The American Civil War Timeline- 150th Anniversary (3 Viewers)

The regimental history goes over the Battle of Booneville more in depth (if anyone cares, its on Google books here, Chapter VII). Anyway, not to belabor it anymore than I have already, but basically Chalmers had 8 regiments, Sheridan had the 2nd Michigan and the 2nd Iowa Cavalry (a frequent companion regiment for many operations). They had a couple advantages, one being position because of the terrain and woods, and two many of the men had repeater rifles (my ancestor carried a five shot Colt revolving carbine). Thus, even though they were outnumbered, the Rebels didn't know that...and the rate of fire of the repeaters led Chalmers to believe he was fighting an opponent who was equally strong.

timschochet said:

I have no family members that were involved in the war in any way. My ancestors on both sides were Jewish immigrants who arrived in this country several decades after the events described here. Yet I hope you'll understand when I write that I feel as strong a link with this war, in my own way, as you do. I think that all Americans should. I see this war as the key event in American history, the event which shaped the country we are today.

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Well said.

Its ironic, my ancestors fought in the 2nd and 4th Michigan Cavalry, but I find myself admiring many of the Confederate generals. But they too, of course, are Americans, and part of the great military tradition that has always been a part of American history.

I frankly don't feel very well qualified to articulate this precisely...but the American Civil War had to be fought. Because of that war, we became a stronger nation. I believe we settled some questions, and due to subsequent events, deferred others for another century. But we collectively decided that once it was over, we were one nation. Northerners have every right to claim Bobby Lee as a hero, just as Southerners can be proud of Grant and Lincoln (we know they'll always hate Sherman).

As I have said previously, I am a student of the CW... not an expert. I can research battles and biographies and using several sources, do a decent job on those topics I think. I wouldn't say it's easy, using 3, 4 or more resources to describe battles, meld them together in a chohesive way with some original thoughts and writing, it takes time, but it's finite. It's easier to research.

The politics, well, that I find much more difficult to post about. That really requires a background of knowledge based on years of reading and studying the war which is far beyond my experience and ability. I will stick to what I think I do well... battles, bios and a post here and there about other things, like the Colt Revolving rifle and the like. Tim and BL have a much better handle on the more subtle but often more important developments of the conflict.

I think we missed the Battle of Pea Ridge, I could do that, but after that, I'm not sure... I think BobbyLane wants Boonesville and Sheridan for obvious reasons. He has a heritage in that battle. You guys let me know what to cover, and I'll do my best. Right now, I am even having a hard time finding a good timeline for some of the events in the spring/summer of 1862. I'm going to sit on this until you two can give me an "assignment", so to speak. Right now, I have no idea what I should research next.

Just a couple of thoughts about the previous series of posts: Just how close were the generals of the Union Army to rebelling themselves? McClellan it seems thought about it. He had many supporters in the ranks of the generals. How tenuous was Lincoln's hold on the government? When this started, weren't Seward and McClellan good friends? At what point did McClellan consider himself betrayed by Seward? He called him a Judas, right?

PS: Just saw BL's several posts prior to this one... now I have to go read them and find out if this post was a waste of time! LOL...

Rovers -timschochet did a very brief writeup on Elkhorn Tavern/Pea Ridge, my only contribution being its one I'm somewhat ignorant about. Hey, if you have the time, do you want to handle Pope and Second Manassas? I guess to lighten your load I could take August 28 *(Brawner's Farm), just because I have a serious man-crush on the Iron Brigade. You could take the campaign and the two-day battle if you like.

Just a couple of thoughts about the previous series of posts: Just how close were the generals of the Union Army to rebelling themselves? McClellan it seems thought about it. He had many supporters in the ranks of the generals. How tenuous was Lincoln's hold on the government? When this started, weren't Seward and McClellan good friends? At what point did McClellan consider himself betrayed by Seward? He called him a Judas, right?

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I think its a big leap from big talk to action. I don't think any of them seriously considered mutiny. But it is extraordinary that it was even discussed, even if only amongst themselves or in private letters.I think one of the reasons the war evolved, and Lincoln's thinking on how the war should be prosecuted, and the President's changing stance on emancipation of the slaves, are all indications that he was driving down a mountain road that required very careful navigation. Turn the wheel a little too hard and she would tip right over, so to speak. I think he was pretty astute, even crafty and devious, and you can see when he pulled back on the throttle (for instance, premature declarations by general Fremont or general Hunter attempting to free slaves in their districts), it was because he understood that he would only be sustained if the will of the people were aligned with his own policies.Ummm...its late and I'm very tired...are you confusing Seward with Stanton? If you are, I am quite sure I have done the exact same thing!! Yes, the Sec of War started out on good terms with Little Mac, but they turned on each other.Seward was the Sec of State for eight years. Is he the one that bought Alaska? I think they called that Seward's folly, but given the vast natural resources, guess it was more savvy than initially realized. BTW, if you go to Madison Square Park (23rd Street & Broadway), directly across from the Flatiron building there is a statue of him. Well, actually, it is a bust of Seward's head...on Lincoln's body. Its too late and I am too tired to look up the back story on that one....

Yeah, I meant Stanton...doh.

Very cool story about yer G-G-G-G gramps there Bobby. I am envious. I have little info about my ancestors, other than they were Irish (mostly) and some were drunks, which makes them harder to track down. Pretty sure my mom's side came over on the famine boats in the late 1840's. Likely had some of that kin in the war, but can't prove it. NY Irish. My old man's father was a real drunken bassad. No info on his parents at all.

Anyways, what roll do you think the Colt Revolving Rifle had on Boonesville? I've seen a couple of places where it is given some credit, and some "lost cause" resources that attempt to deny Boonesville as nothing more than a near figment of Sheridan's imagination, saying he wrote the report to get a star. I dismissed it as pure BS, but it just goes to show that the "lost Cause" movement is alive and well.

Colt

The Colt Revolving Rifle Model 1855 was an early repeating rifle design produced in 1855 by the Colt's Manufacturing Company. The design was essentially similar to revolver type pistols, with a rotating cylinder that held five or six rounds in a variety of calibers from .40 to .64 inches.

Colt Model 1855 CarbineThe weapon was adopted for service by the U.S. Military in 1855, but problems with the design prevented its adoption until 1857. The principal problem was that gunpowder would sometimes leak from the paper cartridges in field conditions, lodging in various recesses around the firing cylinder. Hot gas leaking from the gap between the firing cylinder and the barrel would ignite this powder, which would in turn, ignite all of the powder in the chambers waiting to be fired. (This is known as a "chain fire" and was a relatively common failure with early percussion revolving firearms.) When this happened with the Colt Revolving Rifle, a spray of metal would be sent forward into the left arm and hand of the firer.

This fault resulted in an understandable distrust in the weapon. Commanders attempted to get around the problem in a number of ways. One way was by instructing their men to fire the weapon only while supporting it directly in front of the trigger guard or by holding the lowered loading lever, which moved their left hand out of the path of any chain fire. The second way was to load only a single chamber, preventing any chain fires from occurring.

The weapon performed superbly in combat, seeing action with the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry Union forces at Snodgrass Hill during the Battle of Chickamauga during the American Civil War. The volume of fire from this weapon proved to be so useful that the Confederate forces were convinced that they were attacking an entire division, not just a single regiment. In total 4,712 were purchased during the Civil War. Despite these victories of the weapon, the rifle's faults would prove fatal for the weapon. A board of officers met, and after evaluating the evidence, it decided to discontinue the use of the weapon. The weapons were sold for 42 cents a rifle, a fraction of the original purchase cost.

From Wiki on Booneville:

Lead elements of 4,700 troops under Confederate Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers encountered Sheridan's pickets on the morning of July 1, three and a half miles to the southwest of the town. The pickets fell back and established a sound defensive line at the intersection of the roads from Tupelo and Saltillo. Aided by the new Colt revolving rifle, the line withstood the initial Confederate assault but then withdrew to a backup position two miles closer to the town.

As for me... my biz is cranking up, we have a wedding on Friday and I'm hosting some of the clan from TX at my house starting on Wed thru Sunday, so... you guys are on yer own fer a bit. Not that you will miss me! Somewhere in there I have to find the time to have a Guinness or two for St Patty's. I should be in the sack already... gotta work tomorow... er I mean today.

Out little girl is sick and having a bad night...up and down, can't breath or get comfortable...I see from the monitor she finally fell asleep, been up most of the night...

Yeah, a friend of mine did some research on the 1855 Colt for me a few years ago. At the time we were confused about exactly which model the 2nd Michigan carried in 1862. The 1855 had a very bad reputation, but it seems the later models were more reliable than the early editions. They manufactured 5 or 6 shot revolving rifles in 3 different lengths.

Manufactured first in 1856, the side-hammer, cap-and-ball Colt model 1855 rifle operated on principles similar to Colt’s revolving handguns. 100 colt rifles were purchased and sent to the U.S. troops for field service in 1857. The pre-war .44 caliber rifles were six-shot repeaters, while the war-time procurement guns were .56-caliber five shots. The barrel length of the U.S. Army Colt rifles ranged from 31 5/16 “ to 37 ½ “, and the full length fore-arm was attached to the barrel by two barrel bands. The rear sight was graduated up to 600 yards, and the top straps of the .56-caliber wartime-made guns were stamped, “ COL. COLT’ HARTFORD CT. U.S.A.” The cylinders were fluted, and the rifle took either the angular or saver bayonet. Prior to 1861, the Army had taken delivery of more than 700 model 1855 Colts.

In May 1861, a company of the 8th Massachusetts Infantry was issued Colt revolving rifles while serving in and around Washington, D.C. Later in 1861, pickets of the 12th Kentucky Infantry skirmished with Confederate cavalry at Mill Springs, Ky. The pickets, armed with Colt rifles, killed four rebels with eight shots at 300 yds.

At the end of January 1862, Washington Arsenal took delivery of 1,000 ,56-cal. Colt Model 1855 revolving rifles with 37 ½ “ barrels, and they were issued to Berdan's 1st and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters (U.S.S.S.). When the sharpshooters were informed of the matter, the men rioted. They had been promised Sharps target rifles, and they wanted the Sharps— no other arm would do. Berdan had to place a guard around his headquarters until the excitement subsided. One man of the 2nd Sharpshooters was so dissatisfied he marched off to war with a Springfield rifle-musket. The sharpshooters left for the front with the Colts and some individual target rifles. The 1st U.S.S.S. used Colts in the Siege at Yorktown against Rebel artillery batteries, while the 2nd U.S.S.S. fought against Confederate infantry and artillery at Falmouth, Va. The Colts were exchanged for the promised Sharps by early June, and, in August 1862, the Washington Arsenal had 445 of Berdan's Colts in storage.

