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World War II (1 Viewer)

France, Continued

The German commander of Paris was Lt. Gen Dietrich von Cholitz. Within the city itself, Cholitz commanded about 5,000 soldiers, 50 light and medium guns and 60 airplanes. Obviously, this was no match for the Allied forces rushing in his direction. Cholitz had never expected to fight with these troops, however; the German armies in front of him, commanded by Kluge, were supposed to be the great defense, keeping the western Allies at bay for months, perhaps forever. Cholitz had considered his position one of relative safety and relaxation, and he and his men came to love the City of Light they were "protecting."

But then Hitler had sent Kluge's forces on a foolish offensive, which turned into a trap that they only managed to escape due to the slowness of Montgomery (see post#1230). Now, Kluge's forces, though having escaped that trap, were in full flight for the West Wall. And with the coming of additional American and French troops from the South (see the previous post) and the incredible speed of Patton, suddenly Cholitz found himself on the front line with the "Amis" coming. Frantically he phoned Berlin and pleaded for permission to flee the city. He was shocked by the order he received instead.

Adolf Hitler hated the French. He had hated them since the indignity of losing the First World War. His greatest elation in this war was defeating this enemy in 1940, but as he expressed at the time, a part of him was actually disappointed that the French government had not chosen at that time to defend Paris, instead declaring it an open city. He would not have minded to see Paris destroyed, like Warsaw and Rotterdam had been. This was the first sign of Hitler's inclination toward Gotterdamerung, the destruction of everything, which I referenced earlier. Even when his visited Paris in June, 1940, he showed signs of bitterness toward the artistic genius of the city which was not his and not German.

Now, four years later, with the Allied troops inevitably headed toward the City of Light and all of Hitler's plans in ruins, he gave the order to Cholitz, "Destroy the city." According to testimony at Nuremberg. He gave this order gleefully. If Hitler was going to lose, he would see this greatest city burn first, its famous buildings put to the torch and destroyed, just as Germany would be destroyed. All would go in a great purifying fire, and the ancient gods would look on and be pleased. And, it would be a final punishment against a lifelong enemy.

 
France, Continued

Three Allied armies now were moving through France: Montgomery's 21st Army Group along the coast of Belgium, Hodge's 1st and Patton's 3rd Army leading east toward Paris and beyond. And now Dwight Eisenhower pondered the question of liberating the City of Light. According to his memoirs, he states that he did not want to attack it and provoke street fighting that might desecrate and destroy what he termed "the most beautiful city in the world, a monument to Western Civilization." He had already issued stern orders that no fighting should take place in areas containing important historical or religious landmarks, explaining that in great measure they represente what the Allies were fighting for. But Paris could become a severe logistics burden. To feed its 2 million residents would require 4,000 tons of supplies daily, the equivalent needs of 7 full divisions.

On August 19, however, a rising of the Resistance all but forced Eisenhower's hand. By August 18, more than half the railroad workers were on strike and the city was at a standstill. Virtually all the policemen had disappeared from the streets. Several anti-German demonstrations took place, and armed Resistance members appeared openly. The German reaction was less than forthright prompting small, local Resistance groups, without central direction or discipline, to take possession the very next day of police stations, town halls, national ministries, newspaper buildings and the Hôtel de Ville (city hall).

There were perhaps 20,000 Resistance members in Paris, but few were armed. Nevertheless, they destroyed road signs, punctured the tires of German vehicles, cut communication lines, bombed gasoline depots and attacked isolated pockets of German soldiers. But being inadequately armed, members of the Resistance feared open warfare. To avoid it, Resistance leaders persuaded Raoul Nordling, the Swedish consul-general in Paris, to negotiate with General Choltitz. That evening, August 19, the two men arranged a truce, at first for a few hours, then extended it indefinitely.

The arrangement was somewhat nebulous. Choltitz agreed to recognize certain parts of Paris as belonging to the Resistance. The Resistance, meanwhile, consented to leave particular areas of Paris free to German troops. But no boundaries were drawn, and neither the Germans nor the French were clear about their respective areas. The armistice expired on the 24th.

Why would Choltitz have disobeyed Hitler's orders and made a truce with the Resistance? History is not too clear on this. There is a fine book on this subject by Larry Collins and Dominique LaPierre, Is Paris Burning? which suggests that Choltitz did not wish to be known in history as the man who allowed Paris to be destroyed. ("Is Paris Burning?" is the question that Hitler supposedly asked Choltitz by phone.) According to this account (which was also made into a pretty good film, with a script by Gore Vidal and Francis Ford Coppola), the general actually lied to his subordinates about the nature of the truce. The book also explores the rivalry inside the French Resistance between the Communists and DeGaulle's people, which, although this had significance in terms of the history of postwar France, is not too vital to this narrative.

As a result of being pushed both by the Resistance's actions and by DeGaulle, who wanted to destroy the Communist element, Ike ordered the liberation of Paris, and it was performed without resistance on August 25. Eisenhower and Bradley both entered the city, with their armies. The boulevards were thronged and the two men were quickly recognized. They were mobbed, grabbed and kissed. Eisenhower was embarrassed. "I prefer camps to cities," he wrote to Mamie. Paris was wild, with the same singing, shouting, kissing fervor with which it had welcomed the Doughboys of the United States 1st Infantry Division 26 years earlier. Charles De Gaulle was treated like a king, which he believed was only his due, and moved quickly to oust the Communists.

And what became of von Choltitz, the man who had saved Paris from destruction? He surrendered to the Allies, and was taken prisoner. (This was a wise move, as had he returned to Germany he would surely have been executed for treason.) After the war he returned to his home of Baden-Baden, to live a quiet life. When he died in 1966, the French government chose to give him full military honors.

 
France, Continued

Three Allied armies now were moving through France: Montgomery's 21st Army Group along the coast of Belgium, Hodge's 1st and Patton's 3rd Army leading east toward Paris and beyond. And now Dwight Eisenhower pondered the question of liberating the City of Light. According to his memoirs, he states that he did not want to attack it and provoke street fighting that might desecrate and destroy what he termed "the most beautiful city in the world, a monument to Western Civilization." He had already issued stern orders that no fighting should take place in areas containing important historical or religious landmarks, explaining that in great measure they represente what the Allies were fighting for. But Paris could become a severe logistics burden. To feed its 2 million residents would require 4,000 tons of supplies daily, the equivalent needs of 7 full divisions.

On August 19, however, a rising of the Resistance all but forced Eisenhower's hand. By August 18, more than half the railroad workers were on strike and the city was at a standstill. Virtually all the policemen had disappeared from the streets. Several anti-German demonstrations took place, and armed Resistance members appeared openly. The German reaction was less than forthright prompting small, local Resistance groups, without central direction or discipline, to take possession the very next day of police stations, town halls, national ministries, newspaper buildings and the Hôtel de Ville (city hall).

There were perhaps 20,000 Resistance members in Paris, but few were armed. Nevertheless, they destroyed road signs, punctured the tires of German vehicles, cut communication lines, bombed gasoline depots and attacked isolated pockets of German soldiers. But being inadequately armed, members of the Resistance feared open warfare. To avoid it, Resistance leaders persuaded Raoul Nordling, the Swedish consul-general in Paris, to negotiate with General Choltitz. That evening, August 19, the two men arranged a truce, at first for a few hours, then extended it indefinitely.

The arrangement was somewhat nebulous. Choltitz agreed to recognize certain parts of Paris as belonging to the Resistance. The Resistance, meanwhile, consented to leave particular areas of Paris free to German troops. But no boundaries were drawn, and neither the Germans nor the French were clear about their respective areas. The armistice expired on the 24th.

Why would Choltitz have disobeyed Hitler's orders and made a truce with the Resistance? History is not too clear on this. There is a fine book on this subject by Larry Collins and Dominique LaPierre, Is Paris Burning? which suggests that Choltitz did not wish to be known in history as the man who allowed Paris to be destroyed. ("Is Paris Burning?" is the question that Hitler supposedly asked Choltitz by phone.) According to this account (which was also made into a pretty good film, with a script by Gore Vidal and Francis Ford Coppola), the general actually lied to his subordinates about the nature of the truce. The book also explores the rivalry inside the French Resistance between the Communists and DeGaulle's people, which, although this had significance in terms of the history of postwar France, is not too vital to this narrative.

As a result of being pushed both by the Resistance's actions and by DeGaulle, who wanted to destroy the Communist element, Ike ordered the liberation of Paris, and it was performed without resistance on August 25. Eisenhower and Bradley both entered the city, with their armies. The boulevards were thronged and the two men were quickly recognized. They were mobbed, grabbed and kissed. Eisenhower was embarrassed. "I prefer camps to cities," he wrote to Mamie. Paris was wild, with the same singing, shouting, kissing fervor with which it had welcomed the Doughboys of the United States 1st Infantry Division 26 years earlier. Charles De Gaulle was treated like a king, which he believed was only his due, and moved quickly to oust the Communists.

And what became of von Choltitz, the man who had saved Paris from destruction? He surrendered to the Allies, and was taken prisoner. (This was a wise move, as had he returned to Germany he would surely have been executed for treason.) After the war he returned to his home of Baden-Baden, to live a quiet life. When he died in 1966, the French government chose to give him full military honors.
It wasn't only the resistance that forced Eisenhower's hand. De Gaulle threatened to go into the city with only the French forces, and in fact, General Leclerc went into the suburbs of Paris, exceeding his orders. Eisenhower was not only afraid of destroying the city, but also did not want to be drawn into street fighting a la Stalingrad.After the surrender of the German forces De Gaulle was concerned about establishing his authority, so he asked Eisenhower for two divisions to make sure he had Paris under control. Eisenhower told him he could not spare them from the advance, but that he would have two divisions march through Paris on their way to the front. Eisenhower said that it was probably the only occasion in which troops of an invading army had marched in a victory parade in a great city, being acclaimed by the citizens, to then participate in a pitched battle that same day.

 
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I apologize for this post being late and out of place, I am today on page 24 playing catchup, but I wanted to relate for what its worth a personal experience from visiting Omaha Beach for the 55th anniversary of the landings on June 6 1999.

At the time I was living and working in London, England. My son's Boy Scout Troop, and many other from all over Europe, drove to Normandy and spent a couple days there for this anniversary. Our bus took us to Pointe du Hoc- the gun emplacement is still there today as are the trenches and the whole area is pockmarked with bomb and shell craters. not much has changed i guess. There is a monument to Gen Earl Rudder commemorating the Rangers assault (Gig'em Ags!!!).

After this our bus took us a few miles to the east where we all walked to the southern edge of Omaha Beach, along the beach, up the cliffs to the American Cemetary located there (remember the scenes from Saving Private Ryan at this cemetary?) All the Scouts from all over Europe ringed the central area as the US Ambassador and other dignitaries made presentations. Afterwards each scout was given a flag and the name of an American soldier, he had to find that soldier and place the flag on his grave.... Words escape me in an attempt to describe this.....

Walking along the sandy beaches that day and climbing the cliffs, those brave men who stormed the beaches and climbed those cliffs deserve our eternal gratitude. it must have been sheer hell......

 
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It wasn't only the resistance that forced Eisenhower's hand. De Gaulle threatened to go into the city with only the French forces, and in fact, General Leclerc went into the suburbs of Paris, exceeding his orders. Eisenhower was not only afraid of destroying the city, but also did not want to be drawn into street fighting a la Stalingrad.After the surrender of the German forces De Gaulle was concerned about establishing his authority, so he asked Eisenhower for two divisions to make sure he had Paris under control. Eisenhower told him he could not spare them from the advance, but that he would have two divisions march through Paris on their way to the front. Eisenhower said that it was probably the only occasion in which troops of an invading army had marched in a victory parade in a great city, being acclaimed by the citizens, to then participate in a pitched battle that same day.
Thanks for pointing this out. I had it in my source, but chose not to use it in the narrative because I didn't want to get bogged down in the De Gaulle politics. In retrospect, I should have mentiond it.
 
I apologize for this post being late and out of place, I am today on page 24 playing catchup, but I wanted to relate for what its worth a personal experience from visiting Omaha Beach for the 55th anniversary of the landings on June 6 1999.At the time I was living and working in London, England. My son's Boy Scout Troop, and many other from all over Europe, drove to Normandy and spent a couple days there for this anniversary. Our bus took us to Pointe du Hoc- the gun emplacement is still there today as are the trenches and the whole area is pockmarked with bomb and shell craters. not much has changed i guess. There is a monument to Gen Earl Rudder commemorating the Rangers assault (Gig'em Ags!!!).After this our bus took us a few miles to the east where we all walked to the southern edge of Omaha Beach, along the beach, up the cliffs to the American Cemetary located there (remember the scenes from Saving Private Ryan at this cemetary?) All the Scouts from all over Europe ringed the central area as the US Ambassador and other dignitaries made presentations. Afterwards each scout was given a flag and the name of an American soldier, he had to find that soldier and place the flag on his grave.... Words escape me in an attempt to describe this.....Walking along the sandy beaches that day and climbing the cliffs, those brave men who stormed the beaches and climbed those cliffs deserve our eternal gratitude. it must have been sheer hell......
Great story. Thanks!
 
Prelude To Market-Garden, Part 1

Within 3 months after D-Day, the Allies poured 2 million men into France, and 3.5 million tons of supplies. Eisenhower had enough supplies at the beginning of September to hurl one army group into Germany, and thus perhaps destroy the enemy before he could turn and recover. Naturally enough, both Bradley and Montgomery saw this clearly, and each argued that his own line of advance should be given priority. Monty's was "the long envelopment", that is the longer in distance but the one more likely by boldness and daring to achieve success. It was the northern route across the Rhine between Holland and Germany, knifing down through the northern German plains into the industrial heartland of the Ruhr and thence into Berlin. Bradley's was called "the short envelopment" driving east actoss the waist of Germany to cut the country in two and perhaps come up on Berlin from the south.

