As I have said before on other threads, read "City of Thieves" by David Benioff. It is an excellent novel about the Siege of Leningrad, or Pytor as the city was called by those who lived there. Afterall, it was known as St. Petersburg much longer than it was called Leningrad.
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World War II (2 Viewers)
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
MARSHALL ISLANDS AND THE MARIANAS II
INVASION OF SAIPAN
Bombardment of Saipan began on June 13, 1944. Fifteen battleships were involved, and 165,000 shells were fired. Seven modern fast battleships delivered 2,400 sixteen-inch shells, but to avoid potential minefields, fire was from a distance of 10,000 yards or more, and crews were inexperienced in shore bombardment. The following day the eight pre-Pearl Harbor battleships and eleven cruisers under Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf replaced the fast battleships but were lacking in time and ammunition.
The landings began at 07:00 on June 15, 1944. More than 300 LVTs landed 8,000 Marines on the west coast of Saipan by about 09:00. Eleven fire support ships covered the Marine landings. The naval force consisted of the battleships USS Tennessee and California. The cruisers were Birmingham and Indianapolis. The destroyers were Norman Scott, Monssen, Colahan, Halsey Powell, Bailey, Robinson and the Albert W. Grant.
Careful Japanese artillery preparation — placing flags in the bay to indicate the range — allowed them to destroy about 20 amphibious tanks, and the Japanese strategically placed barbed wire, artillery, machine gun emplacements, and trenches to maximize the American casualties.
However, by nightfall the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions had a beachhead about 6 miles wide and 1/2 mile deep. The Japanese counter-attacked at night but were repulsed with heavy losses. On June 16, units of the U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Division landed and advanced on the Aslito airfield. Again the Japanese counter-attacked at night. On June 18 Japanese General Saito abandoned the airfield.
The invasion surprised the Japanese high command, which had been expecting an attack further south. Admiral Toyoda Soemu, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Navy, saw an opportunity to use the A-Go force to attack the U.S. Navy forces around Saipan. They decided to send in the Imperial Navy, and the resulting Battle of the Philippine Sea will be dealt with next. However, that was such a devastating defeat for Japan, that re-supplying Saipan became impossible.
Without resupply, the battle on Saipan was hopeless for the defenders, but the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man. Saito organized his troops into a line anchored on Mount Tapotchau in the defensible mountainous terrain of central Saipan. The nicknames given by the Americans to the features of the battle — "Hell's Pocket", "Purple Heart Ridge" and "Death Valley" — indicate the severity of the fighting. The Japanese used the many caves in the volcanic landscape to delay the attackers, by hiding during the day and making sorties at night. The Americans gradually developed tactics for clearing the caves by using flamethrower teams supported by artillery and machine guns.
The operation was marred by inter-service controversy when Marine General Holland Smith, unsatisfied with the performance of the 27th Division, relieved its commander, Army General Ralph C. Smith. However, General Holland Smith had not inspected the terrain over which the 27th was to advance. Essentially it was a valley surrounded by hills and cliffs under Japanese control. The 27th took heavy casualties and eventually, under a plan developed by General Ralph Smith and implemented after his relief, had one battalion hold the area while two other battalions successfully flanked the Japanese.
By July 7, the Japanese had nowhere to retreat. Saito made plans for a final suicidal banzai charge. On the fate of the remaining civilians on the island, Saito said, "There is no longer any distinction between civilians and troops. It would be better for them to join in the attack with bamboo spears than be captured."
At dawn, with a group of a dozen men carrying a great red flag in the lead, the remaining able-bodied troops — about 3,000 men — charged forward in the final attack. Amazingly, behind them came the wounded, with bandaged heads, crutches, and barely armed. The Japanese surged over the American front lines, engaging both Army and Marine units. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 105th U.S. Infantry were almost destroyed, losing 650 killed and wounded. However, the fierce resistance of these two battalions, as well as that of Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry, and elements of 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines (an artillery unit) resulted in over 4,300 Japanese killed. For their actions during the 15-hour Japanese attack, three men of the 105th Infantry were awarded the Medal of Honor - all posthumously. Numerous others fought the Japanese until they were overwhelmed by what turned out to be the largest Japanese Banzai attack in the Pacific War.
By 16:15 on July 9, Admiral Turner announced that Saipan was officially secured. Saito, along with commanders Hirakushi and Igeta, committed suicide in a cave. Also committing suicide at the end of the battle was Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the naval commander who led the Japanese carriers at Pearl Harbor and Midway Atoll, who had landed on Saipan to help lead the ground defense.
Many hundreds of Japanese civilians committed suicide in the last days of the battle, some jumping from "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff". Efforts by U.S. troops to persuade them to surrender instead were mostly futile. Widespread propaganda in Japan portraying Americans and British as "devils" who would treat POWs barbarically, deterred surrender.
In the end, about 22,000 Japanese civilians died. Almost the entire garrison of troops on the island — at least 30,000 — died. For the Americans, the victory was the most costly to date in the Pacific War. 2,949 Americans were killed and 10,364 wounded, out of 71,000 who landed.
Among the wounded was the actor Lee Marvin. He was injured in the buttocks by Japanese fire which severed his sciatic nerve. He received a medical discharge. (but went on the kill Nazis in The Dirty Dozen-lol)
(PFC Guy Gabaldon, a Mexican-American from Los Angeles, California, is officially credited with capturing more than 1,000 Japanese prisoners during the battle. PFC Gabaldon, who was raised by Japanese-Americans, used a combination of street Japanese and guile to convince soldiers and civilians alike that U.S. troops were not barbarians, and that they would be well treated upon surrender. For his outstanding bravery, Gabaldon received a Silver Star, which was upgraded to the Navy Cross. During the war, his commanders had requested that he receive the Medal of Honor for his actions; however, his initial award was the Silver Star. In 1998, efforts were re-initiated to secure the Medal of Honor for PFC Gabaldon. The effort is still ongoing.)
INVASION OF SAIPAN
Bombardment of Saipan began on June 13, 1944. Fifteen battleships were involved, and 165,000 shells were fired. Seven modern fast battleships delivered 2,400 sixteen-inch shells, but to avoid potential minefields, fire was from a distance of 10,000 yards or more, and crews were inexperienced in shore bombardment. The following day the eight pre-Pearl Harbor battleships and eleven cruisers under Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf replaced the fast battleships but were lacking in time and ammunition.
The landings began at 07:00 on June 15, 1944. More than 300 LVTs landed 8,000 Marines on the west coast of Saipan by about 09:00. Eleven fire support ships covered the Marine landings. The naval force consisted of the battleships USS Tennessee and California. The cruisers were Birmingham and Indianapolis. The destroyers were Norman Scott, Monssen, Colahan, Halsey Powell, Bailey, Robinson and the Albert W. Grant.
Careful Japanese artillery preparation — placing flags in the bay to indicate the range — allowed them to destroy about 20 amphibious tanks, and the Japanese strategically placed barbed wire, artillery, machine gun emplacements, and trenches to maximize the American casualties.
However, by nightfall the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions had a beachhead about 6 miles wide and 1/2 mile deep. The Japanese counter-attacked at night but were repulsed with heavy losses. On June 16, units of the U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Division landed and advanced on the Aslito airfield. Again the Japanese counter-attacked at night. On June 18 Japanese General Saito abandoned the airfield.
The invasion surprised the Japanese high command, which had been expecting an attack further south. Admiral Toyoda Soemu, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Navy, saw an opportunity to use the A-Go force to attack the U.S. Navy forces around Saipan. They decided to send in the Imperial Navy, and the resulting Battle of the Philippine Sea will be dealt with next. However, that was such a devastating defeat for Japan, that re-supplying Saipan became impossible.
Without resupply, the battle on Saipan was hopeless for the defenders, but the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man. Saito organized his troops into a line anchored on Mount Tapotchau in the defensible mountainous terrain of central Saipan. The nicknames given by the Americans to the features of the battle — "Hell's Pocket", "Purple Heart Ridge" and "Death Valley" — indicate the severity of the fighting. The Japanese used the many caves in the volcanic landscape to delay the attackers, by hiding during the day and making sorties at night. The Americans gradually developed tactics for clearing the caves by using flamethrower teams supported by artillery and machine guns.
The operation was marred by inter-service controversy when Marine General Holland Smith, unsatisfied with the performance of the 27th Division, relieved its commander, Army General Ralph C. Smith. However, General Holland Smith had not inspected the terrain over which the 27th was to advance. Essentially it was a valley surrounded by hills and cliffs under Japanese control. The 27th took heavy casualties and eventually, under a plan developed by General Ralph Smith and implemented after his relief, had one battalion hold the area while two other battalions successfully flanked the Japanese.
By July 7, the Japanese had nowhere to retreat. Saito made plans for a final suicidal banzai charge. On the fate of the remaining civilians on the island, Saito said, "There is no longer any distinction between civilians and troops. It would be better for them to join in the attack with bamboo spears than be captured."
At dawn, with a group of a dozen men carrying a great red flag in the lead, the remaining able-bodied troops — about 3,000 men — charged forward in the final attack. Amazingly, behind them came the wounded, with bandaged heads, crutches, and barely armed. The Japanese surged over the American front lines, engaging both Army and Marine units. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 105th U.S. Infantry were almost destroyed, losing 650 killed and wounded. However, the fierce resistance of these two battalions, as well as that of Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry, and elements of 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines (an artillery unit) resulted in over 4,300 Japanese killed. For their actions during the 15-hour Japanese attack, three men of the 105th Infantry were awarded the Medal of Honor - all posthumously. Numerous others fought the Japanese until they were overwhelmed by what turned out to be the largest Japanese Banzai attack in the Pacific War.
By 16:15 on July 9, Admiral Turner announced that Saipan was officially secured. Saito, along with commanders Hirakushi and Igeta, committed suicide in a cave. Also committing suicide at the end of the battle was Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the naval commander who led the Japanese carriers at Pearl Harbor and Midway Atoll, who had landed on Saipan to help lead the ground defense.
Many hundreds of Japanese civilians committed suicide in the last days of the battle, some jumping from "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff". Efforts by U.S. troops to persuade them to surrender instead were mostly futile. Widespread propaganda in Japan portraying Americans and British as "devils" who would treat POWs barbarically, deterred surrender.
In the end, about 22,000 Japanese civilians died. Almost the entire garrison of troops on the island — at least 30,000 — died. For the Americans, the victory was the most costly to date in the Pacific War. 2,949 Americans were killed and 10,364 wounded, out of 71,000 who landed.
Among the wounded was the actor Lee Marvin. He was injured in the buttocks by Japanese fire which severed his sciatic nerve. He received a medical discharge. (but went on the kill Nazis in The Dirty Dozen-lol)
(PFC Guy Gabaldon, a Mexican-American from Los Angeles, California, is officially credited with capturing more than 1,000 Japanese prisoners during the battle. PFC Gabaldon, who was raised by Japanese-Americans, used a combination of street Japanese and guile to convince soldiers and civilians alike that U.S. troops were not barbarians, and that they would be well treated upon surrender. For his outstanding bravery, Gabaldon received a Silver Star, which was upgraded to the Navy Cross. During the war, his commanders had requested that he receive the Medal of Honor for his actions; however, his initial award was the Silver Star. In 1998, efforts were re-initiated to secure the Medal of Honor for PFC Gabaldon. The effort is still ongoing.)
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
MARSHALL ISLANDS AND THE MARIANAS III
THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA
This battle essentially ended Japanese carrier forces as any real threat to the US in the Pacific. In addition to the six carriers sunk, they lost over 600 aircraft (both carrier and land based), decimating their pilot force and reducing their ability to fly successfully against well trained US pilots. Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the US was weak, and Japan was strong and well trained, Japan had grown steadily weaker, while the US was getting stronger and stronger. Japan had lost the cream of its pilots at Midway, most of the ones who had bombed Pearl Harbor.
New carriers were coming on stream and US pilots were coming to combat operations after two years of training. Additionally, whereas Japanese aircraft had been superior at the beginning of the war, the US had steadily upgraded its aircraft, and the Grumman F6F Hellcat was superior to any Japanese aircraft.
This is what led to this battle being referred to as “The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.”
On June 12, U.S. carriers started a series of air strikes on the Marianas, convincing Admiral Toyoda Soemu, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, that the U.S. was preparing to invade. This came as something of a surprise because the Japanese had expected the next U.S. target to be further to the south, either the Carolines or the Palaus, and therefore the Marianas were protected with a weak force of only 50 aircraft.
On June 14, 1944, the U.S. started its invasion of Saipan, and Toyoda gave the order for the attack. The main portions of the fleet, consisting of six carriers and several battleships, rendezvoused on June 16 in the western part of the Philippine Sea, and completed refueling on June 17.
The Japanese forces had been sighted on June 15 by American submarines, and by the next day Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet, was convinced that a major battle was about to start. By the afternoon of June 18, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, aboard his flagship (the carrier USS Lexington) had his Task Force 58 (the Fast Carrier Task Force) formed up near Saipan to meet the Japanese attack.
TF-58 consisted of five major groups. In front (to the west) was Vice Admiral Willis Lee’s Task Group 58.7 (TG-58.7), the “Battle Line”, consisting of seven fast battleships (Washington, North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Alabama). Just north of them was the weakest of the carrier groups, Rear Admiral William K. Harrill’s TG-58.4 of three carriers (Essex, Langley, and Cowpens). To the east, in a line running north to south, were three groups each containing four carriers: Rear Admiral Joseph Clark’s TG-58.1 (Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, and Bataan); Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery’s TG-58.2 (Bunker Hill, Wasp, Cabot, and Monterey); and Rear Admiral John W. Reeves’s TG-58.3 (Enterprise, Lexington, San Jacinto, and Princeton). The capital ships were supported by eight heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 58 destroyers, and 28 submarines.
Shortly before midnight on June 18, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz sent Spruance a message from Pacific Fleet Headquarters indicating that the Japanese flagship was approximately 350 miles to the west-southwest of Task Force 58. This was based on a "fix" obtained by radio direction-finding.
Mitscher realized that if Task Force 58 were to advance westwards there was a strong chance of a night surface encounter with Ozawa's forces. He therefore conferred with Lee, commander of the Fifth Fleet Battle Line, and inquired whether Lee favored such an encounter. The battleship commander was not enthusiastic about a night engagement with Japanese surface forces, despite his new ships outclassing most of the Japanese battleships, feeling that his crews were not adequately trained for such an action. Shortly after his discussion with Lee, Mitscher asked Spruance for permission to head west during the night to reach what would be an ideal launch position for an all-out aerial assault on the enemy force at dawn.
However, Spruance refused. Throughout the run-up to the battle he had been concerned that the Japanese would try to draw his main fleet away from the landing area using a diversionary force, and would then make an attack around the flank of the U.S. carrier force — an “end run” — hitting the invasion shipping off Saipan. He was therefore not prepared to let Task Force 58 be drawn westwards, away from the amphibious forces.
Spruance was conscious that Japanese operational plans frequently relied heavily on the use of decoying, diversionary forces. Ironically, however, on this occasion there was no such aspect to the Japanese plan. There was no ruse, no diversionary force. Spruance was heavily criticized by many officers after the battle, and continues to be to this day, because he allegedly missed the chance to destroy all of the Japanese strike force, but it is instructive to compare Spruance’s caution with Admiral “Bull” Halsey’s later impetuous pursuit of a diversionary force of Japanese carriers at the Battle of Leyte Gulf that left inferior U.S. forces open to attack off Samar by a Japanese surface action group composed of cruisers, destroyers and battleships. (It was only by incredibly good fortune, and the skill of Taffy 3 Task Group, that a disaster was averted).
(I believe Spruance was the best combat Admiral we had in the war. Yes, he was cautious in this case, but he realized that his primary mission at that time was to protect the landings on Saipan).
At 05:30 on June 19, TF-58 turned northeast into the wind and started to launch their air patrols. The Japanese had already launched their morning search patrols using some of the 50 aircraft stationed on Guam, and at 05:50, one of these, a Mitsubishi Zero, found TF-58. After radioing his sighting of U.S. ships, he attacked one of the destroyers on picket duty and was shot down.
Thus alerted, the rest of the Guam forces began forming up for an attack, but were spotted on radar by U.S. ships, and a group of F6F Hellcats from the Belleau Wood were sent to investigate. The Hellcats arrived while aircraft were still launching from Orote Field. Minutes later, additional radar contacts were seen, which were later discovered to be the additional forces being sent north from the other islands. A huge battle broke out; 35 of the Japanese planes were shot down, and the battle was still going an hour later when the Hellcats were recalled to their carriers.
The recall had been ordered after several ships in TF-58 picked up radar contacts 150 miles to the west at about 10:00. This was the first of the raids from the Japanese carrier forces, with 68 aircraft. TF-58 started launching every fighter it could, and by the time they were in the air, the Japanese had closed to 70 miles However, the Japanese began circling in order to regroup their formations for the attack. This ten-minute delay proved critical, and the first group of Hellcats met the raid, still at 70 miles, at 10:36.
They were quickly joined by additional groups. Within minutes 25 Japanese planes had been shot down, against the loss of only one U.S. aircraft. The Japanese planes that survived were met by other fighters, and 16 more were shot down. Of the remainder, some made attacks on the picket destroyers USS Yarnall and USS Stockham but caused no damage. Three or four bombers broke through to Lee's battleship group, and one made a direct hit on the USS South Dakota, which caused many casualties, but failed to disable her. Not one aircraft of Ozawa’s first wave got through to the American carriers.
At 11:07, radar detected another, much larger attack. This second wave consisted of 109 aircraft. They were met while still 60 miles out, and at least 70 of these aircraft were shot down before reaching the ships. Six attacked Rear Admiral Montgomery’s group, nearly hitting two of the carriers and causing casualties on each. Four of the six were shot down. A small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Enterprise, one torpedo exploding in the wake of the ship. Three other torpedo-planes attacked the light carrier Princeton but were shot down. In all, 97 of the 107 attacking aircraft were destroyed.
The third raid, consisting of 47 aircraft, came in from the north. It was intercepted by 40 fighters at 13:00, while 50 miles out from the task force. Seven Japanese planes were shot down. A few broke through and made an ineffective attack on the Enterprise group. Many others did not press home their attacks. This raid therefore suffered less than the others, and 40 of its aircraft managed to return to their carriers.
The fourth Japanese raid was launched between 11:00 and 11:30, but pilots had been given an incorrect position for the US fleet and could not locate it. They then broke into two loose groups and turned for Guam and Rota to refuel. One group flying towards Rota stumbled upon Montgomery’s task group. Eighteen aircraft joined battle with American fighters and lost half their number. A smaller group of nine Japanese dive bombers of this force evaded U.S. planes and made attacks on the USS Wasp and the USS Bunker Hill, but failed to make any hits.
Eight of these aircraft were shot down in the process. The larger group of Japanese planes had flown to Guam and were intercepted over Orote Field by 27 Hellcats while landing. Thirty of the 49 Japanese planes were shot down, and the rest were damaged beyond repair. Aboard the Lexington afterwards a pilot was heard to remark "Hell, this is like an old-time turkey shoot!" Since then this lopsided air battle has been known as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”.
TF-58 sailed west during the night in order to attack the Japanese at dawn. Search patrols were put up at first light. Admiral Ozawa had transferred to the destroyer Wakatsuki after Taihō had been hit, but the radio gear onboard was not capable of sending the number of messages needed, so he transferred again, to the carrier Zuikaku, at 13:00. It was then that he learned of the disastrous results of the day before and that he had about 150 aircraft left. Nevertheless, he decided to continue the attacks, thinking that there were still hundreds of planes on Guam and Rota, and started planning new raids to be launched on June 21.
American searches finally located the Japanese and launched an attack in the late afternoon. Ozawa had been able to put up very few fighters to intercept the incoming U.S. attack — no more than 35 according to later estimates, but these few were skillfully handled, though the Japanese antiaircraft fire was intense. The U.S. raid, however, contained 550 planes, and the majority were able to press the attack. The first ships sighted by the U.S strike were oilers, and two of these were damaged so severely that they were later scuttled. The carrier Hiyō was attacked and hit by bombs and aerial torpedoes from four Grumman Avengers from Belleau Wood.
Hiyo was set afire after a tremendous blast from leaking aviation fuel. Dead in the water, she slipped stern first under the waves, taking the lives of 250 officers and men. The rest of her crew, about one thousand, survived to be rescued by Japanese destroyers. The carriers Zuikaku, Junyō, and Chiyoda were damaged by bombs, as was the battleship Haruna. Twenty American aircraft were lost in this strike.
That night, Admiral Ozawa received orders from Toyoda to withdraw from the Philippine Sea. U.S. forces gave chase, but the battle was over.
The four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 130 returned to the carriers, and many more were lost on board when the two carriers were sunk on the first day by submarine attacks. After the second day the losses totaled three carriers and over 400 carrier aircraft and around 200 land based planes. Losses on the U.S. side on the first day were only 23, and on the second 100, (but I will tell about that next post) most of them resulting from night landings.
The losses to the Japanese were irreplaceable. At the Japanese naval air arm, only 35 out of Admiral Ozawa's 473 planes were left in a condition fit to fly. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf a few months later, their carriers were used solely as a decoy because of the lack of aircraft and aircrews to fly them.
THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA
This battle essentially ended Japanese carrier forces as any real threat to the US in the Pacific. In addition to the six carriers sunk, they lost over 600 aircraft (both carrier and land based), decimating their pilot force and reducing their ability to fly successfully against well trained US pilots. Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the US was weak, and Japan was strong and well trained, Japan had grown steadily weaker, while the US was getting stronger and stronger. Japan had lost the cream of its pilots at Midway, most of the ones who had bombed Pearl Harbor.
New carriers were coming on stream and US pilots were coming to combat operations after two years of training. Additionally, whereas Japanese aircraft had been superior at the beginning of the war, the US had steadily upgraded its aircraft, and the Grumman F6F Hellcat was superior to any Japanese aircraft.
This is what led to this battle being referred to as “The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.”
On June 12, U.S. carriers started a series of air strikes on the Marianas, convincing Admiral Toyoda Soemu, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, that the U.S. was preparing to invade. This came as something of a surprise because the Japanese had expected the next U.S. target to be further to the south, either the Carolines or the Palaus, and therefore the Marianas were protected with a weak force of only 50 aircraft.
On June 14, 1944, the U.S. started its invasion of Saipan, and Toyoda gave the order for the attack. The main portions of the fleet, consisting of six carriers and several battleships, rendezvoused on June 16 in the western part of the Philippine Sea, and completed refueling on June 17.
The Japanese forces had been sighted on June 15 by American submarines, and by the next day Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet, was convinced that a major battle was about to start. By the afternoon of June 18, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, aboard his flagship (the carrier USS Lexington) had his Task Force 58 (the Fast Carrier Task Force) formed up near Saipan to meet the Japanese attack.
TF-58 consisted of five major groups. In front (to the west) was Vice Admiral Willis Lee’s Task Group 58.7 (TG-58.7), the “Battle Line”, consisting of seven fast battleships (Washington, North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Alabama). Just north of them was the weakest of the carrier groups, Rear Admiral William K. Harrill’s TG-58.4 of three carriers (Essex, Langley, and Cowpens). To the east, in a line running north to south, were three groups each containing four carriers: Rear Admiral Joseph Clark’s TG-58.1 (Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, and Bataan); Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery’s TG-58.2 (Bunker Hill, Wasp, Cabot, and Monterey); and Rear Admiral John W. Reeves’s TG-58.3 (Enterprise, Lexington, San Jacinto, and Princeton). The capital ships were supported by eight heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 58 destroyers, and 28 submarines.
Shortly before midnight on June 18, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz sent Spruance a message from Pacific Fleet Headquarters indicating that the Japanese flagship was approximately 350 miles to the west-southwest of Task Force 58. This was based on a "fix" obtained by radio direction-finding.
Mitscher realized that if Task Force 58 were to advance westwards there was a strong chance of a night surface encounter with Ozawa's forces. He therefore conferred with Lee, commander of the Fifth Fleet Battle Line, and inquired whether Lee favored such an encounter. The battleship commander was not enthusiastic about a night engagement with Japanese surface forces, despite his new ships outclassing most of the Japanese battleships, feeling that his crews were not adequately trained for such an action. Shortly after his discussion with Lee, Mitscher asked Spruance for permission to head west during the night to reach what would be an ideal launch position for an all-out aerial assault on the enemy force at dawn.
However, Spruance refused. Throughout the run-up to the battle he had been concerned that the Japanese would try to draw his main fleet away from the landing area using a diversionary force, and would then make an attack around the flank of the U.S. carrier force — an “end run” — hitting the invasion shipping off Saipan. He was therefore not prepared to let Task Force 58 be drawn westwards, away from the amphibious forces.
Spruance was conscious that Japanese operational plans frequently relied heavily on the use of decoying, diversionary forces. Ironically, however, on this occasion there was no such aspect to the Japanese plan. There was no ruse, no diversionary force. Spruance was heavily criticized by many officers after the battle, and continues to be to this day, because he allegedly missed the chance to destroy all of the Japanese strike force, but it is instructive to compare Spruance’s caution with Admiral “Bull” Halsey’s later impetuous pursuit of a diversionary force of Japanese carriers at the Battle of Leyte Gulf that left inferior U.S. forces open to attack off Samar by a Japanese surface action group composed of cruisers, destroyers and battleships. (It was only by incredibly good fortune, and the skill of Taffy 3 Task Group, that a disaster was averted).
