World War II (1 Viewer)

[Harry Manback]

Yamamoto had spent 2 years at Harvard and had been the Naval Attache in Washington. He had toured the United States and was aware of the industrial might of America.He said: "In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success."He called it right. It was exactly 6 months from Pear Harbor to the end of the Battle of Midway.

I always respected him and was amazed by his accurate and honest assessment of how the war would procede.

 

[timschochet]

Yamamoto's Plan

As the naval attache in Washington back in the 1920's, Yamamoto had heard of the controversial US General Billy Mitchell, who got into a fight with the Navy by claiming that in the next war, air power would make traditional battleships obsolete. Mitchell held several demonstrations in which he showed how bombers could sink a battleship with relative ease. This resulted in all of the great powers building aircraft carriers, though the United States and England still considered their battleships to be the elite ships of their navy.

By 1941, any acute observer should have already realized that this was no longer so. The failure of the British ships at Norway, and the success of the Taranto attack against Italy, should have demonstrated once and for all that ships were helpless against superior air power. But it did not. America continued to believe that large battleships like the California and Arizona were supreme, and England had such faith in the Prince of Wales (which had fought so valiantly against the Bismarck, that Churchill sent her to Singapore as a further warning to the Japanese.

Yamamoto decided to destroy the American battleships at Pearl Harbor. Many of these had already left- to help with Atlantic convoys, FDR had dispatched the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, along with the carrier Yorktown and four light cruisers. But the remaiing battleships at Pearl were still the pride of the American fleet: the California, the Utah, the West Virginia, the Maryland, the Oklahoma. The aircraft carriers Enterprise and Lexington were also based at Pearl.

The plan was a surprise attack from aircraft carriers would sink these ships, and destroy America's pacific position. Yamamoto deliberately designated the attack to be on a Sunday morning, aware that Americans would either be at church or sleeping off the effects of a party the night before. He assembled a task force of 6 aircraft carriers (with 423 airplanes), screened by 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 smaller ships, and tankers for refueling- a total of 30 ships. Command was given to Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagamo, a bluff and hearty sort who up to that moment had no experience with air power. But Nagamo did have two amazing and brilliant subordinates, Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda.

It was Fuchida and Genda who, experimenting endlessly, solved many problems of this operation. Foremost of these was the shallow depth- Pearl Harbor is around 40 feet deep. Japan's aerial torpedoes would bury themselves uselessly in the mud of the harbor floor. Genda worked to develop devices attached to the torpedoes which prevented it from falling below a depth of 36 feet; meanwhile, Fuchida put his pilots through trial runs at perilously low altitudes- these were held at Kagoshima Bay. All failed until, in the fall of 1941, a stabilizing fin was attached to the torpedoes, and with much more trial and error, the problem was solved.

The next problem to overcome was the possibilty of the American ships being protected by antitorpedo nets. Also, the American custom of double mooring its' battleships exposed only the outer vessel. Genda solved this by deciding to use high level horizontal bombers carrying a single bomb adapted from a Japanese battleship's 16 inch shell weighing 1,800 pounds. The pilots of these aircraft were also given special training: they were taught to fly above at 16,500 feet to avoid antiaircraft fire,but Fuchida argued they should come down to 9,800 feet, at which point they would be able to pierce the armored plate. "The risk is worth taking to achieve maximum destruction" he said, and Genda agreed.

Genda was the thinker, and Fuchida was the man of action who would lead the first wave of bombers into battle. It would launch about 230 miles north of Oahu to arrive at Pearl around 8:00 am. Fuchida's flight would possess the element of surprise and was expected to do the most damage. Meanwhile, Yamamoto began planning simultaneous attacks against both Manila and the British. His main concern was that America's most famous and brilliant soldier had, on July 26, 1941, come out of retirement to take over full command of the Filipino defenses- Douglas MacArthur.

 

[Ozymandias]

Yamamoto's Plan

As the naval attache in Washington back in the 1920's, Yamamoto had heard of the controversial US General Billy Mitchell, who got into a fight with the Navy by claiming that in the next war, air power would make traditional battleships obsolete. Mitchell held several demonstrations in which he showed how bombers could sink a battleship with relative ease. This resulted in all of the great powers building aircraft carriers, though the United States and England still considered their battleships to be the elite ships of their navy.

By 1941, any acute observer should have already realized that this was no longer so. The failure of the British ships at Norway, and the success of the Taranto attack against Italy, should have demonstrated once and for all that ships were helpless against superior air power. But it did not. America continued to believe that large battleships like the California and Arizona were supreme, and England had such faith in the Prince of Wales (which had fought so valiantly against the Bismarck, that Churchill sent her to Singapore as a further warning to the Japanese.

Yamamoto decided to destroy the American battleships at Pearl Harbor. Many of these had already left- to help with Atlantic convoys, FDR had dispatched the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, along with the carrier Yorktown and four light cruisers. But the remaiing battleships at Pearl were still the pride of the American fleet: the California, the Utah, the West Virginia, the Maryland, the Oklahoma. The aircraft carriers Enterprise and Lexington were also based at Pearl.

The plan was a surprise attack from aircraft carriers would sink these ships, and destroy America's pacific position. Yamamoto deliberately designated the attack to be on a Sunday morning, aware that Americans would either be at church or sleeping off the effects of a party the night before. He assembled a task force of 6 aircraft carriers (with 423 airplanes), screened by 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 smaller ships, and tankers for refueling- a total of 30 ships. Command was given to Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagamo, a bluff and hearty sort who up to that moment had no experience with air power. But Nagamo did have two amazing and brilliant subordinates, Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda.

It was Fuchida and Genda who, experimenting endlessly, solved many problems of this operation. Foremost of these was the shallow depth- Pearl Harbor is around 40 feet deep. Japan's aerial torpedoes would bury themselves uselessly in the mud of the harbor floor. Genda worked to develop devices attached to the torpedoes which prevented it from falling below a depth of 36 feet; meanwhile, Fuchida put his pilots through trial runs at perilously low altitudes- these were held at Kagoshima Bay. All failed until, in the fall of 1941, a stabilizing fin was attached to the torpedoes, and with much more trial and error, the problem was solved.

The next problem to overcome was the possibilty of the American ships being protected by antitorpedo nets. Also, the American custom of double mooring its' battleships exposed only the outer vessel. Genda solved this by deciding to use high level horizontal bombers carrying a single bomb adapted from a Japanese battleship's 16 inch shell weighing 1,800 pounds. The pilots of these aircraft were also given special training: they were taught to fly above at 16,500 feet to avoid antiaircraft fire,but Fuchida argued they should come down to 9,800 feet, at which point they would be able to pierce the armored plate. "The risk is worth taking to achieve maximum destruction" he said, and Genda agreed.

Genda was the thinker, and Fuchida was the man of action who would lead the first wave of bombers into battle. It would launch about 230 miles north of Oahu to arrive at Pearl around 8:00 am. Fuchida's flight would possess the element of surprise and was expected to do the most damage. Meanwhile, Yamamoto began planning simultaneous attacks against both Manila and the British. His main concern was that America's most famous and brilliant soldier had, on July 26, 1941, come out of retirement to take over full command of the Filipino defenses- Douglas MacArthur.

It seems a little contradictory to say that Yamamoto realized that the day of the battleship was over, and that his plan was to eliminate the American battleships. His plan was to annihilate the American Pacific Fleet; he was just unlucky that the carriers were not in Pearl Harbor on the day.

 

[timschochet]

It seems a little contradictory to say that Yamamoto realized that the day of the battleship was over, and that his plan was to eliminate the American battleships. His plan was to annihilate the American Pacific Fleet; he was just unlucky that the carriers were not in Pearl Harbor on the day.

This is a good point. What you wrote is what I really meant. A little later, we'll get to why the carriers were not there, and what the result of the attack might have been if they HAD been there.

 

[Harry Manback]

It seems a little contradictory to say that Yamamoto realized that the day of the battleship was over, and that his plan was to eliminate the American battleships. His plan was to annihilate the American Pacific Fleet; he was just unlucky that the carriers were not in Pearl Harbor on the day.

This is a good point. What you wrote is what I really meant. A little later, we'll get to why the carriers were not there, and what the result of the attack might have been if they HAD been there.

I'm looking forward to this.I had read when I was younger some speculation that FDR had known this would happen, and allowed it to happen so that the American public would be willing to wage war, but moved the aircraft carriers to keep them safe.I then had heard this was debunked, that the US still hadn't fully realized Aircraft carriers and it was purely a coincidence that the aircraft carriers were on a random training excercise.