Model 1855 Colt revolving rifles went mostly to Union cavalry in 1862, including the 2nd Michigan Cavalry commanded by Col. Phillip H.Sheridan. On July 1, 1862, near Booneville, Miss., the 2nd Michigan's pickets were attacked by Confederate cavalry led by Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers. In the fight, Sheridan used his 160 cavalrymen with their revolving rifles to hold the advance of Chalmers' cavalry while he attacked them in the rear and on the left flank. This forced the Confederates to retreat. The Yankee riflemen waited until the charging Southerners were within 25 to 30 yds. before opening up with their Colts, and the U.S. cavalrymen were pressed so close that they were forced to use the butts of their Colts in hand-to-hand encounters to beat back the attack.

A second cavalry regiment in the Booneville action was the 2nd Iowa. It is not likely that it was issued Colts in this battle, but by December it listed 333 Colt rifles.

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Regarding Sheridan's report and the myth versus reality of Booneville, the historian often has to deal with conflicting after action reports. The rule of thumb is the more contemporaneous report or letter or diary entry is given precedent over later attempts which are written with faded memories, or are perhaps revisionist in nature. In other words, who put down their recollections first, before they had the benefit of collaboration of being influenced by others? You also have to take into account the motivation of the writer. Did they have a consistent reputation for being accurate and faithful to what happened, or did they tend to paint situations in the best possible light? When they wrote about their experience, who did they expect would read their account? A private letter or diary would not reasonably be expected to one day be published or scrutinized in the same manner as an official report.I am aware of Lost Cause efforts to dismiss Booneville, which is why I included the Hempstead diary entry. If Booneville was a figment of Sheridan's imagination, then he must have had a cult of personality which enabled him to hold power over all of his men, including their letters home and diaries which they expected no one else to view.

Listen, Sheridan was a glory hound, no doubt about it. Few in the entire Civil War more ably managed their reputation better than the 5'4" trooper known as Lil' Phil. One of the great mysteries of the war to me is how he got swept up in the tide of the panic at Chickamauga, and emerged unscathed Everybody else who abandoned Rosecran's army on the field - the general commanding, two of his three corps commanders, and several divisional/brigade commanders - saw his career ruined by that flight. Little Phil must have been made of teflon.

But keep in mind that Sheridan was hated by many after the war. He was the one who challenged Meade to let him go on a raid so he could pick a fight with J.E.B. Stuart, and when the Rebel cavalry commander rose to the bait, he met his demise at Yellow Tavern. Then Grant sent him out to the Shenandoah, where he scorched the Valley from one end to the other in the fall of 1864. His destruction of the economic infrastructure of the Valley, called "The Burning" by residents, was one of the first uses of scorched earth tactics in the war. When Warren moved too slowly at Five Forks in April 1865, Sheridan (under Grant's authorization) rode over to that end of the line and dismissed the hero of Gettysburg. Just flat out fired him, with the end game little more than a week away. Add to that Sheridan was busy down in Texas trying to prevent another war from breaking out when they did the magnificent postwar review in Washington in May 1865. Point being is a lot of folks had a reason to chip away at his rep when it came time to put down the history of the war.

Sheridan went on to be a vicious Indian fighter; the manner in which he prosecuted the later years of the Indian Wars of the Great Plains tainted his reputation with some historians, who accuse him of racism and genocide. Like Sherman, he eventually rose to the top, becoming general-in-chief of the army for five years. A lot of men who reach that pinnacle step on others and p.o. plenty because of their driving ambition, and I think is an accurate description of Sheridan.

OK, and just to follow up on the sidebar story about the Madison Square Park statue:

Whose Body Is That Sitting Just Below Seward's Head?

December 3, 1995 NY Times letter to the editor

ETA:

another version

No doubt that both Sheridan and Sherman are still despised in the south. They took the war to the civilians. I'm sure at some point, this controversial subject will be discussed at length.

Since the war was primarilly fought in the south, it was natural for southerners loyal to the confederacy and to their soldiers would do whatever they could to help the southern cause. That included guerilla warfare by some southern men who were never regulars in the Confederate army. I don't know how widespread or common it was, but no doubt, snipers would take pot shots at federal soldiers on the march.

Pope's decree regarding the treatment of southern civilians during the Northern VA campaign wasn't really a new poicy, it was something that had started already, but he put it in writing. Making it worse was how the Union men "interpretted" this poicy. They in many cases took it as permission to take whatever they wanted, even if they didn't need it, and to needlessly and wantonly destroy farms and houses that should not have been put to the torch, just for reasons of revenge and frenzy. They also felt anything they left behind would be eventually used by their enemy, the rebel soldier. They wanted to punish both the civilian Confederate sympathizers and the rebel soldier. They also knew many of these farms were owned by a confederate soldier who was off fighting the war.

This war had a lot of contradictions. Each side hated the other, but there was a level of respect and even compassion for the other. It really is unique in that respect, this country has never fought a war like it before or after.

Sheridan ran into trouble in the west with the "unofficial" beginning of this policy. Union cavalry men where profiteering and stealing horses. When they tried to sell them to Sheridan, as quartermaster, he refused to buy them. He took them, but would not pay. That sort of flies in the face of how the "Lost Cause" wants to paint Sheridan. Maybe it's time for a Sheridan bio.

In the meantime, my civil war food experiment goes forward, even though my time this week is tight. I have made a batch of hardtack, and bought a couple pork chops to dry salt cure. They have been salted and sit in the fridge now. In another week, I drain it, and salt them again. This is he pilot run. If it works, I will find a raw pork belly and go for the genuine item, civil war salt pork (but as I read more, salt beef was also pretty common in the Union ranks too). I am still researching this.... I beleive pork with a lot of fat was preferred over lean meat because the hardtack could be cooked (and softened) in the fat rendered by salt pork from pork bellies. That fat is what made the gravy which would be turned into a sort of gruel that both sides often ate, and sometimes, even enjoyed if given a couple of other things that could be added. Is this where the term "pot luck" started?

General Philip H. Sheridan

The Union's Answer to Jeb Stuart

(this is mostly from Wiki)

Sheridan claimed he was born in Albany, New York, the third child of six by John and Mary Meenagh Sheridan, immigrants from the parish of Killinkere, County Cavan, Ireland. Sheridan was born on March 6, 1831, in Albany, New York. His parents had immigrated to the United States in the year before Sheridan's birth. In 1832, the Sheridans settled in Somerset, Ohio. Philip Sheridan's father, like many other Irish immigrants, found employment on the canals and railroads. He grew up in Somerset, Ohio. Fully grown, he reached only 5 feet 5 inches tall, a stature that led to the nickname, "Little Phil." Abraham Lincoln described his appearance in a famous anecdote: "A brown, chunky little chap, with a long body, short legs, not enough neck to hang him, and such long arms that if his ankles itch he can scratch them without stooping."

Sheridan worked as a boy in town general stores, and eventually as head clerk and bookkeeper for a dry goods store. In 1848, he obtained an appointment to the United States Military Academy from one of his customers, Congressman Thomas Ritchey; Ritchey's first candidate for the appointment was disqualified by failing an examination of mathematics skill and a "poor attitude." In his third year at West Point, Sheridan was suspended for a year for fighting with a classmate, William R. Terrill. The previous day, Sheridan had threatened to run him through with a bayonet in reaction to a perceived insult on the parade ground. He graduated in 1853, 34th in his class of 52 cadets.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Philip SheridanSheridan was commissioned as a brevet second lieutenant and was assigned to the 1st U.S. Infantry regiment at Fort Duncan, Texas, then to the 4th U.S. Infantry at Fort Reading, California. Most of his service with the 4th U.S. was in the Pacific Northwest, starting with a topographical survey mission to the Willamette Valley in 1855, during which he became involved with the Yakima War and Rogue River Wars, gaining experience in leading small combat teams, being wounded (a bullet grazed his nose on March 28, 1857, at Middle Cascade, Oregon Territory), and some of the diplomatic skills needed for negotiating with Indian tribes. He lived with a mistress during part of his tour of duty, an Indian woman named Sidnayoh (called Frances by her white friends), daughter of the chief of the Klickitat Tribe. Sheridan neglected to mention this relationship in his memoirs. He was promoted to first lieutenant in March 1861, just before the Civil War, and to captain in May, immediately after Fort Sumter.

*Note: A "brevet" was a temporary promotion. If a soldier performed the duties of his "brevet" rank, he was paid in that grade. If not, he was paid at his permanent rank.

In the fall of 1861, Sheridan was ordered to travel to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, for assignment to the 13th U.S. Infantry. He departed from his command of Fort Yamhill, Oregon, by way of San Francisco, across the Isthmus of Panama, and through New York City to home in Somerset for a brief leave. On the way to his new post, he made a courtesy call to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck in St. Louis, who commandeered his services to audit the financial records of his immediate predecessor, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, whose administration of the Department of the Missouri was tainted by charges of wasteful expenditures and fraud that left the status of $12 million in doubt. Sheridan sorted out the mess, impressing Halleck in the process. Much to Sheridan's dismay, Halleck's vision for Sheridan consisted of a continuing role as a staff officer. Nevertheless, Sheridan performed the task assigned to him and entrenched himself as an excellent staff officer in Halleck's view.

In December, Sheridan was appointed chief commissary officer of the Army of Southwest Missouri, but convinced the department commander, Halleck, to give him the position of quartermaster general as well. In January 1862, he reported for duty to Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis and served under him at the Battle of Pea Ridge. Sheridan soon discovered that officers were engaged in profiteering. They stole horses from civilians and demanded payment from Sheridan. He refused to pay for the stolen property and confiscated the horses for the use of Curtis's army. When Curtis ordered him to pay the officers, Sheridan brusquely retorted, "No authority can compel me to jayhawk or steal." Curtis had Sheridan arrested for insubordination but Halleck's influence appears to have ended any formal proceedings.

Sheridan performed aptly in his role under Curtis and, now returned to Halleck's headquarters, he accompanied the army on the Siege of Corinth and served as an assistant to the department's topographical engineer, but also made the acquaintance of Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman, who offered him the colonelcy of an Ohio infantry regiment. This appointment fell through, but Sheridan was subsequently aided by friends (including future Secretary of War Russell A. Alger), who petitioned Michigan Governor Austin Blair on his behalf. Sheridan was appointed colonel of the 2nd Michigan Cavalry on May 27, 1862, despite having no experience in the mounted arm.

