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*** Official Russia vs. Ukraine Discussion - Invasion has begun *** (3 Viewers)


(1/5) On 09 November 2023, the Kremlin announced that President Putin will hold his traditional combined press conference and public phone-in before the end of the year.
(2/5) In 2022, the event was cancelled, probably because Russia had suffered high-profile military set-backs in Ukraine over the preceding weeks.
(3/5) Kremlin planners will almost certainly see the event as an important waypoint in Putin’s anticipated campaign to secure a fifth term in office in the March 2024 presidential elections. He is likely to announce his candidacy before the end of 2023.
(4/5) On 10 November 2023, Putin visited the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov on Don, meeting Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.
(5/5) This is Putin's second visit to the headquarters in four weeks: likely an uptick in his continued efforts to paint himself as the ‘patriotic’ candidate ahead of the election campaign.


#New (short) 🧵: @konrad_muzyka, @RALee85, @KofmanMichael, & I just returned from another research trip in Ukraine. We gained lots of new insights into the current state of war some of which we will share publicly. Here are a few quick thoughts.
1. Morale remains high, but exhaustion among troops and impact on attrition on materiel is visible.
2. The importance of the FPV drone adaption battle and ability to scale FPV production for current & future military operations by both sides cannot be overstated.
3. Along with the growing deployment of FPV drones the importance of electronic warfare is also increasing. Controlling or denying the electromagnetic spectrum is slated to grow in importance in 2024.
4. This is & will remain an artillery-centric war. There is no compensation for the availability of concentrated & sustained tube & rocket artillery fire. Having said that ammunition constraints/rationing for most types of ammo are a reality.
5. Importance of Starlink for closing of kill-chains & pervasive ISR remains very high.
There is lots of more info to share in the coming days & months.
We also gained a better understanding into what is required for Ukraine to sustain this fight and what some of the more likelier scenarios for 2024 could be. But I will leave that discussion to my colleagues.


BBC published an article in Russian titled "Does it make sense for Ukraine to fight for Avdiivka?" In this article, several experts argue that Avdiivka lacks military significance. I disagree with this assessment, finding it misleading. Here's why. 🧵Thread:
2/ While I agree that the assault on Avdiivka likely has political reasons, as I discussed on the day the assault started, focusing solely on political aspects is not only inaccurate but also dangerous.
3/ The article states, "Most experts agree that it has exclusively political, not military, significance for the Kremlin."

I strongly disagree with it - Avdiivka has played a key military role in Donetsk since 2014.
4/ On this map, I've marked potential routes and opportunities that could arise for russian forces in the event of Avdiivka falling. While it's not an exact representation, it provides a general idea of the range of opportunities that may open up for Russian forces to advance
5/ Avdiivka plays a key role in both defensive and offensive operations. Avdiivka denies Russian forces operational space and protects the flanks of logistical hubs.
6/ While it's accurate that Avdiivka may not be used as a foothold to assault Donetsk in the near future if an opportunity arises, Avdiivka will play a key role in successfully entering Donetsk. This essentially revisits the 2014 scenario with the potential for different outcomes
7/ I agree with the analysts in this article emphasizing that Ukraine doesn't need a second Bakhmut, especially in its late stage. Holding territory for political rather than operational necessity, when encirclement becomes imminent, can lead to avoidable losses.
8/ Avdiivka's military significance should not be dismissed since it serves as a barrier preventing Russian forces from entering the operational space towards Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Kostiantynivka, crucial nodes in Donetsk oblast.
9/ The Russians underestimated Ukrainian forces in this attack, necessitating resource diversion from elsewhere for limited advances. Although immediate exploitation is doubtful, they can continue to expand by reallocating forces from other areas, replaced by newly formed units


Ukrainian troops have "gained a foothold on the eastern bank of the Dnipro" river, according to the Ukrainian president's office.

Andriy Yermak, Volodymyr Zelenskyy's chief of staff, said Ukraine's Defence Forces had made progress in the Kherson region "against all odds".

"Step by step, they are demilitarising Crimea. We have covered 70% of the distance," he said, in comments published on Mr Zelenskyy's website.

"And our counteroffensive is developing."

This is the first official acknowledgement that Ukraine were stationed on the east bank of the river.
 

Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front. Several Ukrainian officials noted that the situation along the frontline is complex but that Ukrainian forces maintain control of the battlespace.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on November 13 during a conversation with US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown that the Avdiivka, Kupyansk, and Marinka directions are the most intense but noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions in unspecified sectors of the front.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi emphasized that Russian forces are pursuing simultaneous offensive actions in several directions and trying particularly to regain the initiative north and south of Bakhmut.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are reporting an increase of Russian assaults in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk directions.[4]

Ukrainian officials’ statements about the current tempo of Russian operations along the frontline are consistent with ISW's assessment about ongoing Russian offensive operations, particularly in the Kupyansk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka directions.[5] Russian forces will likely struggle to fully regain the initiative across the theater, however, and Ukrainian forces are continuing their own offensive operations and making tactical-level gains along the front, particularly in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[6] The Russian military command will likely have to decide whether to keep certain Russian elements on certain sectors of the front to defend against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations or to redeploy them to support offensive operations elsewhere that will likely culminate without reinforcements. These choices will likely hinder Russia's ability to fully regain the initiative in the coming weeks.


In the ongoing war against Russia, Clearview has become the Ukrainian government’s “secret weapon,” Tymchenko says. More than 1,500 officials across 18 Ukrainian government agencies are using the facial-recognition tool, which has helped them identify more than 230,000 Russian soldiers and officials who have participated in the military invasion. Ukraine's use of Clearview has rapidly expanded beyond identifying Russian troops on their soil. The nation has come to rely on the private U.S. tech company, which has just 35 employees, to assist with a vast range of wartime tasks, many of which have not been previously reported, according to interviews with officials from half a dozen government agencies, law-enforcement officers, Ukrainian analysts, and Clearview executives.
Ukrainian officials have used Clearview to detect infiltrators at checkpoints, process citizens who lost their IDs, identify and prosecute members of pro-Russia militias and Ukrainian collaborators, and even to locate more than 190 abducted Ukrainian children who were transported across the border to live with Russian families. Ukraine has run at least 350,000 searches of Clearview’s database in the 20 months since the outbreak of the war, according to the company. “The volume is insane,” Clearview AI’s CEO, Hoan Ton-That, tells TIME. “Using facial recognition in war zones is something that's going to save lives.”

