Absence of Poison Pills in Nfl contracts offers (1 Viewer)

[TWP]

Not if the poison pill is, as I suggested above, "You get $100MM if you play in a game in a Vikings jersey with authorization of the coach". That has no impact on any team other than the Vikings.GregR has been almost completely spot on in this thread, no idea why people are arguing with him. There is no evidence of explicit collusion. There is plenty of evidence of implicit collusion. Collusion by the teams is bad for the players. The way the teams are acting is bad for the players. It also may or may not be illegal.

The players signed off on the RFA system. The sytem clearly and implicitly is designed to allow the original tream to retain the rights of a player. Therefore...the players would have a very tough time selling this as an illegal collusion on the part of the owners. Consistant use of poison pills would essentially negate the entire RFA system, and it should be painfully and blatantly obvious to everyone that that was never the intent, no matter what player(s) later decided was in their own best interests.What happened was a specific player found a loophole, then found another team willing to exploit that loophole. Much like any loophole in a legal contract, a judge said "sorry, you'r s.. out of luck" to the Seahawks. This whole conversation is much ado about nothing, IMO. If the current RFA system is retained, this loophole will be closed in the next CBA. If it isn't retained (or something very close to it), then it won't much matter.

Yes, it's a stupid loophole as I said above. But in some cases, failure to exploit a loophole is not allowed. And agreeing explicitly or implicitly with others not to exploit the loophole could be collusion. In this case, since it went to court and since the owners tried to get it closed and failed, I think a pretty decent argument could be made for teams not being allowed to collude not to exploit the loophole. From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

 

[GregR_2]

How would it help the players? Take the case of Miles Austin.

Let's say the author is right, and teams that are willing to give up the draft picks think Dallas will just match the contract in the absence of a poison pill which they collude not to use. So no one negotiates with Austin, who only has Dallas he can talk to now, giving Dallas more negotiating power.

If however teams were willing to use the poison pill, Austin might be able to negotiate with two or more other teams and play them against each other to get a better contract.

What if Austin's current contract had a poison pill? Then no other team would be willing to negotiate with him. A player might be willing to accept a poison pill to get a better up-front contract, but it's pretty clear that once that pill is on his contract, he's going to be in a weaker position in future negotiations.

Poison pills normally come up in a situation where a player is not under contract but a team retains some rights to match, either because he's an RFA, or because he's been tagged a Franchise or Transition player. A player under contract doesn't negotiate with other teams (that would be tampering) unless you're talking about a trade and the original club gives permission for them to negotiate.Ok, now that said, sure, let's say Austin, or actually let's just use Hutchinson since he has a poison pill in his current contract. Let's say Seattle wants to trade for Hutchinson back, but doesn't want to deal with the poison pill in his current contract. Vikings give consent for them to negotiate, and Seattle and Hutchinson would have to agree to renegotiate his contract as part of the trade to remove the poison pill.

If Hutchinson wants to go to Seattle, all he has to do is say he'll renegotiate to remove the poison pill and there's no downside then for Seattle to negotiate. If he doesn't want to go to Seattle, he doesn't have to agree to renegotiate. I'd say in a trade negotiation that still favors the player to have the poison pill in there. It only need detract if he wants it to.

 

[babydemon90]

There has to be some party that is getting disadvantaged over this "collusion" otherwise there's no reason for it to exist. If an argument is going to be made for collusion, pointing to the players as the victim is the best bet.

No one forced hutchinson to sign it.....

 

[GregR_2]

And for what it's worth as to how I feel about the article... I think TWP's wording is very appropriate. I haven't seen any evidence of explicit collusion. I could agree the results suggest implicit collusion. I have no idea what standard a court of law would apply here so I have little clue if the NFLPA has a case or not. I also have little doubt they are watching the situation and talking to their lawyers just to see if they have any options there.

And as for how I wish it would work, I'm against the concept of poison pills and I hope the NFL closes the loophole. But right now, the loophole is still open. Either that, or Christo is right and the fact checkers at places like Sports Illustrated and Fox Sports are doing a poor job and the NFL wasn't interested in correcting the media when they are incorrect about NFL rules.

 

[Christo]

And as for how I wish it would work, I'm against the concept of poison pills and I hope the NFL closes the loophole. But right now, the loophole is still open. Either that, or Christo is right and the fact checkers at places like Sports Illustrated and Fox Sports are doing a poor job and the NFL wasn't interested in correcting the media when they are incorrect about NFL rules.

What are you blathering on about?

 

[Kool-Aid Larry]

From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

I thought the prisoner's dilemma was getting ###-raped.

 

[Christo]

From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

Where do you get this? The entire purpose of a poison pill is to give a new team the ability to offer a player a contract that the player's own team would normally match but for the poison pill clause. While it would improve player mobility it would drive player values down.