A month later, Sheridan commanded his first forces in combat, leading a small brigade that included his regiment. At the Battle of Booneville, Mississippi, July 1, 1862, he held back several regiments of Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers's Confederate cavalry, deflected a large flanking attack with a noisy diversion, and reported critical intelligence about enemy dispositions. His actions so impressed the division commanders, including Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, that they recommended Sheridan's promotion to brigadier general. They wrote to Halleck, "Brigadiers scarce; good ones scarce. ... The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotion of Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold." The promotion was approved in September, but dated effective July 1 as a reward for his actions at Booneville. It was just after Booneville that one of his fellow officers gave him the horse that he named Rienzi (after the skirmish of Rienzi, Mississippi), which he would ride throughout the war.

My home made hardtack experiment

This is very easy make by the way. Roughly 3 parts unbleached flour to 1 part water, some salt. Mix the flour and water and knead until it is workable. Add salt, maybe a quarter teaspoon to each cup of flour used. It will stick to your hands, just keep kneading, and add some flour as necessary, continuing to knead it so the dough doesn't rise. Make a sort of round ball of it, and roll it out on a surface well dusted with flour. Roll it to about thick 1/4" thick. Cut the dough into 3 inch squares. Poke hole in it like a cracker has in it. Place on a dry cookie sheet into a preheated 360 degree oven for a half hour. Flip the crackers and return to oven for another 30 minutes.

Once it's cooled, it's like a rock. You can't even bite it without worrying about breaking a tooth. You can use a dull knife and break off a piece on a cutting board by hitting the top of the knife with your hand. Now I know why soldiers broke it up with the butt end of their rifles, it's that hard, and this is fresh hardatck, it gets harder as time goes by.

The taste isn't bad at all. If you want to cheat, cut a 1/8 inch off the end of an Italian bread, just the crust, and let it go stale. That's pretty close to the taste, but not the texture. It has a sort of slightly toasted buttery, even creamy sort of flavor, like the crust of a baked Iltalian bread and has a long aftertaste. If the hardtack is dry, you can only put what I would call large crumbs in your mouth if you hope to eat it that way and chew it at all.

I soaked some in room temp water. In a half hour, the edges got soft enough to nibble on. In all, I did this several times, and it took about 2 hours of soaking and nibbling befgore I could finish one 2X2" "biscuit'. Here is what was most surprising though:

That ONE 2X2 biscuit made me feel like I had eaten a meal. I don't know if it expands in your stomache, or what, but that little cracker filled me the way a decent sandwich does. No wonder the Union troops used to break it up and mix it into their coffee. It's like having breakfast. I will try that tomorrow. I imagine it softens faster in hot water.

Both armies used salt pork, as mentioned in an earlier post, and this was often made of pork bellies, with a lot of fat content. Hardtack would be cooked in the fat rendered from salt pork and water on the campfire. I have my pilot run of pork chops in dry salt now in the fridge. In a week, I have to remove the extracted water (the salt causes the meat to dehydrate) and resalt the meat. It will take 3 weeks before the brining salt finished it's job in extracting almost all of the water from the meat. If you want to try this:

Buy fatty pork or beef. You CANNOT use regular salt. The only thing I have found is Morton's "Tender Quick" which has the required saltpeter in it. Hard to find, but I ordered it from Morton's on line. You also can't use their directions, not for civil war authentic salt pork. Their directions are for modern dry brining for 4 to 8 hours and then cooking. 1862 salt pork has to keep for weeks unrefridgerated. It's a whole different process. You have to use more salt than they call for. Coat every single part of the meat with the brining salt. Put it in air tight plastic and keep it fridged, then resalted (after the leached water and juices have been removed and poured off) in one week, repeat again a week later, and to be sure, resalted a third time in 3 weeks to ensure that as much moisture as possible has been leached out. No moisture means no bacteria.

Toady's beef jerky is an example of fully dehydrated meat. Unopened, it keeps near forever. It is very lean, no fat. Salt pork and salt beef still have fat in it, which means some moisture remains. That means there is still risk of bacterial infection. While this meat was eaten by soldiers in the civil war, it wasn't always bacteria free if it was past it's prime. It was a trade off. The soldiers liked the fat content, they could cook with it and make hardtack easier to eat. The dry hardtack would absorb the fat, and we all know fatty meat often tastes better than lean, dry dehydrated meat does.

At each resalting stage, smell the meat. If it smells bad, it is bad, start over. The salt inhibits bacterial growth. The removal of moisture from the meat also makes it difficult for bacteria to grow. If it smells bad, bacteria is growing. Toss it. If it smells fine, it is fine.

This salt pork and salt beef is obviously super high in salt, and not very healthy to eat. It was also too salty to taste good. Soldiers would remove the salt still stuck to the meat, and breifly boil it, pouring off the liquid, and repeat again. That would remove a lot of the salt. Then they would fry it to render the fat.

They often made this salt pork-hardtack "stew" before marching off. It was ready to eat. Few soldiers ever ate salt pork raw. It had to be cooked. I look forward to finding out how this pork chop salt pork experiment works out. I understand I can expect it to be like shoe leather, in part because it is leaner meat, not pork belly with all that fat.

Hey, the hardtack was better than I thought it would be....

Miltary Tactics, Part Two

Rifling a musket increased it's range fourfold by imparting a spin to a conical bullet that enabled it literally to bore through the air. This fact had been known for centuries, but before the 1850s only special regiments or one or two companies per regiment were equipped with rifles. These companies were used as skirmishers- that is, they operated in front and on the flanks of the main body, advancing or withdrawing in loose order and shooting at will from long range at enemy targets of opportunity. Given the rifle's greater range and accuracy, why were not all infantrymen equipped with it? Because a bullet large enough to "take" the rifling was difficult to ram down with barrel. Riflemen sometimes had to pound the ramrod down with a mallet. After a rifle had been fired a few times a residue of powder built up in the grooves and had to be cleaned out before it could be fired again. Since rapid and reliable firing was essential in a battle, the rifle was not practicable for the mass of infantrymen.

Until the 1850s, that is. Although several people contributed to the development of a practicable military rifle, the main credit belongs to French army Captain Claude E. Minie and to the American James H. Burton, an armorer at the Harper's Ferry Armory. In 1848 Minie perfected a bullet small enough to be easily rammed down a rifled barrel, with a wooden plug in the base of the bullet to expand it upon firing to take the rifling. Such bullets were expensive; Burton developed a cheaper and better bullet with a deep cavity in the base that filled with gas and expanded the rim upon firing. This was the famous "minie ball" of Civil War rifles. The superiority of the rifle was demonstrated by British and French soldiers who carried them in the Crimean War. As Secretary of War in 1855, Jefferson Davis converted the United States army to the .58 caliber Springfield rifled musket. Along with the similar British Enfield rifle (caliber .577, which would take the same bullet as the Springfield), the Springfiled became the main infantry arm of the Civil War.

Because they were single shot weapons loaded from the muzzle, these rifles were still awkward to load. Even the most dextrous soldier could fire no more than 3 shots per minute. Several inventors had developed breechloading rifles by 1861, but with the paper-wrapped cartridges (containing bullets and powder) then in use, gas and sometimes flame escaped from the breech and made the weapon unreliable and even dangerous to the user. (BobbyLayne has touched on this in some earlier posts.) Progress in solving this problem made the single-shot Sharps carbine and rifle popular with the Union calvalry and sharpshooter units that managed to obtain them. The development of metal cartridges enabled the northern army to equip its calvary and some infantry units with repeaters by 1863, of which the seven-shot Spencer carbine was most successful. These weapons had a smaller powder charge an therefore a shorter range than the paper-cartridged Springfield and Enfield, and were more prone to malfunction. The muzzle-loaders remained the principal infantry weapons throughout the war.

Northern industry geared up to manufacture more than 2 million rifles furing the war; unable to produce more than a fraction of this total, the South relied mainly on imports through the blockade and on capture of Union rifles. In 1861 neither side had many rifles, so most soldiers carried old smoothbores taken from storage in arsenals. During 1862 most Union soldiers received new Springfields or Enfields, while many Confederate units still had to rely on smoothbores. This was one reason for the 2 to 1 excess of Confederate casualties in the Seven Days. By 1863 nearly all infantrymen on both sides carried rifles.

Military Tactics, Concluded

The transition from smoothbore to rifle had two main effects: it multiplied casualties; and it strengthened the tactical defensive. Officers trained and experienced in the old tactics were slow to recognize these changes. Time and again gneerals on both sides ordered close-order assaults in the traditional formation. With an effective range of 300-400 yards, defenders firing rifles decimated these attacks. Artillery declined in importance as an offensive weapon, because its accuracy and the reliability of shells at long range were poor, and the guns could no longer advance with the infantry toward enemy lines, for marksmen could pick off the cannoneers and especially the horses at distances up to a half a mile. Sharpshooters also singled out enemy officers, which helps to explain why officers and especially generals had higher casualty rates than privates. Officers on both sides soon began to stay off horseback when possible and to wear a private's uniform with only a sewn-on shoulder patch to designate their rank. The old-fashioned calvary charge against infantry, already obsolescent, became obsolete in the face of rifles that could knock down horses long before their riders got within saber or pistol range. The Civil War hastened the evolution of dismounted calvary tactics in which the horse was mainly a means of transportation rather than a weapon in its own right.

As time went on experience taught soldiers new tactics adapted to the rifle. Infantry formations loosened up and became a sort of large-scale skirmish line in which men advanced by rushes, taking advantage of cover offered by the ground to reload before dashing forward another few yards, working in groups of two or three to load and shoot alternately in order to keep up a continuous rather than a volley fire. But officers had difficulty maintaining control over large units employing such tactics in that pre-radio age. This limited the employment of loose-order tactics and compelled the retention of close-order assaults in some instances to the end of the war.