The Ukrainians found a variety of uses for Clearview. To counteract Russian propaganda denying that their troops were suffering heavy casualties, Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs set up a website called Poter.net, the Russian term for "No Losses," and posted a searchable database with the names of dead Russian soldiers that Clearview helped identify, linking to open-source information from Russian social media so their families could find them. (As of Nov. 13, there were more than 71,000 Russians identified on the site.) The facial-recognition technology was so effective, Tymchenko says, that Russian troops began wearing masks and face coverings, even in sweltering summer months. "They wore them despite the heat because they now knew that we could identify them," Tymchenko says, "and they knew their life wouldn't be the same, that they would never be able to visit normal countries after this activity."
Clearview accelerated Ukraine’s process of collecting evidence to prosecute alleged war criminals, which previously relied on sifting through witness testimony and other data to identify them, Ukrainian officials say. Igor Ponochovnyi, the head of the Prosecutor's Office for Crimea, says his office has used advanced open-source investigations to prosecute war crimes in occupied territories since 2014. But Clearview was something new. For years, it had been impossible for Ukrainian prosecutors to verify the identities of the low-ranking members who made up the bulk of the Crimean Self-Defense forces, an armed militia that has helped Russia occupy the peninsula. Using Clearview, the prosecutor’s office quickly identified more than 70, allowing authorities to arrest them when they entered Ukrainian territory. "We realized we needed to use Clearview on a regular basis for our activities," Ponochovnyi tells TIME.


Some 48% of respondents agreed it was time to negotiate a peace deal, with 39% in favor of pressing on with the war, the Oct. 21-29 telephone poll of 1,611 people by the Russian Field company found. The proportion favoring talks was the highest since the company, which claims to conduct independent polling paid for by crowdfunding, began monitoring attitudes to the war in April last year.
Almost three-quarters said they’d support Putin if he signed a peace accord tomorrow, a level only exceeded in September last year when Russia announced it was drafting 300,000 people to fight in Ukraine, according to the study. Fear of a future draft also emerged, with 58% saying they opposed a second mobilization.
The apparent rise in public concern is unlikely to influence Putin, who has said he’s only willing to engage in talks that accept “the reality on the ground” of Russia’s seizure of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. He has shown no willingness to end the invasion he began in February 2022, even as Russian forces have incurred huge casualties and repeatedly been forced to retreat from occupied territory by Ukrainian troops armed with billions in weapons from US and NATO allies.
 

Ukrainian marines slip across the Dnipro River at night in small groups to reinforce a growing contingent of troops engaged in a daring operation to reinvigorate Kyiv’s military efforts in the occupied south.

They have established three toeholds in and around villages on the eastern bank of the river in recent weeks, cutting off a road Russia uses to supply troops in the area, according to soldiers involved in the operation. The Ukrainians are hunkered down in basements and trenches and heavily outnumbered. Their hold is precarious.

Still, it is a rare bright spot for Kyiv amid a number of somber developments, including the failure of its counteroffensive to gain much ground, a new Russian offensive in the east and uncertainty over additional military aid from the U.S., Ukraine’s most important backer. Ukraine first publicly acknowledged the cross-river operation this week.

Ukrainian forces recently transferred armored Humvees and at least one infantry-fighting vehicle to support troops on the Dnipro’s eastern bank, the soldiers said. If the Ukrainians manage to amass sufficient units and armored vehicles there, they could seek to advance into territory where Russian defenses are less extensive than those further east that blunted the main thrust of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

That could force Russia to reposition forces needed for offensives to the east, and pose a threat to Russian supply lines from occupied Crimea, a critical staging post and logistics hub for Moscow’s war effort that Ukraine has been targeting with drone and missile attacks for weeks.

The operation on the opposite bank a few miles from the Ukrainian-held regional capital of Kherson is proving costly and hard going. Soldiers involved in the fight say they are under heavy fire. Russian drones constantly circle over their hastily dug trenches, coordinating artillery strikes each time they detect movement. As darkness falls, the Ukrainian troops use shovels to dig themselves deeper into the ground.

“We need to be realistic about what can be achieved here,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, an independent military analyst who recently toured the front lines in Ukraine. “The terrain is extremely difficult, making it not only a challenge to steadily resupply forces but also generate the necessary momentum to conduct sustained offensive operations.”

One private in Ukraine’s 38th Marine Brigade who crossed to the eastern bank at the start of November said his unit had advanced 100 yards in the six days he was there before he was evacuated for treatment of a concussion.
“For every fighter we have there, they have 10,” said the 32-year-old private, who gave his name as Andriy. “And we’re sitting in trenches unable to even stick our heads out.”


Ukraine’s recapture of Kherson last November was its last major advance. Russia withdrew troops across the river and began digging defenses.

The area around Krynky is heavily mined by Russian forces. The Ukrainians move forward in small groups to limit their exposure. And the onset of winter next month will complicate their efforts to move men and equipment across the water and stage mechanized advances with any armored vehicles brought over.

Andriy, the marine private, arrived on the left bank on the night of Nov. 1. The soldiers disembarked in different locations, avoiding Russian mines and enemy snipers and spotters, and waded through mud to reach the village of Krynky.

The task for Andriy’s brigade was to move forward in squad and company-size units and push into the forests around the village. They took up positions in rudimentary trenches and dugouts in the forest, but immediately began being pounded by Russian artillery.

In the week Andriy spent on the eastern bank before being injured and evacuated, his unit moved forward 100 yards into the forest, he said. They defended trenches hastily dug in the wet ground, as Russian troops positioned less than 100 meters away blasted them with rocket-propelled grenades.

There was a constant hum overhead as Russian strike and surveillance drones circled over his trench line, with one replaced by another when its battery ran out. Small arms exchanges were constant. Two soldiers in Andriy’s company were killed by a sniper.
Andriy observed the Russians relaxing a short distance away in elaborate dugouts they had constructed over months, equipped with generators and cooking stoves. They played rap music during lulls in fighting.