 

[timschochet]

My next post is going to be about General MacArthur, but after that I plan on going into great detail about the Pearl Harbor attack, and why it came as such a surprise to America. This will take some time, but it is extremely important to this narrative, IMO, for several reasons:

1. Even to this day, the extraordinary circumstances regarding this attack have led many to believe that FDR wanted it to happen and allowed it to happen. Less than a year ago I was listening to talk radio host Michael Medved, a guy I respect, and he commented in an offhand way, "Of course, Roosevelt knew about Pearl Harbor and allowed the ships to be sunk, we know this now." I firmly do NOT believe this is true, and I will describe what I think actually happened, and also how this conspiracy theory got started, and why. What concerns me is that this is an example of how conspiracy theories tend to grow over time. In 60 years from now, will some talk radio host say, "Well of course we know now that Bush knew about 9/11 beforehand and allowed it to happen"? I fear this is certainly possible.

2. The bungling of the American government and military in regard to Pearl Harbor and subsequent events is inexcusable and needs to be revisited again and again as an example of what must never be repeated. Especially in the nuclear age, we cannot afford the type of mistakes that were made then.

 

[Ozymandias]

My next post is going to be about General MacArthur, but after that I plan on going into great detail about the Pearl Harbor attack, and why it came as such a surprise to America. This will take some time, but it is extremely important to this narrative, IMO, for several reasons:1. Even to this day, the extraordinary circumstances regarding this attack have led many to believe that FDR wanted it to happen and allowed it to happen. Less than a year ago I was listening to talk radio host Michael Medved, a guy I respect, and he commented in an offhand way, "Of course, Roosevelt knew about Pearl Harbor and allowed the ships to be sunk, we know this now." I firmly do NOT believe this is true, and I will describe what I think actually happened, and also how this conspiracy theory got started, and why. What concerns me is that this is an example of how conspiracy theories tend to grow over time. In 60 years from now, will some talk radio host say, "Well of course we know now that Bush knew about 9/11 beforehand and allowed it to happen"? I fear this is certainly possible. 2. The bungling of the American government and military in regard to Pearl Harbor and subsequent events is inexcusable and needs to be revisited again and again as an example of what must never be repeated. Especially in the nuclear age, we cannot afford the type of mistakes that were made then.

I agree with you. We love conspiracy theories, but the reality is, there are mistakes and blunders which get us into trouble far more than some masterminds deliberately causing unfortunate events.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Code Breakers

A significant impact on the war in the Pacific was that of the code breakers. US intelligence analysts had succeeded in breaking the chief Japanese naval code, JN-25. However, it must not be supposed that this meant every word was decipherable. In many cases, only 15-20% of the code was broken, and the rest tended to be the result of analysis, and knowledge about Japanese fleet operations, the location of ships, etc. More significantly:

"JN-25 is the name given by codebreakers to the chief, and most secure, command and control communications scheme used by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during and slightly before World War II (it was the 25th Japanese Navy system identified). It was an enciphered code, producing five numeral groups in the traffic which was actually broadcast. It was frequently revised during its lifetime, and each new version required a more or less fresh cryptanalytic start. New code books were introduced from time to time and new superenciphering books were also introduced, sometimes simultaneously. In particular, JN-25 was significantly changed immediately before the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December 1941."

Also, in the two or three weeks prior to Pearl Harbor, Japanese radio traffic had significantly declined (as they were maintaining radio silence).

 

[DCThunder]

Tim are you going to get orgasmic about Dugout Doug the way you did about Churchill by quoting extensively from American Caesar?

 

[timschochet]

Tim are you going to get orgasmic about Dugout Doug the way you did about Churchill by quoting extensively from American Caesar?

Not necessarily. Anyone who reads The Glory and The Dream, which was written in 1975, knows that William Manchester changed his mind about MacArthur. The first book is much more highly critical. I think that Douglas MacArthur is one of our greatest generals, behind only Grant and Lee, perhaps, but he also has flaws, and one of these is key to American thinking on the eve of Pearl Harbor. That's what I intend discussing.

 

[timschochet]

MacArthur

It would take too long for me to give a complete biography of Douglas MacArthur's life up to December, 1941. It is an amazing story, and anyone who is interested can read about it in the excellent book DC mentioned, American Caesar. What I want to focus on here is how his personal story (and family story) intertwines with Filippino history, and how this had a direct and disastrous effect on American military thinking, especially on the eve of Pearl Harbor:

Arthur MacArthur was a famous soldier who at 17 had won a Medal of Honor fighting for the North at the Battle of Chattanooga. After marrying a Southern belle from a fine old Virginia family (four of whose brothers fought for the Confederacy) he had risen through the army ranks to become a general. He was instrumental in defeating the Spanish during the Filipino rising. Though his actions were and remain controversial, (as do America's entire presence in the Philipines), Arthur MacArthur proved his military genius by winning battle after battle. As his son would do later, he also shamelessly promoted himself in the press while criticizing other officers. By 1900 he was named military governor of the Philippines.

Douglas MacArthur had an amazing military career which established him as famous celebrity- he was never particularly revered by his staff and troops, who sometimes made fun of his ostentatious behavior (extragavant dress, referring to himself in the third person, always looking for press angles, etc.) That he was a military genius is beyond doubt. In the mid 1930's after a controversy involving the Bonus Army, MacArthur quit his job as Army Chief of Staff and went back to the Phillipines, where he was treated as royalty. He in turn regarded the islands as a family fief of sorts.

It can't be overemphasized that, while as I wrote MacArthur was not revered by his troops, he was looked upon by the American public, especially those of a conservative political bent, as an untarnished hero, and this lent him a level of expertise that no other military figure had. Even Roosevelt, though a little wary of the general's unending ambition, accepted whatever MacArthur believed as military fact.

And what did MacArthur believe in 1941? When President Manuel Quezon asked him if he thought the Philippines could be defended, MacArthur snapped, "I don't think they can, I know they can." This was a masterpiece of self-deception. A few years earlier, the General Staff of the United States Army had correctly concluded that the archipelago with it's enormous coastline was so indefensible that if attacked, the US troops there would have no choice but to abandon. Perhaps MacArthur never read this report, or if he had, he rejected it. This land had it's freedom, he believed, thanks to the MacArthur family. His father had "liberated" it; on his honor as an American he would never allow it to be surrendered.

MacArthur was aware that the United States fleet, if attacked, might have trouble reaching Manila. He was also aware of the "Germany First" plan, though he already disapproved of it. No matter. He had at his command the so-called "Mosquito Fleet" of torpedo boats, and he had 35 B-17, the "Flying Fortresses".

It was the B-17s that bolstered MacArthur's confidence. Not only did he assert that they could defend the coastline without naval assistance, but they would also destroy Japans' cities if they dared attack. Here was "The bomber will always get through" mentality, a year after it's failure in the Battle of Britain.

Besides these weapons, MacArthur had at his disposal 31,000 American troops and about 112,000 Filippinos (of which 12,000 were professional soldiers, the rest conscripts.) The naval forces assigned to him were small- one heavy cruiser, two lights, four old destroyers, 29 subs, and 32 patrol bombers. The 35 B-17's were stationed at Clark Field in Manila.

MacArthur's confidence in this force, and in himself was so high that the American chiefs of staff, against their better judgment, came to believe it as well, and so did FDR and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. The main reason I have included this post as part of the narrative is that in understanding the negotiations that now took place between America and Japan, it's crucial to recognize that the United States believed they had a force at Manila that was a permanent bulwark against Japanese intentions. They should not have believed this, but they did, because of the power of one General who was so famous.

 

[timschochet]

Hull, Nomura, and Kurusu

The Japanese sent two emmissaries, Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu, to meet with the Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to see if there was any hope of avoiding a conflict. There were difficulties from the start. The two Japanese were practiced at the art of negotiation as it was done in Japan: never reveal what you are really after. Avoid arriving at the real issue until towards the end of any conversation. A good lie is just a valuable, or even more valuable than the truth, and in general it's simply better to lie about everything, especially if the truth was unpleasant. All of this was considered basic good manners in Japan. With regard to lying, there was no moral injunction against it in Japanese society.

Hull, by contrast, was a straight foward good natured man from the Tennessee Hills. A former judge, he tended to see things in black and white. He was blunt and always eager to not waste time and jump right into the heart of any issue. These have always been considered fine American traits, but to the suave Japanese Hull seemed a barbarian. Hull in turn, was incredibly frustrated. He would ask direct questions, and Nomura and Kurusu would ask for delays in answering, or simply tells lies that were on their face obvious to anyone. They thought they were being polite by doing so and could not fathom Hull's angry reaction.

It's also true, as Ozymandius stated earlier, that the Americans broke the Japanese codes through a secret process called Magic. For a time (until the last two weeks, when the codes were again changed) this allowed Hull to know the instructions that the diplomats were being given by Tokyo, and to anticipate them. What neither he nor they knew was that Tokyo considered Nomura and Kurusu to be expendable.

