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Post here when coaches do something you disagree with (3 Viewers)

Kliff attempting the game winning field goal on second down in OT. No idea what the thought process was there.

Then compounding the mistake by calling a TO to ice your own kicker. 

 
Kliff attempting the game winning field goal on second down in OT. No idea what the thought process was there.

Then compounding the mistake by calling a TO to ice your own kicker. 
The TO was because otherwise they would have gotten a delay of game.

Going for the FG on second down was just dumb.

 
Probably a factor of kicking on second down. Kick team wasn't ready to go on the field.
Good point.  "What's that coach?  Wait, you want us to do what?  Ummm ok"
I wasn't watching, but have seen teams do this on a short FG so that if there's a bad snap they can fall on it and still have another down to retry the kick.

(Looking at nfl.com, I see that it was a 41-yarder that they ended up missing anyway so IDKWTF)

 
I wasn't watching, but have seen teams do this on a short FG so that if there's a bad snap they can fall on it and still have another down to retry the kick.

(Looking at nfl.com, I see that it was a 41-yarder that they ended up missing anyway so IDKWTF)
Exactly - it was a 41 yarder and it was 2nd down (not 3rd down).  It seemed like he thought that the odds were better that he was going to lose yards on the next play (as opposed to gaining yards) so he just turtled up and kicked it.  

 
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That Falcons/Lions game - I'm not sure either team knew what to do.  They both had leads late in the game and one of them pretty much being destined to not blow it.  Not a position either team was comfortable with.

 
Exactly - it was a 41 yarder and it was 2nd down (not 3rd down).  It seemed like he thought that the odds were better that he was going to lose yards on the next play (as opposed to gaining yards) so he just turtled up and kicked it.  
Almost seemed like he just thought they would drill it and wanted to get it over with and not mess around anymore.  My guess is that the 3rd down play would have likely been called a run up the middle, probably gaining anywhere from -2 to +3 yards, so I'm not sure it exactly did anything for them.  As it turned out it left more time on the clock for them which actually helped them.

 
I feel like Doug Pederson doesn't appear in this thread as much as he should.  He basically goes for 2 every single time no matter the circumstance.  But today's was a head scratcher (at least to me).  Eagles virtually doing little to nothing on offense all game.  They score a TD with 5 minutes left in the 3rd to cut the lead to 21-17.  Doug inexplicably chooses to go for 2 and of course misses.  It probably wouldn't have mattered either way but I feel like that guy coaches more with his balls than his brains.  

 
Going for two there seems like the right call.

The case for going for two when you're down 10 and then score a TD is similar to the case for when you're down 14 and then score a TD. In both cases, if you make the two-pointer then you're putting yourself in position to win in regulation in a situation where you would've only tied it up had you kicked the XP. And if you miss the two-pointer, then you still have a chance to recover by putting it into the end zone later on rather than settling for a kick (though in this case that means a TD rather than a FG, whereas with the "down 14" case it means a two-pointer rather than an XP).

I've heard that teams' chances of winning when they get the ball late down 4 is surprisingly close to their chances of winning if they get the ball late down 3. Because teams that get it down 3 play too conservatively, content to kick the FG to take it into overtime when they should be trying harder to win in regulation. So being down by either 2 or 4 (depending on the result of the two point conversion) seems like a pretty good deal compared to being down 3.

 
Going for two there seems like the right call.

The case for going for two when you're down 10 and then score a TD is similar to the case for when you're down 14 and then score a TD. In both cases, if you make the two-pointer then you're putting yourself in position to win in regulation in a situation where you would've only tied it up had you kicked the XP. And if you miss the two-pointer, then you still have a chance to recover by putting it into the end zone later on rather than settling for a kick (though in this case that means a TD rather than a FG, whereas with the "down 14" case it means a two-pointer rather than an XP).

I've heard that teams' chances of winning when they get the ball late down 4 is surprisingly close to their chances of winning if they get the ball late down 3. Because teams that get it down 3 play too conservatively, content to kick the FG to take it into overtime when they should be trying harder to win in regulation. So being down by either 2 or 4 (depending on the result of the two point conversion) seems like a pretty good deal compared to being down 3.
Yeah but you can't look at it in a vacuum.  The Eagles offense has been pretty bad all year.  Their offense in the game was pretty anemic.  2 things I don't like about that call.  Given how poorly the Eagles offense had been playing all game, there is a decent chance they don't convert there.  Given how poorly the Eagles offense had been playing, there is a decent chance they don't score a TD the rest of the game.  

