Bin Laden Documents (1 Viewer)

[Don't Toews Me]

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/resources/bin-laden-bookshelf?start=1

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released another set of Bin Laden documents the other day on the 19th. That's the third set released thus far, with the two previous sets came out in March of 2016 and May of 2015. 

I have not read the newly released documents yet, however, the following article touches on the situation:

http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-new-bin-laden-documents/article/2006384

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released 98 additional items from Osama bin Laden's compound today. If the ODNI has its way, then these files will be the last the American people see for some time. The accompanying announcement is titled, "Closing the Book on bin Laden: Intelligence Community Releases Final Abbottabad Documents." The ODNI says today's release "marks the end of a two-and-a-half-year effort to declassify several hundred documents recovered" during the Abbottabad raid.

But the total number of files released thus far, including today's document dump, is just a drop in the bucket compared to what was found in the al Qaeda master's compound. And if the public and the media care about transparency, then they should push to see more.

As THE WEEKLY STANDARD has reported in the past, more than 1 million documents and files were recovered in Abbottabad. Some of the documents (e.g. blanks, duplicates, scans of publicly available media, etc.) are basically worthless. But many thousands more illuminate how al Qaeda has operated.

On May 8, 2011, Tom Donilon, who was then President Obama's National Security Adviser, explained that bin Laden's documents and files would fill a "small college library." Donilon elaborated further that the recovered intelligence demonstrated Osama bin Laden's active role. At the time of his death, the al Qaeda founder oversaw a cohesive international network, receiving updates from around the globe on a regular basis.

In 2012, the Washington Post reported that U.S. officials "described the complete collection of bin Laden material as the largest cache of terrorism files ever obtained, with about 100 flash drives and DVDs as well as five computer hard drives, piles of paper and a handwritten journal kept by the al-Qaeda chief."

To date, the ODNI has released or listed just 620 "items" found in bin Laden's home. Only 314 of these are "declassified material."

That is an insignificant fraction of the total collection.

President Obama's White House also released 17 files via West Point's Combating Terrorism center in 2012. And a handful of additional documents made their way to the public during a terror-related trial in Brooklyn in 2015. But even including those files, the public has still only seen a small number of documents, as compared to the total cache.

Gen. Michael Flynn, who will serve as the National Security Adviser to President Trump, has read and been briefed on some of the bin Laden files. Gen. Flynn also fought to have the documents fully exploited. Last year, Flynn wrote that only a "tiny fraction" had been released to the public. That was before today's release. But the 98 new items hardly mark an appreciable increase.

Transparency is important for a number of reasons. Consider the ODNI's own statement on today's release, and how it provides a remarkably incomplete picture regarding al Qaeda's decades-long relationship with Iran.

Why would ODNI attempt to portray bin Laden's views as fixed and negative—"hatred, suspicion"—when documents written by bin Laden himself tell a more nuanced, yet troubling story?

There's no question that some of bin Laden's files document the tensions and problems in al Qaeda's relationship with Iran. Bin Laden worried that members of his family would be tracked by Iranian intelligence. At one point, al Qaeda even kidnapped an Iranian diplomat in order to force a prisoner exchange. Some senior al Qaeda leaders have been held in Iranian custody for years.

But there is much more to the story, including the documents detailing Iran's longtime collusion with al Qaeda. The ODNI is essentially asking readers to focus on the bad days in al Qaeda's marriage with Iran, while ignoring the good days.

One previously released document, apparently authored by bin Laden himself, summarized his views on Iran. In a letter dated Oct. 18, 2007, Bin Laden warned one of his subordinates in Iraq not to openly threaten attacks inside Iran. Bin Laden explained why (emphasis added):

"You did not consult with us on that serious issue that affects the general welfare of all of us. We expected you would consult with us for these important matters, for as you are aware, Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication, as well as the matter of hostages."