Washington wanted Japan to quit IndoChina and quit the Tripartite pact. Japan wanted a resumption of trade with the United States, but not at these terms. That was the impasse. It is true that the United States now anticipated war. Seeking more time to improve their military situation, Hull asked for a three month extension of negotiations. In return, the US would agree to some limited trade.

Back came the answer from Tokyo to the diplomats, which was decoded: the Deadline can be extended until November 29, but no more. After that date, "things will happen". Alarmed, Roosevelt met with his cabinet. The possibility of a surprise attack was discussed. According to Secretary of War Henry Stimson,

The question was how we should manuever them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves.

It was this comment, combined with the breaking of the code, that has led so many people over the years to suspect conspiracy. In fact, the comment should prove exactly the opposite- the result of Pearl Harbor was quite a bit of danger to the United States. Just as in the case of 9/11, it is a huge jump from comments like these to assume that the President of the United States knew what was going to happen and wanted it to happen.

On November 26, the US reiterated it's damand that Japan withdraw from China, IndoChina, and theTripartite Pact. Nomura and Kurusu were stunned. They reported home that Hull "was as solid as a rock". On the 28th a new message came back, which was not decoded (at this point the codes were changed): continue to "pretend" to negotiate.

Though Hull did not know this message, he anticipated war now. Messages were sent to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short in Hawaii: hostilities with Japan might begin at any moment. "Consider this dispatch a war warning."

 

[DCThunder]

MacArthur

It would take too long for me to give a complete biography of Douglas MacArthur's life up to December, 1941. It is an amazing story, and anyone who is interested can read about it in the excellent book DC mentioned, American Caesar. What I want to focus on here is how his personal story (and family story) intertwines with Filippino history, and how this had a direct and disastrous effect on American military thinking, especially on the eve of Pearl Harbor:

Arthur MacArthur was a famous soldier who at 17 had won a Medal of Honor fighting for the North at the Battle of Chattanooga. After marrying a Southern belle from a fine old Virginia family (four of whose brothers fought for the Confederacy) he had risen through the army ranks to become a general. He was instrumental in defeating the Spanish during the Filipino rising. Though his actions were and remain controversial, (as do America's entire presence in the Philipines), Arthur MacArthur proved his military genius by winning battle after battle. As his son would do later, he also shamelessly promoted himself in the press while criticizing other officers. By 1900 he was named military governor of the Philippines.

Douglas MacArthur had an amazing military career which established him as famous celebrity- he was never particularly revered by his staff and troops, who sometimes made fun of his ostentatious behavior (extragavant dress, referring to himself in the third person, always looking for press angles, etc.) That he was a military genius is beyond doubt. In the mid 1930's after a controversy involving the Bonus Army, MacArthur quit his job as Army Chief of Staff and went back to the Phillipines, where he was treated as royalty. He in turn regarded the islands as a family fief of sorts.

It can't be overemphasized that, while as I wrote MacArthur was not revered by his troops, he was looked upon by the American public, especially those of a conservative political bent, as an untarnished hero, and this lent him a level of expertise that no other military figure had. Even Roosevelt, though a little wary of the general's unending ambition, accepted whatever MacArthur believed as military fact.

And what did MacArthur believe in 1941? When President Manuel Quezon asked him if he thought the Philippines could be defended, MacArthur snapped, "I don't think they can, I know they can." This was a masterpiece of self-deception. A few years earlier, the General Staff of the United States Army had correctly concluded that the archipelago with it's enormous coastline was so indefensible that if attacked, the US troops there would have no choice but to abandon. Perhaps MacArthur never read this report, or if he had, he rejected it. This land had it's freedom, he believed, thanks to the MacArthur family. His father had "liberated" it; on his honor as an American he would never allow it to be surrendered.

MacArthur was aware that the United States fleet, if attacked, might have trouble reaching Manila. He was also aware of the "Germany First" plan, though he already disapproved of it. No matter. He had at his command the so-called "Mosquito Fleet" of torpedo boats, and he had 35 B-17, the "Flying Fortresses".

It was the B-17s that bolstered MacArthur's confidence. Not only did he assert that they could defend the coastline without naval assistance, but they would also destroy Japans' cities if they dared attack. Here was "The bomber will always get through" mentality, a year after it's failure in the Battle of Britain.

Besides these weapons, MacArthur had at his disposal 31,000 American troops and about 112,000 Filippinos (of which 12,000 were professional soldiers, the rest conscripts.) The naval forces assigned to him were small- one heavy cruiser, two lights, four old destroyers, 29 subs, and 32 patrol bombers. The 35 B-17's were stationed at Clark Field in Manila.

MacArthur's confidence in this force, and in himself was so high that the American chiefs of staff, against their better judgment, came to believe it as well, and so did FDR and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. The main reason I have included this post as part of the narrative is that in understanding the negotiations that now took place between America and Japan, it's crucial to recognize that the United States believed they had a force at Manila that was a permanent bulwark against Japanese intentions. They should not have believed this, but they did, because of the power of one General who was so famous.

Don't forget who was MacArthur's right hand man in the Philippines of the late 1930s, Dwight D. Eisenhower. And if it weren't for a falling out between the two and Ike's insistance at going back to DC in August 1939, he'd have been in the Philippines in December 1941, rather than in Washington working with Marshall and the others before goin gto England to later become commander of the AEF.

 

[Sulla]

The first US Navy ship lost to Axis actions occured Oct. 31, 1941 - USS Reuben James (DD 245) was torpedoed and sunk with a crew of 115 by the U-552 while escorting a convoy from Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Apropos of nothing (and without hijack intent), USS Reuben James is also the name of the frigate featured in both Red Storm Rising book and The Hunt for Red October film. One of my favorite passages in Red Storm Rising (or is it in The Hunt for Red October? my feeble brain can't remember, it was so long ago) occurs when Reuben James meets up with HMS Battleaxe and they exchange signals:

HMS Battleaxe: "What in the world is a Reuben James?"

USS Reuben James: "At least we don't name ships after our mothers-in-law!"

Sulla

P.S. Great thread BTW. Tim/OZ, you should collaborate on a book.

 

[timschochet]

Don't forget who was MacArthur's right hand man in the Philippines of the late 1930s, Dwight D. Eisenhower. And if it weren't for a falling out between the two and Ike's insistance at going back to DC in August 1939, he'd have been in the Philippines in December 1941, rather than in Washington working with Marshall and the others before goin gto England to later become commander of the AEF.

This is an interesting fact I had forgotten. It makes you wonder if Ike's presence would have made any difference in Manila?

 

[Ozymandias]

Don't forget who was MacArthur's right hand man in the Philippines of the late 1930s, Dwight D. Eisenhower. And if it weren't for a falling out between the two and Ike's insistance at going back to DC in August 1939, he'd have been in the Philippines in December 1941, rather than in Washington working with Marshall and the others before goin gto England to later become commander of the AEF.

This is an interesting fact I had forgotten. It makes you wonder if Ike's presence would have made any difference in Manila?

The answer is no. MacArthur was not the type of leader to listen to majors. He was convinced of his own rightness; he was a genius, but with flaws, as you point out. The reality is that the British and the French underestimated the Germans at the beginning of the war, and the US underestimated the Japanese. In addition, the Japanese had been at war for 4 years. Their leadership was experienced. The US was just gearing up for war.

 

[DCThunder]

Don't forget who was MacArthur's right hand man in the Philippines of the late 1930s, Dwight D. Eisenhower. And if it weren't for a falling out between the two and Ike's insistance at going back to DC in August 1939, he'd have been in the Philippines in December 1941, rather than in Washington working with Marshall and the others before goin gto England to later become commander of the AEF.

This is an interesting fact I had forgotten. It makes you wonder if Ike's presence would have made any difference in Manila?

The answer is no. MacArthur was not the type of leader to listen to majors. He was convinced of his own rightness; he was a genius, but with flaws, as you point out. The reality is that the British and the French underestimated the Germans at the beginning of the war, and the US underestimated the Japanese. In addition, the Japanese had been at war for 4 years. Their leadership was experienced. The US was just gearing up for war.

I agree. Ike would either have been KIA trying to command a undermanned battalion defending a beach up in the north of Luzon or been captured and been part of the Death March. At worst, he'd have been on Corregidor and maybe have been on the PT boats with Dugout when he skedaddled to Australia. Then he's have spent the rest of the war in SWPac. And if this had happened, who'd have been in London wrangling with the Brits? Patton? Beedle Smith?The emnity that developed bwtween Ike and MacArthur during this period lasted for the rest of their lives, and you can be damn sure that if Truman hadn't fired MacArthur as commanding general in Korea, Ike would have when he was elected president...

