*** Official Russia vs. Ukraine Discussion - Invasion has begun *** (5 Viewers)

[Don't Toews Me]

https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/19/europe/mi6-putin-wagner-rare-speech-intl/index.html

It was a rare moment when the publicly visible Kremlin matched the reality behind closed doors.

That is according to the head of Britain’s Mi6, who in a rare speech in Prague, gave the first confirmation from western intelligence that the boss of private military group Wagner Yevgeny Prigozhin did indeed strike a deal with Putin to end his advance on Moscow during the failed rebellion of June 24. And he had, it seemed, been welcomed into the Kremlin to meet Putin days later.

The Mi6 chief, known as C, also expressed some bafflement at the tremors around the Kremlin during that weekend, and the speed in which loyalties were spurned and returned.

“If you look at Putin’s behaviors on that day”, Richard Moore said of June 24, “Prigozhin started off I think, as a traitor at breakfast. He had been pardoned by supper and then a few days later, he was invited for tea. So, there are some things and even the chief of MI6 finds that a little bit difficult to try and interpret, in terms of who’s in and who’s out.”

Moore also gave a rare indication of the continued health and whereabouts of Prigozhin himself, whose characteristically profane and frequent audio messages published on Telegram have recently stopped. Asked by CNN if Prigozhin was “alive and healthy”, Moore replied the Wagner leader was still: “floating around”, per his agency’s understanding.

“He really didn’t fight back against Prigozhin”, Moore said. “He cut a deal to save his skin, using the good offices of the leader of Belarus”, he said, referring to the intervention of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko who struck the deal. “So even I can’t see inside Putin’s head”, he added. “He has to have realized, I am sure that something that is deeply rotten in the state of Denmark - to quote Hamlet - and he had to cut this deal.”

Moore added it was difficult to make “firm judgments” about the fate of Wagner itself, as a mercenary group, but they “do not appear to be engaged in Ukraine”, and that there “appears to be elements of them in Belarus.”

While Moore maintained that China is “absolutely complicit in the invasion” because of its continued support of the Kremlin head, he added that Iran’s support for Russia has caused division in its most senior officials. “Iran is clearly keen to make as much cash as it can out of this situation”, he said. And while Iran is notably selling drones that usually hit civilian targets, he added: “It will sell anything it can spare and it thinks it can get away with.”

More on that last part: https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-new...s-07-19-23/h_956de607b37f32cc4e7ea6cf3c48e623

The UK’s intelligence chief has said that Iran’s decision to supply Russia with drones for use in the war in Ukraine has triggered “internal quarrels” at the “highest level” of the regime in Tehran.

“Iran's decision to supply Russia with the suicide drones that mete out random destruction to Ukraine's cities has provoked internal quarrels at the highest level of the regime in Tehran,” Richard Moore said in an event in Prague on Wednesday.

"Iran has chosen to receive cash and presumably to receive some military know how in return to support the Russians," Moore added.

The intelligence chief described Iran as an “accomplice” of Russia, calling its decision to supply arms to Russia an “unconscionable” act.

 

[Chadstroma]

Horns of a Dilemma

Why the Ukrainian request for long-range fires is a contentious Issue

amilburn.substack.com

Another good piece from retired Marine Colonel Andy Milburn. Didn't know the UK has practically given Ukraine all of their mine clearing vehicles. Some good notes on ATACMS, HIMARS, and GMRLS as well.

Ukraine and Fires 101

Nevertheless, for the Ukrainians, the requirement for long range fires is real, and will likely have a bearing on the outcome of the offensive, if not the war itself. Ukraine needs a missile system to strike targets in what is known by military planners as the deep battle or operational space. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this requirement is to separate targets into 3 brackets which align with the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

Tactical strikes affect a relatively narrow sector of the front and aimed at targets – troops, positions, vehicles, and C-2 nodes that impede an enemy unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Unit in this case means what are generally referred to as tactical units: any organization up to Division level – but this of course is dependent on the scale of the war. If all you have is a handful of divisions – taking one out of action is going to have operational level consequences. There are no hard rules when it comes to distance, but generally the tactical space extends out to the maximum range of tube artillery, roughly 40 kilometers – beyond which the operational space continues to the limit of most tactical missile systems, around 300 kilometers.

At the operational level, your intent in striking targets is to influence the enemy commander’s ability to accomplish his mission – examples might include command and control nodes above division level, ammunition and logistics storage facilities and re-supply routes. Counter-battery fire, usually directed at firing batteries or even individual pieces is usually conducted at the tactical level – but if your aim is to remove, even for a limited period, an indirect fire capability by destroying at one fell swoop multiple firing batteries, sensors or command and control nodes, then you are in the operational space.

At the strategic level – fires are intended to affect the opposing nation’s ability or will to continue the war. The series of strikes in Russia since the beginning of this year, indicate that the Ukrainians are active in this space, and continue to refine a variety of methods for delivering pain to mother Russia. NATO members have made it clearly apparent that they will not provide weapons in this space, for concerns about escalation.

Russians Adapt Too

The advent of HIMARS in June of last year with GMRLRs, was initially a game changer in the tactical space. The Ukrainians used HIMARs to good effect, targeting ammo depots and command and control nodes across the front. The much-maligned Russian military is nevertheless an adaptive organization. High explosives will have this effect – if delivered in sufficient quantity to make you feel pain, but not enough to bring you to your knees. By late September or so, it became apparent that the GMRLs effect was on the wane. This was because no matter how well trained the crews, GMLRS came with one key limitation that offered the Russians ready sanctuary: range. In this case, the cost was simply to move key assets out of range into the operational space.

There are high value assets whose mission makes it impractical to move beyond 80 kilometers from the front: tactical C-2 nodes and tube artillery for instance. These assets, the Russians learned to protect using dispersion and fortification. By design, the GMLRs warhead fragments on impact, which makes it a very useful target for vehicles and troops in the open, but less so the more that they are dug in. And, since last Fall, the Russians have claimed success in shooting down GMLRs using ground-based air defense systems – a claim affirmed by the Royal United Services Institute, with the proviso that this is technique is highly inefficient in terms of relative cost. Incidentally, the Ukrainians have also adapted to the greatest Russian counter-battery threat: the Lancet loitering munition – through the widespread use of dummy positions for high value firing assets such as HIMARS. Adaptation makes it unlikely that a single weapon system will, by itself, be a game changer.

The Brits have been punching above their weight in support for Ukraine. The Brits, Poles, Norwegians, and Swedes have been donating military equipment well above their own economic and current military ability. The Poles basically gave them all their Soviet stock tanks and Twardy's (Polish upgraded T-72's) and turned around and bought a bunch of Korean K2 Black Panther and Abrams tanks to replace them.

I haven't done the math but if you broke it down by military budget and military equipment given, my guess is that the Brits and Poles have given the most.

The French and Germans have lagged with military gifts focusing more on humanitarian and economic assistance.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

More on the latest US package for Ukraine:

Ukraine war live: Romanian village evacuation leads to 'Russia is attacking NATO' warning; Poland warns of sabotage

There are warnings Russia is expanding its war, after an attack near the Ukraine-Romania border forced the evacuation of a village. And Poland is warning of sabotage on its railways. Catch up on the Ukraine war below.

news.sky.com

In our 17.50 post, we told you the US has announced an additional $1.3bn security package for Ukraine.

The country is using funds in its Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative programme, which allows Joe Biden's administration to buy weapons from industry rather than pull from US weapons stocks.

Here's what's included in the package:

• Four national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS)
• Munitions
• 152mm artillery rounds
• Mine clearing equipment
• Drones

Delivery of the weapons and systems depends on their availability and production timeline.

That would be 12 NASAMS now from the US

More from MI6 chief: https://www.politico.eu/article/007-things-the-chief-of-mi6-told-politico/

With Russia’s invasion almost 18 months old, Kyiv’s Western allies are paying close attention to the progress of a counteroffensive that started earlier this summer. Ukrainian commanders have underscored challenges on the battlefield, as deeply-entrenched Russian troops have strewn the front with many thousands of mines that are slowing Ukraine’s advance.

Kyiv’s progress, which is taking place without strong air support, has led to criticism that Ukraine is advancing too slowly. But Moore struck a positive note.

“Well it’s a hard grind and, you know, Ukrainian officials and military don’t shy away from that. And the Russians have had a chance to put in defense which are very tough to overcome,” he said.

“But I do return to the point that Ukrainian commanders in rather stark contrast to their Russian counterparts want to preserve the lives of their troops and therefore move with due caution. They have still recovered more territory in a month than the Russians managed to achieve in a year.”

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Horns of a Dilemma

Why the Ukrainian request for long-range fires is a contentious Issue

amilburn.substack.com

Another good piece from retired Marine Colonel Andy Milburn. Didn't know the UK has practically given Ukraine all of their mine clearing vehicles. Some good notes on ATACMS, HIMARS, and GMRLS as well.

Ukraine and Fires 101

Nevertheless, for the Ukrainians, the requirement for long range fires is real, and will likely have a bearing on the outcome of the offensive, if not the war itself. Ukraine needs a missile system to strike targets in what is known by military planners as the deep battle or operational space. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this requirement is to separate targets into 3 brackets which align with the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

Tactical strikes affect a relatively narrow sector of the front and aimed at targets – troops, positions, vehicles, and C-2 nodes that impede an enemy unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Unit in this case means what are generally referred to as tactical units: any organization up to Division level – but this of course is dependent on the scale of the war. If all you have is a handful of divisions – taking one out of action is going to have operational level consequences. There are no hard rules when it comes to distance, but generally the tactical space extends out to the maximum range of tube artillery, roughly 40 kilometers – beyond which the operational space continues to the limit of most tactical missile systems, around 300 kilometers.

At the operational level, your intent in striking targets is to influence the enemy commander’s ability to accomplish his mission – examples might include command and control nodes above division level, ammunition and logistics storage facilities and re-supply routes. Counter-battery fire, usually directed at firing batteries or even individual pieces is usually conducted at the tactical level – but if your aim is to remove, even for a limited period, an indirect fire capability by destroying at one fell swoop multiple firing batteries, sensors or command and control nodes, then you are in the operational space.

At the strategic level – fires are intended to affect the opposing nation’s ability or will to continue the war. The series of strikes in Russia since the beginning of this year, indicate that the Ukrainians are active in this space, and continue to refine a variety of methods for delivering pain to mother Russia. NATO members have made it clearly apparent that they will not provide weapons in this space, for concerns about escalation.

Russians Adapt Too

The advent of HIMARS in June of last year with GMRLRs, was initially a game changer in the tactical space. The Ukrainians used HIMARs to good effect, targeting ammo depots and command and control nodes across the front. The much-maligned Russian military is nevertheless an adaptive organization. High explosives will have this effect – if delivered in sufficient quantity to make you feel pain, but not enough to bring you to your knees. By late September or so, it became apparent that the GMRLs effect was on the wane. This was because no matter how well trained the crews, GMLRS came with one key limitation that offered the Russians ready sanctuary: range. In this case, the cost was simply to move key assets out of range into the operational space.

