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To all contributing to this great thread, timschochet especially, for setting it up.
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World War II (2 Viewers)
- Thread starter timschochet
- Start date
To all contributing to this great thread, timschochet especially, for setting it up.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, continued
And so the Japanese came to Hawaii. Most of them were from the peasant class in Japan. They were the third or fourth brothers in large families who had no hope of inheriting land and would likely starve unless they could earn money. But unlike the Chinese and Filipino immigrants, to a man they had no intention of settling in their new land. All of them intended to earn a little money and then return wealthy to Japan. They did not consider themselves immigrants. They came mostly to Oahu and Kawaii, though some Japanese went to work on the large plantations on all the larger islands. They worked from sunup to sundown, and the haoles were very satisfied that the labor problem had been solved. At first.
The problem was, saving money in order to return to Hiroshima or Osaka was difficult, if not impossible. The large companies supplied all goods through company stores. As everywhere, these were overpriced and cheated the worker out of much of his payday. But a far bigger reason was the Japanese consulate in Honolulu. The diplomats there travelled from camp to camp, demanding donations and tithes for the homeland, which grew larger and larger as the years went by. No proud Japanese could ignore the Emperor, whom they believed watched each of them personally, to see how loyal they were to Japan. Loyalty often meant giving up months of earnings over to the consulate, and your reward was a bow and a message that your parents and the Emperor were proud. For most, it was enough. But it also meant they were not saving money.
Eventually many of the laborers realized it would take years to earn enough money to return to Japan prosperous men. And in the meantime, there were no women. Some of the men, desperate, escaped to the city and married Hawaiian women. But these were ostracized by the rest, their memory erased. The larger solution was to send for women from Japan, girls who would be willing to come and marry these men based on a photograph. Yes, it was costly, and would likely delay the long-awaited return to Japan even longer, but loneliness overwhelmed these concerns. With women at their side, they could wait to return a little longer...
The men would trade the use of one dark suit and photograph themselves, sending these to their parents in the villages at home, with the message, "Please find a bride for me." The girls who arrived were terrified, especially because they did not always know which men were meant for them. These were the famous "mail order brides" of which so much has been written. Like their husbands to be, they were farm girls, illiterate but incredibly hard working. Like their husbands, they too intended to return to Japan.
So the brides came and soon children were produced. It is these children that this narrative is concerned with. They were the Nisei, Japanese born on American soil. From the time of their births, they were regarded by their parents as Japanese. But the government of Hawaii regarded them as American, and decreed that they must attend public school. And here is where our story really begins.
And so the Japanese came to Hawaii. Most of them were from the peasant class in Japan. They were the third or fourth brothers in large families who had no hope of inheriting land and would likely starve unless they could earn money. But unlike the Chinese and Filipino immigrants, to a man they had no intention of settling in their new land. All of them intended to earn a little money and then return wealthy to Japan. They did not consider themselves immigrants. They came mostly to Oahu and Kawaii, though some Japanese went to work on the large plantations on all the larger islands. They worked from sunup to sundown, and the haoles were very satisfied that the labor problem had been solved. At first.
The problem was, saving money in order to return to Hiroshima or Osaka was difficult, if not impossible. The large companies supplied all goods through company stores. As everywhere, these were overpriced and cheated the worker out of much of his payday. But a far bigger reason was the Japanese consulate in Honolulu. The diplomats there travelled from camp to camp, demanding donations and tithes for the homeland, which grew larger and larger as the years went by. No proud Japanese could ignore the Emperor, whom they believed watched each of them personally, to see how loyal they were to Japan. Loyalty often meant giving up months of earnings over to the consulate, and your reward was a bow and a message that your parents and the Emperor were proud. For most, it was enough. But it also meant they were not saving money.
Eventually many of the laborers realized it would take years to earn enough money to return to Japan prosperous men. And in the meantime, there were no women. Some of the men, desperate, escaped to the city and married Hawaiian women. But these were ostracized by the rest, their memory erased. The larger solution was to send for women from Japan, girls who would be willing to come and marry these men based on a photograph. Yes, it was costly, and would likely delay the long-awaited return to Japan even longer, but loneliness overwhelmed these concerns. With women at their side, they could wait to return a little longer...
The men would trade the use of one dark suit and photograph themselves, sending these to their parents in the villages at home, with the message, "Please find a bride for me." The girls who arrived were terrified, especially because they did not always know which men were meant for them. These were the famous "mail order brides" of which so much has been written. Like their husbands to be, they were farm girls, illiterate but incredibly hard working. Like their husbands, they too intended to return to Japan.
So the brides came and soon children were produced. It is these children that this narrative is concerned with. They were the Nisei, Japanese born on American soil. From the time of their births, they were regarded by their parents as Japanese. But the government of Hawaii regarded them as American, and decreed that they must attend public school. And here is where our story really begins.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
It is impossible to understand the motivation and courage that filled the soldiers of the 442 without explaining the circumstances of their birth, their upbringing and education. I have already done the first, so now it is time to turn to upbringing and education.
The Japanese farmers were mostly illiterate, and so they were pleased, partly that their children would be receiving a free education at the expense of the Hawaiian government. On the other hand, they were not pleased, because most of them expected to return to Japan someday, and they feared their children would become too Americanized. This led to the establishment of the Japanese schools, where the plan was their children would learn the Japanese language, and to revere the Emperor. These were attended on a daily basis by the Nisei children after regular school ended. While most other children on the islands would be attending 4-6 hours of school a day, this meant the Japanese children were in school 10 hours a day, six days a week. And almost all of these the children of parents who had never attended school at all.
It was a strange, schizophrenic existence. The public schools of Hawaii during this time period (the 1920's and 30's) were markedly inferior in resources and supplies to the private schools where the Haoles attended (the most famous being Punahou). They were filled with tough children of Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese descent. Anyone who spoke English too well was censured by his classmates. Too be accepted, one had to speak pidgen like a moron. Yet, in the classrooms themselves, the Japanese children were educated by a remarkable group of teachers who instilled upon them a love for America: that they were living in the land of the free, and if there were limitations on that freedom by bigotry, it did not matter in the long run, because it was the promise of freedom that made America superior to anywhere else on Earth. The other children may have ignored or rejected this message, but the Nisei took it to heart, especially after certain events took place in the sporting world, which I will get to shortly.
After public shcool was over, while the rowdy children of the other races would play or go home, the Japanese children would line up and march to the Shinto temple, where the man who was a priest on Sundays appeared in a schoolteacher's black kimono to conduct a Japanese school. These were severe men, much given to beating children, proud of the fact that they spoke no English. They were contemptuous of everything American. The sensei impressed upon his charges that they were in this alien land for only a few years until they took up their proper life. The children were taught: Honor the Emperor. Honor your parents. Know your duty. Be a good Japanese.
There was much agitation against the Japanese-language schools, as they were called, and there was no doubt that the priests taught an un-American, Shintoistic, nationalistic body of material, but in those years not a single child who attended these schools ever got into trouble with the police. Among the Japanese children there was no delinquincy. Parents were obeyed and teachers were respected. In the Japanese schools a severe rectitude was taught and enforced, and much of the civic responsibility that marked the adult Japanese community derived from these austere late-afternoon sessions. And it was a strange thing, but not a single child in later years rever remembered much of the jingoistic nonsense taught by the priests; few ever wanted to go back to Japan; but all learned respect for an established order of life. It was if the great freedoms enjoyed in the American school in the first part of the day insulated the child against the nationalism of the afternoon, so that most Japanese children assimilated the best from both schools and were not marred by the worst of either.
It is impossible to understand the motivation and courage that filled the soldiers of the 442 without explaining the circumstances of their birth, their upbringing and education. I have already done the first, so now it is time to turn to upbringing and education.
The Japanese farmers were mostly illiterate, and so they were pleased, partly that their children would be receiving a free education at the expense of the Hawaiian government. On the other hand, they were not pleased, because most of them expected to return to Japan someday, and they feared their children would become too Americanized. This led to the establishment of the Japanese schools, where the plan was their children would learn the Japanese language, and to revere the Emperor. These were attended on a daily basis by the Nisei children after regular school ended. While most other children on the islands would be attending 4-6 hours of school a day, this meant the Japanese children were in school 10 hours a day, six days a week. And almost all of these the children of parents who had never attended school at all.
It was a strange, schizophrenic existence. The public schools of Hawaii during this time period (the 1920's and 30's) were markedly inferior in resources and supplies to the private schools where the Haoles attended (the most famous being Punahou). They were filled with tough children of Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese descent. Anyone who spoke English too well was censured by his classmates. Too be accepted, one had to speak pidgen like a moron. Yet, in the classrooms themselves, the Japanese children were educated by a remarkable group of teachers who instilled upon them a love for America: that they were living in the land of the free, and if there were limitations on that freedom by bigotry, it did not matter in the long run, because it was the promise of freedom that made America superior to anywhere else on Earth. The other children may have ignored or rejected this message, but the Nisei took it to heart, especially after certain events took place in the sporting world, which I will get to shortly.
After public shcool was over, while the rowdy children of the other races would play or go home, the Japanese children would line up and march to the Shinto temple, where the man who was a priest on Sundays appeared in a schoolteacher's black kimono to conduct a Japanese school. These were severe men, much given to beating children, proud of the fact that they spoke no English. They were contemptuous of everything American. The sensei impressed upon his charges that they were in this alien land for only a few years until they took up their proper life. The children were taught: Honor the Emperor. Honor your parents. Know your duty. Be a good Japanese.
There was much agitation against the Japanese-language schools, as they were called, and there was no doubt that the priests taught an un-American, Shintoistic, nationalistic body of material, but in those years not a single child who attended these schools ever got into trouble with the police. Among the Japanese children there was no delinquincy. Parents were obeyed and teachers were respected. In the Japanese schools a severe rectitude was taught and enforced, and much of the civic responsibility that marked the adult Japanese community derived from these austere late-afternoon sessions. And it was a strange thing, but not a single child in later years rever remembered much of the jingoistic nonsense taught by the priests; few ever wanted to go back to Japan; but all learned respect for an established order of life. It was if the great freedoms enjoyed in the American school in the first part of the day insulated the child against the nationalism of the afternoon, so that most Japanese children assimilated the best from both schools and were not marred by the worst of either.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
As the years went by, the Japanese families came to realize that it was less and less likely that they would return to Japan. A bloody strike among the farm laborers was ruthlessly crushed in the late 1920's, and then the Great Depression made conditions even worse and turned these hard working farmers into paupers. Yet the parents continued the pretense that they would go back one day, and yet at the same time, they became more and more obsessed with American children for their children. Such was the case that a penniless Japanese laborer was determined that each of his five children must have nothing less than a full education; twelve years of public school, four years at the local university, followed by three years at graduate school on the mainland. In any other nation in the world, such an ambition would have been insane; it wa to the glory of America, and especially that part known as Hawaii, that such a dream on the part of a poor man was entirely practical, if only the family had the courage to pursue it.
In accordance with the rules that seem to cover all American immigrants, the Nisei were noticeably taller than their parents, with better teeth, wider shoulders, and stronger legs. They could throw like Americans and excelled at athletics, and this fact led to that great equalizer in American culture: sports. I have written that Punahou and a few other rich private schools limited their enrollment to haoles and the very few extremely wealthy Hawaiians and Chinese who were allowed to mingle among the ruling class of Hawaii. There were no Japanese allowed, and it might never have happened, and the Japanese would have been considered outsiders forever, and then the whole experience and story of the Nisei would have changed dramatically: it would have been much more like California, the Japanese might very well have been interned, and the heroics of the 442 might never have taken place.
But because Hawaii is such as small space, and specifically because there were very few schools, Punahou was forced to play the public ones, and the result was rather predictable, especially in football: they got crushed. Since there was no college football on the Islands (at that time, the University of Hawaii did not have a football team because it was too expensive for opponents to play them), high school football became THE sport in the 1930's, more popular among the population than anywhere else, even Texas. A game between two good opponents might draw as many as 30,000 fans. And the stars of the game, featured in the newspapers, were Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, and Japanese. It is vitally important to realize that nowhere on the mainland during this era did minorities recieve recognition in newspapers, much less celebrity status. In California, Japanese were never even mentioned in the press, except as a menace by the Hearst papers.
Very quickly, the wealthy donors of Punahou were sick and tired of losing to the other schools. They began offering sports scholarships to minorities. And mostly they chose Japanese. The reason was they seemed and acted better behaved than the rougher Filipinos and Hawaiians; also, they tended to be better students. Soon there were several Japanese athlete-students, the children of poor laborers, mingling with the children of some of the wealthiest families in America. The effect of this is incalculable. Most importantly is this fact: though after Pearl Harbor the majority of Hawaiians viewed the Japanese-Americans with same hostility as did the majority of Californians and Oregonians, this hostility was not shared by the few elite wealthy haole who controlled the islands. And that would make all the difference.
As the years went by, the Japanese families came to realize that it was less and less likely that they would return to Japan. A bloody strike among the farm laborers was ruthlessly crushed in the late 1920's, and then the Great Depression made conditions even worse and turned these hard working farmers into paupers. Yet the parents continued the pretense that they would go back one day, and yet at the same time, they became more and more obsessed with American children for their children. Such was the case that a penniless Japanese laborer was determined that each of his five children must have nothing less than a full education; twelve years of public school, four years at the local university, followed by three years at graduate school on the mainland. In any other nation in the world, such an ambition would have been insane; it wa to the glory of America, and especially that part known as Hawaii, that such a dream on the part of a poor man was entirely practical, if only the family had the courage to pursue it.
In accordance with the rules that seem to cover all American immigrants, the Nisei were noticeably taller than their parents, with better teeth, wider shoulders, and stronger legs. They could throw like Americans and excelled at athletics, and this fact led to that great equalizer in American culture: sports. I have written that Punahou and a few other rich private schools limited their enrollment to haoles and the very few extremely wealthy Hawaiians and Chinese who were allowed to mingle among the ruling class of Hawaii. There were no Japanese allowed, and it might never have happened, and the Japanese would have been considered outsiders forever, and then the whole experience and story of the Nisei would have changed dramatically: it would have been much more like California, the Japanese might very well have been interned, and the heroics of the 442 might never have taken place.
But because Hawaii is such as small space, and specifically because there were very few schools, Punahou was forced to play the public ones, and the result was rather predictable, especially in football: they got crushed. Since there was no college football on the Islands (at that time, the University of Hawaii did not have a football team because it was too expensive for opponents to play them), high school football became THE sport in the 1930's, more popular among the population than anywhere else, even Texas. A game between two good opponents might draw as many as 30,000 fans. And the stars of the game, featured in the newspapers, were Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, and Japanese. It is vitally important to realize that nowhere on the mainland during this era did minorities recieve recognition in newspapers, much less celebrity status. In California, Japanese were never even mentioned in the press, except as a menace by the Hearst papers.
Very quickly, the wealthy donors of Punahou were sick and tired of losing to the other schools. They began offering sports scholarships to minorities. And mostly they chose Japanese. The reason was they seemed and acted better behaved than the rougher Filipinos and Hawaiians; also, they tended to be better students. Soon there were several Japanese athlete-students, the children of poor laborers, mingling with the children of some of the wealthiest families in America. The effect of this is incalculable. Most importantly is this fact: though after Pearl Harbor the majority of Hawaiians viewed the Japanese-Americans with same hostility as did the majority of Californians and Oregonians, this hostility was not shared by the few elite wealthy haole who controlled the islands. And that would make all the difference.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
As Pearl Harbor approached, many of the Nisei had reached young adulthood. Though they were very respectful to their parents, they did not want to be their parents. They were highly educated, enrolling in college and university both in Hawaii or on the mainland whenever they could. They tried very hard to assimilate, considering themselves true-blue Americans. Most of them did not practice the Shinto religion, and a significant portion had converted to Christianity and were devoutly religious Christians. They had no intention of "returning" to Japan, and gradually their parents realized this and accepted it.
Few were wealthy: there were almost no wealthy Japanese in Hawaii. Most of the parents were still laborers, although the most prominent ones owned stores or barber shops in the towns and cities. The young men and women studied to be doctors, dentists, lawyers and civil workers; they intended to serve their community. And they also were in the military. Hundreds of Japanese boys had enlisted in the Army and the R.O.T.C. In the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, the Army in Hawaii was understaffed and undermanned and willing to accept these volunteers, although they were given the lowest of chores and not truly ever expected to see combat. Even this use of Japanese soldiers was questioned in Washington, notably by FDR aide John J. McCloy, a well known New Dealer who later would emerge as one of the key figures behind the internment of Japanese Americans on the west coast. McCloy received a response from an army colonel who reported that he had no reason to believe the local Hawaiian Japanese were disloyal. However, this issue would come up again.
One attitude that was universal among the Nisei: they hated to be called "Japs". They considered it the greatest of insults, equal to the "N" word for Blacks.
Then came December 7, 1941, and everything changed.
As Pearl Harbor approached, many of the Nisei had reached young adulthood. Though they were very respectful to their parents, they did not want to be their parents. They were highly educated, enrolling in college and university both in Hawaii or on the mainland whenever they could. They tried very hard to assimilate, considering themselves true-blue Americans. Most of them did not practice the Shinto religion, and a significant portion had converted to Christianity and were devoutly religious Christians. They had no intention of "returning" to Japan, and gradually their parents realized this and accepted it.
Few were wealthy: there were almost no wealthy Japanese in Hawaii. Most of the parents were still laborers, although the most prominent ones owned stores or barber shops in the towns and cities. The young men and women studied to be doctors, dentists, lawyers and civil workers; they intended to serve their community. And they also were in the military. Hundreds of Japanese boys had enlisted in the Army and the R.O.T.C. In the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, the Army in Hawaii was understaffed and undermanned and willing to accept these volunteers, although they were given the lowest of chores and not truly ever expected to see combat. Even this use of Japanese soldiers was questioned in Washington, notably by FDR aide John J. McCloy, a well known New Dealer who later would emerge as one of the key figures behind the internment of Japanese Americans on the west coast. McCloy received a response from an army colonel who reported that he had no reason to believe the local Hawaiian Japanese were disloyal. However, this issue would come up again.
One attitude that was universal among the Nisei: they hated to be called "Japs". They considered it the greatest of insults, equal to the "N" word for Blacks.
Then came December 7, 1941, and everything changed.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
In the days and weeks following December 7, 1941, the Army on Hawaii panicked. Part of this was based on the fear that the Japanese would invade, part was based on suspicion of subversion by Japanese Americans, and part based on sheer bigotry. Regarding the subversion, not a single piece of evidence was ever discovered. This in itself was considered suspicious by some.
The first action was that all of the Japanese soldiers and R.O.T.C. members were stripped of their weapons and immediately discharged. This was done without any chance of appeal. Next, several hundred of the most prominent Japanese Americans were thrown into prison. By the term "prominent", I mean anyone who was at all known to the greater community. As I wrote before, there were no wealthy Nisei, no government or labor representatives, no teachers or doctors or businessmen at this time. The "prominent" Japanese Americans were the sports celebrities (mostly teenagers), shopkeepers, and some of the better known older laborers. Finally, plans were made to relocate all the Japanese Americans away from Oahu, where the military was. This was what the west coast was doing, with FDR's approval, so why not here? A serious set of plans was made to ship all of the "Japs" to the island of Molokai, which was one infamous as the lepers colony.
And then a very strange thing happened, unprecedented in America at this time in history, and seemingly impossible anywhere other than Hawaii. A group of prominent whites, the same ones who controlled the islands, went to the powers that be in the Army and very quietly convinced them to release the imprisoned Japanese. These haoles had children who had attended Punahou with the football players; they knew the shopkeepers and laborers. To the army, they guaranteed the loyalty of these Americans. At the same time, they explained that it would not be necessary to relocate the Japanese Americans, so this was not done either, despite the ability of the Army to do so under executive order 9066. Hawaii was the only part of the United States of America where Japanese Americans were not forcibly relocated from their homes. Part of the reason for this was economic, of course: these workers were necessary to keep production going. But it would not have happened if not for the wealthy haoles who insisted with great dignity that that these people were loyal Americans.
It is important to note here that all of the whites who would not allow Hawaii to go down this path were staunch Republicans; conversely most of the people behind the relocation of the Nisei on the west coast were either New Deal Democrats or liberals like Earl Warren. As William Manchester noted in The Glory And The Dream, this represents an interesting contradiction of the notion, long held by many, that violations to civil liberties are inevitably more threatened by the right rather than the left.
Despite the haoles causing the jailed Nisei to be released and no relocation to take place, they did not argue for the Japanese American boys to be allowed back into the Army. It was obvious to everyone that this, at least, was a closed issue.
That is, obvious to everyone but the boys who had been kicked out.
In the days and weeks following December 7, 1941, the Army on Hawaii panicked. Part of this was based on the fear that the Japanese would invade, part was based on suspicion of subversion by Japanese Americans, and part based on sheer bigotry. Regarding the subversion, not a single piece of evidence was ever discovered. This in itself was considered suspicious by some.
The first action was that all of the Japanese soldiers and R.O.T.C. members were stripped of their weapons and immediately discharged. This was done without any chance of appeal. Next, several hundred of the most prominent Japanese Americans were thrown into prison. By the term "prominent", I mean anyone who was at all known to the greater community. As I wrote before, there were no wealthy Nisei, no government or labor representatives, no teachers or doctors or businessmen at this time. The "prominent" Japanese Americans were the sports celebrities (mostly teenagers), shopkeepers, and some of the better known older laborers. Finally, plans were made to relocate all the Japanese Americans away from Oahu, where the military was. This was what the west coast was doing, with FDR's approval, so why not here? A serious set of plans was made to ship all of the "Japs" to the island of Molokai, which was one infamous as the lepers colony.
And then a very strange thing happened, unprecedented in America at this time in history, and seemingly impossible anywhere other than Hawaii. A group of prominent whites, the same ones who controlled the islands, went to the powers that be in the Army and very quietly convinced them to release the imprisoned Japanese. These haoles had children who had attended Punahou with the football players; they knew the shopkeepers and laborers. To the army, they guaranteed the loyalty of these Americans. At the same time, they explained that it would not be necessary to relocate the Japanese Americans, so this was not done either, despite the ability of the Army to do so under executive order 9066. Hawaii was the only part of the United States of America where Japanese Americans were not forcibly relocated from their homes. Part of the reason for this was economic, of course: these workers were necessary to keep production going. But it would not have happened if not for the wealthy haoles who insisted with great dignity that that these people were loyal Americans.
It is important to note here that all of the whites who would not allow Hawaii to go down this path were staunch Republicans; conversely most of the people behind the relocation of the Nisei on the west coast were either New Deal Democrats or liberals like Earl Warren. As William Manchester noted in The Glory And The Dream, this represents an interesting contradiction of the notion, long held by many, that violations to civil liberties are inevitably more threatened by the right rather than the left.
Despite the haoles causing the jailed Nisei to be released and no relocation to take place, they did not argue for the Japanese American boys to be allowed back into the Army. It was obvious to everyone that this, at least, was a closed issue.
That is, obvious to everyone but the boys who had been kicked out.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
When in the early days of the war Japanese boys in Hawaii were removed from combat units and expelled from R.O.T.C., the islands supposed this was the end of the matter. "No *** can be trusted, so we kicked them all out," a general explained.
But to everyone's surprise, the Japanese boys stubbornly refused to accept this verdict. Humbly, quietly, but with an almost terrifying moral force, these boys began to press for their rights as American citizens. "We demand the inalienable privilege of dying for the nation we love," they argued. "We were treated decently at school here. We were taught what democracy means, and we insist upon our right to defend it."
Committees of Japanese boys began hammering officials with petitions. A typical one read, "We are loyal American citizens, and humbly request the right to serve our nation in its time of crisis. If you think you cannot trust us to fight against Japan, at least send us to Europe where this problem does not arise." The committees went to see generals and admirals, governors and judges: "We will do any national work you assign us. We will ask for no wages. We must be allowed to prove we are Americans."