(I believe Spruance was the best combat Admiral we had in the war. Yes, he was cautious in this case, but he realized that his primary mission at that time was to protect the landings on Saipan).
At 05:30 on June 19, TF-58 turned northeast into the wind and started to launch their air patrols. The Japanese had already launched their morning search patrols using some of the 50 aircraft stationed on Guam, and at 05:50, one of these, a Mitsubishi Zero, found TF-58. After radioing his sighting of U.S. ships, he attacked one of the destroyers on picket duty and was shot down.
Thus alerted, the rest of the Guam forces began forming up for an attack, but were spotted on radar by U.S. ships, and a group of F6F Hellcats from the Belleau Wood were sent to investigate. The Hellcats arrived while aircraft were still launching from Orote Field. Minutes later, additional radar contacts were seen, which were later discovered to be the additional forces being sent north from the other islands. A huge battle broke out; 35 of the Japanese planes were shot down, and the battle was still going an hour later when the Hellcats were recalled to their carriers.
The recall had been ordered after several ships in TF-58 picked up radar contacts 150 miles to the west at about 10:00. This was the first of the raids from the Japanese carrier forces, with 68 aircraft. TF-58 started launching every fighter it could, and by the time they were in the air, the Japanese had closed to 70 miles However, the Japanese began circling in order to regroup their formations for the attack. This ten-minute delay proved critical, and the first group of Hellcats met the raid, still at 70 miles, at 10:36.
They were quickly joined by additional groups. Within minutes 25 Japanese planes had been shot down, against the loss of only one U.S. aircraft. The Japanese planes that survived were met by other fighters, and 16 more were shot down. Of the remainder, some made attacks on the picket destroyers USS Yarnall and USS Stockham but caused no damage. Three or four bombers broke through to Lee's battleship group, and one made a direct hit on the USS South Dakota, which caused many casualties, but failed to disable her. Not one aircraft of Ozawa’s first wave got through to the American carriers.
At 11:07, radar detected another, much larger attack. This second wave consisted of 109 aircraft. They were met while still 60 miles out, and at least 70 of these aircraft were shot down before reaching the ships. Six attacked Rear Admiral Montgomery’s group, nearly hitting two of the carriers and causing casualties on each. Four of the six were shot down. A small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Enterprise, one torpedo exploding in the wake of the ship. Three other torpedo-planes attacked the light carrier Princeton but were shot down. In all, 97 of the 107 attacking aircraft were destroyed.
The third raid, consisting of 47 aircraft, came in from the north. It was intercepted by 40 fighters at 13:00, while 50 miles out from the task force. Seven Japanese planes were shot down. A few broke through and made an ineffective attack on the Enterprise group. Many others did not press home their attacks. This raid therefore suffered less than the others, and 40 of its aircraft managed to return to their carriers.
The fourth Japanese raid was launched between 11:00 and 11:30, but pilots had been given an incorrect position for the US fleet and could not locate it. They then broke into two loose groups and turned for Guam and Rota to refuel. One group flying towards Rota stumbled upon Montgomery’s task group. Eighteen aircraft joined battle with American fighters and lost half their number. A smaller group of nine Japanese dive bombers of this force evaded U.S. planes and made attacks on the USS Wasp and the USS Bunker Hill, but failed to make any hits.
Eight of these aircraft were shot down in the process. The larger group of Japanese planes had flown to Guam and were intercepted over Orote Field by 27 Hellcats while landing. Thirty of the 49 Japanese planes were shot down, and the rest were damaged beyond repair. Aboard the Lexington afterwards a pilot was heard to remark "Hell, this is like an old-time turkey shoot!" Since then this lopsided air battle has been known as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”.
TF-58 sailed west during the night in order to attack the Japanese at dawn. Search patrols were put up at first light. Admiral Ozawa had transferred to the destroyer Wakatsuki after Taihō had been hit, but the radio gear onboard was not capable of sending the number of messages needed, so he transferred again, to the carrier Zuikaku, at 13:00. It was then that he learned of the disastrous results of the day before and that he had about 150 aircraft left. Nevertheless, he decided to continue the attacks, thinking that there were still hundreds of planes on Guam and Rota, and started planning new raids to be launched on June 21.
American searches finally located the Japanese and launched an attack in the late afternoon. Ozawa had been able to put up very few fighters to intercept the incoming U.S. attack — no more than 35 according to later estimates, but these few were skillfully handled, though the Japanese antiaircraft fire was intense. The U.S. raid, however, contained 550 planes, and the majority were able to press the attack. The first ships sighted by the U.S strike were oilers, and two of these were damaged so severely that they were later scuttled. The carrier Hiyō was attacked and hit by bombs and aerial torpedoes from four Grumman Avengers from Belleau Wood.
Hiyo was set afire after a tremendous blast from leaking aviation fuel. Dead in the water, she slipped stern first under the waves, taking the lives of 250 officers and men. The rest of her crew, about one thousand, survived to be rescued by Japanese destroyers. The carriers Zuikaku, Junyō, and Chiyoda were damaged by bombs, as was the battleship Haruna. Twenty American aircraft were lost in this strike.
That night, Admiral Ozawa received orders from Toyoda to withdraw from the Philippine Sea. U.S. forces gave chase, but the battle was over.
The four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 130 returned to the carriers, and many more were lost on board when the two carriers were sunk on the first day by submarine attacks. After the second day the losses totaled three carriers and over 400 carrier aircraft and around 200 land based planes. Losses on the U.S. side on the first day were only 23, and on the second 100, (but I will tell about that next post) most of them resulting from night landings.
The losses to the Japanese were irreplaceable. At the Japanese naval air arm, only 35 out of Admiral Ozawa's 473 planes were left in a condition fit to fly. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf a few months later, their carriers were used solely as a decoy because of the lack of aircraft and aircrews to fly them.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
MARSHALL ISLANDS AND THE MARIANAS IV
ADMIRAL MARC MITSCHER
Admiral Mitscher, commanding Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Task Force, forever earned the gratitude of Navy pilots for his actions in the battle of the Philippine Sea. Any pilot will tell you that night carrier landings are the most hazardous action to be accomplished as a pilot.
On June 20 (the second day of the battle), his search planes were out looking for the Japanese fleet but failed to locate it until 15:40. However the report made was so garbled that Mitscher knew neither what had been sighted nor where. At 16:05, another report was received which was clearer, and Mitscher came to the conclusion that a strike had to be launched. The Japanese fleet was now 200 miles away, and there were only 75 minutes until sunset. He realized that if he sent his airplanes out, they would be returning to their carriers at night. His aviators did not normally land at night because of the risk of significant losses due to landing mishaps. The attack went in at 18:30, with devastating losses inflicted on the Japanese, as I listed above.
Because of the risk of Japanese submarines, strict radio silence had to be maintained, and the fleet was not allowed to show lights. Many pilots went to carry out their mission thinking that they would not make it back to their carriers; but still they went. As the pilots were turning for home, the sun had set. They faced a 200 mile flight back to a pinpoint in the ocean, which they would have to find in the dark. All the way back, they wondered if they would make it.
As the pilots approached the fleet, they saw an incredible sight. Against all Navy regulations, and risking a possible court martial, Marc Mitscher had ordered that every light in the fleet in the fleet be turned on. Searchlights probed the sky, and the carriers were illuminated.
In spite of that, the pilots came in at the limit of their range, almost out of gas, and in the confusion about 80 planes (out of the 550 that had gone out) had to ditch in the ocean. However, most of the aircrews were recovered.
Admiral Marc Mitscher, a hero to Navy pilots.
ADMIRAL MARC MITSCHER
Admiral Mitscher, commanding Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Task Force, forever earned the gratitude of Navy pilots for his actions in the battle of the Philippine Sea. Any pilot will tell you that night carrier landings are the most hazardous action to be accomplished as a pilot.
On June 20 (the second day of the battle), his search planes were out looking for the Japanese fleet but failed to locate it until 15:40. However the report made was so garbled that Mitscher knew neither what had been sighted nor where. At 16:05, another report was received which was clearer, and Mitscher came to the conclusion that a strike had to be launched. The Japanese fleet was now 200 miles away, and there were only 75 minutes until sunset. He realized that if he sent his airplanes out, they would be returning to their carriers at night. His aviators did not normally land at night because of the risk of significant losses due to landing mishaps. The attack went in at 18:30, with devastating losses inflicted on the Japanese, as I listed above.
Because of the risk of Japanese submarines, strict radio silence had to be maintained, and the fleet was not allowed to show lights. Many pilots went to carry out their mission thinking that they would not make it back to their carriers; but still they went. As the pilots were turning for home, the sun had set. They faced a 200 mile flight back to a pinpoint in the ocean, which they would have to find in the dark. All the way back, they wondered if they would make it.
As the pilots approached the fleet, they saw an incredible sight. Against all Navy regulations, and risking a possible court martial, Marc Mitscher had ordered that every light in the fleet in the fleet be turned on. Searchlights probed the sky, and the carriers were illuminated.
In spite of that, the pilots came in at the limit of their range, almost out of gas, and in the confusion about 80 planes (out of the 550 that had gone out) had to ditch in the ocean. However, most of the aircrews were recovered.
Admiral Marc Mitscher, a hero to Navy pilots.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
THE GRUMMAN F6F HELLCAT
This was the fighter that established air supremacy in the Pacific.
The Grumman F6F Hellcat was a carrier-based fighter aircraft developed to replace the earlier F4F Wildcat in United States Navy service. Although the F6F bore a family resemblance to the Wildcat, it was a completely new design powered by a 2,000 hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800. Some tagged it as the "Wildcat's big brother". The Hellcat and the Vought F4U Corsair were the primary USN fighters during the second half of World War II.
The Hellcat was the first US Navy fighter for which the design took into account lessons from combat with the Japanese Zero. The Hellcat proved to be the most successful aircraft in naval history, destroying 5,271 aircraft while in service with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps (5,163 in the Pacific and eight more during the invasion of Southern France, plus 52 with the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm during World War II.)
Grumman was working on a successor to the F4F Wildcat well before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. While the F4F was a capable fighter, early air battles revealed the Japanese A6M Zero was more maneuverable and possessed a better rate of climb than the F4F. The F4F did have some advantages over the Zero. Wildcats were able to absorb a tremendous amount of damage compared to the Zero, and had better armament. The F4F was also much faster in a dive than the Zero, an advantage Wildcat pilots used frequently to elude attacking Zeros.
These advantages carried over into the F6F and, combined with other improvements, created a fighter that outclassed the Zero almost completely. The contract for the prototype XF6F-1 was signed on 30 June 1941. The F6F was originally to be given the Wright R-2600 Cyclone engine of 1,700 hp, but based on combat experience of F4F Wildcat and Zero encounters, Grumman decided to further improve their new fighter to overcome the A6M Zero's dominance in the Pacific theater. Grumman installed the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp 2,000 hp estimating a 25% increase in performance would result. The first Cyclone-equipped prototype flew on 26 June 1942 while the first Double Wasp-equipped aircraft, the XF6F-3 had its first flight on 30 July 1942. The standard armament was six .50 caliber machine guns.
Like the Wildcat, the Hellcat was designed for ease of manufacture and ability to withstand significant damage. A total of 212 lb of cockpit armor was fitted to aid pilot survival, as well as a bullet-resistant windshield and armor around the engine oil tank and oil cooler. Self-sealing fuel tanks further reduced susceptibility to fire and often allowed damaged aircraft to return home. The U.S. Navy's all-time leading ace, Captain David McCampbell USN (scored all his 34 victories in the Hellcat. He once described the F6F as "... an outstanding fighter plane. It performed well, was easy to fly and was a stable gun platform. But what I really remember most was that it was rugged and easy to maintain.”
The Hellcat first saw action against the Japanese on 1 September 1943 when fighters off the USS Independence shot down a Kawanishi H8K "Emily" flying boat. Soon after, on 23 and 24 November, Hellcats engaged Japanese aircraft over Tarawa, shooting down a claimed 30 Mitsubishi Zeros for the loss of one F6F. Over Rabaul, New Britain, on 11 November 1943, Hellcats and Corsairs were engaged in day-long fights with many Japanese aircraft including A6M Zeros, shooting down nearly 50 aircraft.
Hellcats were involved in practically all engagements with Japanese air power from that point onward. It was the major U.S. Navy fighter type involved in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where so many Japanese aircraft were shot down that Navy aircrews nicknamed the battle The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The F6F accounted for 75% of all aerial victories recorded by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific.
Navy and Marine F6Fs flew 66,530 combat sorties (45% of all fighter sorties of the war, 62,386 sorties were flown from aircraft carriers) and destroyed 5,163 (56% of all Naval/Marine air victories of the war) at a cost of 270 Hellcats (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 19:1).
The F6F became the prime ace-maker aircraft in the American inventory, with 305 Hellcat aces. That being said, it must be noted that the U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft, but also because they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators from 1942 onwards, as well as having the advantage of ever-increasing numerical superiority.
In British service, the Hellcats proved to be a match even for the main Luftwaffe fighters, the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and ####e-Wulf Fw 190.
The last Hellcat rolled out in November 1945, the total production figure being 12,275, of which 11,000 had been built in just two years. This impressive production rate was credited to the sound original design, which required little modification once production was underway. (and to American industrial might—the Arsenal of Democracy).
This was the fighter that established air supremacy in the Pacific.
The Grumman F6F Hellcat was a carrier-based fighter aircraft developed to replace the earlier F4F Wildcat in United States Navy service. Although the F6F bore a family resemblance to the Wildcat, it was a completely new design powered by a 2,000 hp Pratt & Whitney R-2800. Some tagged it as the "Wildcat's big brother". The Hellcat and the Vought F4U Corsair were the primary USN fighters during the second half of World War II.
The Hellcat was the first US Navy fighter for which the design took into account lessons from combat with the Japanese Zero. The Hellcat proved to be the most successful aircraft in naval history, destroying 5,271 aircraft while in service with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps (5,163 in the Pacific and eight more during the invasion of Southern France, plus 52 with the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm during World War II.)
Grumman was working on a successor to the F4F Wildcat well before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. While the F4F was a capable fighter, early air battles revealed the Japanese A6M Zero was more maneuverable and possessed a better rate of climb than the F4F. The F4F did have some advantages over the Zero. Wildcats were able to absorb a tremendous amount of damage compared to the Zero, and had better armament. The F4F was also much faster in a dive than the Zero, an advantage Wildcat pilots used frequently to elude attacking Zeros.
These advantages carried over into the F6F and, combined with other improvements, created a fighter that outclassed the Zero almost completely. The contract for the prototype XF6F-1 was signed on 30 June 1941. The F6F was originally to be given the Wright R-2600 Cyclone engine of 1,700 hp, but based on combat experience of F4F Wildcat and Zero encounters, Grumman decided to further improve their new fighter to overcome the A6M Zero's dominance in the Pacific theater. Grumman installed the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp 2,000 hp estimating a 25% increase in performance would result. The first Cyclone-equipped prototype flew on 26 June 1942 while the first Double Wasp-equipped aircraft, the XF6F-3 had its first flight on 30 July 1942. The standard armament was six .50 caliber machine guns.
Like the Wildcat, the Hellcat was designed for ease of manufacture and ability to withstand significant damage. A total of 212 lb of cockpit armor was fitted to aid pilot survival, as well as a bullet-resistant windshield and armor around the engine oil tank and oil cooler. Self-sealing fuel tanks further reduced susceptibility to fire and often allowed damaged aircraft to return home. The U.S. Navy's all-time leading ace, Captain David McCampbell USN (scored all his 34 victories in the Hellcat. He once described the F6F as "... an outstanding fighter plane. It performed well, was easy to fly and was a stable gun platform. But what I really remember most was that it was rugged and easy to maintain.”
The Hellcat first saw action against the Japanese on 1 September 1943 when fighters off the USS Independence shot down a Kawanishi H8K "Emily" flying boat. Soon after, on 23 and 24 November, Hellcats engaged Japanese aircraft over Tarawa, shooting down a claimed 30 Mitsubishi Zeros for the loss of one F6F. Over Rabaul, New Britain, on 11 November 1943, Hellcats and Corsairs were engaged in day-long fights with many Japanese aircraft including A6M Zeros, shooting down nearly 50 aircraft.
Hellcats were involved in practically all engagements with Japanese air power from that point onward. It was the major U.S. Navy fighter type involved in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where so many Japanese aircraft were shot down that Navy aircrews nicknamed the battle The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The F6F accounted for 75% of all aerial victories recorded by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific.
Navy and Marine F6Fs flew 66,530 combat sorties (45% of all fighter sorties of the war, 62,386 sorties were flown from aircraft carriers) and destroyed 5,163 (56% of all Naval/Marine air victories of the war) at a cost of 270 Hellcats (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 19:1).
The F6F became the prime ace-maker aircraft in the American inventory, with 305 Hellcat aces. That being said, it must be noted that the U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft, but also because they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators from 1942 onwards, as well as having the advantage of ever-increasing numerical superiority.
In British service, the Hellcats proved to be a match even for the main Luftwaffe fighters, the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and ####e-Wulf Fw 190.
The last Hellcat rolled out in November 1945, the total production figure being 12,275, of which 11,000 had been built in just two years. This impressive production rate was credited to the sound original design, which required little modification once production was underway. (and to American industrial might—the Arsenal of Democracy).
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
It does remind me of the WW2 story.A Dutch pilot, Captain Vandermere, who volunteers for the RAF, is asked to describe his combat activities in the Battle of Britain to a large audience of civilians.He stands at the podium and says (You will supply the proper letter):"I was flying across the English channel when I noticed this #ucker was on my tail. I managed get away from him and I spotted another #ucker and went after him." At this point, his host jumps up, and says: "Captain Vandermere, we call those planes they were flying: Fokkers...Fokkers""Ya", he says: "Those #uckers were flying Fokkers!"
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beer 30
Footballguy
Having talked with my Uncle on this issue I can assure you that most of America's fighting men did everything but marvel about their determinationtimschochet said:
I know what you meant tim, just busting balls.He did speak of their determination. . .fanatical, grim, suicidal. Bonzai charges by the hundreds armed with nothing more than a sword. 5,000 defenders on an island and 12 are taken captive. Amazing will to die for a cause. Especially knowing so far in advance that your country abandoned you to your own defenses. Thankfully our guys killed every one of them they could. #### em.
timschochet
Footballguy
Spring 1944: The Soviets Reach Europe
Marshal Von Kuchler's new position actually was better than it appeared to be on the map because 75% of the 120 mile length from the gulf to the bastion town of Pskov was occupied by the two vast lakes of Pskov and Peipus. On the Soviet right Govorov crossed the Narva River but was pinned down there, while on the ledt Meretskov was stopped at Pskov.
Great as these military victories had been, they were eclipsed by the even greater political success they produced: Finand in middle February entered into peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Finns had always been very uncomfortable with their alliance with the Nazis; they were a free people, and led by Mannerheim, they despised the Nazi politics, especially anti-Semitism, which they alone among the Baltic nations refused to play any part whatsoever. They had only joined Germany in the hope of regaining their lands lost in 1940. Stalin now wisely offered A return to the 1940 agreement. But the Finns did not trust Stalin and wanted more explicit safeguards, which were refused. Stalin also insisted that the Red Army be allowed into Finland to disarm the German forces there, and this resulted in a breakdown of the negotiations. However, Finland's brief defection from the Nazi camp had encouraged discontent in the Balkans.
Meanwhile a sweeping maneuver against the Germans was conducted farther south- west of Kiev- within the Dneiper bend. It was directed by Marshal Zhukov, who had taken personal command of the Red Army there. On March 4, Zhukov attacked on a front of about 60 miles. During the first 2 days he penetrated 50 miles west, capturing Volochisk on the Odessa-L'vov railroad. On the 9th he reached Ternopol. 2 days later Konev on the left began attacking, moving so swiftly and suddenly that he was able to surprise and capture the great German base at Uman, seizing 500 tanks and no fewer than 12,000 trucks. The Germans, now under Model who had replaced Manstein, broke in panic. Model's inadequate and demoralized forces were completely unable to halt Konev's advance, and on March 27 he reached the Prut River in Romania.
Now Zhukov turned southward and advanced on Cernauti, the last rail link between the German armies in Poland and the Ukraine. By March 25 he had crossed the Dniester on a front of 50 miles. The final movement of the winter offensive was the recapture of the Crimea. The peninsula was defended by the German 17th Army consisting of 5 German divisions and 7 weak Romanian divisions, under General Janecke. To hold it Janecke had strengthened the defenses of the Ithmus of Pereskop and the Akmanal Line built by the Soviets in 1942 across the narrowest section of the Kersh Peninsula. Against this position came General F. I. Tolbukhin's 4th Ukranian Group. Tolbuhkin saw that the Sivash Marshes above the Perokop Line were the weak spot in Janecke's position. Early in the morning of April 8, to distract the enemy, the Soviets began an artillery bombardment of Perekop. Next day, while Kersh on the far German right was being attacked, he struck at the first Perekop line on the far left. Breaking through, the Soviets were stopped at the second line at Yushun. Meanwhile, the Sivash was easily crossed. Because it was not frozen, 4 Romanian divisions assigned to hold it had moved 20 miles inland at Dzhankoi.
Janecke was so unhinged by this surprise movement that instead of ordering the Romanians to counterattack, he told them to stay where they were. On April 11 the Soviets fell upon them and scattered them, taking Dzhankoi. Now Janecke ordered a general retreat into Simferopol, thus abandoning his outer defenses and throwing open the front and back doors of the Crimea. But Simferopol soon fell and the frantic Germans and Romanians made for Sevastopol and a movement to Cape Khersonesski on the Crimea's southern tip. There on May 12 the 17th Army surrendered.
Thus ended one of the most remarkable campaigns in history. Most of the German-held lands of Holy Russia were back in Soviet hands. The Red Army stood on the border of East Prussia, inside Poland, on the borders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, (which the Germans had occupied to take advantage of the Carpathian Mountains,) inside Romania and astride the Crimea. But now the spring thaws had come and the offensive came to an end. It would be renewed in June, but the respite still came like a blessed breather to the weary Germans in the East. But the Germans in the West who had seen no combat since the fall of France in 1940 would soon be hearing the rolling thunder of Anglo-American guns.
Marshal Von Kuchler's new position actually was better than it appeared to be on the map because 75% of the 120 mile length from the gulf to the bastion town of Pskov was occupied by the two vast lakes of Pskov and Peipus. On the Soviet right Govorov crossed the Narva River but was pinned down there, while on the ledt Meretskov was stopped at Pskov.
Great as these military victories had been, they were eclipsed by the even greater political success they produced: Finand in middle February entered into peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Finns had always been very uncomfortable with their alliance with the Nazis; they were a free people, and led by Mannerheim, they despised the Nazi politics, especially anti-Semitism, which they alone among the Baltic nations refused to play any part whatsoever. They had only joined Germany in the hope of regaining their lands lost in 1940. Stalin now wisely offered A return to the 1940 agreement. But the Finns did not trust Stalin and wanted more explicit safeguards, which were refused. Stalin also insisted that the Red Army be allowed into Finland to disarm the German forces there, and this resulted in a breakdown of the negotiations. However, Finland's brief defection from the Nazi camp had encouraged discontent in the Balkans.
Meanwhile a sweeping maneuver against the Germans was conducted farther south- west of Kiev- within the Dneiper bend. It was directed by Marshal Zhukov, who had taken personal command of the Red Army there. On March 4, Zhukov attacked on a front of about 60 miles. During the first 2 days he penetrated 50 miles west, capturing Volochisk on the Odessa-L'vov railroad. On the 9th he reached Ternopol. 2 days later Konev on the left began attacking, moving so swiftly and suddenly that he was able to surprise and capture the great German base at Uman, seizing 500 tanks and no fewer than 12,000 trucks. The Germans, now under Model who had replaced Manstein, broke in panic. Model's inadequate and demoralized forces were completely unable to halt Konev's advance, and on March 27 he reached the Prut River in Romania.
Now Zhukov turned southward and advanced on Cernauti, the last rail link between the German armies in Poland and the Ukraine. By March 25 he had crossed the Dniester on a front of 50 miles. The final movement of the winter offensive was the recapture of the Crimea. The peninsula was defended by the German 17th Army consisting of 5 German divisions and 7 weak Romanian divisions, under General Janecke. To hold it Janecke had strengthened the defenses of the Ithmus of Pereskop and the Akmanal Line built by the Soviets in 1942 across the narrowest section of the Kersh Peninsula. Against this position came General F. I. Tolbukhin's 4th Ukranian Group. Tolbuhkin saw that the Sivash Marshes above the Perokop Line were the weak spot in Janecke's position. Early in the morning of April 8, to distract the enemy, the Soviets began an artillery bombardment of Perekop. Next day, while Kersh on the far German right was being attacked, he struck at the first Perekop line on the far left. Breaking through, the Soviets were stopped at the second line at Yushun. Meanwhile, the Sivash was easily crossed. Because it was not frozen, 4 Romanian divisions assigned to hold it had moved 20 miles inland at Dzhankoi.
Janecke was so unhinged by this surprise movement that instead of ordering the Romanians to counterattack, he told them to stay where they were. On April 11 the Soviets fell upon them and scattered them, taking Dzhankoi. Now Janecke ordered a general retreat into Simferopol, thus abandoning his outer defenses and throwing open the front and back doors of the Crimea. But Simferopol soon fell and the frantic Germans and Romanians made for Sevastopol and a movement to Cape Khersonesski on the Crimea's southern tip. There on May 12 the 17th Army surrendered.