 
Going for two there seems like the right call.

The case for going for two when you're down 10 and then score a TD is similar to the case for when you're down 14 and then score a TD. In both cases, if you make the two-pointer then you're putting yourself in position to win in regulation in a situation where you would've only tied it up had you kicked the XP. And if you miss the two-pointer, then you still have a chance to recover by putting it into the end zone later on rather than settling for a kick (though in this case that means a TD rather than a FG, whereas with the "down 14" case it means a two-pointer rather than an XP).

I've heard that teams' chances of winning when they get the ball late down 4 is surprisingly close to their chances of winning if they get the ball late down 3. Because teams that get it down 3 play too conservatively, content to kick the FG to take it into overtime when they should be trying harder to win in regulation. So being down by either 2 or 4 (depending on the result of the two point conversion) seems like a pretty good deal compared to being down 3.
Curious what the numbers on this, but it seems like a good call.  Look at the Washington Football Team today.  They figured they were pretty much a lock for OT and didn't even get there.

 
I feel like Doug Pederson doesn't appear in this thread as much as he should.  He basically goes for 2 every single time no matter the circumstance.  But today's was a head scratcher (at least to me).  Eagles virtually doing little to nothing on offense all game.  They score a TD with 5 minutes left in the 3rd to cut the lead to 21-17.  Doug inexplicably chooses to go for 2 and of course misses.  It probably wouldn't have mattered either way but I feel like that guy coaches more with his balls than his brains.  
Are we sure the kicker wasn't just injured?  Did he kick on the ensuing kickoff?

 
Curious what the numbers on this, but it seems like a good call.  Look at the Washington Football Team today.  They figured they were pretty much a lock for OT and didn't even get there.
Best I have is this tweet by PFF_Moo which says:

Fwiw down 4 is still a slightly worse win percentage than down 3 late in the game. But the difference is much smaller than it should be if teams were playing with the optimal aggressiveness
(in reply to Adam Harstad saying that he thought that teams down 4 actually had a higher winning percentage than down 3.)

 
Week 12: Browns passing on a ~40-yd FG to go up 11.  Instead they got stopped on 4th down and it almost cost them.

Week 13: More stupidity from Vikings.  3rd-and-1 with :18 seconds left and they throw a long incomplete sideline pass, forcing a 50+ yd FG attempt that they miss and go to OT.

 
Andy Reed kicking a FG to go up by 9 with a minute left instead of going for it on 4th down to guarantee victory.  So stupid.

 
Andy Reed kicking a FG to go up by 9 with a minute left instead of going for it on 4th down to guarantee victory.  So stupid.
I disagree. FG makes it a two score game and Butker is good. If they don't convert on 4th then they lose if they give up a TD. 

 
I disagree with Lafleur's call to kick the field goal down by 8 with a little over 2 minutes left in the game (and Brady the opposing QB).  
I don't think it was egregiously bad as some do, and he was an iffy flag away from his offense getting the ball back late with a chance to win the game, but I get why many disliked the decision.  I don't think he makes that decision if the defense was playing late like it had the first 3 quarters. 

 
The FG was clearly the right call. Going for the TD only improves on the FG if:

  1. You get a TD on fourth and goal from the 8 (~20%)
  2. You get the 2-point conversion (~50%)
  3. You stop Tom Brady from advancing far enough to kick a FG with 2:05 on the clock (call it ~50%)
  4. You win in OT (~50%)
That's 2.5% of the time.

The FG is better if:

  1. You make the FG (~95%)
  2. You stop Tom Brady from running out the clock (call it ~40%)
  3. You get a TD after receiving a punt (call it ~30%)
That's 11.4% of the time.

Tweak those numbers as you like but I don't think you'll ever do better with the first set. TD on fourth and goal from the 8 only makes sense if it gives you the win; if you were down by 5, for example. Down by 8 you still have very little chance without another score. And if you have another score you can win anyway.