There are high value assets whose mission makes it impractical to move beyond 80 kilometers from the front: tactical C-2 nodes and tube artillery for instance. These assets, the Russians learned to protect using dispersion and fortification. By design, the GMLRs warhead fragments on impact, which makes it a very useful target for vehicles and troops in the open, but less so the more that they are dug in. And, since last Fall, the Russians have claimed success in shooting down GMLRs using ground-based air defense systems – a claim affirmed by the Royal United Services Institute, with the proviso that this is technique is highly inefficient in terms of relative cost. Incidentally, the Ukrainians have also adapted to the greatest Russian counter-battery threat: the Lancet loitering munition – through the widespread use of dummy positions for high value firing assets such as HIMARS. Adaptation makes it unlikely that a single weapon system will, by itself, be a game changer.

The Brits have been punching above their weight in support for Ukraine. The Brits, Poles, Norwegians, and Swedes have been donating military equipment well above their own economic and current military ability. The Poles basically gave them all their Soviet stock tanks and Twardy's (Polish upgraded T-72's) and turned around and bought a bunch of Korean K2 Black Panther and Abrams tanks to replace them.

I haven't done the math but if you broke it down by military budget and military equipment given, my guess is that the Brits and Poles have given the most.

The French and Germans have lagged with military gifts focusing more on humanitarian and economic assistance.

I just found this link that has a chart towards the bottom with aid by GDP as of May 31, 2023: https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

Pretty useful chart. They break it down by military, humanitarian, and financial aid.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Post-mutiny Moscow descends into factional murk

Vladimir Putin’s authority has suffered a grave blow

www.economist.com

The mutiny also showed that Telegram, and Mr Prigozhin’s network of trolls and bloggers on it, have eroded the Kremlin’s monopoly over information, particularly among young people. While television propagandists awaited instructions from the Kremlin, the mutiny unfolded online. Less than a quarter of young Russians trust TV. Mr Putin staged a parade of uniformed men in the Kremlin, praising them merely for not joining the mutiny, and flew to Dagestan, a Muslim region in the Caucasus, for a show of adoration from his subjects there. An eight-year-old who supposedly cried because she did not get to see the president was flown to the Kremlin and presented with 5bn roubles ($55m) for Dagestan’s needs.
“While it might look like Putin has successfully dealt with the uprising’s fallout… the strain on the system remains,” wrote Alexandra Prokopenko of the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Centre, a think-tank in Berlin. The absence of public retribution against high-ranking military officers who sided with Mr Prigozhin, and the praise showered on security services, which failed to prevent it, suggests that Mr Putin is too worried that purges could create rifts in the army to protect his strongman image.

New cracks appeared on July 13th. Major-General Ivan Popov, commander of the 58th combined-arms army, one of the country’s largest and most capable units, went public after being fired for telling his superiors what was happening at the front: huge losses, inadequate rotation and inferior counter-artillery capabilities. “The forces of Ukraine could not break through our army from the front, but our senior commander hit us from the rear,” Mr Popov said in an audio message that was posted online. Mr Popov’s insubordination made a big impression on pro-war bloggers. Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, a former intelligence officer who led Russia’s incursion in Donbas in 2014, wrote that an uncontrolled disintegration of the army was “just a stone’s throw away”.

What happens next depends on the battlefield. The bombing of the Kerch road bridge that connects Russia to Crimea, which Russia attributed to Ukrainian naval drones, was another blow. Mr Putin maintains that Ukraine has failed to achieve any progress in its counter-offensive. Russian commanders have defended against Ukraine’s counter-offensive well ahead of prepared fortifications, instead of falling back to defensive positions established by Mr Surovikin—at a significant cost to the Russian forces. This slows the Ukrainians’ progress, but if they manage to break through, it could have a greater effect on the Kremlin’s political power. As one foreign military official put it: “It is like hitting a brick wall with a sledgehammer. If it crumbles, there may not be much behind it.”

 

[Chadstroma]

Horns of a Dilemma

Why the Ukrainian request for long-range fires is a contentious Issue

amilburn.substack.com

Another good piece from retired Marine Colonel Andy Milburn. Didn't know the UK has practically given Ukraine all of their mine clearing vehicles. Some good notes on ATACMS, HIMARS, and GMRLS as well.

Ukraine and Fires 101

Nevertheless, for the Ukrainians, the requirement for long range fires is real, and will likely have a bearing on the outcome of the offensive, if not the war itself. Ukraine needs a missile system to strike targets in what is known by military planners as the deep battle or operational space. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this requirement is to separate targets into 3 brackets which align with the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

Tactical strikes affect a relatively narrow sector of the front and aimed at targets – troops, positions, vehicles, and C-2 nodes that impede an enemy unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Unit in this case means what are generally referred to as tactical units: any organization up to Division level – but this of course is dependent on the scale of the war. If all you have is a handful of divisions – taking one out of action is going to have operational level consequences. There are no hard rules when it comes to distance, but generally the tactical space extends out to the maximum range of tube artillery, roughly 40 kilometers – beyond which the operational space continues to the limit of most tactical missile systems, around 300 kilometers.

At the operational level, your intent in striking targets is to influence the enemy commander’s ability to accomplish his mission – examples might include command and control nodes above division level, ammunition and logistics storage facilities and re-supply routes. Counter-battery fire, usually directed at firing batteries or even individual pieces is usually conducted at the tactical level – but if your aim is to remove, even for a limited period, an indirect fire capability by destroying at one fell swoop multiple firing batteries, sensors or command and control nodes, then you are in the operational space.

At the strategic level – fires are intended to affect the opposing nation’s ability or will to continue the war. The series of strikes in Russia since the beginning of this year, indicate that the Ukrainians are active in this space, and continue to refine a variety of methods for delivering pain to mother Russia. NATO members have made it clearly apparent that they will not provide weapons in this space, for concerns about escalation.

Russians Adapt Too

The advent of HIMARS in June of last year with GMRLRs, was initially a game changer in the tactical space. The Ukrainians used HIMARs to good effect, targeting ammo depots and command and control nodes across the front. The much-maligned Russian military is nevertheless an adaptive organization. High explosives will have this effect – if delivered in sufficient quantity to make you feel pain, but not enough to bring you to your knees. By late September or so, it became apparent that the GMRLs effect was on the wane. This was because no matter how well trained the crews, GMLRS came with one key limitation that offered the Russians ready sanctuary: range. In this case, the cost was simply to move key assets out of range into the operational space.

There are high value assets whose mission makes it impractical to move beyond 80 kilometers from the front: tactical C-2 nodes and tube artillery for instance. These assets, the Russians learned to protect using dispersion and fortification. By design, the GMLRs warhead fragments on impact, which makes it a very useful target for vehicles and troops in the open, but less so the more that they are dug in. And, since last Fall, the Russians have claimed success in shooting down GMLRs using ground-based air defense systems – a claim affirmed by the Royal United Services Institute, with the proviso that this is technique is highly inefficient in terms of relative cost. Incidentally, the Ukrainians have also adapted to the greatest Russian counter-battery threat: the Lancet loitering munition – through the widespread use of dummy positions for high value firing assets such as HIMARS. Adaptation makes it unlikely that a single weapon system will, by itself, be a game changer.

The Brits have been punching above their weight in support for Ukraine. The Brits, Poles, Norwegians, and Swedes have been donating military equipment well above their own economic and current military ability. The Poles basically gave them all their Soviet stock tanks and Twardy's (Polish upgraded T-72's) and turned around and bought a bunch of Korean K2 Black Panther and Abrams tanks to replace them.

I haven't done the math but if you broke it down by military budget and military equipment given, my guess is that the Brits and Poles have given the most.

The French and Germans have lagged with military gifts focusing more on humanitarian and economic assistance.

I just found this link that has a chart towards the bottom with aid by GDP as of May 31, 2023: https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

Pretty useful chart. They break it down by military, humanitarian, and financial aid.

Apparently from this chart, I was wrong with what I said about the Germans.

Good info here.

Doing some quick research, I think I underestimated how extensive their "Ringstausch Program" has been which is where they basically had EU/NATO countries gift Ukraine their Soviet/Russian crap and then replaced it with German military industry equivalents. So, for example, Greece got 40 A3 Marder IFV after gifting the same number of BMP-1's to Ukraine. The Czechs got some Leopard II tanks to replace gifting T-72M1's. 28 Slovenian M-55's (T-54/55's) were replaced by 48 MAN KAT1 trucks. And so forth. So, taking this into account, the Germans have basically funded, indirectly, a large direct military investment to Ukraine.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

This looks like the full list of what was sent in the latest US package to Ukraine: https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1681728953248038920

UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace: https://twitter.com/Samfr/status/1681315503493779459

Wallace says that around 230-250k Russian soldiers have been killed or injured in Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1681726641850990605

Zelensky says stores for tons of food and agricultural products meant for nations in Africa and Asia, including China, were targeted in Russia’s air attack on Odesa.

Export controls on critical components do not appear to be working (chart at link): https://twitter.com/elinaribakova/status/1680633478818279425

Russia's War Machine Is Still Running on Western Equipment

Extensive export controls haven't been enough to prevent Western products from being used in the war on Ukraine, writes Elina Ribakova.

www.barrons.com

Additionally, our research has uncovered a new innovative method employed by Russia to bypass export controls, which we refer to as “on-production.” Surprisingly, this method has not yet drawn the attention of policy makers. Once again, China plays a significant role in this process. Around 80% of Western critical components shipped to Russia are actually produced in China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea (data from March to December 2022). This reveals an intricate web of involvement from countries that are enabling Russia to evade export controls and access the components it needs. It also raises concerns about what Western companies know about Russia’s use of their products to attack Ukraine.

The presence of dual-use goods complicates the tracking process through export controls. Russia has established channels that obscure the origins of these items by involving third countries as intermediaries. For instance, computer components found in Russian ballistic and cruise missiles might have initially been purchased for nonmilitary purposes, such as Russia’s space program.

https://twitter.com/meduza_en/status/1681713766004555783

Read a full transcript of Prigozhin’s remarks today to his mercenaries in Belarus, including perhaps the first recorded speech by Dmitry “Wagner” Utkin, the ex military intel officer who reportedly founded the mercenary group that now bears his callsign.

Link is here to the transcript: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/07/19/welcome-to-hell

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1681670752427290625

Rare sighting of Dmitry Utkin in this video posted by Prigozhin. Clearly designed to show they are still a team.

Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino with comments on the China-Russia relationship here. Notably, he believes China is supplying Russia with intelligence:

Aquilino also said that while he has no evidence that China has provided Russia with “lethal aid” for its war against Ukraine, he does believe China is supporting Russia with intelligence.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2023

The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. Footage and imagery published on July 17 and 18 show extensive traffic jams and accidents reportedly on the E58 Mariupol-Melitopol-Kherson City highway – Russia’s...

www.understandingwar.org

The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. Footage and imagery published on July 17 and 18 show extensive traffic jams and accidents reportedly on the E58 Mariupol-Melitopol-Kherson City highway – Russia’s current main logistics line connecting Russia to southern Ukraine – at various points between Mariupol and Berdyansk, and in Kherson Oblast.[1] Russian occupation authorities claimed to have reduced traffic at Crimea-Kherson Oblast checkpoints near Chonhar and Armiansk following significant traffic jams in the morning.[2] Russian occupation authorities also advertised alternate routes and rest stops along them for tourists to drive from occupied Crimea through occupied Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts – rear areas in a war zone – to return to Russia.[3] Russian authorities also announced additional measures to mitigate resulting traffic jams and logistics issues, including a temporary road bridge next to the Kerch Strait Bridge, the reconstruction of a 60-kilometer stretch of road between Crimea and Kherson Oblast through Armiansk, and lowering security measures at the Kerch Strait Bridge checkpoints.[4] Russian authorities reopened one span of the Kerch Strait Bridge to one-way road traffic towards Russia on July 18, and plan to reopen the same span to two-lane traffic on September 15 and the whole bridge to road traffic in November.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 18 that the Russian government is still developing measures to increase the security of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the claimed Russian security failure to adequately protect the bridge.[6]

The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to exhaust Russian forces defending in southern Ukraine and noted that the Russian military command has not solved the force rotation issues Popov outlined before his dismissal.[12] Another prominent milblogger supported Popov, noting that the issues Popov outlined seem more important issues for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to address than transferring Popov to Syria or other information mitigation measures.[13] Some Russian milbloggers amplified reports of several Russian assault groups with forces of up to a platoon simultaneously surrendering to Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[14] Persistent issues with Russian logistics and operations in southern Ukraine may have contributed to these forces’ inability or unwillingness to fight and reported resulting surrender.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Russia Could Attack Civilian Grain Ships in Black Sea, US Warns

The Russian military could attack civilian shipping in the Black Sea as part of its effort to target Ukrainian grain facilities, Biden administration officials said Wednesday, citing new intelligence.

www.bloomberg.com

The Russian military could attack civilian shipping in the Black Sea as part of its effort to target Ukrainian grain facilities, Biden administration officials said Wednesday, citing new intelligence.
“Our information indicates that Russia laid additional sea mines in the approaches to Ukrainian ports,” National Security Council spokesman Adam Hodge said in a statement. “We believe that this is a coordinated effort to justify any attacks against civilian ships in the Black Sea and lay blame on Ukraine.”

https://twitter.com/ABarbashin/status/1681783676701487105

Wagner breakdown of their own numbers: 78k wagnerites fought in Ukraine (of which 49,000 were prisoners)22k dead, 40k wounded

https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1681754672317575168

Wagner-linked Telegram channel releases stats for warlord Yevgeny Prigohin's mercenary group from battle of Bakhmut:
-78,000 fighters, 49,000 of which were convicts
-22,000 killed, 40,000 wounded
-25,000 are now "alive and healthy"
-10,000 of those already in or going to Belarus

Russia’s Weapon of Mass Starvation

Allies' 'main effort' for Ukraine shifting from donating weapons to fixing them

After 17 months of war, Ukraine has amassed a staggering and diverse arsenal of equipment that needs to be maintained.

www.politico.com

The West’s focus on building Ukraine’s war machine has shifted significantly to repairing and sustaining those weapons, a recognition that the war will grind on for months and years to come, the Pentagon’s top acquisition official said.
Even before Ukraine launched its counteroffensive this summer, allies were becoming increasingly worried that efforts to keep donated equipment up and running were falling behind battlefield needs.

Now, with the fight to dislodge tens of thousands of well-entrenched Russian troops chewing through armored vehicles and artillery pieces, the need to get that equipment fixed and back in the fight is more urgent than at any point in the war.

“We’re setting up repair facilities in Europe, we’re translating [training and repair] manuals, we have to do much more together so there’s going to be more of a focus on that” by partner nations, the Pentagon’s acquisition and sustainment chief, William LaPlante, said in an interview.

 

[Orange&Blue]

It will be interesting to see what happens with the grain issue with Turkiye and Russia basically blockading again.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Ukraine war latest: British deputy to ambassador summoned by Moscow; Russia 'preparing attacks on civilian ships'

Russia is preparing attacks on civilian ships following the end of the Black Sea grain deal, the White House has claimed. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian drone strike has killed one person in Crimea. Listen to a Daily podcast special as you scroll as the team asks: is Russia's war doomed?

news.sky.com

Ukraine's troops have made a renewed push to retake the city of Bakhmut and now have Russian forces "semi-encircled", the commander of the Ukrainian ground forces has said.

"At the moment, the deployment of Russian troops resembles an arch, concentrated in Bakhmut. And they are under semi-encirclement. Well, it's impossible not to take advantage of that," Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi told the BBC.

Bakhmut was the focus of the conflict's most intense fighting for months, with both sides incurring heavy losses.

But Colonel General Syrskyi claimed his troops would be able to recapture Bakhmut with 10 times smaller losses than those suffered by the Wagner forces who took the city.

He said retaking the city would be of both symbolic and strategic value.

Ukraine's counteroffensive is generally considered to be moving slowly so far, and the commander said Kyiv is suffering from a disadvantage in terms of artillery, air forces and other hardware.

Ben Wallace: Ukraine has 'tragically become a battle lab' for war technology

The minister says new UK defence plans are influenced by lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

www.bbc.com

Another such lesson from the war in Ukraine is the "power of electronic warfare", Mr Wallace said, explaining: "The use of [electronic] warfare either to act as a decoy or to act as a defence is becoming really important, so it goes up the priority list."

He said that the war in Ukraine had also concentrated minds on the use of "deep fire" artillery, and had informed the decision to retire old 155mm guns and bring in new replacements.
"We have seen a generational shift in ranges of 'deep fire' artillery," he said. "The 155mm gun roughly had a 22-25km range for about 50 years.
"The new generation ... you're getting ranges of 60km in future. So I have taken a decision to phase out the old 155mm [for] the Swedish Archer 1."
Artillery has played a significant role for both sides in Ukraine. Britain's armed forces, however, have scaled down their artillery forces since the end of the Cold War.
Mr Wallace said: "At the end of the Second World War, 35% of the army was artillery. Now, it's roughly 8%. Deep fire is something we need to rebalance. These are the lessons."

Video: https://twitter.com/Mike_Eckel/status/1681954785778364416

Lots of discussion about how formidable Russian defenses are: esp. dangerous minefields and Ukraine lacking adequate supplies of clearing/engineering vehicles. This is (reportedly) a Ukraine Nat. Guard unit using a M58 MCLC somewhere in Zaporizhzhia region

https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1681907526000836608

Overnight, Ukraine managed to shoot down only 5 out of 19 missiles fired by Russia at Odesa and Mykolaiv port infrastructure. It urgently needs more and more modern air defenses — or an ability to take out Russian launchers in Crimea.

https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1681925702184992768

The Onyx anti-ship missiles and the Kh-22 missiles that Russia used against Odesa are supersonic and hard to detect — only the scarce Patriots can deal with them, Ukraine’s Air Force says.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Ukraine’s new Bradley Fighting Vehicles face damage and quick repairs

About a dozen Bradleys have been destroyed, a senior U.S. defense official said. Data from Oryx, a military analysis site that counts losses it has visually confirmed, shows that a couple dozen more have been damaged to varying degrees. Many have been fixed and returned to the battlefield. Some must be sent to Poland for more extensive repairs.

And Bradleys will stop because of damaged tracks depending on what kind of mine they run into, limiting the Ukrainians’ ability to breach the Russians’ defenses with them. Most of the Bradleys getting repaired — reporters from The Post saw at least six at the wooded location they visited — were damaged by mine explosions.

The fighting vehicles were meant to be used in a strategy called combined arms, in which infantry, armor and aviation units work in concert to protect one another and inflict maximum violence. Ukrainian troops received U.S.-led combined arms training in Germany to shed Soviet-era habits of units operating in a vacuum without close coordination.
Ukrainian units have in many cases used the Bradleys as part of that philosophy, the senior U.S. defense official said. But there are anecdotal reports to the contrary, too. Ukraine also still does not have extensive air capabilities.
In some cases, Ukrainian units are “just not using them to their fullest potential with all their other assets that they have available,” the official said. It could be that some commanders feel more comfortable with how they were originally taught and fall back on that experience, the official said.

Some Bradley repairs can take just a few hours. Others need a few days. Some vehicles are labeled “donors,” meaning the Ukrainians will strip out the usable parts to install in other, less-damaged Bradleys and then fill the donor vehicle with the broken bits before shipping it off for a larger-scale repair at the facility in Poland. One early limitation for how quickly the Ukrainians can fix the Bradleys and get them back on the battlefield: not enough spare parts, military personnel said.

Fewer than a dozen Bradleys have been sent to Poland for repair, the U.S. defense official said, and in some cases fresh vehicles were sent to replace those shipped out instead of waiting on repairs. Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hinted Tuesday at a news conference at those unused stocks, describing a “robust Ukrainian reserve force [that] lies in wait to be committed at the optimal time and place of Ukrainian choosing.”

 

[themeistersinger]

EU chief diplomat: Russian strikes against Odesa to cause large-scale food crisis

Russian attacks against Odesa's port infrastructure and deliberate destruction of food stocks will lead to a large-scale food crisis in the world, the EU's top diplomat Josep Borrell said on July 20 as cited by Ukrinform.

kyivindependent.com

 

[themeistersinger]

Syrskyi: Russian forces in Bakhmut 'semi-encircled'

Russian forces in Bakhmut have been semi-encircled as Ukraine created conditions to retake the city, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi told the BBC on July 20.

kyivindependent.com

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Ukraine has started using US-provided cluster munitions in combat, officials say

Russia has targeted the southern city of Odesa for the third night in a row, killing one person, according to Kyiv. Ukrainian defenses were only able to down just over a quarter of the cruise missiles launched at the country overnight. Follow here for live updates.

www.cnn.com

Ukrainian troops have started using US-provided cluster munitions in their counteroffensive against Russia, according to two US officials and another person briefed on the matter.

The US is still waiting for updates from the Ukrainian military about how effective the munitions have been on the battlefield, one of the officials said.

The Washington Post first reported the cluster munitions have been used in combat by Ukraine.

Slider at link: https://news.sky.com/story/russia-p...isgrace-12541713?postid=6195505#liveblog-body

Satellite images have revealed the damage caused to a military base in Crimea after an explosion caused a huge fire to break out yesterday.

The blaze tore through the grounds in the Kirovske district and forced the evacuation of more than 2,000 people.

A nearby highway was also partially closed.

Telegram channels linked to Russian security services and Ukrainian media outlets reported the base was on fire after an overnight attack by Kyiv.

Using the slider below, you can see an image of the area prior to the blast and another taken today, showing the extent of the destruction.

Ukraine war latest: UK responds after Russia imposes restrictions on British diplomats; satellite images show Belarus Wagner base

Russia is preparing attacks on civilian ships following the end of the Black Sea grain deal, the White House has claimed. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian drone strike has killed one person in Crimea. Listen to a Daily podcast special as you scroll as the team asks: is Russia's war doomed?

news.sky.com

The UK has given Ukraine 184,000 more artillery shells than it planned a year ago, the defence secretary has said.