Thus ended one of the most remarkable campaigns in history. Most of the German-held lands of Holy Russia were back in Soviet hands. The Red Army stood on the border of East Prussia, inside Poland, on the borders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, (which the Germans had occupied to take advantage of the Carpathian Mountains,) inside Romania and astride the Crimea. But now the spring thaws had come and the offensive came to an end. It would be renewed in June, but the respite still came like a blessed breather to the weary Germans in the East. But the Germans in the West who had seen no combat since the fall of France in 1940 would soon be hearing the rolling thunder of Anglo-American guns.
timschochet
Footballguy
The way is now cleared, as far the European narrative goes, for me to have the privilege of relating what I consider to be the greatest event of World War II, possibly (this is debatable) the greatest moment in the history of American arms: Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy.
To describe D-Day, including the grand strategy, preparations, and the immediate days following, and to do proper justice to these epic events is going to take several posts, possibly even more than Guadalcanal or the Warsaw Ghetto. So fair warning. This will be the first of three long stories to be told:
First, Overlord will be told from it's planning stages to the occupation of Paris;
Second, the July 12 Plot against Hitler will be related, in full detail (though I'll have to backtrack a little for this)
Third, I will relate what is my personal favorite story of World War II, the 442nd.
After that, I will relate various events regarding the Soviet summer offensive, the Warsaw Uprising, and a few other matters before describing the final great event of 1944, the Battle of the Bulge.
Bear with me.
To describe D-Day, including the grand strategy, preparations, and the immediate days following, and to do proper justice to these epic events is going to take several posts, possibly even more than Guadalcanal or the Warsaw Ghetto. So fair warning. This will be the first of three long stories to be told:
First, Overlord will be told from it's planning stages to the occupation of Paris;
Second, the July 12 Plot against Hitler will be related, in full detail (though I'll have to backtrack a little for this)
Third, I will relate what is my personal favorite story of World War II, the 442nd.
After that, I will relate various events regarding the Soviet summer offensive, the Warsaw Uprising, and a few other matters before describing the final great event of 1944, the Battle of the Bulge.
Bear with me.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
MARSHALL ISLANDS AND THE MARIANAS V
CAPTURE OF GUAM AND TINIAN
Guam is the largest of the Marianas, 30 miles long and 9 miles wide. It had been a United States possession since its capture from Spain in 1898 until it was captured by the Japanese on December 11, 1941, following the Attack on Pearl Harbor. It was not as heavily fortified as the other Mariana Islands such as Saipan that had been Japanese possessions since the end of World War I, but by 1944 it had a large garrison.
The Allied plan for the invasion of the Marianas called for heavy preliminary bombardment, first by carrier aircraft and planes based in the Marshall Islands to the east, then once air superiority was gained, close bombardment by battleships. Guam was chosen as a target because its large size made it suitable as a base for supporting the next stage of operations towards the Philippines, Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands; the deep-water harbor at Apra was suitable for the largest ships; and the two airfields would be suitable for B-29 Superfortress bombers.
The invasion of Saipan was scheduled for June 15, 1944, with landings on Guam tentatively set for June 18. The original timetable was optimistic. Stubborn resistance by the unexpectedly large garrison on Saipan, and a large Japanese carrier attack led to the invasion of Guam being postponed for a month.
Guam, ringed by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf, presents a formidable challenge for an attacker. On July 21 the Americans landed on both sides of the Orote peninsula on the western side of Guam, planning to cut off the airfield. The 3rd Marine Division landed near Agana to the north of Orote at 08:28, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed near Agat to the south. Japanese artillery sank 20 LVTs, but by 09:00 tanks were ashore at both beaches. The 77th Infantry Division had a more difficult landing. Lacking amphibious vehicles, they had to wade ashore from the edge of the reef where they were dropped by their landing craft.
By nightfall the Americans had established beachheads about a mile and a half deep. Japanese counter-attacks were made throughout the first few days of the battle, mostly at night, using infiltration tactics. Several times they penetrated the American defenses and were driven back with heavy loss of men and equipment. Lieutenant General Takeshi Takashina was killed on July 28, and Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata took over the command of the defenders.
Supply was very difficult for the Americans in the first days of the battle. Landing ships could not come closer than the reef, several hundred yards from the beach, and amphibious vehicles were scarce. However, the two beachheads were joined up on July 28, and the Orote airfield and Apra harbor were captured by July 30.
The counterattacks around the American beachheads had exhausted the Japanese. At the start of August they were running out of food and ammunition and had only a handful of tanks left. Obata withdrew his troops from the south of Guam, planning to make a stand in the mountainous central part of the island. But with resupply and reinforcement impossible because of American control of the sea and air around Guam, he could hope to do no more than delay the inevitable defeat for a few days.
Rain and thick jungle made conditions difficult for the Americans, but after an engagement at Mount Barrigada from August 2 to August 4, the Japanese line collapsed; the rest of the battle was a pursuit to the north. As in other battles of the Pacific War, the Japanese refused to surrender, and almost all were killed.
A few Japanese soldiers held out in the jungle. On January 24, 1972, Sergeant Shoichi Yokoi was discovered by hunters. He had lived alone in a cave for 27 years. (See next post)
After Saipan fell to the Americans on July 9, Japan was now within range of the B-29 Superfortress bombers. However, Tinian was more capable of supporting B-29s, because unlike Saipan, the ground was unusually flat, which meant that the airfields could support more aircraft. After the Battle of the PhilipPine Sea, the timetable changed and instead allowed Tinian to be taken after Guam was attacked.
The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions landed on Tinian on 24 July 1944, supported by naval bombardment and artillery firing across the strait from Saipan. A successful feint for the major settlement of Tinian Town diverted defenders from the actual landing site on the north of the island. The USS Colorado and the destroyer USS Norman Scott were both hit by six inch Japanese shore batteries. The Colorado was hit 22 times, killing 44 men. The Norman Scott was hit six times, killing the captain, Seymore Owens, and 22 of his shipmates.
The Japanese adopted the same stubborn defensive tactics as on Saipan, retreating during the day and attacking at night. The gentler terrain of Tinian allowed the attackers more effective use of tanks and artillery than in the mountains of Saipan, and the island was secured in nine days of fighting. On July 31, the surviving Japanese launched a suicide charge.
The battle had the first use of napalm in the Pacific. Of the 120 jettisonable tanks dropped during the operation, 25 contained the napalm mixture and the remainder an oil-gasoline mixture. Of the entire number, only 14 were duds, and eight of these were set afire by subsequent strafing runs. Carried by P-47 Thunderbolts, the "fire bombs", also known as napalm bombs, burned away foliage concealing enemy installations.
Japanese losses were far greater than American losses. The Japanese lost 8,010 dead. Only 313 Japanese were taken prisoner. American losses stood at 328 dead and 1,571 wounded. Several hundred Japanese troops held out in the jungles for months. The garrison on Aguijan Island off the southwest cape of Tinian, commanded by Lieutenant Kinichi Yamada, held out until the end of the war, surrendering on 4 September 1945.
After the battle, Tinian became an important base for further Allied operations in the Pacific Campaign. Camps were built for 50,000 troops. Fifteen thousand Seabees turned the island into the busiest airfield of the war, with six 2,700 yard runways for attacks by B-29 Superfortress bombers on targets in the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands and mainland Japan, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Enola Gay took off from Tinian.
CAPTURE OF GUAM AND TINIAN
Guam is the largest of the Marianas, 30 miles long and 9 miles wide. It had been a United States possession since its capture from Spain in 1898 until it was captured by the Japanese on December 11, 1941, following the Attack on Pearl Harbor. It was not as heavily fortified as the other Mariana Islands such as Saipan that had been Japanese possessions since the end of World War I, but by 1944 it had a large garrison.
The Allied plan for the invasion of the Marianas called for heavy preliminary bombardment, first by carrier aircraft and planes based in the Marshall Islands to the east, then once air superiority was gained, close bombardment by battleships. Guam was chosen as a target because its large size made it suitable as a base for supporting the next stage of operations towards the Philippines, Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands; the deep-water harbor at Apra was suitable for the largest ships; and the two airfields would be suitable for B-29 Superfortress bombers.
The invasion of Saipan was scheduled for June 15, 1944, with landings on Guam tentatively set for June 18. The original timetable was optimistic. Stubborn resistance by the unexpectedly large garrison on Saipan, and a large Japanese carrier attack led to the invasion of Guam being postponed for a month.
Guam, ringed by reefs, cliffs, and heavy surf, presents a formidable challenge for an attacker. On July 21 the Americans landed on both sides of the Orote peninsula on the western side of Guam, planning to cut off the airfield. The 3rd Marine Division landed near Agana to the north of Orote at 08:28, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed near Agat to the south. Japanese artillery sank 20 LVTs, but by 09:00 tanks were ashore at both beaches. The 77th Infantry Division had a more difficult landing. Lacking amphibious vehicles, they had to wade ashore from the edge of the reef where they were dropped by their landing craft.
By nightfall the Americans had established beachheads about a mile and a half deep. Japanese counter-attacks were made throughout the first few days of the battle, mostly at night, using infiltration tactics. Several times they penetrated the American defenses and were driven back with heavy loss of men and equipment. Lieutenant General Takeshi Takashina was killed on July 28, and Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata took over the command of the defenders.
Supply was very difficult for the Americans in the first days of the battle. Landing ships could not come closer than the reef, several hundred yards from the beach, and amphibious vehicles were scarce. However, the two beachheads were joined up on July 28, and the Orote airfield and Apra harbor were captured by July 30.
The counterattacks around the American beachheads had exhausted the Japanese. At the start of August they were running out of food and ammunition and had only a handful of tanks left. Obata withdrew his troops from the south of Guam, planning to make a stand in the mountainous central part of the island. But with resupply and reinforcement impossible because of American control of the sea and air around Guam, he could hope to do no more than delay the inevitable defeat for a few days.
Rain and thick jungle made conditions difficult for the Americans, but after an engagement at Mount Barrigada from August 2 to August 4, the Japanese line collapsed; the rest of the battle was a pursuit to the north. As in other battles of the Pacific War, the Japanese refused to surrender, and almost all were killed.
A few Japanese soldiers held out in the jungle. On January 24, 1972, Sergeant Shoichi Yokoi was discovered by hunters. He had lived alone in a cave for 27 years. (See next post)
After Saipan fell to the Americans on July 9, Japan was now within range of the B-29 Superfortress bombers. However, Tinian was more capable of supporting B-29s, because unlike Saipan, the ground was unusually flat, which meant that the airfields could support more aircraft. After the Battle of the PhilipPine Sea, the timetable changed and instead allowed Tinian to be taken after Guam was attacked.
The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions landed on Tinian on 24 July 1944, supported by naval bombardment and artillery firing across the strait from Saipan. A successful feint for the major settlement of Tinian Town diverted defenders from the actual landing site on the north of the island. The USS Colorado and the destroyer USS Norman Scott were both hit by six inch Japanese shore batteries. The Colorado was hit 22 times, killing 44 men. The Norman Scott was hit six times, killing the captain, Seymore Owens, and 22 of his shipmates.
The Japanese adopted the same stubborn defensive tactics as on Saipan, retreating during the day and attacking at night. The gentler terrain of Tinian allowed the attackers more effective use of tanks and artillery than in the mountains of Saipan, and the island was secured in nine days of fighting. On July 31, the surviving Japanese launched a suicide charge.
The battle had the first use of napalm in the Pacific. Of the 120 jettisonable tanks dropped during the operation, 25 contained the napalm mixture and the remainder an oil-gasoline mixture. Of the entire number, only 14 were duds, and eight of these were set afire by subsequent strafing runs. Carried by P-47 Thunderbolts, the "fire bombs", also known as napalm bombs, burned away foliage concealing enemy installations.
Japanese losses were far greater than American losses. The Japanese lost 8,010 dead. Only 313 Japanese were taken prisoner. American losses stood at 328 dead and 1,571 wounded. Several hundred Japanese troops held out in the jungles for months. The garrison on Aguijan Island off the southwest cape of Tinian, commanded by Lieutenant Kinichi Yamada, held out until the end of the war, surrendering on 4 September 1945.
After the battle, Tinian became an important base for further Allied operations in the Pacific Campaign. Camps were built for 50,000 troops. Fifteen thousand Seabees turned the island into the busiest airfield of the war, with six 2,700 yard runways for attacks by B-29 Superfortress bombers on targets in the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands and mainland Japan, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Enola Gay took off from Tinian.
Last edited by a moderator:
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Part 1
Until the very eve of D-Day, Winston Churchill and his war chiefs had the deepest doubts, misgivings and reservations about the Allied invasion of France. British fears first surfaced on October 23, 1943, when Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: "I do not doubt our ability in the conditions laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply concerned with the build-up and the situation which may arise between the 30th and 60th days..." In other words, he feared a stabilization of the front and a return to the static warfare of World War I. Churchill also cabled General Marshall: "We are carrying out our contract, but I pray God it does not cost us dear." Again in February 1944, he cried out in anguish, "Why are we trying to do this?" Having already proposed Norway or Greece as better battlegrounds, he then suggested landings in Portugal. On June 5, 1944, the day before D-Day, the attitude of Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff and the most outspoken opponent of Overlord, was deeply pessimistic. He wrote: "At the best, it will come very far short of the expectations of the bulk of the people, namely all those who know nothing about its difficulties, At its worst, it may well be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war."
Yet American enthusiasm for the operation remained high and unabated, even rising as D-Day came closer. Why, then, were the British so cautious and the Americans so confident, why did these disagreements remain for so long unresolved among the allies of history's most successful fighting coalition, unsettled indeed until the very last few weeks before the invasion? The answer seems to reside in the differing experience and character of the two peoples.
For a year following the fall of France the British had fought on alone and without any rational hope of victory. Then Hitler's decision to invade Russia in June 1941 sent a ray of hope shining through their dark night of despair. For the remainder of that year, Britain struggled against the German submarine force while building a Bomber Command that would retaliate against her tormentor while fielding an army in the only theater in which she could fight: Africa and the Middle East. Then at the year's close came "the miracle" of Pearl Harbor. Such as it was, a salvation of joy made surer 4 days later when Hitler unwisely and with no provocation declared war on the United States. Nevertheless, during the period of roughly a year in which the United States coud mobilize its unrivaled industrial might for war and conscript, train and field a mass army of its own, the British continued to suffer. Her strength was waning, her people weary. Production of munitions and equipment had been falling since 1942. By May 1944, the British Army had reached its peak strength of 2.75 million men, while the American Army was at 5.75 million, still far below its peak of 8.5 million. Obviously, the Americans were already dominant in the Grand Alliance. But could the American army defeat the Wehrmacht?
Here was the deep doubt in the minds of Churchill and Brooke. Both were aware of the splendid fighting power of the German army, certainly the most formidable force in modern history. Four years of war against it had taught the British that the Wehrmacht should never be engaged except on the most favorable terms. Throughout World War II, whenever British or American soldiers engaged German soldiers on anything like equal terms, the Germans won. Weapon for weapon German equipment outclassed Allied in every category except artillery and transport. In the air, the Allies were superior. But air power depends on weather, and there was always the consideration that if the weather closed down on D-Day, the great air superiority on which the entire operation depended would be nullified. This Churchill and his chiefs were reluctant to risk. They also had found their misgivings about Allied troops justified in North Africa and again in Italy, where Kesselring's masterful handling of his forces had thwarted every effort to crush them. And these were line troops, not elite formations. In France, the Allies would be facing the SS Panzer divisions, Hitler's finest, and the fanatical Hitler Youth. This fear of the German army, then, was probably the most disturbing doubt reigning at the heart of British reticence to undertake Overlord; and it seems safe to say that if it had not been for American enthusiasm for it and insistence on launching it on schedule, the invasion of France might have had to wait until 1945.
There are, of course, other factors as well: Throughout Winston Churchill's entire career, he had been in favor of peripheral actions in war. This is because he correctly recognized the limitations of British manpower. Throughout history, England had won its wars in Europe through a coalition of lesser powers in which England was at the lead: against Phillip of Spain, against Napoleon, against the Kaiser. Direct, frontal attacks in these wars were not considered unless the odds were tremendously in favor of the British. Then came World War I, and the disaster of the static front in France. Churchill had tried to break that front through his Dardanelles strategy, but because of irresolute commanders at sea and on the ground, he lost and was disgraced. Again in World War II he attempted peripheral strikes, in Norway in 1940, in Greece in 1941, and he was the biggest proponent of Italy in 1943.
More importantly, I believe, was the simple fact that Overlord cemented the fact that the British Empire, which had pretty much ruled the world since the modern age had begun, was over, and the American empire had begun. Overlord would not be considered a coalition victory in which the British were the leaders, as in past combat (such as Waterloo); it would be considered an American victory in which England played a supportive role. And it would introduce America as the superpower of the world. The fact that America's industrial abilities and population had made this moment inevitable since the end of the Civil War, despite the strain of isolationism that ran through our foreign policy in the years between 1865 and 1944, made no difference to the British. It was a tough and bitter pill to swallow.
Until the very eve of D-Day, Winston Churchill and his war chiefs had the deepest doubts, misgivings and reservations about the Allied invasion of France. British fears first surfaced on October 23, 1943, when Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: "I do not doubt our ability in the conditions laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply concerned with the build-up and the situation which may arise between the 30th and 60th days..." In other words, he feared a stabilization of the front and a return to the static warfare of World War I. Churchill also cabled General Marshall: "We are carrying out our contract, but I pray God it does not cost us dear." Again in February 1944, he cried out in anguish, "Why are we trying to do this?" Having already proposed Norway or Greece as better battlegrounds, he then suggested landings in Portugal. On June 5, 1944, the day before D-Day, the attitude of Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff and the most outspoken opponent of Overlord, was deeply pessimistic. He wrote: "At the best, it will come very far short of the expectations of the bulk of the people, namely all those who know nothing about its difficulties, At its worst, it may well be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war."
Yet American enthusiasm for the operation remained high and unabated, even rising as D-Day came closer. Why, then, were the British so cautious and the Americans so confident, why did these disagreements remain for so long unresolved among the allies of history's most successful fighting coalition, unsettled indeed until the very last few weeks before the invasion? The answer seems to reside in the differing experience and character of the two peoples.
For a year following the fall of France the British had fought on alone and without any rational hope of victory. Then Hitler's decision to invade Russia in June 1941 sent a ray of hope shining through their dark night of despair. For the remainder of that year, Britain struggled against the German submarine force while building a Bomber Command that would retaliate against her tormentor while fielding an army in the only theater in which she could fight: Africa and the Middle East. Then at the year's close came "the miracle" of Pearl Harbor. Such as it was, a salvation of joy made surer 4 days later when Hitler unwisely and with no provocation declared war on the United States. Nevertheless, during the period of roughly a year in which the United States coud mobilize its unrivaled industrial might for war and conscript, train and field a mass army of its own, the British continued to suffer. Her strength was waning, her people weary. Production of munitions and equipment had been falling since 1942. By May 1944, the British Army had reached its peak strength of 2.75 million men, while the American Army was at 5.75 million, still far below its peak of 8.5 million. Obviously, the Americans were already dominant in the Grand Alliance. But could the American army defeat the Wehrmacht?
Here was the deep doubt in the minds of Churchill and Brooke. Both were aware of the splendid fighting power of the German army, certainly the most formidable force in modern history. Four years of war against it had taught the British that the Wehrmacht should never be engaged except on the most favorable terms. Throughout World War II, whenever British or American soldiers engaged German soldiers on anything like equal terms, the Germans won. Weapon for weapon German equipment outclassed Allied in every category except artillery and transport. In the air, the Allies were superior. But air power depends on weather, and there was always the consideration that if the weather closed down on D-Day, the great air superiority on which the entire operation depended would be nullified. This Churchill and his chiefs were reluctant to risk. They also had found their misgivings about Allied troops justified in North Africa and again in Italy, where Kesselring's masterful handling of his forces had thwarted every effort to crush them. And these were line troops, not elite formations. In France, the Allies would be facing the SS Panzer divisions, Hitler's finest, and the fanatical Hitler Youth. This fear of the German army, then, was probably the most disturbing doubt reigning at the heart of British reticence to undertake Overlord; and it seems safe to say that if it had not been for American enthusiasm for it and insistence on launching it on schedule, the invasion of France might have had to wait until 1945.
There are, of course, other factors as well: Throughout Winston Churchill's entire career, he had been in favor of peripheral actions in war. This is because he correctly recognized the limitations of British manpower. Throughout history, England had won its wars in Europe through a coalition of lesser powers in which England was at the lead: against Phillip of Spain, against Napoleon, against the Kaiser. Direct, frontal attacks in these wars were not considered unless the odds were tremendously in favor of the British. Then came World War I, and the disaster of the static front in France. Churchill had tried to break that front through his Dardanelles strategy, but because of irresolute commanders at sea and on the ground, he lost and was disgraced. Again in World War II he attempted peripheral strikes, in Norway in 1940, in Greece in 1941, and he was the biggest proponent of Italy in 1943.
More importantly, I believe, was the simple fact that Overlord cemented the fact that the British Empire, which had pretty much ruled the world since the modern age had begun, was over, and the American empire had begun. Overlord would not be considered a coalition victory in which the British were the leaders, as in past combat (such as Waterloo); it would be considered an American victory in which England played a supportive role. And it would introduce America as the superpower of the world. The fact that America's industrial abilities and population had made this moment inevitable since the end of the Civil War, despite the strain of isolationism that ran through our foreign policy in the years between 1865 and 1944, made no difference to the British. It was a tough and bitter pill to swallow.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
I think that is correct. Even today, there is a significant strain of thought within Britain that they managed their supremacy in the world significantly better than America has, and that we are still the "upstarts". Churchill, of course, knew that the commander of Overlord had to be an American, which may have also played a part in his eagerness for some other theater where the British would be allowed to take the lead.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
THE LEGEND OF THE JAPANESE SURVIVORS
The stories of Japanese survivors of the American advances in the Pacific have grown into legend. Even Gilligan's Island got into the act, with an episode of a Japanese survivor. But there was much truth to the legend; the Japanese “No Surrender” policy led to tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of needless deaths, but also led to soldiers hiding out in the jungles, in isolation from civilization for years, even decades. Many probably died of malnutrition or disease.
I mentioned the following above, about Guam: On January 24, 1972, Sergeant Shoichi Yokoi was discovered by hunters. He had lived alone in a cave for 27 years.
Additionally there were the following:
The garrison on Aguijan Island off the southwest cape of Tinian, commanded by Lieutenant Kinichi Yamada, held out until the end of the war, surrendering on 4 September 1945. The last holdout on Tinian, Murata Susumu, was not captured until 1953.
Captain Sakae Ōba, who led his company of 46 men in guerrilla actions against US troops following the Battle of Saipan, did not surrender until December 1, 1945, almost 4 months after the war ended.
Yamakage Kufnuku and Matsudo Linsoki, two machine gunners, surrendered on Iwo Jima in January 1949.
Private 1st Class Yūichi Akatsu continued to fight on Lubang Island from 1944 until surrendering in the Philippine village of Looc in March 1950.
Corporal Shōichi Shimada continued to fight on Lubang Island until he was killed in a clash with Philippine soldiers in May 1954.
Private Bunzō Minagawa held out from 1944 until May 1960 on Guam.
Sergeant Tadashi Itō, Minagawa's superior, surrendered days later, May 23, 1960 on Guam.
Corporal Shoichi Yokoi, who served under Ito, was captured on Guam in January 1972.
Private Kinshichi Kozuka held out with Onoda for 28 years until he was killed in a gunbattle with Philippine police in October 1972.
Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda, who held out from December 1944 until March 1974 on Lubang Island in the Philippines with Akatsu, Shimada and Kozuka, surrendered to his former commanding officer in March 1974.
Private Teruo Nakamura was discovered by the Indonesian Air Force on Morotai, and surrendered to a search patrol on December 18, 1974.
I believe that if the US had invaded Japan, it would have been a bloodbath, with millions of Japanese dead, at least a million US casualties, and a guerrilla war which would have gone on for decades. Because of their Bushido culture, the Japanese simply did not give up. Praiseworthy in one sense, and senseless in every other.
The stories of Japanese survivors of the American advances in the Pacific have grown into legend. Even Gilligan's Island got into the act, with an episode of a Japanese survivor. But there was much truth to the legend; the Japanese “No Surrender” policy led to tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of needless deaths, but also led to soldiers hiding out in the jungles, in isolation from civilization for years, even decades. Many probably died of malnutrition or disease.
I mentioned the following above, about Guam: On January 24, 1972, Sergeant Shoichi Yokoi was discovered by hunters. He had lived alone in a cave for 27 years.
Additionally there were the following:
The garrison on Aguijan Island off the southwest cape of Tinian, commanded by Lieutenant Kinichi Yamada, held out until the end of the war, surrendering on 4 September 1945. The last holdout on Tinian, Murata Susumu, was not captured until 1953.
Captain Sakae Ōba, who led his company of 46 men in guerrilla actions against US troops following the Battle of Saipan, did not surrender until December 1, 1945, almost 4 months after the war ended.
Yamakage Kufnuku and Matsudo Linsoki, two machine gunners, surrendered on Iwo Jima in January 1949.
