. "I came through, and I shall return." What about them? This resentment had been growing for some time. Out of 142 official communiques sent out by MacArthur during the struggle, 109 of them referred exclusively to "I" or "General MacArthur". When the troops were mentioned, it was invariably "General MacArthur's men". Also a source of resentment: although all service families had been sent home long ago, MacArthur had insisted on keeping his with him, and when they left in the four torpedo boats, they took spots that might have been reserved for other officers or soldiers.
To make matters worse, MacArthur spurned members of the military that were not Army (and therefore, not under his command). Two days before leaving for Australia, MacArthur recommended all units in Bataan and Corregidor for unit citations with the exception of the Marine and navy units. General Sutherland, MacArthur's crony, stated, "the Marines had gotten far too much unearned glory in the last war and would get no more in this one." This remark was remembered throughout the Pacific War; MacArthur was blamed for it, and he was not forgiven.
Still, the splendid scarecrows of Wainwright fought on, Gaunt, sour of heart and stomach, ragged and red-eyed, bombed by day and shelled by night, they fought on. From both FDR and MacArthur had come orders not to surrender, and MacArthur had ordered a desperation counterattack as a last resort. However, General King on Bataan saw that he had to either surrender or have his people killed piecemeal. King surrendered on April 9, 1942. We shall return to the fate of these soldiers shortly.
That left Corregidor. Under steady aerial bombardment, Wainwright managed to hold out another 4 weeks until the Japanese succeeded in landing there. On May 6, with the Japanese within yards of Malinta Tunnel, Wainwright's men spiked guns, smashed equipment, and burned codes. Wainwright composed his last, sad message to Roosevelt:
With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame, with profound regret and with continued pride in my gallant men, I go to meet the Japanese commander. Goodbye, Mr. President.
The defense of the Phillippines, though ultimately a failure, delayed the Japanese timetables for over four months. Because it was not a military victory, it isn't treated with the same regard as some other battles we will examine, at least not by non-military. But it should be. This battle demonstrated just how amazingly brave American soldiers can be, and how much they are willing to endure. The valor of these men would set a pattern that would be repeated again and again all throughout the Pacific War. All of us who enjoy our freedom in this great country are in their debt, forever and ever.
timschochet
Footballguy
That is a great story. I had no idea of this.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
We should also mention the bravery of many Filipino soldiers who fought alongside the Americans. A significant number escaped into the mountains, and they and others who joined them waged a constant guerrilla war against the Japanese. They, and Philippine civilians, paid a harsh price for that resistance, which continued until MacArthur returned.
timschochet
Footballguy
Uwe Blab
Footballguy
This is why this a great thread. I've been learning and then delving deeper into the stories of heroes like General Wainwright who I never really ever read about other than tangentially. A remarkable man in his own right.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Bataan Death March- Introduction
For 1,000 years before the Meiji Revolution in the late 1860's, all fighting in Japan was mostly carried out by Samurai, their version of medieval knights. These soldiers had their own form of chivalry, called Bushido. Bushido included fighting to the death. Surrender was considered dishonorable. For those who did surrender, their lives were supposed to forfeit. To avoid the shame of capture, a Samurai would often commit Seppuku, or ritual suicide. This was performed by making two slits in one's belly and letting your entrails fall out. Most Samurai were not quite brave enough to handle this, so they often had a "second", another Samurai who would stand behind them and decapitate them.
This practice, and it's legacy, was one of two reasons why the Japanese soldiers of World War II scorned those who surrendered. To them, there was nothing more shameful than being a prisoner of war. Their whole concept of morality shouted against such a voluntary action, as they considered it, and they could not understand how the Americans, British and others could so dishonor themselves. They looked at it in horror and contempt. The best analogy I can come up with is: try to imagine having a fight with a man- you win, and the man then offers you to kill his wife and family, and to give you all of his possessions, and to grovel at your feet and eat dog #### in front of you. What you would feel about that man is exactly what the Japanese felt about those that surrendered.
The other reason is racism, though it wasn't called that at the time. The Japanese Emperor being descended from the Gods, Japan was the land of the Gods, and therefore superior to all other places on Earth. For Japanese officers, Chinese, Filipino, and Caucasians were not quite human. All three were Gaijin, foreign savages. The Japanese simply did not see them in the same way as they would real human beings deserving of good treatment (meaning Japanese.) It must be said that, throughout the Pacific War, the feeling was mutual. As Herman Wouk pointed out in a very insightful passage of The Caine Mutiny, the Japanese looked at Americans as huge mindless monsters who must somehow be destroyed before they destroyed civilization, while the Americans looked at Japanese as insects that had to be exterminated before they could go home.
None of this is meant to excuse the Bataan Death March. After the war, it was correctly regarded as a war crime, and those who could be caught were tried, and some were executed. This was a just sentence. What I have written is only in terms of explanation, not justification. To the general principles I have mentioned here, there was also great anger among the Japanese High Command that the Americans had delayed their time table.
For 1,000 years before the Meiji Revolution in the late 1860's, all fighting in Japan was mostly carried out by Samurai, their version of medieval knights. These soldiers had their own form of chivalry, called Bushido. Bushido included fighting to the death. Surrender was considered dishonorable. For those who did surrender, their lives were supposed to forfeit. To avoid the shame of capture, a Samurai would often commit Seppuku, or ritual suicide. This was performed by making two slits in one's belly and letting your entrails fall out. Most Samurai were not quite brave enough to handle this, so they often had a "second", another Samurai who would stand behind them and decapitate them.
This practice, and it's legacy, was one of two reasons why the Japanese soldiers of World War II scorned those who surrendered. To them, there was nothing more shameful than being a prisoner of war. Their whole concept of morality shouted against such a voluntary action, as they considered it, and they could not understand how the Americans, British and others could so dishonor themselves. They looked at it in horror and contempt. The best analogy I can come up with is: try to imagine having a fight with a man- you win, and the man then offers you to kill his wife and family, and to give you all of his possessions, and to grovel at your feet and eat dog #### in front of you. What you would feel about that man is exactly what the Japanese felt about those that surrendered.
The other reason is racism, though it wasn't called that at the time. The Japanese Emperor being descended from the Gods, Japan was the land of the Gods, and therefore superior to all other places on Earth. For Japanese officers, Chinese, Filipino, and Caucasians were not quite human. All three were Gaijin, foreign savages. The Japanese simply did not see them in the same way as they would real human beings deserving of good treatment (meaning Japanese.) It must be said that, throughout the Pacific War, the feeling was mutual. As Herman Wouk pointed out in a very insightful passage of The Caine Mutiny, the Japanese looked at Americans as huge mindless monsters who must somehow be destroyed before they destroyed civilization, while the Americans looked at Japanese as insects that had to be exterminated before they could go home.
None of this is meant to excuse the Bataan Death March. After the war, it was correctly regarded as a war crime, and those who could be caught were tried, and some were executed. This was a just sentence. What I have written is only in terms of explanation, not justification. To the general principles I have mentioned here, there was also great anger among the Japanese High Command that the Americans had delayed their time table.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Death March
As I have written, on April 9, 1942, against the orders of MacArthur and Wainwright, General King surrendered the Bataan Peninsula to the Japanese. The Luzon Force surrendered was composed of 67,000 Filipinos, 1,000 Chinese, 11,796 Americans. These were diseased and starving men. In lieu of a sword, King handed his pistol to Colonel Motoo Nakayama, and inquired if his men would be well treated. Nakayama replied, "We are not barbarians."
The majority of the prisoners of war were immediately robbed of their keepsakes and belongings and subsequently forced to endure a 61-mile march in deep dust, over vehicle-broken macadam roads, and crammed into rail cars to captivity at Camp O’Donnell. Thousands died en route from disease, starvation, dehydration, heat prostration, untreated wounds, and wanton execution.
Beheadings, cut throats and casual shootings were the more common actions — compared to bayonet stabbings, rapes, disembowelments, numerous rifle butt beatings and a deliberate refusal to allow the prisoners food or water while keeping them continually marching for nearly a week in tropical heat. Falling down or inability to continue moving was tantamount to a death sentence, as was any degree of protest or expression of displeasure.
Prisoners were attacked for assisting someone failing due to weakness, or for no apparent reason whatsoever. Strings of Japanese trucks were known to drive over anyone who fell. Riders in vehicles would casually stick out a rifle bayonet and cut a string of throats in the lines of men marching alongside the road.
Those few who were lucky enough to travel to San Fernando on trucks still had to endure more than twenty-five miles of marching. Prisoners were beaten randomly, and were often denied promised food and water. Those who fell behind were usually executed or left to die. Witnesses say those who broke rank for a drink of water were executed, some even decapitated; the sides of the roads became littered with dead bodies and those begging for help.
On the Bataan Death March, approximately 54,000 of the 75,000 prisoners reached their destination. The death toll of the march is difficult to assess as thousands of captives were able to escape from their guards. All told, approximately 5,000-10,000 Filipino and 600-650 American prisoners of war died before they could reach Camp O'Donnell.
After the surrender of Japan in 1945, an Allied commission convicted General Homma of war crimes, including the atrocities of the death march out of Bataan, and the following atrocities at Camp O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. The general, who had been absorbed in his efforts to capture Corregidor after the fall of Bataan, claimed in his defense that he remained ignorant of the high death toll of the death march until two months after the event. He was executed on April 3, 1946 outside Manila.
On May 30, 2009, at the sixty-fourth and final reunion of Bataan Death March survivors in San Antonio, Texas, Japanese ambassador to the United States Ichiro Fujisaki apologized to the assembled survivors for the Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners of war, on behalf of the Japanese government.
As I have written, on April 9, 1942, against the orders of MacArthur and Wainwright, General King surrendered the Bataan Peninsula to the Japanese. The Luzon Force surrendered was composed of 67,000 Filipinos, 1,000 Chinese, 11,796 Americans. These were diseased and starving men. In lieu of a sword, King handed his pistol to Colonel Motoo Nakayama, and inquired if his men would be well treated. Nakayama replied, "We are not barbarians."
The majority of the prisoners of war were immediately robbed of their keepsakes and belongings and subsequently forced to endure a 61-mile march in deep dust, over vehicle-broken macadam roads, and crammed into rail cars to captivity at Camp O’Donnell. Thousands died en route from disease, starvation, dehydration, heat prostration, untreated wounds, and wanton execution.
Beheadings, cut throats and casual shootings were the more common actions — compared to bayonet stabbings, rapes, disembowelments, numerous rifle butt beatings and a deliberate refusal to allow the prisoners food or water while keeping them continually marching for nearly a week in tropical heat. Falling down or inability to continue moving was tantamount to a death sentence, as was any degree of protest or expression of displeasure.
Prisoners were attacked for assisting someone failing due to weakness, or for no apparent reason whatsoever. Strings of Japanese trucks were known to drive over anyone who fell. Riders in vehicles would casually stick out a rifle bayonet and cut a string of throats in the lines of men marching alongside the road.
Those few who were lucky enough to travel to San Fernando on trucks still had to endure more than twenty-five miles of marching. Prisoners were beaten randomly, and were often denied promised food and water. Those who fell behind were usually executed or left to die. Witnesses say those who broke rank for a drink of water were executed, some even decapitated; the sides of the roads became littered with dead bodies and those begging for help.
On the Bataan Death March, approximately 54,000 of the 75,000 prisoners reached their destination. The death toll of the march is difficult to assess as thousands of captives were able to escape from their guards. All told, approximately 5,000-10,000 Filipino and 600-650 American prisoners of war died before they could reach Camp O'Donnell.
After the surrender of Japan in 1945, an Allied commission convicted General Homma of war crimes, including the atrocities of the death march out of Bataan, and the following atrocities at Camp O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. The general, who had been absorbed in his efforts to capture Corregidor after the fall of Bataan, claimed in his defense that he remained ignorant of the high death toll of the death march until two months after the event. He was executed on April 3, 1946 outside Manila.
On May 30, 2009, at the sixty-fourth and final reunion of Bataan Death March survivors in San Antonio, Texas, Japanese ambassador to the United States Ichiro Fujisaki apologized to the assembled survivors for the Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners of war, on behalf of the Japanese government.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Russian Counteroffensive
By early December 1941, the temperatures around Moscow had dropped as low as 20-50 degrees below zero. German troops were still inadequately dressed for such weather, and their equipment was not designed for it. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported. Guderian ordered his assault against Moscow stopped on December 5, 1941.
Although the Wehrmacht's offensive had been stopped, German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves left and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred fresh divisions from Siberia and the Far East, relying on intelligence from his spy, Richard Sorge, which indicated that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. The Red Army had accumulated a 58-division reserve by early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin. However, even with these new reserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men, only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deployment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some critical points. On December 6, 1941, the counteroffensive started on the Kalinin Front. After two days of little progress, Soviet armies retook Krasnaya Polyana and several other cities in the immediate vicinity of Moscow.
At the Wolf's Layer, Brauschitsch now joined Halder in urging Hitler that the German armies be allowed to retreat backwards and regroup until the winter was over. This was also urged by Guderian and Bock, who were at the site of the battle. Hitler, according to all reports and diaries, flew off the handle, and screamed that there would be no retreat, ever! He then issued Directive No. 39, which ordered all German troops to hold their position upon pain of death.
Just as with so many other aspects of the war between Germany and Russia, there has been great debate over Directive No. 39 ever since. Many historians, including Shirer and Martin Gilbert, credit this order with actually saving the German troops in the winter of 1941 and 1942. According to these sources, Brauschitsch, Halder, Guderian, and Bock were all wrong; any serious German retreat would have been a disaster, because the Russians might have overwhelmed them. (In fact, the Germans were pushed back 150 miles from Moscow, but it was not the more serious withdrawal being proposed.) However, they are also quick to point out that Hitler was not being a tactical genius here; he was simply lucky that his decision, normally wrong according to military doctrine (which usually calls for a fluidity of movement) turned out to be right in this situation. His confidence in his own abilities, and in the positive effects of this decision, would lead to later disaster at Stalingrad.