 

[Ozymandias]

In November 1941, the US needed to have a presence in both oceans. Approximately half the overall fleet was in the Atlantic. In the Pacific, the US had about 130 combatant ships of every category; if you add that of the Allies, they had about 50 more, for a total of 180. Japan's total fleet was about 230, so they enjoyed a significant superiority even before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as other surprise attacks which took place.

On November 22nd, the Pearl Harbor Striking Force, under Admiral Nagumo, set forth on its mission. It was built around 6 fast carriers. They were subject to recall if an agreement with the USA were reached.

 

[Ozymandias]

Don't forget who was MacArthur's right hand man in the Philippines of the late 1930s, Dwight D. Eisenhower. And if it weren't for a falling out between the two and Ike's insistance at going back to DC in August 1939, he'd have been in the Philippines in December 1941, rather than in Washington working with Marshall and the others before goin gto England to later become commander of the AEF.

This is an interesting fact I had forgotten. It makes you wonder if Ike's presence would have made any difference in Manila?

The answer is no. MacArthur was not the type of leader to listen to majors. He was convinced of his own rightness; he was a genius, but with flaws, as you point out. The reality is that the British and the French underestimated the Germans at the beginning of the war, and the US underestimated the Japanese. In addition, the Japanese had been at war for 4 years. Their leadership was experienced. The US was just gearing up for war.

I agree. Ike would either have been KIA trying to command a undermanned battalion defending a beach up in the north of Luzon or been captured and been part of the Death March. At worst, he'd have been on Corregidor and maybe have been on the PT boats with Dugout when he skedaddled to Australia. Then he's have spent the rest of the war in SWPac. And if this had happened, who'd have been in London wrangling with the Brits? Patton? Beedle Smith?The emnity that developed bwtween Ike and MacArthur during this period lasted for the rest of their lives, and you can be damn sure that if Truman hadn't fired MacArthur as commanding general in Korea, Ike would have when he was elected president...

I think enmity is too strong a word. They were rivals, competitors, and may have resented each other, but I don't think they were enemies.

 

[DCThunder]

I think enmity is too strong a word. They were rivals, competitors, and may have resented each other, but I don't think they were enemies.

From Historynet.com:One of the most enigmatic relationships in modern military history was that of Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. Their often-turbulent association spanned virtually the entire decade of the 1930s, during which time Eisenhower worked almost exclusively for MacArthur in a multifaceted role of secretary, adviser, staff officer, and, frequently, whipping boy. Theirs was a relationship that began with great promise and ended in a lifelong enmity between two of the most important figures of World War II.

http://www.historynet.com/dwight-d-eisenho...n-the-1930s.htm

 

[Ozymandias]

I think enmity is too strong a word. They were rivals, competitors, and may have resented each other, but I don't think they were enemies.

From Historynet.com:One of the most enigmatic relationships in modern military history was that of Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. Their often-turbulent association spanned virtually the entire decade of the 1930s, during which time Eisenhower worked almost exclusively for MacArthur in a multifaceted role of secretary, adviser, staff officer, and, frequently, whipping boy. Theirs was a relationship that began with great promise and ended in a lifelong enmity between two of the most important figures of World War II.

http://www.historynet.com/dwight-d-eisenho...n-the-1930s.htm

Even history.net is expressing opinion.By the way, here are Eisenhower's most disliked contemporaries:

5. General Douglas MacArthur,

Supreme Commander Allied Forces in the Pacific, W.W.II

Eisenhower served as MacArthur's assistant in Washington and his advisor in the Philippines in the 1930s. He disliked MacArthur for his vanity, his penchant for theatrics, and for what Eisenhower perceived as "irrational" behavior. "Probably no one has had tougher fights with a senior than I had with MacArthur," Eisenhower once said. While Eisenhower served as Chief of Staff after World War II, MacArthur undermined his efforts to slow down mobilization and later to unify the armed services. He willingly admitted though that MacArthur was smart, decisive, and a brilliant military mind. Working under him was frustrating, but also an invaluable learning experience.

I just can't understand how such a damn fool could have gotten to be a general.

Ann Whitman Diary, Dec.4,1954

MacArthur could never see another sun, or even a moon for that matter, in the heavens, as long as HE was the sun.

Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero, Peter Lyon, pg. 69

4. John F. Kennedy,

Democratic Senator from Massachusetts 1953-61, U.S. President 1961-63

Eisenhower considered John Kennedy too young and inexperienced to be a serious presidential candidate (He referred to Kennedy as "the boy" and "young whippersnapper.") and resented the money and all the political manipulation that made him one. During the campaign he was incensed with Kennedy's claim that his administration was responsible for a missile gap that Eisenhower knew "damn well" didn't exist. When Kennedy won the 1960 election, Eisenhower considered it his own greatest defeat.

As press reporters' adulation of the new president-elect grew, so did Eisenhower's dislike. "We have a new genius in our midst who is incapable of making any mistakes and therefore deserving of no criticism whatsoever," he once remarked with undisguised sarcasm. He abhorred Kennedy's big spending as president and his passive response to the building of the Berlin Wall. He called the new president's challenge to race the Russians to the moon a "stunt," and was particularly perturbed with the accusation of Kennedy's staff that his administration was responsible for the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

You can always tell a Harvard man, but you can't tell him much.

Eisenhower the President, William Ewald, pg. 315

3. Field Marshal Bernard Mongomery,

British General in command of 21st Army Group, W.W. II

Many in the Allied command considered Montgomery to be arrogant and self-infatuated, while he viewed himself as the world's greatest military mind. He resented that Eisenhower was his superior, openly expressing disdain and privately belittling his generalship. Eisenhower displayed heroic patience in his dealings with Monty, but still came close to sacking him. Eisenhower was particularly frustrated with Montgomery's refusal to make a move unless ensured that a vast superiority in troops and weapons guaranteed victory and maintained his reputation. Eisenhower respected Montgomery's abilities though, and Monty, in his own fashion, found Eisenhower difficult to dislike. Montgomery even admitted that Eisenhower was the only one who had the personality to get all the Allies to cooperate and win the war.

I can not forget his readiness to belittle associates in those critical moments when the cooperation of all of us was needed.

To Pug Ismay,

Eisenhower Diary Series Jan. 14, 1959

2. Harry S. Truman,

U.S. President 1945-53

Eisenhower and Truman got along fine until Eisenhower began his campaign for the presidency in 1952 as a Republican. By then, Eisenhower had begun to regard Truman as an inept, undignified leader who had surrounded himself with crooks and cronies. Truman, in turn, was furious with Eisenhower's claim that there was a "mess" in Washington. He was incensed that Eisenhower would undermine his efforts to end the Korean War by promising to go there himself. And he certainly was not pleased with the candidate's criticism of his foreign policy, particularly since Eisenhower appeared to be in total accord with it before the campaign. When it came time for their traditional ride together as president and president-elect to Eisenhower's inauguration ceremonies, the chill in their relationship was clearly evident. Eisenhower even refused Truman's invitation to join him for coffee in the White House.

(I wonder) if I can stand sitting next to him.

Preparing for the Inauguration, 1953

The Ordeal of Power, Emmit Hughes, pg. 54

And Eisenhower's No. 1 Most Disliked Contemporary:

1. Senator Joseph McCarthy,

Republican Senator from Wisconsin 1947-57

Eisenhower loathed McCarthy and the ruthless tactics of his communist witch hunt. He considered the senator to be a hate-filled, power-hungry thug who would go to any lengths for publicity. He was particularly exasperated when McCarthy began to investigate the Army for communists and subpoenaed White House personnel.

This guy McCarthy is going to get into trouble over this. I'm not going to take this one lying down… He's ambitious. He wants to be President. He's the last guy in the whole world who'll ever get there, if I have anything to say.

James Hagerty Diary Feb. 25, 1954

 

[Ozymandias]

My next post is going to be about General MacArthur, but after that I plan on going into great detail about the Pearl Harbor attack, and why it came as such a surprise to America. This will take some time, but it is extremely important to this narrative, IMO, for several reasons:1. Even to this day, the extraordinary circumstances regarding this attack have led many to believe that FDR wanted it to happen and allowed it to happen. Less than a year ago I was listening to talk radio host Michael Medved, a guy I respect, and he commented in an offhand way, "Of course, Roosevelt knew about Pearl Harbor and allowed the ships to be sunk, we know this now." I firmly do NOT believe this is true, and I will describe what I think actually happened, and also how this conspiracy theory got started, and why. What concerns me is that this is an example of how conspiracy theories tend to grow over time. In 60 years from now, will some talk radio host say, "Well of course we know now that Bush knew about 9/11 beforehand and allowed it to happen"? I fear this is certainly possible. 2. The bungling of the American government and military in regard to Pearl Harbor and subsequent events is inexcusable and needs to be revisited again and again as an example of what must never be repeated. Especially in the nuclear age, we cannot afford the type of mistakes that were made then.