For weeks, the Japanese boys got nowhere. Then a few of the former football players, through their contacts from Punahou, managed to get a few of the haoles (parents of their classmates) to convince the Army to accept all volunteer, non military service. The Japanese American young men who volunteered were all of the highest intelligence and patriotism. They foresaw that the entire future of their people in America depended upon what they did in this war against Japan, and they decided that if they were prevented by hysteria from bearing arms, they would bear shovels. They would dig out latrines, and pick up after white soldiers, and build bridges. There would be no work too menial for them, and they would do it all for $90 a month while their haole and Chinese schoolmates earned 10 times that much working for the government in civilian jobs at Pearl Harbor. "We will do anything to prove that we are Americans."
Over several months, they performed these labors with such zeal and energy, that one of the most radical proposals of the entire war was sent to Washington by the very same haoles who owned Hawaii, most of them now in uniform: "A special unit of the United States Army should be formed comprised solely of Japanese boys from Hawaii. Use them in Europe. Throw them against the Germans, and when they perform as we know they will, theyll not only re-establish their credentials here but in America. They will give all free men a propaganda victory over Naziism that will reverberate around the world. With their courage, they will prove Hitler wrong on every single count of his philosophy."
A gasp went up, which was duly reported by cable to Washington, where it was augmented: "Japanese troops in the American army? And a special unit at that? Ridiculous."
But one man did not think it ridiculous. Franklin Delano Roosevelt must be held to account in history, and harshly, for his executive order which allowed for the internment of the Japanese Americans on the west coast. Yet several months later he issued another executive order allowing for the formation of Japanese American troops. And he said at the time: "Patriotism is not a matter of the skin's color. It's a matter of the heart."
And so the 442nd Infantry Regiment of the United States Army came into being. It was decided to ask for 3,000 volunteers: half from Hawaii, and half from the mainland, where the volunteers would have to come from internment camps. But this plan didn't work, because in Honolulu 11,800 rushed forward to serve, stampeding the registration booths. 7 out of 8 were turned down. (Later, when the regiment expanded, these would be allowed to join.) But on the mainland, only 500 men volunteered.
Army generals wanted an explanation for the difference in the numbers. The answer they received, from a white Hawaiian army colonel who was one of the officers of the 442, was illuminating:
Far from being a cause for concern, the differential should encourage us in our devotion to the perpetual effectiveness of democracy. If the result had been any different, I should have been worried. That the Hawaii Japanese behaved well and that the mainland boys did not is to me, and I think to America, reassuring.
In Hawaii, Japanese were free to own land. In California they could not. In Hawaii they had the potential to become schoolteachers and government employees. In California they could not. In Hawaii they were accepted into our best schools, but not in California. In Hawaii they were built into our society and became a part of us, but in California they were rejected.
More important, when war came the Japanese on the mainland were herded into concentration camps and their belongings were ruthlessly stripped from them at 5 cents on the dollar. In Hawaii there was some talk of this, but it was never permitted to go very far. Right after Pearl Harbor a good many Japanese in Hawaii were rounded up for concentration camps, but Caucasian leaders of the community went to the jail and effected the release of those they knew to be loyal. In short, the Japanese in Hawaii had every reason to fight for America; those on the mainland had none; and the basic difference lay not in the Japanese but in the way they were treated by their fellow citizens.
So is it not logical that if you tell a group of Hawaiian Japanese who have not been thrown into camps or robbed of their belongings, "You can volunteer to help us fight oppression", that 11,800 should leap forward? And is it not logical that if you go though concentration camps and tell the brothers of these same men, "We have abused you, imprisoned you, humiliated you, and stolen your belongings, but now we want you to volunteer to fight for us," is it not logical that they should reply, "Go to hell"? I am astonished that so many of the mainland Japanese volunteered. They must be very brave men, and will no doubt be magnificent soldiers.
When in the early days of the war Japanese boys in Hawaii were removed from combat units and expelled from R.O.T.C., the islands supposed this was the end of the matter. "No *** can be trusted, so we kicked them all out," a general explained.
But to everyone's surprise, the Japanese boys stubbornly refused to accept this verdict. Humbly, quietly, but with an almost terrifying moral force, these boys began to press for their rights as American citizens. "We demand the inalienable privilege of dying for the nation we love," they argued. "We were treated decently at school here. We were taught what democracy means, and we insist upon our right to defend it."
Committees of Japanese boys began hammering officials with petitions. A typical one read, "We are loyal American citizens, and humbly request the right to serve our nation in its time of crisis. If you think you cannot trust us to fight against Japan, at least send us to Europe where this problem does not arise." The committees went to see generals and admirals, governors and judges: "We will do any national work you assign us. We will ask for no wages. We must be allowed to prove we are Americans."
For weeks, the Japanese boys got nowhere. Then a few of the former football players, through their contacts from Punahou, managed to get a few of the haoles (parents of their classmates) to convince the Army to accept all volunteer, non military service. The Japanese American young men who volunteered were all of the highest intelligence and patriotism. They foresaw that the entire future of their people in America depended upon what they did in this war against Japan, and they decided that if they were prevented by hysteria from bearing arms, they would bear shovels. They would dig out latrines, and pick up after white soldiers, and build bridges. There would be no work too menial for them, and they would do it all for $90 a month while their haole and Chinese schoolmates earned 10 times that much working for the government in civilian jobs at Pearl Harbor. "We will do anything to prove that we are Americans."
Over several months, they performed these labors with such zeal and energy, that one of the most radical proposals of the entire war was sent to Washington by the very same haoles who owned Hawaii, most of them now in uniform: "A special unit of the United States Army should be formed comprised solely of Japanese boys from Hawaii. Use them in Europe. Throw them against the Germans, and when they perform as we know they will, theyll not only re-establish their credentials here but in America. They will give all free men a propaganda victory over Naziism that will reverberate around the world. With their courage, they will prove Hitler wrong on every single count of his philosophy."
A gasp went up, which was duly reported by cable to Washington, where it was augmented: "Japanese troops in the American army? And a special unit at that? Ridiculous."
But one man did not think it ridiculous. Franklin Delano Roosevelt must be held to account in history, and harshly, for his executive order which allowed for the internment of the Japanese Americans on the west coast. Yet several months later he issued another executive order allowing for the formation of Japanese American troops. And he said at the time: "Patriotism is not a matter of the skin's color. It's a matter of the heart."
And so the 442nd Infantry Regiment of the United States Army came into being. It was decided to ask for 3,000 volunteers: half from Hawaii, and half from the mainland, where the volunteers would have to come from internment camps. But this plan didn't work, because in Honolulu 11,800 rushed forward to serve, stampeding the registration booths. 7 out of 8 were turned down. (Later, when the regiment expanded, these would be allowed to join.) But on the mainland, only 500 men volunteered.
Army generals wanted an explanation for the difference in the numbers. The answer they received, from a white Hawaiian army colonel who was one of the officers of the 442, was illuminating:
Far from being a cause for concern, the differential should encourage us in our devotion to the perpetual effectiveness of democracy. If the result had been any different, I should have been worried. That the Hawaii Japanese behaved well and that the mainland boys did not is to me, and I think to America, reassuring.
In Hawaii, Japanese were free to own land. In California they could not. In Hawaii they had the potential to become schoolteachers and government employees. In California they could not. In Hawaii they were accepted into our best schools, but not in California. In Hawaii they were built into our society and became a part of us, but in California they were rejected.
More important, when war came the Japanese on the mainland were herded into concentration camps and their belongings were ruthlessly stripped from them at 5 cents on the dollar. In Hawaii there was some talk of this, but it was never permitted to go very far. Right after Pearl Harbor a good many Japanese in Hawaii were rounded up for concentration camps, but Caucasian leaders of the community went to the jail and effected the release of those they knew to be loyal. In short, the Japanese in Hawaii had every reason to fight for America; those on the mainland had none; and the basic difference lay not in the Japanese but in the way they were treated by their fellow citizens.
So is it not logical that if you tell a group of Hawaiian Japanese who have not been thrown into camps or robbed of their belongings, "You can volunteer to help us fight oppression", that 11,800 should leap forward? And is it not logical that if you go though concentration camps and tell the brothers of these same men, "We have abused you, imprisoned you, humiliated you, and stolen your belongings, but now we want you to volunteer to fight for us," is it not logical that they should reply, "Go to hell"? I am astonished that so many of the mainland Japanese volunteered. They must be very brave men, and will no doubt be magnificent soldiers.
timschochet
Footballguy
Before I continue with the story of the 442, I want to mention the fact that I am liberally quoting from James Michener's Hawaii. Although a novel, I have found his section on this subject to be historically accurate, and it is the best description of events I could find all in one place. Just wanted to note this so I am not accused later on of plagiarism.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, continued
The armpatch of the 442nd consisted of a blue sky against which rose a brown Diamond Head, at whose feet rested one palm tree and three white lines of rolling surf. Below in block letters stood the pidgin name, "Mo Bettah". The men of the 442nd quickly developed their own fight song:
Four-Forty-Second Infantry— We're the boys of Hawai'i nei— We'll fight for you And the Red, White and Blue, And go to the front... And back to Honolulu-lulu. Fighting for dear old Uncle Sam Go for broke! HOOH! We don't give a damn! We'll round up the Huns At the point of our guns, And vict'ry will be ours! GO FOR BROKE! FOUR-FOUR-TWO! GO FOR BROKE! FOUR-FOUR-TWO! And vict'ry will be ours!
The term "Go for Broke" meant to wager everything. It was commonly used on the Islands, and it would become the byword for the bravery that was displayed by this regiment.
All of the officers of the 442nd were white. Most of these were haoles from Hawaii, who had attended Punahou with some of the soldiers and played football with them. Some of their peers were astonished that these men had volunteered to serve with Japanese troops, and they were often derided and teased in the same manner as Matthew Broderick's character in the film, Glory. (As we shall see, most of them suffered the same eventual final fate of that character as well.)
The soldiers trained in Missisippi. There, they received very specific instructions from the officers: they were only to use "Colored" toilets and water fountains. If abused by white soldiers, as they often were, they were to say nothing and avoid all incidents.
From the novel Hawaii:
Colonel Whipple laid down the most rigid rules and enforced them brutally: "Not a word of Japanese will be spoken in this unit. You're Americans. Under no circumstances are you to ask a white girl for a date. It makes local people mad. You are absolutely forbidden to date a colored girl. That makes them even madder. And they have four long trains that haul beer into this state every week. You can't possibly drink it all."
Remorselessly Colonel Whipple drove his men according to West Point traditions of military behavior and his own family traditions of civil decency. In all America no unit in training suffered more disciplinary action than the 442, for their colonel held them responsible both on the post and off, and at the slightest infraction, he punished them. There was only one flare-up. After a great deal of heart-probing consultation the good people of Mississippi decided that so far as public toilets and buses were concerned, the Japanese soldiers were to be considered white men and thus use white facilities; but where socializing with the community was concerned, it was better if they considered themselves halfway between the white and the Negro and off-limits to each.
This was too much, and Goro went to see Colonel Whipple. "I appreciate what you said, Colonel, and we've been abiding by your rules. But this directive on toilets is just too much. I can urinate like a white man but I've got to socialize like a Negro. The basic thing we're fighting for is human decency. Our men don't want the kind of concessions Mississippi is willing to make. We want to be treated like Negroes."
When the training was over, the 442nd Infantry Regiment was sent to Europe. They were to take part in the invasion of Italy.
The armpatch of the 442nd consisted of a blue sky against which rose a brown Diamond Head, at whose feet rested one palm tree and three white lines of rolling surf. Below in block letters stood the pidgin name, "Mo Bettah". The men of the 442nd quickly developed their own fight song:
Four-Forty-Second Infantry— We're the boys of Hawai'i nei— We'll fight for you And the Red, White and Blue, And go to the front... And back to Honolulu-lulu. Fighting for dear old Uncle Sam Go for broke! HOOH! We don't give a damn! We'll round up the Huns At the point of our guns, And vict'ry will be ours! GO FOR BROKE! FOUR-FOUR-TWO! GO FOR BROKE! FOUR-FOUR-TWO! And vict'ry will be ours!
The term "Go for Broke" meant to wager everything. It was commonly used on the Islands, and it would become the byword for the bravery that was displayed by this regiment.
All of the officers of the 442nd were white. Most of these were haoles from Hawaii, who had attended Punahou with some of the soldiers and played football with them. Some of their peers were astonished that these men had volunteered to serve with Japanese troops, and they were often derided and teased in the same manner as Matthew Broderick's character in the film, Glory. (As we shall see, most of them suffered the same eventual final fate of that character as well.)
The soldiers trained in Missisippi. There, they received very specific instructions from the officers: they were only to use "Colored" toilets and water fountains. If abused by white soldiers, as they often were, they were to say nothing and avoid all incidents.
From the novel Hawaii:
Colonel Whipple laid down the most rigid rules and enforced them brutally: "Not a word of Japanese will be spoken in this unit. You're Americans. Under no circumstances are you to ask a white girl for a date. It makes local people mad. You are absolutely forbidden to date a colored girl. That makes them even madder. And they have four long trains that haul beer into this state every week. You can't possibly drink it all."
Remorselessly Colonel Whipple drove his men according to West Point traditions of military behavior and his own family traditions of civil decency. In all America no unit in training suffered more disciplinary action than the 442, for their colonel held them responsible both on the post and off, and at the slightest infraction, he punished them. There was only one flare-up. After a great deal of heart-probing consultation the good people of Mississippi decided that so far as public toilets and buses were concerned, the Japanese soldiers were to be considered white men and thus use white facilities; but where socializing with the community was concerned, it was better if they considered themselves halfway between the white and the Negro and off-limits to each.
This was too much, and Goro went to see Colonel Whipple. "I appreciate what you said, Colonel, and we've been abiding by your rules. But this directive on toilets is just too much. I can urinate like a white man but I've got to socialize like a Negro. The basic thing we're fighting for is human decency. Our men don't want the kind of concessions Mississippi is willing to make. We want to be treated like Negroes."
When the training was over, the 442nd Infantry Regiment was sent to Europe. They were to take part in the invasion of Italy.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, continued
Lots of buildup, huh? Time for some action finally:
On September 22nd, 1943, the 442nd Infantry Regiment invaded the beaches of Salerno. German planes and heavy artillery tried to harrass them, but their aim was wild and all the units made it without casualty. Salerno lay southeast of Naples and had been chosen because it provided a logical stepping-off place for an encircling movement on Rome, some 250 miles distant (see my previous posts on this subject) and on the day of landing, the Four-Four-Two, as it was universally called, started the long trek north. The Germans, knowing both of their coming and of their composition, were determined to stop them. A specific order had been issued by Hitler: "To defeat the little yellow men who are traitors to our ally Japan and who are being cruelly used as propaganda by their Jewish masters in America, is obligatory. If these criminal little men should win a victory, it would be strongly used against us. They must be stopped and wiped out."
The Japanese boys from Hawaii did not know of this order, and after they had met one line of massive German resistance after another, they concluded: "These krauts must be the best fighters in the world. This is a lot tougher than they told it was going to be." If the 442 gained 3 miles, they did it against the most formidable German resistance: mines killed boys from Maui, tanks overran fighters from Molokai, gigantic shells exploded among troops from Kauai; and dogged, powerful ground forces contested every hill. Casualties were heavy, and it was only the beginning.
The furious efforts of the Germans to halt and humiliate the Japanese boys had an opposite effect to the one Hitler wanted: Allied war correspondents, both European and American, quickly discovered that whereas other fronts might not produce good stories, one could always get something exciting with the 442 because they were the ones that were encountering the best the enemy could provide. Ernie Pyle, among others, marched for some days with the Hawaii troops, and wrote: "I have come to expect our American boys to continue fighting in the face of great odds, but these short, black-eyed little fighters are setting a new record. They continue slugging it out when even the bravest men would consolidate or withdraw. They form a terrific addition to our team, and dozens of boys from Texas and Massachusetts have told me, 'I'm glad they're on our side.'" So Hitler's determination to hit the Japanese so hard that they would be forced to collapse in shame, backfired because they fought on in glory.
Once Ernie Pyle asked one of the soldiers, "Sergeant, why did you push on against that cluster of houses? You knew it was crowded with Germans."
The soldier replied with words that became famous both in Italy and America: "We had to. We fight double. Against the Germans and for every Japanese in America." Reported Pyle: "And they're winning both their wars."
"We fight double", they told themselves, and they pushed on through the winter months. Then came the first real test: the battle of Monte Cassino.
Lots of buildup, huh? Time for some action finally:
On September 22nd, 1943, the 442nd Infantry Regiment invaded the beaches of Salerno. German planes and heavy artillery tried to harrass them, but their aim was wild and all the units made it without casualty. Salerno lay southeast of Naples and had been chosen because it provided a logical stepping-off place for an encircling movement on Rome, some 250 miles distant (see my previous posts on this subject) and on the day of landing, the Four-Four-Two, as it was universally called, started the long trek north. The Germans, knowing both of their coming and of their composition, were determined to stop them. A specific order had been issued by Hitler: "To defeat the little yellow men who are traitors to our ally Japan and who are being cruelly used as propaganda by their Jewish masters in America, is obligatory. If these criminal little men should win a victory, it would be strongly used against us. They must be stopped and wiped out."
The Japanese boys from Hawaii did not know of this order, and after they had met one line of massive German resistance after another, they concluded: "These krauts must be the best fighters in the world. This is a lot tougher than they told it was going to be." If the 442 gained 3 miles, they did it against the most formidable German resistance: mines killed boys from Maui, tanks overran fighters from Molokai, gigantic shells exploded among troops from Kauai; and dogged, powerful ground forces contested every hill. Casualties were heavy, and it was only the beginning.
The furious efforts of the Germans to halt and humiliate the Japanese boys had an opposite effect to the one Hitler wanted: Allied war correspondents, both European and American, quickly discovered that whereas other fronts might not produce good stories, one could always get something exciting with the 442 because they were the ones that were encountering the best the enemy could provide. Ernie Pyle, among others, marched for some days with the Hawaii troops, and wrote: "I have come to expect our American boys to continue fighting in the face of great odds, but these short, black-eyed little fighters are setting a new record. They continue slugging it out when even the bravest men would consolidate or withdraw. They form a terrific addition to our team, and dozens of boys from Texas and Massachusetts have told me, 'I'm glad they're on our side.'" So Hitler's determination to hit the Japanese so hard that they would be forced to collapse in shame, backfired because they fought on in glory.
Once Ernie Pyle asked one of the soldiers, "Sergeant, why did you push on against that cluster of houses? You knew it was crowded with Germans."
The soldier replied with words that became famous both in Italy and America: "We had to. We fight double. Against the Germans and for every Japanese in America." Reported Pyle: "And they're winning both their wars."
"We fight double", they told themselves, and they pushed on through the winter months. Then came the first real test: the battle of Monte Cassino.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
General Mark Clark, a man of his time, believed firmly in the superiority of the white race. He detested minorities, did not want them in his army, and did his best his entire life to preserve this viewpoint. (Late in life, as president of the Citadel, he would fight a losing battle to keep that university segregated.)
Clark did not care for the Japanese American regiment; he had not wanted them in Italy, and he felt the whole thing was a propaganda move forced upon him by those "radicals" in Washington. It was a waste of time when there was a war to be won. As the Fifth Army approached Monte Cassino, Clark at first thought he could succeed with a frontal assault (see my previous post on this battle). But he also realized that there would be tremendous casualties, and he decided that the first troops in would have to be "expendable". Why risk fine, white soldiers?
The 442nd Infantry Regiment was therefore given the honor of the front of the battle line, ordered to assault the fortress of Monte Cassino.
General Mark Clark, a man of his time, believed firmly in the superiority of the white race. He detested minorities, did not want them in his army, and did his best his entire life to preserve this viewpoint. (Late in life, as president of the Citadel, he would fight a losing battle to keep that university segregated.)
Clark did not care for the Japanese American regiment; he had not wanted them in Italy, and he felt the whole thing was a propaganda move forced upon him by those "radicals" in Washington. It was a waste of time when there was a war to be won. As the Fifth Army approached Monte Cassino, Clark at first thought he could succeed with a frontal assault (see my previous post on this battle). But he also realized that there would be tremendous casualties, and he decided that the first troops in would have to be "expendable". Why risk fine, white soldiers?
The 442nd Infantry Regiment was therefore given the honor of the front of the battle line, ordered to assault the fortress of Monte Cassino.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
On January 22, 1944, the 442nd Infantry Regiment halted along a line one mile east of the Rapido River. They were told by their commanding officer, "Our orders are clear and simple. Cross the river...so that the troops behind us can assault that pile of rocks up there. The Germans claim a rabbit can't get across the approaches without being shot at from 6 angles. But we're going across."
A scouting party of 6 riflemen, including 2 who were good at sketching, crawled out of their hiding places at dusk and started on their bellies across the most difficult single battle terrain the Americans were to face in the Second World War. 200 yards west of their present position the 442 would come across an irrigation ditch 3 feet wide and 4 feet deep. As they crawled out of it, they would be facing German machine guns and a marsh some 30 yards wide, beyond which lay another ditch. 30 yards beyond hid a third ditch, twice as deep, twice as wide. As the men climbed up out of this one, they would face a solid wall of machine-gun fire.
It got worse. Beyond this, in front of the dry river, was a stout, murderous stone wall, 12 feet high and with a jagged top. Over the wall they would drop into the eastern half of the dry river bed of the Rapido. It was about 75 feet across, about 15 feet deep, and every spot of its entire cross section was monitored by German machine guns. This led to the river's west bank. It rose fairly straight up from the river bed, 16 feet high, and wasw topped by a double fence of barbed wire which could be expected to contain mines at 2 foot intervals. If the Hawaiian Japanese boys somehow managed to get this far, they then faced the fortress itself: an unassailable rocky height, far far into the sky, and at its crest was the ancient monastery.
The scouts returned with sketches and descriptions that were soon known to everyone in the regiment. They understood that they were being ordered on a suicide mission, facing impossible odds. Gathering their courage, they went.
On January 22, 1944, the 442nd Infantry Regiment halted along a line one mile east of the Rapido River. They were told by their commanding officer, "Our orders are clear and simple. Cross the river...so that the troops behind us can assault that pile of rocks up there. The Germans claim a rabbit can't get across the approaches without being shot at from 6 angles. But we're going across."
A scouting party of 6 riflemen, including 2 who were good at sketching, crawled out of their hiding places at dusk and started on their bellies across the most difficult single battle terrain the Americans were to face in the Second World War. 200 yards west of their present position the 442 would come across an irrigation ditch 3 feet wide and 4 feet deep. As they crawled out of it, they would be facing German machine guns and a marsh some 30 yards wide, beyond which lay another ditch. 30 yards beyond hid a third ditch, twice as deep, twice as wide. As the men climbed up out of this one, they would face a solid wall of machine-gun fire.
It got worse. Beyond this, in front of the dry river, was a stout, murderous stone wall, 12 feet high and with a jagged top. Over the wall they would drop into the eastern half of the dry river bed of the Rapido. It was about 75 feet across, about 15 feet deep, and every spot of its entire cross section was monitored by German machine guns. This led to the river's west bank. It rose fairly straight up from the river bed, 16 feet high, and wasw topped by a double fence of barbed wire which could be expected to contain mines at 2 foot intervals. If the Hawaiian Japanese boys somehow managed to get this far, they then faced the fortress itself: an unassailable rocky height, far far into the sky, and at its crest was the ancient monastery.
The scouts returned with sketches and descriptions that were soon known to everyone in the regiment. They understood that they were being ordered on a suicide mission, facing impossible odds. Gathering their courage, they went.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
January 24 began at Midnight with a thundering barrage of American artillery which illuminated the bleak river but which did not dislodge the Germans. For 40 minutes the barrage continued, and a beginner at warfare might have taken heart, thinking, "No man can live through that," but the men of the 442 knew better. They knew the Germans would be dug in and waiting.
What followed was 5 hours of the most brutal imaginable for the Nisei troops to reach the near bank of the Rapido. At great cost, they made it past the three ditches and over the wall. However at the edge of the river, the Germans threw a wall of bombardment that was almost unbelievable, and the advance was halted. The 442 appeared to dig in. But then 40 men led by Sgt. Sadeo Munemori went down into the bank of the river at 9:00 am. They came with 6 yards of crossing the river when a titanic German concentration of fire killed half the unit. The 20 who were left began to panic, but Munemori commanded sternly, "Up onto that bank and through that barbed wire."