Adolf Hitler was a vengeful man, and he was sick and tired with these generals always getting in his way. He had always despised them; most of them were of an upper class that he did not belong to, and they had scorned the Nazi party when it came to power; secretly, he suspected they still did. Hitler was aided in this belief by Himmler and Goring, who, seeking more power for themselves, constantly whispered in his ear that the generals were treacherous and plotting against the Nazi party. Hitler knew that he had overruled the generals time and again. He had come to believe that he, Hitler, had been solely responsible for all the military successes of the Third Reich. The result of this was that Hitler decided, in the wake of this latest dispute, to fire Brauschitsch and Halder. Then, astonishingly, Adolf Hitler named himself their replacements. Now he was not only the Leader of the New Order, he was also commander of the Army, as well as it's chief of staff. He personally would now direct all tactical movements of his troops thereafter. Only through his genius, he believed, could the war be won.
This action stunned the military, and when Guderian attempted to fly back to the Wolf's Layer again, he was also sacked. Bock, the last holdout, was fired in late January. No one would now challenge Adolf Hitler.
Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued; in the north, Klin and Kalinin were liberated on December 15 and December 16, as the Kalinin Front drove west. The Soviet front commander, General Konev, attempted to envelop Army Group Center, but met strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt, forming a salient that would last until 1943. In the south, the offensive went equally well, with Southwestern Front forces relieving Tula on December 16, 1941. The Luftwaffe was reinforced, as Hitler saw it as the only hope to "save" the situation. The German air arm was to help prevent a total collapse of Army Group Center. Despite the Luftwaffe's best efforts, Soviet air superiority had contributed enormously to the Red Army's victory at Moscow. Between the 17 December and 22 December the Luftwaffe destroyed 299 motor vehicles and 23 tanks around Tula, hampering the Red Army's pursuit of the German Army.In the center, however, progress was much slower, and Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on December 26, Kaluga on December 28, and Maloyaroslavets on January 2, after ten days of violent action. Soviet reserves ran low, and the offensive halted on January 7, 1942, after having pushed the exhausted and freezing German armies back 150 miles from Moscow. This victory provided an important boost for Soviet morale, with the Wehrmacht suffering its first defeat. Having failed to vanquish the Soviet Union in one quick strike, Germany now had to prepare for a prolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed.
By early December 1941, the temperatures around Moscow had dropped as low as 20-50 degrees below zero. German troops were still inadequately dressed for such weather, and their equipment was not designed for it. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported. Guderian ordered his assault against Moscow stopped on December 5, 1941.
Although the Wehrmacht's offensive had been stopped, German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves left and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred fresh divisions from Siberia and the Far East, relying on intelligence from his spy, Richard Sorge, which indicated that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. The Red Army had accumulated a 58-division reserve by early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin. However, even with these new reserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men, only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deployment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some critical points. On December 6, 1941, the counteroffensive started on the Kalinin Front. After two days of little progress, Soviet armies retook Krasnaya Polyana and several other cities in the immediate vicinity of Moscow.
At the Wolf's Layer, Brauschitsch now joined Halder in urging Hitler that the German armies be allowed to retreat backwards and regroup until the winter was over. This was also urged by Guderian and Bock, who were at the site of the battle. Hitler, according to all reports and diaries, flew off the handle, and screamed that there would be no retreat, ever! He then issued Directive No. 39, which ordered all German troops to hold their position upon pain of death.
Just as with so many other aspects of the war between Germany and Russia, there has been great debate over Directive No. 39 ever since. Many historians, including Shirer and Martin Gilbert, credit this order with actually saving the German troops in the winter of 1941 and 1942. According to these sources, Brauschitsch, Halder, Guderian, and Bock were all wrong; any serious German retreat would have been a disaster, because the Russians might have overwhelmed them. (In fact, the Germans were pushed back 150 miles from Moscow, but it was not the more serious withdrawal being proposed.) However, they are also quick to point out that Hitler was not being a tactical genius here; he was simply lucky that his decision, normally wrong according to military doctrine (which usually calls for a fluidity of movement) turned out to be right in this situation. His confidence in his own abilities, and in the positive effects of this decision, would lead to later disaster at Stalingrad.
Adolf Hitler was a vengeful man, and he was sick and tired with these generals always getting in his way. He had always despised them; most of them were of an upper class that he did not belong to, and they had scorned the Nazi party when it came to power; secretly, he suspected they still did. Hitler was aided in this belief by Himmler and Goring, who, seeking more power for themselves, constantly whispered in his ear that the generals were treacherous and plotting against the Nazi party. Hitler knew that he had overruled the generals time and again. He had come to believe that he, Hitler, had been solely responsible for all the military successes of the Third Reich. The result of this was that Hitler decided, in the wake of this latest dispute, to fire Brauschitsch and Halder. Then, astonishingly, Adolf Hitler named himself their replacements. Now he was not only the Leader of the New Order, he was also commander of the Army, as well as it's chief of staff. He personally would now direct all tactical movements of his troops thereafter. Only through his genius, he believed, could the war be won.
This action stunned the military, and when Guderian attempted to fly back to the Wolf's Layer again, he was also sacked. Bock, the last holdout, was fired in late January. No one would now challenge Adolf Hitler.
Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued; in the north, Klin and Kalinin were liberated on December 15 and December 16, as the Kalinin Front drove west. The Soviet front commander, General Konev, attempted to envelop Army Group Center, but met strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt, forming a salient that would last until 1943. In the south, the offensive went equally well, with Southwestern Front forces relieving Tula on December 16, 1941. The Luftwaffe was reinforced, as Hitler saw it as the only hope to "save" the situation. The German air arm was to help prevent a total collapse of Army Group Center. Despite the Luftwaffe's best efforts, Soviet air superiority had contributed enormously to the Red Army's victory at Moscow. Between the 17 December and 22 December the Luftwaffe destroyed 299 motor vehicles and 23 tanks around Tula, hampering the Red Army's pursuit of the German Army.In the center, however, progress was much slower, and Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on December 26, Kaluga on December 28, and Maloyaroslavets on January 2, after ten days of violent action. Soviet reserves ran low, and the offensive halted on January 7, 1942, after having pushed the exhausted and freezing German armies back 150 miles from Moscow. This victory provided an important boost for Soviet morale, with the Wehrmacht suffering its first defeat. Having failed to vanquish the Soviet Union in one quick strike, Germany now had to prepare for a prolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC I
The longest on-going battle of the war was the Battle of the Atlantic, which started on September 1, 1939 and ran for the whole length of the war. Although in its early stages it featured German surface raiders (such as the Graf Spee and the Bismarck) against the Royal Navy, it was fundamentally a battle of German U-boats attacking merchant shipping bound for England, and being hunted by Royal Navy (plus Canadian and later US) surface units. It was estimated that Britain needed a million tons of supplies every week to be able to stay in the war, and those supplIes came primarily from the US, Canada and Britain's overseas possessions.
The biggest weapon in the Allies had was the British development of ASDIC, later called sonar. In its early stages it was a crude weapon, and not effective if the hunter was traveling at high speed. However, it was developed rapidly, and became more and more effective. When a U-boat was detected, it was attacked by depth charges, which had to detonate within 20 ft of the submarine to be effective. (We've all seen the movies, and wondered why they didn't shut the valves before they started leaking-lol).
Although the U-boats operated singly at the start of the war, the Germans adapted to the use of convoys by developing the wolfpack, where many submarines attacked a convoy, overwhelming the ability of the escorts to protect the merchantmen.
After the fall of France, the German Navy could operate from French bases which put them 500 miles closer to Atlantic shipping. The early U-boat operations from the French bases were spectacularly successful. This was the heyday of the great U-boat aces like Gunther Prien of U-47, Kretschmer of U-99, Schepkeof U-100, and others. The U-boat crews became heroes at home in Germany. From June until October 1940, over 270 Allied ships were sunk: this period was referred to by U-boat crews as "Die Glückliche Zeit", the Happy Time.
The disastrous convoy battles of October 1940 forced a change in British tactics. The most important of these was the introduction of permanent escort groups to improve the co-ordination and effectiveness of ships and men in battle. British efforts were helped by a gradual increase in the number of escort vessels available as the old ex-American destroyers and the new British- and Canadian-built Flower class corvettes were now coming into service in numbers. Many of these ships became part of the huge expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, which grew from a handful of destroyers at the outbreak of war to take an increasing share of convoy escort duty.
One of the most important developments was that of ship-borne direction-finding radio equipment, known as HF/DF (High-Frequency Direction-Finding), which was gradually fitted to the larger escort ships. HF/DF let an operator see the direction of a broadcast, even if the messages they were sending could not be read. Since the wolfpack relied on U-boats surfacing to report the position of a convoy, there was a steady stream of messages to intercept.
On May 9, 1941 the British destroyer HMS Bulldog captured U-110 and recovered a complete, intact Enigma Machine. Combined with a couple of other captures, this was a vital breakthrough for the Allied code-breaking efforts. The machine was taken to Bletchely Park, where it was used to help break the German codes. This would give Britain the ability to read German naval signals for much of the remainder of the campaign, and, incidentally, provide the impetus for the development of the first programmable electronic device, the Colossus computer.
The wolfpack tactics relied on radio communications, based on the assumption that the Enigma cipher could not be broken and that short signal messages could not be pinpointed with enough accuracy to endanger the signaling U-boat. Both assumptions were wrong. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, a combination of reading Enigma messages and radio direction finding enabled the British to plot the positions of the U-boat patrol lines, allowing the convoys to be routed to evade them.
By late 1942, the British had developed a new weapon, and warships were being fitted with the Hedgehog anti-submarine mortar which fired twenty-four contact-fused bombs directly "ahead" of the attacking ship. Unlike depth charges, which exploded at certain set depths "behind" the attacking warship, disturbing the water and making it hard to keep track of the target, Hedgehog charges only exploded if they hit a U-boat. This meant that a U-boat could be continuously tracked and attacked until it was sunk. The Hedgehog was a particularly effective weapon, raising the percentage of kills from 7% of attacks to nearer 25%. When one of the Hedgehog charges exploded, it set off the others which increased the weapon's effectiveness.
Detection by radar-equipped aircraft could suppress U-boat activity over a wide area, but an aircraft attack would only be successful with good visibility. U-boats were quite safe from aircraft at night, since the deployment of an illuminating flare gave adequate warning of an attack. The introduction by the British of the Leigh Light in June 1942 was a significant factor in the North Atlantic struggle. It was a powerful searchlight that was automatically aligned with the airborne radar to illuminate targets suddenly while in the final stages of an attack run. This let British aircraft attack U-boats recharging batteries on the surface at night, forcing German submarine skippers to switch to daytime recharges.
The U-boat commanders who survived reported a particular fear of this weapon system since the hum of an aircraft was inaudible at night above the noise of the boat. The aircraft acquired the submarine using centimetric radar which was undetectable with the typical U-Boat equipment, then lined up on an attack run. When metric radar was used, the set would automatically lower the radar power during the approach so that the submarine would not think it was being tracked. With a mile or so to go the searchlight would automatically come on, immediately and accurately illuminating the target from the sky, which had about five seconds warning before it was hit with a stick of depth-charges. A drop in Allied shipping losses from 600,000 to 200,000 tonnes per month was attributed to this ingenious device.
The climax of the campaign came in 1943, which we will deal with in BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC II as the timeline gets us there.
The longest on-going battle of the war was the Battle of the Atlantic, which started on September 1, 1939 and ran for the whole length of the war. Although in its early stages it featured German surface raiders (such as the Graf Spee and the Bismarck) against the Royal Navy, it was fundamentally a battle of German U-boats attacking merchant shipping bound for England, and being hunted by Royal Navy (plus Canadian and later US) surface units. It was estimated that Britain needed a million tons of supplies every week to be able to stay in the war, and those supplIes came primarily from the US, Canada and Britain's overseas possessions.
The biggest weapon in the Allies had was the British development of ASDIC, later called sonar. In its early stages it was a crude weapon, and not effective if the hunter was traveling at high speed. However, it was developed rapidly, and became more and more effective. When a U-boat was detected, it was attacked by depth charges, which had to detonate within 20 ft of the submarine to be effective. (We've all seen the movies, and wondered why they didn't shut the valves before they started leaking-lol).
Although the U-boats operated singly at the start of the war, the Germans adapted to the use of convoys by developing the wolfpack, where many submarines attacked a convoy, overwhelming the ability of the escorts to protect the merchantmen.
After the fall of France, the German Navy could operate from French bases which put them 500 miles closer to Atlantic shipping. The early U-boat operations from the French bases were spectacularly successful. This was the heyday of the great U-boat aces like Gunther Prien of U-47, Kretschmer of U-99, Schepkeof U-100, and others. The U-boat crews became heroes at home in Germany. From June until October 1940, over 270 Allied ships were sunk: this period was referred to by U-boat crews as "Die Glückliche Zeit", the Happy Time.
The disastrous convoy battles of October 1940 forced a change in British tactics. The most important of these was the introduction of permanent escort groups to improve the co-ordination and effectiveness of ships and men in battle. British efforts were helped by a gradual increase in the number of escort vessels available as the old ex-American destroyers and the new British- and Canadian-built Flower class corvettes were now coming into service in numbers. Many of these ships became part of the huge expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, which grew from a handful of destroyers at the outbreak of war to take an increasing share of convoy escort duty.
One of the most important developments was that of ship-borne direction-finding radio equipment, known as HF/DF (High-Frequency Direction-Finding), which was gradually fitted to the larger escort ships. HF/DF let an operator see the direction of a broadcast, even if the messages they were sending could not be read. Since the wolfpack relied on U-boats surfacing to report the position of a convoy, there was a steady stream of messages to intercept.
On May 9, 1941 the British destroyer HMS Bulldog captured U-110 and recovered a complete, intact Enigma Machine. Combined with a couple of other captures, this was a vital breakthrough for the Allied code-breaking efforts. The machine was taken to Bletchely Park, where it was used to help break the German codes. This would give Britain the ability to read German naval signals for much of the remainder of the campaign, and, incidentally, provide the impetus for the development of the first programmable electronic device, the Colossus computer.
The wolfpack tactics relied on radio communications, based on the assumption that the Enigma cipher could not be broken and that short signal messages could not be pinpointed with enough accuracy to endanger the signaling U-boat. Both assumptions were wrong. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, a combination of reading Enigma messages and radio direction finding enabled the British to plot the positions of the U-boat patrol lines, allowing the convoys to be routed to evade them.