Private 1st Class Yūichi Akatsu continued to fight on Lubang Island from 1944 until surrendering in the Philippine village of Looc in March 1950.
Corporal Shōichi Shimada continued to fight on Lubang Island until he was killed in a clash with Philippine soldiers in May 1954.
Private Bunzō Minagawa held out from 1944 until May 1960 on Guam.
Sergeant Tadashi Itō, Minagawa's superior, surrendered days later, May 23, 1960 on Guam.
Corporal Shoichi Yokoi, who served under Ito, was captured on Guam in January 1972.
Private Kinshichi Kozuka held out with Onoda for 28 years until he was killed in a gunbattle with Philippine police in October 1972.
Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda, who held out from December 1944 until March 1974 on Lubang Island in the Philippines with Akatsu, Shimada and Kozuka, surrendered to his former commanding officer in March 1974.
Private Teruo Nakamura was discovered by the Indonesian Air Force on Morotai, and surrendered to a search patrol on December 18, 1974.
I believe that if the US had invaded Japan, it would have been a bloodbath, with millions of Japanese dead, at least a million US casualties, and a guerrilla war which would have gone on for decades. Because of their Bushido culture, the Japanese simply did not give up. Praiseworthy in one sense, and senseless in every other.
Last edited by a moderator:
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
British caution and skepticism irked and angered the Americans. They suspected that their allies were too preoccupied with preservation of the Empire and that the gigantic buildup in Britain might be nothing more than a plan to deceive and distract the Germans until continued massive Allied bombing and German losses to the Soviet Union brought about the collapse of the Third Reich, when Overlord would become Rankin, i.e., the invasion force would become an occupying force. American confidence was based upon their faith in their economy and their troops, which was eventually justified, and their fondness for a direct, straightforward dash across the Channel into France. In this the British thought them naive, that in their inexperience they underestimated the difficulties in planning, logistics and tactics for such a mammoth operation. There was some truth to this, but then conversely the British were much too prone to emphasize difficulty. They did not understand the American genius for overcoming problems,or appreciate the depth of their energy and abundance. The slogan "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer" was not just another Yankee boast but an expression of reality.
An even sharper disagreement arose over Operation Anvil, the simultaneous invasion of Southern France proposed by the Americans. The British opposed it because it would cripple operations in Italy, the Americans wanted it to gain the valuable port of Marseille and for an attack up the valley of the Rhone to join forces with Eisenhower's right flank. For the first time in this continuing squabble, the Americans flatly refused to retreat. They wanted Anvil, later named Dragoon, period. But the old ghost of landing craft shortages arose to haunt them. Because of the misguided emphasis on aircraft production, the resumption of the Pacific offensive by MacArthur and Nimitz and the demands of the Italian operation, there was simply not enough for both invasions to proceed together. Thus Dragoon was postponed for 10 weeks.
But the basic Allied disagreement over Overlord that had begun in the fall of 1943 continued unresolved, and it would remain so until the summer of 1944, with the British cautious and reluctant and the Americans exasperated and eager, until, on May 15, at a briefing of Overlord's top commanders, Winston Churchill approached Eisenhower and declared: "I am hardening toward this enterprise."
Churchill's growing faith in Overlord was probably as much due to his admiration of Eisenhower as to any other cause. For the American had indeed fashioned a command structure- Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF- which even in a single-nation army, let alone a coalition, was a triumph of reason, understanding and generosity of spirit. Ike began by naming 3 Britishers as his subordinate commanders: Marshall Bernard Montgomery on land, Adm. Sir Bertram Ramsey at sea and Marshal Sir Trevor Leigh-Mallory in the air. He had even named a 4th Briton, Air Chief Mashall Tedder, to be deputy supreme commander. Much as these appointments might have dismayed some American officers, they were a boon to Churchill and gave a great boost to British morale.
Although the supreme commander appreciated Montgomery's abilities, he was not eager to endure his abrasive personality and superior airs, prefering Alexander for his ground commander; but Brooke and Churchill were solidly behind the victor of El Alamein, and so Ike accepted him. Nor did he much admire the "somewhat ritualistic outlook" of Ramsey and Leigh-Mallory. But for Tedder he had the utmost respect and admiration and was on the best of terms with this witty, decisive and able airman.
To have granted 4 British officers so much authority over Americans was probably Eisenhower's most generous gester in the interests of the Alliance. Supposedly, he was bowing to British experience and superior military wisdom. This might seem ironic in that Overlord was preeminently an American scheme, springing from their willingness- nay, eagerness- to make the perilous Channel crossing and confront the formidable enemy head on in an operation which the British chiefs themselves had fought so long to delay or even defer. But it was actually no irony if only because Dwight Eisenhower's generous nature gave him an insight into the hearts of the British people deeper than the intuition of his own commanders. He was keenly aware of the suffering and humiliations they had endured. He gave the top commanders after himself to 4 Britons to harden for battle once again those "hearts of oak" that had begun to wilt beneath 5 years of frustration. To Ike the psychologist, a Britain renewed and reconsecrated to its determination to return to Europe might have seemed as valuable as sunny skies over France on D-Day.
British caution and skepticism irked and angered the Americans. They suspected that their allies were too preoccupied with preservation of the Empire and that the gigantic buildup in Britain might be nothing more than a plan to deceive and distract the Germans until continued massive Allied bombing and German losses to the Soviet Union brought about the collapse of the Third Reich, when Overlord would become Rankin, i.e., the invasion force would become an occupying force. American confidence was based upon their faith in their economy and their troops, which was eventually justified, and their fondness for a direct, straightforward dash across the Channel into France. In this the British thought them naive, that in their inexperience they underestimated the difficulties in planning, logistics and tactics for such a mammoth operation. There was some truth to this, but then conversely the British were much too prone to emphasize difficulty. They did not understand the American genius for overcoming problems,or appreciate the depth of their energy and abundance. The slogan "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer" was not just another Yankee boast but an expression of reality.
An even sharper disagreement arose over Operation Anvil, the simultaneous invasion of Southern France proposed by the Americans. The British opposed it because it would cripple operations in Italy, the Americans wanted it to gain the valuable port of Marseille and for an attack up the valley of the Rhone to join forces with Eisenhower's right flank. For the first time in this continuing squabble, the Americans flatly refused to retreat. They wanted Anvil, later named Dragoon, period. But the old ghost of landing craft shortages arose to haunt them. Because of the misguided emphasis on aircraft production, the resumption of the Pacific offensive by MacArthur and Nimitz and the demands of the Italian operation, there was simply not enough for both invasions to proceed together. Thus Dragoon was postponed for 10 weeks.
But the basic Allied disagreement over Overlord that had begun in the fall of 1943 continued unresolved, and it would remain so until the summer of 1944, with the British cautious and reluctant and the Americans exasperated and eager, until, on May 15, at a briefing of Overlord's top commanders, Winston Churchill approached Eisenhower and declared: "I am hardening toward this enterprise."
Churchill's growing faith in Overlord was probably as much due to his admiration of Eisenhower as to any other cause. For the American had indeed fashioned a command structure- Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF- which even in a single-nation army, let alone a coalition, was a triumph of reason, understanding and generosity of spirit. Ike began by naming 3 Britishers as his subordinate commanders: Marshall Bernard Montgomery on land, Adm. Sir Bertram Ramsey at sea and Marshal Sir Trevor Leigh-Mallory in the air. He had even named a 4th Briton, Air Chief Mashall Tedder, to be deputy supreme commander. Much as these appointments might have dismayed some American officers, they were a boon to Churchill and gave a great boost to British morale.
Although the supreme commander appreciated Montgomery's abilities, he was not eager to endure his abrasive personality and superior airs, prefering Alexander for his ground commander; but Brooke and Churchill were solidly behind the victor of El Alamein, and so Ike accepted him. Nor did he much admire the "somewhat ritualistic outlook" of Ramsey and Leigh-Mallory. But for Tedder he had the utmost respect and admiration and was on the best of terms with this witty, decisive and able airman.
To have granted 4 British officers so much authority over Americans was probably Eisenhower's most generous gester in the interests of the Alliance. Supposedly, he was bowing to British experience and superior military wisdom. This might seem ironic in that Overlord was preeminently an American scheme, springing from their willingness- nay, eagerness- to make the perilous Channel crossing and confront the formidable enemy head on in an operation which the British chiefs themselves had fought so long to delay or even defer. But it was actually no irony if only because Dwight Eisenhower's generous nature gave him an insight into the hearts of the British people deeper than the intuition of his own commanders. He was keenly aware of the suffering and humiliations they had endured. He gave the top commanders after himself to 4 Britons to harden for battle once again those "hearts of oak" that had begun to wilt beneath 5 years of frustration. To Ike the psychologist, a Britain renewed and reconsecrated to its determination to return to Europe might have seemed as valuable as sunny skies over France on D-Day.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
D-Day was an all or nothing gamble. There was no doubt that the Allies were going to defeat Hitler, but a debacle on D-Day would have handed all of Europe over to the Soviets. It would have taken the Allies at least a year to be able to mount another such attack, and by that time the Soviets would be close to Berlin. They would have swept across Germany, turning it completely into a vassal state. So it was a gamble, and not a sure thing.
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
The true irony in Eisenhower's preparations for Overlord was the difficulty he experienced in gaining operational control of his own air force. For its success, the cross-Channel invasion depended to the extreme on adroit use of overwhelming air power assigned to it. Overlord was a direct frontal assault against a fortified position. Hitler's Atlantic Wall was continuous from Denmark to the Spanish coast, so there was no chance of outflanking it. The Germans had the advantage of superior manpower, land communications and interior lines. Eisenhower's advantages were control of the air and the sea, meaning that he could deliver a pre-invasion bombardment far greater than the artillery barrages of World War I. Because he was on the offensive, he knew where and when the battle would be fought. Without a line of communication to defend, he could concentrate on a narrow front on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy, where the invasion was to take place. Because Rundstedt did not know where the blow would fall, he had to spread his forces along the Atlantic Wall. Harris's Bomber Command and Spaetz's American Strategic Forces wre thus the key to success.
But both air chiefs objected strenuously to Ike's attempts to place them under his operational command during the 2 months prior to D-Day, now set for June 5, 1944. Specifically, the supreme commander wanted to use the bombers to paralyze the French railway system and thus inhibit Rundstedt from launching his counteroffensive. This was called the Transportation Plan, and its author was Tedder. Spaatz, still clinging to his theories of strategic bombing, offered in its place the Oil Plan, giving priority to the German oil industry, especially its synthetic fuel plants. This, Spaatz argued, would in the long run more effectively paralyze the German army's ground movements- and the Luftwaffe as well- than the Transportation Plan. This was true. But Eisenhower was interested in the short-term effects. Spaatz, who seems to have been indifferent to the difficulties of an amphibious invasion, assumed that the Allied host would get ashore easily. Ike knew different. He was aware that the Germans had accumulated large stocks of fuel in France and had cleverly camouflaged them. During D-Day and the few critical weeks thereafter they would have all fuel they needed to hurl the invaders back into the sea. Harris joined Spaatz in arguing against Ike.
The short-term success of Overlord was so vital that it's hard to believe these men of such high rank didn't recognize the real threat. Hitler wanted an attack in the West. He believed it would decide the war in his favor. He had good reason for this: the Germans troop strength had decreased from 3 million men in 1943 to 2.6 million in December, and then to 2.1 million by March, 1944, as a result of the Soviet offensive. If the Allies attacked and were defeated, they would not be able to launch a new invasion for years. This would then allow Hitler to free up his 59 divisions in France for the final showdown with the Red Army. Within the year his rockets and jet aircraft would be ready.
This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. In the post above this one, Ozymandias asserts that whatever happened on D-Day, the war was already won for the Allies, but that D-Day's significance is that it prevented a Soviet occupation of all Europe. While this might very well be true, I am not 100% convinced that Hitler wasn't right; a defeat at D-Day might have turned the tide. Suppose Hitler's new forces fought the Soviets to a stalemate, and then he offered peace to Stalin? I admit it's unlikely, but in this scenario the Germans could have been triumphant. (And I think they realized this, as well. As I will emphasize again later, it is HIGHLY significant that the German Generals' plot to kill Hitler, for all of the fine talk for years before the event, did not actually take place until AFTER D-Day was a success, meaning that the last chance for a German victory was gone.)
Eisenhower's solution to this argument with his subordinates was to lose his temper. He got Tedder on the telephone and told him, "Now, listen, Arthur, I am tired of dealing with a lot of primadonnas. By God, you tell that bunch if they don't get together and stop quarreling like children, I will tell the PM to get someone else to run this damn war. I'll quit!" This seemed to work; next, Ike took on Churchill. Churchill supported Harris and Spaatz for humane reasons. He did not wish to be responsible for the slaughter and maiming of hundreds of thousands of Belgian and French citizens. He took the issue to FDR, who answered that military conditions must be paramount, and Eisenhower won.
So Ike and Tedder unleashed the vast Allied bombing fleet on the French railway system. By D-Day, 76,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on rail targets. The Seine River bridges west of Paris were virtually destroyed. However, there were no outcries from France. Only 12,000 French and Belgian civilians died, far fewer than had been feared.
Eisenhower always considered the Transportation Plan to be his most important contribution to the success of Overlord.
The true irony in Eisenhower's preparations for Overlord was the difficulty he experienced in gaining operational control of his own air force. For its success, the cross-Channel invasion depended to the extreme on adroit use of overwhelming air power assigned to it. Overlord was a direct frontal assault against a fortified position. Hitler's Atlantic Wall was continuous from Denmark to the Spanish coast, so there was no chance of outflanking it. The Germans had the advantage of superior manpower, land communications and interior lines. Eisenhower's advantages were control of the air and the sea, meaning that he could deliver a pre-invasion bombardment far greater than the artillery barrages of World War I. Because he was on the offensive, he knew where and when the battle would be fought. Without a line of communication to defend, he could concentrate on a narrow front on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy, where the invasion was to take place. Because Rundstedt did not know where the blow would fall, he had to spread his forces along the Atlantic Wall. Harris's Bomber Command and Spaetz's American Strategic Forces wre thus the key to success.
But both air chiefs objected strenuously to Ike's attempts to place them under his operational command during the 2 months prior to D-Day, now set for June 5, 1944. Specifically, the supreme commander wanted to use the bombers to paralyze the French railway system and thus inhibit Rundstedt from launching his counteroffensive. This was called the Transportation Plan, and its author was Tedder. Spaatz, still clinging to his theories of strategic bombing, offered in its place the Oil Plan, giving priority to the German oil industry, especially its synthetic fuel plants. This, Spaatz argued, would in the long run more effectively paralyze the German army's ground movements- and the Luftwaffe as well- than the Transportation Plan. This was true. But Eisenhower was interested in the short-term effects. Spaatz, who seems to have been indifferent to the difficulties of an amphibious invasion, assumed that the Allied host would get ashore easily. Ike knew different. He was aware that the Germans had accumulated large stocks of fuel in France and had cleverly camouflaged them. During D-Day and the few critical weeks thereafter they would have all fuel they needed to hurl the invaders back into the sea. Harris joined Spaatz in arguing against Ike.
The short-term success of Overlord was so vital that it's hard to believe these men of such high rank didn't recognize the real threat. Hitler wanted an attack in the West. He believed it would decide the war in his favor. He had good reason for this: the Germans troop strength had decreased from 3 million men in 1943 to 2.6 million in December, and then to 2.1 million by March, 1944, as a result of the Soviet offensive. If the Allies attacked and were defeated, they would not be able to launch a new invasion for years. This would then allow Hitler to free up his 59 divisions in France for the final showdown with the Red Army. Within the year his rockets and jet aircraft would be ready.
This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. In the post above this one, Ozymandias asserts that whatever happened on D-Day, the war was already won for the Allies, but that D-Day's significance is that it prevented a Soviet occupation of all Europe. While this might very well be true, I am not 100% convinced that Hitler wasn't right; a defeat at D-Day might have turned the tide. Suppose Hitler's new forces fought the Soviets to a stalemate, and then he offered peace to Stalin? I admit it's unlikely, but in this scenario the Germans could have been triumphant. (And I think they realized this, as well. As I will emphasize again later, it is HIGHLY significant that the German Generals' plot to kill Hitler, for all of the fine talk for years before the event, did not actually take place until AFTER D-Day was a success, meaning that the last chance for a German victory was gone.)
Eisenhower's solution to this argument with his subordinates was to lose his temper. He got Tedder on the telephone and told him, "Now, listen, Arthur, I am tired of dealing with a lot of primadonnas. By God, you tell that bunch if they don't get together and stop quarreling like children, I will tell the PM to get someone else to run this damn war. I'll quit!" This seemed to work; next, Ike took on Churchill. Churchill supported Harris and Spaatz for humane reasons. He did not wish to be responsible for the slaughter and maiming of hundreds of thousands of Belgian and French citizens. He took the issue to FDR, who answered that military conditions must be paramount, and Eisenhower won.
So Ike and Tedder unleashed the vast Allied bombing fleet on the French railway system. By D-Day, 76,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on rail targets. The Seine River bridges west of Paris were virtually destroyed. However, there were no outcries from France. Only 12,000 French and Belgian civilians died, far fewer than had been feared.
Eisenhower always considered the Transportation Plan to be his most important contribution to the success of Overlord.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Of course, nothing in war is certain, because we only live in one world, and the other scenarios didn't come to pass. So if D-Day had been a disaster, Hitler could have transferred all those men over to the Eastern Front, and fought the Soviets to a standstill. But it is unlikely.
Recognize that Operation Bagration, launched on 22 June 1944 on the Eastern Front (even if D-Day had been a disaster, the Germans would not been able to move troops to the Eastern Front by then), cost the Germans 670,000 wounded, missing or taken prisoner; it also cost them 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles.
That autumn and winter, when the Soviets attacked in Poland, they outnumbered the Germans on average by five to one in troops, six to one in artillery, six to one in tanks and four to one in self-propelled artillery.
Germany was finished, and all they could do is fight a delaying action. If they had had a million more troops on the Eastern Front, they would still have been significantly outnumbered. And I doubt whether the Soviets at that point, having paid such a horrendous price, would have been content with an armistice.
Recognize that Operation Bagration, launched on 22 June 1944 on the Eastern Front (even if D-Day had been a disaster, the Germans would not been able to move troops to the Eastern Front by then), cost the Germans 670,000 wounded, missing or taken prisoner; it also cost them 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles.
That autumn and winter, when the Soviets attacked in Poland, they outnumbered the Germans on average by five to one in troops, six to one in artillery, six to one in tanks and four to one in self-propelled artillery.
Germany was finished, and all they could do is fight a delaying action. If they had had a million more troops on the Eastern Front, they would still have been significantly outnumbered. And I doubt whether the Soviets at that point, having paid such a horrendous price, would have been content with an armistice.
timschochet
Footballguy
Of course, the idea here is that a major victory for Germany at D-Day causes Stalin to hesitate and reduce the level of Bagration or perhaps not even launch it at all. Unlikely, I admit, but certainly possible.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
PALAU AND PELIELU
By the summer of 1944, victories in the Southwest and Central Pacific had brought the war closer to Japan, with American bombers able to strike at the Japanese main islands. There was disagreement among the U.S. Joint Chiefs over two proposed strategies to defeat the Japanese Empire. The strategy proposed by General Douglas MacArthur called for the recapture of the Philippines, followed by the capture of Okinawa, then an attack on the Japanese mainland. After that, the eventual invasion of Japan would come. Admiral Chester Nimitz favored a more direct strategy of bypassing the Philippines, but seizing Okinawa and Formosa as staging areas to an attack on the Chinese mainland, followed by the future invasion of Japan's southernmost islands.
Both commanders' strategies included the invasion of Peleliu, but for different reasons. The 1st Marine Division had already been chosen to make the assault. President Franklin D. Roosevelt traveled to Pearl Harbor to personally meet both commanders and hear their arguments. MacArthur's strategy was chosen. However, before MacArthur could retake the Philippines, the Palau Islands, specifically Peleliu and Angaur, were to be neutralized and an airfield built to protect MacArthur's right flank.
The US invasion of Pelielu came in September, 1944. U.S. Forces, originally consisting of only the 1st Marine Division, but later relieved by the Army's 81st Infantry Division, fought to capture an airstrip on the small coral island. Major General William Rupertus, commander of 1st Marine Division, predicted the island would be secured within four days. However, due to Japan's well-crafted fortifications and stiff resistance, the battle lasted over two months. It remains one of the war's most controversial because of the island's questionable strategic value and the very high death toll. Considering the number of men involved, Peleliu had the highest casualty rate of any battle in the Pacific War.
By the summer of 1944, the Palau Islands were occupied by approximately 30,000 Japanese troops, with about 11,000 men on Peleliu, made up of the 14th Infantry Division, and Korean and Okinawan laborers. Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, commander of the Division's 2nd Regiment, led the preparations for the island's defense.
The majority of Nakagawa's defenses were based at Peleliu's highest point, Umurbrogol mountain, a collection of hills and steep ridges. Located at the center of Peleliu, Umurbrogol overlooked a large portion of the island, including the crucial airfield. The Umurbrogol contained some 500 limestone caves, connected by tunnels. Many of these were former mine shafts that were turned into defense positions. Engineers added sliding steel armor doors with multiple openings to serve both artillery and machine guns. The Japanese army dug and blasted other positions of throughout Umurbrogol, armed with 81 mm and 150 mm mortars, and 20 mm machine cannon, and backed by a light tank unit and an anti-aircraft detachment. The cave entrances were built slanted as a defense against grenade and flamethrower attacks. The caves and bunkers were connected to a vast system throughout central Peleliu, which allowed the Japanese to evacuate or reoccupy positions as needed, and to take advantage of shrinking interior lines.
The battleships Pennsylvania, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee and Idaho, heavy cruisers Columbus, Indianapolis, Louisville, Minneapolis and Portland, light cruisers Cleveland, Denver and Honolulu, three carriers, and five light carriers dropped 519 rounds of 16-inch (410 mm) shells, 1,845 rounds of 14-inch shells, 1,793 500-pound bombs, and 73,412 .50 caliber bullets onto the tiny island, only six square miles in size.
The Americans believed the bombardment to be successful, as Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf claimed that the Navy had run out of targets. In reality, the majority of the Japanese positions were completely unharmed. Even the battalion left to defend the beaches was virtually unscathed. During the assault, the island's defenders used unusual firing discipline to avoid giving away their positions. The bombardment managed only to destroy Japan's aircraft on the island, as well as the buildings surrounding the airfield. The Japanese remained in their fortified positions, ready to attack the troops soon to be landing.
The Marines landed at 0832 on September 15, the 1st Marines to the north on "White Beach", and the 5th and 7th Marines to the center and south on "Orange Beach". As the landing craft approached the beaches, the Japanese opened the steel doors guarding their positions and let loose with heavy artillery fire. The positions on the coral promontories guarding each flank punished the Marines with 47 mm antiboat guns and 20 mm machine guns. "The first 3 waves got in good, the remaining waves caught hell."[3] By 0930, the Japanese had wiped out 60 LVT's and DUKW's.
The 1st Marines were quickly bogged down by heavy fire from "The Point". Colonel Chesty Puller narrowly escaped death when a high velocity shell landed a direct hit on his LVT. His entire communications section had been wiped out on its way to the beach by an identical hit from a 47 mm round. The 7th Marines to the south faced similar problems with gun emplacements on their flank. Many of their LVT's were knocked out in their approach, leaving their occupants to wade ashore through the coral reef in chest-deep or higher water while being raked by Japanese machine guns; casualties were horrific and many who did make it to the beach alive had lost their rifles and other essential gear.
The 5th Marines made the most progress on D-Day, due to their distance from the heavy gun emplacements guarding the left and right flanks. They pushed forward toward the airfield, but were met with Nakagawa's first counterattack. His armored tank company raced across the airfield to push the Marines back, but were soon assaulted by every available tank, howitzer, naval gun and dive bomber. Nakagawa's inefficient tanks were quickly wiped out, along with their accompanying infantrymen.
At the end of D-Day, the Americans held their two mile stretch of landing beaches, but little else. Their biggest push in the south managed to move a mile inland, but the 1st Marines to the north made very little progress because of the relentless attacks from The Point. The Marines had suffered 1,100 casualties on D-Day, with about 200 dead, and 900 wounded. Rupertus had believed the Japanese would quickly crumble since their perimeter had been broken, still unaware of his enemy's change of tactics.
On D+1, the 5th Marines moved to capture the airfield and push toward the eastern shore. They quickly raced across the airfield under heavy artillery fire from the highlands to the north, suffering heavy casualties in the process. After capturing the airfield, they rapidly advanced to the eastern end of Peleliu, leaving the island's southern defenders to be wiped out by the 7th Marines. This area was hotly contested by the Japanese, who still occupied numerous pillboxes. Temperatures remained around 115°F, and the Marines soon suffered high casualties from heat exhaustion. Further complicating the situation, the Marines' only available water supply was contaminated with oil.
Still, by D+8 the 5th and 7th Marines had accomplished their objectives, holding the airfield and the southern portion of the island.
Having quickly captured the airfield, the American forces put it to use as early as D+3. The "Grasshoppers" (VMO-1) soon began aerial spotting missions for Marine artillery and naval gunfire. On September 26 (D+11), the Corsairs of the VMF-114 landed on the airstrip. The Corsairs began dive-bombing missions across Peleliu, and also brought two more useful weapons to the fight against Japanese fortifications. Corsairs fired rockets to blow open cave entrances for the infantrymen, and also delivered napalm attacks—only the second time the weapon had been used in the Pacific. Napalm proved useful, burning away the vegetation hiding spider holes and usually killing their occupants.
