Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC II
Those who wish to, can refer back to Battle of the Atlantic I, which was post #675 on page 14. There was a follow up on post #677.
http://forums.footballguys.com/forum/index...1652&st=650
By the end of the war, German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic had sent over 2,900 ships and 14 million tons of Allied shipping to the bottom of the sea. In exchange, the Allies sank almost 800 U-Boats and over 30,000 of the 39,000 German sailors who put to sea, never returned – the highest casualty rate of any armed service in the history of modern war.
During the early war, German U-Boat successes against British and American shipping were so remarkable, that in January 1943, the Allies issued a decree in Casablanca which made the defeat of German U-Boats a number one priority. Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of Britain was most noted in his speech summarizing the German U-boats and the Battle of the Atlantic as "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril".
When did the tide turn against the U-boats, who enjoyed such early success at the beginning of the war, and again when America entered the war, that they called those times “the Happy Times”?
By August 1942, U-boats were being fitted with radar detectors to enable them to avoid the sudden ambushes which a radar-equipped aircraft or corvette might spring. The first such receiver, named Metox after its French manufacturer, was capable of picking up the metric radar bands used by the early radars. This not only enabled U-boats to avoid detection by Canadian and U.S. escorts, which were equipped with obsolete radar sets, but allowed them to track convoys where these sets were in use.
After a lull during the winter months, because of cold and wild weather, in the spring of 1943 convoy battles started up again with the same ferocity. By the spring of 1943, there were so many U-boats on patrol in the North Atlantic that it was difficult for the convoys to evade detection, resulting in a succession of vicious convoy battles. In March the escorts were heavily defeated in the battles of convoys UGS 6, HX 228, SC 121, SC 122 and HX 229. One hundred twenty Allied ships were sunk worldwide, 82 ships of 476,000 tons in the Atlantic, and 12 U-boats were destroyed.
The supply situation in Britain was such that there was talk of being unable to continue the war effort, with supplies of fuel being particularly low. It appeared that Admiral Dönitz was winning the war. And yet the next two months would see a complete reversal of fortunes.
In April, losses of U-boats increased while their kills of ships fell dramatically. Thirty-nine ships of 235,000 tons were sunk in the Atlantic, and 15 U-boats were destroyed.
By May, wolf packs no longer had the advantage and that month was to become known as Black May for the U-Boat Arm. The turning point was the battle centered around the slow Convoy ONS 5 (April–May 1943), when a convoy of 43 merchantmen escorted by 16 warships was attacked by a pack of 30 U-boats. Although 13 merchant ships were sunk, six U-boats were sunk by the escorts or Allied aircraft.
Despite a storm which scattered the convoy, the merchantmen reached the protection of land-based air cover causing Admiral Dönitz to call off the attack. Two weeks later, SC 130 saw five U-boats destroyed for no losses. Faced with disaster, Donitz called off operations in the North Atlantic. In all, 43 U-boats were destroyed in May, 34 in the Atlantic. This was 25% of Germany's total operational U-boat strength. The Allies lost 58 ships in May, 34 ships of 134,000 tons of these in the Atlantic.
The Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Allies in two months. There was no single reason for this, but what had changed was a sudden convergence of technologies, combined with an increase in Allied resources.
The mid-Atlantic gap that had been unreachable by aircraft was closed by long-range B-24 Liberator aircraft. Effective employment of these aircraft required shift of operational control from the United States Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command to the United States Navy.
By spring 1943 the British had developed an effective sea-scanning centimetric radar small enough to be carried on patrol aircraft armed with airborne depth charges. Centimetric radar greatly improved detection and was undetectable by the German Metox radar warning equipment.
Further air cover was provided by the introduction of merchant aircraft carrier or MAC ships and later the growing numbers of American-built escort carriers. Flying primarily Grumman F4F/FM Wildcats and Grumman TBF/TBM Avengers, they sailed in the convoys and provided the much needed air cover and patrols all the way across the Atlantic. (Escort carriers, or baby flattops, usually had about 24 to 30 planes—they were used to support troop landings and were outstanding as submarine hunters—they achieved lasting fame during the Battle of Leyte Gulf).
The larger numbers of escorts became available, both as a result of American building programs and the release of escorts that had been tied up in the North African landings during November and December 1942. In particular, destroyer escorts (similar British ships were known as frigates) were designed, which could be built more economically than expensive fleet destroyers and were also more seaworthy than corvettes. (In 1943, the US war machine produced 300 destroyer escorts).
There would not only be sufficient numbers of escorts to securely protect convoys, they could also form hunter-killer groups (often centered around escort carriers) to aggressively hunt U-boats.
The continual breaking of the German naval Enigma enabled the Allied convoys to evade the wolf packs while British support groups and American hunter-killer groups were able to hunt U-boats that approached the convoys or whose positions were revealed by Enigma decrypts.
Donitz’s aim, in this tonnage war was to sink Allied ships faster than they could be replaced; as losses fell, and production, particularly in the U.S., rose, this became increasingly unachievable.
Allied air forces developed tactics and technology to make the Bay of Biscay, the main route for French based U-boats, very dangerous. The introduction of the Leigh Light enabled accurate attacks on U-boats re-charging their batteries on the surface at night. The Luftwaffe responded by providing fighter cover for U-boats exiting into and returning from the Atlantic and for returning blockade runners. Still, with intelligence coming from resistance personnel in the ports themselves, the last few miles to and from port proved hazardous to many U-Boats.
We will return to the Battle of the Atlantic in the latter stages of the war.