There were two very strong arguments favoring Montgomery's northward movement up the Channel coast: the need to overrun the launching sites for the V-2 rockets, and the even greater need for the Belgian port of Antwerp, third largest in the world. These arguments convinced Ike that Monty's 21st Army Group should have supply priority. Bradley's 12th Army Group, however, was to build up east of Paris and "prepare to strike rapidly eastward. But Patton with his 3rd Army was not paying attention to this restraint. On August 30, he crossed the Meuse River was was more than 100 miles east of Paris, close to the German border. Then he ran out of gas. When one of his corp commanders complained that he was low on fuel, Patton told him to keep going "until the tanks stop, then get out and walk." But he flew back to Versailles to convince Ike to increase his tonnage, guaranteeing that he could rupture the Siegfried Line. Eisenhower agreed, allowing Patton to head for Mannheim and Frankfurt, and also agreed to Bradley's request that the First Army stay on Patton's left.

Montgomery exploded when he heard the news. There were not enough supplies for two offensives, he protested. He insisted on retaining priority for his "full-blooded thrust." He called Patton's drive "a side-show", and insisted that Eisenhower meet him in Brussels. This summons of his superior was typical Monty arrogance. Yet, to preserve the peace, Eisenhower did it, though he was injured at the time; his trick football knee had given out. When he met Monty, the latter assumed a pedantic air and proceeded to give Ike a lecture on basic tactics, like a professor talking to a plebe. Finally Eisenhower interrupted him to say, "Steady, Monty, you can't talk to me like that. I'm your boss." Monty apologized, then changed the subject to his new plan that he said promised great results. It called for a daring crossing of the Lower Rhine at Arnhem in Holland to turn the German right flank. It would be done by the British 2nd Army and the Allied Airborne Army. Eisenhower approved it. He was eager to use the the Airborne Army and wanted to get across the Rhine before his offensive lost momentum. Thus was born Operation Market-Garden.

Monty's plan was a good one, but if there was anyone unqualified to execute it, it was Monty. Market-Garden called for a bold opportunistic leader with the style of Patton, not a careful, methodical master of the set-piece battle like Montgomery. But it was too late to make this change, and politically impossible. Ike would also find that he had, to his eventual great distress, ignored the importance of Antwerp. And both Monty and Ike also ignored a second critical factor:

The resilence of the German army.

 
Prelude to Market-Garden, Part 2

After the Battle for Normandy, it appeared that the Wehrmacht had suffered almost irreparable losses in both the East and West. It had lost 450,000 men in the West and in the East a staggering 900,000. Yet at the beginning of September there ware still 3.421 million troops on the rosters of the Feldheer or field army. Of these about 2 million had to be committed to the Soviet front. That remainder would go to Model defending the Siegfried Line.

Throughout September Hitler worked with great skill to provide Model with more troops. Because he could count on an inexhaustible reservoir of slave labor to man his industries, he could impress all Germany's able manhood into the Wehrmacht. In late July he ordered the creation of 18 new divisions earmarked for the West. He also transformed 100 infantry fortress battalions in rear areas into replacement battalions for Model. In mid-August Der Fuhrer ordered activation of 25 reserve divisions to be called Volksgrenadier divisions and thus become the foundation of a new People's Army to replace the old one, which had betrayed and tried to kill him on July 20. The 18 divisions formed in July were also called Volksgrenadier and all would receive their indoctrination and training from Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler and his SS.

The fragments of armored forces battered in the East were organized into 10 new panzer divisions, and some were ready for action in the West by mid-September. Hitler had also decreed that German tank production must match Allied quantity and quality. Production must be concentrated on the formidable Tigers and the peerless Panthers, both of which were more than a match for the Shermans. Hitler also ordered that the West be given priority on the new ironclad killers and that they should go to the new armored divisions, rather than to the depleted panzers. Although this seemed to ignore the experience of the veteran formations, it made certain that the new ones would be built around a battalion of 40 Panthers each- a most formidable armored force indeed. Also the unwelcome defeats on both fronts had conferred a logistics gift on the Wehrmacht: as the amount of conquered territory shrank, so did the fronts and supply lines.

So when Market-Garden commenced on September 17, it was not against an enemy in disarray as so many Allied soldiers of all ranks, motivated by their the-war-is-won attitude, actually believed, but against forces rearmed, reequipped and reinforced in what the Germans called, "The Miracle of the West."

 
Market-Garden Part One

By driving a 60 mile salient into the German right or Northern flank in Holland, Market-Garden would outflank the Siegfried Line and carry Montgomery's forces across the lower Rhine and down the shortest route to Berlin. 5 major water courses crossed Montgomery's path between Antwerp and his objective of Arnheim in Holland. The first 2 were canals north of Eindhoven. The third was the Maas River- or Meuse- 24 miles farther on. 8 miles farther was the Waal River, flowing under an arched bridge at Nijmegan, and finally the end of the salient 20 miles farther east at Arnheim on the lower Rhine. Here it was assumed the German forces were light.

3 airborne divisions- the U.S. 82nd and 101st and the British 1st- were to seize bridges and crossings around these points and thus roll out a carpet for the following infantry and armor of the 2nd British Army. This would be the first daylight drop of the war and the largest airborne assault in all history. Some 16,500 paratroopers and 3,500 glider troops would be involved, virtually all the the strength of the Allied Airborne Army uer Maj. Gen. Lewis Brereton. Operational command wet to Lt. Gen. Browning. This was an unfortunate choice. Browning was just the sort of supercilious British aristocrat that Americans detest. Nor was he the equal of Matthew Ridgeway, whom Bradley wanted.

Ridgeway certainly would never have allowed Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams's U.S. IX Troop Carrier Command to drop the Red Devils of the British 1st Airborne so far from their objective at Arnheim. Because of the immobility of airborne troops, it is doctrine that they must be dropped as close to their objective as possible. But Williams so feared German ack-ack that he was going to drop the Red Devils 10 miles from their objective, the bridge over the Rhine. Williams and Brereton also insisted on one lift a day rather than the originally proposed two, because of the necessity of repairs and "resting" the crews. This meant it would take two days for 3 divisions to be carried to the drop zone, and two days of good weather became an imperative requisite for the success of the operation, which meteorologists refused to guarantee along the English Channel at the approach of autumn.

On a sunny morning 1,545 transports and 478 gliders, together with 371 British fighter escorts and 548 Americans thundered over the Channel carrying the first waves to Belgium and Holland. They followed in the wake of an Allied bombardment force that had struck during the night at enemy fighter bases and AA installations. The Luftwaffe flew only 100 sorties and shot down but a single Allied fighter. General Williams' fears about enemy flak were almost baseless. Only 65 transports and 45 gliders were lost, all but 5 of the gliders because of broken tow ropes. The British lost not a single aircraft to enemy action. For all units the drops were the most accurate ever conducted, either in combat or in training.

But then Market-Garden began to become unraveled.

 
Market-Garden Part 2

The Red Devils landed first, but by extreme bad luck almost all of the armored jeeps of the division's recon squadron were aboard the crashed gliders. The jeeps were to compensate for dropping the paratroopers so far from their objective. Instead of dashing to Arnhem in them to seize the railway and highway bridges, the British had to march there on foot and 4 vital hours were lost en route.

North of Arnhem was high ground commanding the bridges. One battalion of paratroopers was sent to seize it, but was stopped by armed patrols of the 9th SS Panzer Division. A second battalion moving on the bridge was halted by other elements of the 9th SS. Only Lt. Col J. D. Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion was left to assault the bridges. As they neared the railway bridge, it blew up in their faces, seeming to curl into the air toward them. But they did find the highway bridge intact and captured its north end, the one debouching toward the German plain. Frost tried to take the entire bridge during the night by frontal assault and men crossing the river in rowboats, but was stopped each time.

General Urquhart could not break through to Frost because he had to hold open his landing zones for the rest of his division due to arrive during the next 2 days. He had pleaded for enough air lift to land his entire division on the first day- his was the most exposed sector, at the tip of the Allied spearhead- but he had been denied. Next day fog over Britain delayed the reinforcement until 3pm. Then more misfortune befell the Allies. The presence of another SS panzer division, the 10th, was discovered near Arnhem, and complete operational orders for Market-Garden had been captured. It had been taken from an American officer who had foolishly and improperly carried it with him into battle, His glider was shot down, and he was taken prisoner. Within a few hours, the plan was on the desk of Field Marshal Model in his headquarters fortuitously located almost within the Red Devils' drop zone. Model saw at once that he could contain the British spearhead and slow the advance of the following infantry will well-timed counterstrokes.

At the southern end of the airborne corridor, the U.S. 101st Airborne under Maxwell Taylor also landed within its drop zone on the first day, concentrating quickly to move against the highway bridge over the Wilhemina Canal at Son and thence to their objective at Eindhoven. Two battalions of the 506th Parachute Regiment were held up by enemy 88s, and when they came in sight of the Wilhemina Bridge, it rose into the sky with a roar. By midnight, the entire regiment was across, the next day it's soldiers took Eindhoven and captured four bridges over a local river and a canal. Still General Taylor worried about where the following British ground forces might be.

They were behind him. German roadblocks had held up the Irish Guards spearheading the advance of Monty's leading XXX Corps. They did not reach Eindhoven until 7pm in the evening of the second day. But the tanks of the Guards Armored Brigade could not reach Eindhoven until the makeshift bridge over the Wilhemina Canal was strengthened. The XXX Corps were now 33 hours behind schedule.

 
Market-Garden, Part 3

In the middle of the airborne corridor around Nijmegan Gen. James Gavin's 82nd Airborne faced more difficult problems. The 82nd had to capture the highway bridge over the Maas at Grave and next the great 650-yard highway span over the Waal. But seemingly more important to General Browning, the Airborne Army commander, was the 300 foot high Groesbeeck Ridge commanding both and supposedly held by the enemy. He wanted Gavin to take the ridge first. Gavin's paratroopers did, but found no enemy. Having lost valuable time there, still not moving against the Nijmegan bridges, they next captured the Grave bridge and and another bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal. But now the Germans were pouring into Nijmegan, and it seemed to Gavin that the opportunity to capture the bridges there was about to be lost. After many delays, he was finally ready to attack on September 20.

At 3pm Gavin's paratroopers began moving toward the launching point on the quarter-mile-wide Waal. After a tremendous effort, they captured the bridges. (This action made the 82nd Airborne famous around the world, and gave them a glory they still have today.) Nevertheless, even the valor of these splendid troops had not been enough to take the spans before nightfall of the 4th day of Market-Garden. It would take XXX Corps another day to resume the advance.

The Red Devils also fought with legendary valor But it was a hopeless fight. Steadily, remorselessly, the numbers of the paratroopers in their bright red berets shrank. Their ordeal lasted for 9 days and nights. Each day the German counterstrokes cut them up into smaller groups. With no armor and little artillery they fought with rifles and pistols against enemy armor, air, and artillery. Food rations were cut to a 6th. Even ammunition was rationed. Finally, Montgomery brought Market-Garden to a melancholy close. Of the 9,000 Red Devils who had jumpes so gallantly and confidently into a fiery crucible, some 2,000 were withdrawn to British lines. About 6,000 had been captured by the Germans, and half of these were wounded. The rest were dead.

 
Market-Garden, Concluded

Bad luck, bad weather and bad intelligence had plagued Market-Garden from the beginning. Montgomery himself blamed the weather for the operation's failure. But bad weather had to be anticipated in that time and place, and bad luck must always be expected in battle. Bad intelligence gave no indication at all of the armored strength on Model's supposedly weak right flank. Nothing, of course, could have been unluckier than capture of Montgomery's operational order.

Still, tactical boldness was the missing ingredient in the execution of Monty's bold strategic plan. The movement of Dempsey's XXX Corps was altogether too cautious, and the delay in the attack on the Nijmegan bridges altogether too long. If Urquhart with all his forces had been close to the bridge, he might have held it until XXX Corps arrived and prevented the SS divisions from pouring across it to block the path between the Waal and the Rhine. So Market-Garden progressed according to plan, but not according to timetable.

In deep disappointment, and after some very exasperated prodding by Supreme Headquarters, Field Marshal Montgomery turned to what should have been his prior purpose: the seizure of Antwerp. Although the British 11th Armored Division had entered Antwerp as early as September 4, capturing it with almost all of its docks intact, strong German positions around Walcheren Island at the mouth of the Scheldt Estuary made it impossible to use this magnificent port until they were cleaned out. This laborious operation undertaken by Canadian troops was not completed until November 26. By then it was depressingly clear that the war would not end in 1944.

A stalemate now occured in the West. With winter having arrived, it was difficult for the Allies to make headway, and progress was slow. Although Eisenhower and the other commanders were anxious to reach Germany, they realized that they might have to wait until spring to do so. That, in turn, would give Hitler the chance to further consolidate his defenses. Hitler, however, had no intention of of doing so. With the recklessness of a desperate gambler, he decided that what was needed was a surprise attack.

 
We now turn to another of the finest moments in the history of American warfare, the Battle of the Bulge. I will attempt to narrate this great, heroic, battle in the full amount of detail it deserves.

 
Rommel's "Reward", Part One

On October 14, 1944, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel received his final reward from a grateful Fuhrer. In early August Rommel had returned to his home in Herrlingen to convalesce. He had not been a good patient, had even bitten a surgeon major general who had told him to keep quiet. Unknown to Rommel, his colleagues in the conspiracy inadvertently had begun to implicate him deeper in their clumsy plot.