The fortress atop The Point continued to cause heavy casualties across the landing beaches. Puller ordered Captain George Hunt, commander of K Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, to capture the position. He approached The Point short on supplies, having lost most of his machine guns while approaching the beaches. One of Hunt's platoons was pinned down for nearly an entire day in a vulnerable position between fortifications. The rest of his company was also in extreme danger after the Japanese cut a hole in their line, leaving his right flank cut off. However, a rifle platoon began knocking out the Japanese gun positions, one by one. Using smoke grenades for cover, they swept through each hole, destroying the positions with rifle grenades. After knocking out the six machine gun positions, the Marines faced the 47 mm gun cave. A lieutenant blinded the 47 mm gunner with a smoke grenade, allowing a corporal to throw a grenade through the cave's aperture. The grenade detonated the 47 mm's shells, forcing the cave's occupants out, where they were shot.
K Company had captured The Point, but Nakagawa sent counterattack after counterattack to recapture the valuable piece of terrain. The next thirty hours saw four major counterattacks against a sole company, critically low on supplies and out of water. The Marines soon had to resort to hand-to-hand combat to fend off the Japanese attackers. By the time reinforcements arrived, the company had been reduced to 18 men, suffering 157 casualties during the battle for The Point.
After capturing The Point, the 1st Marines moved north into the Umurbrogol pocket, named "Bloody Nose Ridge" by the Marines. Puller led his men in numerous assaults, but every attack was quickly neutralized by the Japanese. The 1st Marines were trapped within the narrow paths between the ridges, with each ridge fortification supporting the other with deadly crossfire. The Marines took increasingly high casualties as they slowly advanced through the ridges. The Japanese again showed unusual firing discipline, striking only when they could inflict mass casualties. As casualties mounted, Japanese snipers began to take aim at stretcher bearers, knowing that if two stretcher bearers were injured or killed, more would have to return to replace them, and the snipers could steadily pick off more and more Marines. In place of their banzai attacks, the Japanese would infiltrate the American lines at night to attack the Marines in their foxholes. The Marines built two-man foxholes, so one could sleep while the other kept watch for infiltrators.
One particularly bloody battle on Bloody Nose came when the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, under the command of Major Raymond Davis, attacked Hill 100. Over six days of fighting, the battalion would suffer 71% casualties. Captain Everett Pope and his company penetrated deep into the ridges, leading his remaining 90 men to seize what he thought was Hill 100. It took an entire day of bloody fighting to reach what he thought was the crest of the hill, but ending up being the nose of yet another ridge, occupied by more Japanese defenders. Trapped at the base of the ridge, Pope set up a small defense perimeter, which was attacked relentlessly by the Japanese throughout the night. The men soon ran out of bullets, and had to fight the attackers off with knives and fists, even resorting to throwing coral rock and empty boxes of ammunition at the Japanese. Pope and his men managed to hold out until dawn. When they evacuated the position, only 9 men remained. Pope would receive the Medal of Honor for his actions.
The Japanese eventually inflicted 60% casualties on Puller's 1st Marines, who lost 1749 out of approximately 3000 men. After six days of deadly fighting in the ridges of Umurbrogol, General Roy Geiger, commander of the III Amphibious Corps, sent elements of 81st Infantry Division to Peleliu to relieve the regiment. The 321st Regiment Combat Team landed on the western beaches of Peleliu, at the northern end of Umurbrogol mountain, on September 23. The 321st Regiment, and the 5th and 7th Marines all took their turn attacking the Umurbrogol, and all suffered similar casualties.
By mid-October, the 5th and 7th Marines both lost around half their men while clawing their way through the ridges. Geiger then decided to evacuate the entire 1st Marine Division, to be replaced by more 81st troops. The 323rd Regimental Combat Team landed on October 15, and by the third week of October, most all of the Marines had been evacuated back to Pavuvu. The Army troops headed off to battle the remaining Japanese on Bloody Nose Ridge, fighting it out for another month before finally securing the island. At the end Nakagawa proclaimed "Our sword is broken and we have run out of spears". He then burnt his regimental colors and committed ritual suicide. He was posthumously promoted to Lieutenant General for his valor displayed on Peleliu.
The reduction of the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol mountain is considered to be the most difficult fight that the U.S. military encountered in the entire Second World War. The 1st Marine Division was severely mauled and it remained out of action until the invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945. In total the 1st Division suffered over 6500 casualties during their month on Peleliu, over a third of their entire division. The 81st Infantry Division suffered over 3000 casualties during their tenure on the island.
The battle was controversial due to its lack of strategic value. The airfield captured on Peleliu was of little use for the attack on the Philippines. The island was never used for a staging operation in subsequent invasions; the Ulithi Atoll, in the Caroline Islands north of the Palaus, was used as a staging base for the invasion of Okinawa. In addition, few news reports were made on the battle. Due to Rupertus' "3 days" prediction, only six reporters bothered coming ashore. The battle was overshadowed by MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies push towards Germany in Europe.
The battles for Angaur and Peleliu showed Americans the pattern of future Japanese island defense which would be seen again at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment prior to amphibious assault at Iwo Jima was only slightly more effective than at Peleliu, but at Okinawa the preliminary shelling was superb. Frogmen performing underwater demolition at Iwo Jima confused the enemy by sweeping both coasts, but later alerted Japanese defenders to the exact assault beaches at Okinawa. American ground forces at Peleliu gained experience in assaulting heavily fortified positions such as they would find again at Okinawa.
By the summer of 1944, victories in the Southwest and Central Pacific had brought the war closer to Japan, with American bombers able to strike at the Japanese main islands. There was disagreement among the U.S. Joint Chiefs over two proposed strategies to defeat the Japanese Empire. The strategy proposed by General Douglas MacArthur called for the recapture of the Philippines, followed by the capture of Okinawa, then an attack on the Japanese mainland. After that, the eventual invasion of Japan would come. Admiral Chester Nimitz favored a more direct strategy of bypassing the Philippines, but seizing Okinawa and Formosa as staging areas to an attack on the Chinese mainland, followed by the future invasion of Japan's southernmost islands.
Both commanders' strategies included the invasion of Peleliu, but for different reasons. The 1st Marine Division had already been chosen to make the assault. President Franklin D. Roosevelt traveled to Pearl Harbor to personally meet both commanders and hear their arguments. MacArthur's strategy was chosen. However, before MacArthur could retake the Philippines, the Palau Islands, specifically Peleliu and Angaur, were to be neutralized and an airfield built to protect MacArthur's right flank.
The US invasion of Pelielu came in September, 1944. U.S. Forces, originally consisting of only the 1st Marine Division, but later relieved by the Army's 81st Infantry Division, fought to capture an airstrip on the small coral island. Major General William Rupertus, commander of 1st Marine Division, predicted the island would be secured within four days. However, due to Japan's well-crafted fortifications and stiff resistance, the battle lasted over two months. It remains one of the war's most controversial because of the island's questionable strategic value and the very high death toll. Considering the number of men involved, Peleliu had the highest casualty rate of any battle in the Pacific War.
By the summer of 1944, the Palau Islands were occupied by approximately 30,000 Japanese troops, with about 11,000 men on Peleliu, made up of the 14th Infantry Division, and Korean and Okinawan laborers. Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, commander of the Division's 2nd Regiment, led the preparations for the island's defense.
The majority of Nakagawa's defenses were based at Peleliu's highest point, Umurbrogol mountain, a collection of hills and steep ridges. Located at the center of Peleliu, Umurbrogol overlooked a large portion of the island, including the crucial airfield. The Umurbrogol contained some 500 limestone caves, connected by tunnels. Many of these were former mine shafts that were turned into defense positions. Engineers added sliding steel armor doors with multiple openings to serve both artillery and machine guns. The Japanese army dug and blasted other positions of throughout Umurbrogol, armed with 81 mm and 150 mm mortars, and 20 mm machine cannon, and backed by a light tank unit and an anti-aircraft detachment. The cave entrances were built slanted as a defense against grenade and flamethrower attacks. The caves and bunkers were connected to a vast system throughout central Peleliu, which allowed the Japanese to evacuate or reoccupy positions as needed, and to take advantage of shrinking interior lines.
The battleships Pennsylvania, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee and Idaho, heavy cruisers Columbus, Indianapolis, Louisville, Minneapolis and Portland, light cruisers Cleveland, Denver and Honolulu, three carriers, and five light carriers dropped 519 rounds of 16-inch (410 mm) shells, 1,845 rounds of 14-inch shells, 1,793 500-pound bombs, and 73,412 .50 caliber bullets onto the tiny island, only six square miles in size.
The Americans believed the bombardment to be successful, as Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf claimed that the Navy had run out of targets. In reality, the majority of the Japanese positions were completely unharmed. Even the battalion left to defend the beaches was virtually unscathed. During the assault, the island's defenders used unusual firing discipline to avoid giving away their positions. The bombardment managed only to destroy Japan's aircraft on the island, as well as the buildings surrounding the airfield. The Japanese remained in their fortified positions, ready to attack the troops soon to be landing.
The Marines landed at 0832 on September 15, the 1st Marines to the north on "White Beach", and the 5th and 7th Marines to the center and south on "Orange Beach". As the landing craft approached the beaches, the Japanese opened the steel doors guarding their positions and let loose with heavy artillery fire. The positions on the coral promontories guarding each flank punished the Marines with 47 mm antiboat guns and 20 mm machine guns. "The first 3 waves got in good, the remaining waves caught hell."[3] By 0930, the Japanese had wiped out 60 LVT's and DUKW's.
The 1st Marines were quickly bogged down by heavy fire from "The Point". Colonel Chesty Puller narrowly escaped death when a high velocity shell landed a direct hit on his LVT. His entire communications section had been wiped out on its way to the beach by an identical hit from a 47 mm round. The 7th Marines to the south faced similar problems with gun emplacements on their flank. Many of their LVT's were knocked out in their approach, leaving their occupants to wade ashore through the coral reef in chest-deep or higher water while being raked by Japanese machine guns; casualties were horrific and many who did make it to the beach alive had lost their rifles and other essential gear.
The 5th Marines made the most progress on D-Day, due to their distance from the heavy gun emplacements guarding the left and right flanks. They pushed forward toward the airfield, but were met with Nakagawa's first counterattack. His armored tank company raced across the airfield to push the Marines back, but were soon assaulted by every available tank, howitzer, naval gun and dive bomber. Nakagawa's inefficient tanks were quickly wiped out, along with their accompanying infantrymen.
At the end of D-Day, the Americans held their two mile stretch of landing beaches, but little else. Their biggest push in the south managed to move a mile inland, but the 1st Marines to the north made very little progress because of the relentless attacks from The Point. The Marines had suffered 1,100 casualties on D-Day, with about 200 dead, and 900 wounded. Rupertus had believed the Japanese would quickly crumble since their perimeter had been broken, still unaware of his enemy's change of tactics.
On D+1, the 5th Marines moved to capture the airfield and push toward the eastern shore. They quickly raced across the airfield under heavy artillery fire from the highlands to the north, suffering heavy casualties in the process. After capturing the airfield, they rapidly advanced to the eastern end of Peleliu, leaving the island's southern defenders to be wiped out by the 7th Marines. This area was hotly contested by the Japanese, who still occupied numerous pillboxes. Temperatures remained around 115°F, and the Marines soon suffered high casualties from heat exhaustion. Further complicating the situation, the Marines' only available water supply was contaminated with oil.
Still, by D+8 the 5th and 7th Marines had accomplished their objectives, holding the airfield and the southern portion of the island.
Having quickly captured the airfield, the American forces put it to use as early as D+3. The "Grasshoppers" (VMO-1) soon began aerial spotting missions for Marine artillery and naval gunfire. On September 26 (D+11), the Corsairs of the VMF-114 landed on the airstrip. The Corsairs began dive-bombing missions across Peleliu, and also brought two more useful weapons to the fight against Japanese fortifications. Corsairs fired rockets to blow open cave entrances for the infantrymen, and also delivered napalm attacks—only the second time the weapon had been used in the Pacific. Napalm proved useful, burning away the vegetation hiding spider holes and usually killing their occupants.
The fortress atop The Point continued to cause heavy casualties across the landing beaches. Puller ordered Captain George Hunt, commander of K Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, to capture the position. He approached The Point short on supplies, having lost most of his machine guns while approaching the beaches. One of Hunt's platoons was pinned down for nearly an entire day in a vulnerable position between fortifications. The rest of his company was also in extreme danger after the Japanese cut a hole in their line, leaving his right flank cut off. However, a rifle platoon began knocking out the Japanese gun positions, one by one. Using smoke grenades for cover, they swept through each hole, destroying the positions with rifle grenades. After knocking out the six machine gun positions, the Marines faced the 47 mm gun cave. A lieutenant blinded the 47 mm gunner with a smoke grenade, allowing a corporal to throw a grenade through the cave's aperture. The grenade detonated the 47 mm's shells, forcing the cave's occupants out, where they were shot.
K Company had captured The Point, but Nakagawa sent counterattack after counterattack to recapture the valuable piece of terrain. The next thirty hours saw four major counterattacks against a sole company, critically low on supplies and out of water. The Marines soon had to resort to hand-to-hand combat to fend off the Japanese attackers. By the time reinforcements arrived, the company had been reduced to 18 men, suffering 157 casualties during the battle for The Point.
After capturing The Point, the 1st Marines moved north into the Umurbrogol pocket, named "Bloody Nose Ridge" by the Marines. Puller led his men in numerous assaults, but every attack was quickly neutralized by the Japanese. The 1st Marines were trapped within the narrow paths between the ridges, with each ridge fortification supporting the other with deadly crossfire. The Marines took increasingly high casualties as they slowly advanced through the ridges. The Japanese again showed unusual firing discipline, striking only when they could inflict mass casualties. As casualties mounted, Japanese snipers began to take aim at stretcher bearers, knowing that if two stretcher bearers were injured or killed, more would have to return to replace them, and the snipers could steadily pick off more and more Marines. In place of their banzai attacks, the Japanese would infiltrate the American lines at night to attack the Marines in their foxholes. The Marines built two-man foxholes, so one could sleep while the other kept watch for infiltrators.
One particularly bloody battle on Bloody Nose came when the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, under the command of Major Raymond Davis, attacked Hill 100. Over six days of fighting, the battalion would suffer 71% casualties. Captain Everett Pope and his company penetrated deep into the ridges, leading his remaining 90 men to seize what he thought was Hill 100. It took an entire day of bloody fighting to reach what he thought was the crest of the hill, but ending up being the nose of yet another ridge, occupied by more Japanese defenders. Trapped at the base of the ridge, Pope set up a small defense perimeter, which was attacked relentlessly by the Japanese throughout the night. The men soon ran out of bullets, and had to fight the attackers off with knives and fists, even resorting to throwing coral rock and empty boxes of ammunition at the Japanese. Pope and his men managed to hold out until dawn. When they evacuated the position, only 9 men remained. Pope would receive the Medal of Honor for his actions.
The Japanese eventually inflicted 60% casualties on Puller's 1st Marines, who lost 1749 out of approximately 3000 men. After six days of deadly fighting in the ridges of Umurbrogol, General Roy Geiger, commander of the III Amphibious Corps, sent elements of 81st Infantry Division to Peleliu to relieve the regiment. The 321st Regiment Combat Team landed on the western beaches of Peleliu, at the northern end of Umurbrogol mountain, on September 23. The 321st Regiment, and the 5th and 7th Marines all took their turn attacking the Umurbrogol, and all suffered similar casualties.
By mid-October, the 5th and 7th Marines both lost around half their men while clawing their way through the ridges. Geiger then decided to evacuate the entire 1st Marine Division, to be replaced by more 81st troops. The 323rd Regimental Combat Team landed on October 15, and by the third week of October, most all of the Marines had been evacuated back to Pavuvu. The Army troops headed off to battle the remaining Japanese on Bloody Nose Ridge, fighting it out for another month before finally securing the island. At the end Nakagawa proclaimed "Our sword is broken and we have run out of spears". He then burnt his regimental colors and committed ritual suicide. He was posthumously promoted to Lieutenant General for his valor displayed on Peleliu.
The reduction of the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol mountain is considered to be the most difficult fight that the U.S. military encountered in the entire Second World War. The 1st Marine Division was severely mauled and it remained out of action until the invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945. In total the 1st Division suffered over 6500 casualties during their month on Peleliu, over a third of their entire division. The 81st Infantry Division suffered over 3000 casualties during their tenure on the island.
The battle was controversial due to its lack of strategic value. The airfield captured on Peleliu was of little use for the attack on the Philippines. The island was never used for a staging operation in subsequent invasions; the Ulithi Atoll, in the Caroline Islands north of the Palaus, was used as a staging base for the invasion of Okinawa. In addition, few news reports were made on the battle. Due to Rupertus' "3 days" prediction, only six reporters bothered coming ashore. The battle was overshadowed by MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies push towards Germany in Europe.
The battles for Angaur and Peleliu showed Americans the pattern of future Japanese island defense which would be seen again at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment prior to amphibious assault at Iwo Jima was only slightly more effective than at Peleliu, but at Okinawa the preliminary shelling was superb. Frogmen performing underwater demolition at Iwo Jima confused the enemy by sweeping both coasts, but later alerted Japanese defenders to the exact assault beaches at Okinawa. American ground forces at Peleliu gained experience in assaulting heavily fortified positions such as they would find again at Okinawa.
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coyote5
Footballguy
Great stuff as always, guys. I'll just add that this is a fantastic first-hand account about the battles for Peleliu and Okinawa:
With The Old Breed
Well worth the read.
With The Old Breed
Well worth the read.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
AMMUNITION SHIP ACCIDENT
USS Mount Hood was the lead ship of her class of ammunition ships for the United States Navy in World War II. USS Mount Hood exploded in Seeadler Harbor at Manus Island (in the Admiralty Islands) on 10 November 1944 killing all men aboard, obliterating the ship itself, and sinking or severely damaging 22 smaller craft nearby.
At 08:30, a party consisting of the communications officer, Lt. L. A. Wallace, and 17 men left the ship and headed for shore. At 08:55, while walking on the beach, they saw a flash from the harbor, followed by two quick explosions. Scrambling into their boat, they headed back to the ship, only to turn around again shortly thereafter as "There was nothing but debris all around..." The USS Mindanao , which lay about 300 m away, was heavily damaged by the explosion and 180 of her crewmen were killed or injured.
Mount Hood, anchored in about 35 feet of water, had exploded with an estimated 3,800 tons of ordnance material on board.The initial explosion caused flame and smoke to shoot up from amidships to more than masthead height. Within seconds, the bulk of her cargo detonated with a more intense explosion. Mushrooming smoke rose to 7,000 feet, obscuring the ship and the surrounding area for a radius of approximately 500 yards.
Mount Hood's former position was revealed by a trench in the ocean floor 1000 feet long, 200 feet wide, and 30 to 40 feet deep. The largest remaining piece of the hull was found in the trench and measured no bigger than 16 by 10 feet.
No other remains of Mount Hood were found except fragments of metal which had struck other ships in the harbor and a few tattered pages of a signal notebook found floating in the water several hundred yards away. No human remains were recovered of the 350 men aboard Mount Hood or small boats loading alongside at the time of the explosion. The only survivors from Mount Hoods crew were a junior officer and five enlisted men who had left the ship a short time before the explosion. Two of the crew were being transferred to the base brig for trial by court martial; and the remainder of the party were picking up mail at the base post office. Charges against the prisoners were dropped following the explosion (I'll bet they were happy they'd broken some rule or other!)
The concussion and metal fragments hurled from the ship also caused casualties and damage to ships and small craft within 2,000 yards. The repair ship Mindanao was the most seriously damaged. Mindanao was broadside to the blast. All personnel topside on Mindanao were killed outright; and dozens of men were killed or wounded below decks as numerous heavy fragments from Mount Hood penetrated the side plating. Eighty-two of Mindanaos crew died. The damage to other vessels required more than 100,000 man-hours to repair, while 22 small boats and landing craft were sunk, destroyed, or damaged beyond repair. Three-hundred-seventy-one sailors were injured from all ships in the harbor.
A board convened to examine evidence relating to the disaster was unable to ascertain the exact cause.
Of course, these types of accidents were not publicized during the war. I have to take my hat off in admiration to those sailors who worked on ammunition ships, because they knew that if they were hit by a bomb, it was goodnight forever. They sometimes kept loading ammunition even when there were air raids going on.
I have to tell you a funny story that one of my bosses told me, years and years ago. He served as a young lieutenant on an ocean going tug in the Pacific. The tug was useful in fighting fires on ships which had been damaged and set on fire, because it had these huge pumps which could throw a one foot wide column of water 100 yards.
He said the captain and the first lieutenant did not get along at all. On one occasion, a ship was set on fire, and the task force commander ordered them to proceed at flank speed to the damaged vessel, which was 4 or 5 miles or so away on the other side of the fleet. The captain set course, and told the lieutenant to signal the ships (with flag signals) in the fleet to give them clear passage. He did so, and my boss said all the ships between them and the damaged ship just got out of the way as fast as they could. When they were about half a mile away, the damaged ship blew up.
After it was over, the captain asked the first lieutenant what he had signaled which made them clear out so fast. The lieutenant replied: “I put up flags which said: STAND CLEAR, I AM TOTALLY OUT OF CONTROL!”.
The captain was furious, and didn't speak to him for a week.
USS Mount Hood was the lead ship of her class of ammunition ships for the United States Navy in World War II. USS Mount Hood exploded in Seeadler Harbor at Manus Island (in the Admiralty Islands) on 10 November 1944 killing all men aboard, obliterating the ship itself, and sinking or severely damaging 22 smaller craft nearby.
At 08:30, a party consisting of the communications officer, Lt. L. A. Wallace, and 17 men left the ship and headed for shore. At 08:55, while walking on the beach, they saw a flash from the harbor, followed by two quick explosions. Scrambling into their boat, they headed back to the ship, only to turn around again shortly thereafter as "There was nothing but debris all around..." The USS Mindanao , which lay about 300 m away, was heavily damaged by the explosion and 180 of her crewmen were killed or injured.
Mount Hood, anchored in about 35 feet of water, had exploded with an estimated 3,800 tons of ordnance material on board.The initial explosion caused flame and smoke to shoot up from amidships to more than masthead height. Within seconds, the bulk of her cargo detonated with a more intense explosion. Mushrooming smoke rose to 7,000 feet, obscuring the ship and the surrounding area for a radius of approximately 500 yards.
Mount Hood's former position was revealed by a trench in the ocean floor 1000 feet long, 200 feet wide, and 30 to 40 feet deep. The largest remaining piece of the hull was found in the trench and measured no bigger than 16 by 10 feet.
No other remains of Mount Hood were found except fragments of metal which had struck other ships in the harbor and a few tattered pages of a signal notebook found floating in the water several hundred yards away. No human remains were recovered of the 350 men aboard Mount Hood or small boats loading alongside at the time of the explosion. The only survivors from Mount Hoods crew were a junior officer and five enlisted men who had left the ship a short time before the explosion. Two of the crew were being transferred to the base brig for trial by court martial; and the remainder of the party were picking up mail at the base post office. Charges against the prisoners were dropped following the explosion (I'll bet they were happy they'd broken some rule or other!)
The concussion and metal fragments hurled from the ship also caused casualties and damage to ships and small craft within 2,000 yards. The repair ship Mindanao was the most seriously damaged. Mindanao was broadside to the blast. All personnel topside on Mindanao were killed outright; and dozens of men were killed or wounded below decks as numerous heavy fragments from Mount Hood penetrated the side plating. Eighty-two of Mindanaos crew died. The damage to other vessels required more than 100,000 man-hours to repair, while 22 small boats and landing craft were sunk, destroyed, or damaged beyond repair. Three-hundred-seventy-one sailors were injured from all ships in the harbor.
A board convened to examine evidence relating to the disaster was unable to ascertain the exact cause.
Of course, these types of accidents were not publicized during the war. I have to take my hat off in admiration to those sailors who worked on ammunition ships, because they knew that if they were hit by a bomb, it was goodnight forever. They sometimes kept loading ammunition even when there were air raids going on.
I have to tell you a funny story that one of my bosses told me, years and years ago. He served as a young lieutenant on an ocean going tug in the Pacific. The tug was useful in fighting fires on ships which had been damaged and set on fire, because it had these huge pumps which could throw a one foot wide column of water 100 yards.
He said the captain and the first lieutenant did not get along at all. On one occasion, a ship was set on fire, and the task force commander ordered them to proceed at flank speed to the damaged vessel, which was 4 or 5 miles or so away on the other side of the fleet. The captain set course, and told the lieutenant to signal the ships (with flag signals) in the fleet to give them clear passage. He did so, and my boss said all the ships between them and the damaged ship just got out of the way as fast as they could. When they were about half a mile away, the damaged ship blew up.
After it was over, the captain asked the first lieutenant what he had signaled which made them clear out so fast. The lieutenant replied: “I put up flags which said: STAND CLEAR, I AM TOTALLY OUT OF CONTROL!”.
The captain was furious, and didn't speak to him for a week.