The country had also "donated significant quantities of military equipment, ammunitions and non-lethal aid" as Kyiv continued to defend its territory, Ben Wallace said.

Having initially planned to send 16,000 "critical" shells to the war-torn nation in 2022, he explained there had been a 15-fold increase.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has regularly called for the West to supply more shells as his troops continue to fight against Russian, which has a greater stockpile of artillery.

Setting out a list of what the UK had provided to Ukraine up to 11 July, Mr Wallace said London had spent £2.3bn on support for its war effort between April 2022 and March 2023.

He said it put the UK only second to the US in terms of international donors of military aid.

Here's what else he said the UK has provided:

• 14 Challenger II tanks
• 4,000 units of ammunition to arm the tanks
• At least five million anti-personnel weapons, including mortars and grenades
• 1,500 anti-aircraft weapons and 100 launchers for them
• £4m spent on spare parts, tools and support kits
• 70,000 units of food rations
• 65,000 items of clothing

Some satellite imagery here of the Wagner base in Belarus: https://news.sky.com/story/russia-p...isgrace-12541713?postid=6194142#liveblog-body

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Military briefing: the mines stalling Ukraine’s advance

Dmytro was marching through shrubbery at the front line east of the town of Lyman when his Ukrainian assault unit came under fire from Russian lines. He stepped aside to dodge the bullets. Then came the explosion.
Dmytro had triggered an anti-personnel mine. The blast dislocated his hips, fractured his pelvis, buried shrapnel deep in his left leg and nearly tore off his left ankle.
“We got him here just in time,” said doctor Viktor Stercheus, after riding with Dmytro and the Financial Times over rocket-cratered roads to Kramatorsk hospital. “He now has a 90 per cent chance of surviving and keeping his leg.”
Hundreds more treated by Stercheus and his colleagues have not been as fortunate. Six weeks into Ukraine’s counteroffensive to reclaim its eastern and southern regions from Russian occupiers, no military obstacle appears as daunting as Russia’s vast and dense minefields, which are destroying Nato-supplied armour, wounding soldiers and zapping morale.

“We can push with 10 brigades but it won’t work because the mines are everywhere, every half a meter there are mines,” said Sultan, a commander in the 78th regiment, a special forces unit, at a field hospital near the front line in Zaporizhzhia region. “They are everywhere.”

To recapture territory, troops must cross miles of open fields littered with thousands of mines: anti-tank, anti-personnel, improvised explosive devices and an array of booby traps.
Some are launched at random into fields from afar, so-called “distance mining”; others bounce in the air when triggered to spray shrapnel as far as possible. Small green plastic ones that soldiers call “butterfly” mines, a reference to their double-winged shape, are hard to de-mine and especially menacing, troops and doctors said.
Sultan, who preferred to be identified by his call sign, encountered his Russian mine as he sought cover in a thin tree line previously used by Russian soldiers. He pushed a branch out of his way and flicked a tripwire. The blast threw him on his back but the tree took most of the shrapnel. He suffered a concussion — his third — and was evacuated to a frontline hospital.
Russian forces, according to the officer, have noticed the Ukrainians’ tactic of capturing enemy positions and then using them to regroup and launch the next assault. Now booby traps are common.

“The mines are channelling the Ukrainian efforts, and they are severely limiting the Ukrainians’ manoeuvre space, which is usually not a great thing when . . . you are attacking,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Russians were employing “basic Soviet doctrine”, he added, drawing parallels with the Red Army laying more than a million mines in 1943 to halt Nazi Germany in the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in history.

Still, Gady said that more demining equipment would not necessarily lead to greater success. “Additional mine-clearing equipment would help, but . . . it would be even tough for well-equipped western militaries such as the US to break through those layered defences.”

Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said that the Russians have “spared no expense in deploying mines” as they prepared defences in the months before Ukraine’s counteroffensive.
“They deployed a variety and types of mines [and] in ways to specifically negate certain mine trawlers, or systems that Ukraine is using,” he said after a visiting Ukrainian commanders and troops on the front line in Zaporizhzhia region. “They’re mining trenches. They’re using radio- controlled mines and in some very creative ways to create issues [for Ukrainian troops].”
Lee said that soldiers could benefit from anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems, a mobile explosive line charge system used to clear mines from a safe distance. These can fit into a backpack and can be carried on foot, better suiting Ukraine’s new dismounted strategy.

But it is not just the mines themselves, which Ukraine can in theory break through, said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who visited Ukrainian positions with Lee.
The layered Russian defences — running through several lines of defences and minefields — are often regenerated as the battle progresses; the time it takes for Ukrainian forces to inch forward is time Russia spends bolstering the next line of mines.
“And that’s really the challenge — for Ukrainian forces is not just breaking through the initial line. It is breaking through with enough resources, enough gas in the tank to exploit that breakthrough to actually achieve a strategic objective in this offensive.”

 

[themeistersinger]

Ukraine updates: Russia threatens Black Sea grain transport – DW – 07/20/2023

Ukraine says Russian attacks are targeting grain export infrastructure, and Moscow has warned that any ships traveling on the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports could be considered military targets. Follow DW for more.

www.dw.com

 

[Chadstroma]

Is the Russian Military A Joke? Captured Weapons from Ukraine Might Give Answers

Captured Russian weapons in Ukraine are being closely studied by the British Army in London, something likely to further solidify insights and technical understanding of Russia’s platforms.

www.19fortyfive.com

They don't answer the question but the answer is largely yes. More so than we thought at the start and the war continues to degrade their military to being that which any single NATO top tier military can challenge it by itself and win in a conventional war.

And we will only get more of a technological advantage as we get our hands on pretty much everything they have in inventory in the land and air power.

 

[thecatch]

Horns of a Dilemma

Why the Ukrainian request for long-range fires is a contentious Issue

amilburn.substack.com

Another good piece from retired Marine Colonel Andy Milburn. Didn't know the UK has practically given Ukraine all of their mine clearing vehicles. Some good notes on ATACMS, HIMARS, and GMRLS as well.

Ukraine and Fires 101

Nevertheless, for the Ukrainians, the requirement for long range fires is real, and will likely have a bearing on the outcome of the offensive, if not the war itself. Ukraine needs a missile system to strike targets in what is known by military planners as the deep battle or operational space. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this requirement is to separate targets into 3 brackets which align with the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

Tactical strikes affect a relatively narrow sector of the front and aimed at targets – troops, positions, vehicles, and C-2 nodes that impede an enemy unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Unit in this case means what are generally referred to as tactical units: any organization up to Division level – but this of course is dependent on the scale of the war. If all you have is a handful of divisions – taking one out of action is going to have operational level consequences. There are no hard rules when it comes to distance, but generally the tactical space extends out to the maximum range of tube artillery, roughly 40 kilometers – beyond which the operational space continues to the limit of most tactical missile systems, around 300 kilometers.

At the operational level, your intent in striking targets is to influence the enemy commander’s ability to accomplish his mission – examples might include command and control nodes above division level, ammunition and logistics storage facilities and re-supply routes. Counter-battery fire, usually directed at firing batteries or even individual pieces is usually conducted at the tactical level – but if your aim is to remove, even for a limited period, an indirect fire capability by destroying at one fell swoop multiple firing batteries, sensors or command and control nodes, then you are in the operational space.

At the strategic level – fires are intended to affect the opposing nation’s ability or will to continue the war. The series of strikes in Russia since the beginning of this year, indicate that the Ukrainians are active in this space, and continue to refine a variety of methods for delivering pain to mother Russia. NATO members have made it clearly apparent that they will not provide weapons in this space, for concerns about escalation.

Russians Adapt Too

The advent of HIMARS in June of last year with GMRLRs, was initially a game changer in the tactical space. The Ukrainians used HIMARs to good effect, targeting ammo depots and command and control nodes across the front. The much-maligned Russian military is nevertheless an adaptive organization. High explosives will have this effect – if delivered in sufficient quantity to make you feel pain, but not enough to bring you to your knees. By late September or so, it became apparent that the GMRLs effect was on the wane. This was because no matter how well trained the crews, GMLRS came with one key limitation that offered the Russians ready sanctuary: range. In this case, the cost was simply to move key assets out of range into the operational space.

There are high value assets whose mission makes it impractical to move beyond 80 kilometers from the front: tactical C-2 nodes and tube artillery for instance. These assets, the Russians learned to protect using dispersion and fortification. By design, the GMLRs warhead fragments on impact, which makes it a very useful target for vehicles and troops in the open, but less so the more that they are dug in. And, since last Fall, the Russians have claimed success in shooting down GMLRs using ground-based air defense systems – a claim affirmed by the Royal United Services Institute, with the proviso that this is technique is highly inefficient in terms of relative cost. Incidentally, the Ukrainians have also adapted to the greatest Russian counter-battery threat: the Lancet loitering munition – through the widespread use of dummy positions for high value firing assets such as HIMARS. Adaptation makes it unlikely that a single weapon system will, by itself, be a game changer.

The Brits have been punching above their weight in support for Ukraine. The Brits, Poles, Norwegians, and Swedes have been donating military equipment well above their own economic and current military ability. The Poles basically gave them all their Soviet stock tanks and Twardy's (Polish upgraded T-72's) and turned around and bought a bunch of Korean K2 Black Panther and Abrams tanks to replace them.

I haven't done the math but if you broke it down by military budget and military equipment given, my guess is that the Brits and Poles have given the most.

The French and Germans have lagged with military gifts focusing more on humanitarian and economic assistance.

From what I've read, France really hasn't done squat.

 

[Chadstroma]

Horns of a Dilemma

Why the Ukrainian request for long-range fires is a contentious Issue

amilburn.substack.com

Another good piece from retired Marine Colonel Andy Milburn. Didn't know the UK has practically given Ukraine all of their mine clearing vehicles. Some good notes on ATACMS, HIMARS, and GMRLS as well.

Ukraine and Fires 101

Nevertheless, for the Ukrainians, the requirement for long range fires is real, and will likely have a bearing on the outcome of the offensive, if not the war itself. Ukraine needs a missile system to strike targets in what is known by military planners as the deep battle or operational space. Perhaps the easiest way to understand this requirement is to separate targets into 3 brackets which align with the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

Tactical strikes affect a relatively narrow sector of the front and aimed at targets – troops, positions, vehicles, and C-2 nodes that impede an enemy unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Unit in this case means what are generally referred to as tactical units: any organization up to Division level – but this of course is dependent on the scale of the war. If all you have is a handful of divisions – taking one out of action is going to have operational level consequences. There are no hard rules when it comes to distance, but generally the tactical space extends out to the maximum range of tube artillery, roughly 40 kilometers – beyond which the operational space continues to the limit of most tactical missile systems, around 300 kilometers.

At the operational level, your intent in striking targets is to influence the enemy commander’s ability to accomplish his mission – examples might include command and control nodes above division level, ammunition and logistics storage facilities and re-supply routes. Counter-battery fire, usually directed at firing batteries or even individual pieces is usually conducted at the tactical level – but if your aim is to remove, even for a limited period, an indirect fire capability by destroying at one fell swoop multiple firing batteries, sensors or command and control nodes, then you are in the operational space.