Gen. Heinrich von Stulpnagel, the commandant of Paris back on July 20, had ordered the arrest of the Gestapo there. Although he released them upon hearing of the failure to kill Hitler he shortly received a notice to report to Army headquarters in Berlin. Like Kluge after him, Stulpnagel understood the dread meaning of that summons. Driving east, he had his driver stop at the Meuse Canal. He got out, waded in the water, drew his pistol and shot himself in the head. But the bullet did not kill but only blinded him. His driver pulled him out of the canal and took him to a hospital. While recovering he repeatedly moaned one word, "Rommel!". Gestapo officers standing around his bed removed him to Berlin where he was tortured and eventually hanged with piano wire. No one knows what he might have said under duress.

At Herrlingen the weeks passed quietly until, on September 6, Rommel's chief of staff, General Speidel, came to see him and informed him that he (Speidel) had been removed from his position and ordered to report to Guderian in Berlin next day. But Speidel never saw Guderian. At 6:00 am the following morning, the Gestapo knocked at his door and took him away. He was twice interrogated, perhaps tortured, but did not talk. (Eventually, Speidel went on to survive the war.) Rommel wrote a letter of protest to Hitler but heard nothing from him. Next their came to Herrlingen his old friend, Dr. Strolin. Fearing that the Gestapo might have planted a microphone in Rommel's study, they conversed in whispers. Strolin asked Rommel what he wanted with the pistol on the desk. "I'm not afraid of the English or the Americans," Rommel replied, "only of the Russians- and the Germans. Strolin left, never to return, after Frau Rommel telephoned him to say that the house was being watched.

Rommel's next visitor was a man named Maier, the local party leader from Ulm. He told the field marshal that the SS chief in Ulm had informed him that Rommel no longer believed in victory. "Victory!" Rommel exclaimed. "Why don't you look at a map?" When Maier mentioned Hitler, Rommel cried: "That damned fool?" Maier was aghast. "You should not say things like that, Herr Field Marshal. You will have the Gestapo after you- if they are not after you already."

Rommel's last visitors were two toadying Nazi generals named Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel. Burgdorf had been previously described by Rommel as "a drunken, foul-mouthed butcher who should never have been a general," and as for Maisel, he said, "If there was any dirty, underhand work going on, you can be sure Maisel was somewhere at the bottom of it." They arrived October 14, with final instructions from Adolf Hitler for Erwin Rommel.

 
Rommel's Reward, Part 2

Nearly an hour later Rommel entered his wife's room. There was on his face a strange and terrible expression that she had never seen before. "What is the matter with you?" she exclaimed in alarm. "What has happened? Are you ill?"

"I have come to say good-bye," he replied, gazing at her tenderly. "In a quarter of an hour I shall be dead. They suspect me of having taken part in the attempt to kill Hitler...They say that von Stulpnagel and General Speidel have denounced me. It is the usual trick. I have told them that I do not believe it, and it cannot be true. The Fuhrer has given me the choice of taking poison or being dragged before the People's Court. They have brought the poison. They say it will take only 3 seconds to act." Frau Rommel begged her husband to go before the court. "No," Rommel replied firmly. "I would not be afraid to be tried in public, for I can defend everything I have done. But I know that I should never reach Berlin."

Rommel said good-bye to his wife, and also to his son, who had come into the room. He went downstairs to take his leave of his devoted aide, Captain Aldinger. Aldinger pleaded with him to attempt to escape. But Rommel said there was no hope. The house was surrounded and the roads blocked off. He could not risk retribution against his wife and son. If he killed himself, at least Frau Rommel would receive a pension and there would be a state funeral. If he chose the court, the situation would be seriously different. "I have spoken to my wife and made up my mind," he said, "I will never allow myself to be hanged by that man, Hitler. I planned no murder. I only tried to serve my country, as I have done all my wife, but now this is what I must do. In about half an hour there will come a telephone call from Ulm to say I have had an accident and am dead."

Rommel got into the car with the two generals and drove off. A few hundred yards from the house the SS driver stopped the car. Burgdorf gave Rommel the poison, saw him take it, and got out of the car. Death did not come in three seconds. For more than five minutes Rommel lay doubled up. convulsed and sobbing in the back seat, practically unconscious, until life at last left him.

Later that afternoon a stricken Frau Rommel and her son were taken to the hospital where Rommel lay, supposedly dead of a stroke. Broken-hearted and grieving, Frau Rommel was nevertheless startled by the epression on her husband's face: his lips were twisted in a grimace of utter contempt.

So perished the finest soldier of the Third Reich.

 
Book recommendation:

Panzer Commander by Colonel Hans von Luck.

He fought in Russia, North Africa and Western Europe, mostly as the commander of Rommel's reconaissance battalion.

 
The Battle of the Bulge, Part 1

Adolf Hitler never really recovered from the effects of the July bombing. His figure was stooped, his puffy face had the pallor of death, his left arm twitched uncontrollably much as he tried to conceal it and when he walked, he dragged one leg behind him. Yet, when he uttered the frequent and enigmatic remark, "My time will come in the mists and snows of winter," his generals were amazed at how his bulging blue eyes shone once again with the old evangelical fervor. (They should not have been amazed. Hitler's romantic beliefs in the power of the "winter warriors" of Germany was part and parcel of his whole obsession with the Wagnerian pagan mythos.) It was not until September 16, 1944, when the high command gathered with him at the Wolf's Lair, that his top generals understood his mystifying prediction.

Gen. Alfred Jodl, chief of operations, was summarizing the situation on the Western Front when he observed that the Americans were attacking the Ardennes and that the Germans had little there to stop them. At the word, "Ardennes," Hitler's eye shown again, and he cried, "I have made a momentous decision! I shall go over to the offensive! That is to say," his hand fell on the map before him, "here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective Antwerp!"

The high command was astounded, After 3 months of fighting on both fronts, the Wehrmacht had suffered a million casualties, almost half of them in the West. Where would Der Fuhrer find the men, weapons and fuel for such a massive counterstroke? Perhaps as many as 30 divisions would be needed, with a third of them armored, WHere would all this come from?

Hitler's situation was desperate, and desperate men try desperate remedies. His plan was to strike through the wooded, hilly terrain of the Ardennes where the Allies were weakest on their broad front and dash for the port of Antwerp about 100 air miles from the German Siegfried Line. By seizing Antwerp he would trap the Allied armies in the north and compel them to sue for a separate peace, o at least replace the implacable policy of Unconditional Surrender. Hitler hoped to put a ***** in the strangest coalition in military history: the Big Three. If he could destroy the British and Canadian armies, Britain would not be able to make good her losses, and Canada would be most reluctant to send another force to Europe. Catastrophic losses would so shock the United States that she would leave the European war altogether an concentrate on her true enemy, Japan. Thus, Nazi Germany would be able to turn with all her still formidable resources on Red Russia and crush her.

Of course, this strategy was based on a complete misunderstanding of the United States. Hitler had declared war with the USA on December 12, 1941 with much the same misunderstanding, and all of the events of the last three years had apparently made no impression on him whatsoever. The result of a complete German victory in the Battle of the Bulge would have been a renewed American effort over the next several months. America would never have sued for peace. It was actually more likely that Stalin would have sued for peace; he was, after all, a dictator who unlike the western Allies could ignore the desires of his own people. Perhaps Hitler should have gambled on attacking in the East rather than the West. But he chose the Ardennes, and the die was cast.

 
THE PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN

Although the Japanese had been able to reinforce their troops in Leyte in the first few days after the invasion, after the Battle of Leyte Gulf it became progressively more difficult to do so, as their attempts to put troops into the port of Ormoc were severely disrupted by Allied air attacks. By November 2, the US Army had captured all five Japanese airfields. The Japanese did manage to get their strength up to 60,000 (from the original 20,000) but by mid-November General Krueger had 180,000 men. The Allied move through the island was hampered by a typhoon (Nov 8) and torrential rains which rendered roads in what was already difficult terrain, virtually impassable.

Then on December 10, Krueger put two divisions ashore south of Ormoc, splitting the defenses, capturing the town and port against light opposition, and by the end of December, organized resistance ceased, although small groups were able to hold out in the jungle until the end of the war. During this time, Admiral Halsey's carriers remained in the area, providing continuous support. However, these days were to see the proliferation of a new Japanese tactic, which was to cause significant damage to surface ships until the end of the war; the Kamikaze attacks.

General Yamaschita (spelling altered to confound the FFA censor), commanding the Japanese in the Philippines, then fell back to his original plan, with much diminished forces (having lost the 60,000 he put into Leyte), which was to defend the island of Luzon, and Manila.

MacArthur now decided to seize the intermediate island of Mindoro, so that his air force could cover the landings on Luzon (which were to take place at the ideal place, Lingayen Gulf—where the Japanese had landed nearly 4 years before-- 110 miles north of Manila). Mindoro was lightly held by the Japanese, and the seizure was so quick that US planes were using the airfield within a week. Of course, the Japanese airplanes were unable to oppose the Mindoro campaign because they were being pounded by Halsey's carrier planes, as well as by the Fifth Air Force.

But the crown for the reconquest of the Philippines was Luzon, and Manila. A total of 164 ships sailed from Leyte Gulf and arrived off Lingayen Gulf and began disembarking four divisions of Krueger's Sixth Army. On January 9, 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.

 
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RAID ON PLOESTI
My uncle was killed piloting a B-24 in a later raid on Ploesti. My grandmother gave me this book about the low-level raid about 40 years ago, and I read it again about once a year. This is one of the most amazing stories ever, and I hope Hollywood makes a movie about it someday. Highly recommended.
 
Battle of the Bulge, Continued

When Hitler spoke of "the mists and snows of winter" he meant that his counteroffensive would be launched in the bad weather that enshrouds northwestern Europe in November and December and thus cancel out the Anglo-American air superiority. He counted heavily on speed and surprise and actually expected to be in Antwerp within a week. To command Operation Watch on the Rhine, later changed to Autumn Mists, he broght the aging Gerd von Rundstedt out of retirement. Because he hoped to deceive the enemy as thoroughly as they had deceived Rundstedt with Operation Fortitude, he at first told this wizened but still venerated old soldier that he was to defend outside the Siegfried and then fall back into the fortifications for the decisive battle. Only later at his own choosing would he reveal his true design.

This was to assign the main effort of the thrust to the 4 armored divisions of the 6th SS Panzer Army to be led by his old Nazi crony, the hard-drinking but faithful Sepp Dietrich. Hitler deliberately chose the SS for the point of honor to humiliate the regular army which had tried to kill him. Dietrich on the right flank was to be supported by the 5th Panzer Army under General Hasso von Manteuffel, another trusted general brought in from the East. On the left or southern flank would be the infantry divisions of the 7th Army under Gen. Erich Brandenberger, who would protect the southern flank of the penetration. Once it had been made, infantry divisions would fan out to secure both flanks.

A special force commanded by Otto Skorzeny, Hitler's favorite Aryan and the man who had rescued Mussolini, was to precede the main attack. Dressed in captured American uniforms and riding in captured American vehicles, the troops were to take the bridges over the River Meuse before they could be blown and thus block the drive on Antwerp. They were also to cut telephone lines, kill American military police directing traffic, so that Germans in Yankee uniforms could direct forces in the wrong direction, shoot up radio stations and sow panic and confusion on the American rear by making false reports of heavy American troops and passing false orders. The Wehrmacht was combed for troops who spoke the American "dialect". There were many volunteers, so that Skorzeny eventually had 3,300 men in his 150th Panzer Brigade, but few of them knew the dialect and- as events would show- none of them knew much about the private lives of American sports and film stars or could light and hold a cigarette in that special American way.

The code name, Greif, could mean a griffin, a mythical creature that was somehow to rule the world for Germany, and also "grasp". One of Skorzeny's lieutenants told him that he had deduced the unit's mission from this word: to race to Paris to seize and kill Dwight Eisenhower. With a straight face Skorzeny, who did not wnat his men to learn of their real mission prematurely and perhaps give it away, made the clever young man promise not to tell anyone of the secret. Skorzeny went to bed that night confident that by morning every man in the 150th would be certain that Paris and the amiable "Ike" of the "Amis" was the unit's objective.

 
The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

Ultimately there would be 30 divisions, 18 infantry and 12 panzer, committed to the attack. There would also be 2,300 tanks and propelled assault guns plus general support troops such as engineers and signal battalions. Goering promised 3,000 airplanes, but the Luftwaffe came up with half that number: still, Hitler was delighted.

As he had done in "the Miracle of the West", Adolf Hitler had reached deep into the cupboard and again found it far from empty. In five years of war, Germany had lost almost 3.75 million men, and yet, for all these enormous losses, the Wehrmacht still stood at close to 10 million men, including 7.5 million in the army. Although these 260 divisions were indeed far-flung, Hitler raised new levies by inducting heretofore-deferred students, men with less than crippling illnesses or defects, nonessential government workers, hospital convalescents, sailors and airmen converted into foot soldiers and by extending the draft at either end to run from 16 to 60. Few of these beardless youths and old men, of course, were conscripted into battle formations. Nevertheless, they could relieve noncombatant soldiers for combat.

Even more surprising, the will of the German people to fight was still strong by late 1944. Unconditional Surrender had bound them closer to their Fuhrer and even the regular 1,000 plane raids on their industry had not shaken their faith in him. Indeed, strategic bombing had not prevented German industrial production from reaching its peak at this time. Small industries were dispersed, especially in the East where the Soviets had few big bombers. Although Germany never did go into round-the-clock production or fully utilize its women workers, a 60 hour work week wa decreed, impressed foreign workers were driven harder and production of civilian or luxury goods drastically curtailed. More and more Jews and other other "undesirables" were shipped in cattle cars to provide slave labor at concentration camp-run factories and mines.