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timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
Patton was the centerpiece of an elaborate deception scheme set up in Dover and Scotland, devised by British Intelligence. It was called Operation Fortitude, and it was designed to make the Germans think the invasion would land at Calais, not Normandy. A fictitious U.S. First Army Group was created under the command of Patton, the general whom the Germans feared most. The Dover-Calais route was the shortest across the Channel, and Rundstedt was already convinced that Calais was the logical place for the enemy to land. (Hitler was not; neither was his astrologers. Both he and they pinpointed Normandy as the landing spot, but interestingly enough this is one time in the war that Hitler allowed the generals to overrule his intuition.) Rundstedt had concentrated his strongest defenses and the 15th Army, his best, at Calais. To keep him there British Intelligence arranged for a mass of dummy installations- landing craft, vehicles, camps and communications- to be stationed around Dover. Radio signals were sent in a code which the Germans could read to strengthen their conviction that Calais was the place. The British Double-Cross System used German spies (all had been captured and "turned" by the British Secret Service) to send reports in secret writing, specifying the various units and assignments of Patton's fake 1st Army Group. Ultra intercepts proved that the Germans had taken the Fortitude bait and believed the Eisenhower possesed a total of 89 divisions, when in fact there were only 47.
(I want to note at this point in the narrative that there are two excellent spy novels that deal with this subject, and the attempts of the German Abwehr to learn whether or not the invasion would arrive in Normandy or Calais: The Eye of the Needle by Ken Follet, and The Unlikely Spy by Daniel Silva. Both can be found at any bookstore or library and are highly recommended.)
To increase Patton's visibility to the Germans, he was instructed to appear frequently in public in the Dover area. He did so. On April 25, at the opening of a club for American servicemen sponsored by British women, he spoke on Anglo-American unity. The two races should work together, Patton said, "since it is the evident destiny of the British and Americans to rule the world." Once again the newspapers on two continents went crazy. Once again Patton gave Eisenhower a tearful apology. Once again Ike sighed, scolded Patton not to let it happen again, and ignored calls for Patton to be sent away.
Patton's indiscetion, however, had no effect on Fortitude, a deception so successful that when the Anglo-Americans began landing on Normandy, the German 15th Army was still waiting for them at Calais.
Patton was the centerpiece of an elaborate deception scheme set up in Dover and Scotland, devised by British Intelligence. It was called Operation Fortitude, and it was designed to make the Germans think the invasion would land at Calais, not Normandy. A fictitious U.S. First Army Group was created under the command of Patton, the general whom the Germans feared most. The Dover-Calais route was the shortest across the Channel, and Rundstedt was already convinced that Calais was the logical place for the enemy to land. (Hitler was not; neither was his astrologers. Both he and they pinpointed Normandy as the landing spot, but interestingly enough this is one time in the war that Hitler allowed the generals to overrule his intuition.) Rundstedt had concentrated his strongest defenses and the 15th Army, his best, at Calais. To keep him there British Intelligence arranged for a mass of dummy installations- landing craft, vehicles, camps and communications- to be stationed around Dover. Radio signals were sent in a code which the Germans could read to strengthen their conviction that Calais was the place. The British Double-Cross System used German spies (all had been captured and "turned" by the British Secret Service) to send reports in secret writing, specifying the various units and assignments of Patton's fake 1st Army Group. Ultra intercepts proved that the Germans had taken the Fortitude bait and believed the Eisenhower possesed a total of 89 divisions, when in fact there were only 47.
(I want to note at this point in the narrative that there are two excellent spy novels that deal with this subject, and the attempts of the German Abwehr to learn whether or not the invasion would arrive in Normandy or Calais: The Eye of the Needle by Ken Follet, and The Unlikely Spy by Daniel Silva. Both can be found at any bookstore or library and are highly recommended.)
To increase Patton's visibility to the Germans, he was instructed to appear frequently in public in the Dover area. He did so. On April 25, at the opening of a club for American servicemen sponsored by British women, he spoke on Anglo-American unity. The two races should work together, Patton said, "since it is the evident destiny of the British and Americans to rule the world." Once again the newspapers on two continents went crazy. Once again Patton gave Eisenhower a tearful apology. Once again Ike sighed, scolded Patton not to let it happen again, and ignored calls for Patton to be sent away.
Patton's indiscetion, however, had no effect on Fortitude, a deception so successful that when the Anglo-Americans began landing on Normandy, the German 15th Army was still waiting for them at Calais.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BURMA II
In May 1942, the Japanese had achieved their objective when they forced the British to withdraw from Burma into India; so they changed over from the offensive to the defense, and sought to consolidate their conquest. The British made plans for the next dry season, in November (with poor roads, it was very difficult to do anything in the monsoon season). However, the limited British Arakan offensive ended in failure. By May 1943, they were back to the same place they had been one year before.
Part of the problem was that Burma was very far down the list of priorities regarding equipment and supplies. Supplies mainly had to come from the USA and Britain, and it was a long way to India. Even when they arrived in India, road and rail transportation was limited to move supplies to the northeast corner of the Indian subcontinent. However, there was a gradual build up of aircraft as the newer ones kept arriving, and the US expanded its industrial capacity.
In this relatively dark period, there was a glimmer of light. General Orde Wingate, a British officer who was a maverick with a tumultous and controversial past, was assigned to the India Burma theater under General Wavell. (Wingate's past is too long and checkered to go into here, but he was accused of sympathizing with the Zionists against British rule in Palestine, did not get along with his superiors—or even his peers; but on the other hand, was extremely successful in organizing guerrilla activities in Ethiopia and East Africa against the Italians).
Wingate suggested that Long Range Penetration Groups, trained to operate in the Burmese jungle, which would be big enough to cause damage to communications and small Japanese outposts, but small enough to avoid detection and capture. He named them Chindits, after a mythical Burmese beast named the Chinthe (half lion and half eagle). The idea was that they would move on land, in the jungle, and could be supplied by air, if necessary. They crossed the Chindwin River and split into two groups with 2200 in the north group and 1000 in the South, in February 1943. They carried out a series of attacks on Japanese outposts, blew up bridges and cut railway lines, and created ambushes on the roads. They proved to be very adept at jungle fighting.
Although the overall casualties to the Japanese were not great, it did lead them to alter their plans. They now decided that they needed to cross the border into India to neutralize Allied offensives into Burma.
As a result, they crossed over into India and threatened Imphal and Kohima. At the time Kohima was held by only 1500 British troops, but they had four divisions, about 60,000 men on the plains of Imphal. General Slim, now in command of the British Army there, brought up reinforcements and was able relieve Kohima when the depleted garrison was making its last stand. In May 1943, they were successful in driving the Japanese back across the Chindwin River.
This move into India was a major strategic blunder for the Japanese. They lost many aircraft, leaving them in a significantly weakened position. In the process, partly because of their unwillingness to acknowledge defeat, they persisted in the offensive long after any prospect of victory was gone. Japanese losses amounted to 50,000 out of the 84,000 they had brought across the river.
This would have an impact in 1944, when the Allies finally began a strong push into Burma.
In May 1942, the Japanese had achieved their objective when they forced the British to withdraw from Burma into India; so they changed over from the offensive to the defense, and sought to consolidate their conquest. The British made plans for the next dry season, in November (with poor roads, it was very difficult to do anything in the monsoon season). However, the limited British Arakan offensive ended in failure. By May 1943, they were back to the same place they had been one year before.
Part of the problem was that Burma was very far down the list of priorities regarding equipment and supplies. Supplies mainly had to come from the USA and Britain, and it was a long way to India. Even when they arrived in India, road and rail transportation was limited to move supplies to the northeast corner of the Indian subcontinent. However, there was a gradual build up of aircraft as the newer ones kept arriving, and the US expanded its industrial capacity.
In this relatively dark period, there was a glimmer of light. General Orde Wingate, a British officer who was a maverick with a tumultous and controversial past, was assigned to the India Burma theater under General Wavell. (Wingate's past is too long and checkered to go into here, but he was accused of sympathizing with the Zionists against British rule in Palestine, did not get along with his superiors—or even his peers; but on the other hand, was extremely successful in organizing guerrilla activities in Ethiopia and East Africa against the Italians).
Wingate suggested that Long Range Penetration Groups, trained to operate in the Burmese jungle, which would be big enough to cause damage to communications and small Japanese outposts, but small enough to avoid detection and capture. He named them Chindits, after a mythical Burmese beast named the Chinthe (half lion and half eagle). The idea was that they would move on land, in the jungle, and could be supplied by air, if necessary. They crossed the Chindwin River and split into two groups with 2200 in the north group and 1000 in the South, in February 1943. They carried out a series of attacks on Japanese outposts, blew up bridges and cut railway lines, and created ambushes on the roads. They proved to be very adept at jungle fighting.
Although the overall casualties to the Japanese were not great, it did lead them to alter their plans. They now decided that they needed to cross the border into India to neutralize Allied offensives into Burma.
As a result, they crossed over into India and threatened Imphal and Kohima. At the time Kohima was held by only 1500 British troops, but they had four divisions, about 60,000 men on the plains of Imphal. General Slim, now in command of the British Army there, brought up reinforcements and was able relieve Kohima when the depleted garrison was making its last stand. In May 1943, they were successful in driving the Japanese back across the Chindwin River.
This move into India was a major strategic blunder for the Japanese. They lost many aircraft, leaving them in a significantly weakened position. In the process, partly because of their unwillingness to acknowledge defeat, they persisted in the offensive long after any prospect of victory was gone. Japanese losses amounted to 50,000 out of the 84,000 they had brought across the river.
This would have an impact in 1944, when the Allies finally began a strong push into Burma.
You do know about the explosion in Halifax harbor in 1917, don't you?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halifax_ExplosionOzymandias said:
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
I know that for Canadians, that was probably World War II (the first being the Pig War). But for the rest of the world, it was WWI.
timschochet
Footballguy
I love reading about Orde Wingate. He first came to my attention in Leon Uris' novel, Exodus, where the character of PP Malcolm (based on Wingate) is responsible for turning the Haganah into a credible fighting force. (He is also responsible for introducing to the Jews the only means of defeating terrorism that has historically proved effective: reprisal.)
He was eccentric, crazy, deeply religious, and one of those guys that Churchill loved, because he was fearless as well. Churchill thought of his as World War II's T.E. Lawrence (another friend of Churchill's). His exploits with the Chindits are great stuff to read about. Sadly, they cost him his life.
There are monuments to Wingate in England, China, Ethiopia what is now Burma, and of course Israel.
He was eccentric, crazy, deeply religious, and one of those guys that Churchill loved, because he was fearless as well. Churchill thought of his as World War II's T.E. Lawrence (another friend of Churchill's). His exploits with the Chindits are great stuff to read about. Sadly, they cost him his life.
There are monuments to Wingate in England, China, Ethiopia what is now Burma, and of course Israel.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Yes, he was controversial, but undeniably brilliant. He was a supporter of unconventional warfare, at a time when the military establishment didn't want to hear those ideas. On the other hand, his men, while disliking him at the time for the intense and rigorous training he put them through, recognized his brilliance and the fact that his focus on hard training saved many lives. His personal courage was not in question, but he took on some of the sacred cows of the British military establishment, and after the war (he died in an airplane crash in Burma), they were critical of him. They were afraid that too much praise for Wingate might encourage indiscipline in the officer corps. One of his lieutenants said that those who criticized him reminded him of the story of the mouse who drank a slug of whiskey and said: "Now show me that damned cat!".
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
The invasion plan called for landings on 5 beaches by 6 divisions of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. On the right were 3 American divisions of the U.S. 1st Army under Omar Bradley, assigned to land at Utah and Omaha beaches; on the left were 1 Canadian and 2 British divisions of the British 2nd Army under Miles Dempsey moving on Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches. Once the beachhead was secured and the advance through France begun, Bradley would take command of the U.S. 12th Army Group while Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges took over 1st Army and Patton's 3rd Army followed the first ashore. On the left, the Canadian 1st Army would follow Dempsey. The Allied objectives were Bayeux, Caen, and the Road to St. Lo. Once Caen was captured (and Monty was confident this would be done in the first day), that would protect the eastern flank of the U.S. 1st as it moved to capture the port of Cherbourg, which was the ultimate goal of the Normandy Invasion. With the capture of this port, the assault of Nazi Europe could not be prevented.
Securing the beach exits was almost as important as landing on them, and to do this Eisenhower decided to employ night drops of one British and two American airborne divisions. The American divisions were the 101st and 82nd airborne, under the command of Matthew Ridgeway. This was a high-risk decision; some of Ike's subordinates believed the casualty rate for the airborne troops could be as high as 70%. But Eisenhower firmly believed the gamble had to be taken, or the D-Day would be lost.
Thus, as D-Day approached, a massive host and mighty armada had been assembled in Britain: men by the millions, ships by the thousands, airplanes and tanks and vehicles by the tens of thousands. The problem was, for them to get to France, a much smaller force was going to have to secure those beaches and seize that port. For the invasion itself, Eisenhower had 150,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 5,300 ships and 12,000 aircraft; and it was upon this enormous preponderance of air power- a ratio of 30 to 1- that he pinned most of his hopes for success.
Perhaps the most ingenious of the new weapons and equipment were the specialized armored vehicles developed by the British under the direction of Maj. Gen. Sir Percy Hobart. There were bulldozer tanks to clear away beach obstacles, flail tanks called Crabs to beat paths through minefields, petard tanks to hurl charges against enemy fortifications, Crocodiles or flamethrowing tanks, and, most revolutionary of all, amphibious tanks called DDs (Dual Drive) which could swim ashore by themselves. After British inventiveness had been joined to Yankee production genius, the specialized armor began flowing to Britain by the thousands. When these were demonstrated to Montgomery and Eisenhower, both showed great enthusiasm, but Omar Bradley, who was to command the American 1st Army on D-Day, was not impressed. Eventually, he accepted only the DD. Such shortsightedness was to have tragic consequences.
We have been spent now a good deal of time discussing the Allied strategy and tactics for the great invasion. But what of the Germans? I will discuss that in the next post.
The invasion plan called for landings on 5 beaches by 6 divisions of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. On the right were 3 American divisions of the U.S. 1st Army under Omar Bradley, assigned to land at Utah and Omaha beaches; on the left were 1 Canadian and 2 British divisions of the British 2nd Army under Miles Dempsey moving on Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches. Once the beachhead was secured and the advance through France begun, Bradley would take command of the U.S. 12th Army Group while Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges took over 1st Army and Patton's 3rd Army followed the first ashore. On the left, the Canadian 1st Army would follow Dempsey. The Allied objectives were Bayeux, Caen, and the Road to St. Lo. Once Caen was captured (and Monty was confident this would be done in the first day), that would protect the eastern flank of the U.S. 1st as it moved to capture the port of Cherbourg, which was the ultimate goal of the Normandy Invasion. With the capture of this port, the assault of Nazi Europe could not be prevented.
Securing the beach exits was almost as important as landing on them, and to do this Eisenhower decided to employ night drops of one British and two American airborne divisions. The American divisions were the 101st and 82nd airborne, under the command of Matthew Ridgeway. This was a high-risk decision; some of Ike's subordinates believed the casualty rate for the airborne troops could be as high as 70%. But Eisenhower firmly believed the gamble had to be taken, or the D-Day would be lost.
Thus, as D-Day approached, a massive host and mighty armada had been assembled in Britain: men by the millions, ships by the thousands, airplanes and tanks and vehicles by the tens of thousands. The problem was, for them to get to France, a much smaller force was going to have to secure those beaches and seize that port. For the invasion itself, Eisenhower had 150,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 5,300 ships and 12,000 aircraft; and it was upon this enormous preponderance of air power- a ratio of 30 to 1- that he pinned most of his hopes for success.
Perhaps the most ingenious of the new weapons and equipment were the specialized armored vehicles developed by the British under the direction of Maj. Gen. Sir Percy Hobart. There were bulldozer tanks to clear away beach obstacles, flail tanks called Crabs to beat paths through minefields, petard tanks to hurl charges against enemy fortifications, Crocodiles or flamethrowing tanks, and, most revolutionary of all, amphibious tanks called DDs (Dual Drive) which could swim ashore by themselves. After British inventiveness had been joined to Yankee production genius, the specialized armor began flowing to Britain by the thousands. When these were demonstrated to Montgomery and Eisenhower, both showed great enthusiasm, but Omar Bradley, who was to command the American 1st Army on D-Day, was not impressed. Eventually, he accepted only the DD. Such shortsightedness was to have tragic consequences.
We have been spent now a good deal of time discussing the Allied strategy and tactics for the great invasion. But what of the Germans? I will discuss that in the next post.
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel- the man who would defend the Atlantic Wall against the Allies- knew full well the awesome might of the enemy air force. He had experienced it in the last days of his desert defeat, and he was aware that it was now much stronger. It was because of this that he had quarreled with his chief, Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. At his headquarters in Paris the aging Rundstedt planned an orthodox defense. With 3,000 miles of coastline to defend with only 59 divisions- many of them second line and only 10 armored- he believed that he must wait until he was certain where the enemy's main blow had come. Then, with the Allies building up for their breakout- the vunerable point- he would launch his counteroffensive.
Rommel disagreed. His experience with Allied air power had taught him that the rear area's railroads and road networks would be so badly bombed and strafed that there would be no chance of a massive counterstroke ever reaching the fighting front. It was because of this conviction that he had worked so hard to strengthen the Atlantic Wall. Within a few months he had laid 4 million mines, compared to 2 million in the three years preceding his arrival. Given time, he proposed to lay 50 to 100 million more. He would surround all strongholds with deep minefields and turn "tankable" country into mine swamps. Because he could not get enough mines, he raided depots and arsenals where he found stocks of millions of old shells which he converted into mines. And he planted them in every imaginable variation, overruling his engineers who wanted to lay them by the book.
Because of his strong mechanical bent, he was quick to see the worth or folly of all the gadgetry proposed to him. Among these, beach and glider obstacles- "Rommel's asparagus", as they were called- were beams driven into the beaches below the low-water mark, some with mines on top, some with steel-cutters to act as "can openers." There were "nutcracker" mines in blocks of concrete and mined logs with a seaward slope. Obsolete tank obstacles were sunk below the high-water mark to impede infantry. Naval mines were sown in shallow waters with floating lines attached to the horns. Ashore, mined poles were planted in the fields to blow up enemy gliders. Deceptions were everywhere- dummy minefields, dummy artillery designed to draw enemy aerial bombardment, which they did- as well as smoke-making equipment to obscure targets and troops alerted to set the dummies afire once the invasion began and thus draw off enemy gunfire.
Rommel was also anxious to use the V-1 rockets against Allied troop concentrations in the south of England. Hitler refused. Even though many of the rocket-launching sites were ready, Der Fuhrer said there were not yet enough to maintain the demoralizing continouous fire he hoped would finally break the British. This was a mistake. Even Eisenhower admitted that if the rockets could have been used "the invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult and perhaps impossible." It was also a mistake for Hitler to refuse to allow Rommel to place his panzer divisions closer to the coast to evade the Allied aerial threat to the movement of his forces. He was allowed to station only one armored division close to the beaches. Yet the Desert Fox remained convinced that the enemy had to be stopped at the water's edge. He knew that the Luftwaffe was now but a broken reed in the limp hands of the drug-addicted Hermann Goering. "The war will be won or lost on the beaches," he told his aide, Capt. Hellmuth Lang. "We'll have only one chance to stop the enemy and that's while he's in the water...struggling to get ashore. Reserves will never get up to the point of attack and it's foolish to consider them...Believe me, Lang, the first 24 hours will be decisive...for the Allies, as well as Germany, it will be the longest day."
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel- the man who would defend the Atlantic Wall against the Allies- knew full well the awesome might of the enemy air force. He had experienced it in the last days of his desert defeat, and he was aware that it was now much stronger. It was because of this that he had quarreled with his chief, Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. At his headquarters in Paris the aging Rundstedt planned an orthodox defense. With 3,000 miles of coastline to defend with only 59 divisions- many of them second line and only 10 armored- he believed that he must wait until he was certain where the enemy's main blow had come. Then, with the Allies building up for their breakout- the vunerable point- he would launch his counteroffensive.
Rommel disagreed. His experience with Allied air power had taught him that the rear area's railroads and road networks would be so badly bombed and strafed that there would be no chance of a massive counterstroke ever reaching the fighting front. It was because of this conviction that he had worked so hard to strengthen the Atlantic Wall. Within a few months he had laid 4 million mines, compared to 2 million in the three years preceding his arrival. Given time, he proposed to lay 50 to 100 million more. He would surround all strongholds with deep minefields and turn "tankable" country into mine swamps. Because he could not get enough mines, he raided depots and arsenals where he found stocks of millions of old shells which he converted into mines. And he planted them in every imaginable variation, overruling his engineers who wanted to lay them by the book.
Because of his strong mechanical bent, he was quick to see the worth or folly of all the gadgetry proposed to him. Among these, beach and glider obstacles- "Rommel's asparagus", as they were called- were beams driven into the beaches below the low-water mark, some with mines on top, some with steel-cutters to act as "can openers." There were "nutcracker" mines in blocks of concrete and mined logs with a seaward slope. Obsolete tank obstacles were sunk below the high-water mark to impede infantry. Naval mines were sown in shallow waters with floating lines attached to the horns. Ashore, mined poles were planted in the fields to blow up enemy gliders. Deceptions were everywhere- dummy minefields, dummy artillery designed to draw enemy aerial bombardment, which they did- as well as smoke-making equipment to obscure targets and troops alerted to set the dummies afire once the invasion began and thus draw off enemy gunfire.
Rommel was also anxious to use the V-1 rockets against Allied troop concentrations in the south of England. Hitler refused. Even though many of the rocket-launching sites were ready, Der Fuhrer said there were not yet enough to maintain the demoralizing continouous fire he hoped would finally break the British. This was a mistake. Even Eisenhower admitted that if the rockets could have been used "the invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult and perhaps impossible." It was also a mistake for Hitler to refuse to allow Rommel to place his panzer divisions closer to the coast to evade the Allied aerial threat to the movement of his forces. He was allowed to station only one armored division close to the beaches. Yet the Desert Fox remained convinced that the enemy had to be stopped at the water's edge. He knew that the Luftwaffe was now but a broken reed in the limp hands of the drug-addicted Hermann Goering. "The war will be won or lost on the beaches," he told his aide, Capt. Hellmuth Lang. "We'll have only one chance to stop the enemy and that's while he's in the water...struggling to get ashore. Reserves will never get up to the point of attack and it's foolish to consider them...Believe me, Lang, the first 24 hours will be decisive...for the Allies, as well as Germany, it will be the longest day."
There's a BBC mini-series on him. It's in my Netflix queue. Just bumped it to the top. I'll let you guys know if it's worth watching.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Sixty four years after the end of WW2, most of the "greatest generation" have passed on. When the war started, they were students and cowboys, mechanics and doctors, assembly line workers and accountants, salesmen and teachers. They went to war because their country needed them, and they rose to the challenge. They fought for their flag and their homes, their country and their loved ones; but most of all, they fought for their comrades. They saw their friends blown up, their buddies die in their arms, their companions severely wounded. Through it all, they persevered, and came home with honor.
We should ever remember all of them; those who died, and those who lived.
We should ever remember all of them; those who died, and those who lived.
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
Weather would dictate the date of the day. The sea had to be calm for invasion ships, the tides low to frustrate Rommel's underwater obstacles and the moon bright and skies clear for the night drops. There was no way of planning for storms. A really violent blow could wreck the invasion. The Allies' only advantages- support from the air and gunfire ships- would be cancelled out. If Overlord failed because of the weather, it would take months to plan and mount another invasion. Certainly there could not be another in 1944.
On the night of June 2, RAF Group Commander JJ Stagg, Ike's chief weatherman, met with the supreme commander and his deputies in the HQ at Southwick House. Stagg had bad news: the weather for June 5- D-Day- would be bad. Overcast and stormy. Eisenhower had to make an immediate decision. The ships carrying Bradley to Utah and Omaha, the beaches farthest away, had to be notified whether to sail or stay in port. Ike decided to set them in motion subject to a last minute cancellation. Final decision would be made next morning.
The same group met several hours later, at 4:30 am on the morning of June 4. Stagg reported that the sea had abated somewhat but that there would be little chance of using the air force. Eisenhower polled his commanders. The atmosphere was tense; thousands of lives were on the line, and what was at stake was nothing less than the outcome of the entire war. Montgomery wanted to go; Leigh-Mallory and Tedder were for a postponement, and Admiral Ramsey was neutral. Not to use his air superiority was too great a risk for Eisenhower; he decided to postpone the invasion for 24 hours. Word went out to the American fleet. With superb skill the ships put about and sailed through the storm back to port, refueling there and preparing to sail the next day. That night another meeting was held. Stagg was cheerful this time, predicting that the weather was moving faster than anticipated, and that June 6 should have fair conditions.
Leigh-Mallory and Tedder were still dubious. It was still too great a risk, in their view. Monty was all for going. Ramsey told Ike that if there was a delay again, it would mean a 48 hour delay this time, and with another storm coming in, that meant a possible delay till June 19, which Tedder expressed favor for. So once again, with his subordinates disagreeing, the decision fell to Eisenhower. With amazing calm, he said that he would "sleep on it for a few hours." And, retiring to his trailer, that's exactly what he did.
