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IDP 401 -- 3-4 Front (1 Viewer)

Jene Bramel

Footballguy
IDP 401 – The 3-4 front

We'll continue the Discussing Defensive Schemes series this week with a look at the 3-4 front, which has arguably become the hottest defensive trend in the NFL today. It’s not quite that simple, though. Just as there are multiple variations of the 4-3 front – Tampa-2 underfronts and zone coverage, ‘Miami’ fronts and aggressive gap attack philosophies, gap control read-and-react schemes, etc – there are different philosophies of the 3-4.

Since some of you have expressed an interest in how today’s defensive fronts developed, we’ll use this first post to add a little historical flavor to our discussion. It’s probably not a stretch to suggest that most think of Lawrence Taylor or the Pittsburgh Steeler zone blitz concept first when someone mentions the 3-4 front. In truth, the 3-4 in the NFL has a much richer history than that.

Unlike the 4-3, which was first designed and successful in professional football, the 3-4 got its start at the University of Oklahoma in the 1940s (and probably sooner -- no pun intended). It wasn’t until the mid-1970s, when teams were looking for ways to contain big speedy running backs and combat the downfield passing schemes that were gaining favor, that the 3-4 took hold in the NFL as an every down defense. Two teams began the revolution, but did it in very different ways.

The Patriots, under former Oklahoma coaches Chuck Fairbanks and Hank Bullough, used a two gap concept on the line, preferring to contain offenses rather than risk an overly aggressive philosophy. Meanwhile, the Oilers were running a much more aggressive, one gap 3-4 under head coach Bum Phillips. By 1980, almost three quarters of the defensive schemes in the NFL had three down linemen. And, like today, plenty of variations developed on the base 3-4 theme.

There were the aggressive Oilers and Saints under Bum Phillips, the Dome Patrol under Jim Mora in New Orleans, the opportunistic, swarming 3-4 schemes of the Dolphins’ No Name and later Killer “Bs”, the not-as-aggressive-as-you’d-think New York Giants of Bill Parcells and Lawrence Taylor, the (original) multiple front schemes of the Orange Crush in Denver and others. Though the philosophies and tendencies varied, the underlying concepts that made the 3-4 popular were the same.

The 3-4 gave coordinators the flexibility to blitz or drop into coverage without changing personnel. Versatile linebackers like Lawrence Taylor or Robert Brazile or Rickey Jackson or Ted Hendricks could rush the passer or drop into coverage effectively. Teams could disguise their blitzes and coverages easily and disrupt the timing and rhythm of the passing attacks that had taken over the league. The outside linebackers could walk up to the line of scrimmage and create a five man front of sorts to help contain the big, quick running backs of the day. Guys like OJ Simpson or Franco Harris found it a little more difficult to get outside against the 3-4.

Not surprisingly, the flexibility of the 3-4 front is driving its resurgence today. While there’s no question that the “scarcity” of the scheme is part of the reason for its current success, the versatility of the 3-4 makes is attractive when defending the pass-heavy attacks of today’s offenses.

Although it’s an artificial construct, we’ll divide today’s 3-4 fronts into three families for our discussion. Nearly all of the 3-4 coordinators in the league today draw concepts from each philosophy (i.e. most teams use both 2-gap and 1-gap alignments), but we’ll pigeonhole some recent teams into a given “family” for effect. Over the next few posts, we’ll look at the differences between the 1-gap and 2-gap 3-4 philosophies, and discuss the multiple front and zone blitz philosophies that grew out of the 3-4 front.

Next Up: What Charlie Weis called the only true 3-4
 
IDP 401 – The “True” 3-4

“The 3-4 defense is what the Giants used to play. There was a nose tackle, two defense ends lined up on the tackles, two outside linebackers and then two [inside linebackers], both covering the guards. One of those linebackers is a fourth rusher. That is the 3-4 — the only 3-4 defense.”
-- Charlie Weis, former Parcells assistant coach


The “only” 3-4 defense? ORLY? What would Weis call all the other 3-4 schemes in the league today with three down linemen? Granted, it’s mostly an argument of semantics, but Weis (and others) would argue that a true 3-4 defense is one where the three defensive linemen are responsible for every gap on the offensive line – a 2-gap line. They’d call the other variations – the Phillips variations, the Collier and Belichick variations, the LeBeau and Capers variations – hybrid schemes of a true 3-4, since they frequently use 1-gap alignments that are the hallmark of the modern 4-3 fronts.

