What's new
Fantasy Football - Footballguys Forums

Welcome to Our Forums. Once you've registered and logged in, you're primed to talk football, among other topics, with the sharpest and most experienced fantasy players on the internet.

Post here when coaches do something you disagree with (2 Viewers)

The Bills had 1 TO left. The TO on the play before was taken by Tennessee.
Oh.  I misunderstood.  I was doing other things last night so not paying that close attention.

I still prefer running a play on 4th down that gives them a chance at a TD or a 1st down like what CalBear said.

 
humpback said:
The Bills had 1 TO left. The TO on the play before was taken by Tennessee.
Exactly. So let's say Allen converts and they call TO. Now the ball is on the 2, there are 22 seconds left and Buffalo has no remaining timeouts. How many plays can they run? I would guess about three assuming they are all incomplete or out of bounds. I also think, absent a sack on one of those plays that drove them way back, there is very little chance that they settle for a FG on the drive. They had already passed up the chance to kick it, so why would they kick on a subsequent down?

 
Exactly. So let's say Allen converts and they call TO. Now the ball is on the 2, there are 22 seconds left and Buffalo has no remaining timeouts. How many plays can they run? I would guess about three assuming they are all incomplete or out of bounds. I also think, absent a sack on one of those plays that drove them way back, there is very little chance that they settle for a FG on the drive. They had already passed up the chance to kick it, so why would they kick on a subsequent down?
 Because time would be even less on their side.  Going for it (especially with the sneak) they assumed they would get 3 plays to try and score a TD.  If they didn't score on those three plays and there are 2 seconds left they could easily choose to kick the FG because factors had changed.  

 
Exactly. So let's say Allen converts and they call TO. Now the ball is on the 2, there are 22 seconds left and Buffalo has no remaining timeouts. How many plays can they run? I would guess about three assuming they are all incomplete or out of bounds. I also think, absent a sack on one of those plays that drove them way back, there is very little chance that they settle for a FG on the drive. They had already passed up the chance to kick it, so why would they kick on a subsequent down?
No one is running an out of bounds play from the 2 yard line (or closer), and a play from there into the end zone only takes 3-4 seconds. 4x4=16, so there was plenty of time to run all 4 plays, and I don't know why you think there was very little chance that they settle for a FG. That's kind of the whole point of this- there's a very big difference between being able to get a 1st down and run 4 more plays than having to score on one specific play. Not really sure why that's relevant anyway, doesn't really matter what they chose to do with the 4th down, the point is they had the time to run 4 more plays.

 
 Because time would be even less on their side.  Going for it (especially with the sneak) they assumed they would get 3 plays to try and score a TD.  If they didn't score on those three plays and there are 2 seconds left they could easily choose to kick the FG because factors had changed.  
Perhaps. But, again assuming they were at or around the 2, the basic calculation is still the same as it was on the 4th and 1: do you kick the FG and go to OT, which is a 50/50 calculation at best, or do you try to punch it in, where your probability of success is likely to be greater than 50%?

This is a hypothetical on top of a hypothetical, so I can't say for sure, but in most of the potential scenarios we're talking about the math would argue pretty strongly in favor of trying to win the game in regulation.

 
Perhaps. But, again assuming they were at or around the 2, the basic calculation is still the same as it was on the 4th and 1: do you kick the FG and go to OT, which is a 50/50 calculation at best, or do you try to punch it in, where your probability of success is likely to be greater than 50%?

This is a hypothetical on top of a hypothetical, so I can't say for sure, but in most of the potential scenarios we're talking about the math would argue pretty strongly in favor of trying to win the game in regulation.
All true.  My only point was that things changed (not having a potential of three or four additional plays to get the TD) which could sway the choice to the FG.  

By running the sneak they were not really trying to score the TD on that play (if it happened great),  They were trying for the 1st down  to get three or four more additional plays.  That was the immediate goal and they liked their chances scoring with three chances at it.  If they got no additional yards (stayed at the 2) it would be a very possible decision to kick the FG. 

 
Perhaps. But, again assuming they were at or around the 2, the basic calculation is still the same as it was on the 4th and 1: do you kick the FG and go to OT, which is a 50/50 calculation at best, or do you try to punch it in, where your probability of success is likely to be greater than 50%?