Those who wish to, can refer back to Battle of the Atlantic I, which was post #675 on page 14. There was a follow up on post #677.
http://forums.footballguys.com/forum/index...1652&st=650
By the end of the war, German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic had sent over 2,900 ships and 14 million tons of Allied shipping to the bottom of the sea. In exchange, the Allies sank almost 800 U-Boats and over 30,000 of the 39,000 German sailors who put to sea, never returned – the highest casualty rate of any armed service in the history of modern war.
During the early war, German U-Boat successes against British and American shipping were so remarkable, that in January 1943, the Allies issued a decree in Casablanca which made the defeat of German U-Boats a number one priority. Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of Britain was most noted in his speech summarizing the German U-boats and the Battle of the Atlantic as "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril".
When did the tide turn against the U-boats, who enjoyed such early success at the beginning of the war, and again when America entered the war, that they called those times “the Happy Times”?
By August 1942, U-boats were being fitted with radar detectors to enable them to avoid the sudden ambushes which a radar-equipped aircraft or corvette might spring. The first such receiver, named Metox after its French manufacturer, was capable of picking up the metric radar bands used by the early radars. This not only enabled U-boats to avoid detection by Canadian and U.S. escorts, which were equipped with obsolete radar sets, but allowed them to track convoys where these sets were in use.
After a lull during the winter months, because of cold and wild weather, in the spring of 1943 convoy battles started up again with the same ferocity. By the spring of 1943, there were so many U-boats on patrol in the North Atlantic that it was difficult for the convoys to evade detection, resulting in a succession of vicious convoy battles. In March the escorts were heavily defeated in the battles of convoys UGS 6, HX 228, SC 121, SC 122 and HX 229. One hundred twenty Allied ships were sunk worldwide, 82 ships of 476,000 tons in the Atlantic, and 12 U-boats were destroyed.
The supply situation in Britain was such that there was talk of being unable to continue the war effort, with supplies of fuel being particularly low. It appeared that Admiral Dönitz was winning the war. And yet the next two months would see a complete reversal of fortunes.
In April, losses of U-boats increased while their kills of ships fell dramatically. Thirty-nine ships of 235,000 tons were sunk in the Atlantic, and 15 U-boats were destroyed.
By May, wolf packs no longer had the advantage and that month was to become known as Black May for the U-Boat Arm. The turning point was the battle centered around the slow Convoy ONS 5 (April–May 1943), when a convoy of 43 merchantmen escorted by 16 warships was attacked by a pack of 30 U-boats. Although 13 merchant ships were sunk, six U-boats were sunk by the escorts or Allied aircraft.
Despite a storm which scattered the convoy, the merchantmen reached the protection of land-based air cover causing Admiral Dönitz to call off the attack. Two weeks later, SC 130 saw five U-boats destroyed for no losses. Faced with disaster, Donitz called off operations in the North Atlantic. In all, 43 U-boats were destroyed in May, 34 in the Atlantic. This was 25% of Germany's total operational U-boat strength. The Allies lost 58 ships in May, 34 ships of 134,000 tons of these in the Atlantic.
The Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Allies in two months. There was no single reason for this, but what had changed was a sudden convergence of technologies, combined with an increase in Allied resources.
The mid-Atlantic gap that had been unreachable by aircraft was closed by long-range B-24 Liberator aircraft. Effective employment of these aircraft required shift of operational control from the United States Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command to the United States Navy.
By spring 1943 the British had developed an effective sea-scanning centimetric radar small enough to be carried on patrol aircraft armed with airborne depth charges. Centimetric radar greatly improved detection and was undetectable by the German Metox radar warning equipment.
Further air cover was provided by the introduction of merchant aircraft carrier or MAC ships and later the growing numbers of American-built escort carriers. Flying primarily Grumman F4F/FM Wildcats and Grumman TBF/TBM Avengers, they sailed in the convoys and provided the much needed air cover and patrols all the way across the Atlantic. (Escort carriers, or baby flattops, usually had about 24 to 30 planes—they were used to support troop landings and were outstanding as submarine hunters—they achieved lasting fame during the Battle of Leyte Gulf).
The larger numbers of escorts became available, both as a result of American building programs and the release of escorts that had been tied up in the North African landings during November and December 1942. In particular, destroyer escorts (similar British ships were known as frigates) were designed, which could be built more economically than expensive fleet destroyers and were also more seaworthy than corvettes. (In 1943, the US war machine produced 300 destroyer escorts).
There would not only be sufficient numbers of escorts to securely protect convoys, they could also form hunter-killer groups (often centered around escort carriers) to aggressively hunt U-boats.
The continual breaking of the German naval Enigma enabled the Allied convoys to evade the wolf packs while British support groups and American hunter-killer groups were able to hunt U-boats that approached the convoys or whose positions were revealed by Enigma decrypts.
Donitz’s aim, in this tonnage war was to sink Allied ships faster than they could be replaced; as losses fell, and production, particularly in the U.S., rose, this became increasingly unachievable.
Allied air forces developed tactics and technology to make the Bay of Biscay, the main route for French based U-boats, very dangerous. The introduction of the Leigh Light enabled accurate attacks on U-boats re-charging their batteries on the surface at night. The Luftwaffe responded by providing fighter cover for U-boats exiting into and returning from the Atlantic and for returning blockade runners. Still, with intelligence coming from resistance personnel in the ports themselves, the last few miles to and from port proved hazardous to many U-Boats.
We will return to the Battle of the Atlantic in the latter stages of the war.
Last edited by a moderator:
:( 
Really DC is a pretty good authority on this subject since he is probably one of a handful of people on this board who were actually close to the time of WWII taking place. Much respect DC, OBC misses you, now Bowie is the old man.
