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WIRED: 9 reasons to wear a tinfoilhat (1 Viewer)





There’s plenty of reason to be concerned Big Brother is watching.



When a federal judge said a lawsuit on that issue could go forward, Congress passed legislationstopping the case in its tracks. Two American lawyers for an Islamic charity did, however, prevail in their suit that they were wiretapped without warrants, but the Administration is appealing. Much of the program was legalized in 2008 by the FISA Amendments Act.



The FBI has also built a nationwide computer system called the Digital Collection System, connected by fiber optic cables, to collect and analyze wiretaps of all types, including ones used in ultra-secret terrorism investigations.



Warrantless GPS Tracking



The Obama administration claims Americans have no right to privacy in their public movements. The issue surfaced this month in a landmark case before the U.S. Supreme Court to determine if law enforcement agents should be required to obtain a probable-cause warrant in order to place a GPS tracking device on a citizen’s car. The government admitted to the Supreme Court that it thinks it would have the power to track the justices’ cars without a warrant.



The invasive technology allows police, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other agencies to engage in covert round-the-clock surveillance over an extended period of time, collecting vast amounts of information about anyone who drives the vehicle that is being tracked. The Justice Department has said that law enforcement agents employ GPS as a crime-fighting tool with “great frequency,” and GPS retailers have told Wired that they’ve sold thousands of the devices to the feds.

Tracking Devices in Your Pocket



That mobile phone in your pocket chronicles almost everything. Once-secret software developed by a private company pretty much chronicles all you do on your smartphone and sends it to the carriers. The carriers themselves keep a wealth of information, such as text messages, call-location data, and PINs — though none of them disclose to their customers what data they store or how long they keep the data.



Law enforcement can get at much of that historical data — and often get real-time tracking information without proving probable cause to a judge.



So-called stingrays are one of the new high-tech tools that authorities are using to track and identify you. The devices, about the size of a suitcase, spoof a legitimate cellphone tower in order to trick nearby cellphones and other wireless communication devices into connecting to the tower, as they would to a real cellphone tower.



The government maintains that the stingrays don’t violate Fourth Amendment rights, since Americans don’t have a legitimate expectation of privacy for data sent from their mobile phones and other wireless devices to a cell tower. While the technology sounds ultra-new, the feds have had this in their arsenal for at least 15 years, and used a stingray to bust the notorious hacker Kevin Mitnick in 1995.



The Border Exception



The Fourth Amendment doesn’t exist along the U.S. border. You know that if you’re a close supporter of WikiLeaks or a friend of alleged WikiLeaks leaker Bradley Manning. You’re no doubt very familiar with the U.S. government’s laptop border search policy, which allows Customs and Border Protection agents to seize and search a laptop belonging to anyone crossing a border into the U.S.



Agents can search through files on a traveler’s laptop, phone or other mobile device, read e-mail or view digital snapshots to uncover incriminating evidence, and they don’t need any reason to do so.



The government argues, and the 9th U.S. Circuit Court agrees that searching through a person’s laptop for copyright violations is no different than looking through their suitcase for cocaine — and thus fits squarely with what is known as the ‘border exception’ to the Fourth Amendment. That means a border agent doesn’t need reasonable suspicion, probable cause or even a hunch to open your laptop, seize it and make copies of your data.



At least three supporters of WikiLeaks, including security researcher Jacob Appelbaum. have been subject to the policy and had devices seized and searched as they re-entered the U.S. from foreign trips. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol seem to particularly like searching Appeblaum’s devices and questioning him, despite the fact that Wikileaks has never been charged with a crime in the U.S.

The “6 Months and It’s the Government’s” Rule



If you’re already not wanting a dose of Prozac, consider that the law allows the government to obtain Americans’ e-mails, without a warrant, if it’s stored on some other company’s servers for more than six months. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, adopted in 1986, turned 25 this year. When written, the law assumed e-mails left on a server for that long were abandoned.



In the age of Gmail, that’s simply ridiculous. A proposal to demand a court warrant for any and all e-mail never got a Senate hearing and was opposed by the Obama administration.