Bin Laden was pragmatic when it came to dealing with Iran for reasons that are not hard to understand: Iran was the "main artery" for his organization. Why would ODNI attempt to portray bin Laden's views as fixed and negative—"hatred, suspicion"—when documents written by bin Laden himself so plainly contradict this?

Since July 2011, President Obama's Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly made it clear that Iran hosts senior al Qaeda leaders. Echoing bin Laden's letter, the State Department has even described al Qaeda's network inside Iran as its "core pipeline."

The Treasury and State Departments publicly accused the Iranian regime of allowing al Qaeda to operate inside Iran in: July 2011, December 2011, February 2012, July 2012, October 2012, May 2013, January 2014, February 2014, April 2014, August 2014, and July 2016.

In addition, during congressional testimony in February 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper described the relationship as a "marriage of convenience."

Today's statement by the ODNI says nothing about this "convenience."

The bin Laden files are an invaluable resource for checking the U.S. Intelligence Community's assessments. The CIA's erroneous assessment of al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan is a case in point.

In June 2010, then CIA Director Leon Panetta told ABC's This Week that al Qaeda's footprint in Afghanistan was "relatively small," totaling "50 to 100" members, "maybe less."

A memo written by Osama bin Laden's chief manager that same month told a different story. In the memo, bin Laden's henchman explained that al Qaeda was operating in at least eight of Afghanistan's provinces as of June 2010. In addition, just one al Qaeda "battalion" based in Kunar and Nuristan had 70 members by itself. In other words, just one al Qaeda "battalion" exceeded the lower bound of the CIA's figures for all of Afghanistan—all by itself. U.S. officials have been forced to concede in recent months that there are far more al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan than previously estimated. If they had accurately assessed bin Laden's files, then they would have already known that.

Osama bin Laden's files are a crucial resource to understanding the 9/11 wars, and al Qaeda's strengths and weaknesses. The American public should be able to see as many of them as possible.

The bold is referring to this press statement: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/224-press-releases-2017/1474-closing-the-book-on-bin-laden-intelligence-community-releases-final-abbottabad-documents

Closing the Book on bin Laden:
Intelligence Community Releases Final Abbottabad Documents

Third, Final Tranche Echoes Earlier Revelations in “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf” Series

Today marks the end of a two-and-a-half-year effort to declassify several hundred documents recovered in the raid on Usama bin Laden’s Abbottabad, Pakistan, compound in May 2011.  This final batch of documents mirrors themes in previous releases, including bin Laden’s:

-Focus on the United States and the West as the primary enemy

-Hatred, suspicion of Iran and a foreboding forecast of a major Sunni-Shia clash

-Criticism of the ISIL (then al-Qa’ida in Iraq) brand of terrorism, cautioning against undisciplined targeting and the importance of gaining support, consensus-building, and providing for the needs of a populace before declaring an Islamic State

“Bin Laden later in life recognized how terrorist organizations are prone to brutal violence that alienates the support they are so desperate to attract, but he and his successors could do little to temper the rise of ISIL and the next generation of zealots,” said one analyst from the interagency team.

This release aligns with the president’s call for increased transparency—consistent with national security prerogatives—and the 2014 Intelligence Authorization Act, which required the ODNI to conduct a review of the documents for release. 

Beginning in October 2014 and with DNI approval, the CIA spearheaded a rigorous interagency review of the classified documents under the auspices of the White House’s National Security Council staff.  Representatives from seven agencies combed through the documents—with the goals of increasing transparency and responding to the congressionally-directed action.

“The declassified documents reveal bin Laden’s strategy for upending global politics through protracted violent conflict directed primarily against the United States and the West.  Bin Laden—like many terrorist leaders before him—was an idealist who romanticized terrorism as a way to right what he believed was wrong with the world—and lead to the re-creation of a lost utopia for his followers, a destructive vision that continues to spark violent conflict globally,” the analyst said.

Given the large number of documents to review, and the increasing public demand to see them, the White House asked ODNI to declassify and release the documents as they were ready.  This is the third, final tranche to be released.  The first tranche was released May 20, 2015 and the second on March 1, 2016. 