 

[TWP]

From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

Where do you get this? The entire purpose of a poison pill is to give a new team the ability to offer a player a contract that the player's own team would normally match but for the poison pill clause. While it would improve player mobility it would drive player values down.

If I am the Vikings and I have Player X that I would like to keep, right now I can tender him at, say, a 2nd round level. That's fine, because I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it. But if they use a pill, I can't match it and I will lose the player. So to keep the player, I'd have to tender him at the 1st round level to force the other team, even with the pill, to pay more than they are willing to. Thereby increasing the value of the player.Right now the implicit collusion is putting an artificial barrier to teams that would have made offers with pills but can't because of the collusion. Therefore, the current teams dont need to protect the players as much by offering them better deals because the players are already artificially protected by the collusion. Of course this artificial protection is a stupid loophole, but we are taking the situation as it is, not as it should be.

 

[Christo]

From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

Where do you get this? The entire purpose of a poison pill is to give a new team the ability to offer a player a contract that the player's own team would normally match but for the poison pill clause. While it would improve player mobility it would drive player values down.

If I am the Vikings and I have Player X that I would like to keep, right now I can tender him at, say, a 2nd round level. That's fine, because I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it. But if they use a pill, I can't match it and I will lose the player. So to keep the player, I'd have to tender him at the 1st round level to force the other team, even with the pill, to pay more than they are willing to. Thereby increasing the value of the player.

No, you don't. The tender the old team puts on a player doesn't restrict the size of contract a new team can offer the player.

 

[TWP]

From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

Where do you get this? The entire purpose of a poison pill is to give a new team the ability to offer a player a contract that the player's own team would normally match but for the poison pill clause. While it would improve player mobility it would drive player values down.

If I am the Vikings and I have Player X that I would like to keep, right now I can tender him at, say, a 2nd round level. That's fine, because I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it. But if they use a pill, I can't match it and I will lose the player. So to keep the player, I'd have to tender him at the 1st round level to force the other team, even with the pill, to pay more than they are willing to. Thereby increasing the value of the player.

No, you don't. The tender the old team puts on a player doesn't restrict the size of contract a new team can offer the player.

That doesn't matter. In the situation where the new team likes the player more than the current team, there is no problem. The new team will offer the player more, the current team won't match, and the deal will get done. That's how players move today.But look at the circumstance where the current team likes the player more than a new team. At what level does the current team need to tender the player in order to keep him? Let's say that a new team values a player at slightly above a 2nd round tender and the current team values the player at a 1st round tender. Without collusion, if the current team tenders the player at the 2nd round level, the new team will use the poison pill to get the player at the 2nd round level, which is a good deal for them. So the current team will need to tender him at the 1st round level to keep the player.

But WITH the collusion, the new team can't use the poison pill. So to get the player, they will have to offer MORE than the 2nd round level. But they only value him slightly more than the 2nd round level, and not as high as the 1st round level, so they will not make an offer, or they will make a 2nd round offer and it will be matched.

See how the artificial protection of knowing that teams wont use the poison pill means that the current team only has to tender the player at the 2nd round level instead of the 1st round level in this scenario? That hurts the player and helps the team.

 

[Christo]

From a game theory perspective, it's a prisoner's dilemma for the teams: in the short-run each team is better off exploiting the others by using poison pills. But in the long-run, all teams are better off in a poison pill-less world and therefore they implicitly agree (through the use of social pressure) not to use them in order to stay at the long-run optimal situation instead of exploiting short-term gains. But, as GregR pointed out, the long-run optimum for the owners is coming at the expense of the players. The players would be better off at the point where all teams used poison pills, since that would increase player mobility and drive up player values. As in any prisoner's dilemma, the only way to achieve the better outcome for the owners is through implicit collusion brought about by it being a repeated game (i.e. if the Vikings screw the Seahawks today, the Seahawks will screw the Vikings tomorrow.)

Where do you get this? The entire purpose of a poison pill is to give a new team the ability to offer a player a contract that the player's own team would normally match but for the poison pill clause. While it would improve player mobility it would drive player values down.

If I am the Vikings and I have Player X that I would like to keep, right now I can tender him at, say, a 2nd round level. That's fine, because I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it. But if they use a pill, I can't match it and I will lose the player. So to keep the player, I'd have to tender him at the 1st round level to force the other team, even with the pill, to pay more than they are willing to. Thereby increasing the value of the player.

No, you don't. The tender the old team puts on a player doesn't restrict the size of contract a new team can offer the player.

That doesn't matter. In the situation where the new team likes the player more than the current team, there is no problem. The new team will offer the player more, the current team won't match, and the deal will get done. That's how players move today.But look at the circumstance where the current team likes the player more than a new team. At what level does the current team need to tender the player in order to keep him? Let's say that a new team values a player at slightly above a 2nd round tender and the current team values the player at a 1st round tender. Without collusion, if the current team tenders the player at the 2nd round level, the new team will use the poison pill to get the player at the 2nd round level, which is a good deal for them. So the current team will need to tender him at the 1st round level to keep the player.