All this talk about gaps again. Is it really that big a deal? Absolutely. Though the boxscores and stat boxes of the 3-4 schemes often look the same – OLB with big sack numbers and (usually) less notable defensive linemen, the underlying philosophies are very different.

Let’s look at the “true” 3-4 first:

“True” 3-4 TE RT RG OC LG LT /DE\ /NT\ /DE\ / \ / \ OLB (BUBBLE) (BUBBLE) OLB \ / \ / LILB RILBA lot of people chuckled at John Madden’s description of Parcells’ 3-4 as a “double bubble” scheme a few years ago, but it’s a good visual to keep in mind. The 2-gap alignment leaves both offensive guards uncovered by defensive linemen. Instead each ILB covers the “bubble” left by the line. (Acknowledging that I’m an idiot when it comes to the innernets, I’ve attached a screenshot of the Raven defense in a double bubble concept (link at the end of this post) if you’re interested in the real thing.)

This kind of 3-4 requires a specific class of player. The defensive linemen have to be monsters, able to handle the lineman in front of them and control the gap to either side. Ideally, they’re disruptive enough that the guards have to help in many cases. The inside linebackers need to be big enough to take on a guard on every play if the linemen aren’t good enough to keep them clean. It’s Parcells’ “Planet Theory” – there are only so many men on the planet big and athletic enough to play defensive lineman in the NFL. To some extent, that theory also applies to the linebackers in a 2-gap 3-4 scheme. Guys like Dat Nguyen won Parcells over, but he wasted no time in looking for guys like Bradie James and Bobby Carpenter and Kevin Burnett to replace smaller players like Dexter Coakley.

Parcells liked the 2-gap 3-4 for a number of different reasons. It’s design makes it more difficult for the offensive linemen to get an angle on his defenders. It makes it easier to drop eight men into coverage and prevent big plays. It makes it easier for a stud OLB to get an angle in pass rush and generate pressure with just four rushers.

But it’s also more difficult to play in today’s NFL. Those planet-like defensive linemen are getting harder and harder to find. How many players come out of today’s college defenses that are built for speed that can hold the point of attack against a monstrous OT and control two gaps? Not many. How many 245-250 lb linebackers agile enough to elude a guard on every play and still close down on a RB with 4.45 speed? Very few.

As a result, the 3-4 fronts gaining favor today are based on the 1-gap schemes designed by Bum Phillips or those that use other wrinkles to bring pressure and disguise coverage. Other than Parcells’ Cowboy teams in recent seasons, every other contemporary 3-4 has strayed from the 2-gap 3-4 in one way or another. The true 3-4 front is becoming a dinosaur of sorts as an every down defense.

Next up: Bum Phillips and the 1-gap 3-4Raven_2_gap.png

 
IDP 401 – Bum Phillips and the 1-gap 3-4

To hear Bum Phillips tell it, developing his version of the 3-4 defense wasn’t rocket science.

"Coaching is pretty simple really. If you don’t got something, find something you do got. Really we didn't have but one [defensive lineman] – [Hall of Famer] Elvin [bethea] - until we got Curley [Culp] in the middle of that season. Then we had two. What we did have was four real good linebackers so all I done was find a way to get our best players on the field."

Like the Fairbanks-Bullough 3-4 scheme that was taking hold in New England at the same time, Phillips was looking to contain the run and create mismatches in pass rush. Though Phillips based his scheme on the same concepts that the New England coaches did, he favored a much more attacking style. He used a number of one-gap techniques in his front seven, stunting and slanting his lineman to cause pressure and using an OLB – “Dr. Doom” Robert Brazile, who was LT before Lawrence Taylor came into the league – frequently as a fourth pass rusher. In many ways, Phillips’ scheme was a 4-3 with four players in a two point stance.

That attacking, aggressive style of play has stood the test of time better than the read-and-react style for much the same reason that the under 4-3 has. It allows players to attack the offense, specifically its ability to disguise the fourth (and fifth or sixth) pass rusher and the coverage behind. In fact, there are a lot of under front concepts in the Phillips 3-4.

“Under” 3-4 TE RT RG OC LG LT /DE\ /NT\ /DE\ OLB OLB LILB RILBUnlike the true 2-gap 3-4 in the last post, there’s no definite “bubble” in this particular front. The strong side end slides down in the guard-tackle gap and the nose tackle slants to the weak side center-guard gap. The weak side end may or may not be head-up on the tackle, sometimes aligning in a 5-technique. I’ve attached another “live” view from the same Ravens team at the end of the post.