I agree with you. We love conspiracy theories, but the reality is, there are mistakes and blunders which get us into trouble far more than some masterminds deliberately causing unfortunate events.

An additional point to consider is that in American Naval thinking, they were still adhering to the Mahan Doctrine, which held that navies had to prepare for the "decisive battle", and that that battle would be fought between the battleships of the opposing nations. Therefore, if the US was to preserve anything, they would have gone for preserving the battleships rather than the carriers. It was only with the attack on Pearl Harbor, and then Coral Sea and Midway that naval strategists finally began to see that the day of the battleship as supreme, was over.P.S. The sinking of the Royal Navy's battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse off Singapore, three days after Pearl Harbor, when they were operating without air cover, also has something to do with it. Churchill described that as possible the blackest day of the war.

 

[timschochet]

Kimmel and Short

Husband Kimmel had become Cinpac (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet) in February of 1941. This had always been an outstanding officer and sailor, though his rise had come completely in peacetime. He was a friend of FDR's, and in every way competent for his command.

Walter Short was also considered an outstanding officer in peacetime, who rose by performing every duty asked of him competently and effortlessly. Like Kimmel, he had never had a combat command.

The two were close personal friends who played golf together twice a month. They understood that Hawaii was considered a prime target should Japan attack. They understood that they must be prepared for such an attack. Yet, one gets the impression that somewhere deep down, they didn't understand it at all.

Perhaps because of the belief that MacArthur's forces in Manila were impregnable, or perhaps because the Japanese were not European, or simply perhaps because we're discussing the United States of America- there is a sense of falseness and nonchalance to all of the negotiations, all of the war warnings, all of the preparations for war that late November of 1941. In a nutshell, Americans simply did not believe that, in the end, Japan would ever attack. What small country would be insane enough to attack the United States of America? I think from FDR to Hull to MacArthur to Kimmel and Short down to the lowest seamen and soldiers- they didn't take the threat seriously because they didn't believe it was really possible. They KNEW Japan was bluffing- it would never happen. America was not psychologically prepared for war.

Afterwards, there was plenty of finger-pointing and recriminations on all sides. It began with General Marshall's message to General Short on November 27, which read:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeapordize your defence. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are deemed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as no, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent...

Of all of George Marshall's various directives issued throughout the war, this might have been the worst. As Short complained afterwards, it is completely ambiguous in nature. It basically warns Short what NOT to do, otherwise he'll be blamed, and at the same time warns himthat he'd better do SOMETHING, but not too much, and not publicly. Besides, the letter mentioned recon, and that was the Navy's job. Short decided the message had really been meant for MacArthur in Manila, not for him.

Admiral Kimmel received from Admiral King a much stronger message:

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. ...an amphibious attack is expected against the Phillipines or perhaps Borneo...

Kimmel was not concerned by this message because it did not mention Hawaii. He assumed the Japanese might threaten to attack somewhere (and the word "threaten" is key because he knew they'd never really do it) but not in Honolulu.

Both men went from these errors to far greater ones in the next few days...

 

[Ozymandias]

Kimmel and Short

Husband Kimmel had become Cinpac (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet) in February of 1941. This had always been an outstanding officer and sailor, though his rise had come completely in peacetime. He was a friend of FDR's, and in every way competent for his command.

Walter Short was also considered an outstanding officer in peacetime, who rose by performing every duty asked of him competently and effortlessly. Like Kimmel, he had never had a combat command.

The two were close personal friends who played golf together twice a month. They understood that Hawaii was considered a prime target should Japan attack. They understood that they must be prepared for such an attack. Yet, one gets the impression that somewhere deep down, they didn't understand it at all.

Perhaps because of the belief that MacArthur's forces in Manila were impregnable, or perhaps because the Japanese were not European, or simply perhaps because we're discussing the United States of America- there is a sense of falseness and nonchalance to all of the negotiations, all of the war warnings, all of the preparations for war that late November of 1941. In a nutshell, Americans simply did not believe that, in the end, Japan would ever attack. What small country would be insane enough to attack the United States of America? I think from FDR to Hull to MacArthur to Kimmel and Short down to the lowest seamen and soldiers- they didn't take the threat seriously because they didn't believe it was really possible. They KNEW Japan was bluffing- it would never happen. America was not psychologically prepared for war.

Afterwards, there was plenty of finger-pointing and recriminations on all sides. It began with General Marshall's message to General Short on November 27, which read:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeapordize your defence. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are deemed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as no, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent...

Of all of George Marshall's various directives issued throughout the war, this might have been the worst. As Short complained afterwards, it is completely ambiguous in nature. It basically warns Short what NOT to do, otherwise he'll be blamed, and at the same time warns himthat he'd better do SOMETHING, but not too much, and not publicly. Besides, the letter mentioned recon, and that was the Navy's job. Short decided the message had really been meant for MacArthur in Manila, not for him.

Admiral Kimmel received from Admiral King a much stronger message:

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. ...an amphibious attack is expected against the Phillipines or perhaps Borneo...

Kimmel was not concerned by this message because it did not mention Hawaii. He assumed the Japanese might threaten to attack somewhere (and the word "threaten" is key because he knew they'd never really do it) but not in Honolulu.

Both men went from these errors to far greater ones in the next few days...

One of the things that this all brought home was that in planning, you had to account for the enemy's capabilities, not his intentions. If you rely on what you think his intentions are, you can be tragically deceived.

 

[boots11234]

amazing facts from WWII link very interesting stuff here

 

[Ozymandias]

While not a believer in the conspiracy theory regarding the Pearl Harbor attack, I do believe that the US government was goading the Japanese, although it may not have been a declared strategy.

We have this, by Vice Admiral Frank Beatty, an aide to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox: "Prior to December 7, it was evident even to me... that we were pushing Japan into a corner. I believed that it was the desire of President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill that we get into the war, as they felt the Allies could not win without us and all our efforts to cause the Germans to declare war on us failed; the conditions we imposed upon Japan — to get out of China, for example — were so severe that we knew that nation could not accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we could have known that she would react toward the United States. All her preparations in a military way — and we knew their over-all import — pointed that way."

Admiral Chester Nimitz's son, said many years later, that his father had said to him: "He said, 'It is my guess that the Japanese are going to attack us in a surprise attack. There will be a revulsion in the country against all those in command at sea, and they will be replaced by people in positions of prominence ashore, and I want to be ashore, and not at sea, when that happens.'"

I think many in the government thought that an attack would come, but not necessarily at Pearl Harbor. It could have been Guam, or the Philippines, or some strategic Pacific location, but I don't think they thought it would be Pearl Harbor. Which, of course, was very shortsighted.

 

[timschochet]

Luck and Errors

1. Kimmel believed that there might be submarine attacks against his ships if Japan went to war elsewhere. He aordered all subs found around Oahu depth bombed. Kimmel also ordered the Enterprise and Lexington to ferry planes to Wake and Midway- this is why they were not at Pearl Harbor, no other reason. The commander of the task force, Admiral William F. "Bull" Halsey, was actively looking for Japanese forces, but in the wide pacific did not encounter any.

2. Kimmel ordered long range aerial reconnaissance of the southwest and south, but not the north and northwest. He assumed Short had ordered the army to recon north. Meanwhile Short had ordered army planes to recon south and southwest, but not the north and northwest. He assumed Kimmel was handling the north. This is not conjecture after the fact- the records clearly show the astonishing fact that this is what both men assummed- and of course the enemy was lying northwest of Japan!

3. Short believed that the biggest threat to his aircraft was sabatoge by the 160,000 Japanese Americans who lived in Hawaii. These people would prove, through their children, to be tremendously loyal, but of course this was not the feeling among the military brass at the time. To avoid this. he ordered most of his airplanes disarmed and packed in bunches where they could be well protected!

4. On December 6, the United States codes were working again, and they broke messages instructions to the two Japanese delegates to meet with Hull tommorow, December 7 at an exact time. Since they had never been given this specific instruction before, it was intepreted that there would be war the next day. FDR personally ordered General Marshall to send war warnings to all Pacific commanders. But the message for Hawaii was held up by atmospheric conditions that blocked the channel to Honolulu. The warning went out by telephone to Western Union in Washington to San Francisco, where it was relayed to Honolulu and arrived there at 7:30 am the next morning. A half hour passed before it was decoded, by then it was too late.