But WITH the collusion, the new team can't use the poison pill. So to get the player, they will have to offer MORE than the 2nd round level. But they only value him slightly more than the 2nd round level, and not as high as the 1st round level, so they will not make an offer, or they will make a 2nd round offer and it will be matched.

See how the artificial protection of knowing that teams wont use the poison pill means that the current team only has to tender the player at the 2nd round level instead of the 1st round level in this scenario? That hurts the player and helps the team.

No, I don't. What you are talking about involves so much more than just an agreement not to use the poison pill. It requires the team to allow the player to get to free agency. If the old team really wants the player it offers him a multiple year contract before the tender date. It also requires the old team to understand how 31 other teams value their player. Most importantly it requires all 31 of the other teams to place the same value on a particular player.

 

[TWP]

No, I don't. What you are talking about involves so much more than just an agreement not to use the poison pill. It requires the team to allow the player to get to free agency. If the old team really wants the player it offers him a multiple year contract before the tender date. It also requires the old team to understand how 31 other teams value their player. Most importantly it requires all 31 of the other teams to place the same value on a particular player.

No it doesnt require any of that. I'm sure you agree that currently there are players that get to RFA status, right? And I'm sure you agree that there are players that get to RFA status that dont switch teams? Those are both observable facts, so you can't really disagree with them.Now the one thing that's not observable, that's required for players to be harmed, is that at some point some team wants a RFA to the degree that they would be interested in taking him at the tendered level if the current team can't match, but they are not interested in offering a level high enough to get the current team not to match under the current system. I believe it is quite clearly true that that must be the case: a team is willing to buy the player at the tendered offer, but not willing to win a bidding war with the current team for the player. However, if you think that situation has never happened and will never happen, then you would be correct in thinking that the collusion does not harm the players. In any case, this is my last post to you on this topic. Whomever said this is moot anyways is correct. Either it will be closed in the new CBA or RFA will be so different that it won't matter anymore.

 

[Christo]

No, I don't. What you are talking about involves so much more than just an agreement not to use the poison pill. It requires the team to allow the player to get to free agency. If the old team really wants the player it offers him a multiple year contract before the tender date. It also requires the old team to understand how 31 other teams value their player. Most importantly it requires all 31 of the other teams to place the same value on a particular player.

No it doesnt require any of that. I'm sure you agree that currently there are players that get to RFA status, right? And I'm sure you agree that there are players that get to RFA status that dont switch teams? Those are both observable facts, so you can't really disagree with them.Now the one thing that's not observable, that's required for players to be harmed, is that at some point some team wants a RFA to the degree that they would be interested in taking him at the tendered level if the current team can't match, but they are not interested in offering a level high enough to get the current team not to match under the current system. I believe it is quite clearly true that that must be the case: a team is willing to buy the player at the tendered offer, but not willing to win a bidding war with the current team for the player. However, if you think that situation has never happened and will never happen, then you would be correct in thinking that the collusion does not harm the players. In any case, this is my last post to you on this topic. Whomever said this is moot anyways is correct. Either it will be closed in the new CBA or RFA will be so different that it won't matter anymore.

No, I have to back back to the statement you made but then said it didn't matter: "I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it." For this alleged agreement to harm players it would require teams to know more than just the fact that a poison pill isn't going to be used.

 

[TWP]

No, I don't. What you are talking about involves so much more than just an agreement not to use the poison pill. It requires the team to allow the player to get to free agency. If the old team really wants the player it offers him a multiple year contract before the tender date. It also requires the old team to understand how 31 other teams value their player. Most importantly it requires all 31 of the other teams to place the same value on a particular player.

No it doesnt require any of that. I'm sure you agree that currently there are players that get to RFA status, right? And I'm sure you agree that there are players that get to RFA status that dont switch teams? Those are both observable facts, so you can't really disagree with them.Now the one thing that's not observable, that's required for players to be harmed, is that at some point some team wants a RFA to the degree that they would be interested in taking him at the tendered level if the current team can't match, but they are not interested in offering a level high enough to get the current team not to match under the current system. I believe it is quite clearly true that that must be the case: a team is willing to buy the player at the tendered offer, but not willing to win a bidding war with the current team for the player. However, if you think that situation has never happened and will never happen, then you would be correct in thinking that the collusion does not harm the players. In any case, this is my last post to you on this topic. Whomever said this is moot anyways is correct. Either it will be closed in the new CBA or RFA will be so different that it won't matter anymore.