Russian armored personnel carriers brought in regular shipments of artillery shells and ammunition during the night. Last week, the Ukrainians said they captured eight Russian soldiers who had changed into Ukrainian uniforms and tried to infiltrate their positions in Krynky.


Yaroslav, a junior sergeant who is a medic in the 38th and was part of the same river crossing as Andriy, set himself up in the basement of a house in Krynky that had been vacated by residents who left during floods unleashed by the Kakhovka dam explosion.
The high floodwaters have long receded, but the walls of the houses are covered with mold, with smelly clothes and rotted furniture inside. They have only basic supplies, with no generators and very few stretchers to carry the dead and wounded to the riverbank.

Yaroslav’s job as a medic was to patch up wounded soldiers and transfer them to boats for treatment on the left bank. He said he struggled to keep up with the flow of wounded soldiers to his basement stabilization point in Krynky, and often the shelling was so intense that some of those carrying stretchers were wounded themselves.

“Everything you have there is what you brought yourself, and what they manage to bring you on boats,” he said. “But for that you have to go to the riverbank, and every such trip is Russian roulette.”

A Ukrainian special forces soldier involved in the river landings, who has returned to the fight despite losing a foot after stepping on a mine in the spring, said the Ukrainian military is trying before winter to sever Russia’s supply lines on the left bank.

On Nov. 7, the Russians launched a heavy bombardment of Ukrainian positions around Krynky, using airstrikes and multiple-launch rocket systems carrying thermobaric warheads, soldiers say. Andriy and Yaroslav said they left in a stupor, utterly exhausted.

Yaroslav joined Ukraine’s counteroffensive after undergoing a month of marine training in the U.K. during the spring. But when his unit entered Krynky, the 45-year-old felt that the British soldiers who trained him had no understanding of the severity of this war.

He said 70% of the homes in the village were intact when he arrived, but when he left six days later, only 30% were still standing. The forests around Krynky were full of corpses, both Russian and Ukrainian, that no one had the capacity to collect.

“This is our last chance for a breakthrough until the war becomes a total stalemate,” said Yaroslav, who said the Kherson campaign has been his hardest battle since Russia’s invasion in February 2022. “If we don’t get support, this operation could be our swan song.”
 

From 5.30 a.m. to 8 p.m., six days a week, the French have been teaching their Ukrainian counterparts the skills of storming trenches and infantry fighting, including combat in urban and forest areas. The brief, as described by French officers: “To make them more lethal and harder to kill.”
Back home, Ukrainians will return to a battlefield that has become, in the words of Ukraine's top general, bogged down in World War I-style trench warfare.

The hope is that Western tactics can help Ukraine break the stalemate.

But the training isn't just French troops instructing Ukrainians. The course was adapted in response to Ukrainian criticism that it wasn't well suited for the type of warfare they'll face against the Russians. And as Ukraine probably has the most combat experience of any force in the West, some of the teaching now goes in the opposite direction.

“The program is not set in stone, we have integrated those criticisms in the training preparation, which is greenlit by the Ukrainians,” said Lieutenant Colonel Even, the chief training officer, who could only be identified by his first name for security reasons.

One addition is the extensive use of drones to reflect the reality of what the Ukrainians will face back home.


France pledged to train 7,000 Ukrainians this year in both France and Poland through the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM).


German lawmakers on Thursday will debate doubling next year's military aid to Ukraine to €8 billion, and Kyiv is hoping that a lot of that new cash will go to air defense.

There's also pressure to use the money to send Ukraine Germany's bunker-busting Taurus cruise missiles — something Berlin has so far avoided doing.

“We need to strengthen both air defense to protect strategic facilities and infrastructure facilities, as well as front-line air defense,” said Illarion Pavlyuk, spokesperson for Ukraine's defense ministry. “Our needs remain the same.”

Pavlyuk added that “Ukraine also needs ammunition of various types.” And not just conventional small arms ammunition or artillery and tank shells, but most importantly, the surface-to-air interceptors and antiaircraft ammunition that protect Ukraine’s skies. This kind of ammunition “is a constant need.”

Robust air defenses to fend off the Russian threat, both in cities and along hundreds of kilometers of frontlines where the two sides are engaged in a life-or-death struggle for air superiority — will be of critical importance this winter both to keep the lights on and to save lives.

“Germany is really concerned about the situation … in Ukraine” ahead of the coldest winter months, said Aylin Matlé, a German Council on Foreign Relations research fellow.

She added that the German government’s assessment of Ukraine’s chances to win back territory before winter sets in are “dire,” citing the disappointing results of this year's counteroffensive.


Matlé said that much of the original €4 billion budget was assigned to a winter aid package, so she calculated that at least some of the spending boost could further augment Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
 

Some, like Germany Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, said the target wouldn't be reached and questioned the sense of setting it in the first place, while others, like Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton, said the bloc was capable of producing enough ammunition — as long as governments sign contracts with arms-makers.
The EDA chief leans toward a more optimistic assessment.
"The target of 1 million will be achieved — maybe even beyond that — but indeed, the timeline is too ambitious," Šedivý said in an interview just hours after meeting defense ministers in his role as the chief of the bloc's technical agency.


For Darya Stepanova, a mother of two who lives in a small town on the eastern side of the Ural mountains, soaring prices for everything from baby food to nappies have forced her family to cut back on most treats and eating out.
The Stepanov family is one of millions of Russian families having to cut back due to the significant changes forced on Russia's economy by the war in Ukraine and the myriad sanctions imposed by the West.
Stepanova, 34, her five year old son and newborn son, try to make ends meet on the 50,000 roubles ($550) a month her husband Sergei earns. When she goes through the snow to the shops, she inspects the prices to search for bargains.
"I can see how everything has become more expensive in the course of just these past five years," Stepanova told Reuters in her flat in Sredneuralsk, a town on the shores of Lake Iset about 25 km (15 miles) north of the Urals city of Yekaterinburg and 1400 km (870 miles) east of Moscow.