 

[timschochet]

Honolulu, December 6, 1941

Saturday night at Pearl Harbor was the customary party night. Men on shore leave streamed into the fleshpots of Honolulu. The officers held parties in their homes or at their clubs. Many Army Air Corps officers and their wives attended a dinner party at the Hickam Field officers club. Admiral Kimmel and his wife were among the guests at a small dinner given by Rear Adm. H. Fairfax Leary and his wife at the Halekulani Hotel. Kimmel mentioned that the Japanese consul had invited him to drop in for a glass of champagne that night. But Kimmel thought that this was rather not the time to sip bubbly with Japanese officials. True to his custom, Kimmel had but one drink and went home early. So did General Short, who had gone with his wife to the Schofield Barracks officers club for an annual charity dinner-dance. Short drove past Pearl Harbor, ablaze with light, exclaiming, "What a great target that would make!"

Aboard the flattops Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku, the pilots went to bed early, inducing sleep by drinking beer. They awoke the next morning refreshed, showered and dressed in clean garments so that they might enter battle spotless like the samurai of old. Aboard Akagi, Commander Fuchida awoke at 5:00 am. He found his subordinate Murata in the officer's mess, already inf full flying togs. "Honlolulu sleeps", he reported. "The Honolulu radio plays soft music. All is fine."

The pilots clambered into their cockpits with handkerchiefs bearing the word Hissho (Certain victory) tied around their flying helmets. The bombers, fightets, and torpedo planes each had a crew of three: pilot, bombadier/observer, and radio operator.

At 5:15 the flight decks of all six carriers were roaring with the pulsation of the motors of 185 airplanes. At the last second, however, Admiral Nagumo ordered two recon planes from cruisers catapulted into the sky. They were to study Pearl and Lahaina roads and then break radio silence to report. Nagumo knew this was a risk that might break surprise, but Nagumo believed precise info was worth the risk. At 5:50 the fighters took off. The first to leave were the Zeroes. Within 15 minutes all 185 planes had launched, the fastest launching on record. Only two fighters failed to fly: one had engine trouble, and one crashed on takeoff, (though the pilot was rescued.) Though they were launched, the planes were not to attack until the radio order was given: Tora! (Tiger) This same order would signal to poised invasion forces all over east Asia that the arrogant Americans had been found asleep in their beds.

 

[timschochet]

Tora! Tora! Tora!

At Pearl there had been a submarine alert, involving the destroyer Ward This was one of Admiral Nagumo's biggest fears: that one of his own subs might alarm the enemy. The Ward spotted the sub, could not identify it, and promptly fired. The second shot struck the submarine at the water line and it sank in 1,200 feet of water. The Ward's captain now reported the action to headquarters, where it was eventually relayed to Admiral Kimmel around 7:00 am, just as he was rising. But Kimmel discounted the report. There had been so many submarine false alarms in the last month that to him it was like the boy who cried "wolf" one too many times. He could have raised an alert, but chose not to.

Opana Mobile Radar Station was located on the Northern tip of Oahu, 230 feet above sea level. Two privates named Lockard and Elliot were on duty that Sunday morning. At the end of a routine night, suddenly the oscilloscope showed a disturbing image- at least 50 planes or more. Nothing that big had ever surfaced. The two men argued as to whether or not there was an error, then decided to telephone the Information Center. They reported the news to the switchboard operator, who told the pursuit officer, Lt. Kermit Tyler. Tyler was sleepy and hungover from a long night of partying. He took a look at the report and decided it was the 12 B-17s due Hawaii from the mainland. "But", said the switchboard operator, "They say there's more than 50 planes!" "Well, then they're idiots!" Tyler snapped. "Don't worry about it."

Commander Fuchida, at the head of his Zeroes, stared at the beautiful sight below him. Eight American battleships were neatly moored along Battleship Row. Most of them were side by side. Nevada, Arizona, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, Oklahoma, California, and Pennsylvania. The target battleship Utah was also in the harbor, along with 5 cruisers and 26 destroyers. The carriers were missing.

Because it was a Sunday, about one third of the crews were on shore leave. Antiaircraft batteries were only partially manned. Most of the ammunition was in padlocked chests. This was all as Yamamoto had planned it back in Tokyo. As the Japanese approached, some of the ships were piping men to morning chow, and others were raising the flag. No American patrol craft were aloft that sparkling, sunny, Sunday morning. On land, all was calm and serene. Church bells were ringing and the messenger with General Marshall's warning was pedalling his way towards General Short's headquarters.

"Tenkai!" Fuchida cried into his microphone. Take attack position! Then he cried, "Tora! Tora! Tora!" And the Japanese attacked.

 

[Ozymandias]

One of the reasons the Americans believed that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked is that the water was very shallow there (averaging 40 ft), and torpedoes needed deeper water if they were dropped from aircraft; they usually went down about 60-70 feet before coming back to a pre-set depth. So no torpedo nets had been set.

However, the Japanese had absorbed, as the Americans had not, the lessons from Taranto, where British torpedo planes had attacked and severely damaged the Italian fleet. The Japanese military attache in Berlin had gone to Taranto and discovered what the British had done. Wooden fins had been added to the torpedoes so they entered the water at a shallower angle. The wooden fins came off when the torpedoes hit the water, but the objective had been achieved. He informed Japan, and the torpedoes were modified and the Japanese pilots went through intensive training with them. However, they were barely ready on time for the departure of the Striking Force.

 

[Ozymandias]

The reason the Japanese went after the Pacific Fleet was not that they intended to conquer America or anything of the sort. There was not even any intention of invading Hawaii. They wanted to bring the Dutch East Indies (with its oil), and Southeast Asia into the Co-Prosperity Sphere. In short, they wanted an empire, and the only thing standing in their way, was the US Pacific Fleet. They believed America was weak, and that the US involvement with Britain would cause the US to back off any opposition to their plans for an Asian Empire.

It was a monumental miscalculation.

 

[timschochet]

I am going to finish with Pearl Harbor tommorow. I'm hoping Redwes comes in here and catches up with Russia. If he doesn't, I'll return to that after I deal with the initial actions by the Japanese.

 

[timschochet]

The Attack on Pearl Harbor Part One

Watching the first planes arrive, and seeing the red spots on them, the radio operator on Ford Island signalled the fleet: "AIR RAID, PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL!" It was too late.

The first ship to die was the Oklahoma. Three torpedoes peeled it open like giant can openers and then two more finished her off. Maryland, moored inside, fought back under the protection of Oklahoma's riddled hull. She escaped with only two bomb hits.

Admiral Kimmel was in his quarters dressing for his Sunday morning golf game with General Short. He heard the shrieking of the diving planes and felt the shock waves of the explosions. He ran next door to the home of Captain John Earle,whose lawn commanded an excellent view of Battleship Row. And he watched. According to Mrs. Earle, "I have never seen a human being so stricken with horror. His face was as white as his uniform."

The first two torpedoes missed West Virginia, but she was then straddled by six more which found their target, plus two bombs. West Virginia capsized, straightened, then sank upright. At this point the sky was now dotted with the black puffs of American antiaircraft fire. But the destruction continued. Next, the flagship Ogala and light cruiser Helena were both crippled by torpedoes. Pennsylvania, meanwhile, put up such a cloud of ack-ack that she was racked by only a single bomb hit. California, moored alone, blew up when a bomb exploded in her magazine.

The ship that took the most hits that morning was the Arizona. Just after Oklahoma capsized, a 16 inch shell fell into the Number 2 turret, exploding in the forward magazine. At least 1,000 men died in that moment, including the admiral on board and the captain. Bomb after bomb penetrated the sinking battleship. It sank with hundreds of sailors trapped below decks. (The remnant of the Arizona is today the site of the monument at Pearl Harbor. If you visit Oahu, this is a must see and very moving. I was awestruck.)

Nevada was moored alone and under partial steam when the first wave struck. She ws the only battleship to get away. She sailed past the burning Arizona, fishing three of her survivors from the water. The Japanese pilots waited for Nevada to approach the harbor entrance before attacking- their intention was to sink her at the entrance and hopefully block it. Nevada took 5 hits, several near hits, lost over 300 men, but kept moving, finally running aground in the mud off Hospital Point. The channel remained open.

It was debris from Arizona that doomed Tennessee. She was set on fire by the shower of flaming objects from the other ship.

 

[timschochet]

The Attack on Pearl Harbor, Part Two

General Short's response to the first explosions was puzzlement: why would the navy run battle practice on Sunday morning? When his adjutant arrived at headquarters with the news, Short was thunderstruck. He immediately ordered Alert Number 3 and all planes to scramble. Again, it was too late.