It was a completely insane thing to attempt. As they got close to the barbed wire, such a furious load of fire bore down on them that they had to drop back into the river. Three more times they they tried to reach the wire, and failed. Huddling in the protection of the far bank of the river, the gallant 20 waited for their companions to catch up with them, when altogether they might have a better chance of crashing the barbed wire. But the fire power of the Germans was so intense that the Japanese boys who were still on the eastern bank could not possibly advance. At times the wall of shrapnel seemed almost solid and it would have been complete suicide to move a man into it. At last Munemori brought the 20 survivors back to the main group. "Tommorow, we'll cross the river," they promised themselves.
On January 26 the Japanese troops did try, but once more the German gunners turned them back with dreadful casualties. On January 27, the 442nd tried for the third time, and although they got to the road on the other side of the river, they were hit with such pulverizing fire that after 45 minutes they were forced to withdraw. That night an Associated Press man wrote one of the great dispatches of the war:
If tears could could be transmitted by cable, and printed by linotype, this story would be splashed with tears, for I have at last seen what they call courage beyond the call of duty. I saw a bunch of bandy-legged Japanese kids from Hawaii cross the Rapido River, and hold the opposite bank for more than 40 minutes. Then they retreated in utter defeat, driven back by the full might of the German army. Never in victory have I seen any troops in the world achieve a greater glory, and if hereafter any American ever questions the loyalty of our Japanese, I am not going to argue with him. I am going to kick his teeth in.
January 24 began at Midnight with a thundering barrage of American artillery which illuminated the bleak river but which did not dislodge the Germans. For 40 minutes the barrage continued, and a beginner at warfare might have taken heart, thinking, "No man can live through that," but the men of the 442 knew better. They knew the Germans would be dug in and waiting.
What followed was 5 hours of the most brutal imaginable for the Nisei troops to reach the near bank of the Rapido. At great cost, they made it past the three ditches and over the wall. However at the edge of the river, the Germans threw a wall of bombardment that was almost unbelievable, and the advance was halted. The 442 appeared to dig in. But then 40 men led by Sgt. Sadeo Munemori went down into the bank of the river at 9:00 am. They came with 6 yards of crossing the river when a titanic German concentration of fire killed half the unit. The 20 who were left began to panic, but Munemori commanded sternly, "Up onto that bank and through that barbed wire."
It was a completely insane thing to attempt. As they got close to the barbed wire, such a furious load of fire bore down on them that they had to drop back into the river. Three more times they they tried to reach the wire, and failed. Huddling in the protection of the far bank of the river, the gallant 20 waited for their companions to catch up with them, when altogether they might have a better chance of crashing the barbed wire. But the fire power of the Germans was so intense that the Japanese boys who were still on the eastern bank could not possibly advance. At times the wall of shrapnel seemed almost solid and it would have been complete suicide to move a man into it. At last Munemori brought the 20 survivors back to the main group. "Tommorow, we'll cross the river," they promised themselves.
On January 26 the Japanese troops did try, but once more the German gunners turned them back with dreadful casualties. On January 27, the 442nd tried for the third time, and although they got to the road on the other side of the river, they were hit with such pulverizing fire that after 45 minutes they were forced to withdraw. That night an Associated Press man wrote one of the great dispatches of the war:
If tears could could be transmitted by cable, and printed by linotype, this story would be splashed with tears, for I have at last seen what they call courage beyond the call of duty. I saw a bunch of bandy-legged Japanese kids from Hawaii cross the Rapido River, and hold the opposite bank for more than 40 minutes. Then they retreated in utter defeat, driven back by the full might of the German army. Never in victory have I seen any troops in the world achieve a greater glory, and if hereafter any American ever questions the loyalty of our Japanese, I am not going to argue with him. I am going to kick his teeth in.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
On January 28, the 442 tried for the fourth time to cross the Rapido, and for the fourth time the Germans mowed them down. Of the 1,300 troops that had arrived at the river four days earlier, 799 were now casualties. Dead Japanese bodies lined the fatal river, and men with arms and legs torn off were moving to the rear. At last it became apparent that the Germans had effectively stopped the advance of the 442. That night, the German commander's intelligence reported, "Victory! The Japanese have been driven back. They're in retreat and seem to be leaving the line."
The report was partially correct. The front unit, which had been led by Sadeo Munemori and had fought so bravely, was being withdrawn. The boys were willing to try again, but they no longer had enough men to maintain a cohesive company and they had to retreat to repair their wounds. So the Germans stopped the 442...for a few hours, because in another part of the line other units from Hawaii were accumulating a mighty force, and on February 8, they actually succeeded in crossing the river and attacking the mountain.
With a powerful surge the Japanese boys drove spearheads almost to the top of the mountain. They scaled heights that even their own officers believed impregnable, and they routed out more than 200 separate machine-gun emplacements. Their heroism in this incredible drive was unsurpassed in World War II, and for a few breathless hours they caught a foothold on the summit of the mountain itself. "Send us reinforcements!" they radioed frantically. "We've got them licked!"
But reinforcements could not negotiate the cliffs, and one by one the Japanese victors were driven back from their dizzy pinnacles. As they stumbled down the steep flanks of Monte Cassino the Germans gunned them unmercifully, but at last the fragments of the force staggered back to camp and announced, "The Germans cannot be driven out." But one fact of triumph remained: the headquarters camp was now on the west bank of the Rapido. The way to Rome was open.
It was in the bruising defeat at Monte Cassino that the 442 became one of the most famous battalions of the war. "The Purple Heart Battalion" it was called, for it had suffered more casualties than any other similar-sized unit in the war. The "Mo Bettahs" won more honors, more decorations, more laudatory messages from the President and the generals than any other. But most of all they won throughout America a humble respect. Caucasians who fought alongside them reported back home: "They're better Americans than I am. I wouldn't have the guts to do what they do." And in Hawaii, those golden islands that the Japanese boys loved so deeply as they died in Italy, people no longer even discussed the tormenting old question: "Are the Japanese loyal?" Now men of other races wondered, "Would I be as brave?" So although the Germans did exactly what Hitler wanted- they crushed the Japanese at Monte Cassino- neither they nor Hitler accomplished what they had initially intended, for in defeat that the Japanese boys exhibited their greatest bravery and won the applause of the world.
Therefore it is strange to report that it was not at Monte Cassino that the 442 won its greatest laurels. This happened, by accident, in a remote corner of France.
On January 28, the 442 tried for the fourth time to cross the Rapido, and for the fourth time the Germans mowed them down. Of the 1,300 troops that had arrived at the river four days earlier, 799 were now casualties. Dead Japanese bodies lined the fatal river, and men with arms and legs torn off were moving to the rear. At last it became apparent that the Germans had effectively stopped the advance of the 442. That night, the German commander's intelligence reported, "Victory! The Japanese have been driven back. They're in retreat and seem to be leaving the line."
The report was partially correct. The front unit, which had been led by Sadeo Munemori and had fought so bravely, was being withdrawn. The boys were willing to try again, but they no longer had enough men to maintain a cohesive company and they had to retreat to repair their wounds. So the Germans stopped the 442...for a few hours, because in another part of the line other units from Hawaii were accumulating a mighty force, and on February 8, they actually succeeded in crossing the river and attacking the mountain.
With a powerful surge the Japanese boys drove spearheads almost to the top of the mountain. They scaled heights that even their own officers believed impregnable, and they routed out more than 200 separate machine-gun emplacements. Their heroism in this incredible drive was unsurpassed in World War II, and for a few breathless hours they caught a foothold on the summit of the mountain itself. "Send us reinforcements!" they radioed frantically. "We've got them licked!"
But reinforcements could not negotiate the cliffs, and one by one the Japanese victors were driven back from their dizzy pinnacles. As they stumbled down the steep flanks of Monte Cassino the Germans gunned them unmercifully, but at last the fragments of the force staggered back to camp and announced, "The Germans cannot be driven out." But one fact of triumph remained: the headquarters camp was now on the west bank of the Rapido. The way to Rome was open.
It was in the bruising defeat at Monte Cassino that the 442 became one of the most famous battalions of the war. "The Purple Heart Battalion" it was called, for it had suffered more casualties than any other similar-sized unit in the war. The "Mo Bettahs" won more honors, more decorations, more laudatory messages from the President and the generals than any other. But most of all they won throughout America a humble respect. Caucasians who fought alongside them reported back home: "They're better Americans than I am. I wouldn't have the guts to do what they do." And in Hawaii, those golden islands that the Japanese boys loved so deeply as they died in Italy, people no longer even discussed the tormenting old question: "Are the Japanese loyal?" Now men of other races wondered, "Would I be as brave?" So although the Germans did exactly what Hitler wanted- they crushed the Japanese at Monte Cassino- neither they nor Hitler accomplished what they had initially intended, for in defeat that the Japanese boys exhibited their greatest bravery and won the applause of the world.
Therefore it is strange to report that it was not at Monte Cassino that the 442 won its greatest laurels. This happened, by accident, in a remote corner of France.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
After the 442 had retired to a rear area in Italy, there to lick their considerable wounds and to reform with fresh replacements from the States, the Mo Bettah Battalion was shipped out of Italy and into Southern France, where it was allowed to march in a leisurely manner up the Rhone Valley. It met little German opposition, nor was it supposed to, for the generals felt that after the heroic performance at Monte Cassino the Japanese boys merited something of a respite, and for once things went as planned. Then, accompanied by a Texas outfit, the 141st Infantry, that had also built a name for itself in aggressive fighting, the 442 swung away from the Rhone and entered upon routing mopping up exercises in the Vosges Mountains, where the easternmost part of France touched the southernmost part of Germany. The aggresive Texans led the way.
The Germans had set a trap for them. Using inferior troops to surrender in panic, they goaded the Texans to charge further and further in to the Vosqes mountains away from the main battle line. Then prearranged guns were swung into position behind them and began pumping high explosives into the Texan camp. The Texans' forward troops, numbering about 300 men, were trapped. They had no food or water or adequate ammunition. They dug in and watched the rim of fire creep constantly closer.
At this point, an American journalist coined the phrase "The Lost Battalion". (This was actually the second time this phrase was used- there had been a previous "Lost Battalion" in World War I.) In Texas radios were kept tuned around the clock. Whole towns listened to agonizing details as the sons of that proud state prepared to die as bravely as their circumstances would permit. A sob echoed across the praries, and Texans began to shout, "Get our boys out of there! For Chrissake, do something!"
Thus what had been intended as a respite for the 442 suddenly became the dramatic high point of the war. The generals, pressured by public opinion to rescue the Lost Battalion, did not believe it could be done. They had to show that the attempt had been made, so they looked around for the most expendable troops to do so. The 442nd was chosen. Once again they were headed on a suicide mission. This time around, they would be putting at risk a few thousand men to rescue a few hundred men. In taking this action, they were performing in accordance with the United States Army's great tradition that no troops get left behind. Even so, it would prove to be an awesome sacrifice.
After the 442 had retired to a rear area in Italy, there to lick their considerable wounds and to reform with fresh replacements from the States, the Mo Bettah Battalion was shipped out of Italy and into Southern France, where it was allowed to march in a leisurely manner up the Rhone Valley. It met little German opposition, nor was it supposed to, for the generals felt that after the heroic performance at Monte Cassino the Japanese boys merited something of a respite, and for once things went as planned. Then, accompanied by a Texas outfit, the 141st Infantry, that had also built a name for itself in aggressive fighting, the 442 swung away from the Rhone and entered upon routing mopping up exercises in the Vosges Mountains, where the easternmost part of France touched the southernmost part of Germany. The aggresive Texans led the way.
The Germans had set a trap for them. Using inferior troops to surrender in panic, they goaded the Texans to charge further and further in to the Vosqes mountains away from the main battle line. Then prearranged guns were swung into position behind them and began pumping high explosives into the Texan camp. The Texans' forward troops, numbering about 300 men, were trapped. They had no food or water or adequate ammunition. They dug in and watched the rim of fire creep constantly closer.
At this point, an American journalist coined the phrase "The Lost Battalion". (This was actually the second time this phrase was used- there had been a previous "Lost Battalion" in World War I.) In Texas radios were kept tuned around the clock. Whole towns listened to agonizing details as the sons of that proud state prepared to die as bravely as their circumstances would permit. A sob echoed across the praries, and Texans began to shout, "Get our boys out of there! For Chrissake, do something!"
Thus what had been intended as a respite for the 442 suddenly became the dramatic high point of the war. The generals, pressured by public opinion to rescue the Lost Battalion, did not believe it could be done. They had to show that the attempt had been made, so they looked around for the most expendable troops to do so. The 442nd was chosen. Once again they were headed on a suicide mission. This time around, they would be putting at risk a few thousand men to rescue a few hundred men. In taking this action, they were performing in accordance with the United States Army's great tradition that no troops get left behind. Even so, it would prove to be an awesome sacrifice.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
It was a murderous, hellish mission. A heavy fog enveloped the freezing Vosges Mountains, and no man could look ahead more than 15 feet. As the Nisei filed into the predawn gloom, each soldier had to hold onto the field pack of the boy in front, for only in this manner could the unit be held together. From the big, moss-covered trees of the forest, German snipers cut down one Hawaiian boy after another, until occasionally some Japanese in desparing frustration would stand stubbornly with his feet apart, firing madly into the meaningless fog. At other times German machine guns stuttered murderously from a distance of 20 feet. But the 442 were aware that firepower that an hour before had been pouring in upon the doomed Texans was now diverted.
To rescue the Lost Battalion, the 442 had to march only one mile, but it was the worst mile in the world, nd to negotiate it was going to require 4 brutal days without adequate food or water or support. The casualties suffered by the Japanese were staggering. They kept close to the trees. When moving through an open space, they ran like hell. And when they hit the next tree, they whirled around to shoot any Germans that might have infiltrated behind them.
At the end of the first day, the 442 had gained only 900 feet, and within the circle of steel wounded Texans were beginning to die from gangrene. Next morning the Japanese boys pushed on, a yard at a time, lost in cold fog, great mossy trees and pinnacle of rock. Almost every foot of the way provided the German riflemen with ideal cover, and they used it to advantage. With methodical care, they fired only when some Japanese ran directly into their guns, and the killed the Nisei with deadly accuracy. On that cold, rainy second day the Japanese troops gained 600 feet, and nearly 100 of the Texans died from wounds and fresh barrages.
A curious factor of the battle was that all the world could watch. It was known that the Texans were trapped; it was known that the 442 were headed toward their rescue, and the deadly game fascinated the press. A Minnesota corporal who had fought with the Mo Bettahs in Italy told a newspaperman, "If anyone can get 'em, the slant-eyes will." In Honolulu newspapers that phrase was killed, but the entire community, sensing the awful odds against which their sons were fighting, prayed.
It was a murderous, hellish mission. A heavy fog enveloped the freezing Vosges Mountains, and no man could look ahead more than 15 feet. As the Nisei filed into the predawn gloom, each soldier had to hold onto the field pack of the boy in front, for only in this manner could the unit be held together. From the big, moss-covered trees of the forest, German snipers cut down one Hawaiian boy after another, until occasionally some Japanese in desparing frustration would stand stubbornly with his feet apart, firing madly into the meaningless fog. At other times German machine guns stuttered murderously from a distance of 20 feet. But the 442 were aware that firepower that an hour before had been pouring in upon the doomed Texans was now diverted.
To rescue the Lost Battalion, the 442 had to march only one mile, but it was the worst mile in the world, nd to negotiate it was going to require 4 brutal days without adequate food or water or support. The casualties suffered by the Japanese were staggering. They kept close to the trees. When moving through an open space, they ran like hell. And when they hit the next tree, they whirled around to shoot any Germans that might have infiltrated behind them.
At the end of the first day, the 442 had gained only 900 feet, and within the circle of steel wounded Texans were beginning to die from gangrene. Next morning the Japanese boys pushed on, a yard at a time, lost in cold fog, great mossy trees and pinnacle of rock. Almost every foot of the way provided the German riflemen with ideal cover, and they used it to advantage. With methodical care, they fired only when some Japanese ran directly into their guns, and the killed the Nisei with deadly accuracy. On that cold, rainy second day the Japanese troops gained 600 feet, and nearly 100 of the Texans died from wounds and fresh barrages.
A curious factor of the battle was that all the world could watch. It was known that the Texans were trapped; it was known that the 442 were headed toward their rescue, and the deadly game fascinated the press. A Minnesota corporal who had fought with the Mo Bettahs in Italy told a newspaperman, "If anyone can get 'em, the slant-eyes will." In Honolulu newspapers that phrase was killed, but the entire community, sensing the awful odds against which their sons were fighting, prayed.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, Continued
From Hawaii:
On the third day of this insane attempt to to force this ring of fire, Baker Company was astonished to see trudging up the hill they had just traversed the familiar figure of Colonel Mark Whipple. The men well knew the basic rule of war: "Lieutenants lead troops against the enemy. Captains stay back and encourage the entire company. Majors and light colonels move between headquarters and the companies. But chicken colonels stay put." Yet here was Colonel Whipple, a West Point chicken colonel, breaking the rule and moving to the front lines. Instinctively the Japanese boys saluted as he passed. When he reached Goro, he said simply, "We're going to march up that ridge and rescue the Texans today."
This was a suicidal approach and no one knew it better than Whipple, but it had been commanded by headquarters. "I can't order my boys into another Cassino," he had protested. "This is worse than Cassino," headquarters had admitted, "but it's got to be done." Whipple had saluted and said, "Then I must lead the men myself." And there he was.
The appearance on the front lines of the white commanders of the 442 gave the Nisei the final burst of courage they needed. With terrifying intensity of spirit they moved up the ridge. The fighting was beyond murderous, with Germans firing pointblank at the rescuers. Barrages from hidden guns planted weeks earlier cut down the Japanese boys with fearful effect, and aftewards some of the survivors remembered thinking, "Why should we have to penetrate such fire? We're losing more than we're trying to save. Are Texans considered more important than Japanese?" They knew the answer, but they kept moving.
When night fell on the 29th of October the Japanese were still 400 yards away from their goal. They slept standing up, or leaning against frozen trees. There was no water, no food, no warmth. Outpost sentries, when relieved, muttered, "I might as well stay here with you." There was no bed. Men ached and those with minor wounds felt the blood thobbing in their veins. Hundreds were already dead.
In the morning light they made their final charge up the mountainside. It was a desperate, horrible hand-to-hand fight up the last 1,000 feet of the ridge. Daniel Inouye, who later became the Senator from Hawaii, was one of those who led the charge that day. He moved directly onto German positions and grenaded them to shreds. He ducked behind trees, and when then last roadblock stood ahead, onomous and spewing death, it was Daniel Inouye who with demonic craftiness went against it, drew its fire so that he could spot its composition, and then leaped inside with grenades and a Tommy gun. He killed 11 Germans, and when his comapnions moved past him to the ultimate rescue of the Texans, he leaned out of the Nazi position and cheered like a schoolboy.
212 surviving Texans were rescued from the trap and made it back down the ridge. THe 442 lost over 800 men in this action. Among the dead were most of the white officers, along with the colonel who had formed the outfit.
The Nisei had won their war.
From Hawaii:
On the third day of this insane attempt to to force this ring of fire, Baker Company was astonished to see trudging up the hill they had just traversed the familiar figure of Colonel Mark Whipple. The men well knew the basic rule of war: "Lieutenants lead troops against the enemy. Captains stay back and encourage the entire company. Majors and light colonels move between headquarters and the companies. But chicken colonels stay put." Yet here was Colonel Whipple, a West Point chicken colonel, breaking the rule and moving to the front lines. Instinctively the Japanese boys saluted as he passed. When he reached Goro, he said simply, "We're going to march up that ridge and rescue the Texans today."
This was a suicidal approach and no one knew it better than Whipple, but it had been commanded by headquarters. "I can't order my boys into another Cassino," he had protested. "This is worse than Cassino," headquarters had admitted, "but it's got to be done." Whipple had saluted and said, "Then I must lead the men myself." And there he was.
The appearance on the front lines of the white commanders of the 442 gave the Nisei the final burst of courage they needed. With terrifying intensity of spirit they moved up the ridge. The fighting was beyond murderous, with Germans firing pointblank at the rescuers. Barrages from hidden guns planted weeks earlier cut down the Japanese boys with fearful effect, and aftewards some of the survivors remembered thinking, "Why should we have to penetrate such fire? We're losing more than we're trying to save. Are Texans considered more important than Japanese?" They knew the answer, but they kept moving.
When night fell on the 29th of October the Japanese were still 400 yards away from their goal. They slept standing up, or leaning against frozen trees. There was no water, no food, no warmth. Outpost sentries, when relieved, muttered, "I might as well stay here with you." There was no bed. Men ached and those with minor wounds felt the blood thobbing in their veins. Hundreds were already dead.
In the morning light they made their final charge up the mountainside. It was a desperate, horrible hand-to-hand fight up the last 1,000 feet of the ridge. Daniel Inouye, who later became the Senator from Hawaii, was one of those who led the charge that day. He moved directly onto German positions and grenaded them to shreds. He ducked behind trees, and when then last roadblock stood ahead, onomous and spewing death, it was Daniel Inouye who with demonic craftiness went against it, drew its fire so that he could spot its composition, and then leaped inside with grenades and a Tommy gun. He killed 11 Germans, and when his comapnions moved past him to the ultimate rescue of the Texans, he leaned out of the Nazi position and cheered like a schoolboy.
212 surviving Texans were rescued from the trap and made it back down the ridge. THe 442 lost over 800 men in this action. Among the dead were most of the white officers, along with the colonel who had formed the outfit.
The Nisei had won their war.
timschochet
Footballguy
The 442, concluded.
The 442nd RCT became the most decorated unit in U.S. military history for its size and length of service.
The 442nd RCT received 7 Presidential Unit Citations (5 earned in one month), and its members received 18,143 awards, including:
21 Medals of Honor (the first awarded posthumously to Private First Class Sadao Munemori, Company A, 100th Battalion, for action near Seravezza, Italy, on April 5, 1945; the others upgraded from other awards in June 2000). Recipients include:
Barney F. Hajiro
Mikio Hasemoto
Joe Hayashi
Shizuya Hayashi
Daniel K. Inouye
Yeiki Kobashigawa
Robert T. Kuroda
Kaoru Moto
Sadao Munemori
Kiyoshi K. Muranaga
Masato Nakae
Shinyei Nakamine
William K. Nakamura
Joe M. Nishimoto
Allan M. Ohata
James K. Okubo
Yukio Okutsu
Frank H. Ono
Kazuo Otani
George T. Sakato
Ted T. Tanouye
52 Distinguished Service Crosses (including 19 Distinguished Service Crosses which were upgraded to Medals of Honor in June 2000)
1 Distinguished Service Medal
560 Silver Stars (plus 28 Oak Leaf Clusters for a second award)
22 Legion of Merit Medals
15 Soldier’s Medals
4,000 Bronze Stars (plus 1,200 Oak Leaf Clusters for a second award; one Bronze Star was upgraded to a Medal of Honor in June 2000. One Bronze Star was upgraded to a Silver Star in September 2009.)
The stellar record of the Japanese Americans serving in the 442nd and in the Military Intelligence Service (U.S. Pacific Theater forces in WWII) helped change the minds of anti-Japanese American critics in the U.S. and resulted in easing of restrictions and the eventual release of the 120,000 strong community well before the end of WWII.
However, the unit’s exemplary service and many decorations did not change the attitudes of the general U.S. population to people of Japanese descent after World War II. Veterans were welcomed home by signs that read “No Japs Allowed” and “No Japs Wanted”, and many veterans were denied service in shops and restaurants, and had their homes and property vandalized.
One notable national effect of the service of the 442nd was to help convince Congress to end its opposition towards Hawaii's statehood petition. Twice before 1959, residents of Hawaii asked to be admitted to the U.S. as the 49th state, but each time Congress was fearful of having a co-equal state that had a majority non-white population. The exemplary record of the Japanese Americans serving in the 442nd and the loyalty showed by the rest of Hawaii's population during World War II overcame those fears and allowed Hawaii to be admitted as the 50th state (Alaska was granted statehood just prior).