Again, for the reasons we’ve talked about in prior posts about Bruce Smith and Warren Sapp, moving the defensive lineman by just 12 inches changes the philosophy entirely. By comparing the two diagrams (and live screen shots), it’s easy to see how the mindset of the defensive linemen changes. It’s clear that the two inside linebackers can be, if the linemen are disruptive at all, better protected from the blocks of interior linemen. You can see the lines of attack for a delayed ILB blitz or how each OLB might get a jump by shifting one defensive end to the outside of an offensive tackle.

The under shifted 3-4 front, with or without a 2-gap end, is just one of many potential variations a coordinator may align his front seven. There are all kinds of potential alignments. In the next post, we’ll examine how someone influenced by both flavors of the 3-4 might be tempted to meld the both concepts with more traditional 4-3 ideas and create a monster playbook with more than 50 fronts. And pull it off with amazing success.

Next up: Bill Belichick’s “hybrid” defenseRaven_Under_1_gap.png

 
IDP 401 – “Variations” of the 3-4: Part One

Apologies for the break in the action. Trying to make up for it with a double post today.

It seems cliché to say that the NFL is a copycat and cyclical league, but it’s undeniable. Defensive schemes start out as unique ideas or variations on a more common theme and the more successful ideas spread out around the league. Offenses adjust, the pool of players right for the scheme effectively shrinks and the process repeats itself.

The 3-4 scheme is no different. Like the 4-3, a closer look at the 3-4 schemes around the league shows a number of variations in style and philosophy. It’s more than just a one-gap, two-gap divide.

Two variations that get lumped in with 3-4 schemes are Bill Belichick’s so-called “hybrid” 3-4 defenses and the zone blitz scheme that gained fame with the Steelers in the 1990s. Interestingly, though, neither “variation” is exclusive to the 3-4 front. Belichick’s teams play a lot of 3-4, but are more multiple-front than either the true 3-4 or Phillips’ 3-4. And the zone blitz can be run out of a four man front.

But, since we hear the terms hybrid and multiple front and zone blitz so often associated with the 3-4 teams, though, we’ll leave the discussion in this thread.

The “Belichick hybrid”

There’s no simple diagram or playbook quirk that defines Belichick’s scheme. Rather, it’s the complete lack of one. Belichick, in a very short span of time early in his career, was introduced to many different defensive schemes at the professional level. Belichick was exposed to Maxie Baughan, who ran George Allen’s complex 4-3 scheme that was full of pre-snap adjustments. He briefly coached with Fritz Shurmur, who would follow Allen (and others) who used a lot of nickel schemes as a base defense. He worked with Joe Collier, who turned a troublesome set of injuries to his front seven into Denver’s vaunted Orange Crush – maybe the original multiple-front scheme. All of that before gaining fame and respect under Bill Parcells and the true 3-4 in New England and New York.

The key to the success of Belichick’s style of play is flexibility of personnel. To be able to effectively switch from a 4-3 to a 3-4 to a dime defense and all points in-between requires versatility at nearly every position. Players have to be able to run and cover and hit. Linemen have to be strong enough to hold the point in the 3-4, but get upfield in a 4-3. Defensive backs have to be very good in zone coverage but competent in man coverage when needed. It requires a special skill set, but also an above-average football IQ. Compared to the base Dungy-Kiffin scheme, which likely started with as little as three or four fronts and a couple of zone coverages, Belichick’s playbook is at least ten times as complicated.

Another important difference in Belichick’s defense is philosophical rather than playbook. Most coordinators identify the weaknesses of an upcoming opponent and gameplan to take advantage. Belichick specifically seeks to take away the strength of an offense, forcing them to operate out of their comfort zone. In a league where you may face a power offense one week and a spread offense the next, the versatility of the multiple front playbook is the only way to pull off such a philosophy.
 
IDP 401 – “Variations” of the 3-4: Part Two

The Zone Blitz

Depending on who you believe, the zone blitz had its beginnings…

… on an airplane in 1988, when **** LeBeau was furiously scribbling on napkins trying to draw up new ways to get pressure and confuse quarterbacks

… in the USFL in 1987, when the staff of the Philadelphia Stars (most notably Jim Mora, Dom Capers and Vic Fangio) assisted in developing a new blitz scheme that had been devised by another Stars’ staffer (John Rosenberg) who had …

… in the 1986 National Championship game, as a defensive assistant with Penn State, confused Miami’s Vinny Testaverde into throwing five interceptions with a complex array of zone coverage and blitz calls.