The Patriot Act



No paranoia list would be complete without including the Patriot Act, the now 10-year-old law adopted in the wake of September 11. The act, which has remained largely the same since former president George W. Bush signed the legislation six weeks after 9/11, gives the government, among other things, the power to acquire phone, banking and other records via the power of a so-called “national security letter,” which does not require a court warrant.



National security letters, perhaps the most invasive facet of the law, are written demands from the FBI that compel internet service providers, financial institutions and others to hand over confidential records about their customers, such as subscriber information, phone numbers and e-mail addresses, bank records and arguably websites you have visited.



The FBI need merely assert, in writing, that the information is “relevant” to an ongoing terrorism or national security investigation. Nearly everyone who gets a national security letter is prohibited from even disclosing that they’ve received one. More than 200,000 letters have been issued by the FBI, despite a series of stinging reports from the Justice Department’s internal watchdog, who found FBI agents weren’t just routinely sloppy; they also violated the law.



Moreover, a decade after Bush’s signature, information is sketchy about how the law is being used in practice. For instance, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) claims the government applies a far broader, andclassified, legal interpretation of the Patriot Act’s power to let the government seize most anything it deems relevant to an investigation (Section 215).



“We’re getting to a gap between what the public thinks the law says and what the American government secretly thinks the law says,” the Senate Intelligence Committee member said in a recent interview with Wired. “When you’ve got that kind of a gap, you’re going to have a problem on your hands.”

Government Malware



It’s little known, but governments have their own malware/spyware that it deploys against suspected lawbreakers. The FBI’s version, the last time we checked, was called CIPAV. Once an FBI agent convinced a target to install it (by clicking an e-mail attachment or link on the web), the spyware reports back everything that computer does online.



German states recently came under fire for misusing a similar program that reportedly could turn on a computer’s camera and take screenshots. And a recent Wall Street Journal story catalogs a surveillance software company which trumpeted its ability to infect users via a fake iTunes update. The company sells its wares to governments around the world.

Known Unknowns



Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took an unfair amount of abuse for his deployment of the phrase “known unknowns.” And it’s these known unknowns that might be the most disturbing part of the list. For instance, does the government think the Patriot Act allows it to force Google to turn over information about anyone who has searched for certain keywords using orders that come with a gag order? Is the NSA sucking up everything we say on our phones and that we do online, under the theory it pushed in a court case that it’s not a search until a human actually looks at the data? How often do police investigating a crime ask wireless providers to give them a list of all the people whose phones were in use in the area when they think a crime was committed? What kind of sweeping surveillance orders have been issued under the 1998 law that Congress passed to legalize much of the warrantless wiretapping of Americans? And finally, how long is the government storing all this data, and how can we be sure that our future governments won’t start using this data to target Americans based on activities protected by the First Amendment?



And no — a tinfoil hat won’t help you at all.

 
http://www.laweekly.com/2012-09-13/news/LAPD-stingray-spying-cellphone/

LAPD Spy Device Taps Your Cell Phone

StingRay is secretly used without warrants

By Jon Campbell Thursday, Sep 13 2012

When you consider the scoundrels the FBI chases down every year — terrorists and serial killers and badass drug kingpins — David Rigmaiden has to be one of the dullest on the list. He's currently in federal custody in Arizona, charged in a long-running scam that netted millions from bogus tax returns.

Still, the Rigmaiden case is being watched closely because of a tool the FBI used to catch him. The device, called a StingRay, would seem right at home in any spy flick.



Suitcase-sized and portable, StingRays are used by law enforcement to track mobile phones in real time. The device electronically impersonates a cellphone tower and dupes the mobile phone into connecting through its own antennae.

Documents obtained by L.A. Weekly through the Freedom of Information Act show that the Los Angeles Police Department is quietly using the StingRay. (Police in Miami, Fort Worth and Gilbert, Ariz., also are known to have the devices.)

LAPD refuses to discuss how it uses the powerful tool, perhaps copying the FBI's playbook, which argued in the Rigmaiden case that revealing too many details would cause serious harm to future investigations.