And while loose-order tactics occasionally succeeded in carrying enemy lines, they did not restore dominance to the tactical offensive, especially when defenders began digging trenches and throwing up breastworks at every position, as they did in 1863 and 1864. It became a rule of thumb that attacking forces must have a numerical superiority of at least 3 to 1 to succeed in carrying trenches defended by alert troops. Robbed by the rifle of some of its potency as an offensive weapon, the artillery functioned best on the defensive by firing at attacking infantry with grapeshot and canister (as at Malvern Hill) in the manner of a huge sawed-off shotgun. Despite the occasional success of head-on tactical assaults such as the Confederate victories at Gaines' Mill, Chancellorsville, and Chickamauga or Union triumphs at Missionary Ridge and Ceder Creek, the defense usually prevailed against frontal attacks. Even when an assault succeeded, it did so at high cost in killed and wounded. Steeped in romantic martial traditions, glorying in the "charge" and in "valor", southern soldiers in the Seven Days suffered greviously from their assaults. Well might D.H. Hill reflect in later years on the bodies piled in front of Union lines at Gaines' Mill:

It was thought to be a great thing to charge a battery of artillery or an earthwork lined with infantry...We were very lavish of blood in those days.

During 1862 and 1863, Confederate armies went on the tactical offensive in 6 of the 9 battles in which the killed and wounded of both sides together exceeded 15,000. Although they won 2 of these 6 battles (Chancellorsville and Chickamauga) and achieved a strategic success in a third (Seven Days), their total casaulties in these 6 contests exceeded Union casualties by 20,000 men (89,000 to 69,000). In the spring of 1864 the situation was reversed as Grant's men suffered nearly twice the casualties of Lee's army when the Yankees took the offensive from the Wilderness to Petersburg. The quest of both sides for victory through tactical assaults in the old manner proved a chimera in the new age of the rifle. The tactical predominance of the defense helps explain why the Civil War was so long and bloody. The rifle and trench ruled Civil War battlefields as thouroughly as the machine-gun and trench ruled those of World War I.

One of the most amazing scenes in the film Gone With The Wind involves the wounded and dead Confederate soldiers lying in the streets of Atlanta. As the camera pulls back, we see more of them. And more. And finally we see that the entire street is full of screaming soldiers lying in agony, with no one to help them. Even today, this is an extraordinary, shocking scene.

I mention this now because the Seven Days was really the first time that the horrors of war were brought home to the civilians in this manner. I am going to combine this subject, and the story of the heroic nurses on both sides, and also a discussion about disease, into a series of posts that, for lack of a better term, I'm simply going to call "The Horror". This is coming up next. Though IMO it's an extremely important read in this overall discussion of the American Civil War, for some of it you may need a strong stomach. Get ready.

The Horror, Part One

In the fog-enshrouded gloom at Malvern Hill on the morning of July 2, 1862, a Union calvary officer looked over the field of the previous day's conflict, and he wrote:

Our ears had been filled with agonizing cries from thousands before the fog was lifted, but now our eyes saw an appalling spectacle upon the slopes down to the woodlands half a mile away. Over 5,000 dead and wounded men were on the ground...enough were alive and moving to give the field a singular crawling effect.

Soon the two armies agreed on a truce to bury the dead and succor the wounded. these tasks etched the horrors of war even more indelibly than the actual fighting. A southern soldier assigned to burial detail wrote:

The sights and smells that assailed us were simply indescribable. Corpses were swollen to twice their original size, some of them actually burst asunder with the pressure of foul gases. The odors were nauseating and so deadly that in a short time we all sickened and were lying with our mouths close to the ground, most of us vomiting profusely. Hogs from a farm nearby were gorging on amputated arms and other portions of the body.

Many civilians on both sides, especially in the South, experienced these sights and smells of war directly. Much of the fighting in May and June 1862 occurred almost on Richmond's doorstep. Many of the 21,000 wounded Confederates from Seven Pines and the Seven Days were brought into the city. "We lived in one immense hospital, and breathed the vapors of the charnel house," wrote a Richmond woman. Churches, hotels, warehouses, shops, barns, even private homes were pressed into service as temporary hospitals. White women volunteered by the hundreds as nurses; slaves were mobilized as orderlies and gravediggers.

Like the Union army, the Confederates gave first aid and emergency treatment of wounded in field hospitals near or on the battlefield. These were places of doom and terror. Doctors with filthy hands, with flies swarming around them, operated usually without anesthetic. To avoid gangrene, which was the normal result of any bullet wound, arms and legs were amputated with the use of saws. Then the open wound was cauterized with flame and the patient was left to recover or die. Over half the time, he died, if not from the wound, then from infection or diseases. Even the ones who did recover could never forget the men all around them screaming in pain and agony at all hours of day and night.

And yet on both sides, there were saintly people, mostly women, who did their best to save as many lives as possible and were successful in this task. We will take a look next at their extraordinary struggle to bring the light of sanity and civilization into the midst of an insane conflict.

timschochet said:

There is much to cover here, and I'm leaving the battles aside for the moment, (though BobbyLayne and Rovers will likely continue with these as well.) Here is a list of topics I plan on narrating:Southern aftermath of the Seven DaysA discussion of military tactics developed during the Seven DaysThe nurses of the SouthThe nurses of the NorthThe effects of diseaseThe question of slavery and emancipation (this will be a long and detailed discussion if we're going to do this right.)The next set of battles that needs to be discussed involves the invasion of Kentucky and the battle of Perryville, before returning to the eastern theater and second Manassas. Rover and BL, you guys are welcome to discuss these battles while I'm busy with the other stuff; otherwise, I'll get to it when I'm done, whenever that is. As in the World War II thread, we're dealing with several important events occuring at the same timeline.

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Do we really want to do battles like Perryvile from Oct 82 before Second Bull Run (Aug 82) and even Antietam in Sept 82? The only significant thing might be Murfreesboro, there were some small scale battles in the west, but none of them very significant militarilly anyway, unless I'm missing something. I see Pope's campaign as the next one that should be done, but whatever you guys want to do. The west heats up again in the late fall of 82, but that was after the big battles in the eastern theatre. Maybe we should agree on a timeline of that can get us on the same page, because right now, I'm lost.Great stuff on the the "horror" Tim. The minie ball was a very nasty bullet. Low velocity, and soft. It spread out and just shattered bones. A soldier was very lucky if it only went through flesh. Around this time, officers started to avoid staying on their horses and even did things with their uniform to hide their rank on the battlefield. The mortality rate for officers was pretty high, and in many battles, the lowly private had a better chance at surviving because he wasn't the focus of sharpshooters the way officers were. Sitting on a horse made you a minie ball magnet. Slowly, in small ways like this, the impact of much more accurate rifled muskets and their range of accurate fire began to change the way soldiers behaved. I think we have all seen the pictures of detached limbs piled up outside of open make shift tents used as operating rooms. Gruesome stuff. Bodies exploding from bloating within a day of death... I can't imagine being showered with innards when attempting to move a dead man. I wonder who drew those duties... maybe slaves? Incredible suffering even for those who weren't shot or wounded. I did some recovery work after 9-11, and that stays with me to this day. Still, I can't imagine clearing a civil war battlefild of it's dead and wounded. The absolute carnage must have been, as you said, horrific.

The Horror, Part Two

On the eve of the Civil War, Florence Nightingale was as much a heroine to American women as she was in England. Nightingale had revolutionized the inadequate British army medical services in the Crimea. She had also dignified nursing as a profession and in 1860 had established the world's first school of nursing at St. Thomas's Hospital in London. When war came to America, several southern white women volunteered their services as nurses or founded small hospitals for soldiers. One of the best such hospitals was established in Richmond by Sally Louisa Tompkins, whom Jefferson Davis eventually commissioned as a captain so that her infirmary could qualify as an army hospital.

These examples defied a prejudice against "refined ladies" working in military hospitals. It was permissible for white women to nurse the sick at home or even in the slave quarters, but they had no business in the masculine milieu of an army hospital which presented sights that no lady should see. Women should stay at home and make bandages, knit socks for soldiers, and comfort the menfolk when they returned from the rigors of battle. Despite the initial wartime prevalence of this view, numerous southern women of good families braved the frowns of father or brother to volunteer as nurses. One of them was 27 year old Kate Cumming of Mobile, who in April 1862 went to Corinth where Beauregard's battered army was trying to recover after Shiloh. "As to the plea of its being no place for a refined lady," Cumming wrote, "I wondered what Miss Nightingale and the hundreds of refined ladies of Great Britain who went to the Crimea, would say to that!"

When Cumming arrived at a Corinth hotel that had been turned into a hospital, she blanched at the sight. "Nothing that I had ever heard or read had given me the faintest idea of the horrors witnessed here." But she and her sisters in mercy fought down the desire to run away, and went immediately to work. She wrote in her diary:

I sat up all night, bathing the men's wounds, and giving them water. The men are lying all over the house, on their blankets, just as they were brought in from the battlefield...The foul air from this mass of human beings at first made me giddy and sick, but I soon got over it. We have to walk, and when we give the men anything we kneel, in blood and water; but we think nothing of it.

Similar experiences befell the Yankee women as well. But these women not only performed with great heroics, they changed attitudes about the roles of women in society which would have effects long after the war was over. Despite their incredible fortitude, however, they could do little to help the terrible conditions, and the spread of diseases. More on this next.

Agreed, Rovers...Pope was THE major campaign summer of '62; the other major story is Lincoln's evolving thinking about what the war should be about, and his July 22nd cabinet meeting...then after Second Manassas you can do the two invasions...and since Chantilly flowed almost immediately into the Maryland campaign - and the race to Louisville was a full month later - it makes since to stay in the east before moving onto Bragg/Buell/Price.

I presume timschochet is following a specific narrative (McPherson?), but it is an unnatural timeline.

BTW, Rovers, how did you manage to have the same typo four times?

('82 when you meant '62)

The Horror, Part 3

Consider these statistics:

In the Korean War, only 1 out of every 50 wounded Americans died of his wounds. In the Vietnam War, the proportion was 1 out of every 400. And by the time of the Iraq War, even this number seems high and has been severly reduced.

In the Civil War, 18 percent of wounded rebels died, and 14 percent of wounded Yankees. That's 1 out of every 6 or 7!! (The difference between the North and South in these numbers are the result of the South not having enough medicine and supplies, especially as the war went on.)

The Civil War was fought at the end of the medical Middle Ages. The 1860s witnessed the dawn of a new era with the research in Europe of Louis Pasteur, Joseph Lister, and others who discovered those miscroscopic culprits that infected water and food and entered the bloodstream through open wounds. Within a generation the new science of bacteriology had revolutionized medicine. The discovery of the link between mosquitoes and yellow fever and malaria made possible the control of these killer diseases.