Headline inflation was 11.9% last year in Russia and this year the forecast is 7.0-7.5% - while at least 15.7 million people live below the poverty line of 14,375 roubles ($157) per month, according to official statistics.
Igor Lipits, a Russian economist, said official Russian data on levels of poverty were poor - as was the overall picture for the Russian economy - despite often rosy announcements aimed at pleasing the Kremlin leadership.
"The real situation is bad," Lipits said, adding that he saw at minimum stagnation and a serious deterioration in economic health after the March presidential election. "A large part of the Russian population have very low wages."
He said around 20 million people could be in or on the verge of poverty in Russia, that many were in debt amid Central Bank interest rates of 15% and that some economists thought the rouble could fall after the election.
At a food market in the former imperial capital of St Petersburg, Lyudmila said she and her friends had sought to cut down and search for discounts. She declined to give her second name.
"What option do we have? Of course we won't die and we won't cry - we will try to survive somehow."
 

Over the last week, Russian forces have continued attacks towards outlying villages of the contested town of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast. Russia is almost certainly attempting a pincer movement to encircle the town. (1/5)
Avdiivka has been fought over for nearly a decade and holds political importance to Russia given its proximity to Donetsk city. (2/5)
Recent advances have likely brought Russian forces close to the Ukrainian-held Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, a sprawling industrial complex which produces coke and a variety of chemicals, occupies a key tactical position to the north of the town. (3/5)
The plant dominates the main road into Avdiivka and, if Russian forces were to secure it, resupplying the town would become increasingly difficult for Ukraine. (4/5)
However, the industrial facility provides Ukraine with a localised defensive advantage and Russian forces will probably suffer significant personnel losses if they attempt to assault the facility. (5/5)


“Sandworm’s [GRU’s] latest grid attack is a watershed moment. It has bucked expectations of a future defined by increasingly tailored malware and has shown that quicker, stealthier, and more generic…methods are better suited for a wartime environment”

“Most concerningly, the [GRU’s] attack method used [vs Ukraine’s grid] is flexible and could affect critical infrastructure globally, such as seaports, railways, airports, hospitals, and other power grids that use the same MicroSCADA software.”


Switzerland has pledged its support for the establishment of a special tribunal to address Russia's crimes of aggression against Ukraine.

"Switzerland is firmly convinced that the aggression against Ukraine must not go unpunished," the Swiss department of foreign affairs said.

The initiative has attracted support from 38 countries, including France, Germany, Norway, Guatemala, Japan and Canada, according to the department's statement.

Switzerland officially joined the core group at a meeting in Berlin on Thursday, it added.

The country has a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs.


The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia. The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) given precision machine tools’ importance in industrial manufacturing. Bloomberg reported on November 15 that the EU’s 12th sanctions package proposes a ban on the export of precision machine tools and machinery parts that Russia uses to make weapons and ammunition, such as welding machines, lithium batteries, thermostats, motors, and drone motors.[1] Bloomberg reported that Russia has been importing precision machines and precision machine tools from Europe to sustain its ammunition production and other DIB production efforts. Bne Intellinews reported in June 2021 that Russia’s near total reliance on European- and US-produced precision machine tools makes Russia particularly vulnerable to such sanctions and noted that at the time Russia imported almost all of the precision machines it required.[2]

Some info on the ongoing fighting across Dnipro River:

Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 15. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks from central Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City, 2km from the Dnipro River, and about 3.6 km north of the E-58 highway) and that Ukrainian forces are also attacking near Poyma (11km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Pishchanivka (15km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[65] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian forces from conducting casualty evacuation and deploying additional Ukrainian personnel to the east bank near the Antonivsky road bridge.[66] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces three to eight kilometers from the Dnipro River's east bank in Kherson Oblast.[67] The geographic extent of this described effort is significantly larger than what any available open-source evidence currently shows.

Russian forces made a recent confirmed advance in a Ukrainian-held area in the east bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued operations against Ukrainian east bank positions on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that Russian forces made some advances into Krynky.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from some areas south of Krynky, near Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River), and near the Antonivsky bridge, but ISW is unable to confirm these claims.[69] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have likely developed a plan to eliminate Ukrainian positions on the east bank by forming three tactical groups.[70] Mashovets stated that Russian forces plan to use two groups to flank the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka road and the Krynky area from the Korsunka (45km northeast of Kherson City and 1km from the Dnipro River) and Kozacha Laheri areas, while the third group will attack south of Krynky and advance north.[71] The Wall Street Journal, citing Ukrainian soldiers who fought on the east bank, reported that Russian forces are employing heavy mines, infiltration tactics, snipers, and heavy artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and airstrikes to defend against Ukrainian advances on the east bank.[72]


Pushing Russian forces back further in Kherson region would potentially put more civilians out of range of enemy artillery and – theoretically – give Kyiv a launching place to push further south toward occupied Crimea. But the Ukrainian gains on the Dnipro’s left bank are tenuous.
A pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel that closely tracks military operations said Thursday that “several small footholds had to be abandoned” on the Dnipro’s left bank.
“The situation is absolutely normal,” the Telegram channel said, adding that some of the repositioning was meant to draw Russian forces and because some positions were too costly or impractical to hold.

But pro-Kremlin military bloggers also said Wednesday that the fight was not progressing easily for Russia.
“Russian forces are trying to eliminate the main AFU [Armed Forces of Ukraine] bridgehead in Krynky with the support of all possible means of long-range defeat,” said one blogger. “At the moment, without success.”
CNN cannot independently verify those Russian claims about the situation on the left bank, and Ukrainian officials have disclosed scant details of the ongoing operation. But the foothold across the Dnipro comes at a time when Ukraine needs to show its Western backers that it is capable of sustaining momentum on the battlefield.
 

Anti-tank barricades and checkpoints adorn a narrow country road somewhere in the vastness of Ukraine. Publication of their exact location is prohibited because they are subject to strict security regulations. State-of-the-art American Patriot air defense systems, with their characteristic missile launchers, can be seen positioned among the autumnal trees. It almost feels like the entrance to a secret military base. After going through a security check, though, the steel gate opens up to a power substation, not some miracle weapon one might otherwise have expected.