The 442nd RCT became the most decorated unit in U.S. military history for its size and length of service.
The 442nd RCT received 7 Presidential Unit Citations (5 earned in one month), and its members received 18,143 awards, including:
21 Medals of Honor (the first awarded posthumously to Private First Class Sadao Munemori, Company A, 100th Battalion, for action near Seravezza, Italy, on April 5, 1945; the others upgraded from other awards in June 2000). Recipients include:
Barney F. Hajiro
Mikio Hasemoto
Joe Hayashi
Shizuya Hayashi
Daniel K. Inouye
Yeiki Kobashigawa
Robert T. Kuroda
Kaoru Moto
Sadao Munemori
Kiyoshi K. Muranaga
Masato Nakae
Shinyei Nakamine
William K. Nakamura
Joe M. Nishimoto
Allan M. Ohata
James K. Okubo
Yukio Okutsu
Frank H. Ono
Kazuo Otani
George T. Sakato
Ted T. Tanouye
52 Distinguished Service Crosses (including 19 Distinguished Service Crosses which were upgraded to Medals of Honor in June 2000)
1 Distinguished Service Medal
560 Silver Stars (plus 28 Oak Leaf Clusters for a second award)
22 Legion of Merit Medals
15 Soldier’s Medals
4,000 Bronze Stars (plus 1,200 Oak Leaf Clusters for a second award; one Bronze Star was upgraded to a Medal of Honor in June 2000. One Bronze Star was upgraded to a Silver Star in September 2009.)
The stellar record of the Japanese Americans serving in the 442nd and in the Military Intelligence Service (U.S. Pacific Theater forces in WWII) helped change the minds of anti-Japanese American critics in the U.S. and resulted in easing of restrictions and the eventual release of the 120,000 strong community well before the end of WWII.
However, the unit’s exemplary service and many decorations did not change the attitudes of the general U.S. population to people of Japanese descent after World War II. Veterans were welcomed home by signs that read “No Japs Allowed” and “No Japs Wanted”, and many veterans were denied service in shops and restaurants, and had their homes and property vandalized.
One notable national effect of the service of the 442nd was to help convince Congress to end its opposition towards Hawaii's statehood petition. Twice before 1959, residents of Hawaii asked to be admitted to the U.S. as the 49th state, but each time Congress was fearful of having a co-equal state that had a majority non-white population. The exemplary record of the Japanese Americans serving in the 442nd and the loyalty showed by the rest of Hawaii's population during World War II overcame those fears and allowed Hawaii to be admitted as the 50th state (Alaska was granted statehood just prior).
timschochet
Footballguy
Final notes:
In 1951, Hollywood made a movie about the exploits of the 442nd, called Go For Broke! As noted, James Michener devotes an entire section of his novel, Hawaii to these brave men. However, other than the odd mention here or there, they are now largely forgotten. Most of the better known chronicles of the Second World War do not mention them, outside of a vague reference or two.
According to Wikipedia, part of the reason lies in something known as the "model minority syndrome": basically meaning those on the left are disdainful of minorities who are too much "like the white man", who don't rebel enough. This began in the 1960s, evidenced by the popularity of Muhammad Ali as a counter-culture figure (During World War II, the most well known Black man in America was Joe Louis, who, unlike Ali, gave up his private existence voluntarily and went into the service.) Even the movie Glory jhas an obligatory scene in which Denzel Washington proclaims that he is not fighting for the United States (extremely doubtful that this every happened.)
The Nisei were incredibly brave, but they were also loyal and extremely patriotic, willing to die for their country in spite of the treatment most Japanese Americans received during wartime. This attitude doesn't really fit with modern leftist philosophy, and I believe this is why these guys don't get more play. In my own small way, among the few people reading this narrative, I've tried to give them some justice.
Thanks for bearing with me on this long-winded story, my favorite of the war. I'd love to read any reaction or commentary. I will shortly resume discussing the liberation of France.
In 1951, Hollywood made a movie about the exploits of the 442nd, called Go For Broke! As noted, James Michener devotes an entire section of his novel, Hawaii to these brave men. However, other than the odd mention here or there, they are now largely forgotten. Most of the better known chronicles of the Second World War do not mention them, outside of a vague reference or two.
According to Wikipedia, part of the reason lies in something known as the "model minority syndrome": basically meaning those on the left are disdainful of minorities who are too much "like the white man", who don't rebel enough. This began in the 1960s, evidenced by the popularity of Muhammad Ali as a counter-culture figure (During World War II, the most well known Black man in America was Joe Louis, who, unlike Ali, gave up his private existence voluntarily and went into the service.) Even the movie Glory jhas an obligatory scene in which Denzel Washington proclaims that he is not fighting for the United States (extremely doubtful that this every happened.)
The Nisei were incredibly brave, but they were also loyal and extremely patriotic, willing to die for their country in spite of the treatment most Japanese Americans received during wartime. This attitude doesn't really fit with modern leftist philosophy, and I believe this is why these guys don't get more play. In my own small way, among the few people reading this narrative, I've tried to give them some justice.
Thanks for bearing with me on this long-winded story, my favorite of the war. I'd love to read any reaction or commentary. I will shortly resume discussing the liberation of France.
JerseyToughGuys
Tough Guy
randomly following along. this seems like an insane number of ships.
Was there a Midway post that itemized things like this?
awesome.
keep up the nice work fellas.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
I think your analysis is substantially correct. Additionally, I wonder what would have happened if the teaching community in Hawaii had been "multicultural" and insisted that the Japanese keep their language, their culture etc. Those Nisei wanted to be Americans, and the curriculum they had at school extolled America. Of course, America is not without flaws, but in focusing too much on her flaws we sometimes lose sight of what an extraordinary country this is.
Mjolnirs
Footballguy
The writing is on the wall.
timschochet
Footballguy
It looks pretty good for them, that's for sure, but it's not won yet, and if you were one of the Allied soldiers in the front lines, it wouldn't make much difference what the final outcome would be; your chances of getting killed or seriously wounded were still pretty high.I'll be starting the liberation of France sometime this weekend.
timschochet
Footballguy
France Part One
By July the Allies had not only secured and extended their beach lodgments and taken Cherbourg, but had brought into France an enormous number of troops and supplies. On Bradley's 40 mile front there were now 2 airborne, 2 armored and 11 infantry divisions, while Monty's front of the same width held 11 infantry and 5 armored divisions. In the 3 weeks succeeding D-Day, the allied navies had ferried no fewer than a million men ashore together with 560,000 tons of supplies- enough to fill a freight train 190 miles long. Here was a logistics feat unmatched in military history.
The objective now was to break out of the lodgment in which the German 7th army still held them contained. To do this, Monty at Caen was to be the pivot on which the entire Allied line was to swing eastward toward the Seine and Paris. Bradley's 1st Army was to provide the impetus for this assault with an attack on the westernmost end of the line. The Americans were to sweep south of the Cotentin past Avranches and at that point cut off the Brittany peninsula at it's neck. Next Patton's Third Army was to plunge into Brittany in quest of its valuable deep-water ports. With the American right anchored on the Loire river, the remainder of the Allied line would make a dash for the Seine. Behind the Seine the retreating Germans would probably reorganize for a stand, while the pursuing Allies paused to regroup and and receive supplies.
On July 3 Middleton's VIII Corps attacked south toward Coutances-St. Lo-Caumont. They made little progress. Next day- the Fourth of July-Middleton's men received novel support from the 1st Army's Artillery. To mark Independence Day, instead of the traditional 48 gun salute, Bradley decided to fire every gun in the army. Thus 1,100 massed guns of every caliber fired a single shell at the Germans, each timed to explode on the split second of noon. All arrived on the German front together, exploding with a single thunderclap that not only shook the Germans but also killed and wounded many of them.
Nevertheless, Middleton's advance was slow. After 12 days od fighting, his forces had suffered 10,000 casualties and gained only 7 miles. It sounded like World War I all over again, and thus Bradley's dream of a breakout and a dash for Avranches ended in a "crushing disappointment to me personally." There were three reasons for this: the first was the fighting spirit of the Germans. Not all of this was from pride or loyalty to Hitler. In the first 7 months of 1944, the Wehrmacht executed 4,000 soldiers, half of them for desertion. But of course there was also the realization, finally, that the German Fatherland was threatened, and soldiers always fight harder in such situations.
The second reason was the tiredness of the frontline troops of the United States army. Since D-Day, continued battle had led to shock and great fatigue. It took Bradley and the other commanders some time to realize this and to throw in fresh troops.
But the biggest problem was the Bocage, whose hilly nature prevented using armor to its best advantage. No tanks were capable of penetrating the hedgerows. This was eventually solved by Yankee ingenuity. A sergeant named Curits Culin welded a set of steel tusks to a Sherman's nose. Experiments showed that this was the answer. The tusk of the "Rhinocerous" hit into the hedgerows to secure the Sherman to it, after which the tank literally exploded through both dirt and roots. When Bradley saw a demonstration, he ordered every one of his large tanks attached with the device.
The value of Sgt. Culin's invention can hardly be exaggerated. It restored maneuverability to Bradleys armor. Now his tanks could move through the Bocage while the Germans could not. This gave Bradley to power to outflank them, Bradley's next move was to cancel out the German soldier's fighting skill: a massive aerial bombardment of the German front by thousands of aircraft, what came to be called "carpet bombing." Now the breakout from St Lo- Operation Cobra- could begin.
By July the Allies had not only secured and extended their beach lodgments and taken Cherbourg, but had brought into France an enormous number of troops and supplies. On Bradley's 40 mile front there were now 2 airborne, 2 armored and 11 infantry divisions, while Monty's front of the same width held 11 infantry and 5 armored divisions. In the 3 weeks succeeding D-Day, the allied navies had ferried no fewer than a million men ashore together with 560,000 tons of supplies- enough to fill a freight train 190 miles long. Here was a logistics feat unmatched in military history.
The objective now was to break out of the lodgment in which the German 7th army still held them contained. To do this, Monty at Caen was to be the pivot on which the entire Allied line was to swing eastward toward the Seine and Paris. Bradley's 1st Army was to provide the impetus for this assault with an attack on the westernmost end of the line. The Americans were to sweep south of the Cotentin past Avranches and at that point cut off the Brittany peninsula at it's neck. Next Patton's Third Army was to plunge into Brittany in quest of its valuable deep-water ports. With the American right anchored on the Loire river, the remainder of the Allied line would make a dash for the Seine. Behind the Seine the retreating Germans would probably reorganize for a stand, while the pursuing Allies paused to regroup and and receive supplies.
On July 3 Middleton's VIII Corps attacked south toward Coutances-St. Lo-Caumont. They made little progress. Next day- the Fourth of July-Middleton's men received novel support from the 1st Army's Artillery. To mark Independence Day, instead of the traditional 48 gun salute, Bradley decided to fire every gun in the army. Thus 1,100 massed guns of every caliber fired a single shell at the Germans, each timed to explode on the split second of noon. All arrived on the German front together, exploding with a single thunderclap that not only shook the Germans but also killed and wounded many of them.
Nevertheless, Middleton's advance was slow. After 12 days od fighting, his forces had suffered 10,000 casualties and gained only 7 miles. It sounded like World War I all over again, and thus Bradley's dream of a breakout and a dash for Avranches ended in a "crushing disappointment to me personally." There were three reasons for this: the first was the fighting spirit of the Germans. Not all of this was from pride or loyalty to Hitler. In the first 7 months of 1944, the Wehrmacht executed 4,000 soldiers, half of them for desertion. But of course there was also the realization, finally, that the German Fatherland was threatened, and soldiers always fight harder in such situations.
The second reason was the tiredness of the frontline troops of the United States army. Since D-Day, continued battle had led to shock and great fatigue. It took Bradley and the other commanders some time to realize this and to throw in fresh troops.
But the biggest problem was the Bocage, whose hilly nature prevented using armor to its best advantage. No tanks were capable of penetrating the hedgerows. This was eventually solved by Yankee ingenuity. A sergeant named Curits Culin welded a set of steel tusks to a Sherman's nose. Experiments showed that this was the answer. The tusk of the "Rhinocerous" hit into the hedgerows to secure the Sherman to it, after which the tank literally exploded through both dirt and roots. When Bradley saw a demonstration, he ordered every one of his large tanks attached with the device.
The value of Sgt. Culin's invention can hardly be exaggerated. It restored maneuverability to Bradleys armor. Now his tanks could move through the Bocage while the Germans could not. This gave Bradley to power to outflank them, Bradley's next move was to cancel out the German soldier's fighting skill: a massive aerial bombardment of the German front by thousands of aircraft, what came to be called "carpet bombing." Now the breakout from St Lo- Operation Cobra- could begin.
timschochet
Footballguy
France, Continued
Cobra had one great though unsuspected advantage: the enemy expected the main push to come from the Anglo-Canadians on the left or eastern flank at Caen. Marshal von Kluge had gone there himself to direct a battle of 14 divisions against the same number of Anglo-Canadians. On the west he had only 11 divisions to oppose 15 American. Thus they were surprised when on July 25 the bombardment began, like nothing the Germans had ever witnessed before. The ground was shaken and rocked as though by an earthquake. Men were beheaded, split in two, buried alive. After the bombers left, the ground attack got going. Fighting was savage. Panzer Lehr soldiers had dug their tanks hull down and were battling stubbornly from them. But the air force had done it's job; the German lines were fragmented.
Even the matchless Panzer Lehr had been pulverized. When Kluge sent a staff officer to Fritz Bayerlein with orders to hold the St. Lo line to the last man, Bayerlein replied with anguished sarcasm:
Out in front everyone is holding out. Everyone. My grenadiers and my engineers and my tank crews- they're all holding their ground. Not a single man is leaving his post. They are lying silent in their foxholes, for they are dead. You may report to the field marshal that the Panzer Lehr Division is annihilated.
On the afternoon of the 25th, Lightin' Joe Collins ordered his mobile columns forward. Bradley had given him 6 divisions for the breakout, all among the finest in the U.S. Army. By nightfall American units had pierced the German line and were outside of it at Marigny. In the morning across the entire front American formations began to shake free of the tenacious Germans. Resistance was crumbling, and the American army's matchless mobility was turning the 7th Army's retreat into a rout.
A sense of exhilaration had seized the American soldiers. Breakout! Pockets of resistance met at crossroads were eliminated by the infantry jumping down from halted tanks, and then the pursuit was renewed. Exultant riflemen rode on the hulls of the tanks or waved from their troop carriers at the cheering, weeping, singing, kiss-blowing French, who greeted them like gods as they roared through their villages. Everywhere along the road abandoned and blackened German vehicles testified to the wide-ranging scourging of the American fighter-bombers. Even the German tank fighters accustomed to mechanized movement could not believe the speed of the American advance, especially by the two armored divisions.
Churchill and the British were stunned as well. The reason for their reluctance to invade France is that they could not imagine the American speed, and the power of of the air force. But they should not have been surprised. In 1940, the Germans revolutionized warfare when they invaded France using speed and mobility that had never been witnessed before. Now, barely 4 years later, the Americans revolutionized warfare again by demonstrating a speed and mobility that made the 1940 invasion as obsolete as horse calvalry had become.
Cobra had one great though unsuspected advantage: the enemy expected the main push to come from the Anglo-Canadians on the left or eastern flank at Caen. Marshal von Kluge had gone there himself to direct a battle of 14 divisions against the same number of Anglo-Canadians. On the west he had only 11 divisions to oppose 15 American. Thus they were surprised when on July 25 the bombardment began, like nothing the Germans had ever witnessed before. The ground was shaken and rocked as though by an earthquake. Men were beheaded, split in two, buried alive. After the bombers left, the ground attack got going. Fighting was savage. Panzer Lehr soldiers had dug their tanks hull down and were battling stubbornly from them. But the air force had done it's job; the German lines were fragmented.
Even the matchless Panzer Lehr had been pulverized. When Kluge sent a staff officer to Fritz Bayerlein with orders to hold the St. Lo line to the last man, Bayerlein replied with anguished sarcasm:
Out in front everyone is holding out. Everyone. My grenadiers and my engineers and my tank crews- they're all holding their ground. Not a single man is leaving his post. They are lying silent in their foxholes, for they are dead. You may report to the field marshal that the Panzer Lehr Division is annihilated.
On the afternoon of the 25th, Lightin' Joe Collins ordered his mobile columns forward. Bradley had given him 6 divisions for the breakout, all among the finest in the U.S. Army. By nightfall American units had pierced the German line and were outside of it at Marigny. In the morning across the entire front American formations began to shake free of the tenacious Germans. Resistance was crumbling, and the American army's matchless mobility was turning the 7th Army's retreat into a rout.
A sense of exhilaration had seized the American soldiers. Breakout! Pockets of resistance met at crossroads were eliminated by the infantry jumping down from halted tanks, and then the pursuit was renewed. Exultant riflemen rode on the hulls of the tanks or waved from their troop carriers at the cheering, weeping, singing, kiss-blowing French, who greeted them like gods as they roared through their villages. Everywhere along the road abandoned and blackened German vehicles testified to the wide-ranging scourging of the American fighter-bombers. Even the German tank fighters accustomed to mechanized movement could not believe the speed of the American advance, especially by the two armored divisions.
Churchill and the British were stunned as well. The reason for their reluctance to invade France is that they could not imagine the American speed, and the power of of the air force. But they should not have been surprised. In 1940, the Germans revolutionized warfare when they invaded France using speed and mobility that had never been witnessed before. Now, barely 4 years later, the Americans revolutionized warfare again by demonstrating a speed and mobility that made the 1940 invasion as obsolete as horse calvalry had become.
timschochet
Footballguy
France, Continued
On August 31, 1944, the 12th Army Group was removed from Montgomery's command, and given to Omar Bradley. This had been planned by Eisenhower for months, to take place as soon as American troops had numerical superiority. But it outraged the British press and public. On the same day, Churchill made Monty a field marshal. But British resentment was not reduced, and it would increase at the spectacle of George Patton's Third Army, racing through Britanny with a speed and dash which made even the celebrated German blitzkrieg appear like slow-motion war.
Patton's Third Army exploded out of the Cotentin Peninsula and charged into the narrow Avranches corridor. Because only 2 roads led into Avranches and only one out of it, the spearheading armor followed by motorized infantry became stalled in a bumper-to-bumper bottleneck. Patton personally uncorked it. He was everywhere up and down the line in his jeep clearing the way for his tanks. Within 24 hours he had successfully passed 2 armored and 2 infantry divisions through the corridor, and sent them dashing west into Britanny.
Patton actually loved war. To be bombed or strafed or machine-gunned exhilarated rahter than frightened him. "Compared to war," Patton said, "all other forms of human endeavor shrink to insignificance. God how I love it." In this love of war, Patton was no different than Winston Churchill, Robert E. Lee, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and many many others. In fact, there is no record of a great general who hated war.
The Third Army moved at an amazing 40 miles a day. It was a sensational dash, but much of Britanny's defending forces had been withdrawn by Kluge for use against Bradley. When Patton swung the Third Army west to join in the attempt to encircle the German 7th Army, his reputation helped to induce Hitler to issue perhaps his most stupid order of the war.
On August 31, 1944, the 12th Army Group was removed from Montgomery's command, and given to Omar Bradley. This had been planned by Eisenhower for months, to take place as soon as American troops had numerical superiority. But it outraged the British press and public. On the same day, Churchill made Monty a field marshal. But British resentment was not reduced, and it would increase at the spectacle of George Patton's Third Army, racing through Britanny with a speed and dash which made even the celebrated German blitzkrieg appear like slow-motion war.
Patton's Third Army exploded out of the Cotentin Peninsula and charged into the narrow Avranches corridor. Because only 2 roads led into Avranches and only one out of it, the spearheading armor followed by motorized infantry became stalled in a bumper-to-bumper bottleneck. Patton personally uncorked it. He was everywhere up and down the line in his jeep clearing the way for his tanks. Within 24 hours he had successfully passed 2 armored and 2 infantry divisions through the corridor, and sent them dashing west into Britanny.
Patton actually loved war. To be bombed or strafed or machine-gunned exhilarated rahter than frightened him. "Compared to war," Patton said, "all other forms of human endeavor shrink to insignificance. God how I love it." In this love of war, Patton was no different than Winston Churchill, Robert E. Lee, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and many many others. In fact, there is no record of a great general who hated war.
The Third Army moved at an amazing 40 miles a day. It was a sensational dash, but much of Britanny's defending forces had been withdrawn by Kluge for use against Bradley. When Patton swung the Third Army west to join in the attempt to encircle the German 7th Army, his reputation helped to induce Hitler to issue perhaps his most stupid order of the war.
timschochet
Footballguy
Note- as we move toward the liberation of Paris, the book I am using (Delivered From Evil) devotes dozens of pages to the Maquis (the French Underground). I have decided not to tell this story. Yes, it's an exciting story like the Warsaw Ghetto or the 442, but the difference is, unlike those events, I have strong doubts that it ever happened the way the French present it. I think the Resistance was mostly myth, never treated seriously by the Germans or the Milice (Vichy police) and then built up after the war. In fact, the behavior of the French after the Allies invaded leaves much to be desired: they took anyone suspected of "collaborating" with the Germans, and without proof one way or another, shaved their heads and forced them on the roads, to be spat upon wherever they went.
I could document here the terrible ways the French behaved under German occupation; how they cooperated with the Germans regarding the Holocaust and other brutal actions. But it's all too dreary to do so, so I prefer not to. But I'm not going to waste my time glamorizing them either. If somebody else wants to take a shot at describing the heroics of the French, be my guest. I'm not a fan.
I could document here the terrible ways the French behaved under German occupation; how they cooperated with the Germans regarding the Holocaust and other brutal actions. But it's all too dreary to do so, so I prefer not to. But I'm not going to waste my time glamorizing them either. If somebody else wants to take a shot at describing the heroics of the French, be my guest. I'm not a fan.
timschochet
Footballguy
France, Continued
"We must strike like lightning!" Hitler told Field Marshal Von Kluge. "When we reach the sea, the American spearheads will be cut off. Obviously they are trying all-out for a major decision here, because otherwise they would not have sent in their best general, Patton...We must wheel north like lightning and turn the entire enemy front from the rear."
This was Hitler's fantastic reaction to the threatened encirclement of the 7th Army. It was not that he saw that Kluge's left flank was open and dangling, but rather that he saw a chance to strike north toward Avranches to trap the Americans in Britanny, and then wheel east to roll up the entire Allied line from its rear. It was as far from reality as a demented mind may retreat. If Kluge had been Rommel, he probably would have not obeyed the order, but he was Kluge, and terrified that many of his friends and comrades were being executed by SS for their "complicity" in Stauffenberg's plot. So he obeyed. Reduced to 650 tanks from the 1,400 committed to battle in Normandy, he scrounged what he could from the eastern front at Caen and formed 5 panzer and SS divisions into the hammerhead of his counterattack at Mortain.
It began August 6, coming into the main against the 30th Division which had just relieved the 1st. Within a few hours the German attack had penetrated the 30th's lines. The 2nd Battalion, 120th Regiment, was overrun and cut off. But it hung on doggedly, refusing for 6 days to submit to German demands for surrender. Meanwhile Kluge's attack on the second day ran into clear weather. The American air force attacked the tanks savagely. Promised help from the Luftwaffe never arrived. Every sortie was intercepted and shot down or turned back. Instead of cutting off Patton, Hitler's maniacal decision had driven his divisions deeper into the American noose. Bradley was ectastic. He told a visiting Henry Morganthau, "This is our opportunity to destroy all German opposition in France."
Kluge did continue to drive deeper into the trap, while Patton sent his XV Corps under Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip driving hard north from Le Mans to Argentan. It was not until August 11 that Kluge conceded that the foolhardy attack should be canceled. He requested permission to withdraw for the Seine. For the first time, Hitler agreed to a withdrawal. But he specified that Kluge must first clear his left flank and rear before he pulled out! Here was madness compounded by idiocy. As Bradley pointed out, "Hitler might more reasonably have ordered his field commander to reverse the downstream flow of the Seine."