This is a hypothetical on top of a hypothetical, so I can't say for sure, but in most of the potential scenarios we're talking about the math would argue pretty strongly in favor of trying to win the game in regulation.
You're still missing a key point of the calculation. The probability of getting 2 yards on 4 (or 5) plays is far greater than having to do so on 1 play. The reason you try for the first down on that first 4th down is because it gives you those 3 (or 4) more opportunities to get the final 2 yards. They wouldn't be part of the equation on the 2nd 4th down.

1st decision- you could score a TD and win, you could get the 1st down and get 3 or 4 more opportunities to win, or you could not get it and lose.

2nd decision- you could score a TD and win or not get it and lose.

The math is much more clearly in their favor the first time.

 
I disagree with the playcall. I line Allen up under center, so the defense has to protect against the sneak. I then have him fake a handoff to the running back and bootleg with the ball. The fake ensures that some of the defense is playing the RB. Now when Allen rolls out a TE or WR is going with him down field so he has the option to run it or pass it. I have seen far more QB sneaks or RB into the line fail in the last couple of years than faking and giving the QB the run pass option. Especially with a mobile, athletic running QB like Allen.

 
I disagree with the playcall. I line Allen up under center, so the defense has to protect against the sneak. I then have him fake a handoff to the running back and bootleg with the ball. The fake ensures that some of the defense is playing the RB. Now when Allen rolls out a TE or WR is going with him down field so he has the option to run it or pass it. I have seen far more QB sneaks or RB into the line fail in the last couple of years than faking and giving the QB the run pass option. Especially with a mobile, athletic running QB like Allen.
That's generally my favorite playcall at the goal line as well, though it's worth pointing out that they were without Knox at that point and had already thrown a goal-line pass to Sweeney, his backup.

The real irony is that the "Billy Special" would have been the perfect call for that situation if they hadn't already run it on the two-point conversion.

Reminds me of the Pats' SB comeback against Atlanta. One of the most underappreciated aspects of Belichick's genius was that he had so many well-designed 2PC plays he could deploy in the same game.

 
That's generally my favorite playcall at the goal line as well, though it's worth pointing out that they were without Knox at that point and had already thrown a goal-line pass to Sweeney, his backup.

The real irony is that the "Billy Special" would have been the perfect call for that situation if they hadn't already run it on the two-point conversion.

Reminds me of the Pats' SB comeback against Atlanta. One of the most underappreciated aspects of Belichick's genius was that he had so many well-designed 2PC plays he could deploy in the same game.


Gotcha. I just saw the play on replay, wasn't watching the game. I just have become so frustrated when defenses line up tight to stop a short yardage situation and the offense just runs right into it with either a sneak or a RB dive. Makes no sense, unless you have a QB like Brady, who has a knack at getting the yardage needed with a sneak and isn't a mobile QB so can't make the defense miss if the defense sniffs out the bootleg call.

 
You're still missing a key point of the calculation. The probability of getting 2 yards on 4 (or 5) plays is far greater than having to do so on 1 play. The reason you try for the first down on that first 4th down is because it gives you those 3 (or 4) more opportunities to get the final 2 yards. They wouldn't be part of the equation on the 2nd 4th down.

1st decision- you could score a TD and win, you could get the 1st down and get 3 or 4 more opportunities to win, or you could not get it and lose.

2nd decision- you could score a TD and win or not get it and lose.

The math is much more clearly in their favor the first time.
Or, 1st decision, you could fail to get the .5 yards and lose. You don't get those extra opportunities unless you succeed at the first opportunity.

So here's the question: How much more likely are you to succeed in getting half a yard on the sneak, compared with running a normal play which might also get you in the end zone? When the strength of the TEN defense is in its front seven and they're playing with injured and untested players in the secondary?

The likelihood of getting at least half a yard running a normal play in that situation is, let's say, at least 60% (better than a 2-pt conversion chance). What's the likelihood of the sneak? Which had already failed once that game?

 
Or, 1st decision, you could fail to get the .5 yards and lose. You don't get those extra opportunities unless you succeed at the first opportunity.

So here's the question: How much more likely are you to succeed in getting half a yard on the sneak, compared with running a normal play which might also get you in the end zone? When the strength of the TEN defense is in its front seven and they're playing with injured and untested players in the secondary?

