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I'd rather not start WW3 at this point, mmkay?
Like I said, if you are advocating keeping this war going as we are, it's assinine
ukdefencejournal.org.uk
www.bloomberg.com
www.pravda.com.ua
Russian GPS jamming in and around Estonia having an increasing impact. For two days in a row planes are unable to land at the second biggest city in Estonia due to GPS jamming. Pretty disturbing.
Second Finnair flight turns back from Tartu due to GPS interference
On Friday night, a second Finnair plane, which was on its way from Helsinki to Estonia was forced to turn back as GPS interference meant it could not land in Tartu.news.err.ee
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.1/21
The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21
Most above-ground structures will crumble or collapse under an overpressure of 20 pounds per square inch (psi) caused by a high explosive detonation. The capacity to generate such overpressures is largely a function of the warhead's yield and its distance to the target. 3/21
The M48 and M57 ATACMS have a lethal radius of ~12.7m for 20psi targets. If the missile falls within 12.7m of its target, the target will likely be destroyed or severely damaged.
Whether the missile falls within that lethal radius, depends on its accuracy. 4/21
The accuracy of ATACMS, including the M48/M57 variants, is classified and not publicly disclosed.
In unclassified documents, an accuracy of 9m CEP is often mentioned. This would mean that, on average, 50% of ATACMS launched at a target will land within a 9m radius of it. 5/21
I consider the 9m CEP estimate to be on the higher end, meaning the unclassified CEP of ATACMS is probably lower, particularly for the M57 variant.
To address this uncertainty, along with uncertainties related to other variables, I employ an input distribution approach. 6/21
This graph indicates the single-shot kill probability (SSKP) of M48/M57 for 20psi targets, or the likelihood that one shot will result in one kill.
Random sampling is used to simulate a range of possible outcomes by varying input parameters according to specified distributions.
This approach eliminates the need to depend on individual parameter inputs, which can be inaccurate due to lack of access to classified information.
Based on the graph, the actual SSKP of M48 and M57 ATACMS for 20 psi targets falls within the range of 0.69-1.0, or 69-100%. 8/21
The peak of the curve on the right side of the X-axis shows that the true SSKP is significantly more likely to be between 0.95 and 1.0 than any other value.
Given the lack of access to classified data, this is our best estimate of M48 and M57 ATACMS capability profile. 9/21
Overall, this means that against regular 20 psi targets, or any softer target, M48/M57 ATACMS have a very high likelihood of achieving destruction with a single shot, as long as the missile is not intercepted or experiences a systemic error.
But what about bridge targets? 10/21
Bridge targets are unique due to their small surface area.
If the missile falls short/overshoots the target lengthwise, it may only punch a hole in the bridge deck (which would still cause damage). If it falls to the side, it will land in the water without causing damage. 11/21
A ballpark estimate is that a Kerch Bridge pillar represents a 10m^2 target, resulting in a 5m lethal radius.
M48/M57 have a lethal radius of ~12.7m for 20 psi targets, meaning that if the missile lands anywhere within 5m of the pillar, we can assume target destruction. 12/21
The likelihood of ATACMS achieving this level of accuracy strongly depends on its CEP.
If the CEP is 9m, the SSKP for a Kerch bridge target point is less than 0.2 or 20%. If the CEP is less than 4m, which may be realistic for the M57, the SSKP increases to >0.8. 13/21
The likelihood of target destruction, or P(kill), can be increased by launching more than one missile at the target, as shown below.
Depending on the CEP, even a relatively low number of M48/M57 ATACMS launched may produce a high likelihood of kill against a bridge target. 14/21
What does this mean?
This analysis suggests that the M48/M57 ATACMS would be highly effective against most, if not all, Russian above-ground structures in Ukraine.
As such, it could serve as an effective replacement for Ukraine's diminishing Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG arsenal. 15/21
This is crucial because, as I have previously highlighted, Ukraine will eventually deplete its supply of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles.