At the strategic level – fires are intended to affect the opposing nation’s ability or will to continue the war. The series of strikes in Russia since the beginning of this year, indicate that the Ukrainians are active in this space, and continue to refine a variety of methods for delivering pain to mother Russia. NATO members have made it clearly apparent that they will not provide weapons in this space, for concerns about escalation.

Russians Adapt Too

The advent of HIMARS in June of last year with GMRLRs, was initially a game changer in the tactical space. The Ukrainians used HIMARs to good effect, targeting ammo depots and command and control nodes across the front. The much-maligned Russian military is nevertheless an adaptive organization. High explosives will have this effect – if delivered in sufficient quantity to make you feel pain, but not enough to bring you to your knees. By late September or so, it became apparent that the GMRLs effect was on the wane. This was because no matter how well trained the crews, GMLRS came with one key limitation that offered the Russians ready sanctuary: range. In this case, the cost was simply to move key assets out of range into the operational space.

There are high value assets whose mission makes it impractical to move beyond 80 kilometers from the front: tactical C-2 nodes and tube artillery for instance. These assets, the Russians learned to protect using dispersion and fortification. By design, the GMLRs warhead fragments on impact, which makes it a very useful target for vehicles and troops in the open, but less so the more that they are dug in. And, since last Fall, the Russians have claimed success in shooting down GMLRs using ground-based air defense systems – a claim affirmed by the Royal United Services Institute, with the proviso that this is technique is highly inefficient in terms of relative cost. Incidentally, the Ukrainians have also adapted to the greatest Russian counter-battery threat: the Lancet loitering munition – through the widespread use of dummy positions for high value firing assets such as HIMARS. Adaptation makes it unlikely that a single weapon system will, by itself, be a game changer.

The Brits have been punching above their weight in support for Ukraine. The Brits, Poles, Norwegians, and Swedes have been donating military equipment well above their own economic and current military ability. The Poles basically gave them all their Soviet stock tanks and Twardy's (Polish upgraded T-72's) and turned around and bought a bunch of Korean K2 Black Panther and Abrams tanks to replace them.

I haven't done the math but if you broke it down by military budget and military equipment given, my guess is that the Brits and Poles have given the most.

The French and Germans have lagged with military gifts focusing more on humanitarian and economic assistance.

From what I've read, France really hasn't done squat.

Comparatively to their economic and military capabilities.... they have gave squat. Which is even more frustrating being they actually were the #1 exporter to Ukraine for military equipment before the invasion. They have given a lot of small arms, body armor, etc and things like MILAN, Javelin and Mistrals. The bulk of their 'large; donations have been about 30 AMX-10RC (which was the first western donation of a tank like vehicle), 50ish VAB's, and some ACMAT Bastions. France has always seemed to be a little more selfish than it's European brethren to me. I think this shows it. Happy to sell it but stingy to give it.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Thread: https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1682127052973932544

Other link: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1682127052973932544.html

Link to podcast referred to here (it's about a 30 min listen, it's a good listen and I'd encourage anyone interested to listen to it): https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/ukraine-struggles-to-scale-offensive-combat-operations/

New WOTR podcast w/ Michael Kofman & Rob Lee reflecting on their trip to Ukraine. Early June attacks were not probing, says Lee. "It was the real counter offensive...an attempt to conduct a rapid breakthrough [&] exploit that as quickly as possible"

Lee: "during this phase, Ukraine used a lot of its new modern equipment...new NATO trained brigades played a key role in the beginning. And ultimately...the first phase of this operation was not a success...That's the conclusion we've reached after talking to a number of people"
Kofman: in Bakhmut, with fluid battle, Russia dug in at battalion level. In south dug in at division and combined arms army level. "There's an effort at manoeuvre defence & the ability to counter attack any gains in those initial tree lines." Notes use of fake trenches.
Kofman points to innovation in Russian mine tactics. "They also have less traditional approaches e.g. stacking multiple anti tank mines on top of each other to destroy and rip off mine clearing tanks or vehicles that have essentially rollers that you typically see for breaching"

Kofman also said: "On top of that, the Russian military has continued to adapt. They built out fake trenches. They have mined trenches. They have distance activated mines that attempt to lure Ukrainian forces into trenches that have been mined with radio activated mines and then blow up the mines once forces jump into them. They have parts of trenches that are intentionally empty, attempting to get Ukrainian units into those trenches to then essentially blow them up. The level of mining, IED's, and adaptation of tactics is pretty substantial beyond just routine doctrinal defense."

Kofman: "this is fundamentally a battle of tree lines. If Ukr forces advance to take a tree line, Russian armour moves out & begins to engage that entire tree line within the at the range of a couple of kilometres." Ukr can't reach Ru armour without ATGMS. Area behind them mined.
Lee: "what we're seeing now is Russia's reaction to what happened in Kharkiv and an attempt to not be embarrassed the same way they were that time. And ultimately, they've learned lessons...and they're fighting in a competent way...they're fighting in a doctrinal way."
Lee: It's not about mines as much as having minefields under observation—"and within Russian fires...And so anytime Ukr has to breach a minefield [Ru] can observe these areas [&] use artillery, anti tank guided missiles, attack helicopters...and that's what creates the problem."
Lee: "The issue is that the new [Ukrainian] brigades, their performance thus far has not lived up to the expectations. And it was always going to be difficult because these brigades were formed on short notice."
Lee points to examples where Ukr unit got disoriented at nighttime, didn't follow in mine-cleared lanes. In one case: bgde advance delayed by hours, advance started at dawn, in more light, & artillery bombardment didn't shift, so preceded attack by hours. Ru ATGMs not suppressed.
Seems like a very good worked example of what people mean when they talk about the difficulty of conducting combined-arms manoeuvre, or "fire and manoeuvre" as opposed to fire *and then* manoeuvre.

Kofman also said: "There are more Russian units forward on the first line than in Kherson, with thick concentration of anti-tank guided missiles. With that said, it's still a fairly echelon defense. I'm not sure I believe the story based on what I've heard that all the Russian units are on the front line and all you have to do is break through the front line and the Russian front will crumble. I think that is far too optimistic, and I also just don't see that as very realistic. I think this is going to be a difficult, grinding fight."

Kofman: "This offensive, while prosecuted by brigades, in practice [was] a series of reinforced companies...So a battalion might deploy company or two forward and third behind them." One reason "why many may have mistaken the initial assault for just probing."

Lee says: "One of the takeaways from talking to some of the Russian commanders who fought in Kherson was that actually a lot of Kherson was about mines. I think we underestimated how much of the problems Ukrainian forces ran into in Kherson was that it was cause of mines. Also, that was probably why Ukraine wasn't able to exploit and make the withdrawal more painful for Russia, which some people expected, because there were so many mines deployed. It just takes time. And that included Russia using some of these remote mine clearing options. Allegedly, that was one of the last assets they brought across the pontoon bridge, one of these remote mine laying systems. Which they're using heavily in the south."

 

[Orange&Blue]

Russians were employing “basic Soviet doctrine”, he added, drawing parallels with the Red Army laying more than a million mines in 1943 to halt Nazi Germany in the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in history.

i mentioned this exact thing about 2 months ago

 

[DA RAIDERS]

Question to those following closer and/or smarter than me: Why hasn't Ukraine blow the bridge to smithereens yet? Seems like that would be a top 3 target in the war.

Ukraine isn't close enough to strike the bridge with artillery. Ukraine isn't able to strike the bridge from the air.

Reinforced concrete is extremely hard to destroy. Think about the amount of explosives it takes for demolition experts to take down a building.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.king5.com/amp/article/news/local/seattle/kingdome-implosion-anniversary/281-4b50b9ff-8fde-44b5-a2bc-392a1a1d7757

SEATTLE — Seattle's iconic Kingdome was demolished in a controlled implosion March 26, 2000.

Sparks from a 21.6-mile web of detonation cord flickered over the ribbed surface of the dome, followed by 5,800 gelatin dynamite charge explosions. The 25,000-ton roof collapsed into a billowing dust cloud in less than 20 seconds

Bridge over the river kwai

 

[Chadstroma]

Sweden Quietly Gave Ukraine A Unique Armored Recovery Vehicle—One That Can Retrieve Damaged Tanks For Repair

It’s unclear how many Bgbv 90s Sweden gave Ukraine. As of 2022, the Swedes had 26 of the priceless vehicles.

www.forbes.com

 

[Don't Toews Me]

A call from the front line: We want to end this war as quickly as possible

A piece written by a combat paramedic in eastern Ukraine.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

CIA chief: Russia’s elite are questioning Putin’s judgment

The brief mutiny led by the Wagner Group’s chief appears to have rattled those around the Russian leader, William Burns told the Aspen Security Forum.

www.politico.com

Russia’s elite are showing increasing anxiety about President Vladimir Putin’s judgment, especially following a brief mutiny that appeared to catch the Kremlin off guard last month, CIA Director William Burns said Thursday.

“What it resurrected was some deeper questions … about Putin’s judgment, about his relative detachment from events and even about his indecisiveness,” Burns said in an appearance at the Aspen Security Forum.

But that Wagner forces were able to travel across a good chunk of Russia unimpeded was a major black eye for Putin, as was Prigozhin’s public criticisms about the rationale for the Russian war on Ukraine and the corruption of the Russian elite.

“I think in many ways it exposed some of the significant weaknesses in a system that Putin has built,” Burns said. Even aside from the mutiny, such weaknesses “were exposed by Putin’s misjudgment since he launched this invasion” of Ukraine.

There are allegations that Sergey Surovikin, another top Russian general, may have known about Prigozhin’s rebellion plans. Surovikin has not been seen in public for weeks. “I don’t think he enjoys a lot of freedom right now,” Burns said.

Putin has managed to defang Prigozhin for now, essentially exiling him to Belarus. The Russian leader is likely to try to separate Prigozhin from what he finds useful in Wagner, a force with mercenaries in many countries, Burns said.

Putin also will likely find a way to exact revenge on Prigozhin and eliminate him in the long run, said Burns, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia.

“If I were Prigozhin, I wouldn’t fire my food taster,” Burns quipped.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

CIA director warns of Russian "false flag" attack in Black Sea

Russian missiles struck grain warehouses in Odesa, destroying tons of crops, as Moscow's forces targeted the southern port city for a fourth straight night. Follow here for live updates.

www.cnn.com

Russia could be preparing a false flag operation attacking a ship in the Black Sea, the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said Thursday, repeating a warning from the US National Security Council.

“We see some very concerning signs of the Russians considering the kind of false flag operations that we highlighted in the run up to the war as well – in other words, looking at ways they might make attacks against shipping in the Black Sea and then blaming, trying to blame it on the Ukrainians,” Bill Burns told the Aspen Security Forum, without providing further detail.

Live updates: Russia's war in Ukraine, Odesa attacks

Russian missiles struck grain warehouses in Odesa, destroying tons of crops, as Moscow's forces targeted the southern port city for a fourth straight night. Follow here for live updates.

www.cnn.com

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has dismissed his ambassador to the United Kingdom, Vadym Prystaiko.

Although no reason has been given, it follows an exchange of testy words between the ambassador, the British defense secretary and Zelensky.