All the planning of Autumn Mist had been in secret. Hitler was so fearful of its discovery that he would not entrust any of its details to be transmitted to anyone by the use of Enigma. By October he was at last ready to inform Gerd von Rundstedt of the plan. The "old man" was by then ensconced in Ziegenberg Castle east of the Rhine, from which he rarely ventured. Indeed, he quickly divined that he was to be a figurehead for Hitler's secret and ambitious operation and that Field Marshal Walter Model, one of his three army group commanders, was to be the true chief. Rundstedt, like almost all Prussian Junkers (Prussian soldiers of landholding or noble descent, usually distinguished by the "von") did not like Model, finding him rough and unethical. But the two men agreed heartily that Hitler's plan was a disaster waiting to happen. It was far too ambitious. Rundstedt said that "all, absolutely all conditions for the possible success of such an offensive were lacking." Between them Rundstedt and Model drew up an alternative plan called the Small Solution in comparison to Hitler's Big Solution. It's objective was only about half the distance to Antwerp; a crossing of the Meuse at Hay to be joined by a simultaneous attack from the north. This would trap the Americans around Aachen in a double envelopment costing them from 10-14 divisions.

Hitler, upon learning of this alternate plan, flew into one of his typical rages. How dare these men question his genius? Again? After he had been proven right in every campaign, every battle, and the only reason that Germany was in the state it was in was because of his generals? For over three hours he raved at Rundstedt and Model. He, Hitler, had defeated France. He, Hitler had put England on the ropes. He, Hitler, had nearly conquered the Soviet Union, only to be stopped by the incompetence of his generals and the cowardice of Paulus. He, Hitler had led the German nation to the greatest heights ever known, and still these idiot generals tried to limit his genius. They were to blame for every defeat, he was responsible for every victory!

The attack, as Hitler had conceived it, was ordered without changes. It was to begin on the morning of December 16.

 
STRATEGIC BOMBING OF JAPAN

The first bombing of Japan was, of course, the Doolittle raid in 1942. But that was just a pinprick, although it had psychological value for the USA, and impacted Japanese psychology to the extent that it was one of the motivating factor for Japanese action against Midway.

The Allies were far away from Japan, across the Pacific. To deliver a substantial blow against the Japanese homeland, they would need to be much closer, and they would need a very large bomber capable of delivering a powerful blow from far away. They moved closer to the Japanese homeland with the island hopping strategy; and the second requirement was the development of the B-29 Superfortress bomber, which had an operational range of 1,500 miles, and could carry a payload of 20,000 lbs. Almost 90% of the bombs dropped on the home islands of Japan were delivered by the B-29.

The B-29 was capable of flight up to 40,000 feet, at speeds of up to 350 mph. This was its best defense, because Japanese fighters of that day could barely get that high, and few could catch the B-29, even if they were at altitude and waiting. Only the heaviest of anti-aircraft weapons could reach it, and since the Axis forces did not have proximity fuses, hitting or damaging the airplane from the ground in combat was next to impossible.

The first raid by B-29s on Japan from China was on 15 June, 1944. The planes took off from Chengdu, over 1,500 miles away. This first raid was also not particularly damaging to Japan. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s that took off hit the target area; four aborted with mechanical problems, four crashed, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and others bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only one B–29 was lost to enemy aircraft.

When the island-hopping campaign captured islands close enough to Japan to be within the range of B-29s, the Twentieth Air Force was assigned to XXI Bomber Command which organized a much more effective bombing campaign of the Japanese home islands. Based in the Marianas, the B-29s were now able to carry their full bomb loads and were supplied by cargo ships and tankers.

On the islands of Tinian, Saipan, and Guam five major airfields (three on the flat island of Tinian), each constructed as a base for a four-group wing of B-29s, became the launch sites for the large B-29 raids against Japan in the final year of the war. These islands could be easily supplied by ship. The first B-29 arrived on Saipan on 12 October 1944, and the first combat mission was launched from there on 28 October 1944, with 14 B-29s attacking the Japanese harbor on Truk atoll.

The first mission against Japan from bases in the Marianas was flown on 24 November 1944, with 111 B-29s sent to attack Tokyo. From that point, more-and-more intense raids were launched regularly until the end of the war. These attacks succeeded in devastating almost all large Japanese cities (with the exception of Kyoto and several others), and they gravely damaged Japan's war industries. Although less publicly appreciated, the aerial-mining program carried out by B-29s against Japanese shipping routes and harbor approaches profoundly degraded Japan's ability to support its population and its army to fight the war.

Unlike all other forces in theater, the Bomber Commands did not report to the commanders of the theaters but directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In March 1945, they were placed under the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific which was commanded by General Carl Spaatz.

As in Europe, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) tried daylight precision bombing. However, it proved to be impossible due to the weather around Japan, as bombs dropped from a great height were tossed about by high winds. General LeMay, commander of XXI Bomber Command, instead switched to mass firebombing night attacks from altitudes of around 7,000 feet on the major centers of Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe. Despite limited early success, particularly against Nagoya, LeMay was determined to use such bombing tactics against the vulnerable Japanese cities. Attacks on strategic targets also continued in lower-level daylight raids.

The first successful firebombing raid was on Kobe on 3 February 1945, and following its relative success the USAAF continued the tactic. Nearly half of the principal factories of the city were damaged, and production was reduced by more than half at one of the port's two shipyards. Much of the armor and defensive weaponry of the bombers was removed to allow increased bomb loads; by this time, Japanese air defense in terms of night-fighters and anti-aircraft guns was so feeble it did not greatly increase the risk.

The first raid of this type on Tokyo was on the night of 23–24 February when 174 B-29s destroyed around one square mile of the city. Following on that success 334 B-29s raided on the night of 9–10 March, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Around 16 square miles of the city was destroyed and over 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the fire storm. The destruction and damage was at its worst in the city sections east of the Imperial Palace. It was the most destructive conventional raid in all of history. The city was made primarily of wood and paper, and Japanese firefighting methods were not up to the challenge. The fires burned out of control, boiling canal water and causing entire blocks of buildings to spontaneously combust from the heat.

The effects of the Tokyo firebombing proved the fears expressed by Admiral Yamamoto in 1939: "Japanese cities, being made of wood and paper, would burn very easily. The Army talks big, but if war came and there were large-scale air raids, there's no telling what would happen."

In the following two weeks, there were almost 1,600 further sorties against the four cities, destroying 31 square miles in total at a cost of 22 aircraft. By June, over forty percent of the urban area of Japan's largest six cities (Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama, and Kawasaki) was devastated. LeMay's fleet of nearly 600 bombers destroyed tens of smaller cities and manufacturing centers in the following weeks and months.

Leaflets were dropped over cities before they were bombed, warning the people and urging them to escape the city. Though many, even within the Air Force, viewed this as a form of psychological warfare, a significant element in the decision to produce and drop them was the desire to assuage American anxieties about the extent of the destruction created by this new war tactic. Warning leaflets were also dropped on cities that were not to be bombed to create uncertainty and absenteeism.

It is instructive to see what percentage of the cities were deemed to have been destroyed by conventional bombing:

Yokohama 58%

Tokyo 51%

Nagoya 40%

Osaka 35%

Kobe 56%

The requirements of strategic bombing led to one of the fiercest battles of WW2. Iwo Jima lay in the path of bombers which went from the Marianas to Japan. It gave the Japanese early warning of Allied attacks, and it was viewed as an emergency landing area for B-29's which might have been damaged on their raids. After a costly battle, (which we will talk about next) this proved to be true, as hundreds of damaged aircraft, or planes with mechanical trouble, used Iwo Jima as a safe harbor landing area in the concluding months of the war.

 
The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

In December of 1944, following the fierce and costly fighting in the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest, Dwight Eisenhower had 65 infantry, armored, and airborne divisions covering a front of 500 miles stretching from the North Sea to Switzerland. His problem was that he had few reserves. Almost every unit was committed. Frederick the Great had said, "He who defends everything, defends nothing." So Ike decided to concentrate his forces in two areas most conducive to continuing the offensive. One was north of the Ardennes region pointed toward the Ruhr, the other south of the Ardennes aimed at the Saar. In the Ardennes itself, that region of eastern Belgium and western Luxemborg through which the Germans had struck in 1940, he deployed minimal forces. And Ike had no reserve with which to contain any possible enemy penetration.

In ignoring the Ardennes, the Allies of 1944 were making the same error as the Allies of 1940! The area was held by the three infantry divisions of General Troy Middleton's VIII Corps, backed up by one armored Division. 20 miles north was another infantry division, Leonard Gerow's V Corps, which held the town of Monschau. The German plan was for Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Division to capture Monschau and open the way for three infantry divisions to protect his northern flank from counterattack. Skorzeny's "Americans' would then dash ahead to seize the Meuse bridges. In the center Mantueffel's 5th Panzer Army would seize Bastogne and the surrounding villages, then strike out for the Meuse. It was a plan that depended on speed, surprise, bad weather, and most of all the Ardennes itself. The forest is a rolling wooded terrain, broken by steep and narrow river valleys. The architect of the attack, Model, was well aware that the campaign would be a fight for roads and especially road junctions such as Bastogne. He was confident he could cross the Meuse, simply because he did not think the Americans would recover quickly eough from his opening blows.

All of the Allied intelligence officers, as well as the generals, were completely fooled. On Dec 12, 4 days before the attack, Monty's intelligence chief wrote, "The enemy is in a bad way... his situation is such that he cannot stage a major offensive operation." Monty himself requested permission from Ike to fly to England and visit his son, since obviously nothing of significance was going to happen until after the new year. Ike let him go. On the front line itself, the 106th Infntry Division was green (it was thought that the Ardennes would be a safe place for these newcomers to train) and were bored. Nothing had happened for months, the war was pretty much over and it was doubtful these troops ever expected to be in real combat.

Meanwhile, the German soldiers, now informed of the surprise attack, were elated. At last they would strike back against the invader who threatened their homeland! The Americans would never know what hit them.

 
The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

Before dawn of December 16, 14 German divisions began moving through the misty forests of the Eifel. Hitler had gotten his bad weather. Overcast skies would ground Allied air for 8 days. The sound of the massive movement of the divisions was agian drowned by the roar of the V-1s overhead bound for Liege and Antwerp. At 5:30 am 2,000 German guns commenced a furious bombardment. It was not an especially shattering barrage, more frightening than devastating, especially to untrained troops unaccustomed to the screaming sound of "the Screaming Meenies," missles fired by the Nebelwefer, a multiple barreled, electrically controlled rocket launcher. The Americans, still thinking of the Ardennes as a quiet sector, were mostly puzzled by the shelling- until they saw the Germans in their coal-scuttle helmets emerging from the morning mists.

On the River Our the 28th Infantry Division stretched out on a front of nearly 30 miles was overwhelmed by the attack of 5 divisions. That night Manteuffel's panzers surged west of the Our with orders to continue the advance through the darkness. On the Schnee-Eifel 2 regiments of the 106th DIvision were rapidly outflanked. Although they held their ground, they were surrounded the following morning, opening the way to St. Vith.

In the south the 4ty Division held firm and in the north Gerow's V Corps units upset Dietrich's timetable. At Monschau his attack was stopped short, and the lunge toward Butgenbach made scant progress, even though Dietrich committed the 12th SS Panzer Division to reinforce the slow-moving infantry. South of Butgenbach, however, the 1st SS Panzer Division found a soft spot: a mechanized calvary group holding the junction of the VIII and V Corps. These troops, untrained and unequipped for battle, were quickly overrun and the spearheads of the 1st SS penetrated 6 miles.

Everywhere else the Americans were fighting with bravery and determination, for it was in this great Battle of the Bulge that their military virtues of tenacity, mobility, and resilience came to the fore. Even the heavily outnumbered troops on the Schnee-Eifel gave the Germans as good as they got, preventing them from obtaining their first-day objectives.

General Gerow in the north was the first to realize that the enemy assault was far from local but rather "something big."He asked Hodges for permission to call off his attack against the Roer fams and withdraw as soon as possible to the Butgenbach Ridge. Hodges refused both requests, chiefly because he didn't appreciate the scale of the assault or realize that there had been penetration to the south. His information was scanty at best. Skorzeny's "Americans" had cut most of the telephone lines that had survived the artillery barrage. Reports reaching Middleton at his headquarters in Bastogne were also conflicting and confused. By midnight all of Middleton's reserves were committed or about to be. It would be a full 24 hours before he got any reinforcements.

 
The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

At Versailles, there was a debate about what kind of attack this was. Bradley, supported by Patton out in the field, thought it was a spoiling attack designed to draw off some of Patton's support forces to the Ardennes. Ike thought differently, and insisted that Middleton be supported. When Patton protested over the phone to Bradley, Ike yelled loud enough for Patton to hear, "Tell him that Ike is running this damned war!" The 9th Army's 7th Armored and the 3rd Army's 10th Armored were both sent to help Middleton.

Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, was not actually a part of 7th Armored. It was a technical unit trained to detect enemy mortars, map, and survey. There were about 140 soldiers in 33 open trucks under the command of Capt. Roger Mills. They were armed only with M-1s and carbines and were not trained fighters. As the convoy neared Malmeady it began to sleet. Those men who had tarpaulins covered themselves with these. Entering Malmeady they found the town's narrow, winding streets jammed with military vehicles, all going in the opposite direction. Townspeople ran alongside the trucks shouting, "Boche! Boche!" and pointing ahead in the direction Battery B was going. Captain Mills was radioed at exactly this time: there had been a German breakthrough at Butgenbach; he was advised to retreat before he headed into a trap. It was too late for such a message; Battery B was already in the thick of it. Beore he could turn around, the Germans spotted him. They came charging across an open field, firing as they came.