Who can say what goes through the mind of a man as he is forced to make a decision such as this, which would affect the future of not only his country, but the whole world? Eisenhower records in his memoirs that he was thinking about how a month's delay had ruined Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union. 30 days lost to the Allies could mean a winter on the Siegfried Line rather than an autumn offensive through it. A delay could also allow the Germans to learn that the target was really Normandy, not Calais. Yet if the weathermen were wrong, and the storm did not abate...the battle would be lost before it started.
Eisenhower returned to the mess room after the two hour nap. The rain began to stop and the winds subsided. Everyone stared at him expectantly. For five minutes, Dwight Eisenhower sat on a sofa in profound silence, and no one said a word. Then he glanced up.
"Okay," he said briskly, "We'll go."
Weather would dictate the date of the day. The sea had to be calm for invasion ships, the tides low to frustrate Rommel's underwater obstacles and the moon bright and skies clear for the night drops. There was no way of planning for storms. A really violent blow could wreck the invasion. The Allies' only advantages- support from the air and gunfire ships- would be cancelled out. If Overlord failed because of the weather, it would take months to plan and mount another invasion. Certainly there could not be another in 1944.
On the night of June 2, RAF Group Commander JJ Stagg, Ike's chief weatherman, met with the supreme commander and his deputies in the HQ at Southwick House. Stagg had bad news: the weather for June 5- D-Day- would be bad. Overcast and stormy. Eisenhower had to make an immediate decision. The ships carrying Bradley to Utah and Omaha, the beaches farthest away, had to be notified whether to sail or stay in port. Ike decided to set them in motion subject to a last minute cancellation. Final decision would be made next morning.
The same group met several hours later, at 4:30 am on the morning of June 4. Stagg reported that the sea had abated somewhat but that there would be little chance of using the air force. Eisenhower polled his commanders. The atmosphere was tense; thousands of lives were on the line, and what was at stake was nothing less than the outcome of the entire war. Montgomery wanted to go; Leigh-Mallory and Tedder were for a postponement, and Admiral Ramsey was neutral. Not to use his air superiority was too great a risk for Eisenhower; he decided to postpone the invasion for 24 hours. Word went out to the American fleet. With superb skill the ships put about and sailed through the storm back to port, refueling there and preparing to sail the next day. That night another meeting was held. Stagg was cheerful this time, predicting that the weather was moving faster than anticipated, and that June 6 should have fair conditions.
Leigh-Mallory and Tedder were still dubious. It was still too great a risk, in their view. Monty was all for going. Ramsey told Ike that if there was a delay again, it would mean a 48 hour delay this time, and with another storm coming in, that meant a possible delay till June 19, which Tedder expressed favor for. So once again, with his subordinates disagreeing, the decision fell to Eisenhower. With amazing calm, he said that he would "sleep on it for a few hours." And, retiring to his trailer, that's exactly what he did.
Who can say what goes through the mind of a man as he is forced to make a decision such as this, which would affect the future of not only his country, but the whole world? Eisenhower records in his memoirs that he was thinking about how a month's delay had ruined Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union. 30 days lost to the Allies could mean a winter on the Siegfried Line rather than an autumn offensive through it. A delay could also allow the Germans to learn that the target was really Normandy, not Calais. Yet if the weathermen were wrong, and the storm did not abate...the battle would be lost before it started.
Eisenhower returned to the mess room after the two hour nap. The rain began to stop and the winds subsided. Everyone stared at him expectantly. For five minutes, Dwight Eisenhower sat on a sofa in profound silence, and no one said a word. Then he glanced up.
"Okay," he said briskly, "We'll go."
Last edited by a moderator:
timschochet
Footballguy
Before I continue with Overlord, I want to discuss at this point the impact the landing at Normandy had on the American people. With the exceptions of V-E Day and V-J Day, no event in World War II so transfixed the public as this one. It is not hyperbole to state that every radio in every household in the United States was tuned into CBS or NBC that morning of June 6, describing the invasion of Europe that had come at last. Chaim Potok's fine novel, The Chosen, describes the event in this passage:
The noise quieted a little, but the radio was still blaring. I couldn't make it out too clearly because every now and then someone would interrupt with a shout or a cheer. The announcer was talking about places called Caen and Carentan. He said something about a British airborne division seizing bridgeheads and two American airborne divisions stopping enemy troops from moving into the Cotentin Peninsula. I didn't recognize any of the names, and I wondered why everyone was so excited. There was war news all the time, but no one ever got this excited; something very special was happening...the announcer was saying something about the Isle of Wight and the Normandy coast and Royal Air Force bombers attacking enemy coast-defense guns and United States Air Force bombers attacking shore defenses. I suddenly realized what was happening and my heart began to beat quickly.
Years ago when I first read this passage, I asked my grandfather how he remembered it. (He was working for Lockheed during World War II.) He told me a similar story. That he remembered my grandmother waking him up early that morning (California time) and they both listened in astonishment. Everywhere he went that day, he remembered, everyone was listening to the radio. And everyone was cheering.
The noise quieted a little, but the radio was still blaring. I couldn't make it out too clearly because every now and then someone would interrupt with a shout or a cheer. The announcer was talking about places called Caen and Carentan. He said something about a British airborne division seizing bridgeheads and two American airborne divisions stopping enemy troops from moving into the Cotentin Peninsula. I didn't recognize any of the names, and I wondered why everyone was so excited. There was war news all the time, but no one ever got this excited; something very special was happening...the announcer was saying something about the Isle of Wight and the Normandy coast and Royal Air Force bombers attacking enemy coast-defense guns and United States Air Force bombers attacking shore defenses. I suddenly realized what was happening and my heart began to beat quickly.
Years ago when I first read this passage, I asked my grandfather how he remembered it. (He was working for Lockheed during World War II.) He told me a similar story. That he remembered my grandmother waking him up early that morning (California time) and they both listened in astonishment. Everywhere he went that day, he remembered, everyone was listening to the radio. And everyone was cheering.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
That is what is known as the "loneliness of command".Churchill wrote about that: "Faced with the desperate alternatives of accepting the immediate risks or postponing the attack for at least a fortnight, General Eisenhower boldly, and as it proved, wisely, chose to go ahead with the operation. At 4 am on June 5, the die was irrevocably cast: the invasion would be launched June 6. In retrospect this decision rightly evokes admiration. It was amply justified by events, and largely responsible for gaining us the precious advantage of surprise. We now know that the German meteorological officers informed their High Command that the invasion on the 5th or 6th of June would not be possible due to stormy weather."timschochet said:
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
By nightfall of June 5 the great invasion fleet was on its way, converging on the Normandy coast from British ports stretching from Wales to the North Sea. Overhead thundered the transport planes carrying 24,000 airborne troops- one third British, two thirds American- who were to land behind German lines and seal the beachheads. The British were to secure the Anglo-Canadian left flank, while the American 82nd and 101st Airborne were to seize that wide lagoon to the rear of Utah and Omaha. If they did not and it was held by the Germans instead, the Yankee beaches could become a slaughter pen.
It did not go smoothly. Many of the Allied pilots were frightened by German flak and flew badly. Some of them released their human loads as far as 35 miles from their targets. But the loss of only 20 Allied aircraft proved that the enemy AA was not intense. Still, the Americans suffered severely from the erratic drops. Jumping into high winds, they were carried far from their objectives, some landing in treetops to be rescued by their comrades or cut down and imprisoned by the Germans. Others drowned.
The 82nd under Maj. Gen. Matthew Ridgeway had the most concentrated drop. Having the advantage of surprise, three guarters of its leading regiment landed within 3 miles of the drop zone. They quickly seized St. Mere Eglise to block the Cherbourg-Carentan road. But they were unable to hold it in the face of counterattacks by the German 91st Infantry Division, which had been specially trained to resist airborne assault. Airborne troops, for all their bravery and splendid physical condition, are powerless in the face of armor and artilllery. Dropping at night in a foreign country, the Americans had no landmarks to guide them. Thousands of men miles from their targets took on the Germans whenever they met them, spreading bewilderment and confusion among the German soldiers. But because its men were so scattered, the 82nd was unable to seize the bridgeheads over the Merderet River to protect its crossings.
Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor's 101st Airborne was more fortunate, its paratroopers landing in an area not so strongly defended. But they too were so widely scattered that by daylight Taylor had been able to concentrate only one sixth of his command. Before then, however, he had been reinforced by a landing of 50 gliders. With these he captured all the exits of all the causeways behind Utah Beach and occupied an abandoned German gun battery.
Although the American airborne divisions had not accomplished all their missions, they had opened the western end of the Cotentin front for movement inland and had so rattled the German 91st that it was forced to give battle in the swamps and orchards of the Merderet Valley rather than to counterattack on the beaches.
By nightfall of June 5 the great invasion fleet was on its way, converging on the Normandy coast from British ports stretching from Wales to the North Sea. Overhead thundered the transport planes carrying 24,000 airborne troops- one third British, two thirds American- who were to land behind German lines and seal the beachheads. The British were to secure the Anglo-Canadian left flank, while the American 82nd and 101st Airborne were to seize that wide lagoon to the rear of Utah and Omaha. If they did not and it was held by the Germans instead, the Yankee beaches could become a slaughter pen.
It did not go smoothly. Many of the Allied pilots were frightened by German flak and flew badly. Some of them released their human loads as far as 35 miles from their targets. But the loss of only 20 Allied aircraft proved that the enemy AA was not intense. Still, the Americans suffered severely from the erratic drops. Jumping into high winds, they were carried far from their objectives, some landing in treetops to be rescued by their comrades or cut down and imprisoned by the Germans. Others drowned.
The 82nd under Maj. Gen. Matthew Ridgeway had the most concentrated drop. Having the advantage of surprise, three guarters of its leading regiment landed within 3 miles of the drop zone. They quickly seized St. Mere Eglise to block the Cherbourg-Carentan road. But they were unable to hold it in the face of counterattacks by the German 91st Infantry Division, which had been specially trained to resist airborne assault. Airborne troops, for all their bravery and splendid physical condition, are powerless in the face of armor and artilllery. Dropping at night in a foreign country, the Americans had no landmarks to guide them. Thousands of men miles from their targets took on the Germans whenever they met them, spreading bewilderment and confusion among the German soldiers. But because its men were so scattered, the 82nd was unable to seize the bridgeheads over the Merderet River to protect its crossings.
Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor's 101st Airborne was more fortunate, its paratroopers landing in an area not so strongly defended. But they too were so widely scattered that by daylight Taylor had been able to concentrate only one sixth of his command. Before then, however, he had been reinforced by a landing of 50 gliders. With these he captured all the exits of all the causeways behind Utah Beach and occupied an abandoned German gun battery.
Although the American airborne divisions had not accomplished all their missions, they had opened the western end of the Cotentin front for movement inland and had so rattled the German 91st that it was forced to give battle in the swamps and orchards of the Merderet Valley rather than to counterattack on the beaches.
timschochet
Footballguy
Overlord, Continued
German reaction to the Allied air invasion was sluggish indeed. Hitler's intelligence officers had been aware for some time that an Allied signal for a rising of the French Resistance would also proclaim D-Day. The signal was for the first two lines from a poem by the Frenchman Paul Verlane: The long sobs of the violins of autumn/Wounding my heart with monotonous languor. On June 1 the British broadcast the first line, which was intercepted and understood by the Germans. On the night of June 5 the second was broadcast and decoded by the German 15th Army at Calais. But it was ignored, probably because the Germans never regarded the French Resistance as anything more than a nuisance, incapable of major operations.
But there was no excuse for many other oversights and omissions. For one, the German navy, convinced that the weather was unfit for invasion, had failed to station patrols in the Channel. Allied minesweeping activity begun with last light of June 5 was ignored. Most detrimental was the absence from HQ of so many top commanders. No one alerted the 21st Panzer Divison, close to the beaches, because no one knew the whereabouts of Gen. Edgar Feuchtlinger, its commander. Wherever he was, it was believed that he was accompanied by a lady. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had gone home to Germany to visit his family and Gen. Friedrich Dollman, 7th Army's chief, was far away in Rennes on an exercise based on an Allied invasion of France! Gerd von Rundstedt was still in Paris listending to his arteries harden, and his staff refused to alert any of his forces on the coast. Instead, they confined themselves to a general warning that the BBC signal might set off an outbreak of sabotage. Gradually, one by one, the various forces were alerted. But German confusion became compounded by the Allied drops of thousands of dummy paratroops. A regiment of bicyclists sent speeding toward a drop zone found only hundreds of sacks attached to parachutes. So many dummies led to German uncertainty about a possible bluff. It was not until 6:00 am that Rundstedt's HQ called the German high command to say that a major invasion was taking place and to ask for release of the armored reserve. But no one dared awake Hitler from his drugged sleep, and the appeal was denied. A little later, General von Salmuth, commander of the 15th Army at Calais, having received reports that his forces could cope with any invasion, went to bed. It was not until after 10:30 am, following the Allied announcement of the invasion, that Rommel was notified. He at once began driving toward the front at high speed, but did not reach La Roche Guyon until 12 hours later. His "longest day" by then was more than half over.
Most significant was the German uncertainty over whether the Normandy landings were THE invasion or merely a feint or a diversion. Fortitude had completely deceived them. Evern the ferocity of the Allied aerial onslaught failed to remove their doubts, if only because the Calais area was worked over nearly as thoroughly as the Contentin. A massive umbrella of thousands upon thousands of Allied fighters and attack bombers ranged over the French interior or swooped down on the invasion beaches to bomb and strafe them. During the night a thousand British heavy bombers struck the coastal defenses, and just before the Omaha landings began, a thousand American bombers roared over the Channel to deliver the final blow: a blanket of 13,000 tons of bombs. Unfortunately, almost all of these cascaded harmlessly into the empty hedgerows 3 miles inland. Because of the smoke and overcast obscuring the beaches, Allied air was reluctant to risk hitting friendly boats and troops and so delayed the drop long enough to guarantee safety but also to cancel out the contribution.
Before dawn, the Normandy coast flickered in the flares and flashes of intensive naval gunfire. There were 9 battleships, 23 cruisers, 104 destroyers and 71 corvettes in the bombardment force, which also gave protection to 6,483 vessels of every description: merchantmen and luxury liners converted into troop ships, tank lighters and 4,000 landing crafts and barges to carry troops and guns ashore. The battleships and cruisers stood well out on the Channel to shoot at selected targets. Destroyers with 5 inchers fingering the sky sped inshore to rake the pillboxes. Rocket ships loosed their flights of missiles, and while the minesweepers cleared lanes for the landing craft, frogmen in green rubber suits leaped into the surf to blow up underwater obstacles. Then the bombardment lifted. An eerie silence broken by sporadic gunfire sttled over the beaches. Now, as always, it was up to the foot soldier with the hand gun.
German reaction to the Allied air invasion was sluggish indeed. Hitler's intelligence officers had been aware for some time that an Allied signal for a rising of the French Resistance would also proclaim D-Day. The signal was for the first two lines from a poem by the Frenchman Paul Verlane: The long sobs of the violins of autumn/Wounding my heart with monotonous languor. On June 1 the British broadcast the first line, which was intercepted and understood by the Germans. On the night of June 5 the second was broadcast and decoded by the German 15th Army at Calais. But it was ignored, probably because the Germans never regarded the French Resistance as anything more than a nuisance, incapable of major operations.
But there was no excuse for many other oversights and omissions. For one, the German navy, convinced that the weather was unfit for invasion, had failed to station patrols in the Channel. Allied minesweeping activity begun with last light of June 5 was ignored. Most detrimental was the absence from HQ of so many top commanders. No one alerted the 21st Panzer Divison, close to the beaches, because no one knew the whereabouts of Gen. Edgar Feuchtlinger, its commander. Wherever he was, it was believed that he was accompanied by a lady. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had gone home to Germany to visit his family and Gen. Friedrich Dollman, 7th Army's chief, was far away in Rennes on an exercise based on an Allied invasion of France! Gerd von Rundstedt was still in Paris listending to his arteries harden, and his staff refused to alert any of his forces on the coast. Instead, they confined themselves to a general warning that the BBC signal might set off an outbreak of sabotage. Gradually, one by one, the various forces were alerted. But German confusion became compounded by the Allied drops of thousands of dummy paratroops. A regiment of bicyclists sent speeding toward a drop zone found only hundreds of sacks attached to parachutes. So many dummies led to German uncertainty about a possible bluff. It was not until 6:00 am that Rundstedt's HQ called the German high command to say that a major invasion was taking place and to ask for release of the armored reserve. But no one dared awake Hitler from his drugged sleep, and the appeal was denied. A little later, General von Salmuth, commander of the 15th Army at Calais, having received reports that his forces could cope with any invasion, went to bed. It was not until after 10:30 am, following the Allied announcement of the invasion, that Rommel was notified. He at once began driving toward the front at high speed, but did not reach La Roche Guyon until 12 hours later. His "longest day" by then was more than half over.
Most significant was the German uncertainty over whether the Normandy landings were THE invasion or merely a feint or a diversion. Fortitude had completely deceived them. Evern the ferocity of the Allied aerial onslaught failed to remove their doubts, if only because the Calais area was worked over nearly as thoroughly as the Contentin. A massive umbrella of thousands upon thousands of Allied fighters and attack bombers ranged over the French interior or swooped down on the invasion beaches to bomb and strafe them. During the night a thousand British heavy bombers struck the coastal defenses, and just before the Omaha landings began, a thousand American bombers roared over the Channel to deliver the final blow: a blanket of 13,000 tons of bombs. Unfortunately, almost all of these cascaded harmlessly into the empty hedgerows 3 miles inland. Because of the smoke and overcast obscuring the beaches, Allied air was reluctant to risk hitting friendly boats and troops and so delayed the drop long enough to guarantee safety but also to cancel out the contribution.
Before dawn, the Normandy coast flickered in the flares and flashes of intensive naval gunfire. There were 9 battleships, 23 cruisers, 104 destroyers and 71 corvettes in the bombardment force, which also gave protection to 6,483 vessels of every description: merchantmen and luxury liners converted into troop ships, tank lighters and 4,000 landing crafts and barges to carry troops and guns ashore. The battleships and cruisers stood well out on the Channel to shoot at selected targets. Destroyers with 5 inchers fingering the sky sped inshore to rake the pillboxes. Rocket ships loosed their flights of missiles, and while the minesweepers cleared lanes for the landing craft, frogmen in green rubber suits leaped into the surf to blow up underwater obstacles. Then the bombardment lifted. An eerie silence broken by sporadic gunfire sttled over the beaches. Now, as always, it was up to the foot soldier with the hand gun.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Interestingly enough, Hitler was convinced the landings would be in Normandy. But the German High Command thought they would be at Calais. Neither Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (the German commander-in-chief) nor Rommel believed the Allies would mount an invasion in such inclement weather that their forecasters had predicted would be as high as Force 7 in the Cherbourg sector, and Force 6 in the Pas de Calais. (Force 6 is 25-30 mph; Force 7 is 30-38 mph). Those winds would create heavy surf conditions, and make landings virtually impossible. They also knew, that if the Allies didn't come between June 4-6, they would have to postpone for 2 weeks (because of tides and moonlight).
In Paris, at OB West, Stagg’s counterpart, the chief German meteorologist, a major named Lettau, advised his superiors that any invasion after June 4 was unlikely due to the bad weather. Von Rundstedt notified Berlin that, “As yet, there is no immediate prospect of the invasion.” General Walter Warlimont, the deputy chief of operations for the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW – the German armed forces high command) later wrote that Berlin “had not the slightest idea that the decisive event of the war was upon them.”
Rommel used the bad weather to return to Germany for his wife Lucie’s birthday on June 6 and, he hoped, to see Hitler to whom he intended to make a personal plea for greater priority for his army group. When he departed by automobile for his home near Ulm, early on June 4, Rommel was confident that nothing untoward would occur in his absence.
Rommel’s chief naval advisor, and later a respected postwar military historian, Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, marveled that Eisenhower made such an important decision without recourse to higher authority, noting that no one in the German chain of command would have dared. It was, Ruge believed, “one of the truly great decisions in military history.”
In Paris, at OB West, Stagg’s counterpart, the chief German meteorologist, a major named Lettau, advised his superiors that any invasion after June 4 was unlikely due to the bad weather. Von Rundstedt notified Berlin that, “As yet, there is no immediate prospect of the invasion.” General Walter Warlimont, the deputy chief of operations for the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW – the German armed forces high command) later wrote that Berlin “had not the slightest idea that the decisive event of the war was upon them.”
Rommel used the bad weather to return to Germany for his wife Lucie’s birthday on June 6 and, he hoped, to see Hitler to whom he intended to make a personal plea for greater priority for his army group. When he departed by automobile for his home near Ulm, early on June 4, Rommel was confident that nothing untoward would occur in his absence.
Rommel’s chief naval advisor, and later a respected postwar military historian, Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, marveled that Eisenhower made such an important decision without recourse to higher authority, noting that no one in the German chain of command would have dared. It was, Ruge believed, “one of the truly great decisions in military history.”
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Mjolnirs
Footballguy
timschochet
Footballguy
The Normandy Landings - Utah Beach
At Utah Beach on the American right a strong current swept the 4th Infantry Division's spearheads 2,000 yards south of their designated area. Usually, such a mishap can be disastrous, but at Utah it was fortunate. The Americans came ashore at the most lightly defended sector of the entire front. The Germans had thought it unlikely that the "Amis" would land immediately in front of the widely flooded areas behind the beaches there. Of 32 DDs assigned to Utah, 28 came successfully ashore.
The Germans defending Utah were almost relieved to see the Americans approach. Throughout the night and early morning they had lain quaking and quivering beneath the Allied bombing, their hands covering their ears. Many of the bunkers, all the 50mm guns, and the lone 75mm cannon had been destroyed. "Everything's wrecked! We've got to surrender!" an elderly mess orderly cried. But the commanding officer, 23 year old Lt. Arthur Jahnke, a wounded and decorated veteran of the Soviet front, calmed his men and ordered them to fight. All Jahnke had left was an 88 and the gun of an old Renault tank dug into the sand, plus some machine guns and mortars. To their dismay Jahnke and his men saw that the Americans were landing at low tide. All of Rommel's obstacles and guns were designed or sited for a high-water landing. Now the Americans either avoided or blew up Rommel's clearly visible "asparagus". The Germans also gaped at the sight of the DD Shermans rising from the sea like monsters to come against them with flaming 75s. Within a few minutes Jahnke and his guns were both knocked out, and he awoke to find himself and his men American prisoners.
Most of the Germans of the 709th Division also surrendered. As the American spearheads mopped up the beaches, the engineers completed demolition of the obstacles. Artillery, vehicles of every description and supplies came pouring ashore. The 4th's soldiers found an undefended beach exist across the flooded fields while the 101st Airborne held 4 more open for them. Soon the Americans were moving across the floods. By nightfall, 23,000 men of Lightnin' Joe Collins VII Corps had come ashore at a cost of only 197 casualties. Good fortune and good judgment had combined to make a military miracle.
And this was just as well, for at Omaha Beach, the exact opposite was occuring, as we shall see.
At Utah Beach on the American right a strong current swept the 4th Infantry Division's spearheads 2,000 yards south of their designated area. Usually, such a mishap can be disastrous, but at Utah it was fortunate. The Americans came ashore at the most lightly defended sector of the entire front. The Germans had thought it unlikely that the "Amis" would land immediately in front of the widely flooded areas behind the beaches there. Of 32 DDs assigned to Utah, 28 came successfully ashore.
The Germans defending Utah were almost relieved to see the Americans approach. Throughout the night and early morning they had lain quaking and quivering beneath the Allied bombing, their hands covering their ears. Many of the bunkers, all the 50mm guns, and the lone 75mm cannon had been destroyed. "Everything's wrecked! We've got to surrender!" an elderly mess orderly cried. But the commanding officer, 23 year old Lt. Arthur Jahnke, a wounded and decorated veteran of the Soviet front, calmed his men and ordered them to fight. All Jahnke had left was an 88 and the gun of an old Renault tank dug into the sand, plus some machine guns and mortars. To their dismay Jahnke and his men saw that the Americans were landing at low tide. All of Rommel's obstacles and guns were designed or sited for a high-water landing. Now the Americans either avoided or blew up Rommel's clearly visible "asparagus". The Germans also gaped at the sight of the DD Shermans rising from the sea like monsters to come against them with flaming 75s. Within a few minutes Jahnke and his guns were both knocked out, and he awoke to find himself and his men American prisoners.
Most of the Germans of the 709th Division also surrendered. As the American spearheads mopped up the beaches, the engineers completed demolition of the obstacles. Artillery, vehicles of every description and supplies came pouring ashore. The 4th's soldiers found an undefended beach exist across the flooded fields while the 101st Airborne held 4 more open for them. Soon the Americans were moving across the floods. By nightfall, 23,000 men of Lightnin' Joe Collins VII Corps had come ashore at a cost of only 197 casualties. Good fortune and good judgment had combined to make a military miracle.
And this was just as well, for at Omaha Beach, the exact opposite was occuring, as we shall see.
timschochet
Footballguy
I will try to start narrating the events of Omaha Beach tonight. It is a key battle of the war, and deserves some time and effort. Of course, nothing that I relate here will come close to expressing in any way the true horrors suffered by the Americans who fought there, as well as their incredible bravery. The opening sequence of Saving Private Ryan probably did a pretty good job of capturing this moment in American history for those of us who, thankfully, were not there to witness it personally.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
GERMAN DISAGREEMENT
In addition to confusion as to where the landings would come, whether Calais or Normandy, the Germans had disagreements as to how to respond to the invasion. Von Runstendt favored a defense in depth, with a powerful counteroffensive to defeat them once they were committed. Whereas Rommel had experienced the overwhelming airpower that the Allies could bring to bear once the invasion started. His staff said that he remembered being pinned down in North Africa for days by an air force not nearly as strong as what he had to face now. He believed that the only option was to hit them at the beaches, as soon as they landed.