By late 1942, the British had developed a new weapon, and warships were being fitted with the Hedgehog anti-submarine mortar which fired twenty-four contact-fused bombs directly "ahead" of the attacking ship. Unlike depth charges, which exploded at certain set depths "behind" the attacking warship, disturbing the water and making it hard to keep track of the target, Hedgehog charges only exploded if they hit a U-boat. This meant that a U-boat could be continuously tracked and attacked until it was sunk. The Hedgehog was a particularly effective weapon, raising the percentage of kills from 7% of attacks to nearer 25%. When one of the Hedgehog charges exploded, it set off the others which increased the weapon's effectiveness.
Detection by radar-equipped aircraft could suppress U-boat activity over a wide area, but an aircraft attack would only be successful with good visibility. U-boats were quite safe from aircraft at night, since the deployment of an illuminating flare gave adequate warning of an attack. The introduction by the British of the Leigh Light in June 1942 was a significant factor in the North Atlantic struggle. It was a powerful searchlight that was automatically aligned with the airborne radar to illuminate targets suddenly while in the final stages of an attack run. This let British aircraft attack U-boats recharging batteries on the surface at night, forcing German submarine skippers to switch to daytime recharges.
The U-boat commanders who survived reported a particular fear of this weapon system since the hum of an aircraft was inaudible at night above the noise of the boat. The aircraft acquired the submarine using centimetric radar which was undetectable with the typical U-Boat equipment, then lined up on an attack run. When metric radar was used, the set would automatically lower the radar power during the approach so that the submarine would not think it was being tracked. With a mile or so to go the searchlight would automatically come on, immediately and accurately illuminating the target from the sky, which had about five seconds warning before it was hit with a stick of depth-charges. A drop in Allied shipping losses from 600,000 to 200,000 tonnes per month was attributed to this ingenious device.
The climax of the campaign came in 1943, which we will deal with in BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC II as the timeline gets us there.
timschochet
Footballguy
Great stuff as always, Ozymandias (Finally got the spelling right!)
I know that the moment Hitler declared war on the United States, the U-Boats were finally unleashed against American shipping and for a while they went crazy. Can you discuss what American losses were like the first several months of 1942?
I know that the moment Hitler declared war on the United States, the U-Boats were finally unleashed against American shipping and for a while they went crazy. Can you discuss what American losses were like the first several months of 1942?
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and Hitler's declaration of war on the US, Admiral Doenitz unleashed "Operation Paukenschlag" (Drumbeat), by deciding to target ships off the US coast and in the Caribbean. By this time the Germans had developed the snorkel, which allowed submarines to be submerged for long periods of time, and soon had the 1,000 ton "milk cow" submarines which could provide fuel and supplies to submarines so that they did not have to return to home port to refuel. The newer submarines could also travel at 8 knots submerged, which made them as fast or faster than most merchant ships.The Second Happy Time was the informal name for a phase in the Second Battle of the Atlantic during which Axis submarines attacked merchant shipping along the east coast of North America. The first "Happy time" was in 1940/41.It lasted from January 1942 to about August of that year. German submariners named it the happy time or the golden time as defence measures were weak and disorganised, and the U-boats were able to inflict massive damage with little risk. During the second happy time, Axis submarines sank 609 ships totaling 3.1 million tons for the loss of only 22 U-boats. This was roughly one quarter of all shipping sunk by U-boats during the entire Second World War.Amazingly enough, Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations refused to order a blackout on US coastal cities (in spite of recommendations from Britain), so that merchant ships were usually sitting targets at night as they were silhouetted against the light of cities. The first sinking of a U-boat by a U.S. Navy ship off the coast of the U.S. did not occur until April 14, 1942, when the destroyer USS Roper sank the U-85. While it is true that the US Navy's objective was primarily on the war in the Pacific, some provision should have been made to have convoy service and more escort vessel produced.It is believed that the advertising campaign "Lose lips sink ships" may well have been more directed to keep the horrendous news of losses from the American public, than it was to prevent information from reaching the Germans.timschochet said:
timschochet
Footballguy
Executive Order 9066
General John L. De Witt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, was an old Phillipine hand. Most of his closest friends were being killed or taken prisoner at Bataan, and this may have affected his frame of mind in February, 1942. He wrote the President that it was "dangerous to war interests to let Japanese Americans roam about. A ***'s a ***, whether born in America or not." He pressed for more powers. Calfornia pressed for Federal action. William Manchester in The Glory and The Dream, perhaps attempting to absolve FDR, writes:
Roosevelt, weary of the issue and preoccupied with theaters of war, told Stimson and McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, to handle it; he asked only that they be as reasonable and humane as possible. Stimson was busy with his own maps and pins, so the initative passed to McCloy, who became the Administration's prime mover for resettlement...Six days later, Attorney General Biddle urged caution, advising FDR that "the Army has not yet advised me of it's conclusions in the matter"...Stimson, the strong man of the cabinet, felt he must support McCloy and DeWitt... Walter Lippman (the journalist) weighed in with what Biddle later called the decisive opinion..."The Pacific Coast is a combat zone: some parts of it may be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield."... On February 19, the President signed Exuctive Order 9066 authorizing the War Department to establish "military areas" and exclude from them "any and all persons."
Manchester, a Roosevelt fan, tries to be forgiving here. He goes on to state mildly, "It was not Roosevelt's finest hour." Indeed it was not. Nor was it America's. With a stroke of his pen, FDR consigned to DeWitt's mercies an innocent and bewildered people who, like most first and second generation settlers, were more loyal to their country than old settlers. Before I relate the fate of these people, there are several points that I wish to make regarding this subject:
1. Manchester may want to absolve FDR somewhat by claiming he was preoccupied and called for compassion. Other historians are not so gentle, and we shouldn't be, either. This was the gravest violation of American civil rights since slavery times, and Roosevelt is the man who signed the order. It is his hand on the document, and ultimately his responsiblity, though not alone.
2. FDR, Stimson, McCloy, Earl Warren, and Walter Lippmann were all New Deal Liberals. As I mentioned before, it has long been litany among those on the left that invasions of civil liberties stem from those on the Right. This did not take place in this situation.
3. In fact, there were at least two prominent right wingers who both argued on behalf the Japanese-Americans: Robert A. Taft, and J Edgar Hoover. Both of these men would later be accused by liberals as being pro-Dictatorship and sympathetic to racism.
4. Another group which strenously protested this decision, and took it all the way to the Supreme Court, was the Amercan Civl Liberties Union. I bring this up because then, as now, the ACLU acted on behalf of it's own principles against the will of the vast majority. I am not using this thread as a platform to defend every action of this organization, but it is noteworthy that they were virtually alone in their position at the time.
5. In 2002 the conservative author Michelle Malkin wrote a book called In Defense of Internment, in which, as the title suggests, she defended the imprisonment of the Nisei and suggested that, in the wake of 9/11, we should consider repeating the process for Arab-Americans. Out of curiosity I tried to read a bit of this at the bookstore, and after a few pages I was so disgusted I had to put it down. How this woman still has credibility among certain sectors of the public is beyond me. But I raise it now because her work demonstrates how important it is that we remember the truth surrounding this most shameful of episodes.
General John L. De Witt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, was an old Phillipine hand. Most of his closest friends were being killed or taken prisoner at Bataan, and this may have affected his frame of mind in February, 1942. He wrote the President that it was "dangerous to war interests to let Japanese Americans roam about. A ***'s a ***, whether born in America or not." He pressed for more powers. Calfornia pressed for Federal action. William Manchester in The Glory and The Dream, perhaps attempting to absolve FDR, writes:
Roosevelt, weary of the issue and preoccupied with theaters of war, told Stimson and McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, to handle it; he asked only that they be as reasonable and humane as possible. Stimson was busy with his own maps and pins, so the initative passed to McCloy, who became the Administration's prime mover for resettlement...Six days later, Attorney General Biddle urged caution, advising FDR that "the Army has not yet advised me of it's conclusions in the matter"...Stimson, the strong man of the cabinet, felt he must support McCloy and DeWitt... Walter Lippman (the journalist) weighed in with what Biddle later called the decisive opinion..."The Pacific Coast is a combat zone: some parts of it may be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield."... On February 19, the President signed Exuctive Order 9066 authorizing the War Department to establish "military areas" and exclude from them "any and all persons."
Manchester, a Roosevelt fan, tries to be forgiving here. He goes on to state mildly, "It was not Roosevelt's finest hour." Indeed it was not. Nor was it America's. With a stroke of his pen, FDR consigned to DeWitt's mercies an innocent and bewildered people who, like most first and second generation settlers, were more loyal to their country than old settlers. Before I relate the fate of these people, there are several points that I wish to make regarding this subject:
1. Manchester may want to absolve FDR somewhat by claiming he was preoccupied and called for compassion. Other historians are not so gentle, and we shouldn't be, either. This was the gravest violation of American civil rights since slavery times, and Roosevelt is the man who signed the order. It is his hand on the document, and ultimately his responsiblity, though not alone.
2. FDR, Stimson, McCloy, Earl Warren, and Walter Lippmann were all New Deal Liberals. As I mentioned before, it has long been litany among those on the left that invasions of civil liberties stem from those on the Right. This did not take place in this situation.
3. In fact, there were at least two prominent right wingers who both argued on behalf the Japanese-Americans: Robert A. Taft, and J Edgar Hoover. Both of these men would later be accused by liberals as being pro-Dictatorship and sympathetic to racism.
4. Another group which strenously protested this decision, and took it all the way to the Supreme Court, was the Amercan Civl Liberties Union. I bring this up because then, as now, the ACLU acted on behalf of it's own principles against the will of the vast majority. I am not using this thread as a platform to defend every action of this organization, but it is noteworthy that they were virtually alone in their position at the time.
5. In 2002 the conservative author Michelle Malkin wrote a book called In Defense of Internment, in which, as the title suggests, she defended the imprisonment of the Nisei and suggested that, in the wake of 9/11, we should consider repeating the process for Arab-Americans. Out of curiosity I tried to read a bit of this at the bookstore, and after a few pages I was so disgusted I had to put it down. How this woman still has credibility among certain sectors of the public is beyond me. But I raise it now because her work demonstrates how important it is that we remember the truth surrounding this most shameful of episodes.
timschochet
Footballguy
Executive Order 9066 Part Two
Under 9066, DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order #20, which was nailed to doors like quarantine orders. All persons of Japanese ancestry were given 48 hours to dispose of their homes, businesses, and furnitures, during their period of resettlement they would be permitted to carry only personal belongings, no hand luggage. All investments and bank accounts were forfeited. Denied the right to appeal, or even protest, the Japanese-Americans on the mainland thus lost 70 million dollars in farm acreage and equipment, 35 million in fruits and vegetables, nearly 500 million in annual income, and savings, stocks and bonds beyond reckoning.
Beginning March 30, the Issei and Nisei were rounded up. It was a brisk Army operation; toddlers were issued tags like luggage, and presently truck conveys drew up. From the sidewalks, soldiers shouted, "Out, Japs!" The trucks took the internees to 15 assembly areas, among them Pasadena's Rose Bowl, and the Santa Anita racetracks. The tracks were the worst because families were housed in horse stalls. These areas were only temporary quarters. The prisoners received identity cards and awaiting transport to 11 huge "relocation centers." These places were all on federal land, usually the most desolate land in the country.
We must define the relocation centers as concentration camps, because by definition that is exactly what they were. The average family of 6 or 7 members was allowed an "apartment" measuring 20 by 25 feet. None had a stove or running water. Each block of barracks shared a community laundry, mess hall, latrines, and open shower stalls, where women were forced to bathe in full view of the sentries.
They were to spend 3 years on dreary tracts east of the Sierra Nevadas, in California's Owens Valley, and at Tule Lake, in Northern California's remote Siskiyou County. Surrounded by barbed wire, with powerful searchlights in watchtowers sweeping their windows each night, they struggled to recapture something of the life they had known before Pearl Harbor, teaching the children, holding church services, and attending what eventually turned out to be 2,120 marriages, 5,981 christenings, and 1,862 funerals.
The ACLU's case went all the way to the Supreme Court. It took over 2 years, and to it's eternal shame, the Court handed down a decision that ranks with Dred Scott and Plessey vs. Ferguson as among it's worst ever. Justice Black wrote that California had been threatened with invasion, the authority of the military was paramount, and the Japanese hadn't been imprisoned because of racial prejudice anyhow. As dissenters Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson pointed out, if it was not because of racism, why didn't German Americans and Italian Americans receive the same fate? No answer was given, nor would it have mattered. The decision received very little press. and in any case it expressed the will of the vast majority of Americans. The Hearst Press continued to keep up the pressure; that same month, they reported that a prisoner riot at Tule Lake "proved the disloyalty of these so-called Americans".
There was no riot at Tule. At no time during the detentions were there any disturbances in the camps. Amazingly, the patriotism of the Japanese-Americans had been almost wholly unaffected by their mistreatment. With incredible stoicism they accepted their fate. The Japanese phrase, "Shigata Ga Nai" which means, "It is what it is" or "What is to be done?" was on everyone's lips. They planted trees, organized activities, and tried to help the war effort in anyway they could, like painting War Bond posters, knowing they would be paid nothing. They had baseball leagues. To the confusion of their guards, they assembled each morning to raise the Stars and Stripes and salute it while their Boy Scout drum and bugle corps (every camp had one) played the National Anthem. The two most popular classes were the English language and American history. Saturday evenings they sang "America the Beautiful", and after January 28, 1943, the men of military age did a lot more than sing.
That was the day Stimson announced that the Army would accept Nisei volunteers. Why they did this, the protests within the Army that followed, and the ultimate result I shall relate in detail later: it is a story that will rank among the greatest I have to relate in this entire narrative. Let me conclude for now with the fact that on the same day the announcement was made, 1,200 men immediately enlisted, and within two months, 17,600 Japanese had joined the Army, taking the recruit's oath of allegience behind barbed wire.