Tank shells and mortar shells rained down on the Americans. Machine-gun bullets raked them. Trucks exploded or crashed into roadside ditches. Some Americans tried to fight back with their puny weapons but the Germans came on. Others ran for a nearby wood and were cut down. An American jeep drove up and braked to a screeching halt. It's driver was Col. Pieper of the SS. He was infuriated. All that ammunition wasted on a helpless target! Those beautiful trucks, which the Germans could use so badly, were all shot up! With some difficulty Pieper stopped the firing. Now the Americans emerged from the ditches with their hands up. They were herded together while SS soldiers eagerly relieved them of their rings, watches, cigarettes, and gloves. The gloves were a particularly welcome prize. Colonel Pieper drove away. He had given orders to gather all the Americans and march them back to a Stalag (POW camp) in the area. About 130 Americans were drawn up in 8 rows within the fields with their hands upraised. Their arms became numb with the effort and their hands numb and cold. A German officer later identified as Maj. Werner Poetschke- probably because he was later killed and made a convienent fall guy- ordered two Mark IV tanks to cover the prisoners. Then he ordered them to open fire. Americans began to fall. "Machen alle kaput!" someone cried. "Kill them all!"

Machine guns on both tanks began to chatter, Americans fell screaming. Others flung themseves to the ground, burying their faces in the mud. For 15 minutes the tank machine guns were swiveled back and forth on this huddled mound of bodies. Screams, cries, groans of agony rose from it. Then the Germans drove away with a roar. An awful silence descended. Then passing German formations fired into the mound. But underneath the dead bodies, there were 41 survivors who hid for hours, then escaped in the night into the forest. (A few others who tried to flee into a cafe were cut down.)

Eventually details of the hideous Malmeady Massacre- the most vicious crime visited upon American troops in Europe- were published throughout the American army. In the hearts of those American soldiers embattled in the Ardennes and those coming to their rescue there burned a horrible ache for revenge.

 
PHILIPPINES, CONTINUED

After the landings north of Manila, in Lingayen Gulf on January 9, the US forces advanced fairly rapidly for over 60 miles until they reached Clark Air Force Base. There Japanese resistance began to stiffen. The battle there lasted until the end of January, and after capturing the base, XIV Corps advanced towards Manila. A second amphibious landing took place on 15 January, 45 miles southwest of Manila. On 31 January, two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division made an airborne assault, capturing a bridge, and later advanced towards Manila.

On 4 February the paratroopers of the 11th Airborne, approaching the city from the south, came to the main Japanese defences south of the city of Manila where their advance was halted by heavy resistance. General Yamaschita had ordered his troops to destroy all bridges and other vital installations as soon as the US forces entered the city, and Japanese forces entrenched throughout the city continued to resist US forces. General MacArthur announced the imminent recapture of Manila on the same day. On 11 February, the 11th Airborne Division captured the last Japanese outer defences, thus encircling the whole city.

When the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese had occurred in 1942, MacArthur had declared Manila to be an “open city”, sparing the inhabitants from becoming involved in street by street, house by house fighting. However, the Japanese decided to fight in Manila, so the battle was fierce, and much of the city was destroyed. It should be pointed out that General Yamaschita chose to withdraw from the city, but 10,000 Imperial Marine troops under Admiral Iwabuchi disobeyed the order and stayed in Manila. US and Filipino forces carried out clearing operations in the city in the following weeks. Casualties totalled 1,010 Americans and 12,000 Japanese.

During the fighting for the city, this led to the Manila Massacre. Various credible Western and Eastern sources agree that the death toll was at least 100,000. During lulls in the battle for control of the city, Japanese troops took out their anger and frustration on the civilians caught in the crossfire. Japanese troops looted and burned, and brutally executed, decapitated and abused women, men and children alike, including priests, Red Cross personnel, prisoners of war and hospital patients.

However, during this time, US Army Rangers, together with Filipino resistance fighters, carried out a daring raid on a prisoner of war camp in Luzon, at Cabanatuan. Fearful that the Japanese would massacre the prisoners being held there since the Bataan Death March (something they had done in other camps), MacArthur authorized the raid on the camp, which succeeded in surprising the Japanese and freeing over 500 prisoners held there. (The raid was featured in a movie titled The Great Raid, which was, however, commercially unsuccessful).

Battles continued throughout the island of Luzon in the following weeks, with more US troops having landed on the island. Filipino resistance fighters also attacked Japanese positions and secured several locations. The Allies had taken control of all strategically and economically important locations of Luzon by March. Small groups of the remaining Japanese forces retreated to the mountainous areas of the island, where they were besieged.

Pockets of Japanese soldiers held out in the mountains - most ceasing resistance with the unconditional surrender of Japan, but a scattered few holding out for many years afterwards. Casualties in the Philippines Campaign were stunningly high for both sides. Japanese losses were 205,535 dead, with 9,050 taken prisoners. Allied losses were far lower, with 8,310 dead and 29,560 wounded.

 
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Ozymandias said:
Japanese losses were 205,535 dead, with 9,050 taken prisoners.
This is an astonishing high dead to prisoner ratio, indicative of the brutality of the Pacific War. In all the European battles I am narrating, even the German/Russian struggles, the number of prisoners and wounded are significantly much higher. Whether it was a combination of Japanese unwillingness to surrender, racism ("The only good *** is a dead ***", etc.) there simply were not very many prisoners taken in the Pacific.I just described the infamous Malmeady Massacre during the Battle of the Bulge. How many such incidents must have occurred during the battles Ozymandius is narrating, but went unrecorded? We'll never know, but the numbers certainly suggest more than a few.
 
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The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

By the morning of the 18th- the third day- General von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army had opened a hole 12 miles wide south of St. Vith. Into it he ordered Gen. Heinrich von Luttwitz's XLVII Corps composed of three armored and one infantry division. The 116th Panzer made for Houffalize while the other three struck out for Bastogne 15 miles away. Nothing lay between this force but the remnants of a weak American armored command already battered the day before. At Bastogne itself, there were no American troops except Middleton's HQ and stragglers from the 28th Division streaming back from the defeat at Our. American communications were so bad that Middleton had no instructions to hold the town and no idea of what reinforcements were on the way. The closest units were the 101st Airborne at Rheims 100 miles to the southwest and the 10th Armored Combat Command B (CCB) 40 miles to the southeast, at Luxembourg city. Between these two forces and Luttwitz's spearheads there now began a race for the town that was the key to the defense or capture of the southern Ardennes.

10th Armored CCB got there first, arriving at dusk of the 18th. Immensly relieved, Middleton quickly ordered this force to block the three roads leading into Bastogne from the east and northeast in hopes of holding off the the onrushing German armor until the 101st Airborne arrived. Middleton now knew these forces were on their way. He had also received orders from Bradley: Bastogne must be held.

It was a close call. By 10pm that night Luttwitz's panzers were only 5 miles from the town. Panzer Lehr commanded by Gen. Fritz Bayerlein was in the lead and had slipped between two of CCB's roadblocks. Bayerlain hoped to gain the prize by a quick thrust under cover of darkness. He might have made it if he had not listened to some "friendly" Belgians who told him of a side road shortcut. It turned out to be a quagmire, and by dawn of the 19th Panzer Lehr was still 2 miles short of Bastogne. Worse for the Germans, the 101st had arrived during the night and joined battle with Panzer Lehr at daybreak.

Throughout the 19th the Germans made no headway, although they did menace Bastogne by capturing Houffalize to the North and Wiltz to the southeast. Only Bastogne now stood in the way of the Panzers reaching the Meuse River.

 
Ozymandias said:
Japanese losses were 205,535 dead, with 9,050 taken prisoners.
This is an astonishing high dead to prisoner ratio, indicative of the brutality of the Pacific War. In all the European battles I am narrating, even the German/Russian struggles, the number of prisoners and wounded are significantly much higher. Whether it was a combination of Japanese unwillingness to surrender, racism ("The only good *** is a dead ***", etc.) there simply were not very many prisoners taken in the Pacific.I just described the infamous Malmeady Massacre during the Battle of the Bulge. How many such incidents must have occurred during the battles Ozymandius is narrating, but went unrecorded? We'll never know, but the numbers certainly suggest more than a few.
I don't think it was racism, per se, although that existed. It was that all too often, Japanese prisoners who had surrendered would turn on their captors with hidden weapons, would attack medical corpsmen who were there to help them, would even call out to corpsmen in English and then ambush them. After a number of such incidents experienced by individual Allied troops, they would simply make sure they were dead. They weren't coordinated assassinations; they were just making sure they could protect themselves.
 
The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

Skorzeny's "Americans" had slipped through the crumbling front on the first two nights, and some of them actually reached the Meuse before they were stopped. The others were busily cutting telephone lines, intercepting liasion officers and dispatch riders, shooting up radio stations and killing military policemen. One of them evne took over a traffic booth to direct a reinforcing regiment down the wrong road. Despite this atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty, the Americans were far from broken. Many small units fought with great bravery, usually without any direction form above. And Bastogne at Mantueffel's flank had yet to be taken. By December 18, the date by which Rundstedt hoped to reach the Meuse, his timetable was badly off schedule.

Eisenhower saw the surprise attack as an opportunity. He ordered Patton to counterattack the German southern flank. The Germans did not consider this a possibilty in their original planning because Patton was in the Saar, too far away. But Ike was aware, as the Germans still apparently were not, of the amazing speed in which Patton could move when ordered. With the possible exception of Rommel, no general in World War II understood speed and how to use it in the way Patton did. Like Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Sherman, Patton was a proponent of risking all in order to mobilize troops at the decisive point to exploit an advantage. He was the best, and by using him in this way, Eisenhower had found the way to ultimately destroy the Germans even before the issue at Bastogne or the Meuse had been decided.

A general who did NOT understand speed was Bernard Montgomery. Yet because the breakthrough would involve his armies to defend the Allied lines, especially if the Germans reached the Meuse, Ike decided that all forces north of the breakthrough would have to be put under his command. He was in the proper place to with all the reserves and the organization needed to deal with the crisis. Bradley was too far away, though he would retain command of the southern end of the German penetration. Bradley was outraged by this decision. He thought Monty a poor commander, and blamed him for the debacle of Market-Garden. "By God, Ike," he roared, "I cannot be responsible to the American people if you do this. I resign!" Eisenhower reddened with anger. He took a deep breath and replied, "Brad, I - not you- am responsible to the American people. Your resignation means absolutely nothing. Those are my orders." Bradley cursed and stormed out. Of course he did not resign. But there was to be much trouble over this decision.

Montgomery took the news with his typical ego. He immediately told the British press, "The Yanks are in trouble, and they have turned to me to save them." When Monty conferred with Hodges and Simpson that same day, one of his own officers said, "the field marshal strode into Hodges' HQ like Christ come to cleanse the temple." Remarkably enough, Hodges and Simpson were eagerly cooperative. Montgomery wanted Hodges to shift his weight westward, Simpson's 9th Army would take over the entire Roer River front, thus freeing roughly half of Collins' VII Corps for a defensive front west of Stavelot to Marche. Monty then suggested a withdrawel of American troops on the other side of the Meuse, allowing the Germans to reach it. At this point Hodges politely but firmly refused. Monty might be in charge, but he was asking the Americans to withddraw, and the United States Army was extremely sensitive about this, which they considered a point of honor: they would NOT withdraw.

This disagreement led to one of the great misunderstandings that would have repercussions for the remainder of the war, and after. Montgomery was on sound tactical ground. Like the good chess player that he was, he intended to move his forces into a defensive position and let the opponent batter themselves against it. But the Americans were angry, in part because they had been surprised, in part because of the Malmedy Massacre. They were out for German blood. Montgomery's patient, methodical approach was not for them. Instead of explaining himself Monty reacted badly, he implied the Yank officers were stupid and phoned Ike threatening to resign unless his orders were obeyed without question. Eisenhower, who at this point had his fill of impetuous generals threatening to quit, told Monty to find a way to straighten out the lines without withdrawing. And he also ordered him not to speak to the press.

Meanwhile Matthew Ridgeway's 82nd Airborne had entered the fray. They reached the river of Salm and engaged Pieper's Battlegroup. The German was forced to escape with 800 men but without any equipment. In the morning, however, the 82nd Airborne found that it's western flank had been turned by a new and powerful German force, and before it could be dealt with St. Vith fell. Hasbrouck, however, in a brilliant tactical maneuver, succeeded in extricating his forces and getting across the Salm. But the Germans had gained a clear route from St. Vith to Houffalize- which fell on December 20- to St. Hubert, west of Bastogne. Bypassed, Bastogne still held out. Manteuffel was now determined either to storm it or choke it to death.

 
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The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

If Manteuffel's panzers had won the race to Bastogne, they would have had an open run to the Meuse. But the Americans in Bastogne had reacted so aggressively that it took 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr three days to work around the town, while a third panzer- the 116th- also had been stopped and diverted. All this delay had taken much of the momentum out of Manteuffel's drive and had given Hodges time to set up defenses on the Ourthe. This move compelled Manteuffel to make a wider westward sweep than he intended, which caused him further delay. At last the German general realized that Bastogne was too important to bypass. He would choke it to death- compel its capitulation- by drawing an iron ring around it.

On the 21st Luttwitz's forward units began the encirclement of the town. But when they began probing for weak spots through a series of piecemeal attacks, they found fierce resistance at every point. They had found an American ring of iron, and Luttwitz next tried to bluff the Americans into surrendering. He sent an English-speaking emmissary into the town with a message which said that the only possible way to save the American troops from annihilation was surrender. The note was brought to the officer commanding the battle in Bastogne, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe. It was read by his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Ned D. Moore.