Since the first release, the Intelligence Community has reviewed hundreds of additional documents for possible declassification and release.  The document-review process can be time consuming because—once a document is declassified—it cannot be reclassified. The IC needs to ensure no declassified document will directly injure efforts to keep the nation secure, including safeguarding sensitive sources and methods.

“While I am pleased to finally bring this interagency effort to its close, I would note that playing a small role in fostering increased government transparency by enabling the American public access to these historic documents is truly humbling,” said the head of the interagency task force as she reflected on the end of the declassification review.

Former NSA analyst John Schindler touched on the AQ-Iran relationship here: http://observer.com/2016/04/uncovering-the-hidden-truths-of-911/

So why create this thread? A couple of reasons:

1. The information is quite interesting and sort of makes one wonder. It begs the question of, "What don't we know?" At the same time, I have zero tolerance for conspiracy theories. However, there is a very fine line between conspiracy theories and investigating the foreign influences of AQ and 9/11 and getting to the bottom of it. And what is curious about the relationship between AQ and Iran is the ideological difference of Iran being Shia and AQ being Sunni. 

2. The Schindler article peaked my interest back when I read it. Him being former NSA (not sure of how long he stayed in, but I'm fairly confident he was in when 9/11 occurred) and obviously knowing things the public does not know once again makes me curious. I won't speculate for reasons already mentioned. This specific excerpt from the linked Schindler article is interesting: 

Despite these facts, the 9/11 Commission demonstrated little interest in Iranian ties to the Planes Operation. While admitting that several of the hijackers had transited Iran, and that Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the notorious KSM, the jihadist entrepreneur who came up with the Planes Operation, had stashed his family in Iran for years, it went no further. Why Tehran would want to help Sunni radicals was left essentially unexplored. In particular, the 9/11 Commission punted on the obvious lines of inquiry that such information opened up to anyone with eyes wanting to see, lamely noting that the issue of Iran’s role “requires further investigation by the U.S. Government.”

That additional inquiry never came. In fairness to the 9/11 Commission, they were not allowed to see important information that might have changed their minds. In particular, they did not see NSA signals intelligence that shed significant light on Iran’s clandestine role supporting al-Qa’ida generally and the Planes Operation particularly. SIGINT from NSA makes up the lion’s share of intelligence in our government, and the fact that the 9/11 Commission was never shown the impressive full NSA archive of reports, many highly classified, on the very topic they were investigating seems incomprehensible.

3. After reading that article way back, I came across a very good book on Al Qaeda. "Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qaeda since 9/11," by Seth G. Jones. I would certainly recommend it to anyone interested on the topic as the book was very informative. Post 9/11, AQ members decided on escape routes out of Afghanistan. They likely assumed the US would invade Afghanistan (and some left after the US invasion in late 2001/early 2002) and that their sanctuary would be lost, but what exactly stops them from fleeing? Many fled to Pakistan, which is where Bin Laden himself fled to after the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. However, some also fled to Iran. These include, but not limited to: Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Saif al-Adel, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani. Sa'ad bin Laden (a son of UBL), and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. These aren't some no name AQ members. Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was a member of AQ's Shura Council in 2001. So was Abu Muhammad al-Masri. And Saif al-Adel. And Abu Hafs al-Mauritani. And Abu Ghayth al-Kuwaiti (who I believe is Sulayman Abu Ghayth). Sa'ad bin Laden was a son of UBL. And Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, of course, later was the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Another member of interest who resided in Iran was Muhammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim (also went by the name Abu Jihad al-Masri), who "was an Al Qaeda operational and propaganda leader." Again, all of this information came from the book and Seth G Jones. The book wasn't exclusively about Iran+AQ relationship, but it did touch on it throughout. 