Under 9066, DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order #20, which was nailed to doors like quarantine orders. All persons of Japanese ancestry were given 48 hours to dispose of their homes, businesses, and furnitures, during their period of resettlement they would be permitted to carry only personal belongings, no hand luggage. All investments and bank accounts were forfeited. Denied the right to appeal, or even protest, the Japanese-Americans on the mainland thus lost 70 million dollars in farm acreage and equipment, 35 million in fruits and vegetables, nearly 500 million in annual income, and savings, stocks and bonds beyond reckoning.
Beginning March 30, the Issei and Nisei were rounded up. It was a brisk Army operation; toddlers were issued tags like luggage, and presently truck conveys drew up. From the sidewalks, soldiers shouted, "Out, Japs!" The trucks took the internees to 15 assembly areas, among them Pasadena's Rose Bowl, and the Santa Anita racetracks. The tracks were the worst because families were housed in horse stalls. These areas were only temporary quarters. The prisoners received identity cards and awaiting transport to 11 huge "relocation centers." These places were all on federal land, usually the most desolate land in the country.
We must define the relocation centers as concentration camps, because by definition that is exactly what they were. The average family of 6 or 7 members was allowed an "apartment" measuring 20 by 25 feet. None had a stove or running water. Each block of barracks shared a community laundry, mess hall, latrines, and open shower stalls, where women were forced to bathe in full view of the sentries.
They were to spend 3 years on dreary tracts east of the Sierra Nevadas, in California's Owens Valley, and at Tule Lake, in Northern California's remote Siskiyou County. Surrounded by barbed wire, with powerful searchlights in watchtowers sweeping their windows each night, they struggled to recapture something of the life they had known before Pearl Harbor, teaching the children, holding church services, and attending what eventually turned out to be 2,120 marriages, 5,981 christenings, and 1,862 funerals.
The ACLU's case went all the way to the Supreme Court. It took over 2 years, and to it's eternal shame, the Court handed down a decision that ranks with Dred Scott and Plessey vs. Ferguson as among it's worst ever. Justice Black wrote that California had been threatened with invasion, the authority of the military was paramount, and the Japanese hadn't been imprisoned because of racial prejudice anyhow. As dissenters Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson pointed out, if it was not because of racism, why didn't German Americans and Italian Americans receive the same fate? No answer was given, nor would it have mattered. The decision received very little press. and in any case it expressed the will of the vast majority of Americans. The Hearst Press continued to keep up the pressure; that same month, they reported that a prisoner riot at Tule Lake "proved the disloyalty of these so-called Americans".
There was no riot at Tule. At no time during the detentions were there any disturbances in the camps. Amazingly, the patriotism of the Japanese-Americans had been almost wholly unaffected by their mistreatment. With incredible stoicism they accepted their fate. The Japanese phrase, "Shigata Ga Nai" which means, "It is what it is" or "What is to be done?" was on everyone's lips. They planted trees, organized activities, and tried to help the war effort in anyway they could, like painting War Bond posters, knowing they would be paid nothing. They had baseball leagues. To the confusion of their guards, they assembled each morning to raise the Stars and Stripes and salute it while their Boy Scout drum and bugle corps (every camp had one) played the National Anthem. The two most popular classes were the English language and American history. Saturday evenings they sang "America the Beautiful", and after January 28, 1943, the men of military age did a lot more than sing.
That was the day Stimson announced that the Army would accept Nisei volunteers. Why they did this, the protests within the Army that followed, and the ultimate result I shall relate in detail later: it is a story that will rank among the greatest I have to relate in this entire narrative. Let me conclude for now with the fact that on the same day the announcement was made, 1,200 men immediately enlisted, and within two months, 17,600 Japanese had joined the Army, taking the recruit's oath of allegience behind barbed wire.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
I must admit I knew about the internment, but had not known how bad it had been. You are right, it was shameful.
timschochet
Footballguy
Rommel!
One of the key things to remember about World War II is how all the different theatres of war affected each other. Back in early 1941, Wavell had been hurt in North Africa by Churchill's diversion of forces to Greece and Crete. Now, in January of 1942, Auchinleck faced a similar problem. Most of the buildup of his troops had been from Australia, New Zealand, and the Far East. The Japanese onslaught meant that the British 8th Army would not receive reinforcements it was expecting. In addition, Australia and New Zealand, very concerned about the possibility of Japanese invasion, were demanding that a substantial portion of their men be sent home for defense.
All of this made Auchinleck dubious about yet another attempted assault on Rommel, which of course Churchill demanded ("What are you waiting for?")
Auchinleck also did not trust Ritchie, his troop commander, who never seemed to concern himself with the possibility of defense against counterattacks. In the eyes of Churchill and the British public, Ritchie had saved the day from an overly cautious Cunningham. Auchinleck thought he knew better. He didn't believe that Ritchie was right for this command. But to sack two generals in 6 months would seriously hurt British morale, so he kept silent.
Ritchie at Bengazi set to work organizing the offensive, steadfastly ignoring warnings to prepare a defense also on the chance that the Desert Fox might strike first. After all, intelligence had assured him that Rommel had not been reinforced and could not be reinforced in time to forestall any attack on him. (These erroneous reports infuriated many front-line commanders, whose troops had actually seen Rommel's new armor.) So Neil Ritchie, the handsome, plodding mediocrity stood opposite Erwin Rommel, the tactical genius who was about to have his greatest military triumph, the one that would cause historians to come to regard him as one of the greatest generals in all of history.
On the evening of January 21,Rommel began a prolonged assault. He came at the British in two columns: one on the coast, one inland. When the enemy's troops were overrun, he quickly concentrated on the coast and pressed forward at the head of his armor. Ritchie thought that this thrust was merely a recon force and that it would retire. It did not. Rommel pressed on. When some of his tanks ran out of fuel, he deliberately increased his speed to compensate, again employing time as a weapon against the slow moving British. On January 27, he feinted towards the inland, tricking both Ritchie and Auchinleck into moving their armor to the east. At once Rommel changed direction and drove for the coast, cutting off the 4th Indian Division, which escaped encirclement only by fighting it's way out. But Benghazi fell to Rommel two days later, along with the enormous stores and fuel and supplies which Ritchie had collected for his planned invasion.
This by itself was a great triumph, but of course the Desert Fox wanted more, much more. The British were on their heels, NOW was the time to strike for Egypt, while the Japanese were hurting them in the Far East. All he needed was some more troops, tanks, air support. He decided to fly to the Wolf's Layer and make his case. Surely Hitler would see it this time.
One of the key things to remember about World War II is how all the different theatres of war affected each other. Back in early 1941, Wavell had been hurt in North Africa by Churchill's diversion of forces to Greece and Crete. Now, in January of 1942, Auchinleck faced a similar problem. Most of the buildup of his troops had been from Australia, New Zealand, and the Far East. The Japanese onslaught meant that the British 8th Army would not receive reinforcements it was expecting. In addition, Australia and New Zealand, very concerned about the possibility of Japanese invasion, were demanding that a substantial portion of their men be sent home for defense.
All of this made Auchinleck dubious about yet another attempted assault on Rommel, which of course Churchill demanded ("What are you waiting for?")
Auchinleck also did not trust Ritchie, his troop commander, who never seemed to concern himself with the possibility of defense against counterattacks. In the eyes of Churchill and the British public, Ritchie had saved the day from an overly cautious Cunningham. Auchinleck thought he knew better. He didn't believe that Ritchie was right for this command. But to sack two generals in 6 months would seriously hurt British morale, so he kept silent.
Ritchie at Bengazi set to work organizing the offensive, steadfastly ignoring warnings to prepare a defense also on the chance that the Desert Fox might strike first. After all, intelligence had assured him that Rommel had not been reinforced and could not be reinforced in time to forestall any attack on him. (These erroneous reports infuriated many front-line commanders, whose troops had actually seen Rommel's new armor.) So Neil Ritchie, the handsome, plodding mediocrity stood opposite Erwin Rommel, the tactical genius who was about to have his greatest military triumph, the one that would cause historians to come to regard him as one of the greatest generals in all of history.
On the evening of January 21,Rommel began a prolonged assault. He came at the British in two columns: one on the coast, one inland. When the enemy's troops were overrun, he quickly concentrated on the coast and pressed forward at the head of his armor. Ritchie thought that this thrust was merely a recon force and that it would retire. It did not. Rommel pressed on. When some of his tanks ran out of fuel, he deliberately increased his speed to compensate, again employing time as a weapon against the slow moving British. On January 27, he feinted towards the inland, tricking both Ritchie and Auchinleck into moving their armor to the east. At once Rommel changed direction and drove for the coast, cutting off the 4th Indian Division, which escaped encirclement only by fighting it's way out. But Benghazi fell to Rommel two days later, along with the enormous stores and fuel and supplies which Ritchie had collected for his planned invasion.
This by itself was a great triumph, but of course the Desert Fox wanted more, much more. The British were on their heels, NOW was the time to strike for Egypt, while the Japanese were hurting them in the Far East. All he needed was some more troops, tanks, air support. He decided to fly to the Wolf's Layer and make his case. Surely Hitler would see it this time.
timschochet
Footballguy
Rommel! Part Two
Rommel was met with resistance at the Wolf's Layer. The generals were not too interested in North Africa; their focus was almost exclusively on the Soviet Union. However, among the German public by now, Rommel had achieved a celebrity status equal to MacArthur in America. As a result, even Hitler was hesitant to disappoint him at this juncture. It was decided that in June there would be a joint German/Italian invasion of Malta. Possession of that strategically placed island would allow the Luftwaffe to interdict British shipping in the Meditteranean. Rommel was instructed to stay on the defensive until then.
There is another take on this interlude from Herman Wouk's novel, War and Remembrance. I can't find mention of it elsewhere, so it may be fiction rather than what really happened, but I think it's interesting enough to relate here. According to Wouk, at least some of the generals were excited enough by Rommel's gains to suggest turning North Africa into a major front. This would involve moving troops out of the Soviet Union and staging a holding action there, while using these same troops to sweep through Egypt and perhaps even into India, thus destroying the weak British Empire. Hitler put a damper on this idea by refusing the notion of having any troops leave Russia, but Wouk's German general believes this idea might have altered the entire war.
Despite not getting his extra troops and supplies, Rommel chafed at not being able to attack. He still believed the British were weakened in North Africa and some gains could be made. He pushed and pushed headquarters until they relented and agreed in May that he could return to the initiative.
Rommel was met with resistance at the Wolf's Layer. The generals were not too interested in North Africa; their focus was almost exclusively on the Soviet Union. However, among the German public by now, Rommel had achieved a celebrity status equal to MacArthur in America. As a result, even Hitler was hesitant to disappoint him at this juncture. It was decided that in June there would be a joint German/Italian invasion of Malta. Possession of that strategically placed island would allow the Luftwaffe to interdict British shipping in the Meditteranean. Rommel was instructed to stay on the defensive until then.
There is another take on this interlude from Herman Wouk's novel, War and Remembrance. I can't find mention of it elsewhere, so it may be fiction rather than what really happened, but I think it's interesting enough to relate here. According to Wouk, at least some of the generals were excited enough by Rommel's gains to suggest turning North Africa into a major front. This would involve moving troops out of the Soviet Union and staging a holding action there, while using these same troops to sweep through Egypt and perhaps even into India, thus destroying the weak British Empire. Hitler put a damper on this idea by refusing the notion of having any troops leave Russia, but Wouk's German general believes this idea might have altered the entire war.
Despite not getting his extra troops and supplies, Rommel chafed at not being able to attack. He still believed the British were weakened in North Africa and some gains could be made. He pushed and pushed headquarters until they relented and agreed in May that he could return to the initiative.
timschochet
Footballguy
Rommel Part 3
Thanks to Hitler's decision, Ritchie had nearly three months to prepare for Rommel's next strike. At Gazala, his newest headquarters,he busily constructed his "mine marsh", a system of independent strong points of men and guns, backed up by armor. This purely defensive posture not only reflected Ritchie's state of mind, it also suggested that he had completely failed to grasp the nature of desert warfare. In a fluid war without front or flanks, devoid of natural features such as rivers, swamps or mountains for protection or as anchors for the flanks, nothing could invite disaster more surely than a fixed defense.
Rommel went around it easily. On the night of May 26 his armor began moving toward Bir Hacheim. Rommel was again personally in the lead, at the head of 500 tanks. He was not supposed to be attacking, and the soldiers of the 8th Army believed that they were going on the offensive. Some of them were at a leisurely breakfast whn the German armor was sighted only a few miles off. Rommel swept through the static defenses and swung north for Tobruk. The 8th Army was compelled to evacuate. Thus began what became known as the "Gazala Gallop". Fleeing troops hastened through Tobruk without stopping in their flight to Egypt.
By June 18, Tobruk stood alone against Rommel, who was already enclosing it in a ring of iron. This was not the old Tobruk that had withstood the Axis flood. It's commander, General H.B. Klopper, had been a general for a month only. He had no combat experience. The 33,000 troops holding the fortress lived in an atmosphere of doom. Ritchie had promised Klopper that a powerful force would strike Rommel in the rear. But he did not tell him how slow it would be in coming. Ritchie could never cope with Rommel's speed, could not even imagine it. On the night of the 19th, Rommel began attacking. On the 21st, Klopper hauled down his colors and Tobruk capitulated.
The British were now in a mood of panic. Rommel seemed invincible. Churchill was publicly chivalrous; he said, "Across the gulf of war, I salute you." But privately he was furious. He was on the brink of relieving Auchinleck when that general relieved Ritchie and personally took command of the 8th Army. Auchinleck determined that the British would stop fleeing and make a stand short of the Nile river. The first battle between Auchinleck and Rommel took place at Mersa Matruh, and Rommel's speed and daring got the better of the British commander. Within 48 hours, Rommel with only 60 tanks and 2,500 foot soldiers routed two British corps with 150 tanks and betwen 40,000 and 50,000 men and sent them reeling backwards towards the Nile. The place where the British turned to stand again was called El Alamein.
Thanks to Hitler's decision, Ritchie had nearly three months to prepare for Rommel's next strike. At Gazala, his newest headquarters,he busily constructed his "mine marsh", a system of independent strong points of men and guns, backed up by armor. This purely defensive posture not only reflected Ritchie's state of mind, it also suggested that he had completely failed to grasp the nature of desert warfare. In a fluid war without front or flanks, devoid of natural features such as rivers, swamps or mountains for protection or as anchors for the flanks, nothing could invite disaster more surely than a fixed defense.