"What does it say, Ned?" McAuliffe asked.

"They want you to surrender."

"Aw, nuts!" McAuliffe exclaimed. Annoyed, he tried to think of a suitably defiant and derisive reply until Lt. Col. Harry Kinnard remarked, "That first crack you made would be hard to beat."

"What was that?"

"Nuts."

Seizing a pen, McAuliffe wrote, "To the German commander: Nuts! From the American commander."

When Col. Joseph Harper, commander of the 327th Glider Infantry, brought the reply to the Germans, they were mystified.

"If you don't understand what 'Nuts' means," Harper snapped, "in plain English it is the same as 'Go To Hell!' And I will tell you something else. If you continue to attack, we will kill every ###### German that tries to break into this city."

The Germans snapped to attention and saluted. "We will kill many Americans," said 1st Lt. Helmuth Henke. "This is war."

"On you way, bud!" Harper snapped, and then before he could restrain a remark he always regretted: "And good luck to you."

McAuliffe's reply delighted the heart of the American public and remains enshrined in a high place in United States military history. It also infuriated Manteuffel, who considered Luttwitz's bluff a threat which, without extensive artillery, he could not enforce. To save face he called upon the Luftwaffe to bomb Bastogne.

 
Market-Garden, Part 3

In the middle of the airborne corridor around Nijmegan Gen. James Gavin's 82nd Airborne faced more difficult problems. The 82nd had to capture the highway bridge over the Maas at Grave and next the great 650-yard highway span over the Waal. But seemingly more important to General Browning, the Airborne Army commander, was the 300 foot high Groesbeeck Ridge commanding both and supposedly held by the enemy. He wanted Gavin to take the ridge first. Gavin's paratroopers did, but found no enemy. Having lost valuable time there, still not moving against the Nijmegan bridges, they next captured the Grave bridge and and another bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal. But now the Germans were pouring into Nijmegan, and it seemed to Gavin that the opportunity to capture the bridges there was about to be lost. After many delays, he was finally ready to attack on September 20.

At 3pm Gavin's paratroopers began moving toward the launching point on the quarter-mile-wide Waal. After a tremendous effort, they captured the bridges. (This action made the 82nd Airborne famous around the world, and gave them a glory they still have today.) Nevertheless, even the valor of these splendid troops had not been enough to take the spans before nightfall of the 4th day of Market-Garden. It would take XXX Corps another day to resume the advance.

The Red Devils also fought with legendary valor But it was a hopeless fight. Steadily, remorselessly, the numbers of the paratroopers in their bright red berets shrank. Their ordeal lasted for 9 days and nights. Each day the German counterstrokes cut them up into smaller groups. With no armor and little artillery they fought with rifles and pistols against enemy armor, air, and artillery. Food rations were cut to a 6th. Even ammunition was rationed. Finally, Montgomery brought Market-Garden to a melancholy close. Of the 9,000 Red Devils who had jumpes so gallantly and confidently into a fiery crucible, some 2,000 were withdrawn to British lines. About 6,000 had been captured by the Germans, and half of these were wounded. The rest were dead.
My cousin participated in the Waal River Crossing, in canvas boats while taking direct fire from the Germans. He was a corporal in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3rd Bn, "I" Co.). Ended up KIA on Sept. 27, 1944 in the Den Heuvel Woods area (Wylerbaan-Grosbeek), body was never recovered (Have all of his records). The 3/504 saw some of the heaviest fighting and casualties of any unit in the 82nd.I have started a website devoted to him and others in the 504th PIR. LINK. Its about half done if anyone's interested in checking it out.

Sorry about the hijack..Good thread. :confused:

 
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The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

The note was brought to the officer commanding the battle in Bastogne, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe. It was read by his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Ned D. Moore.

"What does it say, Ned?" McAuliffe asked.

"They want you to surrender."

"Aw, nuts!" McAuliffe exclaimed. Annoyed, he tried to think of a suitably defiant and derisive reply until Lt. Col. Harry Kinnard remarked, "That first crack you made would be hard to beat."

"What was that?"

"Nuts."

Seizing a pen, McAuliffe wrote, "To the German commander: Nuts! From the American commander."
His son, Ken McAuliffe posts on the forum below quite frequently. He has done some seriously detailed research on this event, has some great commentary on it.http://triggertimeforum.yuku.com/forums/1

My cousin participated in the Waal River Crossing, in canvas boats while taking direct fire from the Germans. He was a corporal in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3rd Bn, "I" Co.). Ended up KIA on Sept. 27, 1944 in the Den Heuvel Woods area (Wylerbaan-Grosbeek), body was never recovered (Have all of his records). The 3/504 saw some of the heaviest fighting and casualties of any unit in the 82nd.

I have started a website devoted to him and others in the 504th PIR. LINK. Its about half done if anyone's interested in checking it out.

Sorry about the hijack..Good thread. :homer:
I still have the IM you sent me regarding him from a year ago to remind me to ask you about the website sometime. Great to see you have it up, first I've seen it. Can't wait to get into it.
 
General McAuliffe, who was temporarily in charge of the 101st Division (in the absence of General Maxwell Taylor), became famous all over the US for this reply. There is an amusing story about this. Shortly after the war, a very prominent Washington D.C hostess held a party with a number of Washington bigwigs. However, the guest of honor was to be General McAuliffe. The hostess, concerned that the only thing that people would talk to him about would be his famous reply, and thinking he might be tired of hearing about it, asked the guests to refrain from mentioning it. They agreed.

General McAuliffe duly arrived and was escorted in to the party. The hostess hurried over, greeted him, and then turned to the other guests. "Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to present our guest of honor to you, the famous General McNuts!"

 
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The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

The hearts of the defenders were lifted by reports that George Patton was already on the way to lift the siege. Although the Germans had been astonished at the speed with which Patton had disengaged in the Saar andd wheeled north, they had been warned of his approach by monitoring the extremely careless radio network that controlled American traffic. Roadblocks were put out to receive him. So prepared, they upset Patton's timetable of driving swiftly to the relief of Bastogne. The German blocking forces were strong and because of the surrounding rugged terrain, they could not be bypassed. One of Patton's columns came within 5 miles of Bastogne but was temporarily halted.

McAuliffe was dismayed by 3rd Army's slow progress. His meager supplies of ammunition were almost gone, By December 23 his artillery was down to 10 rounds per gun. But by then the weather had begun to clear. Supplies were air-dropped. Even though this did not relinquish ammunition stocks, the airdrop boosted American morale for the heavy attack that came that night. The Germans pierced the southeastern side of the perimeter in their heaviest assault so fat. They took possession of a commanding height, and some tanks even broke into the streets of Bastogne. But each one was destroyed and their supporting infantry repulsed. By morning the breach had been destroyed.

Manteuffel was desperate. With Model he realized that early capture of Bastogne was essential to the new plan which they had submitted to Hitler. By then German forces were 60 miles inside Belgium, but slowing down. They were also literally running out of gas. The huge American stocks, which would have replenished their own dwindling supplies, had not been captured. Although Hitler had promised enough fuel for 300 miles of normal running, he had actually given them only a third of that amount. This had been consumed by armor and transport crawling through the tortuous side roads of the Ardennes, a necessity forced upon them by the failure to seize Bastogne.

The new plan was simply a revision of the Small Solution: instead of attacking Antwerp right away, a firm western flank wouls be established on the east side of the Meuse. Later, after the American and British attacks had been repulsed, then an assault north could continue. (It's interesting to note that if Montgomery's plan to withdraw all American troops to the Meuse had been followed, this result would have taken place.) Hitler agreed to this new plan, reluctantly, but he too saw that it would only work if Bastogne was taken before it was relieved. Manteuffel was given firm orders from Der Fuhrer: take Bastogne in the next few days.

Manteuffel had 3 full divisions against McAuliffe's forces half that size. He decided to attack northwest of the town, where defenses had not yet been tested. In fact, this was McAuliffe's strongest sector. Throughout his command that Christmas Eve his men were convinced that the end of their ordeal was at hand. It was now do-or-die. Many of them shook hands for what they thought was the last time. At 3:00am Christmas morning, the Germans attacked. One penetration was made before dawn, and another hole opened up at the first light. 18 German tanks roared up to exploit the breakthrough, blundering into the American tank destroyers, which McAuliffe had wisely sited in anticipation of just such an attempt. All the tanks were knocked out and their following infantry destroyed to a man. By midmorning the line was restored. Another assault was launched the next day, but before it could gain momentum, one of Patton's relief columns burst through the enemy's containing ring.

Bastogne had been relieved. One of the most gallant and dramatic stands in the history of the U.S. Army had inflicted on Manteuffel a severe defeat that would have disastrous repercussions on the Meuse.

 
Market-Garden, Part 3

In the middle of the airborne corridor around Nijmegan Gen. James Gavin's 82nd Airborne faced more difficult problems. The 82nd had to capture the highway bridge over the Maas at Grave and next the great 650-yard highway span over the Waal. But seemingly more important to General Browning, the Airborne Army commander, was the 300 foot high Groesbeeck Ridge commanding both and supposedly held by the enemy. He wanted Gavin to take the ridge first. Gavin's paratroopers did, but found no enemy. Having lost valuable time there, still not moving against the Nijmegan bridges, they next captured the Grave bridge and and another bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal. But now the Germans were pouring into Nijmegan, and it seemed to Gavin that the opportunity to capture the bridges there was about to be lost. After many delays, he was finally ready to attack on September 20.

At 3pm Gavin's paratroopers began moving toward the launching point on the quarter-mile-wide Waal. After a tremendous effort, they captured the bridges. (This action made the 82nd Airborne famous around the world, and gave them a glory they still have today.) Nevertheless, even the valor of these splendid troops had not been enough to take the spans before nightfall of the 4th day of Market-Garden. It would take XXX Corps another day to resume the advance.

The Red Devils also fought with legendary valor But it was a hopeless fight. Steadily, remorselessly, the numbers of the paratroopers in their bright red berets shrank. Their ordeal lasted for 9 days and nights. Each day the German counterstrokes cut them up into smaller groups. With no armor and little artillery they fought with rifles and pistols against enemy armor, air, and artillery. Food rations were cut to a 6th. Even ammunition was rationed. Finally, Montgomery brought Market-Garden to a melancholy close. Of the 9,000 Red Devils who had jumpes so gallantly and confidently into a fiery crucible, some 2,000 were withdrawn to British lines. About 6,000 had been captured by the Germans, and half of these were wounded. The rest were dead.
My cousin participated in the Waal River Crossing, in canvas boats while taking direct fire from the Germans. He was a corporal in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3rd Bn, "I" Co.). Ended up KIA on Sept. 27, 1944 in the Den Heuvel Woods area (Wylerbaan-Grosbeek), body was never recovered (Have all of his records). The 3/504 saw some of the heaviest fighting and casualties of any unit in the 82nd.I have started a website devoted to him and others in the 504th PIR. LINK. Its about half done if anyone's interested in checking it out.

Sorry about the hijack..Good thread. :thumbup:
That is awesome. Thank you!
 
THE BURMA CAMPAIGN--Conclusion

In early 1944, having driven the Japanese out of India with heavy losses, the challenge for the Allies in India for the recapture of Burma was not tactical but logistical. Having been at the far end of a supply chain from Britain and the United States, and having been fairly far down on the priority list, it was necessary to build up the supplies and equipment to be able to overcome the fanatical and strong defensive positions of the Japanese Army.

By this time the Japanese, with their fleet decimated, and facing the forthcoming invasion of the Philippines, recognized that there could be no resupply or reinforcement to their troops in Burma. They had to make do with what they had.

After the monsoon rains had gone, and the ground had dried, British General Slim began Operation Capital, with his forces advancing across a broad front into Burma and on to Mandalay. The Japanese recognized that they would have to cede northern Burma to the Allies, but hoped to be able to hold on, so as not to lose the capital, Rangoon.

In the meantime in China, Chiang Kai Shek forces pushed the Japanese weak divisions under General Honda, back toward Burma, eventually freeing the whole Burma Road, in early 1945. This road had been the principal means of supply to China until the Japanese occupation. From that time on, Chiang Kai Shek had had to be supplied by air (over the Hump).

General Slim pushed his advantage in weapons and men, and despite stubborn resistance by the Japanese, by the middle of March 1945 he had occupied the Central Burma plain, and the way to Rangoon was open. The British had suffered 10,000 casualties in this campaign, but the Japanese losses had been much higher, about a third of the total they had in Burma.

Then on the first of May, the Allies launched Operation Dracula, with an airborne drop at the mouth of the Irrawaddy River, which, coupled with the advance of General Slim's forces from Central Burma, caused the Japanese to evacuate Rangoon toward the south.

The liberation of Burma was now virtually complete.

 
BATTLE OF IWO JIMA

Iwo Jima lay about halfway between the Marianas Islands and the main islands of Japan. It is about 650 miles directly south of Tokyo, and was administered as part of Ogasawara, one of eight villages of Tokyo. It is only about 8 square miles in area, but saw some of the fiercest fighting of the war.

By the time 1945 had arrived, the Japanese were under no illusions that they could conduct offensive operations against the United States. Their focus had to be the defense of the homeland, with the idea of making it so costly to the Americans that they would be able to achieve an armistice on terms favorable to themselves.

The Japanese believed that: “In the light of the above situation, seeing that it was impossible to conduct our air, sea, and ground operations on Iwo Jima toward ultimate victory, it was decided that in order to gain time necessary for the preparation of the Homeland defense, our forces should rely solely upon the established defensive equipment in that area, checking the enemy by delaying tactics. Even the suicidal attacks by small groups of our Army and Navy airplanes, the surprise attacks by our submarines, and the actions of parachute units, although effective, could be regarded only as a strategical ruse on our part. It was a most depressing thought that we had no available means left for the exploitation of the strategical opportunities which might from time to time occur in the course of these operations.”

