cstu
Footballguy
From reading about how it happened it seemed like the U.S. were gutless, believing that Stalin would reject any line north of the 38th and they wouldn't be able to hold any positions in Korea if he refused. However, no attempt was even made to negotiate for the 39th parallel and Stalin instantly accepted the offer of the 38th. Huge mistake.What were they supposed to do, thumb their noses at Stalin?Nice job, guys.After the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the 38th parallel was established as the boundary by Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel of the U.S. State Department - War - Navy Coordinating Committee in Washington, D.C. during the night of the 10th of August 1945, four days before the liberation of Korea.
The Soviets, absent a stern American warning not to enter Korea, and in a superior military position, were generally deemed capable of occupying the entire peninsula before any American troops could get there. Only Stalin’s willingness, it is generally thought, to accept the surrender arrangement made possible the American occupation of southern Korea. However, according to historian Michael Sandusky, U.S. military planners thought the Soviets were capable of much more than was the case. He argues that the on-the-ground situation on August 15, 1945 in Korea and Manchuria was vastly different from what Washington perceived. He says:
In Korea, the meager Soviet forces were brought to a standstill in Chongjin [about 45 miles south of the Soviet border with Korea]. Few Soviet troops were in Korea and the ones that were there were pinned down by resolute Japanese troops.…[T]he Soviets were in no position to expand their presence in Korea.…In Korea, Soviet forces were still well above the forty-first parallel [above Kimchaek on the eastern coast].
Sandusky argues that given the naval and air transport capabilities the U.S. had at its disposal, key areas of Korea as far north as Hamhung (near the 40th parallel) could have been secured by U.S. forces had these areas been accorded the proper priority. At that point, the U.S. had an ability to move troops superior to the Soviets; in order to reach Pyongyang on August 24, the Russians even had to airlift troops. He implies that so much American attention was riveted on obtaining Japan’s surrender that military resources that could have been directed toward Korea were not.
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