Without resupply, Ukraine's long-range strike arsenal may encounter severe shortages by the year's end. 16/21
The analysis also demonstrates that unlike the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missile, which in many ways is optimized to take down bridge targets, ATACMS is not the ideal weapon to destroy the Kerch Bridge. 17/21
This being said, depending on their accuracy, M48 and M57 ATACMS may have bridge-busting capability.
Whether or not they would be used for this purpose in my view depends on:
1) targeting restrictions imposed
2) operational needs and priorities
3) the unclassified CEP
18/21
In any case, the effectiveness of M48/M57 ATACMS against bridges may also be somewhat secondary.
What's crucial is the ability to targetsemi-hardened above-ground structures from long range (0.95-1.0 SSKP), even as
's Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG arsenal nears depletion. 19/21
Finally, M48/M57 ATACMS would allow
That's why I hope that we will soon hear confirmation that thehas delivered these variants or will do so in the near future. 20/21
As @ColbyBadhwar's excellent ATACMS thread shows, the
Part of this could go to
Why have Russian forces advanced in multiple directions and what are the implications? What are the future prospects? Today's analysis by Frontelligence Insight centers on Chasiv Yar, Kurakhkove, and Ocheretyne
Before proceeding, please like and share to aid visibility.
2/ Ukrainian forces retreated from Ocheretyne and Solovyove. While the 115th brigade was blamed, the core issue is that many brigades are not in a condition to hold the enemy with disproportional advantage in personnel, artillery, vehicles, and air support along the frontline
3/ Our team has received reports of poor communication, coordination, and leadership. These problems are rooted in deeper systemic issues, like personnel shortages and challenges in preparing skilled officers for senior roles promptly and in holding them accountable
4/ Our assessment suggests that Russians are attempting to flank and launch a frontal assault on Chasiv Yar, similar to Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Additional Russian troops are reinforcing the area, likely aiming to take over the southern and northern sectors of Chasiv Yar.
5/ If Chasiv Yar falls to Russia, particularly the southern part, they could advance towards Kostyantynivka, disrupting logistics for the force south of Bakhmut. The situation could worsen if Russians move from Ocheretyne towards the road as well.
6/ In the Vuhledar-Donetsk area, Russians aim to cut off Kurakhove - a key logistical hub. The establishment of fire control over the road might severe logistics to Kurakhove. The loss of Kurakhove can put the entire grouping of forces in the Vuhledar area into a risky situation.
7/ Russians are trying to exploit the current unfavorable situation to achieve ambitious operational goals. How did Ukraine find itself in this situation? It's the result of several factors: delayed mobilization efforts, delayed Western aid, and inadequate fortifications
8/ Trenches provide good protection, but with the excessive use of munition-dropping and kamikaze drones, it's crucial to have proper top cover for dugouts and trenches, along with concrete structures and drone-catching nets. It requires resources that understaffed brigades lack
9/ Can the Russians realistically achieve these objectives in 2024? According to the military theory, once defenses are breached, mechanized units can exploit the opening and move into an "operational space" - a geographical area where units can relatively freely maneuver.
10/ Overall, due to losses in vehicles and problematic frontline logistics, the Russian army is unlikely to conduct deep maneuvers into Ukrainian territory as they did during the initial invasion stage. Instead, they will likely focus on attempting to envelop Ukrainian forces
11/ The situation on the frontline is expected to stabilize with the arrival of new ammunition, weaponry, and freshly mobilized but trained recruits. However, it is unlikely that we will see stabilization anytime soon, as it takes time to arm, train, and prepare new recruits
12/ The situation should not be taken lightly, as the Russian military still has a reserve force equivalent to at least two corps, which could be deployed anywhere, including the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, or to reinforce existing axes of advance if weak spots are identified.