Whatever the true origins, the zone blitz had its moments in Cincinnati (led the Bengals to SB XXIII) and New Orleans (the Dome Patrol studs), but wasn’t widely hyped as a defensive strategy until LeBeau and Capers ended up as assistant coaches in Pittsburgh and refined it into a nearly every down defense in the early and mid-1990s.

To hear **** LeBeau tell it, the fundamental concept of the zone blitz scheme has its roots in conversations he had with two pretty well known names in the sports world – Bobby Knight and Bill Arnsparger. LeBeau and Knight were friends at Ohio State as students and shared a philosophy of aggressiveness, or as Knight would put it, “pressure on the ball.” When Arnsparger, the architect of two historically good Miami Dolphin defenses (the “No-Name” squad of the undefeated 1972 season and the Killer Bs in the 1980s), mentioned during a meeting before LeBeau’s fateful plane ride home that he was always “just trying to find a safer way to get some pressure,” the fuse was lit.

Arnsparger’s line cut to the fine point of pressuring the quarterback. Unless you got to the quarterback, an all-out blitz leaves too many holes in the coverage. The risk-reward of a big defensive play vs giving up a big play to the offense is an awful thin tightrope. LeBeau began designing ways to get maximum pressure on the quarterback as safely as possible.

The result was the fire zone scheme. Confuse the offense by disguising your pass rush. Make a four man pass rush function like an all-out blitz. Play zone coverage behind the blitz so that a mistake in the secondary doesn’t result in a big play. Disguise your zone coverage so that a quarterback’s usual sight adjustment leads him right into an unexpectedly covered route.

The basic concept – an exchange of an expected pass rusher for an unexpected one – is relatively simple. The type of exchange and number of players involved in the rotation can become very complex.

Code:
DE-OLB EXCHANGE 						/					  \				  \					   /						^				  ^   \ 	WR	 SLOT WR	/	RT	   RG	   OC ^	 LG	   LT  ^	\					 /   DE					NT				 DE	 \ 	CB			  /	 v											   \		   CB				 OLB*	 v											   OLB						  v			 ILB				ILB		   			   [FIRE]   <<															   [ZONE]						  SS								  FS
The first diagram shows a one player exchange, defensive end for linebacker. If the code diagram isn’t too annoying, you can see how bringing both OLBs at the snap looks like a five man pass rush. The DE-OLB exchange asks the end to threaten the offensive tackle with a quick step toward the pocket, then quickly drop into coverage. If executed properly, the OLB should be able to threaten the pocket, while the end drops into the zone that the quarterback would rightly read as open by sight adjustment for his hot route. The simple exchange looks like a five man “blitz”, but allows the defense to generate blitz-like pressure with a full zone coverage behind.

Code:
MULITPLE EXCHANGE ZONE BLITZ						/										\					   /		  /		/					  \	\ 	WR	 SLOT WR	/	RT	/  RG	/  OC	   LG	   LT  \	\					 /   DE	 /		/	 NT				 DE	 \ 					/	|	 /		/	  |						  \		   				 OLB	 |	/		/	   |						  OLB	CB				   |   /		ILB*	 |			ILB>>>>				   CB 						 V  /				  V						  						   /						  SS*					   											 FS
Here’s a more complicated possibility. Two exchanges – seven men threaten the line at the snap, but only five players rush the passer leaving a three under, three deep zone coverage look. The Steelers will sometimes run similar looks with only two down linemen from a nickel package, where the OLB becomes a standup DE at the line of scrimmage and a slot corner takes the place of the blitzing OLB above.

Zone blitz concepts can be run from a 4-3 front as well, if you’ve got the athletes to do it. Capers ran such a scheme from a 4-3 in Jacksonville, but had the luxury of studs like Tony Brackens and Bryce Paup. Both Capers and LeBeau prefer the 3-4 as a base for their fire zone schemes, as the extra linebacker adds a better athlete and a wider spectrum of potential blitzes.

Like any other defensive scheme, even with stud personnel, the zone blitz is beatable.

1. Run the ball.
Backs with good vision that can see the seams on a play when a blitz has been called can be successful against the exchanges. Draw plays can be particularly effective (as can screens) if the right seam is open.

2. Plenty of play action.
The linemen still must play the run. The extra half step gained by holding the exchange lineman from dropping into coverage can prevent the lineman from beating the receiver to the fire zone.

3. Move the pocket.
Mobile quarterbacks that read well have a better shot at avoiding the pass rush.

4. Max protect.
If enough players are asked to protect the pocket, it’s difficult to defeat the blocking scheme with exchanges and overload blitzes.