The American plan of attack was relatively straightforward. The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were to land on the south-eastern beach and initially focus on securing Mount Suribachi, the southern airfields and the west coast. Once this was completed, the line, reinforced by the 3rd Marine Division, would swing and advance to the northeast. In preparation for the invasion, B-24 Liberators operating out of the Marianas bombed the island for 74 days.

The invasion of Iwo Jima began on February 19, 1945, and battles on the island continued to March 26, 1945. The battle was a major initiative of the Pacific Campaign of World War II. The Marine invasion, known as Operation Detachment, was charged with the mission of capturing the airfields on the island which up until that time had harried U.S. bombing missions to Tokyo. Once the bases were secured, they could then be of use in the impending invasion of the Japanese mainland.

Intelligence sources were confident that Iwo Jima would fall in a week, unaware that the Japanese were preparing a complex defensive posture, radically departing from any of their previous tactics. So successful was the Japanese preparation that it was discovered after the battle that the hundreds of tons of Allied bombs and thousands of rounds of heavy naval gunfire left the Japanese defenders almost unscathed and ready to inflict losses on the U.S. Marines unparalleled up to that point in the Pacific War.

The Imperial Japanese Army positions on the island were heavily fortified, with vast bunkers, hidden artillery, and 11 miles of tunnels. The battle was the first U.S. attack on the Japanese Home Islands and the Imperial soldiers defended their positions tenaciously.

At 02:00 on February 19, 1945, the formidable 16-inch battleship guns from USS North Carolina, USS Washington and later added USS West Virginia signaled the commencement of the invasion of Iwo Jima. American naval craft used nearly everything available in their arsenal to shell the island, from the main guns to the antiaircraft flak cannons to the newly developed rockets. Soon thereafter, 100 bombers attacked the island, followed by another volley from the naval guns.

At 08:59, one minute ahead of schedule, the first of an eventual 30,000 Marines of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, under V Amphibious Corps, landed on the beach. The initial wave was not hit by Japanese fire for quite some time; it was the plan of Japanese General Kuribayashi to hold fire until the beach was full of Marines and equipment. Many of the Marines who landed on the beach in the first wave speculated that perhaps the naval artillery and air bombardment of the island had killed all of the Japanese troops that were expected to be defending the island. In the deathly silence, they became somewhat unnerved as Marine patrols began to advance inland in search of the Japanese positions.

Only after the front wave of Marines reached a line of Japanese bunkers defended by machine gunners did they take hostile fire. Many cleverly concealed Japanese bunkers and firing positions suddenly lit up and the first wave of Marines took devastating losses from machine guns. Marine casualties on the first day were over 2,000. Aside from the Japanese defenses situated on the actual beaches, the Marines faced heavy fire from Mount Suribachi at the south of the island. It was extremely difficult for the Marines to advance because of the inhospitable terrain, which consisted of volcanic ash.

This ash allowed for neither a secure footing nor the construction of defensive foxholes to protect the Marines from hostile fire. However, the ash did help to absorb a portion of the fragments that were expelled by the Japanese artillery. The Japanese heavy artillery in Suribachi would open their reinforced steel doors to fire and then immediately close their doors following to prevent counterfire from the American forces. This made it extremely difficult for American units to destroy a piece of Japanese artillery.

To make matters worse for the American troops, the bunkers were connected to the elaborate tunnel system so that bunkers that were cleared with flamethrowers and grenades became operational shortly afterwards. These reactivated bunkers caused many additional casualties among them as Marines walking past these bunkers did not expect them to suddenly become hostile again. The Marines advanced slowly while taking heavy machine gun and artillery fire. Due to the arrival of armored units, and heavy naval artillery and air units maintaining a heavy base of fire on Suribachi, the Marines were eventually able to advance past the beaches. 760 Marines made a near-suicidal charge across to the other side of Iwo Jima that day. They took heavy casualties, but they made a considerable advance. By the evening, the mountain had been cut off from the rest of the island, and 30,000 Marines had landed. About 40,000 more would follow.

The fighting was extremely fierce. The Americans' advance was stalled by numerous defensive positions augmented by artillery, where they were ambushed by Japanese troops that occasionally sprang out of tunnels. At night, the Japanese would leave their defenses under cover of darkness to attack American foxholes, and battleships fired star shells to deny them cover of darkness. Many Japanese soldiers who knew English would deliberately call for Navy corpsmen, and then shoot them as they approached.

The Marines learned that firearms were relatively ineffective against the Japanese defenders and effectively used flamethrowers and grenades to flush out Japanese troops in the tunnels. One of the technological innovations of the battle, the eight Sherman M4A3R3 medium tanks equipped with the Navy Mark I flame thrower, proved very effective at clearing Japanese positions. The Shermans were difficult to disable, such that defenders were often compelled to assault them in the open, where the Japanese troops would fall victim to the superior numbers of Marines.

The highest position on Iwo Jima was Mt. Suribachi (more on that later). After the fall of Mt. Suribachi in the south, the Japanese still held a strong position throughout the island. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi still had the equivalent of eight infantry battalions, a tank regiment, two artillery and three heavy mortar battalions, plus the 5,000 gunners and naval infantry. With the landing area secure, more troops and heavy equipment came ashore and the invasion proceeded north to capture the airfields and the remainder of the island. Most Japanese soldiers fought to the death.

After running out of most water, food, and supplies, the Japanese troops became desperate towards the end of the battle. Kuribayashi, who had argued against banzai attacks at the start of the battle, realized that Japanese defeat was imminent. Marines began to face increasing numbers of nighttime attacks; these were only repelled by a combination of machine gun defensive positions and artillery support. At times, the Marines engaged in hand-to-hand fighting to repel the Japanese attacks.

On the night of March 25, a 300-man Japanese force launched a final counterattack. The Marines suffered heavy casualties; more than 100 were killed and another 200 Americans were wounded. The island was officially declared "secured" the following day. The number of American casualties was greater than the total Allied casualties at Battle of Normandy on D-Day. Of the approximately 21,000 Japanese soldiers present at the beginning of the battle, over 20,000 were killed and only 1,083 taken prisoner.

Even after Iwo Jima was about to be declared secured, about three thousand Japanese soldiers were left alive in the island's warren of caves and tunnels. Those who could not bring themselves to commit suicide hid in the caves during the day and came out at night to prowl for provisions. Some did eventually surrender and were surprised that the Americans often received them with compassion - offering them water, cigarettes, or coffee. The last of these stragglers, two of Lieutenant Toshihiko Ohno's (whose body was never found) men, Yamakage Kuschitu and Matsudo Linsoki, lasted six years, surrendering in 1951.

Costly as it was, the taking of Iwo Jima did save the lives of many USAAF aircrew, as the island was used to land B-29 bombers on their way to, or back from Japan. The B-29 was a spectacularly successful heavy bomber, but was plagued with engine malfunctions, and Iwo Jima was the safe harbor for many stragglers. The airbase on Iwo Jima handled over 2,400 emergency landings by B-29's. It also enabled the USAAF to send long range P-51 fighters to escort B-29 raids originating in Tinian or Saipan.

Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal took what is probably the most famous picture of the war (in US eyes), when he snapped a photograph of six marines raising the US flag on Mt. Suribachi. Contrary to some early reports, the photograph was not staged. Three of the men raising the flag were killed in later fighting on the island.

The picture was used by sculptor Felix de Weldon to sculpt the USMC War Memorial, located adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery.

You have probably seen it before, but here is the picture of the raising of the flag:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a...lag_raising.jpg

 
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The Battle of the Bulge, Continued

On Christmas Morning the spearheads of the 2nd Panzer Division stood on a ridge above the Meuse, impatiently awaiting the arrival of the fuel and reinforcements they needed to plunge down the Ardennes' western slope to the gleaming river below them. They had been waiting there for 36 hours, and they were alone. The rest of the 2nd was occupied in trying to capture Rochefort and Marche. Rochefort, garrisoned by a single gallant American battalion, held out for 2 nights and a day before falling on Christmas. Now the 2nd's main body was driving west toward Dinant. To the left rear of Dinant, Panzer Lehr was still engaged at Bastogne. On the right rear the 116th Panzer had been checked between Marche and Hotton. None of the 3 reserve armored divisions Hitler had given Manteuffel would reach Dinant. Still Manteuffel ordered the 2nd Panzer to press on to Dinant.

By Christmas morning recon forces had detected a screen of British armor along the Meuse, and there had been reports of clashes with American tanks around Ciney. Ther Germans did not suspect that these were the advance units of General Lightnin' Joe Collins' 2nd Armored Division rolling down from the north. One American combat command intercepted and turned back reinforcements heading for Rochefort while another encircled the woods around Celles where the German advance guard was entrenched. Without fuel, the Germans had to fight where they stood while Americans maneuvered freely over frozen ground. By nightfall of December 27, 1944, the 2nd Panzer's remnants were reeling back toward Rochefort, leaving behind them that river which they had seen but never reached.

On December 23 the weather over the Ardennes suddenly lifted, at last giving Allied air power the chance to strike at the roadbound Germans. Having crowded the roads by daylight in the conviction that they would still be protected by gloomy skies, and having burdened themselves with hundreds of empty American trucks they had taken along as plunder, they were concentrated targets, which the Allied airmen had not seen since the days of the Falaise Gap. Between them the Anglo-Americans flew 15,000 sorties. They not only struck the narrow river crossings but also roads, railroads, and airfields throughout the Rhineland. Model's railheads were knocked out, making his forces dependent upon supplies brought over roads from distant depots. Because Hitler for security reasons had ordered that all the big dumps for the offensive should be located east of the Rhine, the bombings had left him powerless to deliver the tonnage necessary for the maintenance of Model's armies. Certainly the defunct Luftwaffe could not lift it, anymore than it could protect the panzers from Allied air.

Now it appeared to Eisenhower that he could make good on his earlier prediction, "By rushing out of his fixed defenses, the enemy may have given us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat." Bradley had already proposed that the 3 divisions now in SHAEF reserve be given to Patton to strengthen his thrust against the German southern flank while Hodges struck from the north. Montgomery disagreed. He wanted to wait until the Germans exhausted themselves before attacking. This annoyed Bradley and Patton, both of whom thought that Monty was letting the Americans do all the fighting. They wanted him to use the 4 divisions in his reserve. He was reluctant to do so because he did not want to commit them until the Germans had thrown in their own reserves. Monty was also looking beyond the Ardennes. American divisions were arriving constantly in France, but no British. He wanted to keep his XXX Corps intact for the imminent battle for the Rhineland. The dispute was finally resolved by agreeing that if the German attack was not renewed, First Army would begin it's counteroffensive on January 3.

Gerd von Rundstedt, meanwhile, had been trying to persuade Hitler to call of the offensive before the enemy counterattacked. Hitler refused. He still wanted to reach the Meuse, but only after he had launched an assault in Alsace.

 
Which battle had almost as many civilians die as Stalingrad?

Which battle caused the biggest losses in US Navy history?

Which battle caused the largest number of combat fatigue cases in US history?

It was called Operation Iceberg; and it is the battle most people know nothing about.

Coming up next.

 
THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA

The war was winding down. Victory in Europe was in sight as the Germans collapsed back toward Berlin. All eyes were on Europe, and the US didn't really want to publicize bad news. But, beginning in April of 1945, American and Japanese men fought and killed each other as never before. Caught in the crossfire between these warring powers were the native inhabitants of Okinawa. The battle's significance has been lost despite the unprecedented events that occurred during those eighty-two days.

The Battle of Okinawa is distinguished as a hard fought battle, yet often unrecognized when referring to the great battles of the Second World War. Over 250,000 people lost their lives. Approximately 150,000 Okinawans, about a third of the population, perished. At the battle's end, somewhere between a third and half of all surviving civilians were wounded. No battle during the Second World War, except Stalingrad, had as massive a loss of civilian life. The stakes were high. The Japanese, determined to fight to the last man, almost achieved their objective, but in defeat more than 100,000 Japanese combatants died rather than surrender. In the end, fewer than 10,000 of General Mitsuri Ushijimas's Thirty-Second Army were taken prisoner.

United States loss of life was staggering as well. The United States Navy sustained the largest loss of ships in its history with thirty-six lost and 368 damaged. The Navy also sustained the largest loss of life in a single battle with almost 5,000 killed and an equal number wounded. At Okinawa, the United States Tenth Army would incur its greatest losses in any campaign against the Japanese. During those eighty-two days, the Tenth Army would lose 7,613 men and over 30,000 men would be evacuated from the front lines for a minimum of a week due to wounds.  Moreover, the largest numbers of U.S. combat fatigue cases ever recorded would occur on Okinawa.

What made it so tough? Well, this was considered Japanese home territory, and they would fight tenaciously even though the Japanese looked down on the Okinawans as inferior versions of themselves. The Satsuma clan, a feudal shogunate, had conquered the island during the seventeenth century and over the centuries had subsequently impoverished the once wealthy kingdom. Everyone involved, the Okinawans, the Japanese, and the Allies realized that Okinawa, within 350 miles of Kyushu, the southern tip of mainland Japan, would be the stepping-stone for the United States.  Okinawa would be a virtual 'springboard to victory' for the Allies. From Okinawa, the Allies could launch an attack on the mainland by air or sea.