The likelihood of getting at least half a yard running a normal play in that situation is, let's say, at least 60% (better than a 2-pt conversion chance). What's the likelihood of the sneak? Which had already failed once that game?
I wrote write in there "or you could not get it and lose".  :shrug:

Allen had been almost perfect on QB sneaks prior- 13 out of 14 on 4th and 1, and that was less than 1. The sneak is far more likely to convert than a running play there, which is why they sneak it so often (Allen leads the NFL in converting 4th and 1 by a large margin since he's come into the league).

 
While down 24-0 with just under 2 minutes left in the 4th quarter, Jacksonville scored a touchdown and Urban Meyer chose to kick the extra point instead of going for 2, keeping it a 3 possession game instead of giving the team a chance to make it a 2 possession game.  He did go for the onside kick right after that too. 

Inexcusable math failure. 

 
Last edited by a moderator:
Horrible call by Broncos to pass on second down while trying to run out the clock.

Pretty much anything Sean Payton does.

 
That's nonsense.


Most of these guys are idiots at clock management.  That's why the Belichick's of the world destroy them.

I don't remember the details at the end of the Rams NFC Championship Game, but Payton was bailed out of any responsibility by that no-call on the pass interference, when the reality was he's the one who cost them the game.  Could have run the clock out and kicked a field goal for the win.  He doesn't have a clue.

 
A little late, but the Lions decision to go for it on 4th and 1 at the Philly 22 with 13 seconds left in the 1st half was baffling.  You're down 17-0 with a very makeable field goal.  What is the end game of going for it?  You have at most one play left afterward before you have to try a field goal anyway.  Is the chance for one heave into the end zone really more EV than a field goal attempt?  There's no way the math works out in favor of going for it there.  I got the impression real time that the extent it was thought about was "all the smart people now say go for it on 4th down", and they didn't think through why their actual situation was an exception to the rule.

Of course, they were going to lose the game anyway, so I guess it doesn't matter, but just head-scratching.

 
A little late, but the Lions decision to go for it on 4th and 1 at the Philly 22 with 13 seconds left in the 1st half was baffling.  You're down 17-0 with a very makeable field goal.  What is the end game of going for it?  You have at most one play left afterward before you have to try a field goal anyway.  Is the chance for one heave into the end zone really more EV than a field goal attempt?  There's no way the math works out in favor of going for it there.  I got the impression real time that the extent it was thought about was "all the smart people now say go for it on 4th down", and they didn't think through why their actual situation was an exception to the rule.

Of course, they were going to lose the game anyway, so I guess it doesn't matter, but just head-scratching.
Agree. The whole point of going for it on 4th is to increase your chance of a TD, but with that much time left your odds are pretty low.

Best explanation I can think of is Campbell is more interested in setting a tone this year than he is in winning games. But that doesn't really hold up; it's one thing if you're 3-12, it's another if you're a rookie coach who has yet to win a single game and is in legit danger of the first ever 0-17 season (for a franchise that was also the first to ever go 0-16).

 
What confused me about the explanation is that apparently it's only a penalty against the Vikings if the officials accept the second timeout, which they're not supposed to do???  Shouldn't the penalty be on the officials then  :doh:  ?  Seems like the way things are written it's rife for abuse, as an official could ignore all second timeout calls from coaches they like but grant them to coaches that annoy them, who then get double penalized by losing a timeout as well as yardage.  Of course, the coaches have no one to blame but themselves, but it still seems bizarre.

 
Just scroll through the 4th Down Bot Twitter account to see my opinion of Joe Judge's conservatism in last night's game. By my count, there were four instances where they kicked in a situation where the numbers recommended going for it, totaling 13.8% of WP sacrificed. Watching the game live, it felt like it was 30 times totaling 100% WP.

The irony is that the Giants started the game off by going for it on 4th and goal at the 1 and converted. Apparently the lesson they learned was that they shouldn't press their luck.

 
Last edited by a moderator:
A little late, but the Lions decision to go for it on 4th and 1 at the Philly 22 with 13 seconds left in the 1st half was baffling.  You're down 17-0 with a very makeable field goal.  What is the end game of going for it?  You have at most one play left afterward before you have to try a field goal anyway.  Is the chance for one heave into the end zone really more EV than a field goal attempt?  There's no way the math works out in favor of going for it there.  I got the impression real time that the extent it was thought about was "all the smart people now say go for it on 4th down", and they didn't think through why their actual situation was an exception to the rule.