Since last winter, these facilities have been among the best-secured locations in the country. Russia has deployed myriad airstrikes in a systematic attempt to destroy Ukraine's energy supply and break the civilian population's will to fight during the cold season. This particular facility has also been targeted by the Russians on several occasions. "We were hit by a Ch-101 on October 23 and by a Kalibr cruise missile on October 31," says one of the engineers on site. "On December 19, a Shahed drone destroyed one of the transformers."
A new bulwark has been built to shield the facility this winter. "We have implemented various structural solutions to counter missiles and kamikaze drones," Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, CEO of the Ukrainian electricity grid operator Ukrenergo, says during an interview in Kyiv. He avoids providing any further technical details for security reasons. "We're talking about 200,000 tons of sand and 300,000 tons of concrete, thirty times more than in the world's tallest skyscraper, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai."

Following the Russian airstrikes, only two of the three huge metal blocks from the Soviet era are still in operation at this particular company substation. Everything must be done to protect the remaining ones.

Prior to the Russian invasion, Ukraine had been connected to the Russian power grid, so engineers in the neighboring country know precisely where the critical points are in the Ukrainian supply. They could instantly leave hundreds of thousands of people in the dark with a single strike.

In 2022, Russia temporarily managed to knock out 45 percent of the high-voltage grid and half of Ukraine's energy production. Reconstruction has been a slow process and will take years to complete, says Alexander Kharchenko, an expert at the Energy Industry Research Center, a Kyiv-based think tank. "We started our maintenance season in April, as we do every year, and will probably finish it in October 2029."

Even in times of peace, it takes years to set up a power grid, so the current situation is anything but ideal, he says. Power plants and substations are costly and require a significant amount of materials, components and resources to build, operate and maintain. "We can supply the country until it gets down to minus 10 degrees Celsius outside," he says. Last winter, the lowest temperatures measured in that range. Below that, the situation would grow critical, and Ukraine would have to import electricity from other European countries. And even then, it still wouldn’t have enough. Still, the expert isn’t expecting blackouts that would last for days. "The end customers would then have downtimes of two to three hours a day, which, while unpleasant, wouldn’t be apocalyptic," says Kharchenko.

Further Russian attacks on the energy grid would be especially problematic. If successful, the situation could be even worse next year. And Ukraine is anticipating massive attacks. For the past several months, Russia has been using its missiles sparingly, perhaps saving them for winter. Industrial companies, politicians and Western allies have made enormous efforts since last winter to be as well prepared as possible.

"We took measures to protect the grid after the invasion, but we didn't expect attacks on this scale," says Maxim Timchenko, CEO of DTEK, Ukraine's largest energy producer. "We are much better prepared this year." His company's goal was to restore all losses on the electricity grid from the previous year, a goal it has managed to accomplish. The imperative now is to protect them to the degree possible with expanded air defenses, physical protection measures and ample spare parts.

DTEK engineers demonstrate how this could work on a new substation in Irpin, a suburb of Kyiv. The facility is located right next to its Soviet predecessor, which is littered with bullet holes. During the Battle of Kyiv in February 2022, large parts of the city were devastated, including elements of its energy supply. "More than 3,000 of these units were damaged throughout the greater Kyiv area," says Serhii Buriak, who is leading the reconstruction effort.

More at link. Good read. Worth checking out.
 

If you want to understand what’s happening in Ukraine I recommend this podcast with @Jack_Watling, who explains why the trends now favour Russia and what can be done about it

Link to podcast: https://www.ft.com/content/87cf8824-a3b4-4eab-af7d-f88a71977415?shareType=nongift


KYIV @AFP: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Thursday that deliveries of key artillery shells to his military had dropped off after fighting erupted between Israel and Hamas last month.


Ka-52 helicopters are still operating, and they are still a serious problem. Russia began operating helicopters from FARPs soon after the ATACMS strike. Just because you don't see videos of them does not mean they are not there.

Bit more of an organized thread than other day: https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1725112195594272810

I just returned from another research trip to Ukraine with @KofmanMichael, @RALee85, & @konrad_muzyka. My colleagues and I gained lots of new insights into the current state of the war some of which we will share publicly in the near future. Here are a 5 quick thoughts:
1. Morale remains high, but exhaustion among troops & impact on attrition on materiel is visible. Defenses are holding while offensive operations continue along select parts of the front; innovative new tactical concepts are being tried out.
(In general, I am always impressed by the resiliency of the troops and their innovative bottom-up approaches to finding solutions to tactical problems & others.)
2. The importance of the FPV drone adaption battle and ability to scale FPV production for current & future military operations by both sides cannot be overstated. Lots of more info to come on that front!
3. This is & will remain an artillery-centric war. There is no compensation for the availability of concentrated & sustained tube & rocket artillery fire. Having said that ammunition constraints/rationing for most types of ammo are a reality. More to come here too.
4. Armor & protected mobility remains key for any sort of ground operation. No ground assault can happen without mechanized support. This is a lesson we have seen time and again during our past research trips.
5. The importance of Starlink for closing of kill-chains & pervasive ISR remains very high. Terrain, weather conditions and time of the day, however, still matter even on an 'transparent battlefield.'
There is lots of more info to share (e.g., on air defense) in the coming days & months. We also gained a better understanding into what is required for Ukraine to sustain this fight and what some of the more likelier scenarios for 2024 could be.


Some have swum dangerous rivers to leave the country. Others have simply walked out under cover of darkness.

Another 21,113 men attempted to flee but were caught by the Ukrainian authorities, Kyiv confirmed.

After Russia's invasion, most men aged 18-60 were banned from leaving. But data obtained by the BBC reveals dozens have made it out daily.

We have spoken to several men who have escaped in order to join family abroad, study, or simply make a living.

"What am I supposed to do [in Ukraine]?" one man, Yevgeny, said. "Not everyone is a warrior… you don't need to keep the whole country locked up. You can't lump everyone together like they did in the Soviet Union."

The BBC has established - by requesting data of illegal border crossings from neighbouring Romania, Moldova, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia - that 19,740 men illegally crossed into these countries between February 2022 and 31 August 2023.

While we do not know how those men escaped, we do know what methods were used by the other 21,113 who were caught trying. The majority - 14,313 - were attempting to walk or swim across the border, and the remaining 6,800 relied on fraudulently obtained official paperwork stating fake exemptions such as fabricated illnesses, the Ukrainian authorities said.