But Civil War doctors knew none of these things. The medical revolution came too late to benefit them. They were not aware of the exact relationship between water and typhoid, between unsterilized instruments and infection, between mosquitoes and malaria. The concept of asepsis and antisepsis in surgery had not been developed. Doctors could not conceive of antibiotics because they scarcely had a notion of biotics. Moreover, as Rovers has pointed out, the large caliber andd low muzzle velocity of Civil War rifles caused horrible wounds with the bullet usually remaining in the body rather than going through it. Surgeons knew of few ways except amputation to stop gangrene or osteomyelitis or pyemia. Stomach wounds were generally fatal because there was no known prevention of peritonitis. Chloroform and ether were used as anesthetics, but shortages especially in the South sometimes required soldiers to be dosed with whiskey and literally to bite the bullet during an operation. This was the "heroic age" of medicine in which soldiers who suffered anything from dysentery to constipation to malaria to a cold were dosed with calomel or tartar emetic or quinine or morphine or laudanum. Little wonder that many soldiers preferred to remain out of the clutches of doctors. Little wonder, also, that some became narcotics addicts.

Disease was a greater threat to the health of Civil War soldiers than enemy weapons. This had been true of every army in history. Civil War armies actually suffered comparatively less disease mortality than any previous army. While two Union and Confederate soldiers died of diseas for each one killed in combat, the ratio for British soldiers in the Napoleonic and Crimean wars had been 8 to 1 and 4 to 1. For the American army in the Mexican War it had been 7 to 1. Only by our standards (and those of the 20th century) was Civil War disease mortality high. Nevertheless, despite improvement over previous wars in this respect, disease was a crippling factor in Civil War military operations. At any given time a substantial proportion of men in a regiment might be on the sicklist. Disease reduced the size of most regiments from their initial complement of 1,000 men to about half that number before the regiment ever went into battle.

BobbyLayne said:

BTW, Rovers, how did you manage to have the same typo four times?

('82 when you meant '62)

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3am, the night of St Patty's day. Need I explain?

The Horrors, Concluded

Sickness hit soldiers hardest in their first year. The crowding together of thousands of men from various backgrounds into a new and highly contagious disease environment had predictable results. Men (especially those from rural areas) who had never before been exposed to measles, mumps, or tonsilitis promptly came down with these childhood maladies. Though rarely fatal, these illnesses could cripple units for weeks at a time. More deadly were smallpox and erysipelas, which went through some rural regiments like a scythe. If soldiers recovered from these diseases and remained for some time at the training or base camp- where by poor sanitary practices and exposure to changeable weather they fouled their water supply, created fertile breeding grounds fo bacteria, and became susceptible to deadly viruses- many of them contracted one of the three principal killer diseases of the war: diarrhea/dysentery, typhoid, or pneumonia. As they marched southward in summer campaigns, many of them caught the fourth most prevalent mortal disease: malaria. A good many Union occupation troops in southern cities as well as Confederate soldiers camped near other cities- especially Richmond- experienced another soldiers' malady, veneral disease, of which there were about as many reported cases as of measles, mumps, and tonsilitis combined.

Disease disrupted several military operations. Lee's West Virginia campaigns of 1861 failed in part because illness incapacitated so many of his men. One reason for the abandonment of the first effort to capture Vicksburg in July 1862 was the sickness of more than half of the Union soldiers and sailors there. Beauregard's decision to abandon Corinth was influenced by illness of epidemic proportions that more than a third of his army on the sicklist. By the time Halleck's Union army had established its occupation of Corinth in early June, a third or more of the Yankee soldiers were also ill. Nearly half of the 29 Union generals came down sick during the Corinth campaign and its aftermath, including Halleck himself and John Pope with what they ruefully called the "Evacuation of Corinth" (diarrhea) and Sherman with malaria. Halleck's failure after Corinth to continue his invasion into Mississippi resulted in part from fears of even greater disease morbidity among unacclimated northern soldiers in a Deep-South summer campaign.

Illness also influenced the denouement of the Peninsula campaign in Virginia. The health of McClellan's army, already affected by the heavy rains and humid heat among the Chickahominy swamps in May and June, deteriorated further after the army's arrival at Harrison's Landing in July. Nearly a fourth of the unwounded men were sick. Scores of new cases of malaria, dysentery, and typhoid were reported every day. McClellan himself had not fully recovered from an earlier bout with dysentery. With the sickliest season of the year (August-September) coming on, the administration decided over McClellan's protest to withdraw his army from the Peninsula.

(Strategic and political questions also played a part in this decision. McClellan's vision of a limited war for limited ends was now seen as a failed experiment. As a direct result of the strategic southern victory of the Seven Days, a new vision would emerge among northern leaders, which involved an end to slavery. How this happened will be the main subject of my next series of posts.)

Freedom Part One

By the beginning of 1862 the impetus of war had evolved three shifting and overlapping Republican factions on the slavery question. The most dynamic and clearcut faction were the radicals, who accepted the abolitionist argument that emancipation could be achieved through the confiscation of enemy property. On the other wing of the party a smaller number of conservatives hoped for the ultimate demise of bondage but preferred to see this happen by the voluntary action of slave states coupled with colonization abroad of the freed slaves. In the middle were the moderates, led by Abraham Lincoln, who shared the radicals' moral aversion to slavery but feared the racial consequences of wholesale emancipation. Events during the first half of 1862 pushed moderates toward the radical position.

In the next few days I'll be covering the reasons why the moderates moved, the consequences, the reactions by soldiers and Democrats, and the fateful steps which led to emancipation.

Freedom Part Two

A unique combination of history and geography had given New England-born radicals extraordinary power in Congress, especially the Senate. New England and the upper tier of states west of the Hudson settled by Yankee emigrants had been the birthplace of abolitionism and free soil politics. From these regions had come to Washington the earliest and most radical Republicans. 11 of the 12 New England senators chaired committees, and men born in New England but now representing other states held 5 of the 11 remaining chairmanships. 5 of the 10 most prominent radicals in the House, including the speaker and the chairman of the ways and means committee (Galusha Grow and Thaddeus Stevens, both of Pennsylvania) had been born and raised in New England. Little wonder, then, that 7 emanicipation or confiscation bills were favorably reported out of congressional committees by mid-January and became law during the next 6 months.

Some of the laws fulfilled longstanding free-soil goals: prohibition of slavery in the territories; ratification of a new treaty with Britain for more effective suppression of the slave trade; and abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. But while these would have been heralded as great antislavery achievements in peacetime, they scarcely touched the real war issues concerning slavery in 1862. More important was a new article of war passed on March 13 forbidding army officers to return fugitive slaves to their masters. This grappled with the question first raised by Benjamin Butler's "contraband" policy in 1861. Union conquests along the south Atlantic coast and in the lower Mississippi Valley had brought large numbers of slaves into proximity to the Yankees. Many of them escaped their owners and sought refuge- and freedom- in Union camps.

Sometimes their welcome was less than friendly. While northern soldiers had no love for slavery, most of them had no love for slaves either. They fought for Union and against treason; only a minority in 1862 felt any interest in fighting for black freedom. While some Yanks treated contrabands with a degree of equity or benevolence, the more typical response was indifference, contempt and cruelty. Soon after Union forces captured Port Royal, South Carolina, in November 1861, a private described in a letter an incident there that made his "ashamed of America":

About 8-10 soldiers from the New York 47th chased some Negro women but they escaped, so they took a Negro girl about 7 years old, and raped her.

BobbyLayne said:

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I have nothing to post until Gettysburg. I was planning on dropping some Lincoln knowledge throughout the thread but most of the stuff I would have done has been covered and I simply don't have the time I thought I would to do it. Other than that, this has been interesting.

Yankee23Fan said:

BobbyLayne said:

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I have nothing to post until Gettysburg. I was planning on dropping some Lincoln knowledge throughout the thread but most of the stuff I would have done has been covered and I simply don't have the time I thought I would to do it. Other than that, this has been interesting.

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I cover killin'.timschochet has to get off his high effing crescendo, pull his head of the window, sit back down, be happy, and post more stuff about the most important document of the entire century.Once he does that I'll pick it up with Bobby, T.J. and Pete suppressing Mr. 'Headquarters in the Saddle' (he evidently had his headquarters where his hindquarters ought to be).

I mentioned I would be very busy, my seasonal biz cranking up and a wedding which included an invasion of Texans into my household for a week for the event. I don't have the time until Sunday at the earliest to pick anything up. After that, I should be able to make more regular contributions. I guess Pope isn't going to be done until I can get to it?

Rovers said:

I mentioned I would be very busy, my seasonal biz cranking up and a wedding which included an invasion of Texans into my household for a week for the event. I don't have the time until Sunday at the earliest to pick anything up. After that, I should be able to make more regular contributions. I guess Pope isn't going to be done until I can get to it?

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I will do the summer of '62 campaign just as soon as timschochet solves the California deficit and resolves paying for HCR. At least I think he plans on knocking those two things out before he finishes up the E.P.

I'll get to it shortly.

Freedom Part Three

The abolition-influenced Congress, led by grim-visaged, club-footed Thaddeus Stevens, continued to push for full emancipation even after the Seven Days' Debacle. In July of 1862, the Congress passed two important laws- the first empowered the President to enroll soldiers into the army "persons of African descent". The second allowed for the confiscation of property of traitors, "including slaves who shall be deemed captives of war and forever free." The language was deliberately a little vague, though, under pressure by Lincoln who remained concerned about the border states. General Pope in Virginia thought this language was clear enough, however; he ordered his officers to seize rebel property without compensation, to shoot captured guerillas who fired on Union troops, and to expel any civilians who refused to take an oath of allegience.

Southerners erupted in anger toward Pope, which made him for a time the most hated Yankee soldier next to Butler (and of course later Sherman would seize this title.) Robert E. Lee declared that "this miscreant Pope" must be suppressed. Jefferson Davis threatened retaliation on Union prisoners if Pope actually shot guerillas. (None were shot.) But in both Virgina and out west, slaves continued to break for freedom into Union ranks, where they worked for the army. Grant took them in as teamsters and cooks. He wrote to his family that he had no "hobby of my own with regard to the Negro" and "I don't know what is to become of these poor people," but "it weakens the enemy to take them from them."