13/ It's one of the most favorable situations for Russia. Failing to capitalize on it would be an indication of their inability to achieve their goal of seizing the entire Donbas region in the foreseeable future. This, in turn, could force a reassessment of their own end goals
Keeping this going is starting WW3
Please drop this line as it is overtly political and I don't want this thread axed. I think many folks have very different views on the topic and you are basically inviting debate.
www.defenseone.com
www.kyivpost.com
www.timesofisrael.com
I wonder if this is the US behind it brokering a transfer... if so, brilliant! If not... what the hell. Get on it.Patriot air defenses to be mothballed after decades of mostly gathering dust
Within two months, Air Force will replace aging US-made interceptor with more advanced Israeli systems, including Iron Dome
^Perhaps these can go to Ukraine?
www.twz.com
The GPS-jammer affecting aircrafts around Estonia is located in Russia, about halfway to St Petersburg from Narva, Estonia.
This is shown by plotting the highest density of intersecting radio horizons of jammed aircrafts on a map.
Further, a drone-based method supports it.
The GPS-jammer affecting aircrafts around Estonia is located in Russia, about halfway to St Petersburg from Narva, Estonia.
This can be shown by plotting the highest density of intersecting radio horizons of jammed aircrafts on a map.
Further, a drone-based method supports it.
This is a more zoomed in view of the likeliest position of the GPS-jammer operating around Estonia and recently famous for causing the brand new Helsinki - Tartu flight line to cease operating.
See this and linked posts for methodology.
This took some time to make so I will continue the thread tomorrow with drones, more radio horizons and closer explanations.
Data available if interest is shown. Stay tuned.
I should add. The jammer over Estonia is very different in scope and temporal profile. A higher proportion of aircrafts are affected around Estonia and the jammer is almost always on. See plots.
Proportion measure (%) is a bit skewed during nights though, because there are so few planes in the air. And this effect is even stronger around Estonia. Plots show last months total number of observations for respective area.
Correction: Per SIPRI, Israel received 4 Patriot batteries from Germany as well, which would make a total of 7.
The US & Europe need to come together to get these back from Israel so that they can be sent to Ukraine.
www.defenseone.com
www.politico.eu
www.pravda.com.ua
hromadske.ua
www.defenseone.com
GUR assessment of Russian missile production and stockpile:
-40 Tsirkon in service and up to 10 produced per month
-400 Oniks / Oniks-M and up to 10 produced per month
-270 Kalibr and 30-40 produced per month
-45 Kh-69 and 1-3 produced per month
ГУР назвало кількість у росії ракет «циркон», «онікс», «калібр» та Х-69
Про це йдеться у відповіді ГУР на запит АрміяInform. Зокрема, станом на кінець квітня...armyinform.com.ua
Russian forces have gained tactically near Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar, and have attempted a large assault towards Sivers'k. Frontelligence Insight provides a concise analysis of the current situation in this
Before proceeding, please like and share to aid with visibility
2/ According to on-the-ground reports, occasional Russian groups have temporarily crossed the canal at Chasiv Yar but didn't establish a bridgehead. A geolocated video by @giK1893 shows that Russians tried to set a position in the south of Chasiv Yar at the landbridge crossing
3/ Considering that Russians gathered superior means and forces in the area, it's a point of concern. It opens an opportunity to advance into the forest on the west side of the canal. If successful, this would provide them with the freedom to choose further assault directions.
4/ Losing control of the southern part of Chasiv Yar would be negative, opening the road leading to Kostyantynivka, with the small village of Stupochky being the only obstacle in the way. However, we are not currently close to that situation.
6/ Russian forces continuing to make tactical gains in the Ocheretyne area. Their advancing direction suggests an objective to reach Novooleksandrivka and then Vozdvyzhenka, potentially allowing them to cut off the road connecting the vital towns of Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka.
6/ If the @Deepstate_UA's reported territorial gains are accurate, it indicates that Russian forces have captured fortified positions.
If you want to support Ukrainian forces in the area, check @jana_skhidna, a volunteer who consistently delivers aid to frontline forces there
7/ In the Bilohorivka-Siversk direction, over the past 48 hours, the enemy has launched multiple assaults from various directions, supported by a series of KAB strikes. Ground reports indicate that approximately 8 KAB hits occurred within 30 minutes. These assaults were repelled
8/ The frontline situation remains complex, but efforts are underway to stabilize it. The arrival of Western ammunition is expected to improve the situation. While Russian forces are making gains, there is no sign of a frontline collapse.