The Zeroes arrived at Hickam Field to see the American planes lined in up in neat little rows. In the first assault, at least half of the aircraft was destroyed or seriously damaged. The dozen B-17s arriving from the mainland that moment might have suffered a similar fate if not for the flying skill of their pilots and the bravery and accuracy of their gunners. These were the planes that did the most damage that day to the Japanese, shooting down several Zeroes.

The Japanese next struck at Wheeler Field, and destroyed the 82 aircraft there. 4 Japanese planes who had flown too low were shot down, incredibly, by machine gun fire. Meanwhile, a second wave of planes attacked the Harbor itself. Admiral Kimmel continued to watch. At one point a spent bullet crashed towards him, striking him on the chest. As he picked up the slug, a .50 caliber, he turned to one of his captains and said, "It would have been merciful if it had killed me."

The devastation at Pearl Harbor had been beyond Yamamoto's dreams of destruction. Eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and four auxiliary vessels were either sunk, capsized, badly damaged, or generally damaged- 18 in all. Ninety naval aircraft were destroyed, and the Army lost 77 planes with another 128 damaged. 2,403 Americans were killed, and 1,178 were wounded. The Japanese lost 29 airplanes, one large submarine, and 5 midget submarines.

It was a complete victory.

It was also, as Yamamoto had warned his government, complete madness.

 

[Ozymandias]

Although it was an astonishing destruction of the American Pacific fleet, the Japanese failed on two different tactical perspectives. The first is, that the carriers were not there. At the time, it did not seem that important, given the magnitude of the ships sunk, but it would later prove to be crucial. The second is that the Japanese debated whether to launch a third strike, against storage tanks, ammunition depots and port facilities. Finally, Admiral Nagumo decided that the risks were too great; American anti aircraft defense had stiffened (many more planes were shot down during the second strike than during the first), and that the turnaround time would mean that the planes would be returning to the carriers at night, risking further losses.

Admiral Nimitz later said that if they had struck those facilities, it would have set back the war in the Pacific for as much as two years. Yamamoto initially concurred with Admiral Nagumo's decision, but later said it was a huge missed opportunity.

Of course, the Japanese did not think they were in for a long war with the Americans. They thought the Americans, shaken by the loss of the fleet, would push for an armistice.

 

[DCThunder]

Let's Remember Pearl Harbor:

http://blog.videosift.com/video/Remember-Pearl-Harbor

 

[timschochet]

Just a quick interruption in the timeline: today, Setember 1, 2009, is the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. This is the reason this thread was started. You can go back in the early pages of the thread to find the narratives regarding what occurred on September 1, 1939.

 

[kaa]

I view WWII as the end of Europe's ability to project power. The final resolution of the war was that eastern Europe had become satellite nations of the USSR, and western Europe effectively had become satellite nations of the US. The region became little more than a buffer zone between two superpowers. As Europe has turned increasingly anti-business over future decades, its importance has dwindled further, nearing backwater territory. Meanwhile, the far East rises as they grow increasingly pro-business. Russia, China, India and Australia may be the future powers, with Europe long forgotten.

WWII marked a turn in European culture towards oblivion.

 

[Ozymandias]

I view WWII as the end of Europe's ability to project power. The final resolution of the war was that eastern Europe had become satellite nations of the USSR, and western Europe effectively had become satellite nations of the US. The region became little more than a buffer zone between two superpowers. As Europe has turned increasingly anti-business over future decades, its importance has dwindled further, nearing backwater territory. Meanwhile, the far East rises as they grow increasingly pro-business. Russia, China, India and Australia may be the future powers, with Europe long forgotten.WWII marked a turn in European culture towards oblivion.

Demography is destiny. It is that which marks the setting sun in Europe.But that's a discussion for another time.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Japanese would have been well served, knowing America's productive capabilities, to mark the following events, which occurred before Pearl Harbor.

By Act of Congress on May 17, 1938, an increase of 40,000 tons in aircraft carriers was authorized. This permitted the building of USS Hornet

(CV-8) and USS Essex (CV-9).

On June 14, 1940, another increase in tonnage was authorized. Among the ships built under this program were the Intrepid and the new Yorktown.

On July 19, an additional 200,000 tons for carriers was authorized. That would permit the building of up to 10 more carriers. On September 9, 1940, eight more of these carriers were ordered and were to become the Hornet, Franklin, Ticonderoga, Randolph, Lexington,Bunker Hill, Wasp and Hancock.

This was before Pearl Harbor ever happened. It probably took 2 years or so for the carriers to come into service, but the US war production machine was starting to gear up.

 

[DCThunder]

The Japanese would have been well served, knowing America's productive capabilities, to mark the following events, which occurred before Pearl Harbor.By Act of Congress on May 17, 1938, an increase of 40,000 tons in aircraft carriers was authorized. This permitted the building of USS Hornet(CV-8) and USS Essex (CV-9).On June 14, 1940, another increase in tonnage was authorized. Among the ships built under this program were the Intrepid and the new Yorktown.On July 19, an additional 200,000 tons for carriers was authorized. That would permit the building of up to 10 more carriers. On September 9, 1940, eight more of these carriers were ordered and were to become the Hornet, Franklin, Ticonderoga, Randolph, Lexington,Bunker Hill, Wasp and Hancock.This was before Pearl Harbor ever happened. It probably took 2 years or so for the carriers to come into service, but the US war production machine was starting to gear up.

The other key piece of maritime legislation was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 which essentially began the cargo ship building boom that would culminate with the production of over 2,500 Liberty ships and which essentailly replaced the ships sunk by the U-boats faster than they could be sunk.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Japanese would have been well served, knowing America's productive capabilities, to mark the following events, which occurred before Pearl Harbor.By Act of Congress on May 17, 1938, an increase of 40,000 tons in aircraft carriers was authorized. This permitted the building of USS Hornet(CV-8) and USS Essex (CV-9).On June 14, 1940, another increase in tonnage was authorized. Among the ships built under this program were the Intrepid and the new Yorktown.On July 19, an additional 200,000 tons for carriers was authorized. That would permit the building of up to 10 more carriers. On September 9, 1940, eight more of these carriers were ordered and were to become the Hornet, Franklin, Ticonderoga, Randolph, Lexington,Bunker Hill, Wasp and Hancock.This was before Pearl Harbor ever happened. It probably took 2 years or so for the carriers to come into service, but the US war production machine was starting to gear up.

The other key piece of maritime legislation was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 which essentially began the cargo ship building boom that would culminate with the production of over 2,500 Liberty ships and which essentailly replaced the ships sunk by the U-boats faster than they could be sunk.

Yes. The production of Liberty ships was one of the masterpieces of mass production. They were rolling off the assembly lines at the rate of 1 a day.

 

[timschochet]

I plan on continuing with the narrative this afternoon, first with a description of what happened at Clark Field in Luzon, then about the initial American reaction to Pearl Harbor, the world reaction to Pearl Harbor, Germany's decision to declare war, and then discuss in more detail the overall Japanese assault in December of 1941.

But first, I wanted to add a little further perspective on Pearl Harbor itself- in terms of how it changed America, it is probably the most unique event in our history. Only two other events come close to Pearl Harbor in terms of the immediate effect on Americans: Fort Sumter and 9/11.

Unlike Pearl Harbor and 9/11, Fort Sumter was not unexpected. But the attack and surrender did serve to completely galvanize the Northern states. For the moment at least, there was no dissension: the entire North was solidly behind Abraham Lincoln. In a way, it represented a release of tension for the American people, and this was felt on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. But I can't quite give it Pearl Harbor importance because it only unified the North, and not the entire country, and because it was not a surprise.

9/11 was a surprise, and the initial reaction by Americans was extremely similar: disbelief, anger, and a sense of uniting together. However, the similarity ends at this point. A lot of people blame Bush for this, because he almost immediately told us all to go on living our lives, whereas both Lincoln and Roosevelt used their crisies to fundamentally change America. Certainly Bush could have behaved in a like fashion in the week following 9/11, but I personally don't really blame him for this. The real difference with 9/11 was the problem we always face when confronting terrorism: the enemy is elusive. In the cases of Sumter and Pearl, the enemy, no matter how difficult to conquer, was straight foward and in front of us. Invade Richmond, invade Tokyo, and you win and regain lost American honor. With 9/11 there is no clear answer. We took out the Taliban, but the mastermind remains free 8 years later. For these reasons, I don't believe 9/11 is quite equal either. (Though I have to say I certainly did when it happened. I kept thinking to myself, "This is our Pearl Harbor".)

There are, of course, other singular incidents in American history that had a profound effect: the burning of the White House by British troops, the sinking of the Maine, the 1929 stock market crash, the assassination of JFK. But I don't think any of these changed every aspect of American life as much as Pearl Harbor did. It remains the most singular moment in American history.