McClellan didn't like it. He wrote to Lincoln that this should be a war against armed forces, not against the southern population. According to McClellan:

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the southern people. Neither confisction of property nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

McClellan's viewpoint was widely shared among most Democrats in the north, not to mention many Republicans, including the bulk of the new Irish immigrants, who felt threatened by the prospect of freed slaves competing for jobs. Among the Democrats, many also came to believe after the Seven Days that no matter how many victories the North might win, the war itself could never be won, because the geography of the South would not permit it. It was therefore perhaps not a bad idea, thought these people, to negotiate some sort of settlement. These Democrats were termed "Copperheads" by their opponents, the suggestion being that they were snakes, but they gladly took the term, pointing out that the copper "head" was the head of liberty.

McClellan was not a Copperhead. But he did not approve of a harsh war effort and freeing the slaves. A few months earlier Lincoln would have agreed with him. But now he had become convinced of the necessity for "forcible abolition of slavery" and had begun to draft a proclamation of emancipation.

Freedom Part Four

In response to McClellan's arguments, Lincoln replied:

This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for 10 years trying to destroy the government, and if they fail still come back into the Union unhurt.

In this mood, Lincoln called border-state congressmen to the White House on July 12. Once more he urged favorable action on his plan for compensated emancipation. He warned them:

The pressure upon me is increasing. If the border states do not make a decision at once to emancipate gradually, the institution in your states will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion- by the mere incidents of the war. And you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it.

But even this warning fell on mostly deaf ears. Two-thirds of the border-state representatives signed a manifesto rejecting Lincoln's proposal because it would produce too "radical a change in our social system"; it was "interference" by the government with a state matter; it would cost too much (a curious objection from men whose states would benefit from a tax that would fall mainly on the free states); and finally, instead of shortening the conflict by depriving the Confederacy of hope for border-state support, it would lengthen the war and jeapordize victory by driving many unionist slaveholders into rebellion.

This response caused Lincoln to give up trying to conciliate conservatives. From then on the President tilted toward the radical position, though this would not become publicly apparent for more than 2 months. On the July 13, the day he received the border-state manifesto, Lincoln privately told Seward and Welles of his intention to issue an emancipation proclamation. As Welles recorded the conversation, Lincoln said that this question had "occupied his mind and thoughts day and night" for several weeks. He had decided that emancipation was a "military necessity, absolutely essential to the preservation of the Union. We must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued."

Lincoln brushed aside the argument of unconstitutionality. This was war, and as commander in chief he could order seizure of enemy slaves just as surely as he could order seizure of enemy railroads. He said:

The rebels could not at the same time throw off the Constitution and invoke its aid. Having made war on the government, they are subject to the incidents and calamities of war. The border states will do nothing on their own; perhaps it is not fair to ask them to give up slavery while the rebels retain it. Therefore the blow must fall first and foremost on the rebels. Decisive and extensive measures must be adopted. We wanted the army to strike more vigorous blows. The Administration must set and example, and strike at the heart of the rebellion.

OK, lawyers and constitutional experts (hopefully Yankee23fan, Christo, and anyone else who feels qualified): please chime in: was Lincoln correct? Did he, as president, have the right to order the slaves freed? Did congress have the right to do it? Or would a change to the Constitution have been necessary?

Let me restate the questions here in a more organized form:

1. Did Americans who lived in states that chose to secede still have all the constitutional rights of American citizens, prior to the end of the rebellion?

2. Since the Dred Scott decision was established law, did the federal government have the right to abolish slavery anywhere, or did this require a constitutional amendment?

3. Could the president, as commander in chief, take action on this issue separate from the Congress?

timschochet said:

1. Did Americans who lived in states that chose to secede still have all the constitutional rights of American citizens, prior to the end of the rebellion?

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Yes, but they were in the middle of theatre of war. As a result certain limitations that were constitutionally viable were set up (suspension of habeas corpus being one such thing). President Lincoln never officially recognized the rebel states as any form of foreign or separate entity in a legal fashion. They were simply lands of the country engaged in insurrection. Under the authority of the Constitution, he was charged with putting down that rebellion.

2. Since the Dred Scott decision was established law, did the federal government have the right to abolish slavery anywhere, or did this require a constitutional amendment?

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A better question is, 'Was Dred Scott the law of the land'? By June 1862 Congress had passed legislation directly contradicting Dred Scott and proclaiming that the government could regulate, and as a result made illegal, slavery in the territories. Soon thereafter, the Confiscation Act was passed which proclaimed to liberate slaves held by rebels.These actions were the acts of the legislature in direct contravention of the Article III Court. And it is altogether fitting and proper. The Article III courts have no enforcement power and must rely ont he legislature to legitimize, and the executive to enforce, its holdings. Basically, like segregationist education law in the '50's, the two active branches of government took action to ignore the thrid inactive branch. With that as backdrop, it's interesting to wonder if Dred Scott was actually the true law of the land.

The federal government did have the power to a lot with slavery, thanks in large part to the precedent set by southern states in using the federal congress as the authority in slavery matters through compromised policy. Like so many of the arguments of the southern leaders, the duality of their claims defeats their efforts. With slavery, they required the federal government to pass all manner of law for the institution, both limiting it and expanding it, attacking it and protecting it, and then some come to the conclusion that the same government had no authority to deal with the issue in 1862-1865.

But the third part of your question is the big one. Did it require a Constitutional Amendment. I would say, in the end, yes. But simply because the Amendment stops all arguments (at least in theory). There didn't need to be free state and slave state policy arguments anymore with an amendment. So, in that - wanting a final resolution once and for all - yes, an amendment was necessary. But the actual act of emancipation needing an amendment? I don't think so.

3. Could the president, as commander in chief, take action on this issue separate from the Congress?

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I don't know what exactly your question is here. The Emancipation Proclamation was issued by Lincoln through his authority as Commander in Chief. It was a war policy. He was very careful to make it clear that it was, in fact, just that. As Commander in Chief he has certain powers and authorities as codified by the Constitution. When acting as CiC the President is not acting separate from Congress - he is simply acting in the manner required by his station. Congress does likewise.As CiC he had broad authority on policy and procedure and even execution of the "war." The EP was legitmately a war measure enacted through the power of the CiC as codified in the Constitution. And again Lincoln - one of our greatest lawyers mind you - used the arguments and very existence of the rebels against them. The very acts of the southern leaders were revolving around slavery and their argument that the federal government could not take their property. Slaves were mearly that - property. And as such legal citizens could do with their property what they wished. Lincoln used the EP to turn that argument on its head. No one can argue that a legitimate act of war includes the seizure of the enemies property. In fact, that is the very aim of war in all its forms - kill the enemy and take or break his stuff. If slaves are merely property, then a legitimate war power is to enable the government to seize said property. The EP was the executive order requiring that seizure.

Like so many of their arguments, the southern leaders and their sympathizers want it both ways. Constitutional protections when it suits them, and no constitution when it doesn't. But the Constitution is the Constitution. The power Lincoln used in July later that year was a war power. It had in its history legislative acts leading up to the EP, military powers granting it, and the south's own arguments legitimizing it against their outrage (even though that wasn't really needed). It was a master stroke of genuis from a President that had many such master strokes.

Great input, Yankee. We'll see if others agree with you. My only additional question is this: the Union never acknowledged the existence of the Confederacy; therefore, how could they be at war? Wasn't the American Civil War, legally speaking, a police action? And if it was a police action, then doesn't that limit the President's abilities in terms of the seizure of property? Just playing devil's advocate here, but I wouldn't know how to answer this question.

timschochet said:

Great input, Yankee. We'll see if others agree with you. My only additional question is this: the Union never acknowledged the existence of the Confederacy; therefore, how could they be at war? Wasn't the American Civil War, legally speaking, a police action? And if it was a police action, then doesn't that limit the President's abilities in terms of the seizure of property? Just playing devil's advocate here, but I wouldn't know how to answer this question.

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Article II Section 2 grants the President the CiC authority, "when called into the actual service of the United States." Article IV Section 4 requires the, "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."The President is required to act in defense of the nation against insurrection as well as invasion. The only actual formal power to do that rests with the Article II power. With that, the Congress has the Article I Section 8 power to call forth the militia to, among other things, fight against insurrection. And of course, the Congress has the Article I Section 8 power ot declare war. The insurrection of the south required the constitutional defense of the nation. Legally speaking, the Civil War was a rebellion or insurrection. Properly put down within the constitutional framework afforded the President.

Freedom Part 5

Mayor Fernando Wood of New York City was a copperhead Democrat. Upon learning of Lincoln's possible intentions to order emancipation of the slaves, he rushed to his close friend McClellan at army headquarters. He told Mac that the nation was waiting for him to publicly condemn Lincoln; if he did, the Dems would surely choose McClellan as their candidate in 1864 and he would easily win election. McClellan was said to be impressed by this offer, but was wary of publicly criticizing the president. At the same time, Republicans continued to pressure Lincoln to get rid of McClellan. But Lincoln demurred. He recognized that the enlisted men of the Army of the Potomac did not suscribe to Republican criticisms of Mac, and many of their officers did not share the Republican vision of an antislavery war. Because of these facts, Lincoln held off both in dealing with McClellan and in the final step of emancipation.

On July 22, Lincoln informed the cabinet of his intention to issue a proclamation of freedom, and invited comment. Many historians believe that Lincoln at this time had made no decision; he was simply testing his cabinet. Abraham Lincoln's motives remain mysterious to this day. He manipulated his cabinet, just as he did Congress and the American people. It is hard to figure out who the "real" Lincoln was, and his thoughts at this momentous cabinet meeting remain a subject of fierce debate. Most of the cabinet urged Lincoln to go full steam ahead; only Montgomery Blair dissented, on the ground that such an edict would cost Republicans control of Congress in the upcoming elections. Then Seward, while approving the idea, counseled postponement "until you can give it to the country supported by military success." Otherwise the world might view it "as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help, our last shriek, on the retreat." The wisdom of this suggestion "struck me with very great force" said the president later. He put his proclamation in a drawer to wait for victory.

Or had he made up his mind yet? The problem is, Lincoln then spent the next month returning to an idea he had promoted years earlier- sending all or most African-Americans back to Africa. This is an aspect of Lincoln that is rarely discussed in our general view of him. As a matter of fact, in researching this narrative, I asked a black friend of mine if she was aware of Lincoln's suggestions in this regard, and she thought I was making it up. A full discussion of Lincoln's ideas to resettle Blacks, which might be a caveat to any emancipation, is coming up next.