The department, through a spokesperson, refused to comment on the device, despite repeated requests from the Weekly. Through the department's Discovery Unit, which handles requests from the public and media under the California Public Records Act, LAPD also declined to reveal any information on how the devices are used.

LAPD even refuses to say whether its detectives are required by police chief Charlie Beck and the Los Angeles Police Commission — all of whom are appointed by Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa — to obtain a search warrant before the StingRay is deployed against unsuspecting L.A. residents' cellphones.

The FBI has argued that a search warrant is not required, a question at issue in the Rigmaiden case, and one that Beck's people refused to address.

But LAPD is using the devices.

Documents obtained from the Inspector General's office of the Department of Homeland Security reveal that LAPD bought two so-called "IMSI catchers" around 2006. At the time, LAPD had "recently purchased a cellphone tracking system (CPTS) for regional, terrorist-related investigations." The records mention StingRay and KingFish, brand names for IMSI devices made by Florida's Harris Corp.

Separate documents show that, in April 2010, the Los Angeles City Council approved the purchase of $347,050 in additional "StingRay II" equipment — and paid for it with outside funds from the Los Angeles Police Foundation, a nonprofit group that supports police functions, over which the city has no control.

Peter Bibring of the ACLU of Southern California says LAPD's refusal to discuss its internal guidelines for allowing use of the spy device is unreasonable. (Policies typically are not protected from open-government disclosure laws.)

LAPD's reflexive secrecy means, he says, "We can't have a public debate on what kinds of location-monitoring technologies are appropriate, and when they're justified."

Bibring calls LAPD's negative reaction to the Weekly's requests "just inconsistent with the democratic process."

The StingRay is a unique new tool, allowing police to track cellphones directly. According to Chris Soghoian, graduate fellow at the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research at Indiana University, the StingRay exploits the architecture of cellphone networks.

Mobile devices connect to the wider network by using the antennae closest to them at the time. But when LAPD fires up a StingRay, it's often the most powerful signal in the area. Instantly, the department's spy equipment becomes the go-to "tower" for every cellphone and mobile device nearby — not just the phone carried by the suspect they're tracking.

"If the government shows up in your neighborhood, essentially every phone in the neighborhood is going to check in with the government," Soghoian warns. "It's almost like Marco Polo — the government tower says 'Marco,' and every cellphone in the area says 'Polo.' "

And, as in the swimming-pool game, police can narrow down the location of the phone, in this case by using triangulation.

In Arizona, the FBI obtained a court order to track Rigmaiden's laptop but didn't secure a full search warrant. Rigmaiden argues that the technology is so invasive that the government should have to meet the legal standard for getting a warrant. ACLU agrees.

But Rigmaiden, who is representing himself in court, has declined to discuss his case.

StingRays can be used by police instantly, without permission from a middleman provider such as Sprint or Nextel. Officers tailing a suspect can use a StingRay to home in on the target's cellphone, even if they aren't sure of his real name or identity.

Lee Tien, of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, sums up the problem of police acting alone — without search warrants, and without having to approach the commercial provider — saying, "Self-help always has a danger of abuse."

If police gather information from innocent people's cellphones while casting their net, Soghoian says, "There's no icon that shows up on your cellphone that says, 'government tower.' "

Service providers such as T-Mobile or AT&T usually require court oversight. But in situations where there isn't enough evidence to satisfy a judge, police may be tempted to simply deploy a StingRay.

Says Soghoian: "The only thing stopping the government from using this technology to listen to phone calls or spy on hundreds of innocent people are the legal policies put in place by the law enforcement agency, and the kind of court order they've obtained."

But Beck and his spokespeople refuse to reveal to the Weekly their StingRay legal policy — and even rebuffed a simple records request, filed by the Weekly on Aug. 1, asking how much money LAPD has spent on the devices. Moreover, that was the Weekly's second request. LAPD ignored state law, taking 92 days instead of the maximum 24 allowed to respond.

Terry Francke, executive director of Californians Aware, which fights California governmental bodies reticent to open public records to public inspection, says in an email, "The public records act appears to have been grossly violated here" by Beck's staff.