Of course, they were going to lose the game anyway, so I guess it doesn't matter, but just head-scratching.


What was the timeout situation? It seems an odd one on paper, but maybe Campbell's thinking that they're simply not going to beat the Eagles trailing 14 going into the half and they need seven points right now, and that a FG is unacceptable as watching the Eagles take the second half kickoff, scoring, and putting us down 21 midway through the third is kind of a bad spot. If you consider it that way, then Goff has probably three shots at a TD assuming that he is able to complete a checkdown to the sideline in the event that nothing develops deep on 4th down. Obviously getting sacked isn't part of the plan but we're not to know that.

Agree. The whole point of going for it on 4th is to increase your chance of a TD, but with that much time left your odds are pretty low.


The whole point of every decision is to increase your chance of a win. Usually that correlates with going for the TD as more points are generally better, but it's not exactly the same.

 
The whole point of every decision is to increase your chance of a win. Usually that correlates with going for the TD as more points are generally better, but it's not exactly the same.
Yes, when a RB takes a knee at the 1 so his team can run the clock down and kick a game-winning FG as time expires, it's because we're in one of the rare situations where EPA and WP have diverged. But for the vast majority of any game, they are essentially the same thing.

In this scenario, I get the argument that heavy underdog teams want a high variance play even if EPA is negative. I'm sure the numbers argued against the second fake punt they ran against the Rams last week, but I also get the reason for doing it. But you obviously have to draw the line somewhere. If the Lions end up with a 4th and 35 from their own 6 at a time when the game is still close, should they go for it just for the variance? And the problem in this scenario is that, even if you convert the 4th down, your most likely outcome is still a FG to end the drive. (Or, if you've already decided there's no ####ing way you're kicking on this drive, the most likely outcome is that you score nothing).

Given the Lions' situation, I get that Campbell may have had his reasons for doing it, so I'm not going to call it a mind-bogglingly stupid decision. But I still disagree with it.

 
What was the timeout situation? It seems an odd one on paper, but maybe Campbell's thinking that they're simply not going to beat the Eagles trailing 14 going into the half and they need seven points right now, and that a FG is unacceptable as watching the Eagles take the second half kickoff, scoring, and putting us down 21 midway through the third is kind of a bad spot. If you consider it that way, then Goff has probably three shots at a TD assuming that he is able to complete a checkdown to the sideline in the event that nothing develops deep on 4th down. Obviously getting sacked isn't part of the plan but we're not to know that.

The whole point of every decision is to increase your chance of a win. Usually that correlates with going for the TD as more points are generally better, but it's not exactly the same.
I believe they had 1 timeout, but I think you're missing the info that there were 13 seconds left at the start of the 4th down play, so they don't get three shots at a touchdown.  Say 4 seconds for the 4th down play, probably 5-6 for a shot at the end zone and that means you get one play after you convert the 4th, after which you have to kick the field goal anyway.

If you assume 85% field goal success rate, you get 2.55 points for the field goal.  If you assume 65% 4th down conversion rate and 20% success at your end zone play (which I already think are extremely generous), you get 7 points 13% of the time for 0.91 points, zero points obviously the 35% of the time when you fail on 4th, and a FG attempt the other 52% of the time which is 1.33 points.

So, kicking gives you 2.55 vs. 2.24 under the most absolutely generous assumptions of going for it.  Factoring the chance of a turnover or a sack on the 1st down play after you've burned your last timeout on the 4th and the math gets even worse.  Unless you're going with the meta "we are taking chances" message (which I am not necessarily averse to), you have a hard time justifying the decision.  If there were 30 seconds left, the math would change completely and you should probably go for it.

 
Last edited by a moderator:
Dr_Zaius said:
I believe they had 1 timeout, but I think you're missing the info that there were 13 seconds left at the start of the 4th down play, so they don't get three shots at a touchdown.  Say 4 seconds for the 4th down play, probably 5-6 for a shot at the end zone and that means you get one play after you convert the 4th, after which you have to kick the field goal anyway.