 
The FG was clearly the right call. Going for the TD only improves on the FG if:

  1. You get a TD on fourth and goal from the 8 (~20%)
  2. You get the 2-point conversion (~50%)
  3. You stop Tom Brady from advancing far enough to kick a FG with 2:05 on the clock (call it ~50%)
  4. You win in OT (~50%)
That's 2.5% of the time.

The FG is better if:

  1. You make the FG (~95%)
  2. You stop Tom Brady from running out the clock (call it ~40%)
  3. You get a TD after receiving a punt (call it ~30%)
That's 11.4% of the time.

Tweak those numbers as you like but I don't think you'll ever do better with the first set. TD on fourth and goal from the 8 only makes sense if it gives you the win; if you were down by 5, for example. Down by 8 you still have very little chance without another score. And if you have another score you can win anyway.
The issue for GB was they couldn’t win the game without scoring a TD. The chances of scoring a TD WITH the ball at the 8 yard line are exponentially higher than scoring a TD WITHOUT having the football. Here were the options:

- Score a TD, successful 2 point conversion. Game tied. 
- Score a TD, unsuccessful 2 point conversion. Down 2 points. 
- Turnover on downs. Still down 8 points.

The likelihood of stopping Tampa from running out the clock would not change all that much. Obviously TB would have tried to advance the ball more in a tie game. Getting a stop from the defense was required to win in regulation no matter what. 

The point being, in two of the three outcomes, the Packers would have dramatically improved their chances to win. Even if they went for it and failed, the Bucs would have been deep in their own territory (meaning a three and out would have made for a shorter field for the Packers to mount a TD drive).

Someplace will likely calculate the chances of winning over the next few days based on historical numbers. I don’t believe the numbers you listed will bear out, as I don’t think kicking the FG had a 4.5 better chance of winning the game. 

 
One of the reasons the GB coach justified kicking the FG was that they still had all of their timeouts plus an extra timeout at the 2:00 warning.  Tampa Bay returned the kick but the returner slid and stopped the clock with 2:02 left.  Why didn’t he keep running which would have taken the clock down to under 2:00 and that would have used up the timeout for the 2:00 warning? Was he afraid of fumbling?  I was shocked when I saw him sliding.   That slide gave the Packers 40 seconds, it didn’t end up hurting the Bucs, but it could have.

 
One of the reasons the GB coach justified kicking the FG was that they still had all of their timeouts plus an extra timeout at the 2:00 warning.  Tampa Bay returned the kick but the returner slid and stopped the clock with 2:02 left.  Why didn’t he keep running which would have taken the clock down to under 2:00 and that would have used up the timeout for the 2:00 warning? Was he afraid of fumbling?  I was shocked when I saw him sliding.   That slide gave the Packers 40 seconds, it didn’t end up hurting the Bucs, but it could have.
If the packers go for it and don't get it, the bucs are pinned deep.  If they go 3 and out the pack gets the ball again with great field position.

The right play was to go for it.  You have freaking Rodgers. 

 
If the packers go for it and don't get it, the bucs are pinned deep.  If they go 3 and out the pack gets the ball again with great field position.

The right play was to go for it.  You have freaking Rodgers. 
Agree 100%, to much risk going for the FG and then having to guarantee Tampa goes 3 and out and then having enough time to go 70 or 80 yards for a TD.  The only smart play I saw the GB coach was to jump offsides on purpose, I was surprised Tampa didn’t just decline the penalty.

 
The FG was clearly the right call. Going for the TD only improves on the FG if:

  1. You get a TD on fourth and goal from the 8 (~20%)
  2. You get the 2-point conversion (~50%)
  3. You stop Tom Brady from advancing far enough to kick a FG with 2:05 on the clock (call it ~50%)
  4. You win in OT (~50%)
That's 2.5% of the time.

The FG is better if:

  1. You make the FG (~95%)
  2. You stop Tom Brady from running out the clock (call it ~40%)
  3. You get a TD after receiving a punt (call it ~30%)
That's 11.4% of the time.