Rommel went around it easily. On the night of May 26 his armor began moving toward Bir Hacheim. Rommel was again personally in the lead, at the head of 500 tanks. He was not supposed to be attacking, and the soldiers of the 8th Army believed that they were going on the offensive. Some of them were at a leisurely breakfast whn the German armor was sighted only a few miles off. Rommel swept through the static defenses and swung north for Tobruk. The 8th Army was compelled to evacuate. Thus began what became known as the "Gazala Gallop". Fleeing troops hastened through Tobruk without stopping in their flight to Egypt.
By June 18, Tobruk stood alone against Rommel, who was already enclosing it in a ring of iron. This was not the old Tobruk that had withstood the Axis flood. It's commander, General H.B. Klopper, had been a general for a month only. He had no combat experience. The 33,000 troops holding the fortress lived in an atmosphere of doom. Ritchie had promised Klopper that a powerful force would strike Rommel in the rear. But he did not tell him how slow it would be in coming. Ritchie could never cope with Rommel's speed, could not even imagine it. On the night of the 19th, Rommel began attacking. On the 21st, Klopper hauled down his colors and Tobruk capitulated.
The British were now in a mood of panic. Rommel seemed invincible. Churchill was publicly chivalrous; he said, "Across the gulf of war, I salute you." But privately he was furious. He was on the brink of relieving Auchinleck when that general relieved Ritchie and personally took command of the 8th Army. Auchinleck determined that the British would stop fleeing and make a stand short of the Nile river. The first battle between Auchinleck and Rommel took place at Mersa Matruh, and Rommel's speed and daring got the better of the British commander. Within 48 hours, Rommel with only 60 tanks and 2,500 foot soldiers routed two British corps with 150 tanks and betwen 40,000 and 50,000 men and sent them reeling backwards towards the Nile. The place where the British turned to stand again was called El Alamein.
timschochet
Footballguy
El Alamein is a long and epic series of battles. Like Midway, Stalingrad, and Guadalcanal, it deserves a great deal of buildup, narrative, and hopefully lots of discussion. We shall return to it later in the narrative.
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timschochet
Footballguy
Yeah, I covered this guy earlier. I was hoping some math whiz could come along and explain to us, in layman's terms, just exactly how the German code was broken. I read about it, but I couldn't understand it.
timschochet
Footballguy
Since my science skills are less than very good, I have asked NC Commish to come in here and provide a more detailed explanation, in layman's terms, of the development of the atomic bomb. He's agreed and will be giving us some narrative within a few days or so. This should be something to look forward to.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Japanese debate
In the first months of 1942, a dilemma faced the Japanese military leaders: what to do now? With the exception of the Phillipines dragging on and on, their victories had been absolute and complete. The enemy was on their heels. The question became, consolidate, or strike further?
The architect of Pearl Harbor, Isoruko Yamamoto, believed in the latter. He was very much aware of the industrial capacity of the United States. He alone among the Japanese planners had not been surprised by the reaction of the Americans to the strike; he knew more than they did what was coming. Japan, in his view, had one chance- to gamble everything on their current but temporary military superiority. The key to this superiority was the flattops (aircraft carriers.) Japan had 10, the United States had 7. Of the 7, only 3 were in the Pacific. Therefore, Yamamoto's stated goal was to lure the 3 carriers into battle and destroy them. Once this was done, everything could follow: Japan would take Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby in New Guinea while the Combined Fleet destroyed the remnants of the American Pacfic Fleet and capture Midway Island. This would nail down a defense line from the Aleutian Islands in the north through Midway, Wake and the Gilberts and Marshalls in the Central Pacific. Behind it, meanwhile, New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands and Samoa would be conquered, and Australia and New Zealand would be cut off from the rest of the world. Such was Yamamoto's grand scheme.
Not every Japanese military chief supported this grandiose plan. Some of the Admirals saw the danger of overrreaching. The army was reluctant, partly from envy over the navy's brilliant success. Several generals believed that China should be conquered before reaching out for more goals. Some believed that now was the time to strike at the Soviet Union, a move that certainly would have changed world history. There was also a plan to attack the British in India, which again is fascinating to contemplate. What actually happened is that the Japanese could not decide who to listen to, though they leaned towards Yamamoto's plan. But still they hesitated, and key time was lost. Then, on April 18, 1942, the sacred soil of Japan was attacked. The Doolittle Raid!
In the first months of 1942, a dilemma faced the Japanese military leaders: what to do now? With the exception of the Phillipines dragging on and on, their victories had been absolute and complete. The enemy was on their heels. The question became, consolidate, or strike further?
The architect of Pearl Harbor, Isoruko Yamamoto, believed in the latter. He was very much aware of the industrial capacity of the United States. He alone among the Japanese planners had not been surprised by the reaction of the Americans to the strike; he knew more than they did what was coming. Japan, in his view, had one chance- to gamble everything on their current but temporary military superiority. The key to this superiority was the flattops (aircraft carriers.) Japan had 10, the United States had 7. Of the 7, only 3 were in the Pacific. Therefore, Yamamoto's stated goal was to lure the 3 carriers into battle and destroy them. Once this was done, everything could follow: Japan would take Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby in New Guinea while the Combined Fleet destroyed the remnants of the American Pacfic Fleet and capture Midway Island. This would nail down a defense line from the Aleutian Islands in the north through Midway, Wake and the Gilberts and Marshalls in the Central Pacific. Behind it, meanwhile, New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands and Samoa would be conquered, and Australia and New Zealand would be cut off from the rest of the world. Such was Yamamoto's grand scheme.
Not every Japanese military chief supported this grandiose plan. Some of the Admirals saw the danger of overrreaching. The army was reluctant, partly from envy over the navy's brilliant success. Several generals believed that China should be conquered before reaching out for more goals. Some believed that now was the time to strike at the Soviet Union, a move that certainly would have changed world history. There was also a plan to attack the British in India, which again is fascinating to contemplate. What actually happened is that the Japanese could not decide who to listen to, though they leaned towards Yamamoto's plan. But still they hesitated, and key time was lost. Then, on April 18, 1942, the sacred soil of Japan was attacked. The Doolittle Raid!
timschochet
Footballguy
The Doolittle Raid
This came about because FDR wanted to bomb Tokyo as a lift to American morale and a psychological blow to the Japanese. Admirals King and Nimitz (Cincpac, who had replaced Kimmel) knew that land based bombers could not do it, but they agreed that the B-25 Mitchell medium bombers based on an aircraft carrier could. Lt. Colonel James Doolittle, a distinguished aviator and aeronautical engineer would lead them.
The task was difficult. B-25s were not used to taking off in such confined spaces. For a month Dolittle and his crew of pilots practiced takeoffs from abbreviated runways until they believed they had licked the problem. They knew that, once in flight, they could not return to the carrier; they would have to take their chances landing in China.
Admiral William (Bull) Halsey was an energetic fighting man who always had a memorable phrase that was often repeated. When Pearl Harbor occurred, he had said, "Before we're through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell!" Now, commanding the task force that included the Hornet and Enterprise, Halsey said, "This force is bound for Tokyo!" thrilling his men. The task force was supposed to get within 400 miles of Japan, but Halsey was warned not to risk the carriers. At around 550 miles from the target, the fleet spotted some picket boats, and he informed Doolittle that he could go no further. Undaunted, the pilots took off 150 miles farther than was originally planned.
In Tokyo it was like a nightmare come out of the sky. Two bombers suddenly appeared at treetop level, released their 500 pound bombs, then sped away unharmed. Twenty minutes later the other 14 bombers appeared. They were met by heavy but generally inaccurate AA. Two of the American bombers were damaged; 15 of them reached China. With their fuel exhausted, they either crash landed ot abandoned their planes in flight. The last plane somehow landed in the U.S.S.R., where the crew was interned for over 14 months. (This sounds like a fascinating story, but I don't have any more information about it. The Wiki entry reads: the crew who flew to Russia landed 40 miles (65 km) beyond Vladivostok, where their B-25 was confiscated and the crew interned until they managed to escape through Iran in 1943. Why would American pilots need to escape from the Soviet Union?)
The crews of the two planes that wered damaged were captured by the Japanese in China. They were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. Three of them were graciously given life imprisonment; one died in captivity. The others were beheaded.
The United States was electrified by the news that the enemy capital had been bombed. Asked where the planes had come from, FDR just grinned and said, "Shangri La."
Japan was horrified. For the first time ever an enemy had struck at the homeland. The ears of the divine Emperor had been profaned by the sound of American bombs exploding. Yamamoto was so mortified that he put on dress whites and called at the Imperial Palace to apologize personally to Hirohito. Yamamoto used this opportunity to lash at his opponents of the planned Midway operation. Never again! He swore. The Americans must be driven so far back that they could not again even think of insulting the Emperor! In May, 1942, the first part of the campaign began with invasion forces sailing for Tulagi and Port Moseby.
Tulagi was easily taken. Admiral Inoue, the commander of the task force, believed that Port Moseby would be easy as well, since the carriers who had accompanied the Doolittle raid could not return in time. What he was unaware of was that Yorktown, a carrier under the command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, was already in the Coral Sea, and that Nimitz had a new carrier added to his Pacific Fleet, the Lexington. That made 4 all together. The Japanese also did not know that their codes had been broken. Nimitz knew where Inoue was going; now he ordered Lexington to join Yorktown. The Battle of the Coral Sea was on.
Ozymandius will take it from here.
This came about because FDR wanted to bomb Tokyo as a lift to American morale and a psychological blow to the Japanese. Admirals King and Nimitz (Cincpac, who had replaced Kimmel) knew that land based bombers could not do it, but they agreed that the B-25 Mitchell medium bombers based on an aircraft carrier could. Lt. Colonel James Doolittle, a distinguished aviator and aeronautical engineer would lead them.
The task was difficult. B-25s were not used to taking off in such confined spaces. For a month Dolittle and his crew of pilots practiced takeoffs from abbreviated runways until they believed they had licked the problem. They knew that, once in flight, they could not return to the carrier; they would have to take their chances landing in China.
Admiral William (Bull) Halsey was an energetic fighting man who always had a memorable phrase that was often repeated. When Pearl Harbor occurred, he had said, "Before we're through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell!" Now, commanding the task force that included the Hornet and Enterprise, Halsey said, "This force is bound for Tokyo!" thrilling his men. The task force was supposed to get within 400 miles of Japan, but Halsey was warned not to risk the carriers. At around 550 miles from the target, the fleet spotted some picket boats, and he informed Doolittle that he could go no further. Undaunted, the pilots took off 150 miles farther than was originally planned.
In Tokyo it was like a nightmare come out of the sky. Two bombers suddenly appeared at treetop level, released their 500 pound bombs, then sped away unharmed. Twenty minutes later the other 14 bombers appeared. They were met by heavy but generally inaccurate AA. Two of the American bombers were damaged; 15 of them reached China. With their fuel exhausted, they either crash landed ot abandoned their planes in flight. The last plane somehow landed in the U.S.S.R., where the crew was interned for over 14 months. (This sounds like a fascinating story, but I don't have any more information about it. The Wiki entry reads: the crew who flew to Russia landed 40 miles (65 km) beyond Vladivostok, where their B-25 was confiscated and the crew interned until they managed to escape through Iran in 1943. Why would American pilots need to escape from the Soviet Union?)
The crews of the two planes that wered damaged were captured by the Japanese in China. They were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. Three of them were graciously given life imprisonment; one died in captivity. The others were beheaded.
The United States was electrified by the news that the enemy capital had been bombed. Asked where the planes had come from, FDR just grinned and said, "Shangri La."
Japan was horrified. For the first time ever an enemy had struck at the homeland. The ears of the divine Emperor had been profaned by the sound of American bombs exploding. Yamamoto was so mortified that he put on dress whites and called at the Imperial Palace to apologize personally to Hirohito. Yamamoto used this opportunity to lash at his opponents of the planned Midway operation. Never again! He swore. The Americans must be driven so far back that they could not again even think of insulting the Emperor! In May, 1942, the first part of the campaign began with invasion forces sailing for Tulagi and Port Moseby.
Tulagi was easily taken. Admiral Inoue, the commander of the task force, believed that Port Moseby would be easy as well, since the carriers who had accompanied the Doolittle raid could not return in time. What he was unaware of was that Yorktown, a carrier under the command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, was already in the Coral Sea, and that Nimitz had a new carrier added to his Pacific Fleet, the Lexington. That made 4 all together. The Japanese also did not know that their codes had been broken. Nimitz knew where Inoue was going; now he ordered Lexington to join Yorktown. The Battle of the Coral Sea was on.
Ozymandius will take it from here.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA (MAY 5-7, 1942)
The plan for Japan's empire, named the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere, was to be an arc across the Pacific, which would include Southeast Asia. Indonesia, the Philippines, and New Guinea. They needed New Guinea in order to neutralize Northern Australia and prevent it from becoming a springboard for an eventual counterattack by the United States. Some of their plans even included the possibility of the occupation of Northern Australia, which was sparsely populated and almost two thousand miles to the nearest centers of population.
In order to do that, they had to take Port Moresby in New Guinea, to protect their flank for an anticipated move toward Fiji and Samoa. Because the US had broken the Japanese code, they were aware of the move toward Port Moresby, which would be spearheaded by the light carrier Shoho, and which would also include the fast carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku to deal with any possible US involvement.
When it became clear that the invasion of New Guinea was going ahead, Admiral Nimitz detached carriers to oppose the invasion. For the US, it was vital to keep the sea lanes open to Australia, because it was from there that the eventual counterattack against the Japanese empire would come.
Because Enterprise and Hornet had not yet returned from the Tokyo raid, the only carriers available to oppose the invasion were Lexington and Yorktown, and they were sent to the South Pacific. Early on the 5th of May, a scout plane from Admiral Fletcher's force radioed that they had sighted 2 carriers and 4 cruisers. Fletcher immediately scrambled 93 planes from both his carriers. The planes were on their way before it was discovered that the pilot had made an error in the code book and it was really 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Fletcher courageously made the decision to let them continue and his boldness was rewarded when another scout plane detected a carrier just 35 miles away from the original target. With a slight course correction, the first attack by US airplanes upon an enemy carrier of the war happened at 1100, and smothered the Shoho with several torpedoes and 13 bomb hits, sending her down within minutes.