This blows my mind. Why exactly would we have to kick the field goal? The whole point of going for it is to send variance to the stratosphere, which is exactly what you should do as an underdog team already down heavily in order to have any chance to win - Campbell's already worked that out with the playcalling made against the Rams (i.e. the first quarter onsides and all the fake punt shenanigans). So we might lose 1 to 1.5 expected points on a second down GFI and fail, big deal. Call your fourth down play with a checkdown/scramble option if nothing develops deep, call TO if not OOB, you've got 7-8 seconds left, take two shots. Might even get another with the amount of DPI and general one-sided officiating in the league these days.

 
This blows my mind. Why exactly would we have to kick the field goal? The whole point of going for it is to send variance to the stratosphere, which is exactly what you should do as an underdog team already down heavily in order to have any chance to win - Campbell's already worked that out with the playcalling made against the Rams (i.e. the first quarter onsides and all the fake punt shenanigans). So we might lose 1 to 1.5 expected points on a second down GFI and fail, big deal. Call your fourth down play with a checkdown/scramble option if nothing develops deep, call TO if not OOB, you've got 7-8 seconds left, take two shots. Might even get another with the amount of DPI and general one-sided officiating in the league these days.
I do hear what you're saying, but I think I disagree with some of the assumptions here.  Of course we don't have to kick the field goal on 2nd down, but I think we should.  The field goal is ~+2.5 points, the heave is...+1, +.5?  I think 2 points is too much to give up here.  Isn't the median margin of victory in the NFL 8 or 9 points?  A couple of points are a big deal.  Obviously variance is the friend of the underdog, but it can be taken too far.  Running a bomb or trick play for every play call will send it through the roof too, but I would be shocked if such a strategy would increase your chances of winning.  There's a balance that needs to be struck.

Let's say I'm trying to beat you in a gambling game where 20 times I wager an amount from $1-10 and you roll a die and win on 3,4,5,6 while I win on 1,2.  I believe your point is I need to take some high dollar shots and hope that I get lucky if my main goal is to win, which I agree with.  But the maxim of "variance favors the underdog", improperly applied, would lead to me just betting huge amounts repeatedly, which leads to worse losses on average.  Maybe I'm misunderstanding you, though.

 
Totally missed this last Sunday, in part because I was out trick-or-treating with my kids and in part because who the hell would have been paying attention at this point in the game, but I've heard this mentioned a couple different times over the course of the week: Jacksonville was down 24-0 and scored a TD just inside the two-minute warning. They kicked the XP instead of going for two, which by the numbers would be obviously dumb, since a two-pointer could have made it a two-score game. But whatever, they had a 0.01% WP at that point, so what does it really matter? Except then, after already waving the white flag, Meyer still went with an onside kick! If you were still trying to win the game, why wouldn't you go for two? Conversely, if you weren't trying to win, why bother with the onside kick?

In an ultimate "ball don't lie" moment, the Seahawks returned the onside kick for a TD.

 
Not watching the game, so it's possible there's some context I'm missing, but the Raiders just attempted a FG on 4th and 3 from the Giants 7 in the 4th quarter. Appropriately enough, Carlson missed the 25 yard chippie

 
Bears burn their last timeout to ice the kicker and thus can’t use the middle of the field at all to get in fg range. No chance icing a kicker is worth that. Terrible. 
 

Ahh I see the clock would have restarted after the measurement. Had to burn the TO. Nagy > me for today!

 
Last edited by a moderator:
Bears burn their last timeout to ice the kicker and thus can’t use the middle of the field at all to get in fg range. No chance icing a kicker is worth that. Terrible. 
 

Ahh I see the clock would have restarted after the measurement. Had to burn the TO. Nagy > me for today!
Electing to try a 65 yard FG at Heinz field. Not sure why it's a tough  place, but it is. And Santos' longest FG was 55. 

 
Electing to try a 65 yard FG at Heinz field. Not sure why it's a tough  place, but it is. And Santos' longest FG was 55. 
Not sure what the analytics would say, but your chance of converting the FG there has to be better than the chance of completing a Hail Mary, right? Obviously both are low-probability plays.

Also, I looked away for a second and missed what happened on the previous play. I had assumed with 5 seconds they were doing the Hail Mary, but instead it was an incomplete that took three seconds (was it batted down?) and then they sent in Santos. Did Nagy change his mind?

 
Electing to try a 65 yard FG at Heinz field. Not sure why it's a tough  place, but it is. And Santos' longest FG was 55. 
Tough spot regardless so I can’t be harsh on that. Santos didn’t seem to elongate his run up at all. You aren’t making a 65 yarder on that field with your usual stride. 

