...kind of how I want to start, which is to remind that he still has, he Mr. Putin, still has one-third of his combat power not committed to the fight. That's a lot of combat power. And the combat power that he has committed to the fight is a lot of combat power. And the Ukrainians are putting up a stiff resistance. It's heroic, it's inspiring, and it's very clear for the world to see.
But the Russians have still have a lot of operational advantages, despite the shortcomings they've had with logistics and sustainment. And in some of their maneuver, they still have an awful lot of combat power, that is viable and arrayed in and outside Ukraine. I can't speak for Russian planning, Barbara; I couldn't begin to speculate how they factored in how they were going to flow fuel and sustainment. I would tell you that our best estimate is that they did not anticipate the level of resistance that they were going to encounter. And I would also, I think, you know, it bears considering that this is a major, major, conventional operation. That is rare in recent Russian history; they simply don't have a lot of experience moving on another nation-state at this level of complexity and size. I mean, they have three lines of access, all of which has to be supported. And they're, and the north and the northeastern are geographically close. But then you have a southern line of advance that is not at all geographically close to the main bulk of his forces.
So, this is a fairly complex operation that they're attempting. We don't know whether it's a failure in planning. We don't know whether it's a failure in execution. But I think we can assume that they will learn from this and that they will adapt, and that they will overcome these challenges. And we have to keep that in mind, they have a very significant amount of combat power still available for them in and out of the country.