Documents from the StingRay II purchase approved by the City Council in 2010 offer some insight into other reasons why Beck says he wants them. According to a memo signed by the LAPD chief, they can be used for "locating critical missing and kidnapped victims, and also assist detectives in the expeditious arrest of wanted suspects."

Beck further claimed that the technology "has saved numerous lives."

No Los Angeles elected official contacted for this story would comment on the StingRay technology being used within the city they represent.

A spokesman for City Councilman Paul Koretz said he wasn't familiar enough with the issue to weigh in — a sentiment echoed by press staff for City Councilman Bernard Parks (former LAPD chief of police) and City Councilman Paul Krekorian — who sits on the influential Public Safety Committee, which helps determine LAPD budgets and key law enforcement policies.

Two other members of the Public Safety Committee — council members Jan Perry and Dennis Zine, a former police officer — did not return messages left with their staff. Nor did Councilman Richard Alarcon.

Officials working under City Attorney Carmen Trutanich directed the Weekly's calls back to the police department.

Richard Tefank, executive director of the Los Angeles Police Commission, a group of powerful political appointees who delve into major issues such as police wrongdoing and have a say in many of the department's most important policies, said specific policies — such as those governing the use of StingRay in L.A. — are the responsibility of LAPD, not the commission.

The fundamental question of how much data is retained by police is another that LAPD declined to address.

As things stand, no Los Angeles resident — except those targeted by police and then prosecuted using StingRay evidence — will ever know if LAPD has rerouted their cellphone data through its system, potentially archiving their personal information along the way.

Because the StingRay usually grabs the signal of any phone nearby, good guys and bad guys alike could end up as unwitting subscribers to "LAPD Mobile."

On the bright side, they don't require a contract.
 
Hey, the California State Assembly and the State Senate finally did something right! They passed a bill saying law enforcement would be required to get a probable-cause warrant before searching a mobile phone, tablet, or laptop for location information. :thumbup:

But our POS Governor just vetoed it. :thumbdown:

California Gov. Jerry Brown has vetoed legislation that would have required the state’s authorities to get a probable-cause warrant signed by a judge to obtain location information from electronic devices such as tablets, mobile phones and laptops.

The measure passed the state Senate in May and the Assembly approved the plan in August.

The veto of the first-of-its-kind legislation was no surprise.

Brown, a Democrat, last year vetoed a measure requiring police officers to obtain a warrant before searching someone’s cellphone after arresting them. That leaves California police officers free to search through the mobile phones of persons arrested for any crime.
:towelwave:

 
The only thing that really bothers me about all of that is the different font. Why do they do that to us? It is just too suspicious to be a coincidence.

 
Oh well

The Supreme Court closed a 6-year-old chapter Tuesday in the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s bid to hold the nation’s telecoms liable for allegedly providing the National Security Agency with backdoors to eavesdrop, without warrants, on Americans’ electronic communications in violation of federal law.

The justices, without comment, declined to review a lower court’s December decision (.pdf) dismissing the EFF’s lawsuit challenging the NSA’s warrantless eavesdropping program. At the center of the dispute was 2008 congressional legislation retroactively immunizing the telcos from being sued for cooperating with the government in a program President George W. Bush adopted shortly after the September 2001 terror attacks.
 
We'll be like England within fifty years. Cameras everywhere, no privacy, very few personal rights.

 
I find this shocking. That Cops and the feds colluded to violate our raights and routinely lied to the judges/courts in doing so. This is why we have the exclusionary rule fellas...

http://www.wired.com/2014/06/feds-told-cops-to-deceive-courts-about-stingray/

Police in Florida have, at the request of the U.S. Marshals Service, been deliberately deceiving judges and defendants about their use of a controversial surveillance tool to track suspects, according to newly obtained emails.

At the request of the Marshals Service, the officers using so-called stingrays have been routinely telling judges, in applications for warrants, that they obtained knowledge of a suspect’s location from a “confidential source” rather than disclosing that the information was gleaned using a stingray.