Russia’s State Duma took a step forward Wednesday towards approving its biggest-ever federal budget which will increase spending by around 25% in 2024, with record amounts going on defense.
Defense spending is expected to overtake social spending next year for the first time in modern Russian history, at a time when the Kremlin is keen to shore up support for President Vladimir Putin as Russia prepares for a presidential election in March.
Record low unemployment, higher wages and targeted social spending should help the Kremlin ride out the domestic impact of pivoting the economy to a war footing, but could pose a problem in the long term, analysts say.
The draft budget “is about getting the war sorted in Ukraine and about being ready for a military confrontation with the West in perpetuity,” said Richard Connolly, an expert on Russia’s military and economy at the Royal United Services Institute in London.
“This amounts to the wholesale remilitarization of Russian society,” he added.

Although shunned in in the West, the Kremlin “expects to fund expenditures in 2024 from oil and gas revenues thanks to buyers from China and India,” said Alexandra Prokopenko, from the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin and a former Russian Central Bank official.
Russia still sells more to the rest of the world than it buys, and because the ruble is weak, it receives more rubles for its energy sold in dollars, giving it revenue for imports including weapons components.
In recent years, the Russian finance ministry has also attempted to pivot the economy away from its dependence on hydrocarbons, raising increasing amounts from import taxes and VAT and, following the invasion of Ukraine, supposedly “one-off” windfall taxes on state and private companies.

Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said in September that Russia’s economy should grow by 2.8% by the end of this year but that was in comparison to 2022, when the economy shrank as a result of the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Analysts question whether the draft budget is based on realistic projections for growth. If it is not, or if the economic outlook changes, Russia could have to adjust its spending.
“Expecting the same rate of growth shows the degree of optimism that’s underneath this,” said Connolly, adding that Russian officials seem to be aiming for levels of growth comparable to those when recovering from a recession.
The main driver of that growth is Russia’s war in Ukraine, which is now as important to the Kremlin economically as it is politically.

The state and military are now playing a much bigger role in the economy than they have historically, and industries related to the war — including defense production — have helped to drive Russia’s unemployment level down to a record low of 3%.
The war has also taken hundreds of thousands of workers out of the economy, either because they’re fighting in Ukraine or because they’ve fled Russia, often to escape conscription.
Defense companies and those associated with the sector are working at full capacity, leading to labor shortages as vacancies go unfilled, putting more money in the pocket of ordinary Russians as employers compete to hire them, offering higher salaries.
While this is good for the Kremlin ahead of a presidential election, against a backdrop of an already tight labor market it will be a “struggle” for the economy to keep growing while vacancies remain unfilled, Connolly said.
Over the longer term, the government’s increased defense spending also threatens to worsen inflation, as military-related factories operate around the clock, putting money into workers’ pockets from where it flows into the cash registers of local businesses.

Russia’s Central Bank said it expects inflation to be around 4.5% next year, falling from around 7.5% expected for all of 2023.
That has led the central bank to raise its key interest rates to 15%, a step which inhibits spending, growth and inflation for the civilian economy, in an effort to contain the fallout from inflationary government spending by the finance ministry.
While in the short term, the outlook for the Russian economy is not as bad as some predicted in the aftermath of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, shifting the economy to almost completely focus on defense could cause significant long-term challenges.
“Spending that is so skewed toward military and social needs can only be sustainable if the state is at war,” Prokopenko said.

Analysts broadly agree that the budget is sustainable for 2024 but could come under significant pressure if sanctions on Russia are increased, or if there are huge expenditures such as another round of mobilization which would also put pressure on the labor force. The longer the labor force remains tight, the more likely high expectations of wage growth also become entrenched.
If there is a reduction in military spending, or a need to reduce spending which impacts living standards, it could send shockwaves through the Russian economy and significantly impact ordinary people.
Prokopenko said she expected changes to Russia’s tax rates after the presidential elections in order to raise revenue and to stave off economic and social instability because, she said, “the construction of the budget is not sustainable in the long term.”
 
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Logistics and Sustainment in the Russian Armed Forces

Key Findings​

  • Russia's long-term logistics and sustainment challenges include such systemic issues as resource inefficiency in the military and the defense industry; large numbers of inadequate warehousing for fuel and food; unsuccessful, partially implemented, or ongoing reforms in military logistics and sustainment; and corruption.
  • Russia has a large and elaborate military logistics and sustainment system. Although Russia had been increasingly exercising some parts of its logistics and sustainment system prior to the 2022 war with Ukraine, it lacked recent experience with supporting a large-scale ground operation.
  • The performance of the Russian military sustainment and logistics system in Ukraine in 2022 displayed fundamental flaws in operational design and significant force employment issues.
  • The reasons for Russia's dire initial logistics performance in Ukraine must be viewed as part of the larger, poorly planned and executed operation. The extreme secrecy of the initial war plan resulted in many units not having enough time to plan and execute the operation.
  • Large-scale ground operations by Russian forces in Ukraine will likely continue to present lucrative opportunities for long-range strikes to disrupt logistics because of the continued Russian reliance on rail for high-bandwidth resupply and the need to move vast quantities of bulky unguided artillery ammunition for fire support.
  • Russia's military logistics and sustainment system would benefit from further research into potential limitations and vulnerabilities. As with studying other aspects of foreign militaries, the logistics and sustainment system needs to be considered with an understanding of the broader military planning, political, cultural, industrial, and other dimensions of Russia.

Thousands of Ukrainian children taken to Belarus - Yale research

More than 2,400 children from Ukraine aged between six and 17 years old have been taken to 13 facilities across Belarus since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, research published by Yale University said on Thursday.
Ukraine's prosecutor general said in May that he was investigating the alleged role of Belarus in the forced transfer of more than 19,000 identified children from Russian-occupied territories since the conflict broke out, including to Russia.
The total number is estimated by some experts and organisations to be far higher.
The findings by the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, which receives U.S. State Dept. funding, shared with Reuters are the most extensive to date about the alleged role of Belarus in the Russian relocation program for Ukrainian children.