Other articles of interest: 

https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/19/irans-partnership-with-al-qaeda-and-unanswered-questions/

https://20committee.com/2014/09/25/what-if-everything-you-know-about-terrorism-is-wrong/

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unlikely-alliance-irans-secretive-relationship-with-al-qaeda/

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/9/osama-bin-laden-iran-shared-logistical-alliance-in/

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/09/25/Iran-s-relationship-with-al-Qaeda-It-s-complicated.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-binladen-documents-iran-idUSBRE8421EG20120503

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-al-qaeda-iran-connection/

Tried to include some more skeptical pieces of the connection just to show both sides. 

It's impossible to conclude anything substantial here. The biggest thing is just to present some of the facts I came across. 

Anyway, got off on a bit of a tangent there. Saw the first article and figured to touch on the Iran-AQ angle a bit more based on what I've seen/read over the last few months. But the thread is really open to the Bin Laden Documents in general, and with the recent set coming out last week, figured it deserved it's own thread.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

One previously released document, apparently authored by bin Laden himself, summarized his views on Iran. In a letter dated Oct. 18, 2007, Bin Laden warned one of his subordinates in Iraq not to openly threaten attacks inside Iran. Bin Laden explained why (emphasis added):

"You did not consult with us on that serious issue that affects the general welfare of all of us. We expected you would consult with us for these important matters, for as you are aware, Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication, as well as the matter of hostages."

- OH?

 - This seems important.

 

[Reg Lllama of Brixton]

Calm down

 

[Don't Toews Me]

- OH?

 - This seems important.

This is true. There's also more skeptical sections in some of those documents. One of the ones recently released: 

Letter to sons Uthman and Muhammad

You and the brethren should remember any questionable action or observation in any hospital in Iran. If they inject you with a shot, this shot might be loaded with a tiny chip. The syringe size may be normal but the needle is expected to be larger than normal size. The chip size may be as long as a seed of grain but very thin and smooth. Notice if they take any of you for an operation, for good or no good reason, and inject you. Make sure to remember any comments about the reasons for setting you free. Take notes of dates and times of any of such actions.

Letter to sister Um Abd-al-Rahman

The situation that barred me from seeing my precious daughter - may God bless her soul - are the same circumstances that stood between completing the marriage of my daughter from Abi Abdullah - God bless his soul - until he met his God as a martyr on the past 10th of Shawal (AH). It is the same reason to us, irrespective of her old age and being imprisoned eight years in the tyrant prisons of Iran.

Letter to Haj Uthman

In regard to the blatant Iranian expansion, do not be afraid that the many duties and challenges from the enemies are great and dangerous. The Russians were defeated through the favor of Allah, and even when the Crusaders began to intensify their campaigns against the Islamic nation in general and the Mujahidin in particular, it was inevitable that we undertook jihad against this Zionist Crusader alliance.

Today do not fear them because the greatest danger threatening the region is the danger of Iran’s Magi rule, taking into account that it is from within, their large number of residents, and they hide under the banner of extending their influence in Muslim nations in order to turn away the West.

We must carry the Jihad against the Jews, Christians, and heretics. You know that opposing the Safavid Iranian regime will be more difficult and extreme, because the animosity for the Jews and Christians is a generally accepted premise and axiom for Muslims, and from Allah and they deserve it from within the Nation. However, the Safavids have pockets, influence, and many supporters in every part of the Islamic world, especially in the Gulf Nations, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sudan. These Safavids drape the people in their religion and they call it Islam and advocate it and the cause of Palestine. So there will be some Muslims who support this deceptive regime because they do not know the truth of its infidelity and hypocrisy, aside from the atheists and hypocrites who recruited them from our Nation who also align with the Syrian and Qatari regimes, giving them an important media platform in the region. I mean by that Al Jazeera channel, and I add to that its alliance with the opposition movement, Hamas, and the Jihad and some of the other opposition sects that desire to confirm that there is a media and jihad campaign against it that is proportionate to the size and scope of the mission. It is a operational priority to incite all the scholars and proselytizers of the Nation to join in this campaign against the Safavid Rafidites and do everything possible to alarm and recruit whoever refuses to participate in this campaign, specifically those among them who have taken positions of support for some of the Safavid Rafidites figureheads such as the support and praise of al-((Zandani)), ‘Iwad al-((Qarni), and others for Hassan ((Nasrallah).