Though some of the copycat defenses weren’t as successful as the Capers and LeBeau original, the fire zone scheme has stood the test of time. Unlike the 46, which has gone the way of the dodo as a base scheme, the zone blitz remains sound enough to use as an every down defense. It becomes a chess game. You max protect, we’ll feign the zone blitz and drop eight into coverage. You roll your quarterback out and we’ll bring corner blitzes from a two deep shell. All teams have some 46 and zone blitz in their playbook as an aggressive change-up call, but most offensive coordinators would choose to face the 46 rather than the zone blitz.

That’s a wrap on many of the basic concepts of the 3-4 front. The final post in this thread will be an extended aside for the IDP folks. Some of the veterans will recognize most of it from earlier posts in the Forum, but we’ll concentrate on a couple of questions about the 3-4 that were on the minds of IDP folks this time last year. First, can I trust a 3-4 ILB to produce in the box score. And, second, what the hell happened to Jonathan Vilma anyway?

For those of you who are reading along without an interest in IDP leagues (shame on you :thumbup: ), we’ll have one more thread discussing some concepts that don’t fit easily into any of the earlier threads. It’ll be a catch-all thread, starting out with a post or three about the 46 scheme and some discussion of nickel defenses. After that, I’ll probably open a Q&A/request thread to tie up any loose ends.

Next up: The IDP implications of the 3-4
 
IDP 401 – IDP Implications of the 3-4

When the Niners drafted Patrick Willis last April, the reflex of many IDP owners was to dismiss him as a potential stud IDP option. After some research last May, a number of us argued – both anecdotally and with stats – that Willis would be as productive as his talent would let him. If you want to review that discussion, here’s the thread. But while the trend was clear for the 1-gap scheme that Willis landed in with Mike Nolan, it wasn’t nearly as clear for the 2-gap or mixed front schemes. In fact, it was downright confusing in places.

After some more research, we might be a little closer to drawing some meaningful conclusions.

Posting a spreadsheet of statistics would be ugly, and, for most, stupidly :rolleyes: . So, I’ll just post some data after an extensive study of nearly every base 3-4 scheme since the mid-1990s. But first, some disclaimers.

1. Tackle statistics are unofficial. From 2002 forward I used the Elias stats used in our FBG database and by NFL.com. Prior to 2002, I used stats generated by STATS, Inc which can be found on their website or annual handbooks.

2. I made every effort to research primary sources for the depth charts in question. Wherever possible, my depth chart conclusions for the LILB/RILB come from watching games or direct player/coach quotes.

3. I excluded the New England Patriots. Due to the amount of time they spend in a 4-3 front, the frequent injuries to Ted Johnson, Tedy Bruschi, Junior Seau, etal, it’s nearly impossible to get an accurate reckoning of which tackles were made from each side of the formation.

I’m going to split the discussion into three groups – base 1-gap 3-4 ILB, base 2-gap 3-4 ILB and mixed 3-4 front ILB. There’s some overlap within these groups, but I think it’s close enough to have some relevant conclusions.

Base 1-gap 3-4 scheme ILB
(includes the 1995-99 Bills, 2002-03 Falcons, 2002-04 Ravens, 2005 and 2007 49ers and 2004-07 Chargers)
(current teams include DAL, SD, SF)

This was the thrust of the thread from last May when we concluded that the RILB in a primarily 1-gap 3-4 scheme is an IDP moneymaker. The data bolstered coaching comments that the WILB was the “tackle producing” spot in the scheme. Here’s the data:

17 “player seasons”
RILB out-tackled the LILB 14 times
RILB 100+ solo tackles 11 times, 90+ solos 13 times
LILB 100+ solo tackles 2 times, 90+ solos 2 times
RILB avg solo tackles >> 99
LILB avg solo tackles >> 66

That data includes the funky 2007 season, in which two of the three 1-gap teams had a questionable talent at WILB. The hypothesis held up well anyway, though those two teams accounted for two of three seasons in which a 1-gap WILB didn’t hit 90 solos in this study. The Chargers had Matt Wilhelm at WILB. Despite not playing on numerous passing downs, Wilhelm still out-tackled LILB Stephen Cooper 85 (proj to 16 game season) to 74. The Cowboys had Akin Ayodele at WILB. Despite the relatively poor WILB play, LILB Bradie James still couldn’t hit the 66 solo average from the study (64 solos last year).