Rommel commanded Army Group B, under Von Runstendt, who was the commander on the Western Front, reporting to the German General Staff. However, Panzer Group West, which was the Armored Reserve, did not report to Rommel, but to Von Runstendt, through General Von Schweppenburg. And then there was Hitler.
Von Rundstedt wanted the Panzer Group in reserve some distance from the front, to counterattack Allied penetrations. However, Rommel was convinced that Allied airpower and artillery would not allow the Germans the freedom to move large formations, and so insisted that the Panzers should be deployed much closer to the frontline. In the event, Hitler refused to allow his commanders to commit the Panzer Group without his explicit authorisation, and so when the Allied Invasion began on 6 June 1944, Panzer Group West remained immobile.
P.S. Sorry Tim, I realized that some of this you had posted before.
In addition to confusion as to where the landings would come, whether Calais or Normandy, the Germans had disagreements as to how to respond to the invasion. Von Runstendt favored a defense in depth, with a powerful counteroffensive to defeat them once they were committed. Whereas Rommel had experienced the overwhelming airpower that the Allies could bring to bear once the invasion started. His staff said that he remembered being pinned down in North Africa for days by an air force not nearly as strong as what he had to face now. He believed that the only option was to hit them at the beaches, as soon as they landed.
Rommel commanded Army Group B, under Von Runstendt, who was the commander on the Western Front, reporting to the German General Staff. However, Panzer Group West, which was the Armored Reserve, did not report to Rommel, but to Von Runstendt, through General Von Schweppenburg. And then there was Hitler.
Von Rundstedt wanted the Panzer Group in reserve some distance from the front, to counterattack Allied penetrations. However, Rommel was convinced that Allied airpower and artillery would not allow the Germans the freedom to move large formations, and so insisted that the Panzers should be deployed much closer to the frontline. In the event, Hitler refused to allow his commanders to commit the Panzer Group without his explicit authorisation, and so when the Allied Invasion began on 6 June 1944, Panzer Group West remained immobile.
P.S. Sorry Tim, I realized that some of this you had posted before.
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timschochet
Footballguy
The Normandy Landings- Omaha Beach- Part 1
Omaha Beach gave a dreadful and deadly demonstration of Murphy's Law: All that can go wrong will go wrong at the wrong time. It was at this sector around Vierville and St. Laurent that the American bombers, fearing to hit their own craft and troops, had delayed thier drop until the bombs crashed uselessly behind the German defenders. Here also Rommel had stationed the 352nd Division, one of his finest, and British Intelligence's warnings to this effect were all but ignored by General Gerow's staff. Here too the Germans held the strongest natural positions facing the entire Overlord assault: hills and cliffs rising steeply up to 200 feet from the beach and the sea wall above it. At Omaha was the greatest concentration of enemy fire on the 60 mile invasion front. Finally, Gerow's tactical dispositions and handling of his troops all but guaranteed disaster and were redeemed only by the bravery of his soldiers.
Gerow can hardly be criticized for planning a frontal assault, however; there was no room for manuever at Omaha. But his staff might have evolved some plan of maneuver for opening the 5 vital beach exits, and their elaborate timetables were nothing short of an invitation to disaster in even the calmest seas. The V Corps also declined to use all but the DDs of the specialized armor developed by the British. Gerow's soldiers were also boated in darkness 12 miles from the beach, rather than the 7 miles used by the British. Even 7 is quite a distance for troops in LCVPs to travel, especially in the choppy, 10 knot seas off Omaha. But 12 in those rough waters was either a serious error of judgment or the result of the reluctance of the transports to come in that close. It took V Corp's spearheads 3 hours to reach the beaches, and by then most of them had thrown up their breakfasts, all were drenched and many were seasick, covered with puke and caked with salt. Finally, Gerow weighed down his soldiers with an incredible load of equipment, much of it unnecessary or useless. Each man carried a gas mask (!), hand grenades, pole or satchel charges, half pound blocks of TNT, two bandoliers of rifle ammunition, first-aid kit and canteen: a total of 68 pounds. When this is added to his rifle, helmet, bayonet, boots, cartridge belt and clothing, the figure approaches 90 pounds! Even the best-conditioned athletes in the world could not go careening around a battlefield for hours so encumbered. (And remember, as I mentioned, they were all drenched.)
At the outset at least 10 LCVPs were swamped by high waves, drowning most of their occupants. Attempts to land artillery from amphibious trucks called Ducks were a disaster, 26 guns lost. Some rockets fired from far offshore fell short among the assault boats. From some unknown incompetent came the order to launch 32 DDs 3 and a half miles out in heavy seas. 5 of them reached the beach and the other 27 sank like stones, drowning most of their crews. Without the tanks to take enemy fortifications under fire, the infantry had to storm the beaches themselves, flesh against fire. When the tanks did arrive, they came behind, not ahead of, the 8 spearhead companies- 1,450 soldiers in 36 landing craft.
Heavy machine-gun and mortar fire greeted these men as they waded ashore. Many were wounded before they reached dry land and had to struggle painfully up the beach, heading for the protection of the sea wall. Others still groggy from their seasickness clung desperately to the boat obstacles for protection. A wall of wrecked landing craft and vehicles built up quickly on the beach. Among these, other soldiers sought protection from the scything German fire. Some craft cresting the surf were hurled broadside into the obstacles, creating a logjam, which held up the following waves while gathering more hulks into a swelling barricade. On one of them a soldier with a flamethrower took a direct hit in his fuel tank. The explosion catapulted his dying body into the sea and set the vessel on fire.
Omaha Beach gave a dreadful and deadly demonstration of Murphy's Law: All that can go wrong will go wrong at the wrong time. It was at this sector around Vierville and St. Laurent that the American bombers, fearing to hit their own craft and troops, had delayed thier drop until the bombs crashed uselessly behind the German defenders. Here also Rommel had stationed the 352nd Division, one of his finest, and British Intelligence's warnings to this effect were all but ignored by General Gerow's staff. Here too the Germans held the strongest natural positions facing the entire Overlord assault: hills and cliffs rising steeply up to 200 feet from the beach and the sea wall above it. At Omaha was the greatest concentration of enemy fire on the 60 mile invasion front. Finally, Gerow's tactical dispositions and handling of his troops all but guaranteed disaster and were redeemed only by the bravery of his soldiers.
Gerow can hardly be criticized for planning a frontal assault, however; there was no room for manuever at Omaha. But his staff might have evolved some plan of maneuver for opening the 5 vital beach exits, and their elaborate timetables were nothing short of an invitation to disaster in even the calmest seas. The V Corps also declined to use all but the DDs of the specialized armor developed by the British. Gerow's soldiers were also boated in darkness 12 miles from the beach, rather than the 7 miles used by the British. Even 7 is quite a distance for troops in LCVPs to travel, especially in the choppy, 10 knot seas off Omaha. But 12 in those rough waters was either a serious error of judgment or the result of the reluctance of the transports to come in that close. It took V Corp's spearheads 3 hours to reach the beaches, and by then most of them had thrown up their breakfasts, all were drenched and many were seasick, covered with puke and caked with salt. Finally, Gerow weighed down his soldiers with an incredible load of equipment, much of it unnecessary or useless. Each man carried a gas mask (!), hand grenades, pole or satchel charges, half pound blocks of TNT, two bandoliers of rifle ammunition, first-aid kit and canteen: a total of 68 pounds. When this is added to his rifle, helmet, bayonet, boots, cartridge belt and clothing, the figure approaches 90 pounds! Even the best-conditioned athletes in the world could not go careening around a battlefield for hours so encumbered. (And remember, as I mentioned, they were all drenched.)
At the outset at least 10 LCVPs were swamped by high waves, drowning most of their occupants. Attempts to land artillery from amphibious trucks called Ducks were a disaster, 26 guns lost. Some rockets fired from far offshore fell short among the assault boats. From some unknown incompetent came the order to launch 32 DDs 3 and a half miles out in heavy seas. 5 of them reached the beach and the other 27 sank like stones, drowning most of their crews. Without the tanks to take enemy fortifications under fire, the infantry had to storm the beaches themselves, flesh against fire. When the tanks did arrive, they came behind, not ahead of, the 8 spearhead companies- 1,450 soldiers in 36 landing craft.
Heavy machine-gun and mortar fire greeted these men as they waded ashore. Many were wounded before they reached dry land and had to struggle painfully up the beach, heading for the protection of the sea wall. Others still groggy from their seasickness clung desperately to the boat obstacles for protection. A wall of wrecked landing craft and vehicles built up quickly on the beach. Among these, other soldiers sought protection from the scything German fire. Some craft cresting the surf were hurled broadside into the obstacles, creating a logjam, which held up the following waves while gathering more hulks into a swelling barricade. On one of them a soldier with a flamethrower took a direct hit in his fuel tank. The explosion catapulted his dying body into the sea and set the vessel on fire.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Normandy Landings- Omaha Beach, continued
A company of 270 specially trained demolition men followed the infantry ashore, planning to blow up the boat obstacles before the tide covered them so that the following wave of 25,000 men and 4,400 vehicles might have an unimpeded path ashore. But German gunfire killed or wounded nearly half of them and most of the survivors took cover. Only a few obstacles were blown that morning. A path to the beach was opened by landing craft ramming the obstacles either by accident or intent, thus detonating the mines and clearing a lane. Toward this headed lighters carrying 16 armored bulldozers. Only 6 reached the beach, and of these 3 more were destroyed.
Among the infantry huddled beneath the sea wall or strewn among the debris, collapse of command followed quickly upon destruction of communications. One regiment lost 3/4 of its radios, and its forward headquarters was wiped out by a direct hit. Men landed far from the sector for which they had been trained looked wildly and helplessly around for someone to command them. There were few. Too many of the American junior officers on Omaha that morning had been paralyzed by that same immobilizing dread that had come over their men.
Offshore aboard the cruiser Augusta, flagship of Adm. Alan Kirk, the Task Force Commander, Omar Bradley sat inside a 20 by 10 steel command cabin constructed on deck. Along one wall was a row of typists while Bradley and his staff huddled around a big plotting table. The loss of so many DDs shocked him. He and Gerow had counted heavily on their leading the troops ashore to knock out German defenses. Sinkings, swamping, heavy seas, heavy enemy fire and chaos on the beaches, these were the melancholy reports reaching Augusta. When V Corpsreported at noon that the situation was "still critical", Bradley considered diverting Omaha's follow-up forces to Utah or the British beaches, where resistance had been far less severe. The bulk of V Corps's assaut forces and vehicles were scheduled for the second tide. They had to get ashore, if the inevitable enemy counterattack was to be repulsed. Peering grimly at the map, Bradley realized that the battle was out of his hands, and nothing he could do at this point would alter it one way or another. If Omaha Beach was lost, he knew, the other beaches could not be held no matter how easy they were having it now. Everything, the invasion, possibly the war, depended on "that thin, wet line of khaki" that had struggled ashore and was so desperately clinging to its precarious hold.
A company of 270 specially trained demolition men followed the infantry ashore, planning to blow up the boat obstacles before the tide covered them so that the following wave of 25,000 men and 4,400 vehicles might have an unimpeded path ashore. But German gunfire killed or wounded nearly half of them and most of the survivors took cover. Only a few obstacles were blown that morning. A path to the beach was opened by landing craft ramming the obstacles either by accident or intent, thus detonating the mines and clearing a lane. Toward this headed lighters carrying 16 armored bulldozers. Only 6 reached the beach, and of these 3 more were destroyed.
Among the infantry huddled beneath the sea wall or strewn among the debris, collapse of command followed quickly upon destruction of communications. One regiment lost 3/4 of its radios, and its forward headquarters was wiped out by a direct hit. Men landed far from the sector for which they had been trained looked wildly and helplessly around for someone to command them. There were few. Too many of the American junior officers on Omaha that morning had been paralyzed by that same immobilizing dread that had come over their men.
Offshore aboard the cruiser Augusta, flagship of Adm. Alan Kirk, the Task Force Commander, Omar Bradley sat inside a 20 by 10 steel command cabin constructed on deck. Along one wall was a row of typists while Bradley and his staff huddled around a big plotting table. The loss of so many DDs shocked him. He and Gerow had counted heavily on their leading the troops ashore to knock out German defenses. Sinkings, swamping, heavy seas, heavy enemy fire and chaos on the beaches, these were the melancholy reports reaching Augusta. When V Corpsreported at noon that the situation was "still critical", Bradley considered diverting Omaha's follow-up forces to Utah or the British beaches, where resistance had been far less severe. The bulk of V Corps's assaut forces and vehicles were scheduled for the second tide. They had to get ashore, if the inevitable enemy counterattack was to be repulsed. Peering grimly at the map, Bradley realized that the battle was out of his hands, and nothing he could do at this point would alter it one way or another. If Omaha Beach was lost, he knew, the other beaches could not be held no matter how easy they were having it now. Everything, the invasion, possibly the war, depended on "that thin, wet line of khaki" that had struggled ashore and was so desperately clinging to its precarious hold.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
In some ways, Omaha Beach reminds me of Missionary Ridge, in the Battle of Lookout Mountain. It was hell to go forward, but they couldn't go back. So go forward they did, through hell or high water. Indomitable.
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timschochet
Footballguy
The Normandy Landings- Omaha Beach, continued
To the west or right flank of the Americans on Omaha rose the Pointe du Hoc, a cliff upon which German heavy coastal artillery was employed. The guns had a range of nearly 12 miles and could deliver a terrible fire on the ships and craft of the Allied invasion fleet. A force of 200 Rangers under Lt. Col. James Rudder had been trained to scale the cliff and destroy the enemy guns and gunners. They experimented with mortar-propelled grapples used by British commandos to fire scaling ropes over cliffs. They also developed lightweight sectional ladders, which could be quickly assembled and run up the face of the cliff. 4 long extension ladders were borrowed from the London Fire Department and mounted on platforms inside Ducks. Rudder's plan was to lead the assault company ashore himself. But Maj. Gen. Clarence Heubner of the 1st Division objected. "You can't risk getting knocked out in the first round."
"I'm sorry, sir" Rudder replied, "but I'm going to have to disobey you. If I don't take it- it might not go."
Rudder led a small force against the Pointe du Hoc. The bulk of his Rangers were boated, awaiting his signal that the cliff had been taken; then they would come ashore to move overland toward the point. But the signal never came. Rudder was delayed by enemy fire. His Ducks carrying his ladders were unable to penetrate a bomb-pitted shelf beneath the cliff. The Rangers began firing their grapples but the water-soaked ropes were too heavy and fell short. Finally a few of them lodged. The Rangers began hauling themselves up hand-over-hand. The enemy dropped grenades on them. An American destroyer swept inshore and cleared the cliff with 5 inch gunfire. The Rangers began bellying over the top.
They found a deserted, bomb-pitted tableland but no big guns. Then patrols pushing inland found the guns intact in an apple orchard. They had been hidden there to escape the American aerial bombardment, but might also have been removed from the sight of the big Allied battleships which their unprotected gunners might have been reluctant to duel. Whatever the reason, Rudder's Rangers disabled them by blowing their breeches, holding onto the Pointe du Hoc against enemy counterattacks until reinforcements reached them two days later.
Meanwhile, the remaining Rangers offshore, receiving no signal, went roaring toward the beaches in their assault boats, losing some of them and taking casualties as they did. They began moving westward toward the base of the Pointe du Hoc, fighting with great bravery and skill, adding their own considerable push to the slowly rising impetus of the American assault.
To the west or right flank of the Americans on Omaha rose the Pointe du Hoc, a cliff upon which German heavy coastal artillery was employed. The guns had a range of nearly 12 miles and could deliver a terrible fire on the ships and craft of the Allied invasion fleet. A force of 200 Rangers under Lt. Col. James Rudder had been trained to scale the cliff and destroy the enemy guns and gunners. They experimented with mortar-propelled grapples used by British commandos to fire scaling ropes over cliffs. They also developed lightweight sectional ladders, which could be quickly assembled and run up the face of the cliff. 4 long extension ladders were borrowed from the London Fire Department and mounted on platforms inside Ducks. Rudder's plan was to lead the assault company ashore himself. But Maj. Gen. Clarence Heubner of the 1st Division objected. "You can't risk getting knocked out in the first round."
"I'm sorry, sir" Rudder replied, "but I'm going to have to disobey you. If I don't take it- it might not go."
Rudder led a small force against the Pointe du Hoc. The bulk of his Rangers were boated, awaiting his signal that the cliff had been taken; then they would come ashore to move overland toward the point. But the signal never came. Rudder was delayed by enemy fire. His Ducks carrying his ladders were unable to penetrate a bomb-pitted shelf beneath the cliff. The Rangers began firing their grapples but the water-soaked ropes were too heavy and fell short. Finally a few of them lodged. The Rangers began hauling themselves up hand-over-hand. The enemy dropped grenades on them. An American destroyer swept inshore and cleared the cliff with 5 inch gunfire. The Rangers began bellying over the top.
They found a deserted, bomb-pitted tableland but no big guns. Then patrols pushing inland found the guns intact in an apple orchard. They had been hidden there to escape the American aerial bombardment, but might also have been removed from the sight of the big Allied battleships which their unprotected gunners might have been reluctant to duel. Whatever the reason, Rudder's Rangers disabled them by blowing their breeches, holding onto the Pointe du Hoc against enemy counterattacks until reinforcements reached them two days later.
Meanwhile, the remaining Rangers offshore, receiving no signal, went roaring toward the beaches in their assault boats, losing some of them and taking casualties as they did. They began moving westward toward the base of the Pointe du Hoc, fighting with great bravery and skill, adding their own considerable push to the slowly rising impetus of the American assault.
timschochet
Footballguy
The Normandy Landings- Omaha Beach, concluded
Although the German defenders at Omaha possessed the power to impede or disorganize the American advance, they were neither numerous nor strong enough to halt or destroy it. Even though 8 German battalions instead of a supposed 4 opposed the Americans, they could mount those deadly local counterattacks in which the German army excelled. Throughout the battle they fought a static, defensive fight. Thus, whenever the Americans gained ground or seized a toehold, they held it. No Germans attempted to retake it. Like pieces being slowly fitted into a jigsaw puzzle, the Americans steadily expanded their hold. They also were fighting better and with more skill and better judgment.
The commander of 8 LCTs briinging a battalion of amphibious tanks into Omaha was appalled when the first 5 launched sank. He concluded that the seas were far too rough for such operations. He ordered the boats to within 250 yards of the beach before dropping their ramps. The survivors began to take German positions under fire.
Now the battle experience of the veteran 1st Infantry Division on the left began to have its effect. Barely 2 hours after H-Hour small groups of soldiers from "The Big Red One" had begun to advance up the leftward narrow valleys offering vehicle access from the beach. They mounted local attacks against the Germans in their pillboxes and communications trenches. They fought their way onto high ground and began to hammer the Germans on their flanks. By their valor and rising momentum they gave encouragement to the inexperienced and all but paralyzed 29th Infantry Division on their right.
In battle, momentum must be maintained, if only because it can confer mob courage on the men. If it is lost, mob fear takes its place, especially among untried troops. Then the thought uppermost in a soldier's mind is to take cover.
When Brig. Gen. Norman (Dutch) Cota arrived on Omaha with his 29th Division command group at 7:30am, he found chaos and paralysis. He saw a soldier shot down who wept and cried for his mother. He saw another apparently on his knees praying, but when he came closer, he saw that he was dead, his face frozen in terror. Two of his group were killed within 3 feet of him, while another was hurled 20 feet by a shell blast. Cota moved among his dazed troops, compelling junior officers to lead their men forward, searching for openings on the beach. Coming upon a group of pinned-down Rangers, he asked who they were. "Rangers!" came the reply. "Then, #######it, if you're Rangers, get up and lead the way!" Stung, they leaped erect and began blasting paths through the German wire with bangalore torpedoes. Infantry men lurched through them. The road at the top of the cliff was reached. Americans had gotten behind some of the Germans' strongest positions, killing the enemy or taking them prisoners. By 11 am the 29th took Vierville. Cota found an abandoned bulldozer loaded with TNT desperately needed on the beach to blow obstacles. He yelled angrily for a volunteer to drive it. A red-haired soldier stood up. "I'll do it!" he cried, and climbed into the driver's seat. When Cota found another group of Rangers apparently pinned down, he deliberately walked ahead of them to show that there was no enemy fire. There was, but it didn't kill Cota, and because the Americans had such men- soldiers who did not point the way, but cried, "Follow me!" - the near-disaster that had been Omaha was reversed and all along the line the 1st and 29th pressed forward, At 1:30 pm a vastly relieved Omar Bradley read Gerow's message: "Troops formerly pinned down on beaches Easy Red, Easy Green, Fox Red advancing up heights beyond beaches."
By nightfall the Americans controlled an area a mile deep beyond Omaha. Offshore, the Navy had loaded 90 Ducks with ammunition. Their exhausted but valiant crews took them ashore to provide enough firepower to repel the anticipated German counterattack. But it never came. Only at the British beaches to the east- where the Anglo-Canadians had achieved encouraging early success- did the Germans strike back. It is time to tell that story.
Although the German defenders at Omaha possessed the power to impede or disorganize the American advance, they were neither numerous nor strong enough to halt or destroy it. Even though 8 German battalions instead of a supposed 4 opposed the Americans, they could mount those deadly local counterattacks in which the German army excelled. Throughout the battle they fought a static, defensive fight. Thus, whenever the Americans gained ground or seized a toehold, they held it. No Germans attempted to retake it. Like pieces being slowly fitted into a jigsaw puzzle, the Americans steadily expanded their hold. They also were fighting better and with more skill and better judgment.
The commander of 8 LCTs briinging a battalion of amphibious tanks into Omaha was appalled when the first 5 launched sank. He concluded that the seas were far too rough for such operations. He ordered the boats to within 250 yards of the beach before dropping their ramps. The survivors began to take German positions under fire.
Now the battle experience of the veteran 1st Infantry Division on the left began to have its effect. Barely 2 hours after H-Hour small groups of soldiers from "The Big Red One" had begun to advance up the leftward narrow valleys offering vehicle access from the beach. They mounted local attacks against the Germans in their pillboxes and communications trenches. They fought their way onto high ground and began to hammer the Germans on their flanks. By their valor and rising momentum they gave encouragement to the inexperienced and all but paralyzed 29th Infantry Division on their right.
In battle, momentum must be maintained, if only because it can confer mob courage on the men. If it is lost, mob fear takes its place, especially among untried troops. Then the thought uppermost in a soldier's mind is to take cover.
When Brig. Gen. Norman (Dutch) Cota arrived on Omaha with his 29th Division command group at 7:30am, he found chaos and paralysis. He saw a soldier shot down who wept and cried for his mother. He saw another apparently on his knees praying, but when he came closer, he saw that he was dead, his face frozen in terror. Two of his group were killed within 3 feet of him, while another was hurled 20 feet by a shell blast. Cota moved among his dazed troops, compelling junior officers to lead their men forward, searching for openings on the beach. Coming upon a group of pinned-down Rangers, he asked who they were. "Rangers!" came the reply. "Then, #######it, if you're Rangers, get up and lead the way!" Stung, they leaped erect and began blasting paths through the German wire with bangalore torpedoes. Infantry men lurched through them. The road at the top of the cliff was reached. Americans had gotten behind some of the Germans' strongest positions, killing the enemy or taking them prisoners. By 11 am the 29th took Vierville. Cota found an abandoned bulldozer loaded with TNT desperately needed on the beach to blow obstacles. He yelled angrily for a volunteer to drive it. A red-haired soldier stood up. "I'll do it!" he cried, and climbed into the driver's seat. When Cota found another group of Rangers apparently pinned down, he deliberately walked ahead of them to show that there was no enemy fire. There was, but it didn't kill Cota, and because the Americans had such men- soldiers who did not point the way, but cried, "Follow me!" - the near-disaster that had been Omaha was reversed and all along the line the 1st and 29th pressed forward, At 1:30 pm a vastly relieved Omar Bradley read Gerow's message: "Troops formerly pinned down on beaches Easy Red, Easy Green, Fox Red advancing up heights beyond beaches."
By nightfall the Americans controlled an area a mile deep beyond Omaha. Offshore, the Navy had loaded 90 Ducks with ammunition. Their exhausted but valiant crews took them ashore to provide enough firepower to repel the anticipated German counterattack. But it never came. Only at the British beaches to the east- where the Anglo-Canadians had achieved encouraging early success- did the Germans strike back. It is time to tell that story.
timschochet
Footballguy
Very early on in this thread I was asked to point out whenever Canadian troops were involved in the battles we've been describing. I haven't had too much opportunity to do so except for the failed Dieppe Raid. However, the Normandy Landings and the next battle I am about to describe offer a great moment in the history of Canadian valor.
Copeman
Footballguy
No mention of the important role of the naval ships coming close to Omaha beach to unleash their guns on the German defenses when most hope was lost? IIRC, a couple destroyers maneuvered themselves parallel to the beach and opened up with their big guns. This was said to have saved hundreds possibly thousands of lives. The captains did so fully knowing their ships could run aground.
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