Shura law, because of their apostasy, and it is also not mentally sound. The regimes of the region have intelligence agencies that know the extent of the Safavid influence in Iraq and in the nations of the rest of the region. The Saudi Faysal exclaimed years ago that the Americans have handed Iraq to Iran on a platter of gold.

They know the truth, but they are not preparing themselves to defend the countries. Likewise, they have not prepared people to protect themselves. On the contrary, they are practicing despotism and are repressing all those working seriously from forming a real force to defend against the deception of the enemies. They have indeed created a defense for the countries and the worshippers and the United States is responsible for it . 

Today it is marching at a quick pace to reconcile with Iran and coordinate the status with it and the people of the region are paying for it. The foulness of this falls into the hands of the rulers after they dropped their active weapon (the United States), their ally, which is also a friend of the Safavids, their enemy. 

In conclusion, the solution is possible in:

1. Alarming the Nation to the danger of the Rafidite doctrines, their plans to seize the Nation, their capabilities, and the extent of their hatred for the family of Islam. They’re the ones who consider the followers of the Prophet to be infidels, and they are waiting for the opportunity to exhume their bodies and desecrate them. So what do you they will do to us? We already know of the horrible things they have done to Muslims in Iraq.

2. Incite the Sunnis in Iran from the Baluchi’s and the Kurds and contact those scholars that they have left after the cleansing campaigns against them and support them in alarming

They are satisfied by some of the important sayings for their Imams in this modern age, except that there isn’t an opportunity for the Rafidites to escape from the sayings of their former Imams. The Khomeini believes that the Imam is better than the Prophet and the coming King. He classifies his followers and people in Iran as better than the followers of the Prophet, peace and prayers upon him.

Various excerpts in a couple of them that mention Iran. Links to a few others:

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter to Zamaray Sahib.pdf

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter to Shaykh Mahmud 2.pdf

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter to Abu Muhammad Salah.pdf

One of the reasons why I didn't like the wording of that first article from the Weekly Standard was it came across as too speculative. This line in particular: 

Why would ODNI attempt to portray bin Laden's views as fixed and negative—"hatred, suspicion"—when documents written by bin Laden himself tell a more nuanced, yet troubling story?

Unless he's gone through all of the recent documents and scanned through to see what they say about Iran, to me, it just comes across as too speculative. The document he does cite, the one where UBL states, "Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication, as well as the matter of hostages," that one was released in March of 2016, not the recent set released 6 days ago. So it is very possible that perhaps the ODNI was speaking that the recent set spoke of Iran mostly in a negative manner. I'm just not sure what the author was insinuating by the above. 

With a guy like Schindler, I allow a bit more on the speculation side of things because of his background. I know he's seen things I have not. Whether that leeway gets used and abused, I cannot comment on that, but him being former NSA counts for something. Let's not forget, he did come out in 2013 and tell us "Wikileaks is a Moscow front" before I at least heard it anywhere else. 

Which is why I circle back to this Schindler article (the sentences within the article that he hyperlinks are not transferring for some reason). 

Uncovering the Hidden Truths of 9/11

Moreover, focusing solely on Saudi tactical support to the Planes Operation obscures the bigger question of possible strategic support to 9/11. In other words, did any governments secretly aid al-Qa’ida in even more substantial ways than Riyadh did? Regrettably this question was always considered even more off-limits inside the Beltway than talking about Saudi involvement in 9/11—and it still remains explosive today.

That Iran had some sort of hand in the Planes Operation has long been suspected by many insiders. Contrary to what “terrorism experts” may say, Tehran was always willing to aid Sunni extremists like al-Qa’ida, while Osama bin Laden and his ilk were equally willing to accept secret help from the Shia they despise. Iranian intelligence has enjoyed a clandestine relationship with al-Qa’ida going back to the early 1990s, and U.S. intelligence has known of meetings between their leadership and top Tehran spies since 1996.

