The term"sex" as it is used in Title IX is broad and encompasses gender identity, including transgender status. "There is no doubt that 'if we are to give Title IX the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.'" North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (brackets omitted). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the notion that "sex" encompasses only one's biological status as male or female, concluding, instead, that sex discrimination also encompasses differential treatment based on one's failure to conform to socially-constructed gender expectations. 490 U.S. 228,250 (1989) (plurality opinion). Thus, "under Price Waterhouse, 'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex - that is, the biological differences between men and women - and because an individual's gender identity is one aspect of an individual's sex. See, e.g., Smith v. City ofSalem, 378 F.3d 566,575 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203,211 (D.D.C 2006) ("scientific observation may well confirm ... that sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes") (internal citations omitted). Consequently, discrimination on the basis of gender identity is "literally" discrimination on the basisof sex. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293,306-07 (D.D.C. 2008).9 Furthermore, Title IX prohibits sex discrimination based on the perception that an individual has undergone, or is undergoing a gender transition. In Schroer, the court offered the following analogy to help explain how discrimination against an individual because he or she has undertaken, or is undertaking, a gender transition is sex discrimination: Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testifies that he harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only "converts." That would be a clear case of discrimination "because of religion." No court would take seriously the notion that "converts" are not covered by the statute. Discrimination "because of religion" easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion. 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306. Denying Title IX's protections to a student because he has changed or is changing his sex would be "blind ... to the statutory language itself." Id. at 307; see also Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395,2015 WL 1607756, at *7-8 (EEOC Apr. 1,2015) (concluding that federal agency violated Title VII where the complainant's "transgender status was the motivation" for the agency to bar her from using the common women's restrooms); Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (concluding that "intentional discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination 'based on ... sex,' and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII").