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Get your own Goat Model Today! Shop here: https://bit.ly/3LNKBk7This is the US Army’s Tactical Missile System that can yeet missiles 300 kilometers (190 mile...
Oleksandr Tolokonnikov, a spokesman for the Kherson military administration, said that Ukrainian forces are “constantly working on landing marines and others” on the eastern banks of the river, and while he could not talk about specific operations, he cited increased Russian aerial bombardments in the area as evidence of the Kremlin’s concerns about the situation.
“If you look at yesterday, there were 24 aerial bombs,” he said.
A month ago the Ukrainian military was seeing one or two powerful 500- and 1,000-pound guided aerial bombs every day. That number over the past week has risen to about 20, he said. They have often landed in areas populated with civilians, he said, killing and injuring dozens.
If Ukraine can manage to establish a secure position across the Dnipro, it would put Russian targets in Crimea at greater risk, allow Ukrainians to further compromise Russian logistics, and create a new front in an area where Russian fortifications are less comprehensive and minefields are believed to be less dense.
The potential promise of any such effort is matched by the peril it holds. Over centuries of warfare, rivers have proven to be among the most challenging natural barriers for an attacking army. The major bridges linking Kherson city to the eastern bank were destroyed by bombing.
As Ukraine prepared to launch its counteroffensive in the south, there were signs of increased Ukrainian activity in the delta. But then in June the Kakhovka dam was destroyed, the entire region was flooded and military operations were largely halted as the front line was reshaped overnight.
As the floodwaters receded, Ukraine resumed cross-river attacks, according to both Russian and Ukrainian officials and soldiers.
The campaign was bolstered in August with the arrival of nearly 1,000 Ukrainian commandos who took part in a six-month training course in Britain that included more than a month of intense work focused on small boat amphibious operations, including beach raids.
It is impossible to know if the recent flurry of activity along the river is a prelude to a more ambitious operation, as some prominent Russian military bloggers believe, or a continuation of a campaign designed to exploit Russian weak points and force the Kremlin to stretch its military resources.
Konrad Muzyka, a defense analyst for Rochan Consulting, said that while open-source information suggested that Ukrainian forces massed on the western bank are outnumbered by Russians across the river, the current terrain conditions are favorable to support an attack, and he said there was a “roughly even chance” that Ukrainians would conduct a major cross-river operation.
The ultimate goal of a large-scale river crossing would be to establish a bridgehead, which American military doctrine defines as an area on the enemy side of a river that must be free of enemy presence and be large enough to position antiaircraft and antiarmor units to contribute to the crossing’s defense.
It must also provide sufficient space to organize the vehicles as they cross from the friendly side.
There is no indication Ukraine has established a secure bridgehead, and some military analysts are skeptical that Kyiv would undertake such an effort. Throughout the war, Russian offensive operations have been repeatedly undone by failed river crossings.
In weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian military destroyed dozens of Russian armored personnel carriers in one location on the Irpin River northwest of Kyiv.
The Russians attempted seven unsuccessful pontoon crossings before retreating.
Several months later, Ukrainian forces decimated a Russian battalion as it tried to cross a series of pontoon bridges over the Seversky Donets river in northeast Ukraine, killing at least 400 Russian soldiers and destroying dozens of tanks and armored vehicles.
Ukraine's military has deployed more than 500,000 mines along key routes of a possible Russian offensive, according to reports citing a senior commander.
The density of mines in these areas has been increased sixteenfold, the commander of forces in the north, Serhiy Nayev, told Ukraine's news outlet Ukrinform.
Barriers had also been installed on roads and bridges, while measures were also being taken to improve the efficacy of Ukraine's air defense system.
Russia has meanwhile continued to attack the front line city of Avdiivka, according to Ukrainian officials.
On Thursday, Russia's Defense Ministry claimed it had destroyed Ukrainian military vehicles near the city.
Avdiivka lies just 15 kilometers (nine miles) north of Donetsk and has been a symbol of Ukrainian resistance since the first invasion in 2014.
Russia named a replacement for the former head of the country's Aerospace Forces, who was ousted in the wake of this summer's brief rebellion against the military establishment, state news agencies reported.
The TASS and RIA-Novosti agencies both cited a source as saying Colonel General Viktor Afzalov, who reportedly had been acting head of the Aerospace Forces since mid-August, was given the full post. He replaces General Sergey Surovikin.
There was no official confirmation of the report, but state agencies frequently represent official positions through reports citing anonymous officials in Russia's defense and security establishment.
Recently, there has been some debate surrounding the extent of damage to Russian helicopters on Berdians'k and Luhansk airfields, sparked by @GeoConfirmed statement that at least 21 Russian helicopters were either destroyed or damaged.
While their number slightly exceeds our team's public estimate, it's important to note that their estimate is based on solid grounds. The challenge arises from the limitations of commercially available imagery, which do not provide the resolution needed to detect hundreds of small scorch marks around helicopters in Berdiansk.
In the case of Luhansk airport, it's much easier since you can clearly see it from our higher-resolution imagery purchased from Planet Labs.
However, we can independently verify that multiple scorch marks from explosions are clearly visible around Mi-8 helicopters on imagery for non-commercial distribution. Unlike most Ka-52 helicopters, which were burned and destroyed, the Mi-8s likely didn't carry ammunition that would cause explosions. Consequently, the damage might not be easily visible from the satellite or visible at all.
We opted not to incorporate these helicopters into our report because, while we recognize the possibility of their damage, there are no publicly available means to definitively substantiate it. Nevertheless, it's worth noting that even based on images from the Russian Telegram channel (link included in the image description), one can observe multiple holes on the affected helicopter, suggesting that many helicopters sustained damage, even if they did not catch fire.
It's also worth noting that these helicopters are not in flyable condition. To transport them, the Russians had to remove their rotor blades, a process typically done to prepare helicopters for ground transportation. This observation makes the claim of damage highly plausible, which is why GeoConfirmed likely included them and reached a total number of 21
Drawing on more than 450 interviews, a U.N. report documented abuses such as the use of electric shocks against civilians, the rape of women ranging in age from 16 to 83 and the transfer of unaccompanied Ukrainian children to Russian territory.
Vladimir Putin is increasingly confident Russia’s military can outlast Ukraine as a second winter of war approaches with Kyiv’s US and European allies distracted by the deepening conflict between Israel and Hamas.
The Kremlin is convinced developments are moving in Putin’s favor and that he’ll be able to hold on to territories in southern and eastern Ukraine that his army seized in the invasion, according to three people with knowledge of the situation.
Russia’s playing for time as Putin prepares for presidential elections in March, two of the people said. The aim is to secure territory Russia currently holds and, with neither side able to make a decisive breakthrough, wait for war fatigue in the US and Europe to mount and shift pressure onto Ukraine to seek a settlement.
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On 18 October 2023 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia will begin conducting fighter patrols in the eastern Black Sea using the MiG-31I interceptor aircraft armed with Kh-47M2 KINZHAL (DAGGER) air-launched ballistic missiles.
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His justification referred to the recent uplift in the US’ maritime presence in the eastern Mediterranean, with the intent of holding these vessels at risk using a weapon system with a published range of up to 2000km.
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This announcement is in line with typical Russian rhetoric aimed at its domestic audience, calling the West aggressors whilst framing Russian activity as necessary for protection of the state.
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The specific mention of the KINZHAL missile and its capabilities by Putin was almost certainly for strategic messaging purposes, to demonstrate that Russia remains able to produce and operate newly developed weapons, despite the ongoing Ukrainian conflict.
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The KINZHAL effectively remains in operational testing, with its performance in Ukraine to date being poor.
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It remains highly capable on paper, able to fly at hypersonic speeds and evade modern air defence systems, although there almost certainly needs to be significant improvement in how Russia uses it to achieve this potential.
Estonia: “reports of up to 1,000 sea containers being shipped [DPRK to Russia]…Assuming that one sea container can hold 300-350 pieces of artillery ammunition… a total of 300,000 – 350,000 pieces have been transferred.” One month’s supply.
‘"According to our [Estonian] calculations, Russia should still have around 4m pieces of ammunition left. This [means they] could continue at the current relatively low intensity of [using] 10,000 rounds per day for just over a year," Kiviselg said.’
We shouldn't underestimate these deliveries. Even 50,000-100,000 artillery rounds per month from North Korea will make a difference on the battlefield if it can be sustained.
Starting today, I will post a weekly update of equipment losses for the Russian offensive around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine.
#Avdiivka offensive equipment loss numbers as of 20 October 2023.
In summary: 87 RU losses vs. 3 UA losses
Spreadsheet showing the losses in detail: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1VIyACYHfnJi8cUMWjXAXDhS419l9IHcIhGJaK1RWMFQ/edit?usp=sharing
Footage posted two days ago of Russian assaults in the Avdiivka area repulsed by Ukrainian forces. 35/
Ukrainian fighters on the frontline say troops have not only crossed into Russian occupied territory but held a position, apparently for the first time, on the fiercely defended east (or left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson region.
The development is potentially significant. Ukraine's counteroffensive aims to slice through Russian occupied territory, severing a land corridor to the Crimean peninsula which Moscow annexed - illegally - in 2014.
In a text exchange, the 46th brigade told the BBC that troops were engaged in heavy fighting as they try to take full control of the village of Krynky.
If successful, the force said, the settlement would give advanced units a base from which to launch a larger offensive aimed at dividing Russian troops and cutting off their supply lines.
The US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said that Ukrainian forces were continuing larger than usual ground operations on the east bank and Russian military bloggers have also noted fighting in Krynky.
And the action is being closely scrutinised - success here would be seized upon by Ukraine's military chiefs. Their counteroffensive, launched in June, has made slow progress, with limited territorial gains.
But the fighters we spoke to acknowledged that, even if the troops were to take Krynky, a modern day "Normandy landings" style attack was unlikely.
And they gave us a glimpse of the dangers and challenges they face, particularly as winter approaches.
The 46th brigade is fighting further along the vast frontline in the Zaporizhzhia region with the same aim in mind - to cut off Russian access to the Crimean peninsula.
They told us they had just managed to partially breach the first line of Russian defence near the village of Verbove - and that they'd successfully targeted some ammunition depots and bases, but that progress was limited.
They described heavily mined Russian fortifications and daily air attacks on their logistics routes without, they complained, air support of their own.
Russian troops, they said, had been on the defensive but were now on the attack.
And, as winter approaches, conditions are deteriorating - for both sides.
Rainy weather is affecting the work of drones, reconnaissance equipment and aviation, the soldiers said. But they did not anticipate any let-up in the fighting.
"Winter will not be a time for respite," they said.
Why do I feel like more ammunition for Russia will mean, to a great extent: More opportunity for ill-trained Russian soldiers to die.
Estonia: “reports of up to 1,000 sea containers being shipped [DPRK to Russia]…Assuming that one sea container can hold 300-350 pieces of artillery ammunition… a total of 300,000 – 350,000 pieces have been transferred.” One month’s supply.
‘"According to our [Estonian] calculations, Russia should still have around 4m pieces of ammunition left. This [means they] could continue at the current relatively low intensity of [using] 10,000 rounds per day for just over a year," Kiviselg said.’
We shouldn't underestimate these deliveries. Even 50,000-100,000 artillery rounds per month from North Korea will make a difference on the battlefield if it can be sustained.
Link to article referenced in quote above: https://news.err.ee/1609139906/edf-colonel-russia-still-has-four-million-artillery-shells-left
Starting today, I will post a weekly update of equipment losses for the Russian offensive around Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine.
#Avdiivka offensive equipment loss numbers as of 20 October 2023.
In summary: 87 RU losses vs. 3 UA losses
Spreadsheet showing the losses in detail: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1VIyACYHfnJi8cUMWjXAXDhS419l9IHcIhGJaK1RWMFQ/edit?usp=sharing
Some video: https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1715823264595865975
Footage posted two days ago of Russian assaults in the Avdiivka area repulsed by Ukrainian forces. 35/
Ukrainian forces have likely repelled another intensified Russian offensive effort towards Avdiivka in the past several days and inflicted further heavy personnel and equipment losses on Russian troops in the area. Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated that Russian forces mounted another offensive push on Avdiivka between October 19 and 20, and geolocated footage posted on October 21 confirms that Russian forces did make marginal gains northwest of Avdiivka in the waste heap area.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually advancing north of Avdiivka near the waste heap towards Berdychi (5km northwest of Avdiivka).[2] A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces are attacking towards Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), towards Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka), and towards the waste heap from the Krasnohorivka-Vesele area.[3] However, Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces have somewhat decreased the pace of offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 21, and reiterated earlier Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces lost 50 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, and 900 personnel during attacks on Avdiivka on October 19.[4] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Ants Kiviselg notably identified the Avdiivka push as a potential avenue for a new Russian offensive alongside offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.[5] The fact that Russian forces continue to recommit waves of personnel and equipment to offensive efforts in the Avdiivka area suggests that Russian command will continue to prioritize this axis, despite high losses and the general low quality of Russian forces on the offensive.[6] A Ukrainian military official noted that Russia's regular infantry and tactics writ large are "consistently bad" and that Russian forces are relying instead on unmanned aerial systems (such as Lancet drones), artillery, and aviation.[7] It appears that Russian forces are continuing to use ineffective and costly tactics in offensive efforts near Avdiivka leading to high personnel and vehicle losses, and that they have continuously done so in several waves of attacks over the past week suggests that the Russian military command is prioritizing this axis, despite continued and growing losses.
Russian forces are struggling to interdict Ukrainian efforts to supply and reinforce newly captured positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. BBC Russia Service reported on October 21 that Ukrainian personnel involved in ground operations on the east bank stated that they are fighting to take full control of Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krynky, but disagreed about the extent of these positions.[9] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to almost two kilometers south of Kyrnky.[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control all of Krynky, although a different milblogger directly refuted this claim and claimed that Russian forces pushed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group out of positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are firing on Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky roadway bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and the Antonivsky railway bridge north of Poyma (10km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[12] One milblogger claimed that there were combat engagements near Krynky and Pishchanivka (12km southeast of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), although most Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are primarily using aviation and artillery units to try to dislodge Ukrainian forces from positions on the east bank.[13] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are evacuating wounded personnel and transferring new forces and light equipment across the Dnipro River to support positions on the east bank.[14] Ukrainian forces have maintained a presence on the east bank since starting larger-than-usual ground operations on the night of October 17–18, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have been able to adequately supply and reinforce the groups conducting these operations despite increased Russian aviation activity along the Dnipro River.[15]
Russian forces may be diversifying the mix of missiles, guided bombs, and drones used in strikes on Ukrainian rear areas, likely in an attempt to find gaps in Ukrainian air defenses ahead of further strikes over the winter. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched unknown air-to-surface missiles at Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts; Kh-59 missiles at Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts; and Iskander-K cruise missiles and Shahed drones at Kryvyi Rih on the night of October 20–21.[19] The Southern Operational Command noted that three of the unknown missiles detonated mid-air, a Kh-59 struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, and the Iskanders and Shaheds hit industrial facilities in Kryvyi Rih.[20] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian tactical aviation simultaneously launched 30 modified KAB guided bombs against frontline areas in Kherson Oblast.[21] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have never used this combination of weapons in similar strike series before and stated that Russian forces are shifting their main operations to the air.[22] Humenyuk’s statement echoes Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat’s October 8 warning that Russian forces are increasing their drone strike campaign ahead of winter.[23]
The latest restrictions imposed by the Chinese government came into force on 1 September. They apply to longer-range drones weighing more than 4kg, as well as drone-related equipment such as some cameras and radio modules.
Chinese producers of such equipment are now required to apply for export licences and provide end-user certificates, and the government in Beijing - which has not condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine - says commercial Chinese drones must not be used for military purposes.
Ukrainian volunteers and soldiers say the latest Chinese restrictions have so far had minimal impact on the availability of drones, especially the ubiquitous lightweight Mavics made by the Chinese company DJI.
However, they say that the supply of parts has been affected, and they also fear that the situation may worsen in the future.
"The only change for now is that we're more actively buying whatever stock is left in European warehouses," says Lyuba Shypovych, who heads Dignitas, one of the largest Ukrainian volunteer groups supplying the military with drones. "But what we'll be doing in the future is unclear."
She is particularly worried about the availability of parts such as thermal imaging cameras.
"Because days are getting shorter and nights longer, this is definitely having an impact on supplies for our military and on how warfare is conducted in general because we don't have as many thermal imaging drones. Our units are turning blind at night," she says. "This affects both off-the-shelf drones with thermal imaging cameras and parts."
The availability of parts is particularly important for those who assemble their own drones or improve purchased models.
"The impact is being felt. The licences required by China now have limited Ukraine's access to drone parts," says a senior drone operator from the Kastus Kalinouski regiment who uses the callsign Oddr. "But we're looking for alternatives to make sure our drones work as they did before."
This is just the latest hurdle facing volunteers procuring drones for both the Russian and Ukrainian armies.
An investigation by The New York Times found that Chinese companies have in recent months cut back sales of drones and components to Ukrainians.
But it is not just Ukraine that is affected.
Referring to the curbs that came into force on 1 September, Russian newspaper Kommersant, said: "The restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on drone exports have seriously complicated their supplies to Russia and led to a shortage of some parts, such as thermal imaging cameras."
In the absence of direct supplies, buyers from Russia often shop for Chinese drones in countries like Kazakhstan, and, according to Kommersant, the Central Asian state has further complicated things for them by tightening its own drone import regulations.
To minimise the impact of the Chinese restrictions, Ukrainian volunteers have been busy looking for alternatives made in other countries - both in the West and Ukraine itself.
Anatoly Polkovnikov, who helps procure drones, says that a Ukrainian start-up is preparing to launch the production of drone motors.
He says he is optimistic about the future: "I don't think these Chinese restrictions will have any impact on the general situation. I have the feeling that long-term they will stimulate production in Ukraine."
The war in Ukraine is the first armed conflict in which drones have been used so extensively and in such great numbers, and both of the warring sides are determined to keep it that way.
(1/5) Recent Russian assaults in Avdiivka have contributed to a 90% increase in Russian casualties recorded by the Ukrainian MoD.
(2/5) Since February 2022, Russia has significantly increased its force footprint on the ground in Ukraine by intensifying recruitment using financial incentives and the partial mobilisation conducted in Autumn 2022.
(3/5) This increase of personnel is the major factor behind Russia’s ability to both defend held territory and conduct costly assaults.
(4/5) It is likely that Russia has suffered 150,000-190,000 permanent casualties (killed and permanently wounded) since the conflict began, with the total figure including temporarily wounded (recovered and due to return to the battlefield) in the region of 240,000-290,000.
(5/5) This does not include Wagner Group or their prisoner battalions who fought in Bakhmut.
Fighter bomber suggests that a Russian Mi-8MTV-5 helicopter was shot down by Russian air defenses. He says the very first Russian aviation losses in the war were also from friendly fire.
Late one evening this month, two Ukrainian commandos eased into a side street in Kyiv in a battered SUV. Back from a dangerous nighttime assault on Russian positions in the Crimean peninsula, they slipped into a sparsely furnished apartment where they sat at desks, weary and a little disheveled, and described their latest operation in matter-of-fact fashion.
“Very tough,” said Askold, 38. “It was our most difficult operation yet,” added Kukhar, 23. Members of a unit in the special operations forces of G.U.R., Ukraine’s military intelligence service, the men gave only their call signs in accordance with military protocol.
The two men had joined more than 30 others racing more than 100 miles across the western Black Sea on jet skis to attack critical Russian defense installations before making their getaway, the second Ukrainian amphibious raid in six weeks.
The raids were part of a series of punishing attacks on Crimea by Ukrainian forces since midsummer that have succeeded in disabling some Russian air-defense systems and damaging naval repair yards at Sevastopol. Russia later moved 10 warships from Sevastopol on the west coast of Crimea to the port of Novorossisk on the Russian mainland, though U.S. officials say it remains unclear whether the withdrawals were tied to security concerns or just a regular rotation.
But there is no denying that attacks within Crimea are increasing, and may rise even further with the new ATACMS long-range missiles just delivered from the United States. “A dynamic, deep strike battle is underway,” British military intelligence said in a statement.
The partial retreat of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol, its base for more than 200 years, has helped Ukraine break a Russian blockade and keep some shipping moving in the Black Sea. And it comes as a welcome success for Kyiv as it seeks to extend its counteroffensive beyond the bloody slog through Russian minefields.
The most devastating blows came in mid-September, when missiles struck a Russian submarine and a landing ship in the dry docks of the port of Sevastopol. A week later, the Ukrainians fired long-range Storm Shadow missiles into the command headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, also in Sevastopol, wounding dozens of officers.
More Crimeans have come forward with offers of information to Ukrainian intelligence since that attack, said Sevgil Musaieva, the editor of the Kyiv-based daily Ukrainska Pravda, citing Ukrainian intelligence officials.
They were scared to share information before, she said, adding that now, “maybe they expect that something will happen soon and they want to help the Ukrainian armed forces.”
Alongside the missile strikes, the G.U.R. began its commando activities. In late July, its operatives took control of the Boyko Towers — a group of gas drilling rigs in the western Black Sea that Russia seized in 2014 but had since abandoned — and dismantled a surveillance antenna.
On Aug. 24, Ukrainian commandos made their first known raid on Crimea since 2016, attacking a Russian base on Cape Tarkhankut, the westernmost point of the peninsula. The base houses an antenna and systems that jam electronic communications over a wide area.
“Thanks to this antenna they see everything in the sea,” said a commander of the Bratstvo group, which carried out the raid, identified by his call sign, Borghese. “The task was to approach them at very close range and blow them up,” he added.
Bratstvo, which means “brotherhood” in Ukrainian, is a political party led by Dmytro Korchynsky, a veteran of wars in the Caucasus fighting against Russian troops in the 1990s, who is reported to have ties to former Soviet and Ukrainian intelligence services. The party has been described variously as Christian nationalist and right-wing extremist. Since the beginning of the full-scale war, which began in February 2022, Bratstvo volunteers have been integrated with the ranks of the G.U.R. and mounted the first attacks into Russia last year and on Crimean soil this year.
For the first commando raid, Borghese had bought a flotilla of jet skis to transport 20 men to a Russian base on Cape Tarkhankut. Led by a commander whose call sign is Muraha, they set off at dusk with an accompanying supply boat, riding into a complete electronic blackout because of the Russian jamming systems, relying only on a hand-held compass. Because of the discomfort of doubling up on the jet skis, half of the men rode in the supply boat for much of the way.
With the Russian Navy largely absent from the western part of the Black Sea, the greatest threat to the Ukrainian commandos was from the air. Russia has air supremacy in the area, and conventional Ukrainian vessels have come under repeated attack from Russian jets. But the small size and low profile of jet skis helped them to evade notice.
They reached the shore in the early hours of the morning, landing on a pebbly beach. Armed with four machine guns, five of the men climbed a hill and took positions overlooking the base and the antenna.
As the rest of the group came ashore, Russian machine guns guarding the base opened fire, Muraha said. But the men on the hill were ready and laid down suppressive machine-gun fire of their own.
Using shoulder-held launchers, they fired several rocket-propelled grenades at the antenna and the base before retreating. Some of the group raised a Ukrainian flag against a building, capturing it on video before making their getaway.
The group escaped without injury. But the supply boat had come under fire and retreated, so all 20 commandos had to make the six-hour return trip on the jet skis, which were specially outfitted with compartments to carry ammunition and extra fuel.
Intercepts of Russian communications indicated that the Russians had taken casualties in the attack, Borghese said, but he did not know if the main target, the antenna, had been hit.
Nick Reynolds, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, described the raid on Crimea as “tactically interesting,” but premature. “Ukraine is not yet in a position to capitalize on any weakening of Russian defenses there,” he said.
Borghese said the main achievement of the operation was to change perceptions, proving that Ukrainian forces could reach the Crimean shore and showing the Russian public that Crimea was no longer a safe place.
“It raises our Ukrainian morale and it diminishes Russian and Crimean morale,” he said. “They cannot relax on these beaches anymore.”
Russian forces are funneling additional forces to the Avdiivka front despite ongoing challenges with frontal mechanized assaults and the failure of a renewed push on October 19-20. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that there were no significant changes along the front in the Avdiivka direction on October 22.[1] Russian forces are likely once again pausing following a failed major push which suffered heavy losses. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces “unexpectedly” counterattacked in the direction of Pisky (8km southwest of Donetsk City) and pushed Russian forces from positions in the area. Another milblogger stated that claims of Ukrainian advances near Pisky and Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) are false.[2] Another Russian source allegedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct counterattacks in his unspecified sector of the front.[3] Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances southeast of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely cleared the Avdiivka waste heap area and that the area is currently a contested “gray zone.”[5]
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger discussed difficulties that may be contributing to a “positional deadlock” for Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction as of October 22.[6] The milblogger claimed that it is difficult to conduct maneuver warfare on a static front line with a large number of personnel and fortified areas on both sides. The milblogger noted that Ukrainian drones and other precision weapons have made armored vehicles increasingly vulnerable and have made ground attacks increasingly difficult. The milblogger also noted that Russian forces are facing difficulties in overcoming Ukrainian minefields near Avdiivka and are unable to completely destroy Ukrainian logistics, allowing the Ukrainian command to quickly transfer personnel to critical areas. Russian sources have previously claimed that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[7] These challenges are highly similar to those faced by Ukrainian forces in southern Ukraine in the initial weeks of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in June 2023. However, it remains to be seen if Russian forces have the capabilities and flexibility to adapt in some manner, as Ukrainian forces did following early setbacks in June 2023.
Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces continue to transfer personnel to the Avdiivka direction to support offensive efforts despite heavy losses. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that the Russian military is deploying personnel from Russian territory directly to the Avdiivka direction to replace personnel losses.[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has recently transferred several Russian regiments comprised of mobilized personnel to the Avdiivka direction, indicating that Russia likely does not plan to abandon operations in this direction.[9] Mashovets noted that the Russian military also transferred elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) to the Spartak-Yakolivka-Minerale-Kashtanove area (4km south to 5km southeast of Avdiivka).
A prominent Russian milblogger and frontline commander criticized Russian top-down censorship campaigns. Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky claimed on October 22 that many Russians are dissatisfied with official reports and summaries about the war in Ukraine and urged Russian officials to report honestly about the frontline to garner wider public support.[21] Khodakovsky, who has consistently complained about problems affecting Russian combat operations, claimed that all of his statements are “inspected with increased scrutiny” given his official status.[22] Khodakovsky argued that one can “install filters on the central media” but cannot make people think a certain way.[23] Khodakovsky claimed that unspecified actors who are “embarrassed” by his statements are pushing Rosgvardia to take action against him for his criticisms.[24] Khodakovsky was appointed the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Rosgvardia in occupied Donetsk Oblast in February 2023 and commands Rosgvardia’s special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[25] Khodakovsky‘s claim, if true, indicates that some actors may be trying to leverage Rosgvardia's likely concern about potential repercussions for Khodakovsky’s increasingly vocal criticisms, which have become more conspicuous as other Russian milbloggers engage in greater self-censorship over fears of running afoul of Russian authorities.[26]
Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's ideological and rhetorical campaign against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has largely become decoupled from the issue of the Wagner Group and appears to have outlived Prigozhin himself. Russian lawyer Kirill Kachur, whom the Russian Investigative Committee charged in absentia for embezzlement and bribery in 2022, claimed on October 22 that Prigozhin filed applications to the Russian Investigative Committee to initiate a criminal case against Russian Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for the “genocide of the Russian people, the murder to tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy” before Wagner’s June 24 armed rebellion.[27] Kachur appealed to Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to publicly address what has happened to these applications since Prigozhin’s death and concluded that Russians who support Prigozhin and his message should coalesce around the ideological principles Prigozhin espoused and push for the restoration of justice in Russian society.[28] Kachur’s invocation of Prigozhin’s ideological opposition to the Russian MoD suggests that the intense dislike for and disapproval of the MoD has outlived Prigozhin, even as the Wagner Group has disbanded as a centralized entity. A select camp within the Russian information space that aligns itself with Prigozhin’s hyper-nationalist pro-war, yet anti-MoD ideology will likely continue to launch informational critiques on the MoD and the Russian military command as the war continues.
GUR's Andriy Yusov says Russia has more than 400,000 soldiers in Ukraine.
It appears that the Russians may be losing multiple brigade elements from the 2nd CAA and DNR forces in their assault on Avdiivka. Gerasimov strikes again, this time with no pushback on his bad ideas (so far). Yet there are some troubling issues to consider. A thread. (/1)
Through visual analysis of satellite imagery, our team found Russian military vehicle losses in Avdiivka between October 10 and October 20. The total number exceeded 109, indicating a significant loss of approximately aligning to a brigade-sized force in just ten days.Thread:
(1/9) Russian government spending is becoming increasingly focused on the costs of its war on Ukraine.
(2/9) The state’s proposed 2024 budget envisages an approximate 68% increase in planned defence spending compared to that allotted for 2023 – this puts defence spending for 2024 at around 6% of GDP.
(3/9) In contrast, education and healthcare spending will be frozen at the 2023 allocation, which amounts to a real term spending cut due to inflation.
(4/9) More spending will need to be allocated to fund payments and healthcare costs for the mounting numbers of wounded soldiers and the families of those killed in the conflict.
(5/9) More than half of those soldiers wounded severely enough to require longer term medical care have lost limbs, with one in five requiring upper limb amputations, Deputy Labour Minister Alexei Vovchenko stated on 17 October 2023.
(6/9) These injured soldiers will almost certainly require lifelong healthcare.
(7/9) Consistently heightened military spending will highly likely contribute to inflationary pressures within Russia.
(8/9) Furthermore, continued increases in military spending would force the Russian government to make difficult decisions about how to fund the war, likely increasing financial pressures on Russian businesses.
(9/9) However, any substantial future reduction in military expenditure would likely remove an increasingly central driver of Russian economic activity in the face of sanctions.
The number of Russians who say their salary does not cover basic spending has jumped by 20% in two years to almost half, according to a survey, as Moscow diverts record fiscal resources to funding its invasion of Ukraine.
The findings, from a survey of almost 5,000 people conducted by recruiter Headhunter in October, underlined Russia's economic woes and could be an issue for its authorities in the run-up to March's presidential election, in which Vladimir Putin is considered highly likely to extend his more than two decades in power.
Asked whether their salary was enough to cover basic spending - without taking into account income from second jobs or investments - just one in five surveyed said yes.
"Yes, with difficulty," replied another 36% of respondents, while 45% said their salary was insufficient, up from 25% in 2021 and 39% in 2022, Headhunter's survey showed.
In 2021, before Russia launched what it calls a "special military operation" in Ukraine, 36% of those surveyed felt their salary was sufficient.
1/2 Looks like the Russian MOD is finally moving to standardize small quadcopter/FPV operations and tactics - the military wants to create "separate units operating (these) mini-UAVs, and...to unify the tactics of using such mini-drones and unify their operator training."
2/2 The lack of standardization of drone use tactics and training was a persistent point of complaint from the Russian volunteer community that still provides the drones, trains the operators and develops usage tactics.
Serhii Popko, the Head of the Kyiv City Military Administration, said that Russia has launched more than 300 cruise missiles, 14 ballistic missiles, and almost 400 Shahed drones at Kyiv over the past 12 months.
As the ground war in Ukraine continues to grind ahead of the winter months, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are experiencing falling availability rates with their existing fleet of combat aircraft. The culprit is a combination of a high number of losses of fixed-wing aircraft combined with a drop in mission-capable rates due to the higher-than-normal number of flight hours being flown by those aircraft remaining.
In the UK MoD’s Sept. 28 defense intelligence update on the war, London estimated that since the start of the conflict, the VKS has lost 90 combat air frames. This includes significant numbers of the most modern Sukhoi aircraft models, which have become difficult, if not impossible, to replace. The situation has only grown worse in the weeks since, when it was reported that Russia’s own air defense units had shot down two of their own Su-35S fighter aircraft within a few days of one another.
Speaking to Breaking Defense during the Oct. 3-4 Warsaw Security Forum, a NATO-nation military aviation analyst described incidents in which Russian aircraft system failures have prevented what could have otherwise been dangerous confrontations with alliance members or partners in the skies.
“When it comes to the Russian VKS all you can say sometimes is ‘thank God for shoddy maintenance,’” he commented.
Another issue facing Russian industry, according to their Ukrainian counterparts, is diminishing supplies of spares for the VKS is largely due to international sanctions that have choked off supplies of foreign electronic components. Compounding the issue, Ukrainian industry sources report that some of Russia’s qualified industry specialists left the country shortly after the invasion and there are few if any replacements for these personnel.
“We are seeing the birth of a set of intelligence services that are like Mossad in the 1970s,” said a former senior CIA official, referring to the Israeli spy service long accused of carrying out assassinations in other countries. Ukraine’s proficiency at such operations “has risks for Russia,” the official said, “but it carries broader risks as well.”
“If Ukraine’s intelligence operations become even bolder — targeting Russians in third countries, for example — you could imagine how that might cause rifts with partners and come into serious tension with Ukraine’s broader strategic goals,” the official said. Among those goals is membership in NATO and the European Union.
“Ukraine’s own collection efforts fed the skepticism that Zelensky and others had about Putin’s plans [prior to Feb. 2022] because they were eavesdropping on military and FSB units that themselves were not informed until the eve of the war.”
“They were getting an accurate picture from people who were also in the dark,” one U.S. official said.
Deep State's map shows Russian gains to the west and southwest of Krasnohorivka over the past four days. They say Russia still has reserves and is increasingly continuing assaults with infantry, instead of armor. 44/
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Germany expected to announce "good news" for Ukraine on Tuesday, October 24, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba said.
"I won't spoil it yet, but you will hear everything," Kuleba added.
The 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine published a video confirming that the unit is operating Swedish-delivered CV9040 armored fighting vehicles.
Note that all vehicles seen here are equipped with Barracuda multi-spectral camouflage.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet responded to a possible attack by Ukrainian "underwater sabotage forces" in the area of Sevastopol in the Crimea tonight, the Governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhayev announced.
Avdiivka.
This is quite a story from Oleg Sentsov, the Ukrainian filmmaker (formerly imprisoned by Russia), now in the UAF.
I will paste the whole text from the link below.
On October 19th, "we repelled a major assault on the hottest frontline right now. The first group, where I was, managed to gain a foothold in the enemy's trench and immediately engaged in battle on two fronts. The second group also went in, into another trench, eliminated the enemy, but reserve forces brought up by the enemy drove them back out. The third group endured fierce combat and was almost completely killed right at the start of the operation.
The orcs were pushing wave after wave of infantry and armored groups, which were largely destroyed by our artillery, drones, and a tank. Of course, the overall picture on this front was much broader, especially when you watch it on livestreams - they say the Russian offensive yesterday was massive. But I saw it all from a smashed-up trench, and the view there isn't great, though there are plenty of other sensations.
The enemy infantry was unable to dislodge us, though they squeezed us into a 50-meter strip. The contest of who had more grenades continued. The roar of their armor emboldened the enemy, so shouts of "Surrender!" rang out from both flanks constantly. Out of 13 fighters we had one seriously wounded and several lightly wounded. Then a fragment from an underbarrel grenade launcher caught me under the ribs. It became clear that we were not only unable to accomplish our mission, but also wouldn't last until nightfall.
And then we saw a column of enemy tanks barreling right for us along the landing zone. There were six of them, festooned with infantry hanging off them like monkeys in trees. Would I say I got scared? Not exactly. I just vividly realized that death was coming. The only thing I could order was for everyone to take cover, hoping they wouldn't spot us, though I was certain they were making right for us.
The lead tank was firing chaotically onto the landing zone, the others following behind. The column was passing our trench, and we opened up on the dismounts of the rearmost vehicles, as we had no antitank weapons left. The tank crews didn't notice us, and the orcs riding atop had no way to report contact. At the edge of the landing zone, the column turned around and headed back. We exchanged fire with their dismounts again (with unpleasant results for some), grasped that this enemy may have a different objective than hunting for our group. Then came the order to pull out.
We got lucky. We got lucky many times that day. Including when we escaped that encirclement under cover of two Bradleys that came for us. But not everyone who took part in this operation was so fortunate. Hope still remains that someone from the other groups was captured, or is wandering the landing areas - searches are ongoing.
Today there's lots of video and statistics about enemy losses (on October 20th the General Staff reported approximately 1380 enemies destroyed). Lots of rejoicing that we bloodied the enemy again. But there are no statistics about what sacrifices this costs us. Behind every number is someone's life and a universe of grieving loved ones left in ruins. This sorrow remains mostly with the families of the fallen and their comrades-in-arms. Eternal memory to the fallen heroes..."
Over half of the Russian soldiers who have been severely injured in Ukraine have lost limbs, a government official in Moscow has said, as President Putin’s forces suffered fresh losses in an offensive in the east of the country.
“This is such a vivid problem, it’s a lot,” Alexei Vovchenko, a deputy labour minister, said at a meeting with Russian senators, according to state media. Vovchenko said that 54 per cent of all severely injured Russian soldiers had at least one limb amputated.
Russia has not provided figures since March last year, one month after the start of its invasion, when it said the number of wounded soldiers was 3,825. However, the British defence ministry said yesterday that up to 190,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or so badly injured that they would be unable to take any further part in combat.
In an interview, Ukraine’s Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin told POLITICO Western countries needed to accelerate production of missiles, shells and military drones as close to frontlines as possible.
“The free world should be producing enough to protect itself," Kamyshin said, on a mission to the German capital to persuade arms producers to invest in war-ravaged Ukraine. "That's why we have to produce more and better weapons to stay safe."
Current factory capacity was woeful, he argued. “If you get together all the worldwide capacities for weapons production, for ammunition production, that will be not enough for this war,” said Kamyshin of the state of play along Ukraine's more than 1,000 kilometers of active frontline.
As the Israel Defense Forces continue to pummel Gaza and fighting gathers pace along the contact line in Ukraine, armies are burning through ammunition at a rate not seen in decades. Policymakers are asking whether Western allies can support both countries with air defense systems and artillery at once.
The answer, says Kamyshin, is to start building out production facilities now. “What happens in Israel now shows and proves that the defense industry globally is a destination for investments for decades,” he said.
Since Russia's war on Ukraine started in February 2022, western governments have been funneling arms to Kyiv. That includes hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds, armored vehicles and other equipment.
But as the grind of war continues, Kyiv has changed tack — appointing Kamyshin, the former boss of Ukraine's state railway — to the post of minister for strategic industries. Ukraine, formerly a major military hub in the Soviet Union, is now trying to increase output of armored vehicles, ammunition and air defense systems, he said, and wants Western partners to invest.
A key step is expected on Tuesday, when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal will announce a new joint venture between Rheinmetall and Ukroboronprom, a Ukrainian defense company, Kamyshin said.
Ukrainian troops could take advantage of Russia's focus on the ongoing battles around Avdiivka, by attempting something bigger to the south of Kherson, on the southern bank of the Dnipro River, Col. Toomas Väli, deputy chief of operations at the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) General Staff, said on ETV show "Esimene Stuudio."
Recently, in the ongoing war in Ukraine, there has been a lot of attention on what is happening in and around the city of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast. Speaking on ETV show "Esimene Stuudio," Väli said that, as Ukraine has built extensive fortifications in and around Avdiivka since 2014, in his view, Russian forces ought to have realized before they began maneuvering there, that their chances of succeeding were low.
"The Ukrainians have had time to prepare for this, and they have not overlooked the concentration of the Russian Federation's troops near Avdiivka, because most of the columns were moving out from cities in Donetsk Oblast. A great many of those who were first to go on the offensive in Avdiivka were mobilized from Donetsk Oblast. This was to be expected, and the Ukrainians had obviously anticipated it," he said.
At the same time, the launch of the offensive on Avdiivka may have been linked to Russian president Vladimir Putin's visit to China, according to Col. Väli. "We always tend to focus on the tactical situation on the ground, however, Putin's visit to China took place at the same time. There is probably some connection, because when a president goes to talk to the president of another country, he will want to talk about how successful his troops have been in military operations."
According to Väli, Russia's offensive had also been carefully prepared, as the principles of joint forces cooperation such as air support and armored maneuvering can be seen. "They basically tried to do everything there according to their own regulations, but they have not succeeded," said Väli.
Ukraine, however, could exploit Russia's current focus on Avdiivka by taking action elsewhere, Väli said.
"While we are looking very carefully at a particular place, at the same time they might be doing something else somewhere else. As things stand, what is happening downstream of the Dnipro, in Kherson Oblast, could be an indication of something that Ukraine is trying to exploit," he said.
"They have actually been constantly prodding at Russian Federation troops from across the river. This type of raiding, taking advantage of night vision capabilities, using small vessels, which cross the Dnipro quickly, make a quick hit and then go back. This has been done before. But in the last two or three days, something different has been observed. In this sense, it seems that Ukraine is trying to do something more to the south and south-east of Kherson. Warfare is often so opportunistic that if there is a way to squeeze through from somewhere, they will squeeze through from there, however, it is too early to judge at the moment. It seems that the Russians were expecting it and have moved their reserves. But, for now, I would keep an eye on the southern bank of the Dnipro," he explained.
"At the very moment when Ukraine would be able to move ten kilometers beyond the line of the Dnipro River, this would allow them to build some more serious pontoon bridges over the Dnipro, and out of range of Russian artillery. It's very difficult to speculate, but I'm keeping my fingers crossed and I'm looking at the southern direction of the Dnipro with great interest," added Väli.
The U.S. has provided Ukraine with MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Kyiv's forces have already used them. Väli explained that the ATACMS will increase Ukrainian troops' firing range by 150 kilometers.
"The possibility of hitting at a range of almost 300 kilometers means that the Russian Federation will have to make changes to its current maneuvers. They will have to change their command and control points, they will probably have to move aircraft again from the airfields to somewhere further away, which in turn means they will probably not be able to support their own ground maneuvers as quickly," said Col. Väli.
"It will be interesting to see what happens now. However, what is now clear is that the Ukrainians have the opportunity to have an impact from a distance. Would that mean any kind of breakthrough? Probably not. Here again we come to the point that the numbers are probably large enough so as to enable a massive strike on everything in a particular area. It's not a 155mm projectile, we're still talking about a precision weapon," said Väli.
"This is a precision weapon, which can hit very high-value targets," he added.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said the country’s forces are leaning heavily on Chinese DJI drones in the defense of their country, a claim that the manufacturer has since declared was news to them.
The Oct. 8 statement made by Denys Shmyhal at the Kyiv International Economic Forum that Ukraine is effectively buying 60% of DJI’s global output of Mavic quadcopter drones, even though the vendor officially prohibits selling to militaries, highlights how commercial technology with military utility can permeate conflict zones practically unimpeded.
Ukraine is also growing its own drone program, so it is hard to ascertain how reliant the country is on the small drones made in China, which has aligned itself with the attacker, Russia. In Europe, DJI Mavic-series drones sell on Amazon from €600 ($640) to several thousand euros, depending on the sophistication of the aircraft, onboard camera and user terminal interface.
“We are utterly surprised by the statement by the Ukrainian prime minister as he has no insight into DJI’s production numbers,” a DJI spokesperson told Defense News. “The statement bears no resemblance to reality and is totally misleading with regards to DJI’s involvement in the use of its production in Ukraine.”
Russia appears to be increasingly supplementing the use of Shahed-131/136 drones with cheaper and lighter domestically produced drone variants during strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Russian media speculated on October 23 that Russian forces used new long-range "Italmas" drones and Italmas variants for the first time in Ukraine during a drone attack on Kyiv Oblast.[3] Russian sources noted that Italmas drones are lighter than Shaheds and are harder to detect and shoot down. Russian milbloggers noted that Italmas drones are cheaper than Shaheds, which means that they can be more widely manufactured and used, but that they deliver lighter payloads, which restricts their usefulness in isolation.[4] Russian sources noted, therefore, that Russian forces will likely use the Italmas drones in tandem with Shaheds.[5] ISW previously assessed that Russia is likely trying to expand and diversify its arsenal of drones, missiles, and guided bombs for strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in advance of the fall-winter season, and increased use of Italmas drones is likely part of the wider munitions diversification effort.[6]
Russian authorities are intensifying mobilization efforts targeting Central Asian migrant communities in Russia. Russian Internal Affairs (MVD) Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev met with the MVD board to discuss “migration problems” and “ethnic crime” and insinuated that migrants commit crimes at a higher rate than natural born Russian citizens.[7] Kolokoltsev defended recent Russian law enforcement mobilization raids on migrant communities and claimed that Russian law enforcement is enforcing standard legal norms.[8] A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee is conducting investigations into naturalized migrants with Russian citizenship and is reopening previously terminated and canceled criminal cases in order to mobilize migrants to fight in Ukraine.[9] The insider source also claimed that the Russian Investigative Committee will now investigate migrants for committing any offense, even minor ones, and will expand that individual’s investigation to include their friends and family. The insider source claimed that unspecified actors, possibly the MVD or MVD Head Alexander Bastrykin, ordered Russian state media to increase reporting about ethnic crime in Russia, likely to set informational conditions for further mobilization raids on migrant communities.[10] Bastrykin has continually advocated for the targeted mobilization of migrants with Russian citizenship, in line with Russian law enforcement’s recent expansion of its efforts to detain and forcibly register migrants with Russian citizenship for military service.[11]
(1/4) Over the last week fighting has intensified around the banks of the lower reaches of the Dnipro River. Ukraine has given higher priority to operations in this sector, building up small bridgeheads on the east bank it has controlled since the summer.
(2/4) Russia has likely been alert to the possibly of attacks across the river since it withdrew its forces from the western bank 12 months ago.
(3/4) The area is under the control of the newly established 18th Combined Arms Army, after some of the units previously in the area were diverted to the Orikhiv axis to the east.
(4/4) As in most sectors, a decisive factor is almost certainly the combatants’ ability to bring accurate, intense artillery fire to bear. Initial indication suggests that Russia has maintained a significant artillery capability within range of the river.
The US is "beginning to pivot to rebuilding the defense industrial base inside Ukraine" DoD acquisition chief Bill LaPlante said today.
"I spent almost two weeks in Brussels...working on this, and you're gonna see more there. "
In Ukraine, Russian Su-25-series aircraft continue to use almost exclusively unguided rockets (S-8-series, S-13-series, S-24B, & S-25-series). The stills below, taken from a recent Russian MoD clip, show several of the aircraft armed with 20-round B8M1 pods for S-8-series FFARs.
Russian serviceman shows results of a HIMARS strike on a BM Grad artillery system parked in a tree line. This resulted in a violent detonation of the ammo which killed the gunner. His comrades built a monument using damaged rusty remnants of the Grad.
What's also new: a total of THREE cables were damaged in few hours time.
HMS Belos currently supporting Estonian authorities on investigating another area but the Swedish Navy is not commenting on that due request by Estonia.
The Russian army has used new, longer-range drones for the first time in an attack on the Kyiv region, Russian media reported.
Italmas drones are harder to detect and shoot down than Shaheds - an Iranian-made drone that has become a staple of Russian attacks, said the Institute for the Study of War, citing Russian sources.
The drones are lighter and cheaper, but this means they carry smaller payloads than Shaheds, so it is likely they will be used in tandem, the ISW said.
The new drones may be part of Russia's efforts to expand its arsenal for strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure as colder weather approaches, the thinktank said.
Away from the public eye and the bloody front line, Ukraine and Russia are still talking.
The countries, now sworn enemies fighting a grinding war, are managing to negotiate on a few core humanitarian issues: exchanging prisoners of war and dead soldiers’ bodies; the passage of ships from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports; and, most recently, the return of Ukrainian children from Russia.
In some cases, Moscow and Kyiv use intermediaries, including Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the Vatican, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
But most of the wartime bartering is done directly, by individual representatives, including in tough and unpleasant face-to-face meetings on the Ukrainian-Russian border and in Istanbul, as well as phone calls, according to some Ukrainian officials involved in the discussions.
Neither side is keen to advertise the existence of these back channels.
“It’s very, very emotionally difficult,” said Dmytro Usov, a Ukrainian military intelligence official who heads a coordination center overseeing prisoner exchange negotiations.
Ukraine’s military has formed a battalion of soldiers made up entirely of Russian citizens who want to fight against President Vladimir Putin’s invasion.
The Sibir (Siberia) battalion has brought together dozens of Russians and people from ethnic minorities in Russia who traveled via third countries because they wanted to join the Ukrainian army, according to officials at their training camp. Unlike volunteer groups such as the Freedom of Russia legion that have declared support for Ukraine, the soldiers are part of the regular Ukrainian army and expect to be sent into battle very soon.
They include people from groups such as Yakuts and Buryats in Russia’s vast eastern Siberian region who said they wanted independence from Russia and viewed Ukraine’s victory in the war as a step toward that goal.
“If people want to fight for Ukraine, for our borders, for the collapse of this Russian soviet regime, why not?” Batya, their Ukrainian instructor and commander, told Bloomberg News during a visit Tuesday to the group’s training ground. “It is their choice and it shows that not all Russians support Putin.”
Last winter, after some difficult months when Ukraine’s power grid came under frequent assault by salvoes of Russian cruise missiles and Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, the country’s air defence slowly gained the upper hand. The vast majority of Russian missiles were shot down before reaching their targets. Western ground-based air-defence systems, such as Patriot and IRIS-T missile batteries, arrived in the nick of time, and Ukraine showed considerable skill in integrating a wide mix of platforms and radars. Its repair teams confounded expectations by managing to restore energy supplies rapidly, even after multiple attacks—and despite becoming targets themselves.
But this winter Ukraine is braced for more of the same, or worse, from an enemy that has learned from last year’s campaign. Ukraine has built concrete defences around important parts of its electricity grid, and has acquired emergency generators to prevent total blackouts. But just as the ground war is essentially attritional in nature, so is the air war.
Douglas Barrie, an air-power specialist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, says the question for both the defenders and the attackers is, “What have you got left?” In other words, will Ukraine run out of anti-missile munitions before Russia runs out of cruise and ballistic missiles and attack drones? And will Ukraine have enough batteries to cover the targets that the Russians are able to hit?
Nico Lange, a Ukraine expert at the Munich Security Conference, worries that Ukraine has neither enough platforms nor sufficient munitions for those that it does have. The country is now almost entirely dependent on Western systems, having used up nearly all of the mostly Soviet-era s-300 and Buk missiles it was able to get its hands on. The deficiency is especially acute for short-to-medium range systems, such as the Kongsberg/Raytheon National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), made in Norway and America.
Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, has hinted that more NASAMS, and the AIM-7 missiles it can fire, will be sent to Ukraine from existing stocks. However, Mr Lange says that production rates are not increasing quickly enough to meet Ukraine’s needs this winter. Defence companies in Europe are willing to crank up production on existing lines, but, says Mr Lange, still appear reluctant to invest in new lines to increase longer-term capacity.
So even when Ukraine has been promised the kit it needs, there is no guarantee it will arrive in a timely way. Take the IRIS-T batteries, two of which have already shown their effectiveness. Germany has promised to send more to Ukraine, but it is not clear when they will arrive. After the Brussels meeting Germany issued a list of everything it has sent, or is about to send, to Ukraine. The list included two more IRIS-T batteries. The system’s manufacturer, Diehl Defence, has committed to doubling production from four systems a year to eight, but not until 2025.
Six IRIS-T systems are due to be delivered this month, but to Germany’s own air force rather than to Ukraine. Other European air forces are also scrambling to place orders for IRIS-T, impressed by its near 100% hit rate in defending Kyiv.
One short-term answer to the shortage of cutting-edge air-defence systems is to send older systems that the West and its allies no longer want but are held in storage. An example is Patriot’s predecessor, the Hawk medium-range surface-to-air missile that entered service in the 1960s, but which remains effective if fitted with updated radar. Spain has sent some Hawks to Ukraine, and America may provide many more, some via Taiwan.
Similarly, the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow, an equally whiskery short-range anti-ship missile, has turned out to work well with Ukraine’s Soviet-era Buk launchers. More could be dusted off for service.
And Ukraine needs whatever it can get. The West once thought its sanctions might deny Russia the components it needs to make more missiles. But those hopes have dimmed. In May Ukrainian intelligence sources estimated that each month Russia is able to manufacture around 60 land attack cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles and two Kinzhal hypersonic glide weapons. Mr Barrie says that debris recovered from recent strikes by KH101 cruise missiles confirms that they were recently produced.
Russia is repurposing surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles for land attack roles. It can also call on innumerable cheap loitering munitions and Shahed drones, which are now being built in Russian factories.
An emerging threat is air-launched “glide bombs” guided by GLONASS, the Russian equivalent of GPS. They have a range of 50km, are accurate to within ten metres and are far cheaper than missiles. Mr Lange says that Ukraine has a desperate need for more and better electronic-warfare equipment that can counter both guided bombs and drones. But he fears that donor countries may be reluctant to share it.
By stockpiling missiles during the summer, Russia should be able to resume attacks at a similar level of intensity to last year’s, and maintain them for several months. There are also some indications from recent strikes that Russia will opt to hit targets less well defended than Kyiv, such as Odessa and other port cities. As Mr Barrie says: “Ukraine is a big country. There are lots of things the Russians can go after.”
Russia, it appears, is not going to run out of missiles. The question is whether Ukraine will retain the means to keep shooting them down.
Ukrainian fighter pilots began training on F-16s in the United States this week, a U.S. Air Force spokesperson has confirmed to The War Zone. This kicks off the process of getting these aircraft into Ukrainian Air Force hands, after a long campaign to secure them and then develop a path to train aircrew and maintainers.
“The 162nd Wing, Arizona Air National Guard, began training a small number of Ukrainian pilots this week in F-16 fundamentals,” the Air Force spokesperson said. “The training curriculum will align with the foundational knowledge and skills of each pilot and is expected to last several months. This follows President Biden and Secretary Austin’s decision to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s as part of the United States contribution to Ukraine.”
The training is taking place at Morris Air National Guard Base in Tucson, Arizona, facilitated by the 162nd Wing. The launch of this part of the syllabus indicates that at least the first cadre of pilots have now completed language training, which was undertaken at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas.
Avdiivka Update (please note that the situation might have evolved by the time of your reading):
The situation remains difficult, with ongoing Russian pressure on both the flanks and the town of Avdiivka itself. While neither side holds complete control over the Waste Heap, Russian forces have managed to achieve access to it and can make occasional/temporary use of this position.
Russian forces have been heavily utilizing air-dropped bombs and guided air-dropped bombs, resulting in significant damage to structures within Avdiivka, including civilian infrastructure.
Satellite imagery shows a concentration of heavy artillery shelling to the north of Avdiivka, in close proximity to the heap, suggesting sustained pressure on defenders.
Here are the images for comparative analysis. The images are from October 15th and October 25th:
Despite Russian denials, mounting losses are becoming increasingly evident. These losses have been corroborated by drone footage, geolocation efforts by volunteers, and satellite imagery.
In this specific area to the west of Krasnohorivka, for instance, 16 Russian vehicles were destroyed, damaged, or abandoned.
To sum up, the duration of the enemy's intent and ability to sustain these high-pressure assaults remains uncertain, despite notable losses in personnel and equipment. Reports suggest a decrease in the number of vehicles employed in assaults, yet the persisting shelling and assaults raise concerns. Russians appear to be making small but incremental progress toward Stepove, even in the face of significant losses in vehicles and personnel.
This advancement could potentially create a dangerous situation, as a foothold in Stepove may enable them to sever the remaining logistical routes to Avdiivka.
While Ukraine has a good chance to repel Russian advances, it would be both unrealistic and naive to claim that the Russians capturing Stepove is an entirely impossible scenario. Ultimately, if the Russians are unable to achieve success, this operation could become one of their most costly campaigns in the second half of 2023.
Rare confirmation of an FSB Special Purpose Center KIA in Ukraine. Major Evgeny Grebenkin served with the FSB Special Purpose Center's Alfa unit and was reportedly killed on July 6, 2023.
What looks like a significant development in the Black Sea was reported by the Ukrainian Operational Command South today.
Russian aviation has reportedly dropped 4 probable bottom mines and this seems to have halted traffic to/from Odessa today.
1/22 Daily Ukrainemap thread for Wed 25th October 2023
Highlights: Heavy FPV drone compilations from Ukraine near Kherson and Bakhmut
Russian flag raised on waste heap near Avdiivka. Assaults continue
Kherson east bank landings continue
Russia is also innovating. They are scaling up production of FPV and Lancet loitering munitions, UMPK glide bombs, Orlan-30 UAVs, Krasnopol laser-guided artillery rounds, and other systems. They are modernizing many of these systems as well.
Despite Russia’s official rejection of recent reports, it is almost certain that North Korean munitions have now reached ammunition depots in western Russia. These depots support Russian military operations in Ukraine. (1/4)
If North Korea sustains the recent scale and pace of military-related shipments (more than 1,000 containers over the last several weeks), it will be on course to become one of Russia’s most significant foreign arms suppliers, alongside Iran and Belarus. (2/4)
It is currently unclear what Russia has agreed to provide North Korea in return. It is unlikely the full package has been finalised; it was highly likely one of the primary discussion topics during recent senior level Russian visits to North Korea. (3/4)
It will likely include a mixture of financial compensation, other economic support, the provision of military technology, and cooperation on other high technology areas, such as space. (4/4)
The European Union is falling behind on plans to provide Ukraine with a million artillery shells by March, people familiar with the matter said, potentially giving Russian forces an advantage in the supply of ammunition.
Under plans made earlier this year, the EU pledged to provide the artillery ammunition rounds to Ukraine over a 12-month period, first by dipping into existing stocks and then through joint procurement contracts and increasing industrial capacity.
With more than half of that time now gone, the initiative has so far delivered about 30% of the target and, based on the volume of contracts signed to date, risks missing its goal, according to people and documents seen by Bloomberg News. Several member states have privately asked the bloc’s foreign policy arm to extend their deadline, the people added.
The US — which is aiming to increase its own production to about 1 million shells per year in 2024 — has urged the EU to step up its efforts, the people said. White House spokespeople declined to comment.
With Ukraine’s counteroffensive making limited progress and allies bracing for a long war, the ammunition supplies pledged by the EU are critical for helping Ukraine keep pace with Russia’s production. Some estimates see Russian plants delivering 2 million rounds next year, while Moscow has also received supplies from North Korea and continues to shop around for Soviet-era shells.
Allies had been hoping that their combined support would match Russia in volume and that Kyiv would have the upper hand thanks to the superior standards of western shells and weapons, one of the people said. The people asked not to be identified discussing their concerns about military supplies.
Ukraine aims to produce tens of thousands of drones every month by year-end as it ramps up its defence industry output despite the challenge posed by Russian attacks, the minister for strategic industries said on Wednesday.
Speaking at a NATO Industry Forum in Stockholm, Oleksandr Kamyshin, the minister who oversees Ukraine's defence industry, did not disclose detailed current drone production figures, but put the number in the thousands per month.
"By the end of this year, it would be dozens of thousands a month. And that's something we grow even faster than conventional warfare ammunition and warfare weapons," he said.
Facing depleting Western weapons warehouses as the war drags on, Ukraine wants to boost local production of different military equipment and munitions in order to secure stable and faster supplies. Russia's regular drone and missile strikes across the country are an additional challenge to that.
"Speaking about shells, for instance, we produce times more now than for the whole (of) last year," Kamyshin said.
"We found a model of how it can be working even under shelling," he added, giving no further details.
Ukrainian officials hope cooperation with Western arms producers can also help revive the domestic arms industry and create an additional boost for the economy.
Kamyshin said he had recently seen a "new wave of interest" in his country from Western defense industry companies. Ukraine on Tuesday announced that it had registered a joint venture with German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall.
"It's a positive wave, it shows more interest, and I am sure that interest will lead us to new joint ventures, new local production facilities," the minister said.
Ukraine’s soldiers have received praise for their acts of valour on the battlefield, where they are locked in a David-versus-Goliath fight against the much larger and more powerful Russian army. But Ukraine’s doctors, nurses and paramedics are no less important, as they wage a daily battle of their own to save the lives of their country’s defenders.
“This is the second frontline,” said army surgeon Bohdan at a different stabilisation point in Pokrovske, a town about 25 miles north of the main focus of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the southern Zaporizhzhia region.
More than 20 months into the intense all-out war, Ukraine’s medics are in constant need of crucial supplies. Over a dozen combat medics interviewed since the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in May expressed frustration that defective medical equipment and a lack of medical training was costing soldiers’ lives.
The conflict’s grinding nature is evidenced by a steady flow of wounded troops to stabilisation points, including five facilities visited by the FT in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Between 30 to 80 wounded Ukrainian soldiers pass through each facility every day, medics say. But when the fighting spikes, it is not unusual for the rate to increase to 150 a day.
Alina Bilous, a combat medic in Pokrovske, said she saw a three-fold increase in wounded soldiers after the counteroffensive began in late May. She and the other medics there have since been working “24 hours a day, seven days a week”. They sleep in cots down the hall from the operating tables and bloodstained stretchers, with a pungent metallic smell mixed with the stinging odour of antiseptic hanging in the air.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces made further marginal advances west of Robotyne.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also achieved unspecified partial success west of Verbove (9km west of Robotyne).[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on October 24 that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[3]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a fall-winter Russian strike campaign against Ukraine after another series of Russian drone strikes on the night of October 24 to 25. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed a total of 11 Russian Shahed-131/136 drones over Khmelnytskyi and Mykolaiv oblasts.[4] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is preparing to defend against a Russian fall-winter strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and suggested that Ukraine is planning for its own strikes on Russian military assets in turn.[5] Zelensky stated that the Russian military is aware of Ukraine’s intentions to strike Russian military infrastructure in Crimea and Russia and is moving the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) away from Crimea and Russian aircraft further from the Russia-Ukraine border, likely in response to continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian naval and aviation assets.[6]
Russia is executing soldiers who try to retreat from a bloody offensive in eastern Ukraine, the White House has said.
According to the US, some of the casualties suffered by Russia near Avdiivka were "on the orders of their own leaders".
Russian and Ukrainian troops have been locked into a fierce battle for the frontline town since mid-October.
Russia is thought to have suffered "significant" losses in this time.
Ukrainian estimates put the number of Russian casualties in Avdiivka at 5,000, while the US says that Russia lost "at least" 125 armoured vehicles and more than a battalion's worth of equipment.
A Ukrainian army spokesperson said that Russian troops were refusing to attack Ukrainian positions near Avdiivka because of heavy losses and that there had been mutinies in some units.
"Russia's mobilised forces remain under-trained, under-equipped and unprepared for combat, as was the case during their failed winter offensive last year," National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said in a briefing on Thursday.
He said that the Russian military "appears to be using what we would call 'human wave' tactics, just throwing masses of these poorly trained soldiers right into the fight."
"No proper equipment, no leadership, no resourcing, no support. It is unsurprising that Russian forces are suffering from poor morale," Mr Kirby added.
Import records confirm that Ukraine acquired Turkish-made cluster munitions in July, confirming earlier visual evidence and reporting that the war-torn country has a second source for the controversial weapons.
Eighteen shipments of M483A1 cluster munitions shells labeled as Turkish in origin arrived in Ukraine on July 31, according to Ukrainian documents gathered by Import Genius, an aggregator of trade data. Each 155mm shell contains 88 submunitions designed to inflict casualties across a wider area than standard artillery ammunition.
That’s just a few weeks after Ukraine began receiving similar weapons from the United States, whose Biden administration had recently dropped its resistance to Kyiv’s requests for them. Such weapons had already been used by both sides since the Russian invasion. They are widely banned, although not in the United States.
Russian drone strikes near a nuclear power plant in western Ukraine this week have revived anxiety among Ukrainian officials and civilians over one of the most oppressive hardships of the war: a winter assault on their nation’s energy grid.
The strikes on Wednesday, which landed near the Khmelnytsky nuclear facility, drew an angry response from President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, who said it was “highly likely” that the power plant was the target. They also prompted another warning from the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency about the precarious nuclear safety situation in Ukraine.
Mr. Zelensky vowed on Wednesday night that Ukraine would hit back at targets inside Russia if Moscow tried once again to plunge his nation into cold and darkness.
A year ago, Russia destroyed roughly 61 percent of Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity, while also targeting its water supply and internet access. Many civilians resorted to candles to light homes and bathed using buckets. The absence of cellphone power and elevators in apartments that stopped working proved an additional challenge.
The Kyiv School of Economics estimated in early September that the cost of direct damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was more than $8.8 billion so far.
Petro Kotin, the head of Ukraine’s nuclear energy utility, Energoatom, said that the defenses around the country’s nuclear facilities were constantly being improved.
“This is a task for our military and their special anti-drone equipment,” he told journalists during a tour of the Khmelnytsky plant in September.
It is one of three working nuclear power plants under the government’s control, which together provide roughly half of the nation’s power.
Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency, said that it had experts at the Khmelnytsky plant when air raid alarms sounded at 1:26 a.m. Wednesday, followed by two loud explosions.
One drone was shot down about three miles from the plant and another about 12 miles away, the agency reported.
They were part of a swarm of 11 drones that targeted the area, Ukrainian officials said. While they were all shot down, at least 20 people were injured and scores of homes and business were damaged by falling debris, Ukrainian officials said.
Yuriy Ihnat, a spokesman for Ukraine’s air force, said it was impossible to say for sure if the nuclear power plant was the main target of the attack since the drones were shot down. However, he said, Russia targeted the power lines linking nuclear power plants to the grid last year and it was likely they would employ a similar strategy this year.
“It is clear that Russia may focus attacks exactly where it did last year, so every assistance package, every system that is provided to Ukraine, even if it is an older one” is essential, Mr. Ihnat said.
There was no direct impact from this week’s drone attack at the plant and the blasts did not affect its operations or its connection to the national electricity grid, the U.N. agency reported.
The shock waves damaged the windows of several buildings at the site, including the passageway to the reactor buildings and the training center, the agency reported. Two of the plant’s 11 off-site radiation monitoring stations were briefly knocked offline.
“The fact that numerous windows at the site were destroyed shows just how close it was,” Mr. Grossi said. “Next time, we may not be so fortunate.”
(1 of 4)
The Russian Airforce’s Long Range Aviation fleet (LRA) of heavy bombers has not conducted air launched cruise missile strikes into Ukraine for over a month, one of the longest gaps in such strikes since the conflict began.
(2 of 4)
While Russia is still able to utilise other strike capabilities, the LRA had been the primary method for conducting stand-off precision strikes.
(3 of 4)
Russia almost certainly needed to reduce the frequency of its strikes to replenish its diminishing stockpile of AS-23a KODIAK cruise missiles.
(4 of 4)
Russia will likely use any recently produced inventory LRA munitions to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the winter. Russia will highly likely continue to supplement any such campaign with Iranian-designed one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks.
Oleg Tsaryov, a former Ukrainian lawmaker who joined the Russian side in 2014 and was touted as a potential replacement to Zelensky if Russia had seized Kyiv last year, is reported to be in critical condition after an assassination attempt in Yalta, Crimea.
Oleg Tsaryov has been shot and is in critical condition in Crimea, according to Russian reports. A former member of Ukraine's parliament for Yanukovych's Party of Regions, Tsaryov was one of Russia's early Novorossiya puppets in eastern Ukraine back in 2014 and is wanted by Kyiv.
Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered 5,000 personnel killed and wounded and 400 armored vehicles losses near Avdiivka and Marinka (southwest of Donetsk City) since October 10.[1] Satellite imagery has confirmed that the Russian military has lost at least 109 military vehicles, primarily armored fighting vehicles and tanks, near Avdiivika between October 10 and 20.[2] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that Russian forces appear to be using fewer armored vehicles near Avdiivka, although Russian forces may be regrouping for renewed large mechanized assaults as they did between the initial mechanized assaults on October 10 and a second series of large mechanized assaults on October 19 and 20.[3] The Russian command has funneled additional forces to the Avdiivka front to offset heavy manpower losses and maintain the Russian military’s ability to sustain its ongoing offensive effort.[4]
The Russian command will likely struggle to offset Russian equipment losses, particularly in armored vehicles, however. Widespread Russian equipment losses and shortages in the first year of the full-scale invasion heavily restricted Russia’s ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare during the Russian military's winter-spring 2023 offensive, contributing to further losses in disorderly mechanized assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in January and February 2023.[5] Heavy losses around Vuhledar likely prevented the Russian command from committing to sustained mechanized assaults elsewhere in Ukraine later in the winter-spring 2023 offensive.[6] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka appear to be much larger than earlier equipment losses around Vuhledar. It remains unclear if the prospect of further heavy equipment losses will deter the Russian command from launching another series of large, mechanized assaults near Avdiivka. Russia has gradually mobilized elements of its defense industrial base (DIB) to address equipment shortages but has not done so at a scale remotely sufficient to offset the cumulative Russian equipment losses in Ukraine.[7] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely lead to even more pronounced Russian equipment shortages and setbacks for any progress that the Russian military has made in addressing degraded mechanized maneuver warfare capabilities.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced north of Pidstepne (15km east of Kherson City).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9]
Week 86.
Markarova's comments came earlier today during a question and answer session at the 2023 Military Reporters and Editors conference in Washington, D.C. Interestingly, she also specifically talked about the value and limits of longer-range ATACMS variants able to hit targets up to 186 miles (300 kilometers), which Ukrainian forces are not understood to have received. U.S. officials told various outlets last week that only versions with shorter 102-mile (165-kilometer) ranges had been sent to Ukraine so far.
"It's not even long-range, right? Even the 300 kilometers [range variant] is not really a long range [weapon] from the military standpoint," she said. "But [we need] longer range capability so that we can actually reach everywhere on our territory, that we can not only prepare the battlefield, but we can actually change the situation."
"We need to threaten all the logistical channels of [the] Russians," Markarova continued. "We need to put all of their ammo dumps and helicopters and everything they have there [at risk]."
The Ukrainian Ambassador's comments come just a day after Myroslava Gongadze. VOA's Eastern Europe Chief, wrote on X, formerly Twitter, that a senior Ukrainian military official told her that the country's foreign partners would start supplying unspecified missiles with a 300-kilometer range starting in January 2024. The clear assumption here is that this is a reference to longer-range ATACMS variants.
#Avdiivka offensive equipment loss numbers as of 27 October 2023.
In summary: 157 RU losses vs. 8 UA losses
Note that I pushed the start date of the offensive from 2023-10-10 to 2023-10-09 due to fighting around Novomykhailivka on the 9th.
#Zaporizhzhia counter-offensive equipment loss numbers as of 27 October 2023.
In summary:
492 UA losses vs. 557 RU losses
Total losses minus drones and trucks:
460 UA losses vs 458 RU losses
Col. Tarmo Kundla, head of the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) General Staff's ops department, said that Russia is currently looking to gain the initiative on the ground in Ukraine in order to have some form of success to present domestically. This, in his view, is important for Vladimir Putin in the run-up to next year's Russian presidential elections and also for Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, who aims to consolidate his own position.
"The armed forces of the Russian Federation have continued, as in previous weeks, with their intensified attacks in the direction of Avdiivka-Marinka and Kupiansk-Lyman. It is likely that the main objective for the Russian Armed Forces at the moment is to regain the initiative and to formalize some form of success in order to present it to the [Russian] public as a victory," Kundla said at an Estonian Ministry of Defense press conference on Friday.
In Col. Kundla's view, there are two major reasons for this.
"First, creating a successful military image is important for Putin in light of next year's presidential elections. However, it is also necessary for Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu to secure his position in the ministry," Kundla noted.
"And second, seizing the initiative is important for the Russian Armed Forces in order to stop the Ukrainian counter-attack in the south, more specifically in the direction of Luhansk," he added.
Kundla said, that at a tactical level, the Russian forces' goal is to gain control of the important Zherebets and Oskil river crossings before the road conditions deteriorate further. According to Col. Kundla, The town of Avdiivka itself is important for controlling the road network around Donetsk and extending the Donetsk city buffer zone.
He explained that Ukraine will continue with the raids it has been conducting in Kherson with the possibility of building a bridgehead. "It is likely that their aim is to tie up the Russian Federation Armed Forces there. And isolated bits of information indicate that some units have been brought in by Russia, so things are probably going according to plan [for Ukraine]," Kundla said.
He also added, that Ukrainian units have continued to attack the areas around Robotyne and Bakhmut, making some progress, though nothing significant.
A third factor Kundla highlighted was the Ukrainian attacks on Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, which aim to prevent the use of the naval base.
"Overall, in terms of the bigger picture, the war of attrition continues. On the front line, there is a stalemate, and it can still be expected that neither side will be able to achieve decisive progress in the foreseeable future, as both side's forces are quite similar. It is very difficult to say which side currently holds the initiative. Who takes the initiative now will depend very much on whether Russia succeeds in attacking Avdiivka and how the Ukrainian offensive in the south develops," Kundla said.
Agree with the non-political statement but doesn't the bolded imply political comments?Putin's War, Week 87. The Battlefield Shifts to Washington and Brussels
Reminder - if you're going to comment on this article, steer clear of the Republican-Democrat stuff. But most of this article is excellent analysis of the situation on the ground - feel free to comment on that
(1/4) Over the last week, heavy but inconclusive fighting has continued around the Donetsk Oblast town of Avdiivka, where Russia initiated a major offensive effort in mid-October 2023.
(2/4) Russia has probably committed elements of up to eight brigades to the sector. These elements have likely suffered some of Russia’s highest casualty rates of 2023 so far.
(3/4) Russian nationalist ‘mil bloggers’ have been harshly critical of the military’s tactics in the operation. The nature of the operation suggests that Russia’s core military-political challenge remains the same as it has throughout most of the war.
(4/4) Political leaders demand more territory to be seized but the military cannot generate effective operational level offensive action.
In response to ferocious Russian attacks, Ukraine in recent days has redeployed battalions from at least one brigade on the southern front to Avdiivka — a sign that Kyiv is drawing on resources that otherwise might be focused on its counteroffensive to oust Russian occupiers.
Avdiivka has been a target since Russia began fomenting war in Ukraine in 2014, and arguably has more strategic value than Bakhmut, which Russia seized in May.
Over the past decade, Russian forces have repeatedly tried to encircle the city. Capturing Avdiivka could open up a 30 to 40 mile stretch of the front line and could create a gateway from occupied Donetsk to other cities, like Kostiantynivka to the north, which are key to Putin’s goal of conquering the entire Donetsk region.
The head of Avdiivka’s military administration, Vitalii Barabash, said that Russia’s recent attacks were unlike anything he had seen in nearly a decade of fighting, with Moscow deploying huge numbers of personnel and equipment.
The last road to Avdiivka from Ukrainian-held territory cuts past a high tree line before veering off to the south at the entrance to the city’s giant Coke and Chemical Plant. Once the economic heart of Avdiivka, which had a prewar population of 32,000, the plant is now smashed and deserted.
On Tuesday, Avdiivka felt like it was at the eye of a storm. Outgoing artillery thundered every few minutes, as Ukraine pounded the northeast periphery of the city, trying to halt the Russian advance.
“Today it’s a bit quieter,” Barabash said. “We can see that their military is reinforcing their positions. We believe there will be a third wave in their offensive soon.”
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and six Shahed-131/136 drones from the near Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five Shaheds over Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on October 27 that Russian forces launched over 500 Shaheds targeting critical infrastructure and military facilities in Ukraine in September 2023.[4] Ihnat also stated that the composite materials for the fuselage of modernized Shaheds make them harder to detect and that weather conditions do not affect Russian Shahed operations.[5]
For the site, yes. But most of the time this guy's content is non-political, at least for the Ukraine war. When he leads off with mostly political stuff I don't link it.Agree with the non-political statement but doesn't the bolded imply political comments?Putin's War, Week 87. The Battlefield Shifts to Washington and Brussels
Reminder - if you're going to comment on this article, steer clear of the Republican-Democrat stuff. But most of this article is excellent analysis of the situation on the ground - feel free to comment on that
Western defense officials worry that with Israel going to war as the West battles Russia by proxy in Ukraine, there won’t be enough artillery shells and other weapons to keep both allies in the fight.
The issue is concerning NATO planners even though Israel isn’t a member of the alliance and few European countries supply it with military equipment.
But the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its European members are deeply invested in supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion, and the prospect of two hot wars potentially consuming arms and equipment from the same stockpiles or supply chains is starting to worry officials.
“Of course” there are concerns about competition for military resources because of limited production capacity, said Göran Mårtensson, director general of the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration, which handles procurement for the country’s defense ministry. “There will be more need for that limited production capacity in Europe and the U.S.”
Since Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine roughly 20 months ago, defense contractors across the West have geared up production, but output remains below the volumes of ammunition and equipment being spent on Ukraine’s battlefields.
NATO members’ defense industries lack sufficient spare capacity to react to crises like now, alliance Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told the forum. “We need more of that to ensure that we have the production when we need it.”
Most companies are producing as much as they can within their existing production facilities and the next step would be new investments, said Esa Rautalinko, chief executive of Finnish armaments group Patria. Bringing new facilities online can take from two to five years, he said.
With demand increasing faster than production, prices of some supplies have soared. NATO-standard 155-millimeter artillery shells, one of the West’s most basic armaments, had cost governments about $2,100 apiece before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, said Dutch Admiral Rob Bauer, Stoltenberg’s top military adviser, at the NATO forum.
The price of those shells, which Bauer dubbed “one of the most coveted objects in the world right now,” has increased fourfold, to about $8,400, he said.
Politicians have called on defense companies to expand capacity and accelerate output.
“If I were the industry, I would read the room and increase production,” said Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, in Brussels.
Industry officials say they need assurances that demand won’t drop at the cessation of hostilities, undercutting companies’ investments, as has happened in the past.
“Both sides need to loosen the mutually destructive chokehold and stop waiting for the other to move first,” Bauer said.
The U.S. has begun moving in recent months by pumping billions of dollars into retooled factories to produce more rockets, missiles, shells and rocket motors. It has issued almost $25 billion in contracts to arm Ukraine and replenish U.S. stocks.
Bill LaPlante, the Defense Department’s acquisition chief, has called in recent weeks for European countries to sign more contracts to encourage industry.
European governments have placed some orders, but not on the Pentagon’s scale. The European Union in the spring pledged to provide Ukraine with one million artillery shells within one year, but is behind on that target, Kallas said.
Sweden and three other Nordic countries earlier this month announced a rare multicountry order for 155mm shells for Kyiv, valued at roughly $54 million. At the prices NATO’s Bauer cited, that would deliver fewer than 7,000 rounds.
Mårtensson at the Swedish procurement agency, which led the order, said it could expand or add countries.
European governments’ call for industry to shoulder investment responsibility before signing contracts is misguided, Patria’s Rautalinko said. “We can’t do that without a vision of long-term demand—this isn’t retail,” he said.
Adding to uncertainty, he said, pressure from the Middle East conflict hasn’t yet filtered through to Europe’s defense-industry debates. Europeans might see the fight as more of an issue for Israel and the U.S., he said, but that would be a mistake.
“Everything is connected,” he said. “If Israel is helped out from the U.S. stockpiles, that’s taken away from something.”
Different armaments are being used in the two conflicts so far, but that could change if hostilities spread around Israel.
General Dynamics said it has been able to boost production of artillery shells and other munitions faster than expected, boosted by Pentagon investment in new facilities. The company is targeting annual production of one million shells, a fivefold increase.
With American weapons and western attention suddenly swinging towards the Middle East, Russia has poured more men and equipment into some ferocious assaults in northeast Donbas, towards Kupiansk; in southeast Donbas, at Avdiivka; and in Zaporizhzhia, north of Tokmak, to halt Ukrainian progress southwards.
What’s more, last week Moscow seemed to be digging into the stockpile of missiles it has been conserving. It looks as if Russia’s winter air offensive is under way, targeting civilian infrastructure for the second year running.
Avdiivka is becoming another Bakhmut. Except that Bakhmut had no real strategic importance. It was a symbol the Wagner mercenaries wanted to create for themselves. But Avdiivka does have genuine strategic value: it is on a key route into the city of Donetsk, as close to the airport as it is to the northern suburbs of the city.
The road system makes Avdiivka the gateway to southern Donbas. The Ukrainians have held it against Russian pressure since last year. It is Kyiv’s route to victory in that sector. If they lose Avdiivka now, they will be locked out of the south, and most of what they have achieved in the Donbas further north will count for little. Ukraine’s 1st Tank Brigade has been brought in to defend Avdiivka, while parts of the hard-fighting 47th Mechanised Brigade have been pulled out of the main southerly thrust from Zaporizhzhia and sent east to help defend the city. Fierce battles have been going on for control of the coke and chemicals plant on Avdiivka’s northern flank and the sand quarry at the village of Opytne on the southern flank. These two miserable industrial sites really matter.
No wonder Kyiv appears to be deeply worried. According to rumours among security sources in Ukraine, the military commander Valery Zaluzhny argues that the Ukrainian offensive is almost over, that they must hold what they have got and prepare for operations next year. But President Zelensky does not agree, or will not admit it, because of the perception in the West that his war for Ukraine’s survival seems to have reached a stalemate. He knows that western patience is limited for his maximalist demands that Ukraine must recover all territory invaded by Russia since 2014, and Kyiv is deeply frustrated not to show more progress in its much-vaunted summer offensive. Kyiv well understands the political impact in the West of any appearance of stalemate. In truth, the events of the summer are both better and worse than that, but Ukrainian leaders are far from certain that western politicians or their public will grasp that.
Ukraine’s situation is better than stalemate because they are inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces in their recent attacks. In ten days from October 10, Russia’s visually verified vehicle losses in Avdiivka were 109 — comprising tanks, fighting vehicles and support units, more than a full brigade’s worth. In the past week its losses have not diminished, and Russian personnel losses are running at several hundred a day. The Russians are still operating human-wave attacks with their convicts or inexperienced troops.
Ukraine is also inflicting heavy losses south of Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukraine has been trying to break through to Tokmak and open the route to the coast, splitting Russian forces in two. That now looks unlikely, but the Russians have used up their reserves in holding on north of Tokmak. They are certainly stretched and Kyiv may still be hoping that Russian defences will prove brittle in the rear areas if only they can break through more of the forward defence lines. Ukraine has also been very successful in degrading Russian forces in the rear areas with its western-supplied “deep-strike” precision missiles and artillery. They have created conditions that will make it difficult for Russian forces to settle safely into winter quarters.
The Ukrainians will certainly keep fighting, particularly when the wet weather gives way to freezing ground and heavy vehicles can disperse off the roads again. If Kyiv can cope with current Russian pressure in the Donbas, then the immediate strategic prize — not far away now — is to get within easy missile and artillery range of Crimea. This would make it too dangerous for the Russians to use Crimea as a military hub, feeding troops and airpower into the battlefields of Ukraine. It would make it an unenviable home for the 800,000 Russians who have moved in since 2014, and it would be a major setback for Putin to see the pride and joy of his “Novorossiya” under such threat. With only two slender land routes connecting Crimea to the rest of Ukraine and one vulnerable bridge over the Kerch Strait linking it to Russia, Crimea is inherently vulnerable if the Ukrainians get much closer to it.
For their part, Russian forces have certainly learnt some lessons at a tactical level after 20 months of war. They combine their forces better than they did; they use air power much more efficiently and they protect their logistics more carefully. But at the operational level, Russian high command still throws one unit after another into the front line. It has no operational reserve and keeps piling barely trained, badly equipped troops into the boots of the dead in the belief that enough of the survivors will eventually break through.
In response to its losses, the Kremlin is making major efforts to get Russia’s ethnic minorities into uniform and has geared up for a full war economy. But that economy is stalling. After a production spike until the second quarter of 2023, its armaments industries have reached a plateau, short of components, workers and skills. Even the biggest producers, such as the UralVagonZavod tank factory, the United Aircraft Corporation and the United Engine Corporation, are rumoured to be operating at about 70 per cent of their March 2023 capacity. They struggle to maintain a three-shift production cycle. The fact is, Russia is probably unable to mount another full strategic offensive in Ukraine until spring 2025 at the earliest — unless Kyiv folds before then, or Ukraine’s western allies effectively withdraw their material support.
That also makes the current situation worse than a stalemate for the Ukrainians: this is now a war of attrition, of the sort western powers have not seen since the world wars of the last century. Wars of attrition are ultimately won by the side that can best gear up its industries and apply its productive capacity directly to the battlefield — from high-tech cyber systems down to bullets, boots and “meals ready to eat”.
The Russians can — eventually — do this for themselves. The Ukrainians can do some of this for themselves and are gearing up for a high-production arms industry in the future. But they can only match Russia in any real war of attrition with western support, particularly next year when Russia will be heavily dependent on what it can squeeze from North Korea, Iran and China.
Western leaders naturally recoil from the idea that the struggle between crude Russian imperialism and liberal democracy can be won only in an attritional way. They want to see Ukrainian forces achieve the sort of battlefield victories western forces enjoyed at times over the past 70 years, such as in the Falklands or the first Gulf War in 1991. But this summer indicates that it is unlikely to go that way. Kyiv is fearful that what happens at a coke and chemical plant or a sand quarry near Avdiivka may convince western observers, when they glance back from the Middle East, that an attritional war has begun. They fear that the West’s nerve will fail and 2024 will become Ukraine’s toughest test yet.
Drones continue to play a huge role on the battlefield in Ukraine, ETV news show "Aktuaalne kaamera" (AK) reports from the Southern front in Zaporizhzhia oblast.
The AK team, comprising Anton Aleksejev and camera operator Kristjan Svirgsden, visited Ukrainian personnel who, after several weeks, were able to drive Russian forces from their own dug in positions.
On soldier, nicknamed "Gray-head", said: "Given we have breached their first and second lines and are already reaching their third, then in fact they are already retreating to well-prepared positions. So each of their second or third lines might as well be the first line of defense. The closer to the Surovikin line, the better their positions are protected."
The Surovikin Line is a complex set of fortifications in Southeastern Ukraine named after a present-day Russian general.
On this section of the front, drones have proven at least as effective a mode of attack as artillery, in part due to their relatively inexpensive price.
Another Ukrainian, "Geko," says: "We're still working on this attack drone aspect. We're still learning, though we've already hit a couple of targets."
"Dark," another Ukrainian, tells ERR that: "Our attack drone unit can neutralize both personnel and equipment. Drones are much cheaper than using artillery, too. A single shell costs somewhere around $2,000-$3,000, while one drone costs $500 or $600."
Aleksejev and Svirgsden report feeling that drones can indeed prove quite a terrifying weapon just half an hour later, as their small group crosses a clearing.
This made them the perfect target for a drone operated by the enemy, which on targeting them meant the quickly had to take cover under some nearby vegetation.
A Ukrainian soldier nicknamed "Spider" evacuated the group from the area in his car, despite the danger.
This method of transport is quite common on the front line, with volunteers lending their own vehicles or even selling them to the soldiers, who have to pay for them out of their own pocket.
There is a high turnover too. "Spider" says that of over a dozen vehicles he has brought to the area, only three or four remain, the rest having been taken out by drone strikes or artillery.
In nearby positions, Ukrainian forces were busy tackling incoming drones, even as they lacked the jamming tech which would have made this more straightforward.
"They have far more [drones], in industrial quantities. We can't compete with that yet,""Geko" says.
While the Russians have pulled back, they have not left the area. A village a few kilometers away has been razed to the ground by the invaders, but the Ukrainian soldiers counsel against going anywhere near there – putting the return rate of journalists who do venture there at around 20 percent.
The original AK segment (in Estonian, Ukrainian and Russian) is here.
According to some reports, Russian losses in the face of Ukrainian advances in Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast, have been among its highest of this year and may amount to as much as a brigade equivalent.
Russian milbloggers claimed on October 29 that Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Colonel General Oleg Makarevich as the commander of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces operating in the Kherson direction. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not announced or confirmed reports of Makarevich’s dismissal at the time of this publication and is unlikely to do so given its tendency to regularly conceal high-profile military command changes.[24] One Russian blogger claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Makarevich during his recent visit to the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on October 19.[25] The blogger also claimed that Teplinsky was effectively demoted from his position as deputy overall theater commander, although it is unclear if Teplinsky still held this position.[26] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that rumors about Makarevich’s dismissal emerged over the last week and that his removal was “long overdue” due to his handling of the military situation in the Kherson direction.[27] The milblogger added that Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Colonel General Alexei Kim effectively commands the entire Joint Grouping of Russian Forces in Ukraine.[28] ISW cannot independently verify these claims.
Makarevich’s reported dismissal indicates that the Kremlin or the Russian military command may be sufficiently worried and skeptical of his ability to repel recent larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that a small Ukrainian “bridgehead” in Krynky (a settlement on east bank Kherson Oblast) likely triggered Makarevich’s removal.[29] Other Russian milbloggers reiterated similar theories, claiming that Makarevich’s negligence and extreme lack of command initiative enabled repeated Ukrainian landings on east bank Kherson Oblast.[30] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian “bridgeheads” on east bank Kherson Oblast are setting a dangerous precedent and that Russian forces under Makarevich’s command were unable to adequately counter and respond to Ukrainian threats.[31]
Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut amid continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 29. Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced over the railway line south of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations south of Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[37] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces established control over unspecified positions in the Zaporizhia direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast) over the past week.[38]
The Russian information space continues to debate the future of the Wagner Group’s remaining personnel. Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers claimed on October 28 that the Wagner Group is officially a detachment of Rosgvardia and will retain its structures and commanders.[50] The milbloggers claimed that Rosgvardia is encouraging active and reserve Wagner personnel to sign contracts with Rosgvardia, including six-month contracts for service in Ukraine or nine-month contracts for service in Belarus, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. A smaller group of Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers denied recent reports that large groups of former Wagner personnel are joining Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz units in Russia or the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) Expeditionary Force in Syria.[51] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on October 29 claiming to show “Akhmat” Commander Apty Alaudinov and Russian State Duma Deputy Nikolai Brykin welcoming 170 former Wagner fighters to “Akhmat” units.[52]
(1/5) A Russian state-backed private military company (PMC) is specifically attempting to recruit women into combat roles in Ukraine for the first time.
(2/5) Recent social media adverts have appealed for female recruits to join Borz Battalion, a part of Russian PMC Redut, to work as snipers and uncrewed aerial vehicle operators. Redut is likely directly sponsored by the Russian Main Directorate of Intelligence.
(3/5) In March 2023, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 1,100 women were deployed in Ukraine, which would equate to only around 0.3 per cent of its force. As Redut’s advert points out, they currently serve in mostly medical support and food service roles.
(4/5) It remains unclear whether official Russian defence forces will seek to follow suit and open more combat roles to women.
(5/5) Women have rarely taken front line fighting roles within pro-Russian forces during the current conflict; however, there was a strong tradition of female snipers and other combat troops in Soviet forces during the Second World War.
Ukraine’s army said it had overnight “successfully hit” part of Russia’s air defence system located in annexed Crimea, Agence France-Presse reports.
“The armed forces successfully hit a strategic object of the air defence system on the western coast of occupied Crimea,” the army’s strategic communications unit said on social media. It gave no further details and Russia gave no official comment.
But the influential Rybar Telegram channel – which is close to the Russian army – alleged Ukraine had launched two US ATACMS missiles that fell near the village of Olenivka, on the western coast of Crimea.
Rybar said Russian forces were not able to down the missiles “but thanks to measures taken earlier there was no serious damage”.
The social media account alleged that “half an hour later” Black Sea fleet sailors found three Ukrainian naval drones near Sevastopol.
Rybar said one of them was “destroyed”, while another two tried to enter the Bay of Khersones before being shot at and sunk by Russian forces.
These claims are yet to be independently verified.
Russia has significantly bulked up its forces around the devastated Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, with its soldiers switching from a defensive posture to taking “active actions”, a Ukrainian military commander has said.
Russia captured Bakhmut, the scene of some of the bloodiest fighting of the 20-month war, in May. Ukraine has been on the counteroffensive since June to try to retake occupied land in the south and east, including the town.
“In the Bakhmut area, the enemy has significantly strengthened its grouping and switched from defence to active actions,” Gen Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the ground forces, wrote on Telegram.
He described the situation in the east as difficult, with Russian forces particularly active near the north-eastern Ukrainian-held town of Kupiansk, where he said Moscow’s troops were trying to advance simultaneously in several directions.
He said that Russian troops have suffered heavy losses, Reuters reports. These claims have not yet been independently verified.
Public support for aid to Ukraine has been in decline for months in the U.S., and Zelensky’s visit did nothing to revive it. Some 41% of Americans want Congress to provide more weapons to Kyiv, down from 65% in June, when Ukraine began a major counteroffensive, according to a Reuters survey taken shortly after Zelensky’s departure. That offensive has proceeded at an excruciating pace and with enormous losses, making it ever more difficult for Zelensky to convince partners that victory is around the corner. With the outbreak of war in Israel, even keeping the world’s attention on Ukraine has become a major challenge.
After his visit to Washington, TIME followed the President and his team back to Kyiv, hoping to understand how they would react to the signals they had received, especially the insistent calls for Zelensky to fight corruption inside his own government, and the fading enthusiasm for a war with no end in sight. On my first day in Kyiv, I asked one member of his circle how the President was feeling. The response came without a second’s hesitation: “Angry.”
The usual sparkle of his optimism, his sense of humor, his tendency to liven up a meeting in the war room with a bit of banter or a bawdy joke, none of that has survived into the second year of all-out war. “Now he walks in, gets the updates, gives the orders, and walks out,” says one longtime member of his team. Another tells me that, most of all, Zelensky feels betrayed by his Western allies. They have left him without the means to win the war, only the means to survive it.
But his convictions haven’t changed. Despite the recent setbacks on the battlefield, he does not intend to give up fighting or to sue for any kind of peace. On the contrary, his belief in Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia has hardened into a form that worries some of his advisers. It is immovable, verging on the messianic. “He deludes himself,” one of his closest aides tells me in frustration. “We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.”
Zelensky’s stubbornness, some of his aides say, has hurt their team’s efforts to come up with a new strategy, a new message. As they have debated the future of the war, one issue has remained taboo: the possibility of negotiating a peace deal with the Russians. Judging by recent surveys, most Ukrainians would reject such a move, especially if it entailed the loss of any occupied territory.
Zelensky remains dead set against even a temporary truce. “For us it would mean leaving this wound open for future generations,” the President tells me. “Maybe it will calm some people down inside our country, and outside, at least those who want to wrap things up at any price. But for me, that’s a problem, because we are left with this explosive force. We only delay its detonation.”
For now, he is intent on winning the war on Ukrainian terms, and he is shifting tactics to achieve that. Aware that the flow of Western arms could dry up over time, the Ukrainians have ramped up production of drones and missiles, which they have used to attack Russian supply routes, command centers, and ammunition depots far behind enemy lines. The Russians have responded with more bombing raids against civilians, more missile strikes against the infrastructure that Ukraine will need to heat homes and keep the lights on through the winter.
Zelensky describes it as a war of wills, and he fears that if the Russians are not stopped in Ukraine, the fighting will spread beyond its borders. “I’ve long lived with this fear,” he says. “A third world war could start in Ukraine, continue in Israel, and move on from there to Asia, and then explode somewhere else.” That was his message in Washington: Help Ukraine stop the war before it spreads, and before it’s too late. He worries his audience has stopped paying attention.
By the time Zelensky returned to Kyiv, the cold of early fall had taken hold, and his aides rushed to prepare for the second winter of the invasion. Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure have damaged power stations and parts of the electricity grid, leaving it potentially unable to meet spikes in demand when the temperature drops. Three of the senior officials in charge of dealing with this problem told me blackouts would likely be more severe this winter, and the public reaction in Ukraine would not be as forgiving. “Last year people blamed the Russians,” one of them says. “This time they’ll blame us for not doing enough to prepare.”
The cold will also make military advances more difficult, locking down the front lines at least until the spring. But Zelensky has refused to accept that. “Freezing the war, to me, means losing it,” he says. Before the winter sets in, his aides warned me to expect major changes in their military strategy and a major shake-up in the President’s team. At least one minister would need to be fired, along with a senior general in charge of the counteroffensive, they said, to ensure accountability for Ukraine’s slow progress at the front. “We’re not moving forward,” says one of Zelensky’s close aides. Some front-line commanders, he continues, have begun refusing orders to advance, even when they came directly from the office of the President. “They just want to sit in the trenches and hold the line,” he says. “But we can’t win a war that way.”
When I raised these claims with a senior military officer, he said that some commanders have little choice in second-guessing orders from the top. At one point in early October, he said, the political leadership in Kyiv demanded an operation to “retake” the city of Horlivka, a strategic outpost in eastern Ukraine that the Russians have held and fiercely defended for nearly a decade. The answer came back in the form of a question: With what? “They don’t have the men or the weapons,” says the officer. “Where are the weapons? Where is the artillery? Where are the new recruits?”
In some branches of the military, the shortage of personnel has become even more dire than the deficit in arms and ammunition. One of Zelensky’s close aides tells me that even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, “we don’t have the men to use them.”
Since the start of the invasion, Ukraine has refused to release official counts of dead and wounded. But according to U.S. and European estimates, the toll has long surpassed 100,000 on each side of the war. It has eroded the ranks of Ukraine’s armed forces so badly that draft offices have been forced to call up ever older personnel, raising the average age of a soldier in Ukraine to around 43 years. “They’re grown men now, and they aren’t that healthy to begin with,” says the close aide to Zelensky. “This is Ukraine. Not Scandinavia.”
The picture looked different at the outset of the invasion. One branch of the military, known as the Territorial Defense Forces, reported accepting 100,000 new recruits in the first 10 days of all-out war. The mass mobilization was fueled in part by the optimistic predictions of some senior officials that the war would be won in months if not weeks. “Many people thought they could sign up for a quick tour and take part in a heroic victory,” says the second member of the President’s team.
Now recruitment is way down. As conscription efforts have intensified around the country, stories are spreading on social media of draft officers pulling men off trains and buses and sending them to the front. Those with means sometimes bribe their way out of service, often by paying for a medical exemption. Such episodes of corruption within the recruitment system became so widespread by the end of the summer that on Aug. 11 Zelensky fired the heads of the draft offices in every region of the country.
The decision was intended to signal his commitment to fighting graft. But the move backfired, according to the senior military officer, as recruitment nearly ground to a halt without leadership. The fired officials also proved difficult to replace, in part because the reputation of the draft offices had been tainted. “Who wants that job?” the officer asks. “It’s like putting a sign on your back that says: corrupt.”
After extensive research and analysis of North Korean deliveries to Russia using various sources and calculations, we estimate that Russia has received around 2,000 cargo containers containing over half a million artillery shells. The article link is at the end of thisthread:
2/ This estimate, which leans toward the conservative side, suggests that the actual number likely surpasses 500,000. These artillery shells encompass predominantly both 152mm and 122mm calibers.
3/ We measured containers, identified types, gathered data on the crates, and used basic mathematical calculations to arrive at what we think is a reliable estimate. To validate our findings, we applied different approaches to calculations and arrived at nearly identical numbers
4/ We decided to explore multiple scenarios because we lack precise data on the distribution of delivered ammunition, resulting in our report containing 4 variants. Nevertheless, it's highly likely that at least 50% of the total deliveries consist of 152mm ammunition.
5/ The White House confirmed 1,000 container shipments from September to October. October 27th, satellite images show a cargo ship at Rajin port. This proves continuous shipments, extending almost a month beyond the White House's announcement of 1,000 containers in early October.
6/ The substantial ammunition supply is a concern for Ukraine, given the war's reliance on artillery. Though there were occasional shortages and decreased artillery fire, Russian forces partially retained their ammunition stocks, now augmented by North Korean deliveries.
7/ This also raises questions about whether Russia provided financial support to the cash-strapped North Korean regime or shared other military technologies, potentially affecting the security environment of the Korean peninsula.
(1/6) As reported by Russian state-backed media, the deputy commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, has likely personally taken over command of Russia’s Dnipro Grouping of Forces.
(2/6) He replaces Colonel General Oleg Makaevich. The force is responsible for the occupied areas of Kherson Oblast, including the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.
(3/6) Fighting has intensified in this area in recent weeks as Ukrainian forces have contested Russian control of the river’s eastern bank.
(4/6) Teplinsky is likely held in high regard by the Russian General Staff and has experience commanding operations in the area: he was the officer on the ground in charge of Russia’s relatively successful withdrawal from west of the Dnipro in November 2022.
(5/6) It is almost certain that repelling Ukrainian attacks across the Dnipro and holding territory in occupied Kherson Oblast remains a high priority objective for Russian forces in Ukraine.
(6/6) Teplinsky’s appointment is likely an indication of increased pressure on Russian forces defending the area.
QuickI was looking for evidence of the first claimed ATACMS strike in occupied Crimea but couldn't find any. However, what I did find were three recently constructed positions for Russian air defense systems near Chernomorske, seen on @planet satellite images.
"Both the Prigozhin mutiny and the pogroms in the North Caucasus show that no matter how brutal the Russian regime may seem, it is weak and indecisive as soon as it is confronted with any non-anti-Putin unrest." Some sharp observations by @Stanovaya.
The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered. Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Janis Sarts stated that events in Makhachkala represent some of the manifestations of the radicalization of the Russian society resulting from the war in Ukraine and the surrounding media environment.[10] Sarts stated that Russian media has been inciting hatred against Ukrainians, the West, and Israel and observed that many deceased Russian servicemen who had fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine hailed from Dagestan. A Russian milblogger similarly implied that the Kremlin’s efforts to blame the riots on foreign psychological and information operations allow Russian officials to avoid responsibility for enabling the strengthening of radical sentiments among Russian Muslim populations.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the hyper-nationalist ideologies espoused by the Kremlin as the justifications for the war are having domestic ramifications for Russia, particularly in ethnic minority communities.[12]
Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Kurdyumivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[18] Additional geolocated footage from October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced west of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions near Bakhmut and offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[20]
Russian forces continue to use “Storm-Z” assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct “meat assaults” (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training “Storm-Z” assault units for future assaults without equipment.[21] A Russian milblogger reportedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that “meat assaults” are when Russian infantry forces attack without artillery support to suppress Ukrainian firing positions.[22] The milblogger claimed that when two Russian regiments conduct ”meat assaults” side by side, the seam between the areas of responsibility of both regiments remains unsecured and vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Another Russian milblogger claimed that “Storm-Z” assault detachments in the Avdiivka direction and on Bakhmut’s southern flank are often destroyed after a few days of active operations and on average lose between 40-70 percent of their personnel.[23] The milblogger criticized the Russian military’s poor training of “Storm-Z” units and the unwillingness of superior officers to consider the proposals of “Storm-Z” commanders when assigning them combat missions. The milblogger stated that “Storm-Z” units are often introduced into battle before conducting reconnaissance or establishing connections with neighboring units and typically struggle to evacuate their wounded without artillery cover, leading to higher losses. Both milbloggers noted the lack of proper artillery support for Russian attacks and counterattacks.[24] One milblogger stated that these factors contribute to “Storm-Z” units being turned into “trash” before achieving any significant results.[25] ISW has frequently reported on the ineffectiveness of “Storm-Z” units.[26]
Top Zelenskyy Adviser Admits the Truth About Corruption in Ukraine: 'People Are Stealing Like There's No Tomorrow'
Johnathan Jones By Johnathan Jones October 31, 2023 at 6:23am
People at the highest levels of Ukraine’s government are lining their pockets with cash as U.S. taxpayers prepare to fund yet another year of that nation’s war against Russia, an adviser to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said.
Time magazine published a lengthy story on Monday about reporter Simon Shuster’s recent visit to the war-torn country in which he shared insights he said he gained into the morale of those leading Ukraine nearly two years after Russia invaded it.
According to an unnamed senior adviser to Zelenskyy, people at the top are “stealing” like there is no tomorrow and Ukraine’s president faces pressure to root out corruption as its allies continue to give the country everything it asks for.
Shuster followed Zelenskyy back to Ukraine after he and his closest advisers visited the U.S. in September.
He commented that Ukraine’s president “can feel during his travels that global interest in the war has slackened. So has the level of international support.”
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The reporter also spoke to an adviser who said that in spite of some internal housecleaning in the Zelenskyy Cabinet, theft is rampant.
“Amid all the pressure to root out corruption, I assumed, perhaps naively, that officials in Ukraine would think twice before taking a bribe or pocketing state funds,” Shuster wrote.
“But when I made this point to a top presidential adviser in early October, he asked me to turn off my audio recorder so he could speak more freely. ‘Simon, you’re mistaken,’ he says. ‘People are stealing like there’s no tomorrow.'”
If you could click a button to listen to a Western Journal article, would you use it?
While Zelenskyy fired numerous Defense Ministry officials this year to change a perception that corruption was widespread, the adviser told Shuster that people behind the corruption did not “feel any fear” about facing consequences for misusing government funds as Ukraine relies on international aid.
Shutter added, “By the time [Zelenskyy] acted ahead of his U.S. visit, ‘it was too late,’ says another senior presidential adviser. Ukraine’s Western allies were already aware of the scandal by then.
“Soldiers at the front had begun making off-color jokes about ‘Reznikov’s eggs,’ a new metaphor for corruption. ‘The reputational damage was done,’ says the adviser.”
Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov resigned in September in what Reutersreferred to as a “wartime shakeup” of Zelenskyy’s Cabinet.
Related:
FBI Had 40 Informants Relaying Information on the Biden Crime Family
Reports that people in the Ukrainian government are “stealing” come as President Joe Biden and U.S. lawmakers face pushback from taxpayers about their blank check policy toward funding a war with no end in sight.
According to CNN, Congress had approved $113 billion for Ukraine as of Sept. 21.
Lawmakers have not tracked the funds once they have been disbursed, which has sparked calls for transparency regarding exactly what U.S. taxpayers are going further into debt for.
The United States was $33.7 trillion in debt as of Tuesday, according to the U.S. Debt Clock.
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Johnathan Jones has worked as a reporter, an editor, and producer in radio, television and digital media.
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Five months into its counter-offensive, Ukraine has managed to advance by just 17 kilometres. Russia fought for ten months around Bakhmut in the east “to take a town six by six kilometres”. Sharing his first comprehensive assessment of the campaign with The Economist in an interview this week, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, says the battlefield reminds him of the great conflict of a century ago. “Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he says. The general concludes that it would take a massive technological leap to break the deadlock. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
The course of the counter-offensive has undermined Western hopes that Ukraine could use it to demonstrate that the war is unwinnable–and thus change Vladimir Putin’s calculations, forcing the Russian president to negotiate. It has also undercut General Zaluzhny’s assumption that he could stop Russia by bleeding its troops. “That was my mistake. Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war.” But not in Russia, where life is cheap and where Mr Putin’s reference points are in the first and second world wars in which Russia lost tens of millions.
An army of Ukraine’s standard ought to have been able to move at a speed of 30km a day as it breached Russian defensive lines. “If you look at NATO’s text books and at the maths which we did [in planning the counter-offensive], four months should have been enough time for us to have reached Crimea, to have fought in Crimea, to return from Crimea and to have gone back in and out again,” General Zaluzhny says sardonically. Instead he watched his troops and equipment get stuck in minefields on the approaches to Bakhmut in the east, his Western-supplied equipment getting pummelled by Russian artillery and drones. The same story unfolded on the offensive’s main thrust, in the south, where newly formed and inexperienced brigades, despite being equipped with modern Western kit, immediately ran into trouble.
“First I thought there was something wrong with our commanders, so I changed some of them. Then I thought maybe our soldiers are not fit for purpose, so I moved soldiers in some brigades,” says General Zaluzhny. When those changes failed to make a difference, the commander told his staff to dig out a book he once saw as a student in a military academy in Ukraine. Its title was “Breaching Fortified Defence Lines”. It was published in 1941 by a Soviet major-general, P. S. Smirnov, who analysed the battles of the first world war. “And before I got even halfway through it, I realised that is exactly where we are because just like then, the level of our technological development today has put both us and our enemies in a stupor.”
That thesis, he says, was borne out as he went to the front line in Avdiivka, also in the east, where Russia has recently advanced by a few hundred metres over several weeks by throwing in two of its armies. “On our monitor screens the day I was there we saw 140 Russian machines ablaze—destroyed within four hours of coming within firing range of our artillery.” Those fleeing were chased by “first-person-view” drones, remote-controlled and carrying explosive charges that their operators simply crash into the enemy. The same picture unfolds when Ukrainian troops try to advance. General Zaluzhny describes a battlefield in which modern sensors can identify any concentration of forces, and modern precision weapons can destroy it. “The simple fact is that we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing. In order for us to break this deadlock we need something new, like the gunpowder which the Chinese invented and which we are still using to kill each other,” he says.
This time, however, the decisive factor will be not a single new invention, but by combining all the technical solutions that already exist, he says. In an article written for The Economist by General Zaluzhny (see here), as well as in a full-length essay shared with the newspaper, he urges innovation in drones, electronic warfare, anti-artillery capabilities and de-mining equipment, including new robotic solutions. “We need to ride the power embedded in new technologies,” says the general.
But by holding back the supply of long-range missile systems and tanks, the West allowed Russia to regroup and build up its defences in the aftermath of a sudden breakthrough in Kharkiv region in the north and in Kherson in the south late in 2022. “These systems were most relevant to us last year, but they only arrived this year,” he says. Similarly, F-16 jets, due next year, are now less helpful, suggests the general, in part because Russia has improved its air defences: an experimental version of the S-400 missile system can reach beyond the city of Dnipro, he warns.
Yet the delay in arms deliveries, though frustrating, is not the main cause of Ukraine’s predicament, according to General Zaluzhny. “It is important to understand that this war cannot be won with the weapons of the past generation and outdated methods,” he insists. “They will inevitably lead to delay and, as a consequence, defeat.” It is, instead, technology that will be decisive, he argues. The general is enthused by recent conversations with Eric Schmidt, the former chief executive of Google, and stressed the decisive role of drones, and of electronic warfare which can prevent them from flying.
North Korea has dispatched military advisers and more than a million artillery shells to Russia, South Korea’s spy agency has briefed its parliamentarians.
Yoo Sang-bum, a politician who attended the National Intelligence Service briefing, said shipments had been under way since August and so far amounted to two months’ worth of supplies for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
The agency believes North Korea has ramped up the work of its munitions factories and is mobilising additional workers to meet Russian demand, Yoo added.
Lt. Col. Tanel Lelov, head of the air defense department of the Estonian Division Headquarters, said small drones are commonly used as they are easy to acquire.
Lelov said Russia has learned to use drones better but has had little success.
"There has certainly been progress in the use of drones on the tactical side in both directions. The Russian side has certainly started to make better use of drones on the sections of the front where the attacks are taking place, whether for observation, target identification, or even for fire control of indirect fire units. That's where they've really gotten better," he told the show.
He added that small drones are a cost-effective means of wearing down an opponent's anti-aircraft defenses. Sometimes they are so small that they do not show up on older radar systems.
Russia has also launched fewer missile attacks in recent weeks, he said. This is because the Russian forces are preparing to attack Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
"There have not been a lot of missile strikes, and at the moment, it's more of a reconnaissance of Ukraine's critical infrastructures, with a view to possibly attacking them at the beginning of the winter. The Ukrainians /..../ are fortifying these critical objects, they are defending them with different anti-aircraft weapons according to the threat assessment given to these objects. And, hopefully, these attempts by Russian troops to damage or destroy this infrastructure will fail," Lelov said.