Now it was the Japanese turn to have some faulty intelligence. Japanese scout planes reported that there were two carrier forces, and then a third, which was close to Admiral Hara, the Japanese commander on the scene. (However, this last was the US oiler Neosho and an accompanying destroyer, the Sims). Hara immediately launched a full attack on the hapless Neosho; the destroyer Sims went down in minutes, and the oiler was severely damaged but remained afloat until her crew was rescued.
It was now nearing dark, and Hara faced a dilemma. He decided to take his 27 best pilots and send them out on a night attack. They passed near Fletcher's fleet, where they were intercepted and ten of them were shot down; some reports claim that many crash landed trying to make a night carrier landing, so Hara got only less than ten of them back. However, the remaining ones returned to report that American carriers were only about 50 miles away. During the night, the Japanese moved north, while the Americans moved southwest. Everything depended on finding the enemy as soon as possible in the morning. By morning the fleets were about 200 miles apart.
Both fleets located the enemy at almost exactly the same time, 0800 hours. The advantage, however, was to the Japanese, because they had moved into cloud cover, and the Americans were under clear skies. The planes were evenly matched, the Americans had 121, the Japanese 122. However, the Japanese were more experienced, and furthermore, their torpedoes were better. The Americans scored hits on the Shokaku, damaging her severely, and putting her out of action. However, the Japanese inflicted damage on the Yorktown, and were able to hit the Lexington with bombs and torpedoes. Although Lexington seemed initially to have sustained survivable damage, and was able to recover planes, she was wracked by a huge explosion, and became an inferno. Finally, she had to be abandoned. She drifted and was eventually torpedoed by the destroyer Phelps.
The battle of the Coral Sea was the first which took place in which the opposing fleets never caught sight of the other. It was a tactical victory for the Japanese, because they inflicted more damage, and this at a time that the US was critically short of carriers. No one knew it then, but this was the high water mark for the Japanese. For the first time, their offensive had been blunted.
In retrospect, it was a strategic setback for Japan. They had to abandon their plans to invade Port Moresby, and the damage sustained by the Shokaku, and the loss of many experienced pilots from the Zuikaku, were to make a difference, and very soon. Neither of them would participate in the forthcoming decisive battle.
The plan for Japan's empire, named the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere, was to be an arc across the Pacific, which would include Southeast Asia. Indonesia, the Philippines, and New Guinea. They needed New Guinea in order to neutralize Northern Australia and prevent it from becoming a springboard for an eventual counterattack by the United States. Some of their plans even included the possibility of the occupation of Northern Australia, which was sparsely populated and almost two thousand miles to the nearest centers of population.
In order to do that, they had to take Port Moresby in New Guinea, to protect their flank for an anticipated move toward Fiji and Samoa. Because the US had broken the Japanese code, they were aware of the move toward Port Moresby, which would be spearheaded by the light carrier Shoho, and which would also include the fast carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku to deal with any possible US involvement.
When it became clear that the invasion of New Guinea was going ahead, Admiral Nimitz detached carriers to oppose the invasion. For the US, it was vital to keep the sea lanes open to Australia, because it was from there that the eventual counterattack against the Japanese empire would come.
Because Enterprise and Hornet had not yet returned from the Tokyo raid, the only carriers available to oppose the invasion were Lexington and Yorktown, and they were sent to the South Pacific. Early on the 5th of May, a scout plane from Admiral Fletcher's force radioed that they had sighted 2 carriers and 4 cruisers. Fletcher immediately scrambled 93 planes from both his carriers. The planes were on their way before it was discovered that the pilot had made an error in the code book and it was really 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Fletcher courageously made the decision to let them continue and his boldness was rewarded when another scout plane detected a carrier just 35 miles away from the original target. With a slight course correction, the first attack by US airplanes upon an enemy carrier of the war happened at 1100, and smothered the Shoho with several torpedoes and 13 bomb hits, sending her down within minutes.
Now it was the Japanese turn to have some faulty intelligence. Japanese scout planes reported that there were two carrier forces, and then a third, which was close to Admiral Hara, the Japanese commander on the scene. (However, this last was the US oiler Neosho and an accompanying destroyer, the Sims). Hara immediately launched a full attack on the hapless Neosho; the destroyer Sims went down in minutes, and the oiler was severely damaged but remained afloat until her crew was rescued.
It was now nearing dark, and Hara faced a dilemma. He decided to take his 27 best pilots and send them out on a night attack. They passed near Fletcher's fleet, where they were intercepted and ten of them were shot down; some reports claim that many crash landed trying to make a night carrier landing, so Hara got only less than ten of them back. However, the remaining ones returned to report that American carriers were only about 50 miles away. During the night, the Japanese moved north, while the Americans moved southwest. Everything depended on finding the enemy as soon as possible in the morning. By morning the fleets were about 200 miles apart.
Both fleets located the enemy at almost exactly the same time, 0800 hours. The advantage, however, was to the Japanese, because they had moved into cloud cover, and the Americans were under clear skies. The planes were evenly matched, the Americans had 121, the Japanese 122. However, the Japanese were more experienced, and furthermore, their torpedoes were better. The Americans scored hits on the Shokaku, damaging her severely, and putting her out of action. However, the Japanese inflicted damage on the Yorktown, and were able to hit the Lexington with bombs and torpedoes. Although Lexington seemed initially to have sustained survivable damage, and was able to recover planes, she was wracked by a huge explosion, and became an inferno. Finally, she had to be abandoned. She drifted and was eventually torpedoed by the destroyer Phelps.
The battle of the Coral Sea was the first which took place in which the opposing fleets never caught sight of the other. It was a tactical victory for the Japanese, because they inflicted more damage, and this at a time that the US was critically short of carriers. No one knew it then, but this was the high water mark for the Japanese. For the first time, their offensive had been blunted.
In retrospect, it was a strategic setback for Japan. They had to abandon their plans to invade Port Moresby, and the damage sustained by the Shokaku, and the loss of many experienced pilots from the Zuikaku, were to make a difference, and very soon. Neither of them would participate in the forthcoming decisive battle.
timschochet
Footballguy
My wife has an aunt in her late 70's who married young, and her first husband was aboard Lexington as a sailor. According to her, he abandoned ship in the Coral Sea and was fished out of the water on a life boat and made it to a destroyer. I don't have any more details, wish I did!
As a sidenote, there was a very good movie made about the Doolittle raid, called "30 Seconds Over Tokyo" that was released in 1944 and starred Spencer Tracy as Doolittle and Van Johnson as one of the pilots. It was surprisingly accurate for this kind of "feel good" morale boosting movie and incorporated actual footage of the B-25s in training and launching from the carriers.The film begins in February 1942 as the United States Army Air Forces plan to retaliate for the Pearl Harbor attack by bombing Tokyo and four other Japanese cities. Lt Col "Jimmy" Doolittle (Spencer Tracy), the leader of the mission, assembles a volunteer force of aircrews who begin their top secret training by learning to take their B-25 Mitchell medium bombers off in the short distance of 500 feet or less to simulate taking off from the deck of an aircraft carrier. After depicting the squadron's month of hazardous training in Florida, the story goes on to describe the raid's successful launch from the carrier USS Hornet, the harrowing attacks on Japan by the 16 B-25s, and the raid's aftermath.
While en route to Japan, the Hornet's task force is discovered by Japanese picket boats, and the bombers are forced to take off twelve hours early at the extreme limit of their range. After their successful attack on Japan, all but one of the planes run out of fuel before reaching their recovery airfields in China. As a result, their crews are forced to either bail out over China or crash land along the coast (one plane landed safely in Russia and its crew was interned for over a year). Lawson's B-25 unexpectedly crashes in the surf while trying to land on a beach in darkness and heavy rain. He and his crew survive, but then face tremendous hardships and danger while being escorted to American lines by friendly Chinese. While still in China, Lawson has a leg amputated by the mission's flight surgeon as a result of his serious crash injuries. The film ends with Lawson being reunited with his wife Ellen in a Washington, DC, hospital.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Because the Lexington was afloat for hours after the attack, most of the crew, including the captain, were rescued. However, 216 of the 3,000 crew, went down with the ship.
timschochet
Footballguy
Does anyone have any more info on the B-25 that landed in Russia? I'm really fascinated by this story; I'd like to know why they were interned, why the State Department didn't insist they be released immediately (or if it was unknown, whether or not it created a controversy when it was revealed) why they were forced to escape and how they did so. Sounds like a great plot for a movie.
The flick Pearl Harbor also covers the Doolittle Raid, if you can stomach Alec Baldwin as Doolittle.
The flick Pearl Harbor also covers the Doolittle Raid, if you can stomach Alec Baldwin as Doolittle.
I've read some stuff about US pilots interned in Siberia and IIRC it had to do with Soviet secrecy about what was going on out there. As I also recall, there were some instances of B-29 pilots crash-landing there in the later part of the war. Stalin's paranoia about the US knowing what he was doing cannot be underestimated, even during the time we were their "allies". The Russians probably thought that the Doolittle guys were spys and so held them for that reason alone.And comparing Alec Baldwin to Spencer Tracy is ludicrious.
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SofaKings
Footballguy
Probably had something to do with Stalin's wishes to not provoke the Japanese. While they were fighting the Germans the Soviets did not want to get involved in a land battle with the Japanese. The main bulk of the Japanese Army was located in China within easy striking distance of Vladivostock and other Siberian outposts.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
MIDWAY PRELIMINARIES
Lying more that 1,100 miles east and slightly north of Hawaii, Midway atoll seems an unlikely place for the two most powerful Pacific nations to come face to face with each other, and fight the most decisive engagement of the Pacific War. But it was more than one third of the way from Pearl Harbor to Japan, and would be a powerful strategic place to hold in the eventual naval showdown between those two nations. Less than 6 miles in diameter, it was nevertheless an unsinkable aircraft carrier which could be used for reconnaissance, fuel and ammunition storage and a platform from where to launch bomber and fighter attacks.
Admiral Yamamoto decided that he needed Midway. Furthermore, he also knew that the Americans would be reluctant to give it up, for the reasons stated above. His hope was that he could lure the US Navy into a decisive confrontation, while he still enjoyed numerical naval superiority. He knew too well what would happen in a long war; he knew that the USA had produced 4,500,000 automobiles in 1940, while the Japanese had produced 48,000. His hope was for a decisive victory early and then, maybe, the US could be discouraged from the long road back.
There was some infighting going on in Japan regarding Midway; some felt it was too far away. But all of that ended on April 18, when Jimmy Doolittle's B-25s bombed Tokyo. Japanese had to have Midway to strengthen its defensive perimeter. The plan that emerged was an intricate ballet which involved a diversionary attack on the Aleutians, and a powerful 6 carrier striking force, which would be backed up by the Main Force with the battleship Yamato (the biggest battleship in the world, with 18.1 inch guns that could hurl a broadside more than 25 miles), and 6 other battleships with the invasion troops. Over 170 ships in all.
A small hitch developed on May 17, when the carrier Shokaku limped back into harbor, her deck shattered and her bow blown off. She was followed by the Zuikaku, with only 6 torpedo planes and 9 bombers left. Of course, the Japanese claimed that Coral Sea had been a great victory, and it had been accomplished by the 5th Air Squadron, which was widely viewed as the weakest in the Japanese fleet. : “Son of concubine gained a victory, so that sons of legal wives could find no rival in the world,” ran the joke around the fleet. But Shokaku and Zuikaku were out of the battle.
But so what? The Americans had little left. The Lexington had been sunk at Coral Sea, and the Yorktown possibly sunk or so severely damaged, she would be out of commission for weeks, if not months. At most, the Americans would be able to oppose them with Enterprise and Hornet. Plus, the Americans had lost most of their battleships in Pearl Harbor. Four carriers would be enough to do the job.
Three thousand miles away in Pearl Harbor, the Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit under Joseph Rochefort were busy decoding Japanese radio traffic. Codebreaking was not a simple task of having the key; most of the time, they could decode around 20% of the traffic, and the rest was a result of analysis, history, and knowledge and expertise. In the middle of April, Rochefort received the only direct message he ever got from Admiral King, CNO. The Japanese had just raided Ceylon. Based on his best estimate, what did he think the Japanese would do next?
Rochefort came up with a 4 point estimate: 1) Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean were over; 2) they weren't going to attack Australia; 3) they were planning something towards New Guinea; and 4) there was something brewing in the mid-Pacific, but couldn't say what or where. By the first of May, the pieces were falling into place; the planned invasion of New Guinea was on. In the Central Pacific, it was hard to look at a map and miss Midway.
As they continued to analyze radio traffic, it seemed to point more and more to a large operation involving most of the Imperial Combined Fleet. But where? Time and again, the initials AF kept coming up in conversations regarding equipment or destinations. Finally someone in the Combat Intelligence Unit seemed to remember AF coming up in radio intercepts during Pearl Harbor. They combed though thousands of messages, and eventually found that indeed a message had been sent by a Japanese seaplane which had refueled by a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, and which mentioned that AF was nearby. From then on, the supposition they worked on was that AF was Midway.
There were skeptics, because codebreaking was still imperfect. Finally, the Marines at Midway were instructed to send a message in plain English that they were low on fresh water. And two days later, an intercept was picked up which stated that AF was low on fresh water.
On May 16th, Admiral Nimitz radioed Admiral Halsey with Hornet and Enterprise: “Expedite return.” Yorktown, although damaged, also hurried her return to Pearl Harbor. Now everything the Navy had was thrown into high gear. B-17s arrived from the USA, and went on to Midway, big new PBY's (search seaplanes) arrived in Pearl, fighters and dive bombers, barbed wire, PT boats, artillery, anti aircraft guns, and even light tanks were shipped to Midway. On Midway itself, fortifications were dug, runways were extended, training exercises were doubled.
The curtain was about to go up.