Earlier this month, Prystaiko said that Zelensky had referred to the British defense secretary sarcastically, describing such rhetoric as unhealthy.

The row began at the NATO summit in Lithuania.

British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said that “whether we like it or not, people want to see gratitude” for the West’s military contributions to Ukraine’s war effort.

“I said to the Ukrainians last June, when I drove 11 hours to be given a list, I’m not Amazon,” Wallace said on July 12, according to a transcript of his remarks sent to CNN by the UK’s defense ministry.

When a reporter asked Zelensky about those remarks during NATO summit press conference, the Ukrainian president said: “I don't quite understand the question – it just seems to me that we have always been very grateful to the United Kingdom.”

“I just don't know what he means. How else we should thank him? Well, let him write to me and tell me how I need to thank people so that we can be fully grateful. We can also wake up in the morning and thank the minister personally.”

The following day Prystaiko was interviewed on Sky News, where he was asked whether there was £a hint of sarcasm” in Zelensky’s response to Wallace.

Prystaiko conceded there was “a little bit of sarcasm” and went on to criticize Zelensky.

“President Zelensky’s term when he said that each and every morning he will wake up and call Ben Wallace to thank him – I don’t believe that this sarcasm is healthy. We don’t have to show the Russians that we have something between us. They have to know that we are working together. If anything happens, Ben can call me and tell me everything he wants.”

CNN has reached out to Prystaiko.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Russia Seeks to Divert Ukrainian Forces Away From Counteroffensive

As Ukrainian forces edge forward in the south and east of the country, Russia is pressing an offensive in the north.

www.wsj.com

Article on some of Russia's actions in the north in Lyman and even further north from there. Essentially trying to divert Ukrainian resources from the south by threatening to advance. One lieutenant in the north says Ukraine needs more air defense systems to shoot down Russian drones (mentions the Gepard).

Another lieutenant in the north says Russia's big push in early July in Lyman featured tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry, and artillery.

Here in the northwest, the Russians are now employing new tactics by sending small infantry groups at night to dig in at new positions. “They are skilled with their shovels,” he said.
But Ukrainian troops are, so far, holding firm. Zhytar said his Soviet-era Gvozdika howitzer, whose name translates as Carnation, is highly accurate.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Some interviews by CNN with a solider from the 47th Mechanized Brigade with some comments about the earlier days of the offensive:

Even with new armored vehicles from the US, progress is hard won on Ukraine’s southern front

 

[themeistersinger]

A Russian soldier said his unit was sent into battle with no ammo and one grenade each — to kill themselves​

MSN

 

[themeistersinger]

Russia Detains Former Separatist Ukraine Commander - The Moscow Times

Russian army veteran and ex-FSB officer Igor Girkin has been detained, his wife and the RBC business daily’s sources said Friday. Girkin, who helped Moscow annex Crimea in 2014 and then organized pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukraine, was detained by law enforcement officers around 11:30 a.m.

www.themoscowtimes.com

 

[themeistersinger]

Black Sea Grain Deal is Dead, Highlighting Turkey's Strategic Relevance

Whether the grain deal is reinstated or not, will not reduce Turkey’s strategic importance. This is not something to celebrate.

www.19fortyfive.com

 

[themeistersinger]

To call this ‘cringe’ would be an understatement of the century. Brace yourselves. If you’re planning to watch the whole video make sure to grab a bucket just in case you might need to throw up. I warned you!#Sarmat #WashingtonDC #Russia #RussiaUkraineWar

https://twitter.com/NatalkaKyiv/status/1680680110704189444

 

[Don't Toews Me]

How Russia learnt from mistakes to frustrate Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Russian forces are taking inspiration from Wagner mercenaries as they hold the line even as casualties mount

www.thetimes.co.uk

The Russian army, after being humiliated on several occasions in 2022, has learnt from its mistakes. It has expanded its use of both suicide and surveillance drones, making its artillery more precise against Ukraine’s western-supplied armour.
Ukrainian soldiers also say they had to some extent copied Yevgeny Prigozhin’s reviled but resilient Wagner mercenaries, whose ability to withstand huge losses was grimly successful before their disappearance from the war after June’s mutiny.

Last autumn, during a counteroffensive east of Kharkiv, several Russian battalions fled en masse, allowing the Ukrainians to break through the front.
This time the Russians have not only dug in better, but they are also more mentally prepared to hold out despite high levels of casualties, the Ukrainians say. Four fifths might run, said one Ukrainian soldier, who identified himself by his call sign, Star, but that still leaves a fifth behind.
Through their own drone surveillance, they watch Russian trenches being pummelled by western-supplied artillery, often a grotesque spectacle of flying arms and legs. But still the Russians do not retreat.

Near by, Denys, 46, a veteran of the fighting also newly arrived at the hospital, was shaking and glassy-eyed from concussion inflicted by a tank shell. He described how his unit from the 110th brigade had been held up by a combination of all these factors for weeks in front of the village of Pryutne to the south.
When the Ukrainian assault troops and reconnaissance squads swept forwards a couple of weeks into the counteroffensive, they passed a forest situated ahead of the village. The two Russian battalions holding it had mostly fled. But one company remained behind, determined to hang on, and continued to attack the Ukrainian supply lines from the rear. “Two of them came up to me from behind,” Denys said. “Luckily I swung round and saw them, and killed them first.”
An officer, call sign Fixer, described the problem. “We can’t just smash everything up with artillery — the forest is too big,” he said. “And we don’t just want to send infantry in as that would be suicide for them.”
Instead, special forces units have been prepared to infiltrate the woods and clear it bit by bit — a slow and gradual process, as the counteroffensive has become.

In the meantime, the men who would otherwise be advancing stay in their trenches, sitting ducks for Russian jets, helicopters, artillery and tank shells. Star was one of four men who was treated for concussion after a Russian jet attacked their position and missed.
They were also lucky — they were moved to another trench overnight to await evacuation for treatment and saw their old position obliterated by a follow-up direct hit with a heavy Ofab [high explosive fragmentation bomb] missile. “Next day, there was no position left,” Star said.
He hoped that as the offensive gathered pace, Ukraine’s own jets would come into play. One reason for confused expectations for the Ukrainian counteroffensive is the lack of air cover, with neither side having managed to win the battle for the skies.
Western tactics rely on having air supremacy — never challenged in recent wars in the Middle East — to soften up the defending lines and blitz the approaches, destroying hazards like mines.

With the US refusing before now to allow the delivery of F16s which would outgun their Russian rivals, the whole approach to an advance has to change. Moreover, even when jets are used, the order of battle is reversed.
Rather than softening up the defences with jets, ground forces have to soften up the defences first to make it safe for the jets to fly without too great a danger from ground-based anti-aircraft fire.

All the soldiers who spoke to The Times said that the resistance being put up by the Russians could and would be overcome. “We have to get to the sea before the end of summer, or the water will be too cold for swimming,” said Fixer.
All said that quicker supplies of ammunition, particularly artillery shells, and weapons that could counter the minefields would reduce the level of Ukrainian casualties.

In the meantime, the “shock troops” of the offensive are neither the western-supplied tanks nor the special forces assault units, but sappers, sent out to sweep mines in direct line of fire of the enemy.
The fastest advances in the counteroffensive have been around Bakhmut, the town in the east that has been the centre of the biggest battle of the war. But this is a diversion, where the aim is to demoralise the Russians by putting them under pressure in a spot they spent thousands of lives to capture.
The real aim of the counteroffensive is to drive south of Pryutne to the Black Sea, to split the Russian occupation forces in two. They have made five miles. Another 65 to go.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported t

www.understandingwar.org

Ukrainian military officials outlined the challenge of defending against Onyx missiles and Russia’s shortage of Kh-22 missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Onyx missiles fly at a speed of more than 3,000 kilometers per hour at a high altitude and then quickly change altitude to 10–15 meters above the surface when striking a target, making it difficult to detect and destroy.[8] Ihnat noted on July 19 that Russian forces are using Onyx cruise missiles that are designed to destroy targets located directly on the coastline along the sea.[9] Ihnat also stated on July 20 that Russia does not have the same ability to manufacture Kh-22 missiles that it does to produce other types of high-precision long-range missiles.[10] Ihnat noted that Russia had approximately 250 Kh-22 missiles at the beginning of the war in February of 2022 and has already used approximately 150 missiles against Ukraine.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced on July 20. A Ukrainian commander operating in the Bakhmut area reported on July 19 that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.8km likely on the southern flank of Bakhmut, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced on Bakhmut’s northern flank on July 20.[37] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces cannot rapidly advance near Bakhmut due to heavy Russian force concentrations in the area.[38] The Russian military command concentrated a high density of forces in the Bakhmut area to defend against Ukrainian attacks in the area, likely an intended effect of those attacks, though Syrskyi and other Ukrainian officials have repeatedly restated their intent to retake Bakhmut.[39] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued advancing in the Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and are continuing to advance by roughly 100 meters per day south and southeast of Orikhiv.[40] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak reiterated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be slow and difficult but will prevent Russian forces from retaking the battlefield initiative.[41] The Washington Post reported that Ukrainian forces have begun using Western-provided cluster munitions in southeastern Ukraine and assessed that Ukrainian forces will likely use them near Bakhmut soon.[42] The Washington Post, citing an anonymous Ukrainian military official, reported that Ukrainian forces are using the cluster munitions to “break up [Russian] trenches slowing down Ukrainian forces.”

 

[Don't Toews Me]

🔴 Live: Russia detains prominent hardliner who accused Putin of weakness in Ukraine

A prominent Russian hardliner who accused President Vladimir Putin of weakness and indecision in Ukraine was detained Friday on charges of extremism, a signal the Kremlin has toughened its approach with…

www.france24.com

Bulgaria decided on Friday to send about 100 armoured personnel carriers to Ukraine in the Balkan country's first shipment of heavy equipment to Kyiv.

Parliament approved – with 148 votes in favour and 52 against – a proposal of the new pro-European government to send the vehicles along with armaments and spare parts.

The government bought various models of Soviet-made BTR carriers in the 1980s but they were never used.

"This equipment is no longer necessary for the needs of Bulgaria, and it can be of serious support to Ukraine in its battle to preserve the country's independence and territorial integrity after the unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression," parliament said in its decision.

EU and NATO member Bulgaria has in stock large quantities of Soviet-style weapons coveted by Ukraine and also produces ammunition for them.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Russia says West ‘responsible for death of Russian journalist’ in Ukraine

Moscow on Saturday said the West is "responsible" for the death of a Russian war correspondent killed in Ukrainian shelling in the southern Zaporizhzhia region on Saturday. Earlier, the Russia-installed…

www.france24.com

French President Emmanuel Macron's diplomatic adviser said China was delivering items to Russia that could be used as military equipment that in turn could be used in its war in Ukraine.

"There are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do," said Emmanuel Bonne during a rare public address Thursday at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado, which is being broadcast.

When asked what he was referring to, he said it was the delivery of "kind of military equipment".

"As far as we know, they are not delivering massively military capacities to Russia," he added.

A French diplomatic source told AFP that the adviser referred to the "possible deliveries of dual-use technologies", both civilian and military.