This battle would generate many 'firsts' for the history books, beyond the first time that United States troops fought on Japanese soil. The battle occurred during a time of unprecedented historical significance. The two highest-ranking officers to die on the battlefield during the Second World War were the commanders on Okinawa, General Mitsuri Ushijima and General Simon B. Buckner. Furthermore, when General Roy Geiger, a Marine aviator, assumed temporary command until General Joseph W. Stillwell arrived, it was the first time that a Marine would command a fighting force as large as a field army.

Other events also contributed to the neglect of Okinawa in the public memory of World War II. In February 1945, the Battle of Iwo Jima raged. The loss of life and the willingness of the Japanese to fight to the last man were beyond the comprehension of most Americans. Trying to grasp the loss of life that bloody spring in the Pacific was just too painful for the American populace.

On March 9-10, 1945, the massive bombardment of American incendiary bombs destroyed much of Tokyo. Five days after Love Day, the Soviet Union entered the war and joined the Allies on the Pacific front. Twelve days after Love Day, April 12, 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt died. Many of the young men fighting could remember no other president. Nor did many of them know anything about their new Commander-in-Chief, Harry S Truman.

On May 8, 1945, while the men of the Sixth prepared to 'move out' and relieve the Army on the southern end of Okinawa, the Germans surrendered. On July 2, 1945, while the Sixth Marine Division rested, trained, and prepared for the expected invasion of mainland Japan, the first Atomic Bomb would be detonated in New Mexico. The Battle of Okinawa lost its place in history because the history that was being made in 1945 was itself so monumental.

 
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THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA II

The operation on Okinawa was named Operation Iceberg, and the landing would be referred to as 'L Day' or 'Love Day' and perhaps in keeping with April Fools Day, the landing encountered virtually no opposition. This lack of opposition was unexpected and unprecedented. The Tenth Army itself was unique. With the combination of Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur's forces, a joint task force had been assembled. Not just a U.S. joint task force, but one that included Great Britain. The British Task Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, turned over operational control to Admiral R.A. Spruance, U.S. Navy, Commander, Fifth Fleet. This combining of marines, soldiers, and naval personnel created the largest group of Americans and Allies to land in the Pacific, 548,000, before it was all over.

The United States Navy assembled an unprecedented armada, with 1,300 ships laying in wait off the coast of Okinawa. In fact, the effort in the spring offensive of 1945 was far greater than the previous spring offensive in Europe. During the Normandy invasion, the Allies had employed 150,000 troops, 284 ships, and 570,000 tons of supplies, all of which required a very short supply line. On Okinawa, in Japan's back yard, maintaining the supply line seemed an incomprehensible feat. In the invasion of Okinawa, there were 183,000 troops, (102,000 Army and 81,000 Marine Corps personnel), 327 ships, and 750,000 tons of supplies.

Although Allied land forces were entirely composed of U.S. units, the British Pacific Fleet (BPF; known to the U.S. Navy as Task Force 57) provided about a quarter of Allied naval air power (450 planes). It comprised many ships, including 50 warships of which 17 were aircraft carriers, but the British armoured decks meant that fewer planes could be carried in a single aircraft carrier, although the carriers were more resistant to kamikaze strikes. Although all the aircraft carriers were provided by the UK, the carrier group was a combined British Commonwealth fleet with British, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian ships and personnel. Their mission was to neutralize Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Islands and provide air cover against Japanese kamikaze attacks.

Most of the air-to-air fighters and the small dive bombers and strike aircraft were U.S. Navy carrier-based airplanes. The Japanese had used kamikaze tactics since the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but for the first time, they became a major part of the defense. Between the American landing on April 1 and May 25, seven major kamikaze attacks were attempted, involving more than 1,500 planes. The U.S. Navy sustained greater casualties in this operation than in any other battle of the war.

In the three-month battle for Okinawa, the Japanese flew 1,900 kamikaze missions, sinking dozens of Allied ships and killing more than 5,000 U.S. sailors at the cost of 1,465 expended kamikaze planes (2,200 other Japanese and 763 U.S. aircraft were also destroyed, including during the land battle). The ships lost were smaller vessels, particularly the destroyers of the radar pickets, as well as destroyer escorts and landing ships. While no major Allied warship was lost, several fleet carriers were severely damaged.

The protracted length of the campaign under stressful conditions forced Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to take the unprecedented step of relieving the principal naval commanders to rest and recuperate. Following the practice of changing the fleet designation with the change of commanders, U.S. naval forces began the campaign as the U.S. Fifth Fleet under Admiral Raymond Spruance, but ended it as the U.S. Third Fleet under Admiral William Halsey.

Events even larger than the life and death struggle on Okinawa occurred during the spring of 1945. All of these events were common knowledge to the troops fighting and those on the home front, and these events did shape contemporary perspective regarding Okinawa. Ironically, because Okinawa is the final battle of the Second World War, the war's end would obscure the battle's accomplishments. In 1945, journalist Sid Moody of the Associated Press summarized it best: “Before Hiroshima there was Okinawa. Because of Okinawa, in considerable part there was Hiroshima. Okinawa lost its place in history in part because of Hiroshima.”

 
BATTLE FOR OKINAWA III

In April 1945 Ernie Pyle joined the fight in the Pacific, having been most widely known American correspondent in the European theater. He quickly became acquainted with the Pacific Marines and tried to describe, 'Who they were.' He wrote that their battles in the Pacific had been so fierce that their reputation and his imagination had turned them into men from Mars, and that he was almost afraid of them.

Instead he found them “confident but neither cocky or smart-alecky. They had fears, and qualms and hatred for the war the same as anybody else. They want to go home as badly as any soldier I've ever met.” Pyle tried to understand the minds of the Marines he had chosen to follow. He found them young, sentimental, and compassionate, bowing to Okinawan civilians on the road and adopting animals of all sorts as pets. They were Americans, with all the contradictions that the word implies. He finally concluded that the “Marines do not thirst for battles. I've read and heard enough about them to have no doubts whatever about the things they can do when they have to. They are OK for my money, in battle and out.”  

The Japanese on Okinawa were prepared for an invasion. As early as 1943, the Ryukyus, the islands that make up Okinawa, had been part of the Japanese plan of defense, the 'Absolute National Defense Zone.' Japan's Thirty-Second Army came into being on March 22, 1944. In the beginning, their mission was just to defend the Ryukyus, build airfields, and help hold the 'Tojo Line' in the Central Pacific. As the situation deteriorated for them, so did the infrastructure of the Japanese military machine. Arguments over how to use assets created a situation in which General Ushijima's loss was unavoidable. For the Japanese the objective of the campaign would never be victory on Okinawa. It was to wear the Americans down.

The Japanese knew they could not win, therefore their mission, "jikyusen", became a battle of attrition. For every man lost he must take ten Americans, for every plane, a boat. The objective would be to destroy or at least delay the U.S. Fleet. This would give the Japanese time to prepare the homeland. The southern end of Okinawa seemed ideal for Ushijima's battle of attrition. Honeycombed with caves that had for over a year been reinforced to create interlocking defenses (often by conscripted labor), the southern end was easily defended. Ridges and rocky embankments, trees and foliage, made it an easy place to fight a battle of attrition. Delaying tactics and groups to slow the Allies would be employed, but Ushijima's plan was always was a southern standoff below the Shuri-Yonaburu line. Meanwhile, the U.S. fleet would be supplying the troops on land, leaving them exposed to Japanese air and naval attacks. This, argued Tokyo's leaders, would further slow the Allies attack on the mainland.

At the beginning of the campaign, Ushijima would command approximately 110,000 men. Twenty thousand consisted of Okinawan Home Guard that supplemented the Japanese Army made up of the 24th Division, 62nd Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, the First, Second, Third, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, and the Twenty-ninth Independent Brigades. As a U.S. Special Operations report prior to the invasion predicted, 'it can safely be assumed that most of the troops entrusted with the defenses of Okinawa will be Manchurian trained.' The Thirty-Second Army consisted of tough combat veterans. Ushijima's artillery would be the heaviest concentration so far encountered by the Allies in the Pacific. Furthermore, the Thirty-Second Army had naval, amphibious, and air assets at its disposal.

The goal of the Allied Pacific campaign was to reach the 'industrial heart of Japan,' southern Honshu between Shimonoseki and the Tokyo plain.This strategy entailed taking successive steps towards mainland Japan, the 'island hopping' we have talked about previously. “Operation Iceberg” called for the invasion of Okinawa and adjacent smaller islands which were were within medium bomber range of mainland Japan and would provide airfields for both bombers and fighters. Okinawa would provide good anchorage, and the islands would help establish support positions for the invasion of first, Kyushu, and eventually industrial Honshu.

The commanders for 'Operation Iceberg' would be Admiral Raymond Spruance and Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, Task Force 58; Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Task Force 51; and Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, the Tenth Army. Major General Roy S. Geiger would lead the 3rd Amphibious Corps with three Marine Divisions, the 1st, 2nd, and 6th and four Army infantry divisions, the 24th Corps, made up of the 7th, 27th, 77th, and the 96th, with one in reserve. The landing, Love Day, would be April 1, 1945.

 
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THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA-- IV

The main landing was made by XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps on the Hagushi beaches on the western coast of Okinawa on L-Day. The 2nd Marine Division conducted a demonstration off the Minatoga beaches on the southeastern coast to confuse the Japanese about American intentions and delay movement of reserves from there.

Tenth Army swept across the south-central part of the island with relative ease by World War II standards, capturing the Kadena and the Yomitan airbases. In light of the weak opposition, General Buckner decided to proceed immediately with Phase II of his plan—the seizure of northern Okinawa. The 6th Marine Division headed up the Ishikawa Isthmus. The land was mountainous and wooded, with the Japanese defenses concentrated on Yae-Take, a twisted mass of rocky ridges and ravines on the Motobu Peninsula. There was heavy fighting before the Marines finally cleared the peninsula on April 18.

Meanwhile, the 77th Infantry Division assaulted Ie Shima, a small island off the western end of the peninsula, on April 16. In addition to conventional hazards, the 77th Infantry Division encountered suicide bombers, and even Japanese women armed with spears. There was heavy fighting before Ie Shima was declared secured on April 21 and became another air base for operations against Japan.

(Sadly, Ernie Pyle, the most beloved of war correspondents, was killed by machine gun fire on Ie Shima)

The campaign on Okinawa involved eight (including the one held in reserve) U.S. divisions, support units, and naval assets. If one were telling the story of the Navy on Okinawa, the stories would be about kamikazes and the largest loss of life in the U.S. Navy's history. The Army would recount tales of places called Hacksaw, Ie Shima, the Pinnacle, and Kakazu. The First Marine Division would remember Wana Draw, Shuri Castle, and Kunishi.

But it was the Sixth Marine Division which was pivotal and those Marines are credited with taking the majority of the island of Okinawa. The Sixth Marine Division has a unique place in military, especially Marine Corps history. Its place has been under-recognized in part because, unlike most other divisions, the Sixth never reactivated after the Second World War. The Sixth was formed on Guadalcanal in September of 1944 under the command of Major General Lemuel Shepard, a veteran of the First World War, who had been commanding the First Marine Brigade on Guam. The core of the Division was made up of battle-hardened Marines, some of whom were veterans of Eniwetok, some of whom had fought on Saipan. These hardened veterans of the Central and Western Pacific were augmented with replacement troops newly arrived from the United States and by special troops such as corpsman, reconnaissance, tanks, engineers, and other auxiliary units.

In addition to battle-hardened Marines, the Sixth supplemented its ranks with Marines who had previously held stateside billets. This became possible after 1943 when women Marines, the Women's Reserve, began taking over clerical and other non-combat positions stateside. Their numbers grew to 18,000, and this substantial expansion freed able-bodied men to go overseas.

After training as a unit on Guadalcanal for five months, they felt ready for the challenges that were in their future. The Sixth, although a new division, entered the Battle of Okinawa with more combat experience than any of the other Marine Divisions in their initial assaults.

Although few marines other than Shepherd knew the destination, the division had been planning and training for a landing for months before their departure from Guadalcanal in March 1945. After a rest and rendezvous stop at the Ulithi atoll, in the Carolines, the division's briefings and preparation began in earnest.

The fleet began moving into place around the Ryukyu Island chain in March. The first kamikaze assault of the Okinawan campaign occurred on March 18, 1945. The navy began 'softening up' the island on March 21 with naval bombardment. The Okinawans came to refer to the bombardment of Okinawa as the 'Typhoon of Steel.' The Kerama Islands that were off the coast of Okinawa were occupied March 25 through March 28 by members of the Tenth Army, which gave the Allies a place for fuel replenishment and pre-invasion bases.

The first waves went in at 8:30 am. The landings were to take place on the west coast of Okinawa on the Hagushi beaches, known as Green Beach and Red Beach by the landing troops. The plan called for U.S. forces to spread out and sever the island in two. The Marines of the First and Sixth Divisions were to move west to east and then go north. After landing, the Army headed south. On Love Day, the 2nd Marines were to conduct a diversionary operation on the southern end of Okinawa. The expected bloody landing never materialized. The Tenth Army strolled onto the island with little opposition.

The left flank of the Tenth Army became the Sixth's zone of action. The 4th, the 22nd, and the 15th regiments, the lead contingents for the Sixth, achieved their first day's objective by 10:30 am. The Tenth Army controlled Yontan and Kadena airfields. By that evening the 29th regiment, which had been held in reserve and had not anticipated an Easter landing, were on land. Equipment and 60,000 troops were on shore by the end of the first day, which was beyond the scheduled L-2 objective. By L-7, the Marines had secured Nago, Okinawa's second largest city, and were headed further north. The division would run into resistance on the Motobu Peninsula especially on the well-fortified positions around Mount Yaedake in mid-April. Organized resistance on the northern two-thirds of the island would end April 20. The Marine divisions thought their job finished.

 

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