Tweak those numbers as you like but I don't think you'll ever do better with the first set. TD on fourth and goal from the 8 only makes sense if it gives you the win; if you were down by 5, for example. Down by 8 you still have very little chance without another score. And if you have another score you can win anyway.
Well stated. This is pretty clearly the correct answer. People underestimate how hard it is to get a 2 and then win in OT. Kicking the fg all but eliminates those 2 necessities to win the game. 

 
I disagree with Lafleur's call to kick the field goal down by 8 with a little over 2 minutes left in the game (and Brady the opposing QB).  
The decision hinged on being down 8 vs. 7... Certainly changes the math.  To be honest, I didn't like them going for two earlier.  That extra point seems to always come back to haunt you.

 
Worse case GB goes for the TD and fails.  They have to stop TB and have enough time to try for a TD and 2 point conversion, then hope for OT.

 A good result would have been getting the TD, but failed on 2 point conversion.  So down by 2.  They still have to stop TB and have enough time to get ball back and only have to kick a FG to win.

The best result would have been getting the TD and 2 point conversion.  Kicking the ball to Tampa, holding them and getting the ball back with enough time to kick a FG to win the game, if not, take chance in OT

The worse case was not going for TD (since Aaron Rodgers is the QB), deciding to kick a FG, hoping to be able to stop Tampa and then hoping there is enough time to go and score a game winning TD. 

With Aaron Rodgers as your QB, you can’t go by percentages, he’s one of the greatest QBs of all time, let him win or lose the game, not your defense (unless your defense is the ‘85 Bears).  

 
According to the ESPN Win Probability Model, GB had a 10% chance of winning the game by going for it and a 9.5% chance by kicking the FG.

LINK
Interesting. Would really love to see their math there. Particularly with the 21% conversion rate needed they say is needed to break even with the fg at 9.5% Because then you still need 50 (really maybe 48%) chance of getting the 2. And then 50% to win in OT. Which puts you at 5.25% without even accounting for Tampa being in more advantageous spot to win in regulation if you do succeed to tie it. I guess they’re giving more viability to the “if you fail to convert” scenarios (for either the td or the 2) where GB could still get the ball back and win or go to OT. 

 
The FG was clearly the right call. Going for the TD only improves on the FG if:

  1. You get a TD on fourth and goal from the 8 (~20%)
  2. You get the 2-point conversion (~50%)
  3. You stop Tom Brady from advancing far enough to kick a FG with 2:05 on the clock (call it ~50%)
  4. You win in OT (~50%)
That's 2.5% of the time.

The FG is better if:

  1. You make the FG (~95%)
  2. You stop Tom Brady from running out the clock (call it ~40%)
  3. You get a TD after receiving a punt (call it ~30%)
That's 11.4% of the time.

Tweak those numbers as you like but I don't think you'll ever do better with the first set. TD on fourth and goal from the 8 only makes sense if it gives you the win; if you were down by 5, for example. Down by 8 you still have very little chance without another score. And if you have another score you can win anyway.
Well stated. I thought it was a poor decision.

The key is the defense had to stopped Brady. Up to that point the Packers had given up 31 points and forced two punts. In that context, LaFluer should have recognized the low probability of stopping the Bucs and put the ball in Rodgers hands. 

Curious about the percentages, are those Rodgers’ career numbers?

 
Well stated. I thought it was a poor decision.

The key is the defense had to stopped Brady. Up to that point the Packers had given up 31 points and forced two punts. In that context, LaFluer should have recognized the low probability of stopping the Bucs and put the ball in Rodgers hands. 

Curious about the percentages, are those Rodgers’ career numbers?
It’s a good discussion. Forcing 2 punts is bit disingenuous when they had 3 picks and should have a had a 4th (safety dropped a lollipop right before half). Also, they were going to have to stop Brady in any of the scenarios whether it was from getting a first down or 2 to end it or from driving 40-45 for a game winning fg.

 
Well stated. I thought it was a poor decision.

The key is the defense had to stopped Brady. Up to that point the Packers had given up 31 points and forced two punts. In that context, LaFluer should have recognized the low probability of stopping the Bucs and put the ball in Rodgers hands. 