An ammunition depot was hit in Crimea: https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-new...s-07-22-23/h_f1ba7dbba914762f4fb9f01d952a35db

Ukrainian forces hit an ammunition dump in Crimea on Saturday, forcing an evacuation of the area and canceling train services, according to information from Russian-backed authorities.

It marks the latest in a series of recent strikes on Russian supplies and critical infrastructure in the Russian-occupied peninsula.

Videos posted on social media and geolocated by CNN shows thick black smoke rising not far from a railway station in the town of Oktyabrskoye in the center of Crimea. In one of the videos, at least three loud explosions can be heard.

Sergey Aksyonov, the Russian-installed head of the peninsula, said a drone had struck an ammunition storage facility, prompting him to order the evacuation of everyone within a 5-kilometer (about 3-mile) radius, as well as the cancellation of several train services.

There were no initial reports of casualties, he said.

Some video of the aftermath of the attack: https://twitter.com/BBCWillVernon/status/1682700029302120453

Short video segment on a Ukrainian workshop that refurbishes and modifies weapons, including captured weaponry: https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230722-ukranian-soldiers-revamp-russian-weapons-left-behind

Short segment here on the situation in the Kupyansk area: https://www.france24.com/en/video/2...raine-s-unyielding-city-amid-russian-advances

Ukraine war live: Romanian village evacuation leads to 'Russia is attacking NATO' warning; Poland warns of sabotage

There are warnings Russia is expanding its war, after an attack near the Ukraine-Romania border forced the evacuation of a village. And Poland is warning of sabotage on its railways. Catch up on the Ukraine war below.

news.sky.com

Ukraine has released its latest tally for Russian losses since the full-scale invasion began, with the number of servicemen killed now at 241,330 according to its military.

The figures - generally higher than Western estimates - suggest that 640 members of Kremlin forces have been killed in the past day.

Also notable is the claimed loss of seven tanks and 19 artillery systems.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Piece by Sean Bell (retired Air Vice-Marshal in RAF): https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-...generals-is-making-his-forces-weaker-12924977

Strong and decisive leadership is required if Russian success in Ukraine is to be achieved. Instead, a culture of suspicion and fear permeates all levels of the military - even into the Kremlin - as the ramifications of Prigozhin's abortive rebellion continue to reverberate.

Russia's "crisis of command" might not directly impact Russia's immediate frontline defences, as soldiers there have no choice but to fight or be shot as deserters by their colleagues.

However, if Ukraine does manage to break through the Russian defensive line and the floodgates open, leadership shortcomings will be exposed, and Russian courage, bravery and initiative will be in very short supply.

Thread with some good graphics/imagery at link: https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1682708959289851904

Russian forces in Ukraine continue to expand defenses along the front line. This updated map shows many of Russia's new fortifications and links each to satellite imagery. (1/4)

Near Lysychansk (Luhansk Oblast), Russian forces added new trenches and barriers along roads leading toward the city. (2/4)

In Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces built new defenses as Ukraine regained territory near Bakhmut. (3/4)

There is some other imagery here: https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukraine

Update on Luhansk region: https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-new...s-07-22-23/h_22cc01f8d0b119f91483d29d4d071aa1

While Russian forces mount an essentially defensive operation in the south of Ukraine, they've adopted a more offensive posture elsewhere along the front line, according to updates from Kyiv's military, regional leaders and Russian bloggers.

In Ukraine's eastern Luhansk region, in particular, Moscow’s troops appear to have Ukraine firmly on the back foot.

“Yesterday the enemy tried to advance almost along the entire front line (running through the Luhansk region). These attempts were stopped by our military. The enemy is suffering significant losses in personnel and means but is pressing on every day,” Artem Lysohor, head of the region's military administration, said on Telegram Saturday.

Lysohor listed five locations in Luhansk where Russian forces had recently attacked.


A Ukrainian army spokesperson reminded TV viewers that Russia has assembled 100,000 soldiers to the east of an area between the towns of Lyman and Kupyansk. The towns are about 100 kilometers (62 miles) apart, north of Bakhmut on the eastern front.

“Although the situation is complicated, it is under our control,” said Serhii Cherevatyi, the military spokesperson.

“The enemy is acting according to the classic scheme — they are conducting artillery and air strikes on our positions to the maximum extent possible. And then they try to attack with platoon-company-level units … trying to attack our positions,” Cherevatyi added.

Reports from Russia: Rybar, a Russian military blogging site, says Moscow's forces have made territorial gains in the northeastern Kharkiv region, capturing a railway station in the village of Movchanove and expanding control around the nearby town of Lyman Pershyi.

It is not possible for CNN to immediately verify claims of battlefield gains or losses by either side, but it is notable that the DeepState mapping site also suggests modest Russian gains in the same area.

Also in the east, Ukrainian forces continue their efforts to capture higher ground around Bakhmut, but gains are small and hard to defend, according to reports.

Rybar reported the Ukrainian army has "once again managed to gain a foothold on the heights" near the town of Klishchivka, just south of Bakhmut. But, the Russian site reported, it had come “at the cost of significant losses.”

“The Ukrainian defense forces are holding the initiative (around Bakhmut), putting pressure on the enemy, and liberating Ukrainian land meter by meter,” Cherevatyi said.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Ukraine counteroffensive: UK armoured vehicles help to save lives

Ukrainian troops are taking heavy casualties during their counter-offensive but high-quality hardware is reducing the numbers

www.thetimes.co.uk

Good read on some of the armored vehicles UK has provided as well as some comments on the offensive:

Ukrainian troops are taking heavy casualties as they continue their counteroffensive against dug-in Russian forces in southeastern Ukraine but far fewer of their men are being killed than expected, soldiers have said.
Cautious tactics — refusing to replicate the Russian method of full-frontal attack — along with better medical care and high-quality armoured vehicles supplied by Ukraine’s Nato allies, Britain among them, have combined to minimise the numbers killed so far during the six-week assault.
At secret repair workshops for armoured vehicles — many of them workhorses of the British Army such as the Mastiff and its Wolfhound variant — The Times was given a graphic example of how one of the less glamorous Nato offerings to the Ukrainian army is playing its part.

A tank had scored a direct hit on a Wolfhound troop carrier, leaving a neat hole in its side. Two plates of sheet armour had deflected the shell into the vehicle’s gearbox, where it had sheared the driveshaft under the driver’s seat. But from the inside, the damage was hard to spot. A fire that broke out in the cabin had been quickly extinguished and no one inside was hurt.

“To be honest, the soldiers are all surprised at the ability of these vehicles to withstand fire,” said Serhii Ivanov, a lieutenant who is overseeing the Wolfhound’s repair. “They really save lives. After a few battles in one of these, no one wants to go back to the old Soviet BTR [personnel carrier] or anything like it. By comparison that’s a coffin, a 100 per cent chance of death.”
Britain has not specified how many armoured vehicles it has donated to Ukraine alongside its much higher-profile gift of 14 Challenger 2 tanks. But the number is known to be in the hundreds — mostly Mastiffs, Wolfhounds, Huskies and other variants of the American Cougar.

The Humvees may be more immediately familiar to non-military types than the British offerings thanks to movies set in the Middle East, where they make good desert vehicles. But their drivers say the heavier, slower, stolid Mastiff and its variants are more reliable in the soggy undergrowth of the Ukrainian countryside, which is more Hampshire than Helmand.
That is not to say they are invincible. Along the counteroffensive’s southern front there is no doubt that many Ukrainian troops have been killed as improved Russian targeting has scored hits on the advancing armour and its supporting infantry.
The death count has been Ukraine’s most closely guarded secret from the beginning of the war, the one issue that soldiers are not allowed to discuss with the media.
The official version is that three Russians are dying for every Ukrainian, but when a soldier can be persuaded to speak, he usually laughs that off, saying that the politicians are being cautious and the real ratio is much more in their favour.

These soldiers may not want to face a harsh truth of the war that is only too evident in the graveyards outside every big city, where lines of fresh mounds of earth sport the yellow-and-blue national flag. But they are genuinely shocked at the comparison with their own side and the way the Russians treat their injured and dead, who are simply left on the battlefield.
By way of illustration, a soldier recovering from concussion at one of the front’s main field hospitals this week showed off two gruesome images on his mobile phone, from the line of Russian trenches his unit had captured last weekend.
One was of a fresh Russian corpse. The other was of a corpse reduced to a skeleton, skin picked off or rotted. “They were a hundred yards apart,” the soldier said. The first soldier had been forced to fight alongside the decomposing corpse of his comrade for weeks, before being killed himself.

The field hospital, along with its forward operating aid station a short distance behind the front lines 12 miles away, where some of the fiercest fighting is going on, was also testament to the disparity between the sides.
During our two-day visit a steady stream of casualties came in, including a man who had received severe shrapnel wounds to the head and blast injuries, and was pale with shock.

In fact, during the time we were there, no bodies were brought in. The hospital’s boss, Major Andriy Komarinets, 52, chief surgeon of the 110th Brigade, said that since he had set up the forward operating outpost on June 6, his medics had not lost a single man who had reached them alive. “We have been able to treat every single casualty.”
He said that the first ten days of the counteroffensive had been “very busy”. It was at that point the Ukrainian side changed its tactics from armoured assault to more tentative advances across minefields, sappers leading the way to clear a path for the others.

It is messy work and the mines are exacting a toll. Another man arrived at the hospital having lost a leg and large amounts of blood. But he, too, was stable.
Back near the front a company commander, who had returned a short time earlier from four days in the hospital recovering from concussion, considered the state of the counteroffensive so far. He and his men had been taking a pounding from Russian tanks as they waited for an opportunity to renew their advance. They had been shelled, like him, and lost limbs. One had been shot, but survived.
He was cheerful. He claimed that the Russians had sent waves of men to retake his trenches but his men had “killed them all”. And counting his own losses was easy. “In six weeks, not one of my men has been killed.”

 

[Don't Toews Me]

The world is isolating Putin. Here's what that could mean for the war

^Short interview with a Georgetown professor who is an expert on Russia.


Ukraine is now the most mined country. It will take decades to make safe

In a year and a half of conflict, land mines — along with unexploded bombs, artillery shells and other deadly byproducts of war — have contaminated a swath of Ukraine roughly the size of Florida or Uruguay. It has become the world’s most mined country.

About 30 percent of Ukraine, more than 67,000 square miles, has been exposed to severe conflict and will require time-consuming, expensive and dangerous clearance operations, according to a recent report by GLOBSEC, a think tank based in Slovakia.

Though the ongoing combat renders precise surveys impossible, the scale and concentration of ordnance makes Ukraine’s contamination greater than that of other heavily mined countries such as Afghanistan and Syria.

Ukraine’s contaminated territory is so massive that some experts estimate humanitarian clearance would take the approximately 500 demining teams in current operation 757 years to complete.

Demining teams crawl inch by inch across the terrain, using metal detectors and sometimes explosive-sniffing dogs, excavating every signal, not knowing whether they will uncover a harmless nail or deadline mine.

Demining is not just slow, it’s also expensive. The World Bank estimates that demining Ukraine, which costs between $2 and $8 per square meter, will cost $37.4 billion over the next 10 years.