9/ These tactical gains may appear minor, but accumulation can lead to operational success. The goal is to form a multi-echelon double-pincer move. The smaller pincer aims to isolate forces south of Bakhmut, while the larger pincer seeks to encircle the entire grouping of forces
10/ Ukraine can slow down and even stop the Russian advance, but not without losing several settlements. Despite shortcomings in strategic and operational planning, senior officers and soldiers at the tactical level are demonstrating personal initiative to fix the situation
11/ For instance, individual officers and soldiers have taken the initiative to get machinery from charity funds and volunteers to build defenses. They also established ad-hoc training to train new soldiers who did not receive adequate training in the official training facilities
12/ Most of these assaults have been countered thanks to infantry, supported by FPV drones, whose ammunition is still being produced in improvised workshops. Innovative ways to bypass EW or enhance FPV flight range are being developed and implemented at the individual level
13/ Overall, thanks to ground-level efforts driven by the personal initiative of brigade officers, soldiers, and sergeants, along with the arrival of Western aid and stabilization measures that we can't disclose, the situation may improve
14/ An important detail that I forgot to add. There is a risk posed by Russian control over Ocheretyne. This control opens up more opportunities besides Novoolekasndirvka, as it allows access to a road that runs north towards the south of the Kostyantynivka area.
www.lemonde.fr
foreignpolicy.com
news.err.ee
www.bloomberg.com
www.defenseone.com
apnews.com
www.airandspaceforces.com
www.thetimes.co.uk
May 2nd updates on frontline developments from the Frontelligence Insight, including the information about a potential Russian offensive in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts
Before proceeding, please like and share to aid with visibility, as sometimes we get less visibility
2/ After successes in the Ocheretyne area, Russian forces now have slightly more than 10 kilometers of ground between them and the T0504 highway, which connects Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. However, another potential threat is emerging from the northward-leading road.
3/ The Russian expansion into Arkhangel's'ke widens their range of possibilities and complicates Ukrainian efforts to establish a cohesive defensive system across such a broad area, particularly given the understaffing of many brigades.
4/ Frontelligence Insight analyzed imagery from April 22nd and May 1st to identify new scorch marks left by artillery or other projectiles. The results indicate Russian efforts concentrated in the western and northern directions, suggesting they may attempt to exploit this road.
5/ As mentioned in our previous update, Russians launched multiple assaults in the Bilohorivka-Siversk area. The 6th separate MRB tried to assault Spirne, south of Bilohorivka, with 1 tank and 3 MTLBs carrying infantry. Only 1 MTLB survived and retreated. Photo: @4emberlen
6/ The Kharkiv-Sumy Area Offensive (?)
There is speculation about Russia's intentions to invade Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, requiring clarification of key details.
We previously identified Russian forces equivalent to two corps stationed along the border of Sumy and Kharkiv.
7/ Firstly, we have not observed the formation of a concentrated force capable of conducting a deep strike. Instead, we see scattered units that could potentially assemble into a striking force in the future, although this is not evident at present.
8/ Based on available to us information, these units are mainly infantry-based and have insufficient tanks and armored vehicles for deep maneuvers. Therefore, any operations against Ukrainian forces in Sumy and Kharkiv will differ from the large-scale invasion seen in 2022
9/ Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, suggests that Russia’s northern grouping, located across the border from Kharkiv, currently consists of 35,000 troops.
10/ This aligns with our earlier estimates of the force approximately equivalent to 2 Russian corps in the area. Skibitsky anticipates that Russia's main offensive will commence "at the end of May or beginning of June."
11/ While their increased presence poses some threat, the current force levels are insufficient for a significant deep maneuver into Ukrainian territory. Our team will continue to monitor the area to identify changes
www.politico.com
www.pravda.com.ua
Why would Russia negotiate anything other than the capitulation of Ukraine right now?
euromaidanpress.com
www.bloomberg.com
www.lrt.lt
Tank of Ukrainian 58th Motorized Brigade repels Russian mechanized attack on their positions.
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