Last year showed that you can’t use 3-4 1-gap WILB = stud as a default, but a every down backer in this scheme has put up 99 or more solos 12 times in 17 player seasons. Pay very close attention to what happens in San Diego and Dallas this offseason.

Base 2-gap 3-4 scheme ILB
(includes the 1995-97 Jets and 2005-06 Cowboys)
(current teams may include MIA)

This group remains difficult to handicap, since access to reliable tackle data isn’t possible. Anecdotally, the RILB should be the backer to target. When Parcells took his Giant teams to the Super Bowl, guys like Harry Carson and Pepper Johnson were the main tackle producers. Both were WILB. Parcells himself has been quoted as saying he “always played the guy who should be the leading tackler at that position.” But more recently, that expectation hasn’t been as reliable as could be hoped. In fact, only once has a backer made more than 75 solo tackles (projected) in a season.

Code:
5 “player seasons”				  LILB					  RILB2006 Cowboys	  Bradie James	66		Akin Ayodele	  642005 Cowboys	  Bradie James	73		Dat Nguyen et al  551999 Jets		 Bryan Cox	   43		Marvin Jones	  691998 Jets		 Pepper Johnson  42		Bryan Cox		 481997 Jets		 Dwayne Gordon   42		Marvin Jones	  87
It remains difficult to make an argument based on the stats. It’s clear that the RILB in 2005 and 2006 was a below average player (Ayodele, Fowler, Shanle) or a poor fit for a 2-gap 3-4 scheme (Nguyen). Assuming both players play every down, it’s probably best to lean toward the RILB in a 2-gap 3-4, especially since the only team that may run the scheme this year will have a Parcells playbook.

Mixed front 3-4 schemes
(includes 1993-2000 and 2004-07 Steelers, 1995-98 Panthers, 1998-99 Bengals, 2002-05 Texans, 2005-07 Browns and 2006-07 Jets)
(current teams include NE, NYJ, CLE, PIT and ARI (at times))

Here comes the rub. The mixed front schemes are a mix of 1-gap and 2-gap fronts. Anecdotally and statistically, it appears that the 2-gap 3-4 should favor the RILB. The 1-gap 3-4 clearly favors the RILB. It follows that the RILB, then, should be the primary target in these schemes.

Well…

Code:
29 “player seasons”						  LILB			  RILB100+ solos				  5				 1 90+ solos				  10				 685+ solos				  15				 9Out-tackled teammate	   22				 6Average Solos			  82				72
By any reasonable comparison, the strong side backer has the upper hand. In many cases, it’s not particularly significant. And the 82 solo/yr average isn’t exactly anything to reach for in the draft. But, between 1993 and 2007, over six separate teams and multiple coordinators, the RILB has made more than 90 solos only six of a possible 29 times. That includes inconsistent tackle efforts from well-respected talents like Jonathan Vilma, Takeo Spikes, Earl Holmes and Chad Brown at RILB. It includes better than expected efforts from replacement level talents like Eric Barton and Jay Foreman.

So, what’s an IDP owner to do?

Don’t give up on this group (or the base 2-gap group) because it’s hard to handicap. 16 of 58 potential player seasons with 90+ solos shouldn’t be ignored. As wise posters have noted in similar threads before ( :cough: DonFue :cough: ), it’s hard to go wrong rostering an above-replacement level talent from this pool of players – just take the better talent and forget about it, :loco: .

Pay close attention to how these guys are used. Every down opportunity is key. A guy that gets used frequently in pass rush in a zone blitz scheme can withstand an unexpectedly poor tackle output and remove some risk. Look for a poor surrounding cast that might increase opportunity.

Upper tier talent. Every down player. Poor surrounding cast increasing potential opportunity. Hey, doesn’t Jonathan Vilma fit that profile? What happened to that guy anyway?

I think it’s still hard to say. The RILB slot seems to be less favorable in these Belichick copycat defenses – five seasons in CLE and NY combined and the RILB has yet to out-tackle the LILB despite arguably being the more talented backer (D’Qwell Jackson, Vilma). Vilma, at 230 pounds, isn’t a good bet to hold up against bigger blockers. And Vilma’s attitude wasn’t great. It was probably a combination of all of the above.

It’ll be interesting to see how the second and third groups trend in the future, since a rash of hybrid schemes will probably be the next cycle of defensive schemes.
 
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i have to read this thread about 20 more times to comprehend it. My ADD kicked into high gear.

i think calculus was easier.

Other than my brain melting, this is a tremendous read!!!

Thank you.

 

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