 
Not sure what the analytics would say, but your chance of converting the FG there has to be better than the chance of completing a Hail Mary, right? Obviously both are low-probability plays.

Also, I looked away for a second and missed what happened on the previous play. I had assumed with 5 seconds they were doing the Hail Mary, but instead it was an incomplete that took three seconds (was it batted down?) and then they sent in Santos. Did Nagy change his mind?
Yeah pass was batted down, they had a sideline out that would have picked up a few more yards. Not sure if they could have gotten out of bounds on time. 

 
Not sure what the analytics would say, but your chance of converting the FG there has to be better than the chance of completing a Hail Mary, right? Obviously both are low-probability plays.

Also, I looked away for a second and missed what happened on the previous play. I had assumed with 5 seconds they were doing the Hail Mary, but instead it was an incomplete that took three seconds (was it batted down?) and then they sent in Santos. Did Nagy change his mind?
That FG % has to be essentially zero- the longest FG ever at Heinz Field (~20 years) is 56 yards and his career long (8 years) was 55. The hail mary is obviously very low percentage, but higher than zero, plus you could get a defensive penalty.

On the play before they were just trying to pick up a few yards quickly before trying the FG.

 
Yeah pass was batted down, they had a sideline out that would have picked up a few more yards. Not sure if they could have gotten out of bounds on time. 
Honestly, trying to run a sideline out with five seconds left is probably dumber than whatever low-percentage option he chose on the final play 

 
That FG % has to be essentially zero- the longest FG ever at Heinz Field (~20 years) is 56 yards and his career long (8 years) was 55. The hail mary is obviously very low percentage, but higher than zero, plus you could get a defensive penalty.
I realized there is essentially no way to calculate the historical percentage, since the number of 65-yard attempts is heavily skewed by selection bias. Nearly all the attempts are going to be by guys like Tucker and Prater in ideal conditions. 

I'm not sure it's zero, but I could certainly see the argument that the HM was a higher-percentage play. Either way I agree with @Cobbler1that all of Nagy's options were incredibly low percentage.

 
Honestly, trying to run a sideline out with five seconds left is probably dumber than whatever low-percentage option he chose on the final play 
To be fair to Nagy, which seems weird because I think he’s terrible, they picked up 11 and 12 yards in 5 and 6 seconds earlier that drive. Getting 5-7 yards in less than 5 seemed possible. 
 

Also something seems off with the timing before the Pittsburg fg. That qb run took 10 seconds off the clock? I know Ben is slow but 10 seconds to run 2 yards and then refs signal for a measurement? Or did Nagy lose a little bit not knowing (like me) that he had to call a TO there?

 
Not a great day for veteran coaches with reputations as risk takers.

First, down 10 in the 3rd quarter, Arians punts on 4th and 2 from his own 46, which the 4th down bot rated as costing him 8.1 WP%.

But, even if it wasn't as egregious in terms of win probability (only 5.8%), Payton's decision to kick a FG on 4th and goal from the 1 with 5:35 left in the game was absolutely indefensible. Fortunately, people don't make this argument as much anymore, but the way the rest of the game played out should put the final nail in the "stay in the game as long as possible" coffin. The FG cut Tennessee's lead to 8, the Saints got the ball back and scored a TD in the final minute, then failed on the 2PC and lost the game. If they had gone for it and converted (which they would have had a good chance of doing), they would have been in position to win the game on that last drive.

Also, leave aside the numbers for a minute: You're underdogs and are playing backups at QB/RB/WR. If you put together a drive and get all the way to the 1, you have to come away with more than three points.

 
Dolphins face 3rd and 5 at their own 41. They throw it short of the sticks and pick up three, but there's an OPI called. Jets decline the penalty. Dolphins, faced with 4th and 2 from their own 44, punt.

There is literally nothing about that entire sequence that I agree with on either side.

 
Down 19-0 3rd Q-3:00 left, 4th and 3 on the 25 and Vrabel bypasses the FG for a TD, good move but then Down 2 scores and a FG Vrabel decides to not go for 2 points and decides to kick the Xtra Point and of course Bullock misses and now they are down 19-6 vs 19-8 and need 2 more Touchdowns now. 

 

Users who are viewing this thread

Top