Lying more that 1,100 miles east and slightly north of Hawaii, Midway atoll seems an unlikely place for the two most powerful Pacific nations to come face to face with each other, and fight the most decisive engagement of the Pacific War. But it was more than one third of the way from Pearl Harbor to Japan, and would be a powerful strategic place to hold in the eventual naval showdown between those two nations. Less than 6 miles in diameter, it was nevertheless an unsinkable aircraft carrier which could be used for reconnaissance, fuel and ammunition storage and a platform from where to launch bomber and fighter attacks.
Admiral Yamamoto decided that he needed Midway. Furthermore, he also knew that the Americans would be reluctant to give it up, for the reasons stated above. His hope was that he could lure the US Navy into a decisive confrontation, while he still enjoyed numerical naval superiority. He knew too well what would happen in a long war; he knew that the USA had produced 4,500,000 automobiles in 1940, while the Japanese had produced 48,000. His hope was for a decisive victory early and then, maybe, the US could be discouraged from the long road back.
There was some infighting going on in Japan regarding Midway; some felt it was too far away. But all of that ended on April 18, when Jimmy Doolittle's B-25s bombed Tokyo. Japanese had to have Midway to strengthen its defensive perimeter. The plan that emerged was an intricate ballet which involved a diversionary attack on the Aleutians, and a powerful 6 carrier striking force, which would be backed up by the Main Force with the battleship Yamato (the biggest battleship in the world, with 18.1 inch guns that could hurl a broadside more than 25 miles), and 6 other battleships with the invasion troops. Over 170 ships in all.
A small hitch developed on May 17, when the carrier Shokaku limped back into harbor, her deck shattered and her bow blown off. She was followed by the Zuikaku, with only 6 torpedo planes and 9 bombers left. Of course, the Japanese claimed that Coral Sea had been a great victory, and it had been accomplished by the 5th Air Squadron, which was widely viewed as the weakest in the Japanese fleet. : “Son of concubine gained a victory, so that sons of legal wives could find no rival in the world,” ran the joke around the fleet. But Shokaku and Zuikaku were out of the battle.
But so what? The Americans had little left. The Lexington had been sunk at Coral Sea, and the Yorktown possibly sunk or so severely damaged, she would be out of commission for weeks, if not months. At most, the Americans would be able to oppose them with Enterprise and Hornet. Plus, the Americans had lost most of their battleships in Pearl Harbor. Four carriers would be enough to do the job.
Three thousand miles away in Pearl Harbor, the Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit under Joseph Rochefort were busy decoding Japanese radio traffic. Codebreaking was not a simple task of having the key; most of the time, they could decode around 20% of the traffic, and the rest was a result of analysis, history, and knowledge and expertise. In the middle of April, Rochefort received the only direct message he ever got from Admiral King, CNO. The Japanese had just raided Ceylon. Based on his best estimate, what did he think the Japanese would do next?
Rochefort came up with a 4 point estimate: 1) Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean were over; 2) they weren't going to attack Australia; 3) they were planning something towards New Guinea; and 4) there was something brewing in the mid-Pacific, but couldn't say what or where. By the first of May, the pieces were falling into place; the planned invasion of New Guinea was on. In the Central Pacific, it was hard to look at a map and miss Midway.
As they continued to analyze radio traffic, it seemed to point more and more to a large operation involving most of the Imperial Combined Fleet. But where? Time and again, the initials AF kept coming up in conversations regarding equipment or destinations. Finally someone in the Combat Intelligence Unit seemed to remember AF coming up in radio intercepts during Pearl Harbor. They combed though thousands of messages, and eventually found that indeed a message had been sent by a Japanese seaplane which had refueled by a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, and which mentioned that AF was nearby. From then on, the supposition they worked on was that AF was Midway.
There were skeptics, because codebreaking was still imperfect. Finally, the Marines at Midway were instructed to send a message in plain English that they were low on fresh water. And two days later, an intercept was picked up which stated that AF was low on fresh water.
On May 16th, Admiral Nimitz radioed Admiral Halsey with Hornet and Enterprise: “Expedite return.” Yorktown, although damaged, also hurried her return to Pearl Harbor. Now everything the Navy had was thrown into high gear. B-17s arrived from the USA, and went on to Midway, big new PBY's (search seaplanes) arrived in Pearl, fighters and dive bombers, barbed wire, PT boats, artillery, anti aircraft guns, and even light tanks were shipped to Midway. On Midway itself, fortifications were dug, runways were extended, training exercises were doubled.
The curtain was about to go up.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
MIDWAY ACT I
On May 27th, the Carrier Striking Force, with carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu, escorted by 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 11 destroyers, set out from Japan, under the command of Admiral Nagumo. On May 29th, the warships for the invasion force, 2 battleships, 5 cruisers, and a swarm of destroyers. Then behind them, the Main Force, led by the Yamato, and 34 other ships, with Admiral Yamamoto on Yamato. Quite possibly the most powerful overall combined fleet which had ever sortied out in history. There were also leaving to join them troopships and heavy cruisers from Guam, tankers and support craft; 190 ships overall, and they would use, on this one operation, more fuel than the Japanese Navy used for a full year during peacetime. How could they lose?
On May 16th, just before Halsey turned and raced for Pearl Harbor, he had been spotted by Japanese patrol craft in the South Pacific. So it seemed to the Japanese that they might miss taking on the US carriers again. Well, that would just make the job that much easier.
On May 25th, there was new excitement in the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. They had intercepted a long Japanese coded message that laid it on the line. The message mentioned the units, the ships, the captains, the course, the launching time, everything. Rochefort was hard at work on the translation and forgot he was to meet with Nimitz at a certain time. He turned up half an hour late, and got a frosty reception from the Admiral. But Nimitz warmed up as Rochefort gave him, point by point, the exact battle order and operating plan of the Japanese Striking Force. That was lucky, because the next day the Japanese changed the key, and it would be weeks before they could read the coded traffic easily again.
On May 26th, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 16 pounded up from the Solomons. It had been an exciting trip back, full of speculation. They were on strict radio silence, and even the airplane radio transmitters had been wired off. And on his bunk lay Admiral Halsey, down with a skin disease that would not let him sleep, a bundle of nerves. Admiral Nimitz took one look at him and sent him to the hospital. Halsey would miss the battle of a lifetime. After Halsey went to the hospital, Nimitz reached down to a more junior Admiral, Raymond Spruance, and put him in command of Task Force 16. It was an intuitively brilliant decision, because Spruance went on to become quite probably the best combat admiral we had in the Pacific during the course of the war.
On May 27th, a speck appeared to the southward from Pearl Harbor. It was the Yorktown, trailing an oil slick for miles behind her. Her crew, after 101 days at sea, were looking forward to extended liberty as she nosed into drydock, ready for repairs. No such luck. Down in drydock, inspecting the ship were a crowd of officers, including Admiral Chester Nimitz. The damage was extensive, as the direct hit she had sustained had penetrated 4 decks down, spreading havoc for 100 feet in every direction—decks blistered, doors and hatches blown off, bulkheads ripped off, frames and stanchions twisted. It would take weeks to fix. After looking at it, Nimitz said: “We must have her back in three days”. The repair party looked at one another, gulped and said: “Yes, sir.”
A few days previous, Nimitz had sent out 18 submarines to fan out in an arc north and west of Midway; he also placed some of them in an arc to protect a possible move by the Japanese toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had also planned a submarine arc to detect any movement out of Pearl Harbor. They had also planned a seaplane reconnaissance for the last few days, to detect the movement of carriers out of Pearl Harbor. This had worked well in practice, back in March. The seaplanes were to refuel from a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, but when the submarine arrived they found the Americans already had a tender there and a couple of seaplanes so they had to suspend the operation. No one told Admiral Nagumo, commanding the Carrier Striking Force. He assumed that no news was good news.
But for one reason or another, the Japanese submarines which were set to set up the cordon between Hawaii and Midway were late; they wouldn't be in position until June 3. The Japanese were also picking up increased radio traffic out of Pearl, and at sea. It appeared that the Americans were gearing up for something. Admiral Yamamoto, 600 miles behind the Carrier Striking Force, wondered whether this information should be sent to Admiral Nagumo but his staff preached the gospel of radio silence.
Back at Pearl, Spruance led Task Force 16 (carriers Enterprise and Hornet) plus about 20 cruisers and destroyers, out on May 28th. In consulting with Nimitz, he had suggested that they lie off to the northeast of Midway, ready for an ambush, but also have the flexibility to cover Pearl Harbor should the Japanese intend to go there. He would be in command until Admiral Fletcher joined them with Yorktown. When he queried whether Yorktown could be ready, Nimitz replied. “She'll be there.”
Down in drydock, hundreds were working on the Yorktown. The power to Honolulu kept getting shut down, sector by sector, as the huge power requirements from the Navy Yard pushed the power company to capacity. Many of the repair crew worked for three straight days, on the edge of exhaustion, with very little sleep. But get it done, they did. By the 29th, the drydock was flooded and the Yorktown was afloat again. They kept working on her, and by 0900 on the 30th, the engines started turning over. She was gliding down the channel when the last workers left the ship. That afternoon her revamped air group landed (they had been training on the other side of the island). They had accomplished wonders, but the odds were still long. The rendezvous with Spruance would take place on an imaginary spot in the ocean: Point Luck.
They would need a lot of it.
On May 27th, the Carrier Striking Force, with carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu, escorted by 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 11 destroyers, set out from Japan, under the command of Admiral Nagumo. On May 29th, the warships for the invasion force, 2 battleships, 5 cruisers, and a swarm of destroyers. Then behind them, the Main Force, led by the Yamato, and 34 other ships, with Admiral Yamamoto on Yamato. Quite possibly the most powerful overall combined fleet which had ever sortied out in history. There were also leaving to join them troopships and heavy cruisers from Guam, tankers and support craft; 190 ships overall, and they would use, on this one operation, more fuel than the Japanese Navy used for a full year during peacetime. How could they lose?
On May 16th, just before Halsey turned and raced for Pearl Harbor, he had been spotted by Japanese patrol craft in the South Pacific. So it seemed to the Japanese that they might miss taking on the US carriers again. Well, that would just make the job that much easier.
On May 25th, there was new excitement in the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. They had intercepted a long Japanese coded message that laid it on the line. The message mentioned the units, the ships, the captains, the course, the launching time, everything. Rochefort was hard at work on the translation and forgot he was to meet with Nimitz at a certain time. He turned up half an hour late, and got a frosty reception from the Admiral. But Nimitz warmed up as Rochefort gave him, point by point, the exact battle order and operating plan of the Japanese Striking Force. That was lucky, because the next day the Japanese changed the key, and it would be weeks before they could read the coded traffic easily again.
On May 26th, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 16 pounded up from the Solomons. It had been an exciting trip back, full of speculation. They were on strict radio silence, and even the airplane radio transmitters had been wired off. And on his bunk lay Admiral Halsey, down with a skin disease that would not let him sleep, a bundle of nerves. Admiral Nimitz took one look at him and sent him to the hospital. Halsey would miss the battle of a lifetime. After Halsey went to the hospital, Nimitz reached down to a more junior Admiral, Raymond Spruance, and put him in command of Task Force 16. It was an intuitively brilliant decision, because Spruance went on to become quite probably the best combat admiral we had in the Pacific during the course of the war.
On May 27th, a speck appeared to the southward from Pearl Harbor. It was the Yorktown, trailing an oil slick for miles behind her. Her crew, after 101 days at sea, were looking forward to extended liberty as she nosed into drydock, ready for repairs. No such luck. Down in drydock, inspecting the ship were a crowd of officers, including Admiral Chester Nimitz. The damage was extensive, as the direct hit she had sustained had penetrated 4 decks down, spreading havoc for 100 feet in every direction—decks blistered, doors and hatches blown off, bulkheads ripped off, frames and stanchions twisted. It would take weeks to fix. After looking at it, Nimitz said: “We must have her back in three days”. The repair party looked at one another, gulped and said: “Yes, sir.”
A few days previous, Nimitz had sent out 18 submarines to fan out in an arc north and west of Midway; he also placed some of them in an arc to protect a possible move by the Japanese toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had also planned a submarine arc to detect any movement out of Pearl Harbor. They had also planned a seaplane reconnaissance for the last few days, to detect the movement of carriers out of Pearl Harbor. This had worked well in practice, back in March. The seaplanes were to refuel from a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, but when the submarine arrived they found the Americans already had a tender there and a couple of seaplanes so they had to suspend the operation. No one told Admiral Nagumo, commanding the Carrier Striking Force. He assumed that no news was good news.
But for one reason or another, the Japanese submarines which were set to set up the cordon between Hawaii and Midway were late; they wouldn't be in position until June 3. The Japanese were also picking up increased radio traffic out of Pearl, and at sea. It appeared that the Americans were gearing up for something. Admiral Yamamoto, 600 miles behind the Carrier Striking Force, wondered whether this information should be sent to Admiral Nagumo but his staff preached the gospel of radio silence.
Back at Pearl, Spruance led Task Force 16 (carriers Enterprise and Hornet) plus about 20 cruisers and destroyers, out on May 28th. In consulting with Nimitz, he had suggested that they lie off to the northeast of Midway, ready for an ambush, but also have the flexibility to cover Pearl Harbor should the Japanese intend to go there. He would be in command until Admiral Fletcher joined them with Yorktown. When he queried whether Yorktown could be ready, Nimitz replied. “She'll be there.”
Down in drydock, hundreds were working on the Yorktown. The power to Honolulu kept getting shut down, sector by sector, as the huge power requirements from the Navy Yard pushed the power company to capacity. Many of the repair crew worked for three straight days, on the edge of exhaustion, with very little sleep. But get it done, they did. By the 29th, the drydock was flooded and the Yorktown was afloat again. They kept working on her, and by 0900 on the 30th, the engines started turning over. She was gliding down the channel when the last workers left the ship. That afternoon her revamped air group landed (they had been training on the other side of the island). They had accomplished wonders, but the odds were still long. The rendezvous with Spruance would take place on an imaginary spot in the ocean: Point Luck.
They would need a lot of it.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
MIDWAY ACT II
Navy PBY's were out, searching an arc across the ocean 700 miles from Midway. Tokyo Intelligence radioed Yamamoto telling him they suspected a US carrier force northeast of Midway. Once again, the gospel of radio silence was kept, and the presumption was that Nagumo, in the Carrier Striking Force, 600 miles ahead, had received the same information. But the Akagi had a lower superstructure than the Yamato, and the carriers were encountering bad weather, so no message got through.