Freedom Part 6

Lincoln's decision to table emancipation until a military victory created a lengthy pause, during which he was savaged by both extremes. On the left, abolitionists and radicals were especially abusive. "Lincoln is no better than a wet rag!" complained William Lloyd Garrison. "He is stumbling, halting, prevaricating, irresolute." Frederick Douglass believed that Lincoln was "allowing himself to be...the miserable tool of traitors and rebels." Greeley gave Lincoln hell in the columns of the New York Tribune, and suggested that the Republicans might want to look in another direction in 1864, "if the Union survives."

But Lincoln could, as he had shown, handle the critics within his own party. The real threat came from the right. The emergence of slavery as the most salient war issue in 1862 threatened to turn a large element of the Democrats into an antiwar party. This was no small matter. THe Democrats had received 44% of the popular votes in the free states in 1860. If the votes of the border states are added, Lincoln was a minority president of the Union states. The Copperhead faction of the Democrats, which stood for reunion through negotiations rather than victory, continued to grow and grow. Southerners pinned great hopes on the Copperhead faction, which they considered large and strong enough to paralyze the war effort.

There is a disconnect here regarding the Copperheads which is important to note as it would come to have both immediate and long term effects on the war. The Copperheads never intended to see the Union permanently divided. They simply believed that the South could be brought back into the Union through negotiations, which would involve some concessions on slavery (which the Copperheads were willing to make.) They were wrong of course; at this point only military victory over the South would return them to the fold. But the Copperheads refused to believe this. This refusal caused Republicans to consider the Copperheads both deluded, and, possibly, traitors.

But more importantly, the Confederates believed that the Copperheads would, if they came to power, stop the war and recognize the Confederacy. The fact that not a single Copperhead ever expressed this idea seemed to make no difference whatsoever to Southern beliefs. Both Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee believed that many northerners were on their side, and especially in the border states. Lee in particular was convinced that the good people of Maryland were just waiting to revolt against "Those People", as he called the Union Army, if he (Lee) just led the way. This line of thinking would lead to his invasion of Maryland later that year.

I'm digressing a little bit here, but this stuff is important, so bear with me. In my next post, I will return to the Democratic reaction to emancipation ideas (it was pretty ugly) and then I will get to Lincoln's idea to resettle the freedmen in Africa, (which I was supposed to cover in this post!) I fully realize this discussion is taking longer than I originally planned, because there are so many fascinating subjects to cover. And believe me, I am only skimming the surface.

timschochet said:

The problem is, Lincoln then spent the next month returning to an idea he had promoted years earlier- sending all or most African-Americans back to Africa. This is an aspect of Lincoln that is rarely discussed in our general view of him. As a matter of fact, in researching this narrative, I asked a black friend of mine if she was aware of Lincoln's suggestions in this regard, and she thought I was making it up. A full discussion of Lincoln's ideas to resettle Blacks, which might be a caveat to any emancipation, is coming up next.

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He was pretty open about it in eaerlier speeches. As I've said on these boards before, his "solution" for slavery was always pragmatic, not idealistic. And it changed with the times and necessities of those times, be they run up to Civil War or Civil War itself. Simply claiming he was for slaveries end - the Great Emancipator - is factually incorrect.

Yankee23Fan said:

timschochet said:

The problem is, Lincoln then spent the next month returning to an idea he had promoted years earlier- sending all or most African-Americans back to Africa. This is an aspect of Lincoln that is rarely discussed in our general view of him. As a matter of fact, in researching this narrative, I asked a black friend of mine if she was aware of Lincoln's suggestions in this regard, and she thought I was making it up. A full discussion of Lincoln's ideas to resettle Blacks, which might be a caveat to any emancipation, is coming up next.

Click to expand...

He was pretty open about it in eaerlier speeches. As I've said on these boards before, his "solution" for slavery was always pragmatic, not idealistic. And it changed with the times and necessities of those times, be they run up to Civil War or Civil War itself. Simply claiming he was for slaveries end - the Great Emancipator - is factually incorrect.

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A Historic White House Meeting

Eager to proceed with the Chiriqui project**, on August 14, 1862, Lincoln met with five free black ministers, the first time a delegation of their race was invited to the White House on a matter of public policy. The President made no effort to engage in conversation with the visitors, who were bluntly informed that they had been invited to listen. Lincoln did not mince words, but candidly told the group:

You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffers very greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffers from your presence. In a word, we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason at least why we should be separated.

... Even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race ... The aspiration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when free, but on this broad continent, not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you.

... We look to our condition, owing to the existence of the two races on this continent. I need not recount to you the effects upon white men growing out of the institution of slavery. I believe in its general evil effects on the white race.

See our present condition -- the country engaged in war! -- our white men cutting one another's throats, none knowing how far it will extend; and then consider what we know to be the truth. But for your race among us there could not be war, although many men engaged on either side do not care for you one way or the other. Nevertheless, I repeat, without the institution of slavery, and the colored race as a basis, the war would not have an existence.

It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated.

An excellent site for black resettlement, Lincoln went on, was available in Central America. It had good harbors and an abundance of coal that would permit the colony to be quickly put on a firm financial footing. The President concluded by asking the delegation to determine if a number of freedmen with their families would be willing to go as soon as arrangements could be made.

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http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v13/v13n5p-4_Morgan.html**

Ambrose W. Thompson, a Philadelphian who had grown rich in coastal shipping, provided the new president with what seemed to be a good opportunity. Thompson had obtained control of several hundred thousand acres in the Chiriqui region of what is now Panama, and had formed the "Chiriqui Improvement Company." He proposed transporting liberated blacks from the United States to the Central American region, where they would mine the coal that was supposedly there in abundance. This coal would be sold to the US Navy, with the resulting profits used to sustain the black colony, including development of plantations of cotton, sugar, coffee, and rice. The Chiriqui project would also help to extend US commercial dominance over tropical America

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Freedom Part 7

As they had done in every election since the birth of the Republican party, northern Democrats exploited the race issue for all they thought it was worth in 1862. The Black Republican "party of fanaticism" intended to free "two or three million semi-savages" to "overrun the North and enter into competition with the white laboring masses" and mix with "their sons and daughters". "Shall the Working Classes be Equalized with Negroes?" screamed Democratic newspaper headlines. Ohio's soldiers, warned the state's congressman and Democratic leader Samuel S. Cox, would no longer fight for the Union "if the result shall be the flight and movement of the black race by millions northward." Archbishop John Hughes stated:

We Catholics, and a vast majority of our brave troops in the field, have not the slightest idea of carrying on a war that costs so much blood and treasure just to gratify a clique of Abolitionists.

With this kind of rhetoric from their leaders, it was little wonder that some white workingen took their prejudices into the streets. In a half-dozen or more cities, anti-black riots broke out during the summer of 1862. Some of the worst violence occurred in Cincinnatti, where the replacement of striking Irish dockworkers by Negroes set off a wave of attacks on blacks neighborhoods. In Brooklyn a mob of Irish-Americans tried to burn down a tobacco factory where two dozen black women and children were working. (Later on in this narrative I will be discussing in some detail a much greater riot in the New York area, the worst race riot in American history).

With these incidents in mind, and in an attempt to placate Northern Democrats while at the same time work toward emancipation, some Republicans came up with they believed was a workable solution: colonization.

Freedom Part 8

Abraham Lincoln's defenders have long argued that the president believed that support for colonization was the best way to defuse much of the anti-emancipation sentiment that might otherwise sink the Republicans in the 1862 elections. Followers of this theory are of the opinion that Lincoln did not himself really believe in colonization; he knew it was impracticable and impossible. But he had to say he believed in it in order to keep the country unified. (A modern-day analogy could be made to Senator John McCain, who in his campaign for president and for the senate has changed his position regarding immigration reform to "seal the borders first." But many people believe that McCain is parroting what many conservative voters want to hear, that he doesn't believe its really practicable, and remains in favor of immigration reform.)

Yet, on August 14, 1862, Lincoln invited a group of black leaders to the White House. He said that slavery was "the greatest wrong inflicted on any people". But even if slavery were abolished, racial differences and prejudices would remain. He told them:

Your race suffer very greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. The Negro has little chance to achieve equality in the United States. There is an unwillingness on the part of the people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain among us...I do not mean to discuss this, but to propose it as a fact with which we have to deal. I cannot alter it if I would.

This fact, said Lincoln, made it necessary for black people to emigrate to another land where they would have better opportunities. The president asked the black leaders to recruit volunteers for a government-financed colonization project in Central America or Northern Africa. If this worked, it might pave the way for the emigration of thousands more who might be freed in the war.

A few comments before I relate the response of the black leaders in the next post. To me, this does not sound like a man who doesn't believe in what he is suggesting. Lincoln's ideas were not original, and it's important to note that long after his death many prominent African-Americans pondered them seriously. Probably the most important black leader between the ages of Booker T. Washington and Martin Luther King, Jr., Marcus Garvey, sponsored a "Back to Africa movement" in which he basically repeated Lincoln's proposal: that the federal govt. would pay for a mass emigration. Only in recent history has the idea that Blacks and Whites can live in America in full equality without strife taken hold upon the perception of the majority. The Black Muslim movement does not believe it to this day.

What's important is that Lincoln was for emancipation, and willing to risk his presidency to advance it. This among other things that we are describing make him, IMO, our greatest president. He was wrong about colonization, but compared to what he was right about, I see this as minor.

Here is an interesting article from today's Charleston Post and Courier:

Long-lost patriot found in North Charleston

While this isn't directly related to the time of this thread, it is indirectly. Besides, those that would find this article of interest would be in this thread anyway.

The article lists Bernard E Bee, Jr. as his son when they mean grandson since BEB was born 12 years after this guy died.

During the years before and after the Revolutionary War, Thomas Bee of Charleston cut a wide swath.

He was a lawyer, legislator, lieutenant governor and more. He studied at Oxford University, and his public service spanned 50 years, culminating in a federal judgeship he held until his death in 1812. He had three wives and eight children.

Bee once owned more than 7,000 acres and was described as "a planter of considerable opulence," and his opposition to the Stamp Act and other activities before the Revolutionary War caused one judge to brand him "a furious Liberty Boy."

But Bee's grave on Woodstock Plantation, in what today is northern North Charleston, had been largely forgotten as a thick stand of woods grew around it.

The property, inherited by Bee's third wife, Susannah Bulline Bee, evolved into an early commercial node along the Best Friend train line, the nation's first regularly scheduled passenger railroad in 1830.

But the epicenter of the Lowcountry's massive 1886 earthquake was near the plantation, and most of its buildings were lost and never rebuilt.