However, the Allies had a problem, and it was Montgomery. In order to trap the Germans, Monty's troops had to reach Falaise, and they were moving with their typical speed: slow and methodical. Patton was exasperated. He phoned Bradley several times and insisted he be allowed to plunge ahead. Bradley refused. "You wait," he told the chafing general.
Meanwhile Bradley's reports to SHAEF had created great excitement in the Alllied world. Eisenhower, Churchill, FDR, and even Brooke were jubilant. Correspondents who had been writing so gloomily of stalemate on the Western Front, now remembered November 1918 and wrote euphorically of a German surrender by September. How many weeks would it take? Ike pointed out that Hitler could only expect death if he surrendered; therefore there would be no surrender.
Nonetheless, Wall Street reacted sharply in anticipation of a quick peace. Interestingly enough, stocks tumbled.
"We must strike like lightning!" Hitler told Field Marshal Von Kluge. "When we reach the sea, the American spearheads will be cut off. Obviously they are trying all-out for a major decision here, because otherwise they would not have sent in their best general, Patton...We must wheel north like lightning and turn the entire enemy front from the rear."
This was Hitler's fantastic reaction to the threatened encirclement of the 7th Army. It was not that he saw that Kluge's left flank was open and dangling, but rather that he saw a chance to strike north toward Avranches to trap the Americans in Britanny, and then wheel east to roll up the entire Allied line from its rear. It was as far from reality as a demented mind may retreat. If Kluge had been Rommel, he probably would have not obeyed the order, but he was Kluge, and terrified that many of his friends and comrades were being executed by SS for their "complicity" in Stauffenberg's plot. So he obeyed. Reduced to 650 tanks from the 1,400 committed to battle in Normandy, he scrounged what he could from the eastern front at Caen and formed 5 panzer and SS divisions into the hammerhead of his counterattack at Mortain.
It began August 6, coming into the main against the 30th Division which had just relieved the 1st. Within a few hours the German attack had penetrated the 30th's lines. The 2nd Battalion, 120th Regiment, was overrun and cut off. But it hung on doggedly, refusing for 6 days to submit to German demands for surrender. Meanwhile Kluge's attack on the second day ran into clear weather. The American air force attacked the tanks savagely. Promised help from the Luftwaffe never arrived. Every sortie was intercepted and shot down or turned back. Instead of cutting off Patton, Hitler's maniacal decision had driven his divisions deeper into the American noose. Bradley was ectastic. He told a visiting Henry Morganthau, "This is our opportunity to destroy all German opposition in France."
Kluge did continue to drive deeper into the trap, while Patton sent his XV Corps under Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip driving hard north from Le Mans to Argentan. It was not until August 11 that Kluge conceded that the foolhardy attack should be canceled. He requested permission to withdraw for the Seine. For the first time, Hitler agreed to a withdrawal. But he specified that Kluge must first clear his left flank and rear before he pulled out! Here was madness compounded by idiocy. As Bradley pointed out, "Hitler might more reasonably have ordered his field commander to reverse the downstream flow of the Seine."
However, the Allies had a problem, and it was Montgomery. In order to trap the Germans, Monty's troops had to reach Falaise, and they were moving with their typical speed: slow and methodical. Patton was exasperated. He phoned Bradley several times and insisted he be allowed to plunge ahead. Bradley refused. "You wait," he told the chafing general.
Meanwhile Bradley's reports to SHAEF had created great excitement in the Alllied world. Eisenhower, Churchill, FDR, and even Brooke were jubilant. Correspondents who had been writing so gloomily of stalemate on the Western Front, now remembered November 1918 and wrote euphorically of a German surrender by September. How many weeks would it take? Ike pointed out that Hitler could only expect death if he surrendered; therefore there would be no surrender.
Nonetheless, Wall Street reacted sharply in anticipation of a quick peace. Interestingly enough, stocks tumbled.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES I
He would keep his promise; he was coming, and the Japanese knew it.
When he had left Corregidor and gone to Australia, under orders from President Roosevelt, General Douglas MacArthur had promised the Philippines, “I shall return.” Although this may seem a little self serving, it should be recognized that MacArthur had been Commander in Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, responsible to the Philippine government.
As the Allies moved up the South Pacific, clearing the Japanese out of some islands and isolating them on others, two broad approaches to Japan presented themselves. One was to bypass the Philippines and go to Taiwan, and the other to bypass Taiwan, and go to the Philippines. Nimitz argued for the first, and MacArthur, obviously, for the second. The definition was not made until MacArthur and Nimitz met with Roosevelt and his military staff in Hawaii. It was to be the Philippines. However, MacArthur was not the only reason; the invasion of Taiwan would have required more ground troops than were available, and Nimitz came around to MacArthur's point of view.
The Philippines stretch for more than a thousand miles, with the largest islands being Luzon, in the north, and Mindanao in the south. Manila, and the greater percentage of the population, were in Luzon. In order to split the Japanese defenses, the decision was made to go to Leyte, one of the smaller islands that lie between the major islands. From this island, the Allies could construct airfields which would give them overwhelming firepower over the whole of the Philippines. Leyte Island is about 2,800 square miles, and had a population of about 2 million. They were fiercely opposed to the Japanese, who had treated them very harshly. At one time, there had been six Japanese divisions on the island, but on October 20th there was just one; a total of about 20,000 Japanese troops.
So Leyte Gulf was to be the invasion point, and the ensuing naval battle was to be the biggest naval battle of WW2, the most far flung naval battle of all time, and one of the greatest naval battles in history; it would involve aircraft carriers, airplanes, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, tankers, and submarines, plus all the troopships and landing craft.
The invasion was to be on October 20, 1944, by four divisions of General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, and was to be backed up by Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet. This was composed of old battleships and small escort carriers. However, Admiral Bull Halsey's Seventh Fleet composed of the cream of the US Navy, with fast carriers and modern battleships, was to provide cover and meet any Japanese threat that could emerge.
The battle was preceded by devastating attacks from Halsey's fleet against Taiwan and Okinawa, as well as the Philippines. These would prove crucial, because during these attacks the US forces destroyed more than 500 Japanese planes, with a loss of only 79. However, Japanese pilots made wildly extravagant claims which were radioed to Tokyo. They claimed to have sunk eleven carriers, two battleships and three cruisers, leading the Japanese to believe that they stood a real chance of repelling the invasion. Actually, virtually none of those losses had occurred.
So, on the morning of October 20th, preceded by a devastating naval barrage, the landing craft approached the beaches on Leyte Island and began to go ashore. LTV's, amphibious tanks, LCI troop carriers, LST's, LCV's, wave after wave after wave of boats and equipment and men. Japanese resistance was sporadic and quickly overcome.
Sixth Army forces landed on assigned beaches at 10:00. The X Corps pushed across a 4 mi stretch of beach between Tacloban airfield and the Palo River. Fifteen miles to the south, XXIV Corps units came ashore across a 3 mile strand between San José and the Daguitan River. Troops found as much resistance from swampy terrain as from Japanese fire.
Within an hour of landing, units in most sectors had secured beachheads deep enough to receive heavy vehicles and large amounts of supplies. Only in the 24th Division sector did enemy fire force a diversion of follow-up landing craft. But even that sector was secure enough by 13:30 to allow Gen. MacArthur to make a dramatic entrance through the surf and announce to the populace the beginning of their liberation: "People of the Philippines, I have returned! By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil."
By the end of A-day, the Sixth Army had moved 2 miles inland and controlled Panaon Strait at the southern end of Leyte. In the X Corps sector, the 1st Cavalry Division held Tacloban airfield, and the 24th Infantry Division had taken the high ground on Hill 522 commanding its beachheads. In the XXIV Corps sector, the 96th Infantry Division held the approaches to Catmon Hill. The 7th Infantry Division took the town of Dulag, which forced Gen. Makino to move his command post 10 mi inland to the town of Dagami. The initial fighting was won at an Allied cost of 49 killed, 192 wounded.
The battle for the island of Leyte was to continue for more than two months. After the invasion, the Japanese reinforced Leyte with 34,000 more troops, which they were able to land at the ports which were still available to them. During this time, the Allied troops relied on supplies and reinforcement from Leyte Gulf, which would not have been possible had the Japanese succeeded in having the Imperial Navy overwhelm the landing area.
He would keep his promise; he was coming, and the Japanese knew it.
When he had left Corregidor and gone to Australia, under orders from President Roosevelt, General Douglas MacArthur had promised the Philippines, “I shall return.” Although this may seem a little self serving, it should be recognized that MacArthur had been Commander in Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, responsible to the Philippine government.
As the Allies moved up the South Pacific, clearing the Japanese out of some islands and isolating them on others, two broad approaches to Japan presented themselves. One was to bypass the Philippines and go to Taiwan, and the other to bypass Taiwan, and go to the Philippines. Nimitz argued for the first, and MacArthur, obviously, for the second. The definition was not made until MacArthur and Nimitz met with Roosevelt and his military staff in Hawaii. It was to be the Philippines. However, MacArthur was not the only reason; the invasion of Taiwan would have required more ground troops than were available, and Nimitz came around to MacArthur's point of view.
The Philippines stretch for more than a thousand miles, with the largest islands being Luzon, in the north, and Mindanao in the south. Manila, and the greater percentage of the population, were in Luzon. In order to split the Japanese defenses, the decision was made to go to Leyte, one of the smaller islands that lie between the major islands. From this island, the Allies could construct airfields which would give them overwhelming firepower over the whole of the Philippines. Leyte Island is about 2,800 square miles, and had a population of about 2 million. They were fiercely opposed to the Japanese, who had treated them very harshly. At one time, there had been six Japanese divisions on the island, but on October 20th there was just one; a total of about 20,000 Japanese troops.
So Leyte Gulf was to be the invasion point, and the ensuing naval battle was to be the biggest naval battle of WW2, the most far flung naval battle of all time, and one of the greatest naval battles in history; it would involve aircraft carriers, airplanes, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, tankers, and submarines, plus all the troopships and landing craft.
The invasion was to be on October 20, 1944, by four divisions of General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, and was to be backed up by Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet. This was composed of old battleships and small escort carriers. However, Admiral Bull Halsey's Seventh Fleet composed of the cream of the US Navy, with fast carriers and modern battleships, was to provide cover and meet any Japanese threat that could emerge.
The battle was preceded by devastating attacks from Halsey's fleet against Taiwan and Okinawa, as well as the Philippines. These would prove crucial, because during these attacks the US forces destroyed more than 500 Japanese planes, with a loss of only 79. However, Japanese pilots made wildly extravagant claims which were radioed to Tokyo. They claimed to have sunk eleven carriers, two battleships and three cruisers, leading the Japanese to believe that they stood a real chance of repelling the invasion. Actually, virtually none of those losses had occurred.
So, on the morning of October 20th, preceded by a devastating naval barrage, the landing craft approached the beaches on Leyte Island and began to go ashore. LTV's, amphibious tanks, LCI troop carriers, LST's, LCV's, wave after wave after wave of boats and equipment and men. Japanese resistance was sporadic and quickly overcome.
Sixth Army forces landed on assigned beaches at 10:00. The X Corps pushed across a 4 mi stretch of beach between Tacloban airfield and the Palo River. Fifteen miles to the south, XXIV Corps units came ashore across a 3 mile strand between San José and the Daguitan River. Troops found as much resistance from swampy terrain as from Japanese fire.
Within an hour of landing, units in most sectors had secured beachheads deep enough to receive heavy vehicles and large amounts of supplies. Only in the 24th Division sector did enemy fire force a diversion of follow-up landing craft. But even that sector was secure enough by 13:30 to allow Gen. MacArthur to make a dramatic entrance through the surf and announce to the populace the beginning of their liberation: "People of the Philippines, I have returned! By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil."
By the end of A-day, the Sixth Army had moved 2 miles inland and controlled Panaon Strait at the southern end of Leyte. In the X Corps sector, the 1st Cavalry Division held Tacloban airfield, and the 24th Infantry Division had taken the high ground on Hill 522 commanding its beachheads. In the XXIV Corps sector, the 96th Infantry Division held the approaches to Catmon Hill. The 7th Infantry Division took the town of Dulag, which forced Gen. Makino to move his command post 10 mi inland to the town of Dagami. The initial fighting was won at an Allied cost of 49 killed, 192 wounded.
The battle for the island of Leyte was to continue for more than two months. After the invasion, the Japanese reinforced Leyte with 34,000 more troops, which they were able to land at the ports which were still available to them. During this time, the Allied troops relied on supplies and reinforcement from Leyte Gulf, which would not have been possible had the Japanese succeeded in having the Imperial Navy overwhelm the landing area.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES II
The Japanese had prepared several war plans, depending on what the Allies did next. Once the Japanese were sure the Americans were landing in the Philippines, they planned an all out naval attack, which, if successful, would destroy the troop landings and landing craft, deal overwhelming damage to the US Navy, and isolate the troops which had landed. They were prepared to commit all their naval reserves to this operation.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf included four major naval engagements: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
However, a serious and fundamental defect in the Allied plan for the invasion of the Philippines was that there would be no overall American admiral in command of the US Naval forces. (By the way, I might mention here that I use Allied and American interchangeably, because the forces were overwhelmingly American; but there were elements of the Australian and New Zealand navies, as well as other Allied units). This lack of a unified command, along with failures in communication, was to produce a crisis, and very nearly a strategic disaster, for the American forces. Only incredibly intrepid actions by the commanders on the scene, and the bravery of the men under fire, were able to avert a debacle. By coincidence, the Japanese plan using three separate fleets also failed to designate an overall commander.
The Japanese plan, known as SHO-GO1, called for Vice-Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa's ships, known as Northern Force, to lure the main American covering forces away from Leyte. Northern Force would be built around several aircraft carriers, but these would have very few aircraft or trained aircrew. (The Japanese aircrews had been decimated in the previous months). The carriers would serve as the main bait to draw American carrier forces away, so that the Center Force and Southern Force could deliver the punishing blow on the landing operations.
As the US covering forces were lured away, two other surface forces would advance on Leyte from the west. The Southern Force under Admirals Nishimura and Shima would strike at the landing area via Surigao Strait. The Center Force under Admiral Kurita, by far the most powerful of the attacking forces, would pass through San Bernardino Strait into the Philippine Sea, turn southwards, and then also attack the landing area.
As the overall battle approached, these were the forces available:
For the Japanese:
1 fast carrier
3 light carriers
9 battleships
14 heavy cruisers
6 light cruisers
35+ destroyers
300+ planes (including land-based aircraft)
For the Allies:
8 fast carriers
8 light carriers
18 escort carriers
12 battleships
24 cruisers
141 destroyers and destroyer escorts
Many PT boats, submarines, and fleet auxiliaries
About 1,500 planes
PRELIMINARY ACTIONS IN THE PALAWAN PASSAGE
As it sortied from its base in Brunei, Kurita's powerful "Center Force" consisted of five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna), ten heavy cruisers (Atago, Maya, Takao, Chōkai, Myōkō, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone and Chikuma), two light cruisers (Noshiro and Yahagi) and 15 destroyers. By pre-WW2 standards, this was an incredibly powerful surface fleet; as long as it did not come up against a carrier force, it would be very, very strong.
Kurita's ships passed Palawan Island around midnight on 22-23 October. The American submarines Darter and Dace were positioned in company with each other on the surface close by. At 00:16 on 23 October, Darter's radar detected the Japanese formation at a range of 30,000 yds. Her captain promptly made visual contact. The two submarines quickly moved off in pursuit of the ships, while Darter made the first of three contact reports. At least one of these was picked up by a radio operator on Yamato, but Kurita failed to take appropriate anti-submarine precautions.
Darter and Dace (traveling on the surface at full power) after several hours gained a position ahead of Kurita's formation with the intention of making a submerged attack at first light. This attack was unusually successful. At 05:24, Darter fired a spread of six torpedoes, at least four of which hit Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago. 10 minutes later, Darter made two hits on the Atago's sister ship Takao with another spread of torpedoes. At 05:56 Dace made four torpedo hits on the heavy cruiser Maya (sister to Atago and Takao).
Atago and Maya quickly sank. Takao turned back to Brunei escorted by two destroyers — and was followed by the two submarines. On 24 October, as the submarines continued to shadow the damaged cruiser, Darter ran aground on the Bombay Shoal. All efforts to get her off failed, and she was abandoned. Her entire crew was, however, rescued by Dace.
Takao returned to Singapore, where she remained for the rest of the war; joined in January 1945 by Myōkō. Atago had sunk so rapidly that Kurita was forced to swim in order to survive. He was rescued by one of the Japanese destroyers, and he then transferred to the battleship Yamato.
The Japanese had prepared several war plans, depending on what the Allies did next. Once the Japanese were sure the Americans were landing in the Philippines, they planned an all out naval attack, which, if successful, would destroy the troop landings and landing craft, deal overwhelming damage to the US Navy, and isolate the troops which had landed. They were prepared to commit all their naval reserves to this operation.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf included four major naval engagements: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar, as well as other actions.
However, a serious and fundamental defect in the Allied plan for the invasion of the Philippines was that there would be no overall American admiral in command of the US Naval forces. (By the way, I might mention here that I use Allied and American interchangeably, because the forces were overwhelmingly American; but there were elements of the Australian and New Zealand navies, as well as other Allied units). This lack of a unified command, along with failures in communication, was to produce a crisis, and very nearly a strategic disaster, for the American forces. Only incredibly intrepid actions by the commanders on the scene, and the bravery of the men under fire, were able to avert a debacle. By coincidence, the Japanese plan using three separate fleets also failed to designate an overall commander.
The Japanese plan, known as SHO-GO1, called for Vice-Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa's ships, known as Northern Force, to lure the main American covering forces away from Leyte. Northern Force would be built around several aircraft carriers, but these would have very few aircraft or trained aircrew. (The Japanese aircrews had been decimated in the previous months). The carriers would serve as the main bait to draw American carrier forces away, so that the Center Force and Southern Force could deliver the punishing blow on the landing operations.
As the US covering forces were lured away, two other surface forces would advance on Leyte from the west. The Southern Force under Admirals Nishimura and Shima would strike at the landing area via Surigao Strait. The Center Force under Admiral Kurita, by far the most powerful of the attacking forces, would pass through San Bernardino Strait into the Philippine Sea, turn southwards, and then also attack the landing area.
As the overall battle approached, these were the forces available:
For the Japanese:
1 fast carrier
3 light carriers
9 battleships
14 heavy cruisers
6 light cruisers
35+ destroyers
300+ planes (including land-based aircraft)
For the Allies:
8 fast carriers
8 light carriers
18 escort carriers
12 battleships
24 cruisers
141 destroyers and destroyer escorts
Many PT boats, submarines, and fleet auxiliaries
About 1,500 planes
PRELIMINARY ACTIONS IN THE PALAWAN PASSAGE
As it sortied from its base in Brunei, Kurita's powerful "Center Force" consisted of five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna), ten heavy cruisers (Atago, Maya, Takao, Chōkai, Myōkō, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone and Chikuma), two light cruisers (Noshiro and Yahagi) and 15 destroyers. By pre-WW2 standards, this was an incredibly powerful surface fleet; as long as it did not come up against a carrier force, it would be very, very strong.
Kurita's ships passed Palawan Island around midnight on 22-23 October. The American submarines Darter and Dace were positioned in company with each other on the surface close by. At 00:16 on 23 October, Darter's radar detected the Japanese formation at a range of 30,000 yds. Her captain promptly made visual contact. The two submarines quickly moved off in pursuit of the ships, while Darter made the first of three contact reports. At least one of these was picked up by a radio operator on Yamato, but Kurita failed to take appropriate anti-submarine precautions.
Darter and Dace (traveling on the surface at full power) after several hours gained a position ahead of Kurita's formation with the intention of making a submerged attack at first light. This attack was unusually successful. At 05:24, Darter fired a spread of six torpedoes, at least four of which hit Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago. 10 minutes later, Darter made two hits on the Atago's sister ship Takao with another spread of torpedoes. At 05:56 Dace made four torpedo hits on the heavy cruiser Maya (sister to Atago and Takao).
Atago and Maya quickly sank. Takao turned back to Brunei escorted by two destroyers — and was followed by the two submarines. On 24 October, as the submarines continued to shadow the damaged cruiser, Darter ran aground on the Bombay Shoal. All efforts to get her off failed, and she was abandoned. Her entire crew was, however, rescued by Dace.
Takao returned to Singapore, where she remained for the rest of the war; joined in January 1945 by Myōkō. Atago had sunk so rapidly that Kurita was forced to swim in order to survive. He was rescued by one of the Japanese destroyers, and he then transferred to the battleship Yamato.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES III
BATTLE OF THE SIBUYAN SEA—24 OCTOBER
Around 08:00 on 24 October, the Imperial Navy's Center Force was spotted and attacked entering the Sibuyan Sea by VF-20 squadron Hellcat fighters, VB-20 Helldiver dive bombers, and VT-20 Avenger torpedo bombers from USS Enterprise of Halsey's 3rd Fleet. Despite its great strength, 3rd Fleet was not well-placed to deal with the threat. On 22 October, Halsey had detached two of his carrier groups to the fleet base at Ulithi to provision and rearm. When Darter's contact report came in Halsey recalled Davison's group but allowed Vice Admiral McCain, with the strongest of Task Force 38's carrier groups, to continue towards Ulithi.
Halsey finally recalled McCain on 24 October — but the delay meant that the most powerful American carrier group played little part in the coming battle, and that 3rd Fleet was therefore effectively deprived of nearly 40% of its air strength for most of the battle. On the morning of 24 October, only three groups were available to strike Kurita's force, and the one best positioned to do so — Bogan's Task Group 38.2 — was by mischance the weakest of the groups, containing only one large carrier — the Intrepid — and two light carriers (the failure to promptly recall McCain on 23 October was also effectively to deprive 3rd Fleet, throughout the battle, of four of its six heavy cruisers).
Planes from carriers Intrepid and Cabot of Bogan's group attacked at about 10:30, making hits on the battleships Nagato, Yamato, Musashi and severely damaging the heavy cruiser Myōkō. A second wave from Intrepid, Essex and Lexington later attacked, with VB-15 Helldivers and VF-15 Hellcats from Essex, scoring another 10 hits on Musashi. As she withdrew, listing to port, a third wave from Enterprise and Franklin hit her with 11 bombs and 8 torpedoes.
Kurita turned his fleet around to get out of range of the aircraft, passing the crippled Musashi as his force retreated. He waited until 17:15 before turning around again to head for the San Bernardino Strait — Musashi capsized and sank at about 19:30.
Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi had directed three waves of aircraft from his First Air Fleet based on Luzon against the carriers of Rear Admiral Sherman's Task Group 38.3 (whose aircraft were also being used to strike airfields in Luzon to prevent Japanese land-based air attacks on Allied shipping in Leyte Gulf). Each of Ōnishi's strike waves consisted of some fifty to sixty aircraft.
Most of the attacking Japanese planes were intercepted and shot down or driven off by Hellcats of Sherman's combat air patrol, most notably by two fighter sections from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell (who is credited with shooting down nine of the attacking planes in this one action).
However, one Japanese aircraft (a Yokosuka D4Y Judy) slipped through the defences, and at 09:38 hit the light carrier USS Princeton with a 550 lb armor-piercing bomb which caused a severe fire in Princeton's hangar. Her emergency sprinkler system failed to operate, and fires spread rapidly. A series of explosions followed. The fires were gradually brought under control, but at 15:23 there was an enormous explosion (probably in the carrier's bomb stowage aft), causing more casualties aboard Princeton, and even heavier casualties — more than 300 — aboard the cruiser Birmingham which was coming back alongside to assist with the firefighting.
Birmingham was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire. Other nearby vessels were also damaged. All efforts to save Princeton failed, and she was finally scuttled — torpedoed by the light cruiser Reno — at 17:50.
In all US 3rd Fleet flew 259 sorties against Center Force, mostly by Hellcats, on 24 October. This weight of attack was not nearly sufficient to neutralize the threat from Kurita. It contrasts with the 527 sorties flown by 3rd Fleet against Ozawa's much weaker Northern Force on the following day. Moreover, a large proportion of the Sibuyan Sea attack was directed against just one ship, Musashi. This great battleship was sunk, and cruiser Myōkō crippled, but every other ship in Kurita's force remained battleworthy and able to advance.