Among the key findings detailed in the 39-page report were that children had been transported from at least 17 cities in Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions in what Yale researchers described as an ongoing practice.
More than 2,000 children Yale identified were transported to the Dubrava children's centre in Belarus' Minsk region between September 2022 and May 2023, it said, while 392 children were taken to 12 other facilities.
"Russia's systematic effort to identify, collect, transport, and re-educate Ukraine's children has been facilitated by Belarus," the report said.
"Russia's federal government and Belarus' regime have been working together to coordinate and fund the movement of children from Russia-occupied Ukraine through Russia to Belarus."
Transports to Belarus through Russia were "ultimately coordinated" between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko, it added.

Once in Belarus, children have been subjected to military training and re-education and Lukashenko approved the use of state organizations to transport children from Ukraine to Belarus and finance their transportation, the Yale report said.
It is unclear how many of the children identified by Yale's research remain in Belarus.
 

Ukrainian forces have established several fortified bridgeheads on the Russian-occupied left bank of the Dnipro river in their most significant territorial gains for weeks in their otherwise stalled counteroffensive.
Ukraine’s military confirmed the advances in a statement on Friday without naming where they were.
“The Ukrainian marines, in co-operation with other units of the defence forces, managed to gain a foothold on several bridgeheads,” read the statement.
Russia also acknowledged the Ukrainian presence for the first time. Vladimir Saldo, the Moscow-appointed governor of Russian-occupied Kherson province, said on Telegram that Ukrainian forces were in one area, near the village of Krynky — 18 miles north-east of Kherson city.
A western official on Thursday said Ukraine had moved “elements of three brigades” to the Russian-occupied east bank of the river, and confirmed reports last week by Russian military bloggers that Ukraine has moved some vehicles across.
A brigade typically numbers 2,000 to 5,000 soldiers but the official said the Ukrainian contingent probably consisted of “hundreds”.
The western official said Russian forces had not been able to push them back and the Ukrainians had established a “significant foothold” in the area.


Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced on November 16 that Russian authorities are strengthening Russian air defense over Russia’s Central Federal Okrug, likely in response to Ukraine’s recently implied intent to conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in rear areas during the winter. Patrushev also announced that Russian authorities have organized patrols to protect critical infrastructure facilities to prevent attacks and that the Russian government is funding the creation of “territorial defense lines” for oblasts bordering Ukraine.[5] Patrushev added that Russian authorities are updating a list of all critical infrastructure facilities – including fuel and energy facilities and important transportation objects – that require protection from unspecified threats.[6] The Central Federal Okrug consists of 18 federal subjects including Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts, which border Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk stated on November 13 that Ukraine needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles to strike Russian rear areas.[8] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces’ current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[9]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize actors in the Russian information space for distorting the reality of the Russian war effort, highlighting an emerging cyclical dynamic in the Russian information space in which the majority of Russian sources coalesce around a particular predominant narrative and, in turn, a subset of different sources coalesces to criticize the majority’s prevailing opinion. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian state media may have falsely convinced the Russian people that “everything is fine” in Russia’s war in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger claimed that he does not understand why Russian state media devotes so much time to promoting narratives about the “imminent collapse of Ukraine" and portrays the Russian war effort so positively that Russian viewers think that signing a military service contract is unnecessary. Another Russian milblogger who previously served throughout the front in Ukraine and correctly assessed Russia’s foundational problems in Kharkiv Oblast in spring 2022 criticized several unnamed Russian milbloggers for their recent overly positive reporting about Russian counterattacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[11] The milblogger claimed that the other milbloggers preemptively claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on the east bank and criticized them for setting unrealistic expectations for Russian forces. The milblogger noted that such overoptimistic claims are forcing Russian servicemen to “catch up” to these Russian politicians’ and commanders’ unrealistic expectations of Russian battlefield successes. The milblogger’s complaint suggests that the situation in Kherson Oblast remains very ambiguous and is dynamic. The milblogger’s complaint mirrors recent reports that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality and that local Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align with the Russian General Staff’s inaccurate maps.[12] Disjointed Kremlin efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space and report overly optimistic news are likely creating these cycles of coalescence and backlash among Russian sources. The Russian information space may grow increasingly volatile as the rift between the Kremlin optimists and their critics expands.
 

(1/5) For the first time, Russia has likely started using A-50 MAINSTAY D, its Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, to identify targets over Ukraine for its SA-21 long-range ground-based air defence missile system.
(2/5) This adds to MAINSTAY’s core mission of co-ordinating fighter aircraft.
(3/5) Compared to SA-21’s usual ground-based radar, MAINSTAY can use its radar to spot adversary aircraft at longer ranges because its altitude allows it to see further around the curvature of the earth.
(4/5) Russia has likely expedited integrating MAINSTAY and SA-21 partially because it is concerned about the prospect of Ukraine deploying Western-provided combat aircraft.
(5/5) There is a realistic possibility that Russia will accept more risk by flying MAINSTAY closer to the front-line in order to effectively carry out its new role.


So, what does this all mean?

We asked military analyst Sean Bell to decipher the language used in the latest MoD update.

"The MAINSTAY is a very effective airborne early warning aircraft that is used to warn of air threats approaching Russian territory," Bell says.

"To date, Ukraine has not mounted a credible air threat - it has older generation aircraft and limited numbers, so is keeping the military jets that it has for supporting the ground offensive and attacking Russian logistic supply hubs etc."

So why start using the MAINSTAY now? Ukraine has not changed its tactical use of its fighter aircraft?

Bell says one reason for this could be to track the missiles and drones that Ukraine is launching towards Russia.

"The MAINSTAY could track those targets earlier and provide greater warning for Russian Air Defence systems," he says.

"Another reason could be that the MAINSTAY has a ground-mapping radar that is helping Russia provide targeting information to its surface-to-surface missile systems."

Bell goes on to say that it could also be - as the MoD suggests - an opportunity to better integrate the MAINSTAY with Russia's wider air defence systems in readiness for the deployment of a greater fighter threat from Ukraine.

This could come in the form of Ukraine receiving F-16 fighters or NATO/the West deploying air power into Ukraine.

"However, MAINSTAY is an expensive strategic asset, and the closer it operates to Ukraine, the more it will attract Ukraine air defences to attack the platform," Bell says.

"It would be a major prize if Ukraine could shoot one down, and the Russians will not want to risk that eventuality."