As I exposed in my 2007 book Unholy Terror, it was this toxic secret brew of Saudi cash and Iranian know-how that enabled al-Qa’ida in the 1990s to transform from a regional terrorist group into a global movement and threat. The real road to 9/11 was paved by Riyadh’s moneymen and Tehran’s spies, who despite their mutual antipathy were both eager to help bin Laden and his movement in their jihad against the West.

Despite these facts, the 9/11 Commission demonstrated little interest in Iranian ties to the Planes Operation. While admitting that several of the hijackers had transited Iran, and that Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the notorious KSM, the jihadist entrepreneur who came up with the Planes Operation, had stashed his family in Iran for years, it went no further. Why Tehran would want to help Sunni radicals was left essentially unexplored. In particular, the 9/11 Commission punted on the obvious lines of inquiry that such information opened up to anyone with eyes wanting to see, lamely noting that the issue of Iran’s role “requires further investigation by the U.S. Government.”

That additional inquiry never came. In fairness to the 9/11 Commission, they were not allowed to see important information that might have changed their minds. In particular, they did not see NSA signals intelligence that shed significant light on Iran’s clandestine role supporting al-Qa’ida generally and the Planes Operation particularly. SIGINT from NSA makes up the lion’s share of intelligence in our government, and the fact that the 9/11 Commission was never shown the impressive full NSA archive of reports, many highly classified, on the very topic they were investigating seems incomprehensible.

Since the U.S. Government did not do its job, the task of unraveling Iran’s links to 9/11 has fallen to private citizens who have filed suit against Tehran, with some success. At a minimum, they have marshaled impressive evidence that Iran’s secret role was important and something that needs serious examination. Recently a Federal judge agreed, ordering Tehran to pay more than $10.5 billion in damages to the families of 9/11 victims on the basis of Iran’s role in that criminal conspiracy.

Nearly six years ago, I implored our government to at last deal with the knotty issue of foreign ties to 9/11, in particular to release any and all intelligence that bears on this vital question, to no avail. The same questions remain: What foreign governments had any operational impact on 9/11? What was Saudi Arabia’s role? How many hijackers spent time in Iran and what were they doing there? Were any al-Qa’ida officials involved in the Planes Operation, especially KSM, assessed as Iranian agents? What about Imad Mughniyeh, Iran’s arch-terrorist, who before his 2008 death is believed to have enjoyed a close relationship with certain top Sunni jihadists? Did Mughniyeh have anything to do with 9/11?

Answering these questions will finally bring the real backstory of 9/11 into focus. By all means our government ought to release the 28 Pages, the public should demand no less. Yet there is no point in unmasking Saudi Arabia’s role in the murder of nearly 3,000 Americans while ignoring the equally important, and possibly far greater role of Iran behind 9/11. It’s time for the truth to be revealed. The victims and the American public deserve nothing less than the full story of September 11, 2001.

On a side note, now that Schindler mentioned Mughniyeh, I must link this story for a very interesting read on his death:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-and-mossad-killed-senior-hezbollah-figure-in-car-bombing/2015/01/30/ebb88682-968a-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html?utm_term=.dc23c8c38e70

The part where they also could have killed Qassem Soleimani, but didn't have the authority, was very interesting.

I put the above section in bold because I consider it important coming from the source it's coming from.

Calm down

I'm as cool as a cucumber. Note that I am not concluding anything because concluding anything definitive would be irresponsible. If others think I am concluding something in particular, then I should have worded my posts more wisely and the onus then falls on me. I'm simply presenting some of the limited information I recently came across. I'm assuming nothing, concluding nothing, insinuating nothing. 

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

I agree about the point about the ODNI quote, and actually for the uninitiated I was not sure where that was coming from. 

That is a lot to process there, thanks for all that detail.

 

[beer 30]

. Lotta reading here