As a result of the momentous decision now made by Admiral Halsey, Kurita was able to proceed through San Bernardino Strait during the night, to make an unexpected and dramatic appearance off the coast of Samar on the following morning.
BATTLE OF THE SIBUYAN SEA—24 OCTOBER
Around 08:00 on 24 October, the Imperial Navy's Center Force was spotted and attacked entering the Sibuyan Sea by VF-20 squadron Hellcat fighters, VB-20 Helldiver dive bombers, and VT-20 Avenger torpedo bombers from USS Enterprise of Halsey's 3rd Fleet. Despite its great strength, 3rd Fleet was not well-placed to deal with the threat. On 22 October, Halsey had detached two of his carrier groups to the fleet base at Ulithi to provision and rearm. When Darter's contact report came in Halsey recalled Davison's group but allowed Vice Admiral McCain, with the strongest of Task Force 38's carrier groups, to continue towards Ulithi.
Halsey finally recalled McCain on 24 October — but the delay meant that the most powerful American carrier group played little part in the coming battle, and that 3rd Fleet was therefore effectively deprived of nearly 40% of its air strength for most of the battle. On the morning of 24 October, only three groups were available to strike Kurita's force, and the one best positioned to do so — Bogan's Task Group 38.2 — was by mischance the weakest of the groups, containing only one large carrier — the Intrepid — and two light carriers (the failure to promptly recall McCain on 23 October was also effectively to deprive 3rd Fleet, throughout the battle, of four of its six heavy cruisers).
Planes from carriers Intrepid and Cabot of Bogan's group attacked at about 10:30, making hits on the battleships Nagato, Yamato, Musashi and severely damaging the heavy cruiser Myōkō. A second wave from Intrepid, Essex and Lexington later attacked, with VB-15 Helldivers and VF-15 Hellcats from Essex, scoring another 10 hits on Musashi. As she withdrew, listing to port, a third wave from Enterprise and Franklin hit her with 11 bombs and 8 torpedoes.
Kurita turned his fleet around to get out of range of the aircraft, passing the crippled Musashi as his force retreated. He waited until 17:15 before turning around again to head for the San Bernardino Strait — Musashi capsized and sank at about 19:30.
Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi had directed three waves of aircraft from his First Air Fleet based on Luzon against the carriers of Rear Admiral Sherman's Task Group 38.3 (whose aircraft were also being used to strike airfields in Luzon to prevent Japanese land-based air attacks on Allied shipping in Leyte Gulf). Each of Ōnishi's strike waves consisted of some fifty to sixty aircraft.
Most of the attacking Japanese planes were intercepted and shot down or driven off by Hellcats of Sherman's combat air patrol, most notably by two fighter sections from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell (who is credited with shooting down nine of the attacking planes in this one action).
However, one Japanese aircraft (a Yokosuka D4Y Judy) slipped through the defences, and at 09:38 hit the light carrier USS Princeton with a 550 lb armor-piercing bomb which caused a severe fire in Princeton's hangar. Her emergency sprinkler system failed to operate, and fires spread rapidly. A series of explosions followed. The fires were gradually brought under control, but at 15:23 there was an enormous explosion (probably in the carrier's bomb stowage aft), causing more casualties aboard Princeton, and even heavier casualties — more than 300 — aboard the cruiser Birmingham which was coming back alongside to assist with the firefighting.
Birmingham was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire. Other nearby vessels were also damaged. All efforts to save Princeton failed, and she was finally scuttled — torpedoed by the light cruiser Reno — at 17:50.
In all US 3rd Fleet flew 259 sorties against Center Force, mostly by Hellcats, on 24 October. This weight of attack was not nearly sufficient to neutralize the threat from Kurita. It contrasts with the 527 sorties flown by 3rd Fleet against Ozawa's much weaker Northern Force on the following day. Moreover, a large proportion of the Sibuyan Sea attack was directed against just one ship, Musashi. This great battleship was sunk, and cruiser Myōkō crippled, but every other ship in Kurita's force remained battleworthy and able to advance.
As a result of the momentous decision now made by Admiral Halsey, Kurita was able to proceed through San Bernardino Strait during the night, to make an unexpected and dramatic appearance off the coast of Samar on the following morning.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES IV
The Japanese were not the only ones who tended to exaggerate their effect. American pilots reported many hits on enemy battleships, and reported that the Japanese battleships were retiring from San Bernardino Strait. But most of the hits were on Musashi. These reports led Admiral Halsey to believe the Center Force had been temporarily nullified. And now we come to the first great miscommunication.
After the Japanese Southern and Center forces had been detected, but before Ozawa's carriers had been located, Halsey and the staff of 3rd Fleet, aboard the battleship New Jersey, prepared a contingency plan to deal with the threat from Kurita's Center Force. Their intention was to cover San Bernardino Strait with a powerful task force of fast battleships supported by two of the 3rd Fleet's fast carrier groups. The battleship force was to be designated Task Force 34 and to consist of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison of Task Group 38.4 was to be in overall command of the supporting carrier groups.
At 15:12 on 24 October, Halsey sent a telegraphic radio message to his subordinate task group commanders, giving details of this contingency plan. He said that Task Force 34 “will be formed”.
Halsey sent information copies of this message to Admiral Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters and Admiral King in Washington. But he did not include Admiral Kincaid (7th Fleet) as information addressee. The message was picked up by 7th Fleet, anyway, as it was common for Admirals to direct radiomen to copy all message traffic they detected, whether intended for them or not.
As Halsey intended Task Force 34 as a contingency to be formed and detached when he ordered it, when he wrote "will be formed" he meant the future tense, but he neglected to say when Task Force 34 would be formed, or under what circumstances. This omission led Admiral Kinkaid of 7th Fleet to believe that Halsey was speaking in the imperative, not the future tense, and so he concluded that Task Force 34 was being formed right then and would take station off San Bernardino Strait.
Admiral Nimitz, in Pearl Harbor, reached exactly the same conclusion. Halsey did send out a second message at 17:10 clarifying his intentions in regard to Task Force 34:
IF THE ENEMY SORTIES (THROUGH SAN BERNADINO STRAIT) TF 34 WILL BE FORMED WHEN DIRECTED BY ME.
Unfortunately, Halsey sent this second message by voice radio, so 7th Fleet did not intercept it, and Halsey did not follow up with a telegraphic message to Nimitz or King. The serious misunderstanding caused by Halsey's ambiguous wording of his first message and his failure to notify Nimitz, King, or Kincaid of his second clarifying message was to have a profound influence on the subsequent course of the battle.
The one Japanese force that wanted to be discovered (because it was the bait) was the only force the Americans hadn't been able to find. Finally 3rd Fleet's aircraft located Ozawa's Northern (decoy) force at 16:40 on 24 October. This was largely because 3rd Fleet had been preoccupied with attacking Kurita and defending itself against the Japanese air strikes from Luzon.
Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force constituted the main Japanese threat, and he was determined to seize what he saw as a golden opportunity to destroy Japan's last remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Center Force had been neutralized by 3rd Fleet's air strikes earlier in the day in the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring, Halsey radioed (to Nimitz and Kinkaid):
CENTRAL FORCE HEAVILY DAMAGED ACCORDING TO STRIKE REPORTS.
AM PROCEEDING NORTH WITH THREE GROUPS TO ATTACK CARRIER FORCES AT DAWN.
The words "with three groups" proved dangerously misleading. It was the next bit of miscommunication. In the light of the intercepted 15:12 24 October "…will be formed as Task Force 34" message from Halsey, Admiral Kinkaid and his staff assumed, as did Admiral Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters, that Task Force 34, commanded by Lee, had now been formed as a separate entity.
They assumed that Halsey was leaving this powerful surface force guarding San Bernardino Strait (and covering Seventh Fleet's northern flank) while he took his three available carrier groups northwards in pursuit of the Japanese carriers. But Task Force 34 had not been detached from his other forces, and Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the 3rd Fleet's carriers. Halsey had consciously and deliberately left San Bernardino Strait absolutely unguarded.
Halsey and his staff officers ignored information from a night reconnaissance aircraft operating from the light carrier Independence that Kurita's powerful surface force had turned back towards San Bernardino Strait.
When Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, commanding TG 38.2, radioed this information to Halsey's flagship, he was rebuffed by a staff officer, who tersely replied "Yes, yes, we have that information." Vice Admiral Lee, who had correctly deduced that Ozawa's force was on a decoy mission and indicated this in a blinker message to Halsey's flagship, was similarly rebuffed.
Commodore Arleigh Burke and Commander James Flatley of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's staff had come to the same conclusion. They were sufficiently worried about the situation to wake Mitscher, who asked "Does Admiral Halsey have that report?" On being told that Halsey did, Mitscher, knowing Halsey's temperament, commented "If he wants my advice he'll ask for it" and went back to sleep.
The entire available strength of 3rd Fleet continued at high speed northwards, away from San Bernardino Strait. Behind them, they left the door wide open to Leyte Gulf.
The Japanese were not the only ones who tended to exaggerate their effect. American pilots reported many hits on enemy battleships, and reported that the Japanese battleships were retiring from San Bernardino Strait. But most of the hits were on Musashi. These reports led Admiral Halsey to believe the Center Force had been temporarily nullified. And now we come to the first great miscommunication.
After the Japanese Southern and Center forces had been detected, but before Ozawa's carriers had been located, Halsey and the staff of 3rd Fleet, aboard the battleship New Jersey, prepared a contingency plan to deal with the threat from Kurita's Center Force. Their intention was to cover San Bernardino Strait with a powerful task force of fast battleships supported by two of the 3rd Fleet's fast carrier groups. The battleship force was to be designated Task Force 34 and to consist of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison of Task Group 38.4 was to be in overall command of the supporting carrier groups.
At 15:12 on 24 October, Halsey sent a telegraphic radio message to his subordinate task group commanders, giving details of this contingency plan. He said that Task Force 34 “will be formed”.
Halsey sent information copies of this message to Admiral Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters and Admiral King in Washington. But he did not include Admiral Kincaid (7th Fleet) as information addressee. The message was picked up by 7th Fleet, anyway, as it was common for Admirals to direct radiomen to copy all message traffic they detected, whether intended for them or not.
As Halsey intended Task Force 34 as a contingency to be formed and detached when he ordered it, when he wrote "will be formed" he meant the future tense, but he neglected to say when Task Force 34 would be formed, or under what circumstances. This omission led Admiral Kinkaid of 7th Fleet to believe that Halsey was speaking in the imperative, not the future tense, and so he concluded that Task Force 34 was being formed right then and would take station off San Bernardino Strait.
Admiral Nimitz, in Pearl Harbor, reached exactly the same conclusion. Halsey did send out a second message at 17:10 clarifying his intentions in regard to Task Force 34:
IF THE ENEMY SORTIES (THROUGH SAN BERNADINO STRAIT) TF 34 WILL BE FORMED WHEN DIRECTED BY ME.
Unfortunately, Halsey sent this second message by voice radio, so 7th Fleet did not intercept it, and Halsey did not follow up with a telegraphic message to Nimitz or King. The serious misunderstanding caused by Halsey's ambiguous wording of his first message and his failure to notify Nimitz, King, or Kincaid of his second clarifying message was to have a profound influence on the subsequent course of the battle.
The one Japanese force that wanted to be discovered (because it was the bait) was the only force the Americans hadn't been able to find. Finally 3rd Fleet's aircraft located Ozawa's Northern (decoy) force at 16:40 on 24 October. This was largely because 3rd Fleet had been preoccupied with attacking Kurita and defending itself against the Japanese air strikes from Luzon.
Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force constituted the main Japanese threat, and he was determined to seize what he saw as a golden opportunity to destroy Japan's last remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Center Force had been neutralized by 3rd Fleet's air strikes earlier in the day in the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring, Halsey radioed (to Nimitz and Kinkaid):
CENTRAL FORCE HEAVILY DAMAGED ACCORDING TO STRIKE REPORTS.
AM PROCEEDING NORTH WITH THREE GROUPS TO ATTACK CARRIER FORCES AT DAWN.
The words "with three groups" proved dangerously misleading. It was the next bit of miscommunication. In the light of the intercepted 15:12 24 October "…will be formed as Task Force 34" message from Halsey, Admiral Kinkaid and his staff assumed, as did Admiral Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters, that Task Force 34, commanded by Lee, had now been formed as a separate entity.
They assumed that Halsey was leaving this powerful surface force guarding San Bernardino Strait (and covering Seventh Fleet's northern flank) while he took his three available carrier groups northwards in pursuit of the Japanese carriers. But Task Force 34 had not been detached from his other forces, and Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the 3rd Fleet's carriers. Halsey had consciously and deliberately left San Bernardino Strait absolutely unguarded.
Halsey and his staff officers ignored information from a night reconnaissance aircraft operating from the light carrier Independence that Kurita's powerful surface force had turned back towards San Bernardino Strait.
When Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, commanding TG 38.2, radioed this information to Halsey's flagship, he was rebuffed by a staff officer, who tersely replied "Yes, yes, we have that information." Vice Admiral Lee, who had correctly deduced that Ozawa's force was on a decoy mission and indicated this in a blinker message to Halsey's flagship, was similarly rebuffed.
Commodore Arleigh Burke and Commander James Flatley of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's staff had come to the same conclusion. They were sufficiently worried about the situation to wake Mitscher, who asked "Does Admiral Halsey have that report?" On being told that Halsey did, Mitscher, knowing Halsey's temperament, commented "If he wants my advice he'll ask for it" and went back to sleep.
The entire available strength of 3rd Fleet continued at high speed northwards, away from San Bernardino Strait. Behind them, they left the door wide open to Leyte Gulf.
bmarks6161
Footballguy
Absolutely love this thread and have really enjoyed reading it. 
Just wanted to add alot of the French were very bitter, rude and unwelcoming to the troops especially in the smaller villages. They felt the Americans would bring more war and destruction to their lands and way of life. Many of these French were completely satisfied with the German occupation and wanted the Allies to leave.
timschochet
Footballguy
This actually doesn't surprise me, but what I wrote was a direct quote from my source.Absolutely love this thread and have really enjoyed reading it.
Just wanted to add alot of the French were very bitter, rude and unwelcoming to the troops especially in the smaller villages. They felt the Americans would bring more war and destruction to their lands and way of life. Many of these French were completely satisfied with the German occupation and wanted the Allies to leave.
timschochet
Footballguy
It remains one of the stunning moves in military history that Halsey chose to leave the San Bernardino Strait undefended. It would have have made no difference to him to leave a small portion of his forces behind, and there would have been no problem inside the gulf.
According to Herman Wouk's War and Remembrance, many if not most of Halsey's commanders sailing with him were shocked that they were leaving no one behind. Whether this is true or not, I don't know. Wouk is generally positive of Halsey, whom he describes as a Patton at sea, but castigates him over this error.
According to Herman Wouk's War and Remembrance, many if not most of Halsey's commanders sailing with him were shocked that they were leaving no one behind. Whether this is true or not, I don't know. Wouk is generally positive of Halsey, whom he describes as a Patton at sea, but castigates him over this error.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
Yes, there are a lot of parallels between him and Patton. We will discuss Halsey's decision after the battles are over. There is some more information coming in the next couple of posts.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES V
We have related the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, in which Halsey's planes encountered the Center Force and sank the battleship Musashi, and caused Admiral Kurita to temporarily withdraw from the San Bernardino Strait, on October 24. The other three major encounters occurred October 25 and 26, with some overlap. However, even though the Battle of Samar concluded on October 25, while the Battle of Cape Engaño spread over October 25 and 26, we will relate the Battle of Samar last. We now turn to the Battle of Surigao Strait, which is when the Imperial Navy's Southern Force came into contact with the US Navy.
THE BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT—25 OCTOBER
Nishimura's "Southern Force" consisted of the battleships Yamashiro and Fusō, the heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. They were attacked by bombers on 24 October but sustained only minor damage.
Because of the strict radio silence imposed on the Center and Southern Forces, Nishimura was unable to synchronise his movements with Shima and Kurita. When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at 02:00, Shima was more than 25 miles behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte.
As the Southern Force approached Surigao Strait, it ran into a deadly trap set by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had a substantial force. There were six battleships: West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, with their 14 and 16 inch guns; all but Mississippi had been sunk or damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor and since repaired. There were the 8 in and 6 in guns of the four heavy cruisers (USS Louisville (Flagship), Portland, Minneapolis and HMAS Shropshire) and four light cruisers (Denver, Columbia, Phoenix and Boise).
There were also the smaller guns and torpedoes of 28 destroyers and 39 PT boats. To pass through the narrows and reach the invasion shipping, Nishimura would have to run the gauntlet of torpedoes from the PT boats followed by the large force of destroyers, and then advance under the concentrated fire of the six battleships and their eight flanking cruisers disposed across the far mouth of the Strait.
At 22:36, one of the PT boats — PT-131 — first made contact with the approaching Japanese ships. Over more than three-and-a-half hours, the PT boats made repeated attacks on Nishimura's force. They made no torpedo hits, but sent contact reports which were of use to Oldendorf and his force.
As Nishimura's ships entered Surigao Strait they were subjected to devastating torpedo attacks from the American destroyers disposed on both sides of their line of advance. At about 03:00, both Japanese battleships were hit by torpedoes. Yamashiro was able to steam on, but Fusō exploded and broke in two. Two of Nishimura's four destroyers were sunk; another, Asagumo, was hit but able to retire, and later sank.
At 03:16, West Virginia's radar picked up the surviving ships of Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yards and had achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yards. West Virginia tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:53, she fired the eight 16 inch guns of her main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (almost 13 miles!), striking Yamashiro with her first salvo. She went on to fire a total of 93 shells. At 03:55, California and Tennessee joined in, firing a total of 63 and 69 14 in shells, respectively. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese battleships, with their inferior fire control systems, could not return fire.
The other three US battleships, equipped with less advanced gunnery radar, had difficulty arriving at a firing solution. Maryland eventually succeeded in visually ranging on the splashes of the other battleships' shells, and then fired a total of 48 16 in projectiles. Pennsylvania was unable to find a target and her guns remained silent.
Mississippi only obtained a solution at the end of the battle-line action, and then fired just one (full) salvo of twelve 14 in shells. This was the last salvo ever to be fired by a battleship against another heavy ship, ending an era in naval history.
Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 16 in and 14 in armor-piercing shells, as well as the fire of Oldendorf's flanking cruisers. Shigure turned and fled but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at about 04:20, with Nishimura on board. Mogami and Shigure retreated southwards down the Strait.
The rear of the Southern Force, the "Second Striking Force" commanded by Vice Admiral Shima, had approached Surigao Strait about 30 miles astern of Nishimura. It too came under attack from the PT boats, and one of these hit the light cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo which crippled her and caused her to fall out of formation.
Shima's two heavy cruisers (Nachi and Ashigara) and eight destroyers next encountered remnants of Nishimura's force. Seeing what he thought were the wrecks of both Nishimura's battleships (actually the two halves of Fusō), Shima ordered a retreat. His flagship, Nachi, collided with Mogami, flooding Mogami's steering-room and causing her to fall behind in the retreat; she was sunk by aircraft the next morning.
The bow half of Fusō was sunk from gunfire by Louisville, and the stern half sank off Kanihaan Island. Of Nishimura's seven ships, only Shigure survived. Shima's ships did survive the Battle of Surigao Strait but they would be sunk in further engagements around Leyte.
The Battle of Surigao Strait was the last battleship-versus-battleship action in history. It was also the last battle in which one force (the Americans, in this case) was able to "cross the T" of its opponent. However, by the time the battleship action was joined the Japanese line was very ragged and consisted of only one battleship (Yamashiro), one heavy cruiser and one destroyer, so that the classic "crossing of the T" was notional and had little effect on the outcome of the battle.
We have related the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, in which Halsey's planes encountered the Center Force and sank the battleship Musashi, and caused Admiral Kurita to temporarily withdraw from the San Bernardino Strait, on October 24. The other three major encounters occurred October 25 and 26, with some overlap. However, even though the Battle of Samar concluded on October 25, while the Battle of Cape Engaño spread over October 25 and 26, we will relate the Battle of Samar last. We now turn to the Battle of Surigao Strait, which is when the Imperial Navy's Southern Force came into contact with the US Navy.
THE BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT—25 OCTOBER
Nishimura's "Southern Force" consisted of the battleships Yamashiro and Fusō, the heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. They were attacked by bombers on 24 October but sustained only minor damage.
Because of the strict radio silence imposed on the Center and Southern Forces, Nishimura was unable to synchronise his movements with Shima and Kurita. When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at 02:00, Shima was more than 25 miles behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte.
As the Southern Force approached Surigao Strait, it ran into a deadly trap set by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had a substantial force. There were six battleships: West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, with their 14 and 16 inch guns; all but Mississippi had been sunk or damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor and since repaired. There were the 8 in and 6 in guns of the four heavy cruisers (USS Louisville (Flagship), Portland, Minneapolis and HMAS Shropshire) and four light cruisers (Denver, Columbia, Phoenix and Boise).
There were also the smaller guns and torpedoes of 28 destroyers and 39 PT boats. To pass through the narrows and reach the invasion shipping, Nishimura would have to run the gauntlet of torpedoes from the PT boats followed by the large force of destroyers, and then advance under the concentrated fire of the six battleships and their eight flanking cruisers disposed across the far mouth of the Strait.
At 22:36, one of the PT boats — PT-131 — first made contact with the approaching Japanese ships. Over more than three-and-a-half hours, the PT boats made repeated attacks on Nishimura's force. They made no torpedo hits, but sent contact reports which were of use to Oldendorf and his force.
As Nishimura's ships entered Surigao Strait they were subjected to devastating torpedo attacks from the American destroyers disposed on both sides of their line of advance. At about 03:00, both Japanese battleships were hit by torpedoes. Yamashiro was able to steam on, but Fusō exploded and broke in two. Two of Nishimura's four destroyers were sunk; another, Asagumo, was hit but able to retire, and later sank.
At 03:16, West Virginia's radar picked up the surviving ships of Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yards and had achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yards. West Virginia tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:53, she fired the eight 16 inch guns of her main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (almost 13 miles!), striking Yamashiro with her first salvo. She went on to fire a total of 93 shells. At 03:55, California and Tennessee joined in, firing a total of 63 and 69 14 in shells, respectively. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese battleships, with their inferior fire control systems, could not return fire.
The other three US battleships, equipped with less advanced gunnery radar, had difficulty arriving at a firing solution. Maryland eventually succeeded in visually ranging on the splashes of the other battleships' shells, and then fired a total of 48 16 in projectiles. Pennsylvania was unable to find a target and her guns remained silent.
Mississippi only obtained a solution at the end of the battle-line action, and then fired just one (full) salvo of twelve 14 in shells. This was the last salvo ever to be fired by a battleship against another heavy ship, ending an era in naval history.
Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 16 in and 14 in armor-piercing shells, as well as the fire of Oldendorf's flanking cruisers. Shigure turned and fled but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at about 04:20, with Nishimura on board. Mogami and Shigure retreated southwards down the Strait.
The rear of the Southern Force, the "Second Striking Force" commanded by Vice Admiral Shima, had approached Surigao Strait about 30 miles astern of Nishimura. It too came under attack from the PT boats, and one of these hit the light cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo which crippled her and caused her to fall out of formation.
Shima's two heavy cruisers (Nachi and Ashigara) and eight destroyers next encountered remnants of Nishimura's force. Seeing what he thought were the wrecks of both Nishimura's battleships (actually the two halves of Fusō), Shima ordered a retreat. His flagship, Nachi, collided with Mogami, flooding Mogami's steering-room and causing her to fall behind in the retreat; she was sunk by aircraft the next morning.
The bow half of Fusō was sunk from gunfire by Louisville, and the stern half sank off Kanihaan Island. Of Nishimura's seven ships, only Shigure survived. Shima's ships did survive the Battle of Surigao Strait but they would be sunk in further engagements around Leyte.