Curious about the percentages, are those Rodgers’ career numbers?
Percentages are made up. Plug in other numbers if you like. But be sure that the number you're using for converting on 4th-and-8 is a lot lower than the number you're using for making a 2-point conversion. And that for going for it to work, you need both of those things to happen, and you still need to stop Tampa Bay and win in OT. So:

[Some number about 50% (2PC)] * [Some number a lot lower than 50% (4th and 8)] * 50% [OT win probability] 

 
I'll just get this out of the way, I am not an analytics guy. Surely in a vacuum and by comparing past results, you can create probabilities that may or may not be true. "Historically speaking, decision XYZ had the highest win probability."

All of that "historical data" does not apply to this situation and these players. All that historical data is applicable to average players like Kyle Orton and Phillip Rivers. This game featured two of the best Quarterbacks in NFL history:

1.) Rodgers is one of the MOST CLUTCH QBs I have ever seen. He scores a Touchdown in that situation more often than 90% of other guys who have ever played the position. So the suggested "win probability" here doesn't apply to him. He is an outlier, he gets his own subset of probabilities.

2.) Brady is the MOST WINNING QB in NFL History. The moment the Packers kicked that FG, you knew they were not going to get the ball back. Brady has the ability to convert the first down and end the game better than 90% of guys who have ever played the position. So the suggested "win probability" of kicking the FG doesn't apply when playing against him. He is an outlier, he gets his own subset of probabilities.

If this was a matchup of Brian Griese vs Jay Cutler (or any combination of mediocre QBs which the win probability stats are heavily weighted on), then I agree that kicking the FG is the correct move. But the moment you have a HOF Quarterback on both sides, the win projection based on the entire volume of less talented players becomes irrelevant. Because the % in which Rodgers converts a Touchdown there versus the % Brady converts a first down there are outliers from all the data in which "win probability" is built upon.


 

 
According to the ESPN Win Probability Model, GB had a 10% chance of winning the game by going for it and a 9.5% chance by kicking the FG.

LINK
Allow me to stretch your mind a little bit. Do you think that ESPN's Win Probability Model factors in who is playing Quarterback for each team?

The obvious constraint to this data, is that ESPN would ascribe a 10% win probability to Green Bay regardless if Aaron Rodger was playing or not. It's playing the odds on the situation in general. You could plug in Tim Tebow into the game and ESPN's computer formula (remember it's just a robot) would still tell you that "Teams win 10% of the time in this situation".


But you intrinsically know that changing from Aaron Rodgers to Tim Tebow in that situation would lower the winning probability. Since the formula they use does not accurately reflect the individual situation, I don't think it is a great metric of whether or not the correct decision was made.


For instance, let's say I am at the Casino playing blackjack and I am dealt a 15 and dealer is showing a 5. Under normal probabilities, I have a 54% chance of busting my hand if I take a hit. HOWEVER, let's also assume that I am counting cards and the count is significantly negative (there are more low cards than high cards left in the shoe).

Since I KNOW more high cards have been dealt than low cards, I know that my chance of BUSTING on a hit is lower than the traditional 54% the book says it is. In this situation, it may actually be a higher percentage play to take a hit even though the book (in general) says it's the lower percentage play.

Does that make sense?

 
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Allow me to stretch your mind a little bit. Do you think that ESPN's Win Probability Model factors in who is playing Quarterback for each team?

The obvious constraint to this data, is that ESPN would ascribe a 10% win probability to Green Bay regardless if Aaron Rodger was playing or not. It's playing the odds on the situation in general. You could plug in Tim Tebow into the game and ESPN's computer formula (remember it's just a robot) would still tell you that "Teams win 10% of the time in this situation".


But you intrinsically know that changing from Aaron Rodgers to Tim Tebow in that situation would lower the winning probability. Since the formula they use does not accurately reflect the individual situation, I don't think it is a great metric of whether or not the correct decision was made.


For instance, let's say I am at the Casino playing blackjack and I am dealt a 15 and dealer is showing a 5. Under normal probabilities, I have a 54% chance of busting my hand if I take a hit. HOWEVER, let's also assume that I am counting cards and the count is significantly negative (there are more low cards than high cards left in the shoe).

