In modern Ukraine, assassinations date back to at least 2015, when its domestic security service (SBU) created a new body after Russia had seized Crimea and the eastern Donbas region. The elite fifth counter-intelligence directorate started life as a saboteur force in response to the invasion. It later came to focus on what is euphemistically called “wet work”.
Valentin Nalivaychenko, who headed the SBU at the time, says the switch came about when Ukraine’s then leaders decided that a policy of imprisoning collaborators was not enough. Prisons were overflowing, but few were deterred. “We reluctantly came to the conclusion that we needed to eliminate people,” he says. A former officer of the directorate describes it in similar terms. “We needed to bring war to them.” In 2015 and 2016 the directorate was linked to the assassinations of key Russian-backed commanders in the Donbas; Mikhail Tolstykh, aka “Givi”, killed in a rocket attack; Arsen Pavlov, aka “Motorola”, blown up in a lift; Alexander Zakharchenko, blown up in a restaurant (pictured).
Intelligence insiders say the SBU’s fifth directorate is playing a central role in counter-Russia operations. The SBU’s relative size and budget—five times bigger than HUR’s—mean it has been most able to pull off the most sophisticated jobs, for example bombing the Kerch bridge, linking Russia to Crimea, in October 2022. Others, though, emphasise the role of HUR, with its underground networks and increased wartime prominence. “We are mostly the white-collar guys,” insists an SBU source. Another increasingly important player in occupied Ukraine is the Special Operations Forces (SSO). This is a relatively new group that co-ordinates Rukh Opory (Resistance Movement), Ukraine’s partisans. The operation in Kharkiv, for example, was the SSO’s. Denys Yaroslavsky, an officer in the SSO, says the service is now pushing for more powers to сonduct operations within Russia itself. That is not universally welcomed elsewhere in Ukraine’s intelligence community.
Ukraine’s president is understood to authorise the most controversial operations, though other decisions are delegated. A high-level government source with knowledge of the work declines to discuss the details: “It’s important not to comment or even think about such operations.” But he says that Volodymyr Zelensky has issued a clear order to avoid collateral damage among civilians. “The president communicates this instruction to people formally, and, on occasion, by shouting at them.” Ukraine had to choose its targets carefully, the source adds; it might “not always” have done so.
Ukraine’s leadership came under particular scrutiny in October, when the New York Times reported that the American government was blaming it for a car-bomb that killed Darya Dugina, daughter of Alexander Dugin, a nationalistic philosopher. That sharpened an already-lively internal debate within Ukrainian intelligence. It was unclear if Ms Dugina was meant to die; some reports suggest she had switched cars with her father.
But a subsequent string of operations targeting mid-level propagandists showed a trend that few of the insiders interviewed for this article were happy with. “These are marginal figures,” says one source in SBU counter-intelligence. “It makes me uncomfortable.” The former SBU fifth-directorate officer suggests the operations were designed to impress the president rather than bring victory any closer. “Clowns, prostitutes and jokers are a constant around the Russian government,” he says. “Kill one of them, and another will appear in their place.”