On Midway, everything was almost ready. The PBY's would leave before dawn and the B-17's would get into the air right after them; nobody wanted to be caught in a dawn attack. It was only when scouts had been out 400 miles that they knew they could relax for another day. Then, near the end of his outward leg, a PBY spotted a group of ships. He could count 11, so it was obvious that this was part of the invasion fleet (it was part of the troop transport group, ahead because they left earlier and were slower than the others). He radioed back to Midway, and the B-17's got up in the air. They only carried half their bomb load because of the extreme range, and they circled at high altitude and came in over the transports. The B-17's dropped their bombs, but had no hits. They were followed by a night attack by PBY's, which achieved a torpedo hit but no real damage. The next morning, the Carrier Striking Force was less than 700 miles from Midway, and increased speed to 12 knots. At 1500, wanting to be able to launch at dawn the next day, the carriers leaped forward at 24 knots.
At midnight, they were 110 miles from the launching point. By this time, all the submarines were in place to report any movement of US carriers out of Pearl in response to the attack on Midway. The Japanese were confident they could deal with them when the time came. They did not know the birds had already flown.
Admiral Fletcher did not get taken in by the original radio report. He correctly surmised that it was part of the invasion fleet, and that the attack from the carriers would come from the northwest. During the night the US carriers steamed slowly northward so that at dawn they would be in a perfect position for a surprise attack on the Japanese flank.
At 0400 the Japanese carriers turned into the wind and began to launch planes. By 0445 they were in formation; 36 bombers from the Hiryu and Soryu, 36 dive bombers from the Kaga and Akagi, and 36 fighters, 9 from each carrier. As the planes faded into the sky, Nagumo brought up his second wave, an insurance policy in case the US carriers showed up. 36 dive bombers, 36 torpedo planes, and 36 fighters. They also sent out 7 search planes, but no one took them very seriously. There were no US carriers around. The last of these planes was delayed half an hour. It wouldn't make much difference.
A PBY had also left Midway at 0400, patrolling the all important 315 degree arc. It seemed like a milk run, until they saw a seaplane whiz past them, headed for Midway. It meant the Japanese were close. Then, suddenly two aircraft carriers emerged from under the cloud cover. Another PBY flying a slightly different course behind suddenly saw a huge flight of planes. There was no time for code. In plain English, he radioed: “Many planes heading Midway. Bearing 320, distance 150!”.
“That's him” said Spruance, as the message was handed to him. There was relief, anticipation and some apprehension. Because it was not realized for some time that there were two PBY's reporting and the messages were sometimes conflicting. Furthermore, where were the carriers? They needed course and speed. Finally, at 0552, the message: “Two carriers, in front of main body of ships, course 135, speed 25”. That was enough for Fletcher. He radioed Spruance: Proceed southwesterly and attack carriers when definitely located. I will follow as soon as I have recovered the search planes.”
Task Force 16 plunged forward at 25 knots. General Quarters was sounding and the ship was alive as sailors and airmen ran to their stations. At Midway, the race was on to get all the planes in the air before the Japanese struck. The B-17's were no problem, they were already enroute to attack the transports again, and were now diverted toward the carriers. At 0600 the fighters took off, and soon there were 25 in the air; they would not have long to wait, as Navy radar put the bogeys 74 miles away. Then the 6 TBF's, then the 4 B-26 bombers. And then the 16 relatively new SBD's. Inside the radar station, the operators watched as the two blips approached each other; one heading in, the other heading out.
The Japanese shook off the fighters, with some small losses along the way, but when they lined up and bombed Midway, in spite of the success they had in destroying installations, they saw they had hit an empty target. No planes were there. As the Japanese planes turned for home, Lieutenant Tomonaga radioed back: “THERE IS NEED FOR A SECOND ATTACK.”
The Striking Force had been at sea for more than a week, and there was no sign of US carriers. It was folly to keep reserving them just in case, when Midway clearly needed another attack. Then all hell broke loose. In came the TBF's with torpedo attacks, the B-26's came over and dropped torpedoes and bombs, there was antiaircraft fire everywhere, carriers had to turn madly to port and to starboard to avoid torpedoes, Zeros were flying down pursuing the US planes, all was mad chaos. To the Japanese, it seemed the attacks had been poorly coordinated. But they accomplished more than expected. Admiral Nagumo needed no more convincing; Midway had to be hit again.
At 0715 Nagumo ordered his second wave to rearm. So off came the torpedoes and armor piercing bombs, and they began to be reloaded with bombs to hit Midway. They were halfway though it when there came a report from the search plane which had been delayed. “Sighted what appear to be 10 enemy surface ships, course 150 degrees, speed over 20 knots.” So the Japanese suspended operations for the moment, but the radioed report were maddingly vague. Were there carriers, or not? If they weren't there, there was plenty of time to hit Midway again and then turn and deal with this surface fleet. Then came another attack from Midway; 16 TBD's coming in. They dropped bombs and came close, but once again, no real damage.
At 0800 the search plane radioed again: “Enemy is composed of five cruisers and five destroyers.” Everybody breathed a sigh of relief. However, the attacks had disrupted the fleet formation. They needed a little more time to bring them together so that air cover could properly defend them. Then came the cry again, “Enemy planes”, as the B-17's which had been diverted from attacking the transports, came rumbling in. They dropped their bombs from high altitude and they splashed all around the carriers. They felt sure at least one carrier had been hit (but none had). By 8:14 the attack was over, just as the returning first wave were arriving back at the carriers.
Then came a new message from the search plane: “Enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier.” This was a shock. No more thoughts about a second strike on Midway. Should they attack immediately? Or should they wait until they switched the second wave back to torpedoes and armor piercing bombs? Or until they recovered Tomonaga's first strike? Or until they refueled the fighters flying air cover? Then came word of yet another attack, the fifth that morning. These were the ancient Vindicators that were at Midway, hopelessly obsolete and sitting ducks for the air cover. But once again the ships were forced to maneuver to avoid torpedoes. Once again, no real damage was done.
Rear Admiral Yamaguchi in Hiryu radioed Nagumo. “Consider it advisable to launch attack immediately. No, thought Kusada, Nagumo's Chief of Staff. Better not to go off half cocked. Launching the planes immediately would mean the bombers would go without fighter cover, making them easy target for enemy fighters. Furthermore, the returning pilots would have to ditch and they would lose the planes and many of the pilots. It would be much better to first recover the returning planes; then refuel the combat air patrol fighters and then rearm the second wave fighters. Then, with proper coordination, they could launch an all out attack on the US task force. That was his recommendation to Admiral Nagumo. And that is what they decided to do.
Shortly after 0900, all the planes had been recovered, and were being refueled. At 0917, the Carrier Striking Force turned to the northeast, to be prepared to launch planes. Along the eastern horizon, the carrier Chikuma's look out reported 16 torpedo planes coming straight in—headed straight for the heart of the Carrier Striking Force.
Navy PBY's were out, searching an arc across the ocean 700 miles from Midway. Tokyo Intelligence radioed Yamamoto telling him they suspected a US carrier force northeast of Midway. Once again, the gospel of radio silence was kept, and the presumption was that Nagumo, in the Carrier Striking Force, 600 miles ahead, had received the same information. But the Akagi had a lower superstructure than the Yamato, and the carriers were encountering bad weather, so no message got through.
On Midway, everything was almost ready. The PBY's would leave before dawn and the B-17's would get into the air right after them; nobody wanted to be caught in a dawn attack. It was only when scouts had been out 400 miles that they knew they could relax for another day. Then, near the end of his outward leg, a PBY spotted a group of ships. He could count 11, so it was obvious that this was part of the invasion fleet (it was part of the troop transport group, ahead because they left earlier and were slower than the others). He radioed back to Midway, and the B-17's got up in the air. They only carried half their bomb load because of the extreme range, and they circled at high altitude and came in over the transports. The B-17's dropped their bombs, but had no hits. They were followed by a night attack by PBY's, which achieved a torpedo hit but no real damage. The next morning, the Carrier Striking Force was less than 700 miles from Midway, and increased speed to 12 knots. At 1500, wanting to be able to launch at dawn the next day, the carriers leaped forward at 24 knots.
At midnight, they were 110 miles from the launching point. By this time, all the submarines were in place to report any movement of US carriers out of Pearl in response to the attack on Midway. The Japanese were confident they could deal with them when the time came. They did not know the birds had already flown.
Admiral Fletcher did not get taken in by the original radio report. He correctly surmised that it was part of the invasion fleet, and that the attack from the carriers would come from the northwest. During the night the US carriers steamed slowly northward so that at dawn they would be in a perfect position for a surprise attack on the Japanese flank.
At 0400 the Japanese carriers turned into the wind and began to launch planes. By 0445 they were in formation; 36 bombers from the Hiryu and Soryu, 36 dive bombers from the Kaga and Akagi, and 36 fighters, 9 from each carrier. As the planes faded into the sky, Nagumo brought up his second wave, an insurance policy in case the US carriers showed up. 36 dive bombers, 36 torpedo planes, and 36 fighters. They also sent out 7 search planes, but no one took them very seriously. There were no US carriers around. The last of these planes was delayed half an hour. It wouldn't make much difference.
A PBY had also left Midway at 0400, patrolling the all important 315 degree arc. It seemed like a milk run, until they saw a seaplane whiz past them, headed for Midway. It meant the Japanese were close. Then, suddenly two aircraft carriers emerged from under the cloud cover. Another PBY flying a slightly different course behind suddenly saw a huge flight of planes. There was no time for code. In plain English, he radioed: “Many planes heading Midway. Bearing 320, distance 150!”.
“That's him” said Spruance, as the message was handed to him. There was relief, anticipation and some apprehension. Because it was not realized for some time that there were two PBY's reporting and the messages were sometimes conflicting. Furthermore, where were the carriers? They needed course and speed. Finally, at 0552, the message: “Two carriers, in front of main body of ships, course 135, speed 25”. That was enough for Fletcher. He radioed Spruance: Proceed southwesterly and attack carriers when definitely located. I will follow as soon as I have recovered the search planes.”
Task Force 16 plunged forward at 25 knots. General Quarters was sounding and the ship was alive as sailors and airmen ran to their stations. At Midway, the race was on to get all the planes in the air before the Japanese struck. The B-17's were no problem, they were already enroute to attack the transports again, and were now diverted toward the carriers. At 0600 the fighters took off, and soon there were 25 in the air; they would not have long to wait, as Navy radar put the bogeys 74 miles away. Then the 6 TBF's, then the 4 B-26 bombers. And then the 16 relatively new SBD's. Inside the radar station, the operators watched as the two blips approached each other; one heading in, the other heading out.
The Japanese shook off the fighters, with some small losses along the way, but when they lined up and bombed Midway, in spite of the success they had in destroying installations, they saw they had hit an empty target. No planes were there. As the Japanese planes turned for home, Lieutenant Tomonaga radioed back: “THERE IS NEED FOR A SECOND ATTACK.”
The Striking Force had been at sea for more than a week, and there was no sign of US carriers. It was folly to keep reserving them just in case, when Midway clearly needed another attack. Then all hell broke loose. In came the TBF's with torpedo attacks, the B-26's came over and dropped torpedoes and bombs, there was antiaircraft fire everywhere, carriers had to turn madly to port and to starboard to avoid torpedoes, Zeros were flying down pursuing the US planes, all was mad chaos. To the Japanese, it seemed the attacks had been poorly coordinated. But they accomplished more than expected. Admiral Nagumo needed no more convincing; Midway had to be hit again.
At 0715 Nagumo ordered his second wave to rearm. So off came the torpedoes and armor piercing bombs, and they began to be reloaded with bombs to hit Midway. They were halfway though it when there came a report from the search plane which had been delayed. “Sighted what appear to be 10 enemy surface ships, course 150 degrees, speed over 20 knots.” So the Japanese suspended operations for the moment, but the radioed report were maddingly vague. Were there carriers, or not? If they weren't there, there was plenty of time to hit Midway again and then turn and deal with this surface fleet. Then came another attack from Midway; 16 TBD's coming in. They dropped bombs and came close, but once again, no real damage.
At 0800 the search plane radioed again: “Enemy is composed of five cruisers and five destroyers.” Everybody breathed a sigh of relief. However, the attacks had disrupted the fleet formation. They needed a little more time to bring them together so that air cover could properly defend them. Then came the cry again, “Enemy planes”, as the B-17's which had been diverted from attacking the transports, came rumbling in. They dropped their bombs from high altitude and they splashed all around the carriers. They felt sure at least one carrier had been hit (but none had). By 8:14 the attack was over, just as the returning first wave were arriving back at the carriers.
Then came a new message from the search plane: “Enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier.” This was a shock. No more thoughts about a second strike on Midway. Should they attack immediately? Or should they wait until they switched the second wave back to torpedoes and armor piercing bombs? Or until they recovered Tomonaga's first strike? Or until they refueled the fighters flying air cover? Then came word of yet another attack, the fifth that morning. These were the ancient Vindicators that were at Midway, hopelessly obsolete and sitting ducks for the air cover. But once again the ships were forced to maneuver to avoid torpedoes. Once again, no real damage was done.
Rear Admiral Yamaguchi in Hiryu radioed Nagumo. “Consider it advisable to launch attack immediately. No, thought Kusada, Nagumo's Chief of Staff. Better not to go off half cocked. Launching the planes immediately would mean the bombers would go without fighter cover, making them easy target for enemy fighters. Furthermore, the returning pilots would have to ditch and they would lose the planes and many of the pilots. It would be much better to first recover the returning planes; then refuel the combat air patrol fighters and then rearm the second wave fighters. Then, with proper coordination, they could launch an all out attack on the US task force. That was his recommendation to Admiral Nagumo. And that is what they decided to do.
Shortly after 0900, all the planes had been recovered, and were being refueled. At 0917, the Carrier Striking Force turned to the northeast, to be prepared to launch planes. Along the eastern horizon, the carrier Chikuma's look out reported 16 torpedo planes coming straight in—headed straight for the heart of the Carrier Striking Force.
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