Since I KNOW more high cards have been dealt than low cards, I know that my chance of BUSTING on a hit is lower than the traditional 54% the book says it is. In this situation, it may actually be a higher percentage play to take a hit even though the book (in general) says it's the lower percentage play.

Does that make sense?
So, GB gets a win probability upgrade for having Aaron Rodgers. What about TB for having Tom Brady?

 
So, GB gets a win probability upgrade for having Aaron Rodgers. What about TB for having Tom Brady?
I would say the win probability DECREASES significantly for Green Bay putting the ball in Brady's hands with 2 minutes left compared to almost any other Quarterback who has ever played the game. All the "historical stats" in which those probabilities are built, are from Quarterbacks much less talented than the GOAT.

I think you can really equate win probability as an average (if not specifically that) and in that average, Rodgers converts a touchdown there more often than the field and Brady ices the game more often than the field. That alone calls for an adjustment to the computer generated model, imo.


It's like predicting a low scoring game in basketball between two teams that average 115 points a game when the league average is 105. You're dealing with outliers and you have to treat the outliers differently than the teams who truly hover around that 105 point scored mark.

 
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You don’t dodge giving the ball to the amazing Tom Brady by going for it. You actually are a coin flip away from having to give it to him twice.

 
Cobbler1 said:
You don’t dodge giving the ball to the amazing Tom Brady by going for it. You actually are a coin flip away from having to give it to him twice.
Exactly. People are talking about fourth-and-8 as if it's the end of the game. At the very best—if you make it and you make the 2-point conversion (give those whatever chance you like but it's well under 50% combined)—now you're handing the ball to Tom Brady with over 2 minutes left when all he needs is a FG to win the game. Which, it turns out, is exactly how Brady won most of his biggest games. 

 
CalBear said:
The FG was clearly the right call. Going for the TD only improves on the FG if:

  1. You get a TD on fourth and goal from the 8 (~20%)
  2. You get the 2-point conversion (~50%)
  3. You stop Tom Brady from advancing far enough to kick a FG with 2:05 on the clock (call it ~50%)
  4. You win in OT (~50%)
That's 2.5% of the time.

The FG is better if:

  1. You make the FG (~95%)
  2. You stop Tom Brady from running out the clock (call it ~40%)
  3. You get a TD after receiving a punt (call it ~30%)
That's 11.4% of the time.

Tweak those numbers as you like but I don't think you'll ever do better with the first set. TD on fourth and goal from the 8 only makes sense if it gives you the win; if you were down by 5, for example. Down by 8 you still have very little chance without another score. And if you have another score you can win anyway.
This seems like it could use some improvement but is a great start. What about stopping Brady and then scoring your own field goal? 

Why is it only a 40 percent chance of stopping Brady from getting 1 first down but above a 50 percent chance of stopping him from getting into field goal range?  Those seem further apart but in probably picking nits. 

It's really interesting trying to figure out a good model for this one with logic.  Maybe you left out a lot of the branches because of low or offsetting chances. 

 
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Haven't seen much about how Tampa's play calling likely would have changed if GB went for it and failed vs taking the FG and kicking off. Typically teams get increasingly conservative in trying to finish off the game as their lead increases. And when the opponent can only tie the game in a worst case scenario, that's when you usually see a team commit to the run to burn timeouts before punting. 

So while I don't have the numbers, I'm guessing kicking the FG led TB to be a bit more aggressive in their play calling, trying to guard against GB being able to come back down the field and potentially win in regulation. 

 
This seems like it could use some improvement but is a great start. What about stopping Brady and then scoring your own field goal? 

Why is it only a 40 percent chance of stopping Brady from getting 1 first down but above a 50 percent chance of stopping him from getting into field goal range?  Those seem further apart but in probably picking nits. 

It's really interesting trying to figure out a good model for this one with logic.  Maybe you left out a lot of the branches because of low or offsetting chances. 
There’s plenty of branches. Most of them offsetting or small as you say. The biggest one left out is probably the 75 ish % chance you don’t get the 4th and goal you still have a chance to stop them, get the ball back, and drive 60 ish yards to score and get the 2 and win in OT. That’s probably .75 * .5 * .3 * .5 *.5. That adds another 3% to the winning outcomes of going for it. It’s very interesting to me.

 

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