A series of five emails (.pdf) written in April, 2009, were obtained today by the American Civil Liberties Union showing police officials discussing the deception. The organization has filed Freedom of Information Act requests with police departments throughout Florida seeking information about their use of stingrays.

“Concealing the use of stingrays deprives defendants of their right to challenge unconstitutional surveillance and keeps the public in the dark about invasive monitoring by local police,” the ACLU writes in a blog post about the emails. “And local and federal law enforcement should certainly not be colluding to hide basic and accurate information about their practices from the public and the courts.”

The U.S. Marshals Service did not respond to a call for comment.

Stingrays, also known as IMSI catchers, simulate a cellphone tower and trick any nearby mobile devices into connecting with them, thereby revealing their location. When mobile phones—and other wireless communication devices—connect to the stingray, the device can see and record their unique ID numbers and traffic data, as well as information that points to the device’s location. By moving the stingray around, authorities can triangulate the device’s location with greater precision than they can using data obtained from a fixed tower location.

A stingray, made by Harris Corp.
gallery-cam@2x.png
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
The government has long asserted it doesn’t need a probable-cause warrant to use stingrays because the devices don’t collect the content of phone calls and text messages, but instead operate like pen-registers and trap-and-traces, collecting the equivalent of header information. The ACLU and others argue that the devices are more invasive than a trap-and-trace and should require a warrant. By not obtaining a warrant to use stingrays, however, police can conceal from judges and defendant’s their use of the devices and prevent the public from learning how the technology is employed.

But the emails released Thursday show police in Florida are going even further to conceal their use of the equipment when they seek probable cause warrants to search facilities where a suspect is located, deceiving the courts about where they obtained the evidence to support their application for the search.

The initial email, which bears the subject line “Trap and Trace Confidentiality,” was sent by Sarasota police Sgt. Kenneth Castro to colleagues at the North Port (Florida) Police Department. It was sent after Assistant State Attorney Craig Schaefer contacted police to express concern about an application for a probable cause warrant filed by a North Port police detective. The application “specifically outlined” for the court the investigative means used to locate the suspect. Castro informs his colleague that the application should be revised to conceal the use of the surveillance equipment.

“In the past,” Castro writes, “and at the request of the U.S. Marshalls (sic), the investigative means utilized to locate the suspect have not been revealed so that we may continue to utilize this technology without the knowledge of the criminal element. In reports or depositions we simply refer to the assistance as ‘received information from a confidential source regarding the location of the suspect.’ To date this has not been challenged, since it is not an integral part of the actual crime that occurred.”

He then requests that “If this is in fact one of your cases, could you please entertain either having the Detective submit a new PCA and seal the old one, or at minimum instruct the detectives for future cases, regarding the fact that it is unnecessary to provide investigative means to anyone outside of law enforcement, especially in a public document.”

Capt. Robert Estrada, at the North Port Police Department, later confirmed in an email, “[W]e have changed the PCA within the agency after consulting with the [state Attorney's Office]. The PCA that was already within the court system according to the SAO will have to remain since it has already been submitted. At some point and time the SAO will submit the changed document as an addendum. We have implemented within our detective bureau to not use this investigative tool on our documents in the future.”

The release of the emails showing interference by a state attorney and the U.S. Marshals Service comes two weeks after agents from the Marshals Service took the extraordinary measure of seizing other public documents related to stingrays from the Sarasota Police Department in order to prevent the ACLU from examining them.

The documents, which were responsive to a FOIA request seeking information about Sarasota’s use of the devices, had been set aside for ACLU attorneys to examine in person. But hours before they arrived for the appointment to view the documents, someone from the Marshals Service swooped in to seize the documents and cart them to another location.

ACLU staff attorney Nathan Freed Wessler called the move “truly extraordinary and beyond the worst transparency violations” the group has seen regarding documents detailing police use of the technology.

The U.S. Marshals Service is not the only entity conspiring with police to prevent the public from learning about the equipment. The Harris Corporation, a Florida-based company that makes one of the most popular models of stingrays called Stingray, has made law enforcement agencies sign a non-disclosure agreementexplicitly prohibiting them from telling anyone, including other government bodies, about their use of the secretive equipment.

 
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