The Battle of Surigao Strait was the last battleship-versus-battleship action in history. It was also the last battle in which one force (the Americans, in this case) was able to "cross the T" of its opponent. However, by the time the battleship action was joined the Japanese line was very ragged and consisted of only one battleship (Yamashiro), one heavy cruiser and one destroyer, so that the classic "crossing of the T" was notional and had little effect on the outcome of the battle.
Maroney=Sped
Footballguy
Can anyone give me a summary? TIA.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES VI
The Battle of Cape Engaño (25–26 October)
Ozawa's "Northern Force" comprised four aircraft carriers (Zuikaku — the last survivor of the six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 — the light carriers Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers (Hyūga and Ise — the two after turrets had been replaced by a hangar, aircraft handling deck and catapult, but neither battleship carried any aircraft in this battle), three light cruisers (Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. His force had only 108 aircraft.
Ozawa's force was not located until 16:40 on 24 October. Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, and was determined to seize what he saw as an almost perfect opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Japanese Center Force had been neutralized by 3rd Fleet's air strikes on 24 October in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring to Brunei, Halsey radioed "Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn."
The force which Halsey was taking north with him — three groups of Mitscher's Task Force 38 — was overwhelmingly stronger than the Japanese Northern Force. Between them, these groups had five large fleet carriers (Intrepid, Franklin, Lexington, Enterprise, and Essex), five light fleet carriers (Independence, Belleau Wood, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto), six battleships (Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington), eight cruisers (two heavy and six light), and more than 40 destroyers. The air groups of the 10 US carriers present contained a total of almost 1,000 aircraft.
At 02:40 on 25 October, Halsey detached Task Force 34, built around the 3rd Fleet's six battleships and commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. As dawn approached, the ships of Task Force 34 drew ahead of the carrier groups. Halsey intended Mitscher to make air strikes followed by the heavy gunfire of Lee's battleships.
Around dawn on 25 October, Ozawa launched 75 aircraft to attack the 3rd Fleet. Most were shot down by American combat air patrols, and no damage was done to the US ships.
During the night Halsey had passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Admiral Mitscher, who ordered the American carrier groups to launch their first strike wave, of 180 aircraft, at dawn — before the Northern Force had been located. When the search aircraft made contact at 07:10 this strike wave was orbiting ahead of the task force. At 08:00, as the attack went in, its escorting fighters destroyed Ozawa's combat air patrol of about 30 planes.
The US air strikes continued until the evening, by which time Task Force 38 had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, sinking the fast carrier Zuikaku, the light carriers Chitose and Zuihō, and the destroyer Akitsuki. The light carrier Chiyoda and the cruiser Tama were crippled. Ozawa transferred his flag to the light cruiser Ōyodo.
Admiral Kincaid, with the Seventh Fleet, was in charge of the Leyte Gulf area surrounding the landings on Leyte. Shortly after 08:00, desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from 7th Fleet. One from Kinkaid, sent in plain language, read: "MY SITUATION IS CRITICAL. FAST BATTLESHIPS AND SUPPORT BY AIR STRIKES MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP ENEMY FROM DESTROYING CARRIER ESCORTS AND ENTERING LEYTE."
Halsey recalled in his memoirs that he was shocked at this message, recounting that the radio signals from the 7th Fleet had come in at random and out of order because of a backlog in the signals office. It seems that he did not receive this vital message from Kinkaid until around 10:00. Halsey later claimed that he knew Kinkaid was in trouble, but had not dreamed of the seriousness of this crisis.
One of the most alarming signals from Kinkaid reported that, after their action in Surigao Strait, 7th Fleet's own battleships were critically low on ammunition. Even this failed to persuade Halsey to send any immediate assistance to Seventh Fleet. In fact, the 7th Fleet battleships were not as short of ammunition as Kinkaid's signal implied, but Halsey did not know that.
Now we come to another great miscommunication. From 3,000 miles away in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz had been monitoring the desperate calls from Kincaid, and sent Halsey a terse message: (To understand the impact, you have to realize that radio operators added filler at the beginning and end of messages, so as to confuse possible attempts to break the code—the real message was within the double consonants) "TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS."
When the message was handed to Halsey, his radio staff had deleted the initial filler, but handed him the message that included the ending filler. So Halsey read a message, coming from Nimitz, saying: "WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR THE WORLD WONDERS."
Therefore Halsey, when reading the message, thought that the last words — ‘THE WORLD WONDERS’ — were a biting piece of criticism from Nimitz, threw his cap to the deck and broke into "sobs of rage". Rear Admiral Robert Carney, his Chief of Staff, confronted him, telling Halsey "Stop it! What the hell's the matter with you? Pull yourself together."
Eventually, at 11:15, more than three hours after the first distress messages from 7th Fleet had been received by his flagship, Halsey ordered Task Force 34 to turn around and head southwards towards Samar. At this point, Lee's battleships were almost within gun range of Ozawa's force. Two-and-a-half hours were then spent refuelling Task Force 34's accompanying destroyers.
After this succession of delays it was too late for Task Force 34 to give any practical help to 7th Fleet, other than to assist in picking up survivors, and too late even to intercept Kurita's force before it made its escape through San Bernardino Strait.
Yes, it is true that Halsey had destroyed much of the remaining Japanese carrier force. But the complete destruction of Ozawa's fleet had escaped him.
The Battle of Cape Engaño (25–26 October)
Ozawa's "Northern Force" comprised four aircraft carriers (Zuikaku — the last survivor of the six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 — the light carriers Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers (Hyūga and Ise — the two after turrets had been replaced by a hangar, aircraft handling deck and catapult, but neither battleship carried any aircraft in this battle), three light cruisers (Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. His force had only 108 aircraft.
Ozawa's force was not located until 16:40 on 24 October. Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, and was determined to seize what he saw as an almost perfect opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Japanese Center Force had been neutralized by 3rd Fleet's air strikes on 24 October in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring to Brunei, Halsey radioed "Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn."
The force which Halsey was taking north with him — three groups of Mitscher's Task Force 38 — was overwhelmingly stronger than the Japanese Northern Force. Between them, these groups had five large fleet carriers (Intrepid, Franklin, Lexington, Enterprise, and Essex), five light fleet carriers (Independence, Belleau Wood, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto), six battleships (Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington), eight cruisers (two heavy and six light), and more than 40 destroyers. The air groups of the 10 US carriers present contained a total of almost 1,000 aircraft.
At 02:40 on 25 October, Halsey detached Task Force 34, built around the 3rd Fleet's six battleships and commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. As dawn approached, the ships of Task Force 34 drew ahead of the carrier groups. Halsey intended Mitscher to make air strikes followed by the heavy gunfire of Lee's battleships.
Around dawn on 25 October, Ozawa launched 75 aircraft to attack the 3rd Fleet. Most were shot down by American combat air patrols, and no damage was done to the US ships.
During the night Halsey had passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Admiral Mitscher, who ordered the American carrier groups to launch their first strike wave, of 180 aircraft, at dawn — before the Northern Force had been located. When the search aircraft made contact at 07:10 this strike wave was orbiting ahead of the task force. At 08:00, as the attack went in, its escorting fighters destroyed Ozawa's combat air patrol of about 30 planes.
The US air strikes continued until the evening, by which time Task Force 38 had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, sinking the fast carrier Zuikaku, the light carriers Chitose and Zuihō, and the destroyer Akitsuki. The light carrier Chiyoda and the cruiser Tama were crippled. Ozawa transferred his flag to the light cruiser Ōyodo.
Admiral Kincaid, with the Seventh Fleet, was in charge of the Leyte Gulf area surrounding the landings on Leyte. Shortly after 08:00, desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from 7th Fleet. One from Kinkaid, sent in plain language, read: "MY SITUATION IS CRITICAL. FAST BATTLESHIPS AND SUPPORT BY AIR STRIKES MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP ENEMY FROM DESTROYING CARRIER ESCORTS AND ENTERING LEYTE."
Halsey recalled in his memoirs that he was shocked at this message, recounting that the radio signals from the 7th Fleet had come in at random and out of order because of a backlog in the signals office. It seems that he did not receive this vital message from Kinkaid until around 10:00. Halsey later claimed that he knew Kinkaid was in trouble, but had not dreamed of the seriousness of this crisis.
One of the most alarming signals from Kinkaid reported that, after their action in Surigao Strait, 7th Fleet's own battleships were critically low on ammunition. Even this failed to persuade Halsey to send any immediate assistance to Seventh Fleet. In fact, the 7th Fleet battleships were not as short of ammunition as Kinkaid's signal implied, but Halsey did not know that.
Now we come to another great miscommunication. From 3,000 miles away in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz had been monitoring the desperate calls from Kincaid, and sent Halsey a terse message: (To understand the impact, you have to realize that radio operators added filler at the beginning and end of messages, so as to confuse possible attempts to break the code—the real message was within the double consonants) "TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS."
When the message was handed to Halsey, his radio staff had deleted the initial filler, but handed him the message that included the ending filler. So Halsey read a message, coming from Nimitz, saying: "WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR THE WORLD WONDERS."
Therefore Halsey, when reading the message, thought that the last words — ‘THE WORLD WONDERS’ — were a biting piece of criticism from Nimitz, threw his cap to the deck and broke into "sobs of rage". Rear Admiral Robert Carney, his Chief of Staff, confronted him, telling Halsey "Stop it! What the hell's the matter with you? Pull yourself together."
Eventually, at 11:15, more than three hours after the first distress messages from 7th Fleet had been received by his flagship, Halsey ordered Task Force 34 to turn around and head southwards towards Samar. At this point, Lee's battleships were almost within gun range of Ozawa's force. Two-and-a-half hours were then spent refuelling Task Force 34's accompanying destroyers.
After this succession of delays it was too late for Task Force 34 to give any practical help to 7th Fleet, other than to assist in picking up survivors, and too late even to intercept Kurita's force before it made its escape through San Bernardino Strait.
Yes, it is true that Halsey had destroyed much of the remaining Japanese carrier force. But the complete destruction of Ozawa's fleet had escaped him.
timschochet
Footballguy
Halsey was a fine commander. As I explored earlier in this thread, his contribution to Guadalcanal helped win that crucial battle. Yet here is again an example of a man concerned about his own pride and image over what should be the main concern: winning the battle. We saw this earlier with Adm. Nagumo at the Battle of Midway, when he chose to ignore Yama####a's pleadings because he considered them a personal affront. When we do the upcoming Civil War thread, we will explore this with a host of generals on both sides of that conflict- men who allowed their egos to get in the way of their rationality. Halsey should have read the message, realized his error, and made a 180 for San Bernardino, without going into sobs of rage. That's what Spruance would have done. (Of course, Spruance would likely not have made the error in the first place.)
timschochet
Footballguy
Something else that Wouk adds in his analysis of this battle: One of Wouk's themes is that all battles are filled with mistakes and human errors, mostly stupid. Leyte Gulf is filled with terrible mistakes on both sides (along with great heroism and gallantry, which Ozy is about to get to.) But in a world filled with nuclear weapons, we cannot afford to make these errors, nor can we afford to assume that the other side is going to make rational decisions. Therefore, Herman Wouk reaches an inevitable conclusion, which he states in the preface to his novel and again in the Leyte Gulf narrative:
Either war is finished or we are.
Either war is finished or we are.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
I am going to be very critical of Halsey in the summation, but let me say a word in his favor here. Halsey was impulsive and aggressive. We perhaps cannot realize the incredibly high esteem that these admirals held for Nimitz. Nimitz, in his way, was as brilliant as MacArthur, but without the ego. He was a wonderful judge of character, and the admirals that he brought to the fore, Halsey, Spruance, Marc Mitscher, Turner, etc. were the ones who won us the war. To receive an apparent public rebuke from Nimitz would have been incredibly hard to bear for someone of Halsey's temperament. Yes, you are right. Spruance would not have reacted that way; but you are also right that Spruance would not have blundered the way Halsey did.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES VIIa
BATTLE OF SAMAR—24 OCTOBER
This story is a little long, but it deserves to be told...and remembered.
“In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours between 0730 and 0930 off Samar ”
Samuel Eliot Morison—Official Historian of United States Naval Operations in World War II
When Admiral Halsey left the door open for the Japanese in San Bernardino Strait, he was obviously unaware that Admiral Kurita had turned around, and under cover of darkness, was once again heading through the strait towards Leyte Gulf. In Leyte Gulf were hundreds of merchant ships and landing craft, ferrying supplies and equipment and ammunition and reinforcements to the troops which had disembarked on Leyte four days previously. Only light naval forces equipped to attack ground troops and submarines, stood in the path of battleships and cruisers intent on destroying the American invasion.
This very powerful force of Japanese battleships, cruisers, and destroyers commanded by Admiral Kurita engaged a US task unit of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. The Americans were taken entirely by surprise because the Seventh Fleet had firmly believed that its northern flank was being protected by Admiral Halsey's immensely powerful 3rd Fleet, which consisted of eight fleet carriers and six fast battleships.
(A word here about escort carriers. They were about one third the size of the fleet carriers, and carried about 25 airplanes, compared to the approximately 100 in the larger carriers—they were intended primarily for anti-submarine and convoy duty, although, as in this case, they assisted landing operations).
Kurita's force passed through San Bernardino Strait at 0300 on 25 October 1944 and steamed southwards along the coast of Samar, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away. This hope proved to have been amply fulfilled - Halsey had taken all of his available strength north. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Northern Force that Halsey had been lured away. The brunt of the forthcoming battle was to be borne by the northernmost group of Admiral Kincaid's 7th Fleet, who forever after would be known as “Taffy 3”, because of their radio name.
Steaming about 60 mi east of Samar before dawn 25 October, escort carrier St. Lo launched a four-plane anti-submarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day’s initial air strikes against the landing beaches. At 0637, Ensign William C. Brooks, piloting a Grumman Avenger from St. Lo, sighted a number of ships expected to be from Halsey's Third Fleet, but they appeared to be Japanese.
When he was notified, Admiral Sprague was incredulous and demanded positive identification. Flying in for an even closer look, Brooks reported, "I can see pagoda masts. I see the biggest meatball flag on the biggest battleship I ever saw!" Yamato alone displaced as much tonnage as all units of Taffy 3 combined. They had spotted the largest of the three attacking Japanese forces, comprising four battleships, six heavy and light cruisers, and 10-12 destroyers. Approaching from the west northwest only 17 mi away, they were already well within gun and visual range of the closest task group Taffy 3. The fox was loose among the chickens—but these chickens were guarded by eagles.
Taffy 3’s lookouts spotted the antiaircraft fire to the north. The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 0645, having achieved complete tactical surprise which at about the same time others in Taffy 3 had picked up targets from surface radar and Japanese radio traffic. At 0659, Yamato opened fire at a range of 20 mi and the Americans were soon astonished to see the spectacle of colorful geysers of the first volleys of shellfire finding the range. Each Japanese ship used a different color of dye marker so they could spot their own shells.
Not finding the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for larger fleet carriers and assumed that he had a task group of the 3rd Fleet under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, ordering a "General Attack". Rather than a carefully orchestrated effort, each division in his task force was to attack separately. The Japanese had just changed to a circular antiaircraft formation, and the order caused some confusion, allowing Sprague to lead the Japanese into a tail chase, which forced the Japanese to use only their forward guns, while exposing them to his own rear-firing weapons.
Immediately, Admiral Sprague, on Taffy 3 directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and then withdraw towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. He ordered his destroyers to generate smoke to mask the retreating carriers.
Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts were tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. Destroyers like Johnston were Fletcher-class destroyers. They were affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" for their lack of armor, but they were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. The destroyers had five single 5 inch and light antiaircraft guns which were not designed to take on armored battleships or cruisers. Only their 10 Mark-15 torpedoes housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships posed a serious threat to battleships. Destroyer escorts like the Samuel B. Roberts were even smaller and slower, since they were designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines. With two 5 in guns without automatic fire control, they carried only three torpedoes (even PT boats carried four), and rarely trained in coordinated torpedo attacks. Since torpedoes only had a range of about 5.5 miles, they were best used at night, because in daylight, an attacker would have to survive a gauntlet of shellfire which could reach out to 25 miles. In this battle, they would be thrown against a fleet led by the largest battleship in the world.
After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon sent into near-suicidal daylight torpedo runs. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think they were cruisers and full-size destroyers. Their lack of armor tended to aid clean penetration of armor piercing rounds before Japanese gunners switched to high explosive shells, which caused much more extensive damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although the decks would be littered with the dead and seriously wounded. Destroyers from Taffy 2 to the south also found themselves under shellfire, but as they were spotted by Gambier Bay which had signaled for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect their own carriers.
Commander Ernest E. Evans, commanding officer of the destroyer Johnston, the closest to the attackers, took the initiative. He ordered his ship to "flank speed, full left rudder," attacking on his own in what appeared to be a suicide mission. Johnston approached the cruiser squadron flagship, the heavy cruiser Kumano, for a torpedo attack. At a range of 10 mi, Johnston opened fire, aiming for Kumano's superstructure, bridge and deck, since her 5 in shells would have bounced off the enemy's belt armor. One advantage the Americans had in gunnery was the use of largely the same radar-assisted Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System used on battleships. The brains of the system was the Ford Mark I Fire Control Computer which provide coordinated automatic firing solutions of her 5 in guns merely by pointing the gun director at the target. The Japanese were using colored marker shells to bracket the range of a target, but US destroyers and even the carriers were often able to dodge Japanese misses by weaving to avoid shells, and steering towards splashes, while inflicting accurate hits on larger Japanese ships. When Johnston closed to within torpedo range, she fired a salvo, which blew the bow off Kumano, which also took the heavy cruiser Suzuya out of the fight, as she stopped to assist.
At a range of 7 miles, the battleship Kongō sent a 14 in shell through Johnston's deck and engine room, cutting the destroyer's speed in half to 17 knots, and interrupting electric power to the aft gun turrets. Then three 6 in shells, possibly from Yamato, struck Johnston's bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing fingers from Captain Evans' left hand. The bridge was abandoned and Evans proceeded to steer the ship back towards the fleet, shouting orders from aft down to men manually operating the rudder from aft, when he noticed other destroyers starting their torpedo run.
Emboldened by Johnston's attack, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's destroyers and destroyer escorts on the offensive. They attacked the Japanese line, drawing fire and scattering the Japanese formations as ships turned to avoid torpedoes. Despite heavy damage, Evans turned Johnston around and reentered the fight while damage control teams restored power to two of the three aft turrets.
Two hours into the attack, Captain Evans aboard Johnston spotted a line of four Japanese destroyers led by the light cruiser Yahagi making a torpedo attack on the carriers and moved to intercept. Johnston fired and scored hits on them, pressuring them to fire their torpedoes prematurely at 10,500 yards distance at 0915. The torpedoes were reaching end-of-run as they approached their target, and broached.
At 0910, a direct hit on one of Johnston's forward turrets knocked it out and set off many of the 5 in shells stored in the turret. Her damaged engines stopped, leaving her dead in the water. As her attackers gathered around the vulnerable ship, they concentrated fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat." Under heavy attack from the air and fire from American destroyers and destroyer escorts, the Japanese cruisers broke off and turned northward at 0920. At 0945, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. As a Japanese destroyer cruised slowly by, the survivors saw the enemy standing at attention to salute.
BATTLE OF SAMAR—24 OCTOBER
This story is a little long, but it deserves to be told...and remembered.
“In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours between 0730 and 0930 off Samar ”
Samuel Eliot Morison—Official Historian of United States Naval Operations in World War II
When Admiral Halsey left the door open for the Japanese in San Bernardino Strait, he was obviously unaware that Admiral Kurita had turned around, and under cover of darkness, was once again heading through the strait towards Leyte Gulf. In Leyte Gulf were hundreds of merchant ships and landing craft, ferrying supplies and equipment and ammunition and reinforcements to the troops which had disembarked on Leyte four days previously. Only light naval forces equipped to attack ground troops and submarines, stood in the path of battleships and cruisers intent on destroying the American invasion.
This very powerful force of Japanese battleships, cruisers, and destroyers commanded by Admiral Kurita engaged a US task unit of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. The Americans were taken entirely by surprise because the Seventh Fleet had firmly believed that its northern flank was being protected by Admiral Halsey's immensely powerful 3rd Fleet, which consisted of eight fleet carriers and six fast battleships.
(A word here about escort carriers. They were about one third the size of the fleet carriers, and carried about 25 airplanes, compared to the approximately 100 in the larger carriers—they were intended primarily for anti-submarine and convoy duty, although, as in this case, they assisted landing operations).
Kurita's force passed through San Bernardino Strait at 0300 on 25 October 1944 and steamed southwards along the coast of Samar, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away. This hope proved to have been amply fulfilled - Halsey had taken all of his available strength north. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Northern Force that Halsey had been lured away. The brunt of the forthcoming battle was to be borne by the northernmost group of Admiral Kincaid's 7th Fleet, who forever after would be known as “Taffy 3”, because of their radio name.
Steaming about 60 mi east of Samar before dawn 25 October, escort carrier St. Lo launched a four-plane anti-submarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day’s initial air strikes against the landing beaches. At 0637, Ensign William C. Brooks, piloting a Grumman Avenger from St. Lo, sighted a number of ships expected to be from Halsey's Third Fleet, but they appeared to be Japanese.
When he was notified, Admiral Sprague was incredulous and demanded positive identification. Flying in for an even closer look, Brooks reported, "I can see pagoda masts. I see the biggest meatball flag on the biggest battleship I ever saw!" Yamato alone displaced as much tonnage as all units of Taffy 3 combined. They had spotted the largest of the three attacking Japanese forces, comprising four battleships, six heavy and light cruisers, and 10-12 destroyers. Approaching from the west northwest only 17 mi away, they were already well within gun and visual range of the closest task group Taffy 3. The fox was loose among the chickens—but these chickens were guarded by eagles.
Taffy 3’s lookouts spotted the antiaircraft fire to the north. The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 0645, having achieved complete tactical surprise which at about the same time others in Taffy 3 had picked up targets from surface radar and Japanese radio traffic. At 0659, Yamato opened fire at a range of 20 mi and the Americans were soon astonished to see the spectacle of colorful geysers of the first volleys of shellfire finding the range. Each Japanese ship used a different color of dye marker so they could spot their own shells.
Not finding the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for larger fleet carriers and assumed that he had a task group of the 3rd Fleet under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, ordering a "General Attack". Rather than a carefully orchestrated effort, each division in his task force was to attack separately. The Japanese had just changed to a circular antiaircraft formation, and the order caused some confusion, allowing Sprague to lead the Japanese into a tail chase, which forced the Japanese to use only their forward guns, while exposing them to his own rear-firing weapons.
Immediately, Admiral Sprague, on Taffy 3 directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and then withdraw towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. He ordered his destroyers to generate smoke to mask the retreating carriers.
Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts were tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. Destroyers like Johnston were Fletcher-class destroyers. They were affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" for their lack of armor, but they were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. The destroyers had five single 5 inch and light antiaircraft guns which were not designed to take on armored battleships or cruisers. Only their 10 Mark-15 torpedoes housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships posed a serious threat to battleships. Destroyer escorts like the Samuel B. Roberts were even smaller and slower, since they were designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines. With two 5 in guns without automatic fire control, they carried only three torpedoes (even PT boats carried four), and rarely trained in coordinated torpedo attacks. Since torpedoes only had a range of about 5.5 miles, they were best used at night, because in daylight, an attacker would have to survive a gauntlet of shellfire which could reach out to 25 miles. In this battle, they would be thrown against a fleet led by the largest battleship in the world.
After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon sent into near-suicidal daylight torpedo runs. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think they were cruisers and full-size destroyers. Their lack of armor tended to aid clean penetration of armor piercing rounds before Japanese gunners switched to high explosive shells, which caused much more extensive damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although the decks would be littered with the dead and seriously wounded. Destroyers from Taffy 2 to the south also found themselves under shellfire, but as they were spotted by Gambier Bay which had signaled for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect their own carriers.
