In the past few days, #Ukraine and its offensive into #Kursk has demonstrated again how surprise plays a major role in human conflict. What role has surprise played in this war, and how did Ukraine surprise Russia...again? 1/22
2/ Surprising the opponent is an important method of seizing the initiative on the battlefield or at the strategic level. But the impacts of surprise are transient. As such, exploitation must be executed quickly against surprised – and shocked – enemy forces before they can regain coherency in their command and control and respond effectively.
3/ The past 30 months of war since the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine offers multiple examples where advanced technology has not prevented humans from innovating, deceiving and surprising their enemies.
4/ Key examples include: the previous Belgorod incursions, the defeat of Russia north of Kyiv, the Kerch bridge attack, the drone attacks on Moscow, the Kharkiv offensive in 2022, the failure of the Ukraine counteroffensive in 2023, the Progozhin mutiny, and the reinvigoration of NATO (big surprise for Putin).
5/ The events of the past 72 hours have demonstrated this again. Ukraine, in a rapidly developing offensive, crossed its frontier with Russia and has been advancing on two axes of advance into the Kursk region of Russia.
6/ The question needs to be asked: how did Ukraine achieve such a stunning surprise against the Russians at this point of the war?
7/ Surprise has many contributing factors, as Schelling wrote: "Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined that actions get lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it."
8/ A full accounting of Russian performance in the lead up to, and during, this August 2024 Ukrainian cross-border offensive is some way off. Likewise, we probably won’t be exposed to the Ukrainian intelligence and planning for this offensive for some time into the future.
9/ However, it is likely that the Ukrainian surprise against the Russians was the result of five key factors: good intelligence; Ukrainian deception measures; Ukrainian operational security; timing; and Russian self-deception / failure of humility.
10/ Contributing Factor 1: Good Intelligence. Intelligence is a foundational element of military operations. Combining collection ops with their in-depth knowledge about Russian culture & doctrine will have provided the foundations for the planning for this operation into Kursk.
11/ Contributing Factor 2: Deception. NATO doctrine on deception describes it as “deliberate measures to mislead targeted decision-makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to the commander’s objectives.”
12/ Ukraine probably developed a comprehensive deception plan that was designed to decieve Russia (and other observers) about the following: 1. Its intention to conduct a major offensive in 2024; 2. Movement of forces for the offensive; 3. Location & timing of where the Ukrainian offensive would be conducted; 4. Stockpiling of logistics to support the operation; 5. Deployment of key supporting elements including air defence and EW.
13/ Contributing Factor 3: Operational Security. Achieving surprise also demands strict operational security that commences long before the execution of an operation. This operational security will have been designed by the Ukrainians to deny the Russians knowledge of Ukraine’s intention to deceive them about planned operations.
14/ Contributing Factor 4: Timing. In war, the ability to exploit time is one of the most important considerations in the planning and execution of military activities. Timing for this Ukrainian offensive will have been driven by its capacity to concentrate the forces required for close combat, engineer support, artillery, air defence, communications, logistics, and electronic warfare.
15/ Ukraine shaped expectations among its supporters – and therefore in the Russian military leadership – that any kind of major offensive from the Ukrainian armed forces is probably not likely in 2024. Therefore, they have got inside the temporal decision cycle of the Russians as well as those observing the war. This week, #Ukraine did something much earlier than expected.
16/ Contributing Factor 5: Russian Self-Deception and Failure of Humility. Self-deception involves denying or rationalizing away the significance, relevance, or importance of opposing evidence and / or logical argument. This is not uncommon in military affairs.
17/ An element of self-deception in Russian military leadership in the lead up to the offensive might also be a failure of humility. A failure of humility occurs when a military force fails to undertake the intellectual efforts to understand their adversary.
18/ The Russians, believing that they had the strategic momentum in this war, and making good progress on the eastern front in Ukraine, failed to give the Ukrainians adequate credit for being a thinking, complex and adaptive entity that was studying them and planning accordingly.
19/ Surprise remains one of the enduring features of war. As Clausewitz wrote, “surprise of the enemy…lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings, for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable.” And as we have seen in the past 72 hours it will continue to be a feature of the war in Ukraine.
20/ Ukraine has achieved a major surprise against Russia in its #Kursk offensive. This tactical, operational and strategic surprise shows that modern military operations are far less transparent than some would have us believe. Humans, not technology, still determine the trajectory of war. End
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Kursk region has been captured by Ukrainian forces, and that Ukrainian troops are now as much as 25km deep into Russia. Radio silence in Kyiv.
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Ukrainian forces continue advancing east of Sudzha, heavy fighting reported throughout the area.
Vitaliy Ihorovych and Denys Boyarchuk, paratroopers of the 2nd Air Assault Battalion, 80th Air Assault Brigade, were killed in action on August 7, 2024, during a battle in Kursk Oblast. They are the first known casualties of Ukraine's ongoing cross-border operation.
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