 

[Chadstroma]

Putin personally warned by Xi against Ukraine nuclear attack as tables turn on Russia

 

[Chadstroma]

Warsaw summons Russian ambassador after Putin threatens Poland

Warsaw has summoned the Russian Ambassador to Poland after President Vladimir Putin threatened Poland and claimed it was eyeing territory in Ukraine and Belarus. “The western territories of present-day Poland are a gift from (Soviet tyrant Joseph) Stalin to the Poles, have our friends in Warsaw...

kyivindependent.com

 

[Don't Toews Me]

U.S. in no hurry to provide Ukraine with long-range missiles

The Biden administration is holding firm, for now at least, on its refusal to send long-range Army missiles to Ukraine despite mounting pressure from U.S. lawmakers and pleas from the government in Kyiv, according to U.S. officials.

Disappointment at the slow pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive against entrenched Russian forces and a newly equivocal tone by President Biden have led to widespread speculation that the missiles will soon follow the path taken by other U.S. weapons systems that were first denied but ultimately approved during the 17 months of the war.

In late May, Biden appeared to alter his previously firm “no” on the possibility of ATACMS, the Army Tactical Missile System, saying for the first time that it was “still in play.” Two weeks later, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that he and Biden had spoken about the missiles at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, but that no decision had been made.

But U.S. defense and administration officials familiar with the issue said that despite what one called a growing public perception of “some sort of slow, gravitational pull” toward approval, there has been no change in U.S. policy and no substantive discussion about the issue for months. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to address the sensitive subject.

The Pentagon believes that Kyiv has other, more urgent needs than ATACMS, and worries that sending enough to Ukraine to make a difference on the battlefield would severely undercut U.S. readiness for other possible conflicts.
The number of ATACMS in American stockpiles is fixed, awaiting replacement with the next generation, longer-range Precision Strike Missile, called the Prism, for PrSM, which is expected to enter service by the end of this year, officials said. Lockheed Martin still manufactures 500 ATACMS each year, but all of that production is destined for sale to other countries.

The ATACMS would allow Ukrainian forces to target the farthest reaches of Russian-occupied Crimea from their own current front lines, including the 12-mile Kerch Bridge and the Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

Since last year, the administration has cited several reasons for holding back. Refusal initially centered on concerns that Ukraine might fire the long-range missiles into Russian territory, escalating the conflict into a U.S.-Russia confrontation. Even supplying the weapons, Moscow has said publicly, would cross a red line.
Whatever Moscow’s threats, those worries seem to have abated. The Biden administration has said it is satisfied with public statements and written pledges from Kyiv not to use U.S.-supplied weapons to target Russians beyond the border. Although officials privately concede there have been some breaches, Ukraine is said to have largely complied with those promises.

Britain and France have recently supplied cruise missiles with a range of about 140 miles — nearly three times as far as what was previously available to Ukraine, but about 50 miles short of the range of the ATACMS — after coordinating their decisions with the United States.
“We are confident that these weapons will be used by Ukraine in accordance” with agreements “not to attack Russian soil,” a senior European official said.

Not only would the ATACMS be game-changers in Ukraine, in the view of the administration, but they also would “limit the use of HIMARS or the GMLRS,” a defense official said, referring to the U.S. High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System it is capable of firing six at a time with a nearly 50-mile range. The ATACMS are also fired from HIMARS, but only one at a time.
“There’s a very limited number [of ATACMS] available to export, and for distances longer than the GMLR can reach, the Ukrainians have been given Storm Shadows and SCALPS,” the defense official said. This fall or winter, Ukraine also will receive U.S. GLSDB, or Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs, with a range of 93 miles and the ability to fire on a 360-degree trajectory.

ATACMS are nearly two-ton guided missiles. Each one is 13 feet long, 2 feet in diameter, and costs nearly $1.5 million. First designed in the 1980s, they were used in combat by the Army in both the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Ukrainians believe the ground-launched missiles would provide a capability beyond the cruise missiles, which are launched from aircraft.

The limited number of ATACMS is the U.S. military’s most pressing concern. While the exact number in the U.S. arsenal is classified, Lockheed Martin has made only about 4,000 since production began, many of them used by the U.S. Army in combat, exercises and periodic testing.
At the same time, nearly 900 have been sold to allies and partners abroad in the past decade — including 211 since the beginning of the Ukraine war, according to the State Department’s list of foreign military sales. They have gone to NATO allies, Persian Gulf countries and as far afield as Taiwan and Australia, usually in conjunction with the sale of HIMARS. The administration notified Congress in April of the pending sale of 40 of the missiles to Morocco.
To fulfill those and future foreign orders, the Army has signed at least three contracts with Lockheed Martin since 2018, totaling about $1 billion, for ongoing manufacture of ATACMS, which are “currently in full-rate production … at a rate of about 500 per year” at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Camden, Ark., according to a company spokesperson, who declined to be named. All are destined for foreign sales.

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Terrible: https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1682892910755282945

Odesa’s main Orthodox cathedral. Established in 1794, destroyed by Stalin in 1936, rebuilt under an independent Ukraine and destroyed again by Putin in 2023. One of several historical parts of central Odesa, a UNESCO world heritage site, hit by Russian missiles strikes today.

There is a short video at the link as well

 

[Nathan R. Jessep]

Sea drones, missile strikes and blockade: Ukraine's counteroffensive in Crimea

Ukraine’s attacks on the Crimean Bridge and Port of Sevastopol show how it plans to retake the peninsula by cutting it off from Russia

www.reuters.com

 

[Chadstroma]

'Witch' — Ukraine's fearless mortar commander — orders walls of fire

Absent air support, Ukrainian infantry fighting for Bakhmut need mortar cover to advance. As Scripps News international correspondent Jason Bellini reports, ‘Witch’ — a former lawyer who became a platoon commander in the 241st Territorial Defense Brigade —delivers.

scrippsnews.com

 

[Don't Toews Me]

Ukraine’s Lack of Weaponry and Training Risks Stalemate in Fight With Russia

The U.S. and Ukraine knew of the shortfalls, but Kyiv still launched its offensive.

www.wsj.com

When Ukraine launched its big counteroffensive this spring, Western military officials knew Kyiv didn’t have all the training or weapons—from shells to warplanes—that it needed to dislodge Russian forces. But they hoped Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness would carry the day.
They haven’t. Deep and deadly minefields, extensive fortifications and Russian air power have combined to largely block significant advances by Ukrainian troops. Instead, the campaign risks descending into a stalemate with the potential to burn through lives and equipment without a major shift in momentum.
As the likelihood of any large-scale breakthrough by the Ukrainians this year dims, it raises the unsettling prospect for Washington and its allies of a longer war—one that would require a huge new infusion of sophisticated armaments and more training to give Kyiv a chance at victory.

The American hesitation contrasts with shifting views in Europe, where more leaders over recent months have come to believe that Ukraine must prevail in the conflict—and Russia must lose—to ensure the continent’s security.
But European militaries lack sufficient resources to supply Ukraine with all it needs to eject Moscow’s armies from the roughly 20% of the country that they control. European leaders are also unlikely to significantly increase support to Kyiv if they sense U.S. reluctance, Western diplomats say.

Now, Ukraine is on the offensive against Russian positions where troops have had months to build extensive defenses including minefields, barriers and bunkers. Western military doctrine holds that to attack a dug-in adversary, an attacking force should be at least three times the enemy’s size and use a well-coordinated combination of air and land forces.
Kyiv’s troops lack the mass, training and resources to follow those prescriptions.
“Ukraine really needs to be able to scale up and synchronize military operations if it wants to be able to break through Russian defenses,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, an independent military analyst who recently toured Ukrainian front lines.

Gady said that rather than concentrating forces in assaults involving many units firing volleys of rockets and artillery—supporting simultaneous waves of advancing ground forces—Ukraine is attacking sequentially, with shelling followed by company-level infantry advances. The tactic “often telegraphs to the Russians that they’re attacking,” he said.
The small-scale approach, which is easier for commanders to orchestrate than pushing ground forces under covering artillery, creates its own problems, such as reduced mobility. Safely removing wounded soldiers from the front and bringing in fresh ammunition is more treacherous in company-level operations because the medical and logistics corps are less protected.

Conducting synchronized large-scale attacks is difficult for any armed force—even Western ones with more and better equipment than Ukraine has—because integrating vast numbers of land and air troops in the fast, violent ballet of a frontal assault is enormously difficult.
No Western military would also try to breach established defenses without controlling the skies.
“America would never attempt to defeat a prepared defense without air superiority, but they [Ukrainians] don’t have air superiority,” said John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who is now an associate professor of warfighting studies at the U.S. Army War College. “It’s impossible to overstate how important air superiority is for fighting a ground fight at a reasonable cost in casualties.”

Russian drones and attack helicopters, particularly Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator” gunships, have proven particularly dangerous. Ka-52s, which are among Russia’s most modern aircraft, can remain far behind Russian lines and rely on targeting data from spotter drones scanning the front. Their laser-guided Vikhr missiles have a range of roughly 5 miles, which is more than twice the range of any portable antiaircraft missiles in Ukraine’s armory.
U.S. Defense Department analysts knew early this year that Ukraine’s front-line troops would struggle against Russian air attacks. A classified Pentagon assessment from February, allegedly leaked by Air National Guard Airman Jack Teixeira, tallied a tiny number of weapons in Ukrainian hands able to hit distant aircraft and cited the risk of “inability to prevent Russian air superiority.”
Kyiv lacks sufficient air-defense equipment—such as U.S.-made Patriot batteries or more mobile German Gepard systems—to deploy many near front lines. Patriots and other large, less-mobile systems are also vulnerable to Russian drone attacks.
Ukraine’s paucity of battlefield air-defenses and antiaircraft weaponry has allowed Russia to dominate skies along much of the front.

“The Russians are now able to make better use of their aviation assets,” said Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank in London. “Russia doesn’t have air-superiority over the whole of Ukraine, but from the defender’s perspective, they’re in a much better position.”

 

[Chadstroma]

Russia and Iran's 'unprecedented' military ties worried the US, but it's starting to look like Russia can't hold up its end of the deal

With their partnership looking more and more one-sided, Iranians may ask what they are getting in exchange for aiding Russia.

www.businessinsider.com

 

[themeistersinger]

‘Very Alarming’: Muscovites Shaken By Fresh Drone Attack on Capital - The Moscow Times

Moscow residents were startled awake in the middle of the night as Ukrainian drones crashed close to the Russian Defense Ministry building in the city center on Monday and another hit an office building in a southern area of the capital. “Around 3:30-3:40 a.m.

www.themoscowtimes.com

 

[Dezbelief]

Hundreds of thousands of people fled Russia after it invaded Ukraine — and now the countries that took them in are seeing a boost in their economies

Armenia, which was once known as the Silicon Valley of the Soviet Union, saw its 2022 GDP growth spike to 12.6%, according to World Bank data.

www.businessinsider.com

Hundreds of thousands of people fled Russia after it invaded Ukraine — and now the countries that took them in are seeing a boost in their economies​