 

[timschochet]

Clark Field

Clark Field is a military defeat every bit as impactful as Pearl Harbor, but it does not get the recognition among the public, for the same reason that Grant's victory at Vicksburg does not receive equal recognition among the public as does the battle of Gettysburg. History does not seem to allow for contemporaneous events to be remembered- one usually takes precedence. Clark Field occurred 8 hours after Pearl Harbor.

Why it occurred has never been resolved. Here is what we know: MacArthur's 18 B-17s were parked there when the command center at Manila learned that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. According to the General's plan, the Flying Fortresses were supposed to raid Japanese air bases at Formosa. General Lewis Brereton, commander of the Far East Air Force, went to MacArthur's headquarters to get his permission to begin the raid. Here then is the first question- if the orders had already been given in the event of war with Japan, why was Brereton seeking MacArthur's permission? In any case, he was not allowed to see MacArthur- MacArthur's chief of staff, Richard Sutherland, automatically blocked entry to "the General", as he called him. (Sutherland was one of many cronies of MacArthur who slavishly dressed like their idol, and worshipped him.) Brereton then asked Sutherland for permission to launch, and Sutherland said he wanted a photorecon made first of the targets. While this tedious process occurred, the Japanese arrived and wiped out Clark Field. All 18 B-17's were destroyed, along with 56 fighters, 25 other aircraft, and numerous installations.

Afterwards, Brereton blamed Sutherland, Sutherland blamed Brereton for misunderstanding him, and MacArthur denied knowledge of the entire affair. MacArthur claimed much later that if he had known, he would have never authorized the B-17's to bomb Formosa anyhow, because such a strike would have been a disaster. He is probably correct about this, given Japanese numerical superiority, but it begs the question, why was it part of his original plan anyhow? And how could he have believed the B-17s by themselves gave him protection in Manila against a Japanese assault?

With the destruction of MacArthur's airplanes, the Japanese now had complete command of the air, and the Phillippines could not be defended. The only question was how long could they last. Japanese timetables called for a quick landing and conquest, and soldiers of the Imperial Army began landing in Luzon on December 22. But now, MacArthur, with his mistakes having doomed him and with his back to the wall, would prove just how brilliant a soldier he truly was.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Japanese Imperial offensive

Simultaneous with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese invaded Thailand (which surrendered within 24 hours), Hong Kong, Wake Island (where the Japanese were initially repulsed but returned in force 14 days later), and Guam. Thailand was to be used as a springboard to the Malayan Peninsula, where the British were to suffer a major defeat. In January, they were to invade the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia).

Two days after pearl Harbor, they sank the British battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse, as was mentioned earlier.

 

[Uncle Humuna]

 

[Ozymandias]

A little known battle in 1939 brought one of the major figures of the war to prominence. The Soviet Army had been purged during the 1930's and its officer corps had been decimated. In the Far Eastern part of Russia, on the border of Manchuria and Mongolia, Russians and Japanese had come into conflict, as the Kwantung Army of Japan had seized Manchuria and marched westward.

There were some border incidents, and both sides began building up troops in the area. Over the summer months there were clashes as the armies sparred with each other. In June, Lt General Georgy Zhukov arrived to take command of the Soviet Forces. The armies were of considerable size, since each side had about 100,000 troops.

The Japanese tried several times to break through and defeat the Soviets, and were planning a major offensive but Zhukov struck first. He had approximately 500 tanks, which he divided into two wings. Then his infantry and armored personnel carriers advanced in the center. When he had the Japanese pinned down, he sent the armor around in a pincer movement, and completed a classic double envelopment, trapping the Japanese 23rd Division. When they refused to surrender, he had them wiped out by artillery barrages.

Casualty figures for the Battle of Khalkin Gol are hard to come by, but the general belief is that the Soviets lost 20,000 and the Japanese lost 45,000. After this, the Japanese and Germans signed a truce.

There is an important aftermath to this battle, in addition to the fact that Georgy Zhukov became the major figure in the defense of Moscow, and then the commander in chief of all the Soviet Armies on their way to Berlin.

Inside the Japanese government there had been considerable discussion whether their empire should be extended westward, toward all the riches of the Russian steppes (favored by the Army, which had been in Manchuria since the early 1930's), or southward, toward the riches of IndoChina (which was favored by the Navy). Because of Khalkin Gol, they decided that the westward expansion would be too difficult, so they opted for the south.

 

[timschochet]

December 7, 1941- Washington, DC

At 2:00 pm, the Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu arrived at Cordell Hull's offices. They were over an hour late. As they were waiting in the antechamber, FDR called Hull and informed him that there was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. He said the report had not been confirmed.

Hull invited the Japanese in, and without sitting down they handed him a note from the Japanese government. The note, listing American "crimes" in detail, stated that, since it was clear the United States planned on attacking Japan, the Japanese government had chosen to take "defensive action". Hull stood, and replied:

I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely on the record. I have never seen a document that was more crowded infamous falsehoods and distortions- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.

Hull, the record says, did not wait for a reply. He ushered the two sad diplomats out.

The day after the Japanese attack, FDR addressed a joint session of Congress: "Yesterday, December 7, 1941, was a date that shall live in infamy", he began, and concluded by asking Congress to declare war on Japan. Congress did, with but a single dissenting vote.

Never before had Americans been so united. Isolationists and interventionalists burned with anger at Japan's treacherous sneak punch. With one blow, the Japanese had aroused and brought together a nation that had been dedicated to passivity and dissension. Japan had foolishly believed that the US would allow it to fight a limited war. It had completely misjudged the American character, and for the sake of an initial advantage that would soon fade away. "One can search military history in vain" wrote naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, "for an operation more fatal to the agressor."

Past American Presidents such as Washington, Madison, Polk, Lincoln, McKinley, Theodore Wilson, and Woodrow Wilson had all struggled with fighting a war while hampered by the pluralist nature of the American republic. In the future, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton, both Bushes, and Obama would find the same task daunting.

Not FDR. He was given carte blanche at the outset to do what he wanted, and he maintained this throughout the war until his death with very little criticism. This is a unique aspect of the war for a democratic country. Even Churchill could not avoid challenges in the House of Commons. Roosevelt was virtually unhampered in his actions, which allows us to be even more critical of his mistakes, and more praiseworthy of his accomplishments, both of which I will do my best to document in the coming narrative.

 

[Ozymandias]

The Japanese, of course, did not intend the attack to take place prior to the declaration of war. They intended the attack to be a surprise immediately after the declaration of war, thus fulfilling one of the requirements under the Hague Convention. However, for a variety of reasons, including the slow decoding of the documents by the Japanese Embassy, the actual meeting took place after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Although it would not have made any difference (the US knew that they were going to because they had broken the Japanese diplomatic code "Purple"), the fact that the attack came before the formal declaration handed the USA an immense psychological advantage. This was part of the reason that the US unified so quickly after the attack. The Japanese were seen as dishonorable and cowardly.

Admiral Yamamoto was incensed that Japanese Foreign Office bungling had led to the declaration of war had been delivered late. He may or may not have said the words which have been attributed to him: "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve." But he expressed similar sentiments to his associates.

 

[timschochet]

Hitler's Decision

On December 12, 5 days after Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared war on the United States. He was urged not to by several of his generals. There had been no mention of Germany in FDR's December 8 speech. Furthermore, the Russians had begun a counteroffensive on December 6 (more on this later.) At least, several generals argued, get Japan to declare war on Russia. But it was not to be. Hitler explained to them that he had signed a pact with Japan and his honor made him keep it. This was on the face of it absurd- Der Fuhrer had spent the last 8 years breaking one agreement after another.

Hitler, I believe, revealed his true aim when he gave his speech to the Reichstag declaring war. "Roosevelt!" he screamed in rage and anger. He compared himself to the American president- one the scion of a rich, aristocratic family, the other the son of a poor civil servant. Resentment and envy was part of it; rage at FDR for daring to interfere in his attempted conquests of England and Russia was another. The entire speech was one long screech of hatred.

Hitler was, of course, an insane madman, and also a genius. Up to this point in his life and conquests, the genius part of him prevailed. From January 1933 to December 1941, he had made one brilliant diplomatic and military move after another. Dunkirk was certainly a mistake, but it could be excused in light of the overall victory. Even the attack on Russia, huge gamble though it was, was well-concieved and came very close to ultimate success. But here, finally and perhaps inevitably, the madman took over. Hitler seemed at this moment to have no recognition of the potential of America's industrial might. Privately he told his cronies, America is a land filled with Jews and Negroes.

And so, of all of his errors (and there would be plenty to come), this was his biggest one. From the moment he declared war on America, Germany, like Japan, was doomed.