The Bee family moved on, first to the Upstate and then out west. Over time, nature reclaimed their former rice fields.

The last century's roads and rail lines largely skirted Woodstock, at least until work began to extend the Palmetto Commerce Parkway from Ladson Road to Ashley Phosphate Road.

A surveyor working on the project found a grave site and mentioned it to his neighbor in Prosperity. The neighbor, Susan Saunders, just happened to be vice regent of Sumter's

Home chapter of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

When Saunders learned that one of the stones was marked, "In Memory of the Honble Thomas Bee who died in 1812 Aged 72," she realized a long-lost patriot had been found.

"I was just like, 'Oh my gosh!' " she said. "It just got lost in time. It was completely lost in time."

The small cemetery is in the woods, not visible from the roads, and it isn't accessible today.

But its owners, the Weber and Weiser companies, know it's one of several historical sites they plan to highlight as they develop the area, said Elliott Summey, a Charleston County councilman and Weiser's vice president of development.

"Obviously, we're going to do development in and around it, but we're going to preserve it," Summey said, adding that there's thoughts of trails and preserved sites relating to the plantation and to the Best Friend.

Bee hosted President George Washington for breakfast at Woodstock during his southern trip, and Bee's resume includes a myriad of other service, such as a delegate to the Continental Congress, chairman of the board for the new College of Charleston and the St. Cecilia Society in Charleston.

One of Bee's sons, Bernard Elliott Bee, served the Confederate cause and was one of the first officers killed in the war -- but not before he gave Brig. Gen. Thomas Jackson his famous nickname by likening him to a "stone wall."

Bee died in 1812, seven years after his third wife, while he was visiting family in Pendleton. With the exception of a street in downtown Charleston, Saunders says Bee's legacy largely faded away.

She is happy that will soon change.

"He'll be recognized as a hero of the American Revolution," she said, "which is obvious."

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the best thing about the civil war was the beards

timschochet said:

Freedom Part 8

Abraham Lincoln's defenders have long argued that the president believed that support for colonization was the best way to defuse much of the anti-emancipation sentiment that might otherwise sink the Republicans in the 1862 elections. Followers of this theory are of the opinion that Lincoln did not himself really believe in colonization; he knew it was impracticable and impossible. But he had to say he believed in it in order to keep the country unified. (A modern-day analogy could be made to Senator John McCain, who in his campaign for president and for the senate has changed his position regarding immigration reform to "seal the borders first." But many people believe that McCain is parroting what many conservative voters want to hear, that he doesn't believe its really practicable, and remains in favor of immigration reform.)

Yet, on August 14, 1862, Lincoln invited a group of black leaders to the White House. He said that slavery was "the greatest wrong inflicted on any people". But even if slavery were abolished, racial differences and prejudices would remain. He told them:

Your race suffer very greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. The Negro has little chance to achieve equality in the United States. There is an unwillingness on the part of the people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain among us...I do not mean to discuss this, but to propose it as a fact with which we have to deal. I cannot alter it if I would.

This fact, said Lincoln, made it necessary for black people to emigrate to another land where they would have better opportunities. The president asked the black leaders to recruit volunteers for a government-financed colonization project in Central America or Northern Africa. If this worked, it might pave the way for the emigration of thousands more who might be freed in the war.

A few comments before I relate the response of the black leaders in the next post. To me, this does not sound like a man who doesn't believe in what he is suggesting. Lincoln's ideas were not original, and it's important to note that long after his death many prominent African-Americans pondered them seriously. Probably the most important black leader between the ages of Booker T. Washington and Martin Luther King, Jr., Marcus Garvey, sponsored a "Back to Africa movement" in which he basically repeated Lincoln's proposal: that the federal govt. would pay for a mass emigration. Only in recent history has the idea that Blacks and Whites can live in America in full equality without strife taken hold upon the perception of the majority. The Black Muslim movement does not believe it to this day.

What's important is that Lincoln was for emancipation, and willing to risk his presidency to advance it. This among other things that we are describing make him, IMO, our greatest president. He was wrong about colonization, but compared to what he was right about, I see this as minor.

Click to expand...

There was also Liberia, The idea was not new, and had already been done on a smaller scale. From Wiki on LiberiaThe history of Liberia is unique among African nations because of its relationship with the United States. It is one of the few countries in Africa, and the only country in West Africa, without roots in the European Scramble for Africa. It was founded and colonized by freed American slaves with the help of a private organization called the American Colonization Society in 1821-1822, on the premise former American slaves would have greater freedom and equality there.[4]

Slaves freed from slave ships also were sent there instead of being repatriated to their countries of origin.[5] These colonists formed an elite group in Liberian society, and, in 1847, they founded the Republic of Liberia, establishing a government modeled on that of the United States, naming Monrovia, their capital city, after James Monroe, the fifth president of the United States and a prominent supporter of the colonization.

B-Deep said:

the best thing about the civil war was the beards

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Time for a beard-off!John Bell Hood (CSA)

Richard Ewell (CSA)

James Longstreet (CSA)

James Longstreet (in retirement)

Jubal Early (CSA, during war)

Jubal Early (in retirement)

J.E.B. Stuart (CSA)

Nathan Bedford Forrest (CSA)

Ambrose Burnside (USA ) - Mr. Sideburns!

Boy...I never realized how lopsided this was for the CSA. Compare:

prominent Union Generals

prominent Confederate Generals

If it wasn't for Burnside this would total domination for the rebels!

BobbyLayne said:

B-Deep said:

the best thing about the civil war was the beards

Click to expand...

Time for a beard-off!John Bell Hood (CSA)

Richard Ewell (CSA)

James Longstreet (CSA)

James Longstreet (in retirement)

Jubal Early (CSA, during war)

Jubal Early (in retirement)

J.E.B. Stuart (CSA)

Nathan Bedford Forrest (CSA)

Ambrose Burnside (USA ) - Mr. Sideburns!

Boy...I never realized how lopsided this was for the CSA. Compare:

prominent Union Generals

prominent Confederate Generals

If it wasn't for Burnside this would total domination for the rebels!

Click to expand...

the golden age of facial hair

Richard Ewell had a mighty beard

My wife, while watching Gettysburg, said "they're going a little overboard with the beards, aren't they?"

errr... no.

jwb said:

My wife, while watching Gettysburg, said "they're going a little overboard with the beards, aren't they?"errr... no.

Click to expand...

had this discussion elsewhere. Women don't get facial hair. IT is sad. Clerly the beard is like a peacock's feathers, it is a sign of manliness and women should swoon at it. Yet years of societal oppression has made them bury their raw sexual attraction to beards.

The hope of Pope

The basic problem for the Union cause in the summer of 1862 was one of high command.

For four months now, ever since the abrupt relief of McClellan back in March, the overall conduct of the war had been directed by Lincoln and Stanton - a sort of two-headed, four-thumbed amateur - with results just short of disastrous. Stonewall Jackson, for example, had frightened Stanton and decoyed Lincoln into breaking up combinations McClellan had designed for taking Richmond; so that Davis and Lee, professionals both, had been able to turn the tables on the Army of Potomac, effecting countercombinations that drove it headlong to the James. Part of the fault could be assigned to flaws that developed in subordinate commanders - on the one hand, Frémont's ineptness; on the other, McClellan's lack of aggressive instincts - but most of it lay with the overall direction, which had permitted the enemy to bring pressure on those flaws.

Lincoln could see this now in retrospect, much of it at any rate, and in fact he had begun to suspect it soon after the failure of his chessboard combinations in the Valley. In his distress, before the blow fell on the Peninsula, his mind turned back to Winfield Scott, the one general who had shown thus far that he really knew what war was all about. The old man was in retirement up the Hudson at West Point, too infirm for travel. So on June 23 - a Monday; the first of the Seven Days was two days off - Lincoln boarded a special train and rode north to see him. What they talked about was a secret, and it remained so. But when McClellan wired the War Department on June 27, while Porter was under attack on Turkey Hill: "I will beg that you put some one general in command of the Shenandoah and of all troops in front of Washington for the sake of the country. Secure unity of action and bring the best man forward," Lincoln, who had returned two days before, had already done what he suggested, even before his visit up the Hudson. That is, he had united the troops under one commander. Whether he brought the best man forward remained to be seen.

John Pope was the man: Halleck had praised him so highly for taking Island No. 10 - a strongly fortified post garrisoned by 12,000 men and 58 guns - that he lost him. Indeed, for months now the news from that direction had seem to indicate that the formula for victory, so elusive here on the seaboard, had been discovered by the generals in the west - in which case, as Lincoln and Stanton saw it, the thing to do was to bring one of them East and give him a chance to apply it. Grant's record having been tarnished by Shiloh and the subsequent rumors of negligence and whiskey, Pope was the more or less obvious choice, not only because of his victories and Halleck's praise of his aggressiveness during the campaign against Corinth, but also because Lincoln, as a prairie lawyer pleading cases in Pope's father's district court, had known him back in Illinois. So Pope was sent for.

Arriving while Lincoln was up the country seeing Scott, he made at once an excellent impression on Stanton and the members of the Committee on Conduct of the War, who saw in him the antithesis of McClellan. For one thing, there was nothing of caution about him; he was a talker, and his favorite words were "I" and "forward." (If he had been placed in charge of the West in the early spring, he said, nothing could have stopped his march to New Orleans; by now he would have split the South in two and gone to work on the crippled halves.) For another, he was sound on the slavery question, assuring the committee that he and it saw eye to eye on the matter. Senator Benjamin Wade and the others were delighted. Lincoln, when he returned from the visit with Scott, was pleased to see the confidence Pope had managed to invite in so brief a span, and gave him at once his orders and assignment to the command of an army expressly created for his use.

Its strength was 56,000 men and its mission was to move in general down the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, just east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, so as to close in on the Confederate capital from the west and north, while McClellan's Army of Potomac applied pressure from the east; thus Richmond would be crushed in a giant nutcracker, with Pope as the upper jaw. His army was created by consolidating the commands of McDowell, Banks and Frémont. All three of these generals outranked - an unusual arrangement to say the least (all were Major Generals; seniority was determined by date of rank) - but only one of them took official umbrage. This was Frémont: which solved another problem. His protest resignation was accepted, and Lincoln replaced him with Franz Sigel, whose appointment, though it involved a thousand-mile transfer, was considered felicitous since so many of the troops involved were of German extraction.

On June 26, 1862, the order was created that gave birth to the Army of Virginia.