Commander Ernest E. Evans, commanding officer of the destroyer Johnston, the closest to the attackers, took the initiative. He ordered his ship to "flank speed, full left rudder," attacking on his own in what appeared to be a suicide mission. Johnston approached the cruiser squadron flagship, the heavy cruiser Kumano, for a torpedo attack. At a range of 10 mi, Johnston opened fire, aiming for Kumano's superstructure, bridge and deck, since her 5 in shells would have bounced off the enemy's belt armor. One advantage the Americans had in gunnery was the use of largely the same radar-assisted Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System used on battleships. The brains of the system was the Ford Mark I Fire Control Computer which provide coordinated automatic firing solutions of her 5 in guns merely by pointing the gun director at the target. The Japanese were using colored marker shells to bracket the range of a target, but US destroyers and even the carriers were often able to dodge Japanese misses by weaving to avoid shells, and steering towards splashes, while inflicting accurate hits on larger Japanese ships. When Johnston closed to within torpedo range, she fired a salvo, which blew the bow off Kumano, which also took the heavy cruiser Suzuya out of the fight, as she stopped to assist.
At a range of 7 miles, the battleship Kongō sent a 14 in shell through Johnston's deck and engine room, cutting the destroyer's speed in half to 17 knots, and interrupting electric power to the aft gun turrets. Then three 6 in shells, possibly from Yamato, struck Johnston's bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing fingers from Captain Evans' left hand. The bridge was abandoned and Evans proceeded to steer the ship back towards the fleet, shouting orders from aft down to men manually operating the rudder from aft, when he noticed other destroyers starting their torpedo run.
Emboldened by Johnston's attack, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's destroyers and destroyer escorts on the offensive. They attacked the Japanese line, drawing fire and scattering the Japanese formations as ships turned to avoid torpedoes. Despite heavy damage, Evans turned Johnston around and reentered the fight while damage control teams restored power to two of the three aft turrets.
Two hours into the attack, Captain Evans aboard Johnston spotted a line of four Japanese destroyers led by the light cruiser Yahagi making a torpedo attack on the carriers and moved to intercept. Johnston fired and scored hits on them, pressuring them to fire their torpedoes prematurely at 10,500 yards distance at 0915. The torpedoes were reaching end-of-run as they approached their target, and broached.
At 0910, a direct hit on one of Johnston's forward turrets knocked it out and set off many of the 5 in shells stored in the turret. Her damaged engines stopped, leaving her dead in the water. As her attackers gathered around the vulnerable ship, they concentrated fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat." Under heavy attack from the air and fire from American destroyers and destroyer escorts, the Japanese cruisers broke off and turned northward at 0920. At 0945, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. As a Japanese destroyer cruised slowly by, the survivors saw the enemy standing at attention to salute.
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timschochet
Footballguy
Sprague, who had been little known before this incident, was suddenly thrust into a battle situation in which he faced incredible odds against him, without any preparation whatsoever. In a matter of minutes, he and the men under him made one great decision after another in the heat and smoke of battle. Of course military war colleges will study this forever, (especially navies) because Sprague did everything right.
On the other hand, Kurita, a battle-trained veteran, made one mistake after another, mostly because he misunderstood the nature of his enemy. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, know your enemy, know yourself, 100 battles, 100 victories. But how many times in this narrative have we encountered commanders who, for whatever reason, believed their opponent was far larger than they actually were? Kurita's mission was a suicide mission, and he knew that. His orders were clear. He should have ignored or tried to ignore whatever ships were in his way and headed for the shore to destroy the troops there.
But the heroes of the day was the United States Navy in its greatest hour in our history. Even if Sprague made all the right decisions, it was the willingness of the men under him to charge those battleships which will always be celebrated.
On the other hand, Kurita, a battle-trained veteran, made one mistake after another, mostly because he misunderstood the nature of his enemy. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, know your enemy, know yourself, 100 battles, 100 victories. But how many times in this narrative have we encountered commanders who, for whatever reason, believed their opponent was far larger than they actually were? Kurita's mission was a suicide mission, and he knew that. His orders were clear. He should have ignored or tried to ignore whatever ships were in his way and headed for the shore to destroy the troops there.
But the heroes of the day was the United States Navy in its greatest hour in our history. Even if Sprague made all the right decisions, it was the willingness of the men under him to charge those battleships which will always be celebrated.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES VIIb
BATTLE OF SAMAR (cont.)
At 0735, the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, captained by Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland, turned and headed toward the battle, passing the damaged Johnston, which was retiring. Roberts had only two 5 in guns, one forward and one aft, and just three Mark-15 torpedoes, but attacked the heavy cruiser Chōkai. With smoke as cover, Roberts steamed to within 2.5 mi of Chōkai, coming under fire from the latter’s two forward 8 inch turrets.
Roberts had moved so close that the enemy couldn't depress their guns low enough to hit her; the shells passed overhead. Once she was within torpedo range, she launched her three torpedoes, apparently registering at least one hit. Roberts then fought with the Japanese ships for a further hour, firing over 600 5 in shells, and while maneuvering at very close range, mauling Chōkai's superstructure with her 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. At 0851, the Japanese landed two hits, the second of which destroyed the aft gun turret. With her remaining 5 in gun, Roberts set the bridge of the cruiser Chikuma afire and destroyed the No. 3 gun turret, before being pierced again by three 14 in shells from Kongō. With a 40 ft hole in her side, Roberts took on water, and at 0935, the order was given to abandon ship.
Gunner's Mate Paul H. Carr was in charge of the aft 5 in gun mount, which fired nearly all of its 325 stored rounds in 35 minutes before a breech explosion. Carr was found dying at his station, begging for help loading the last round he was holding into the breech. He was awarded a Silver Star. A guided missile frigate was later named for him. The USS Copeland and Samuel B. Roberts guided missile frigates were also named for the ship and its captain.
The ship sank in 30 minutes with 89 of her crew. She would go down in history as "the destroyer escort that fought like a battleship".
Companion destroyer escorts Raymond, Dennis, and John C. Butler also launched torpedoes. Dennis was struck by a pair of cruiser shells. John C. Butler ceased fire after expending her ammo an hour into the engagement. Although these attacks did not cause huge damage on the overall Japanese forces, they slowed them down, and made them break formation as they twisted and turned to avoid torpedoes and surface gunfire. Destroyer Hoel actually closed and launched a torpedo attack on the battleship Kongo, forcing her to take violent evasive action. Hoel was sunk. Destroyer Heerman launched torpedoes at the Yamato, forcing her into evasive action. All these attacks slowed the Japanese forces as they tried to close with the escort carriers, which were far slower.
The carriers of Taffy 3 turned south and withdrew through shellfire at their top speed of 17.5 knots. The six carriers dodged in and out of rain squalls and managed to launch all available Wildcat fighters and Avenger torpedo bombers with whatever armament they were already loaded with. Some had rockets, machine guns, depth charges, or nothing at all. Very few had general purpose bombs or torpedoes. Against ground targets and subs, the obsolescent Wildcats were low cost stand-ins for the faster Hellcats and heavier Helldivers which flew from larger carriers. The pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip, Leyte, to rearm and refuel".
Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy. Airplanes from Taffy 1 and Taffy 2, the more southern escort carrier groups, swooped in, dropping bombs and raking the Japanese ships with machine gun fire. Some landed at Tacloban and were back in the air in 20 minutes.
After one hour, the Japanese had closed the chase to within ten miles of the carriers. That the carriers had managed to evade destruction reinforced the Japanese belief that they were attacking fast fleet carriers. At 0800, Sprague ordered the carriers to "open fire with pea-shooters when the range is clear". The tail chase was also advantageous for the sole anti-ship armament of small carriers that was a single manually controlled stern-mounted 5 in as a stinger, though they were loaded with anti-aircraft shells. As anti-aircraft gunners observed helplessly, an officer cheered them by exclaiming, "just wait a little longer, boys, we’re sucking them into 40-mm range."
Although the Japanese succeeded in sinking two of the escort carriers (St. Lo and Gambier Bay), the continuous attacks by aircraft and destroyers had their effect. Though Kurita's battleships had not been seriously damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. His flagship Yamato had been forced to turn north in order to avoid torpedoes, causing him to lose contact with much of his task force. Yamato had also been damaged by aircraft and shells. The ferocity of the determined, concentrated sea and air attack from Taffy 3 had already sunk or crippled the heavy cruisers Chōkai, Kumano, and Chikuma, confirming to the Japanese that they were engaging major fleet units rather than escort carriers and destroyers.
Kurita was at first not aware that Halsey had already taken the bait and that his battleships and carriers were far out of range. He had also been deceived by fierce offensive attacks that had come only from a light force that on paper did not have the firepower to be a serious threat. Soon, signals from Ozawa had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the whole of the 3rd Fleet, which meant that the longer he continued to engage, the more likely it was that he would suffer devastating air strikes from Halsey's main attack carriers which were even more threatening than the tiny force of Taffy 3.
Finally, Kurita received word that the Southern Force that he was to meet up with had been destroyed the previous night. Calculating that the fight was not worth further losses, and believing he had already sunk or damaged several American carriers, Kurita broke off the engagement at 0920 with the order: "all ships, my course north, speed 20". He reshaped course for Leyte Gulf, but became distracted by reports of another American carrier group to the north. Preferring to expend his ships against capital ships rather than transports, he turned north after the non-existent enemy fleet, and ultimately withdrew back through San Bernardino Strait.
As he retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait, the smaller and heavily damaged American force continued to press the battle. While watching the Japanese retreat, Admiral Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim: "Damn it, boys, they're getting away!"
The Japanese had sent 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers, with a total displacement of 213,000 tons, against a USN force of 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts, with a total displacement of 78,000 tons.
Cautious Japanese tactics were hampered by the belief they were fighting a much more powerful force. Conversely, the Americans accurately sensed the gravity of their predicament, and quickly improvised an intrepid strategy based on harassment and delay which did not hesitate to throw inadequately armed and trained men, planes and ships directly against battleships if that was the only thing available.
Taffy 3, in one of the most gallant actions of the naval war, had fought off an overwhelming Japanese superior force, the most powerful surface fleet the Japanese had sent to war since the Battle of Midway.
Incidentally, they had also saved Admiral William “Bull” Halsey's career.
BATTLE OF SAMAR (cont.)
At 0735, the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, captained by Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland, turned and headed toward the battle, passing the damaged Johnston, which was retiring. Roberts had only two 5 in guns, one forward and one aft, and just three Mark-15 torpedoes, but attacked the heavy cruiser Chōkai. With smoke as cover, Roberts steamed to within 2.5 mi of Chōkai, coming under fire from the latter’s two forward 8 inch turrets.
Roberts had moved so close that the enemy couldn't depress their guns low enough to hit her; the shells passed overhead. Once she was within torpedo range, she launched her three torpedoes, apparently registering at least one hit. Roberts then fought with the Japanese ships for a further hour, firing over 600 5 in shells, and while maneuvering at very close range, mauling Chōkai's superstructure with her 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. At 0851, the Japanese landed two hits, the second of which destroyed the aft gun turret. With her remaining 5 in gun, Roberts set the bridge of the cruiser Chikuma afire and destroyed the No. 3 gun turret, before being pierced again by three 14 in shells from Kongō. With a 40 ft hole in her side, Roberts took on water, and at 0935, the order was given to abandon ship.
Gunner's Mate Paul H. Carr was in charge of the aft 5 in gun mount, which fired nearly all of its 325 stored rounds in 35 minutes before a breech explosion. Carr was found dying at his station, begging for help loading the last round he was holding into the breech. He was awarded a Silver Star. A guided missile frigate was later named for him. The USS Copeland and Samuel B. Roberts guided missile frigates were also named for the ship and its captain.
The ship sank in 30 minutes with 89 of her crew. She would go down in history as "the destroyer escort that fought like a battleship".
Companion destroyer escorts Raymond, Dennis, and John C. Butler also launched torpedoes. Dennis was struck by a pair of cruiser shells. John C. Butler ceased fire after expending her ammo an hour into the engagement. Although these attacks did not cause huge damage on the overall Japanese forces, they slowed them down, and made them break formation as they twisted and turned to avoid torpedoes and surface gunfire. Destroyer Hoel actually closed and launched a torpedo attack on the battleship Kongo, forcing her to take violent evasive action. Hoel was sunk. Destroyer Heerman launched torpedoes at the Yamato, forcing her into evasive action. All these attacks slowed the Japanese forces as they tried to close with the escort carriers, which were far slower.
The carriers of Taffy 3 turned south and withdrew through shellfire at their top speed of 17.5 knots. The six carriers dodged in and out of rain squalls and managed to launch all available Wildcat fighters and Avenger torpedo bombers with whatever armament they were already loaded with. Some had rockets, machine guns, depth charges, or nothing at all. Very few had general purpose bombs or torpedoes. Against ground targets and subs, the obsolescent Wildcats were low cost stand-ins for the faster Hellcats and heavier Helldivers which flew from larger carriers. The pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip, Leyte, to rearm and refuel".
Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy. Airplanes from Taffy 1 and Taffy 2, the more southern escort carrier groups, swooped in, dropping bombs and raking the Japanese ships with machine gun fire. Some landed at Tacloban and were back in the air in 20 minutes.
After one hour, the Japanese had closed the chase to within ten miles of the carriers. That the carriers had managed to evade destruction reinforced the Japanese belief that they were attacking fast fleet carriers. At 0800, Sprague ordered the carriers to "open fire with pea-shooters when the range is clear". The tail chase was also advantageous for the sole anti-ship armament of small carriers that was a single manually controlled stern-mounted 5 in as a stinger, though they were loaded with anti-aircraft shells. As anti-aircraft gunners observed helplessly, an officer cheered them by exclaiming, "just wait a little longer, boys, we’re sucking them into 40-mm range."
Although the Japanese succeeded in sinking two of the escort carriers (St. Lo and Gambier Bay), the continuous attacks by aircraft and destroyers had their effect. Though Kurita's battleships had not been seriously damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. His flagship Yamato had been forced to turn north in order to avoid torpedoes, causing him to lose contact with much of his task force. Yamato had also been damaged by aircraft and shells. The ferocity of the determined, concentrated sea and air attack from Taffy 3 had already sunk or crippled the heavy cruisers Chōkai, Kumano, and Chikuma, confirming to the Japanese that they were engaging major fleet units rather than escort carriers and destroyers.
Kurita was at first not aware that Halsey had already taken the bait and that his battleships and carriers were far out of range. He had also been deceived by fierce offensive attacks that had come only from a light force that on paper did not have the firepower to be a serious threat. Soon, signals from Ozawa had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the whole of the 3rd Fleet, which meant that the longer he continued to engage, the more likely it was that he would suffer devastating air strikes from Halsey's main attack carriers which were even more threatening than the tiny force of Taffy 3.
Finally, Kurita received word that the Southern Force that he was to meet up with had been destroyed the previous night. Calculating that the fight was not worth further losses, and believing he had already sunk or damaged several American carriers, Kurita broke off the engagement at 0920 with the order: "all ships, my course north, speed 20". He reshaped course for Leyte Gulf, but became distracted by reports of another American carrier group to the north. Preferring to expend his ships against capital ships rather than transports, he turned north after the non-existent enemy fleet, and ultimately withdrew back through San Bernardino Strait.
As he retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait, the smaller and heavily damaged American force continued to press the battle. While watching the Japanese retreat, Admiral Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim: "Damn it, boys, they're getting away!"
The Japanese had sent 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers, with a total displacement of 213,000 tons, against a USN force of 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts, with a total displacement of 78,000 tons.
Cautious Japanese tactics were hampered by the belief they were fighting a much more powerful force. Conversely, the Americans accurately sensed the gravity of their predicament, and quickly improvised an intrepid strategy based on harassment and delay which did not hesitate to throw inadequately armed and trained men, planes and ships directly against battleships if that was the only thing available.
Taffy 3, in one of the most gallant actions of the naval war, had fought off an overwhelming Japanese superior force, the most powerful surface fleet the Japanese had sent to war since the Battle of Midway.
Incidentally, they had also saved Admiral William “Bull” Halsey's career.
Ozymandias
Footballguy
BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND THE PHILIPPINES—AFTERMATH
“Halsey acted stupidly”. Captain Ramius The Hunt for Red October.
Indeed he did. Impetuous and aggressive, Halsey had many great qualities. He was a great admiral, but he let a single minded focus on the overriding strategy overwhelm other, secondary strategic objectives. The US Pacific Navy had one overriding strategic objective in WW2. That was to seek out the Japanese fleet and destroy them. But in doing so, they had to use economy of force, and observe other secondary strategic objectives. One of these other strategic objectives was to advance up the Pacific in order to set the stage for the eventual bombing of, and if necessary, the invasion of Japan.
In order to do that, they had to secure the Philippines. Halsey was where he was because of the invasion of the Philippines, and even though he had the goal of destroying the Japanese fleet, he also had the goal of protecting the invasion of Leyte Island. His taking along the battleships of Task Force 34, which he did not need, showed an inability to see anything other than one big objective.
Had Kurita's force come upon the beaches at Leyte, they would have destroyed hundreds of ships and landing craft, caused thousands of deaths, and set the war back for months. At the time, Leyte Gulf contained most of the landing craft in the Pacific. It would have taken weeks, if not months, to replace them, and in the meantime, the troops on Leyte would have been exposed. The disaster would have required a scapegoat, and as the one most responsible for it, Halsey would have been gone.
That is why I said: “Taffy 3 saved his career.”
Now, to be fair to him, he was also aware that Admiral Spruance had come in for criticism for not following up after the Battle of Midway (But not from Nimitz, as Spruance was following counsel from Nimitz not to risk his carriers unnecessarily). By the way, Halsey and Spruance commanded the same task force. It was TF38 when Halsey was in command, and TF58 when Spruance was in command. But Spruance would not have left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded. He was the best admiral we had in the Pacific, aggressive when he needed to be, and prudent when he needed to be.
Taken in its entirety, the overall Battle of Leyte Gulf was the biggest naval battle in history, involving 282 ships which displaced more gross tonnage than in any previous battle. The Japanese losses were four carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. The Allied Navy lost one light carrier, two escort carriers and three destroyers. The Japanese Imperial Navy ceased to be an effective force and was essentially rendered useless.
In writing about the battle of Samar, years later, Admiral Nimitz said: “Admiral Sprague squeezed every possible advantage out of wind, rain, smoke, interior position, and air and surface attack to confuse and repulse an immensely superior enemy. Overhead, the escort carrier planes, untrained in attacking surface ships, performed like fast carrier aircraft at their best. The screening vessels, steaming boldly into battleship and cruiser fire to launch their torpedoes, provided the slender margin of victory that enabled the attacks to succeed and most of the escort carriers to escape. The history of the United States Navy records no more glorious two hours of resolution, sacrifice and success.”
We will continue with the land campaign in the Philippines later.
“Halsey acted stupidly”. Captain Ramius The Hunt for Red October.
Indeed he did. Impetuous and aggressive, Halsey had many great qualities. He was a great admiral, but he let a single minded focus on the overriding strategy overwhelm other, secondary strategic objectives. The US Pacific Navy had one overriding strategic objective in WW2. That was to seek out the Japanese fleet and destroy them. But in doing so, they had to use economy of force, and observe other secondary strategic objectives. One of these other strategic objectives was to advance up the Pacific in order to set the stage for the eventual bombing of, and if necessary, the invasion of Japan.
In order to do that, they had to secure the Philippines. Halsey was where he was because of the invasion of the Philippines, and even though he had the goal of destroying the Japanese fleet, he also had the goal of protecting the invasion of Leyte Island. His taking along the battleships of Task Force 34, which he did not need, showed an inability to see anything other than one big objective.
Had Kurita's force come upon the beaches at Leyte, they would have destroyed hundreds of ships and landing craft, caused thousands of deaths, and set the war back for months. At the time, Leyte Gulf contained most of the landing craft in the Pacific. It would have taken weeks, if not months, to replace them, and in the meantime, the troops on Leyte would have been exposed. The disaster would have required a scapegoat, and as the one most responsible for it, Halsey would have been gone.
That is why I said: “Taffy 3 saved his career.”
Now, to be fair to him, he was also aware that Admiral Spruance had come in for criticism for not following up after the Battle of Midway (But not from Nimitz, as Spruance was following counsel from Nimitz not to risk his carriers unnecessarily). By the way, Halsey and Spruance commanded the same task force. It was TF38 when Halsey was in command, and TF58 when Spruance was in command. But Spruance would not have left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded. He was the best admiral we had in the Pacific, aggressive when he needed to be, and prudent when he needed to be.
Taken in its entirety, the overall Battle of Leyte Gulf was the biggest naval battle in history, involving 282 ships which displaced more gross tonnage than in any previous battle. The Japanese losses were four carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. The Allied Navy lost one light carrier, two escort carriers and three destroyers. The Japanese Imperial Navy ceased to be an effective force and was essentially rendered useless.
In writing about the battle of Samar, years later, Admiral Nimitz said: “Admiral Sprague squeezed every possible advantage out of wind, rain, smoke, interior position, and air and surface attack to confuse and repulse an immensely superior enemy. Overhead, the escort carrier planes, untrained in attacking surface ships, performed like fast carrier aircraft at their best. The screening vessels, steaming boldly into battleship and cruiser fire to launch their torpedoes, provided the slender margin of victory that enabled the attacks to succeed and most of the escort carriers to escape. The history of the United States Navy records no more glorious two hours of resolution, sacrifice and success.”
We will continue with the land campaign in the Philippines later.
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Ozymandias
Footballguy
By the way, for anyone who might be interested and is in the area, The Chester Nimitz Museum of WW2 (newly renovated) is reopening in his hometown, Fredericksburg, TX on Monday, December 7th. Fredericksburg is about an hour from San Antonio, or Austin.
timschochet
Footballguy
France, Continued
On August 15, a huge armada of 1,800 ships, including 7 British and 2 American carriers, appeared off the French Riviera between Toulon and Cannes. They carried the U.S. 6th Army Group under Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. His spearheads were the U.S. 7th Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Patch, and the Free French 1st Army, under Tasigny. The first objective were the Mediterranean ports of Toulon and Nice ad the huge port of Marseilles. These were taken with little difficulty. Germany's weak 19th Army, holding a 100 mile front, had been as badly deceived as the 15th at Calais. Even two weeks of concentrated aerial and naval bombardment had failed to shake its belief that the Allies were planning another leapfrog attack in Italy, this time at Genoa. In two days of fighting, Allied casualties were only 1,800 an the Germans were in flight.
After securing the vital southern ports, the Americans and French burst out in pursuit, pushing rapidly north and west toward the Rhone. In 10 days they were driving through Avignon, Opposition continued to be light. Other units in the east moved northeast on Grenoble, taking thousands of prisoners daily. On September 11 the left flank reached Dijon. Both flanks then wheeled east to await a linkup with Patton's 3rd Army, speeding down from the north. All the Allied armies now formed a continuous front from Switzerland to the North Sea.
Marseilles was the great prize. From September to December 1944, Marseilles unloaded more tonnage than any of the other ports avaible to the allies. Eisenhower was elated. The next big prize (and headache): Paris.
On August 15, a huge armada of 1,800 ships, including 7 British and 2 American carriers, appeared off the French Riviera between Toulon and Cannes. They carried the U.S. 6th Army Group under Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. His spearheads were the U.S. 7th Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Patch, and the Free French 1st Army, under Tasigny. The first objective were the Mediterranean ports of Toulon and Nice ad the huge port of Marseilles. These were taken with little difficulty. Germany's weak 19th Army, holding a 100 mile front, had been as badly deceived as the 15th at Calais. Even two weeks of concentrated aerial and naval bombardment had failed to shake its belief that the Allies were planning another leapfrog attack in Italy, this time at Genoa. In two days of fighting, Allied casualties were only 1,800 an the Germans were in flight.
After securing the vital southern ports, the Americans and French burst out in pursuit, pushing rapidly north and west toward the Rhone. In 10 days they were driving through Avignon, Opposition continued to be light. Other units in the east moved northeast on Grenoble, taking thousands of prisoners daily. On September 11 the left flank reached Dijon. Both flanks then wheeled east to await a linkup with Patton's 3rd Army, speeding down from the north. All the Allied armies now formed a continuous front from Switzerland to the North Sea.
Marseilles was the great prize. From September to December 1944, Marseilles unloaded more tonnage than any of the other ports avaible to the allies. Eisenhower was elated. The next big prize (and headache): Paris.
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