No, I have to back back to the statement you made but then said it didn't matter: "I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it." For this alleged agreement to harm players it would require teams to know more than just the fact that a poison pill isn't going to be used.

Again: No, it doesn't. Do you agree that the ability for a team to match an offer makes the player worse off? I.e. a restricted free agent is worse off than an unrestricted free agent?Do you agree that poison pills essentially negate the ability of a team to match offers for restricted free agents?Do you agree that this negates the impact in the first question and thereby makes the player better off? I.e. allows him to be treated like a free agent, signing with any team for any amount of money, without the current team having a right of first refusal? Since teams wouldnt be able to match offers, in order to protect their players, their only option would be to tender them at higher levels, thereby discouraging other teams from poaching them. This is really very simple: being able to match makes players worse off, poison pills removes the ability to match therefore making players better off, collusion removes poison pills thereby making players worse off again.

 

[Christo]

No, I don't. What you are talking about involves so much more than just an agreement not to use the poison pill. It requires the team to allow the player to get to free agency. If the old team really wants the player it offers him a multiple year contract before the tender date. It also requires the old team to understand how 31 other teams value their player. Most importantly it requires all 31 of the other teams to place the same value on a particular player.

No it doesnt require any of that. I'm sure you agree that currently there are players that get to RFA status, right? And I'm sure you agree that there are players that get to RFA status that dont switch teams? Those are both observable facts, so you can't really disagree with them.Now the one thing that's not observable, that's required for players to be harmed, is that at some point some team wants a RFA to the degree that they would be interested in taking him at the tendered level if the current team can't match, but they are not interested in offering a level high enough to get the current team not to match under the current system. I believe it is quite clearly true that that must be the case: a team is willing to buy the player at the tendered offer, but not willing to win a bidding war with the current team for the player. However, if you think that situation has never happened and will never happen, then you would be correct in thinking that the collusion does not harm the players. In any case, this is my last post to you on this topic. Whomever said this is moot anyways is correct. Either it will be closed in the new CBA or RFA will be so different that it won't matter anymore.

No, I have to back back to the statement you made but then said it didn't matter: "I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it." For this alleged agreement to harm players it would require teams to know more than just the fact that a poison pill isn't going to be used.

Again: No, it doesn't. Do you agree that the ability for a team to match an offer makes the player worse off? I.e. a restricted free agent is worse off than an unrestricted free agent?

No

 

[Truman]

I don't see how this would be collusion.

I don't think it can be collusion if everyone agrees to it.

This is sarcasm right?

 

[Truman]

No, I don't. What you are talking about involves so much more than just an agreement not to use the poison pill. It requires the team to allow the player to get to free agency. If the old team really wants the player it offers him a multiple year contract before the tender date. It also requires the old team to understand how 31 other teams value their player. Most importantly it requires all 31 of the other teams to place the same value on a particular player.

No it doesnt require any of that. I'm sure you agree that currently there are players that get to RFA status, right? And I'm sure you agree that there are players that get to RFA status that dont switch teams? Those are both observable facts, so you can't really disagree with them.Now the one thing that's not observable, that's required for players to be harmed, is that at some point some team wants a RFA to the degree that they would be interested in taking him at the tendered level if the current team can't match, but they are not interested in offering a level high enough to get the current team not to match under the current system. I believe it is quite clearly true that that must be the case: a team is willing to buy the player at the tendered offer, but not willing to win a bidding war with the current team for the player. However, if you think that situation has never happened and will never happen, then you would be correct in thinking that the collusion does not harm the players. In any case, this is my last post to you on this topic. Whomever said this is moot anyways is correct. Either it will be closed in the new CBA or RFA will be so different that it won't matter anymore.

No, I have to back back to the statement you made but then said it didn't matter: "I know that other teams won't offer him deals at the 2nd round level because they know that I will match it." For this alleged agreement to harm players it would require teams to know more than just the fact that a poison pill isn't going to be used.

Again: No, it doesn't. Do you agree that the ability for a team to match an offer makes the player worse off? I.e. a restricted free agent is worse off than an unrestricted free agent?

No

So free markets are less efficient?

 

[Christo]

I don't see how this would be collusion.

I don't think it can be collusion if everyone agrees to it.

This is sarcasm right?

No.

 

[TWP]

I don't see how this would be collusion.

I don't think it can be collusion if everyone agrees to it.

This is sarcasm right?

No.

No, it's trolling

 

[Christo]

So free markets are less efficient?

It's not a free market. The analysis has to be made within the framework of the CBA. Even if we accept that this is an agreement between the owners but not the players, the owners refusal to aid the players in getting around restricted free agency doesn't make the players "worse off."

 

[Christo]

I don't see how this would be collusion.

I don't think it can be collusion if everyone agrees to it.

This is sarcasm right?

No.

No, it's trolling

Not at all. Your "game theory" bs does not apply.