President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Friday posted images from the area showing the military using drones and operating on speedboats on the Dnipro.
"Our warriors. Thank you for your strength, for moving forward!" he said on Telegram messenger.
Kovalyov said Ukrainian troops were conducting sabotage and reconnaissance actions to discover and disrupt logistics for Russian ammunition and food supplies. He said the Russian military were mounting heavy resistance and had brought in reinforcements.
Very bad weather was another obstacle to Kyiv's operations, Natalia Humeniuk, spokesperson for the southern military command said.
"We must be aware that in very bad weather conditions, they are complicated. This not only complicates a physical advance but also aerial reconnaissance. Because there is a thunderstorm warning," she said in televised comments.

On the other hand, she added, the weather would not allow Russian troops to use their tactical aviation as much as earlier, something the Ukrainian military was using to "consolidate success".
According to Ukrainian military bloggers, Ukrainian forces crossed the Dnipro in small groups in the summer to create an initial foothold around a railway bridge near Kherson and then sought to expand their presence in nearby villages on the east bank, including Krynky.
The news comes months into Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the southeast and east that have not produced a major breakthrough. Ukrainian officials have blamed extensive Russian minefields and defensive lines, and delays in supplies of weapons from the West.
Russian forces, which occupy around 17% of Ukraine, are now again on the offensive in the east in the Kyiv-held town of Avdiivka, near the Moscow-held city of Bakhmut, and in other areas.
The Ukrainian military said in its daily update that fighting was raging along the entire frontline from the south to the east, reporting 72 combat clashes in the last 24 hours.
The fiercest battles were around Avdiivka, Mariinka and Bakhmut in the eastern Donetsk region, it said.
Vitalyi Barabash, head of Avdiivka's military administration, said on television that Russian forces were making a big push towards the town's industrial zone near a vast coke plant, and bringing in reinforcements.


The Dutch government has earmarked an additional €2 billion ($2.2 billion) in military aid for Ukraine in 2024, in what Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said was a sign of unwavering support for Kyiv's war against Russia.

"This will safeguard our support for Ukraine and ensure continuity, which is critical for Ukraine," she said, referring to a November 22 election in the Netherlands that will change the composition of the ruling government coalition.

Support will be provided based on Kyiv's needs, Ollongren said, and may include advanced drone capabilities.

It is part of a wider package the Netherlands will provide to Ukraine next year that includes an initial €102 million for reconstruction and humanitarian aid that will be increased during the year if needed.

The latest package takes the total amount of Dutch support for Ukraine during the conflict to around €7.5 billion, Ollongren said.
 

Amid the ongoing debate about the number of operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines, I've analyzed and compiled imagery of bases used for helicopter operations by the Russians. The findings are summarized in this 🧵Thread:

1/
2/ Based on acquired Maxar images from November 1st, the Taganrog airbase hosted at least 4 operational Ka-52 helicopters on its tarmac. The surrounding activity indicates their use, a fact further supported by their absence in earlier shots.
3/ The Buturlinovka Airbase accommodates a minimum of 5 Ka-52 helicopters. Although Helicopter #7 is not distinctly visible in this image, the next image includes a slightly older photo of the same helicopter at the same location for clarity.
4/ Identifying helicopters in high-resolution imagery (0.5 - 1m) can be challenging, but certain distinct characteristics help with recognition: fuselage length, two coaxial rotors, a shorter tail, and a unique frontal shape, among others.
5/ Zernograd airbase, the home of the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, currently houses approximately 8 additional Ka-52 helicopters.
6/ In these calculations, I excluded several Ka-52 helicopters undergoing repairs or maintenance, evident from the missing rotor blades. Additionally, for OPSEC reasons, I didn't account for 2 more Ka-52 helicopters located at FARP.
7/ The scope of my analysis focuses on the operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines. I didn't add helicopters located in other regions of Russia, such as Central Russia and the Far East.
8/ With a 90% confidence level and error not exceeding 30%, presented evidence strongly indicates that Russia still maintains operational Ka-52 helicopters.
9/ Both the Ka-52 and numerous Mi-28 helicopters continue to pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces along the frontline. Their ability to deploy LMUR and Vikhr missiles extends their reach, enabling them to engage targets beyond the range of SHORAD
10/ Moving on to the next base, Rovenki Airbase, traditionally home to a substantial number of helicopters, has recently dispersed its helicopters in response to emerging threats, due to its proximity to the border.
11/ In October and early November, Rovenki Airbase accommodated more than three Ka-52 helicopters. I counted only three Ka-52 helicopters, excluding those with missing blades, as their operational status is hard to determine
12/ Kirovske Airbase in Crimea housed a total of 6 Ka-52 helicopters.
13/ Let's assume that roughly 30% of the helicopters I've identified could be duplicates (the same helicopter at different locations and times), partially or fully inoperable, or mistakenly identified.
14/ Rounding gives us around 8 helicopters. Even assuming 8 were included wrongly, we still have 17 operational helicopters. Therefore, claims suggesting there are no or only a few functional Ka-52s are invalid.
15/ In summary, satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters, with the actual number likely much higher.


Putin has reason to believe that time is on his side. At the front line, there are no indications that Russia is losing what has become a war of attrition. The Russian economy has been buffeted, but it is not in tatters. Putin’s hold on power was, paradoxically, strengthened following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in June. Popular support for the war remains solid, and elite backing for Putin has not fractured.

Western officials’ promises of reinvigorating their own defense industries have collided with bureaucratic and supply-chain bottlenecks. Meanwhile, sanctions and export controls have impeded Putin’s war effort far less than expected. Russian defense factories are ramping up their output, and Soviet legacy factories are outperforming Western factories when it comes to much-needed items like artillery shells.

The technocrats responsible for running the Russian economy have proven themselves to be resilient, adaptable, and resourceful. Elevated oil prices, driven in part by close cooperation with Saudi Arabia, are refilling state coffers. Ukraine, by contrast, depends heavily on infusions of Western cash.

That's a longer read. Would recommend it.
 
AP also reporting similar to what FT reported earlier: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-dnieper-river-fe197bdd93119c29335162af1c8a8de4

Western officials with intelligence knowledge, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive information, said Thursday that Ukraine has portions of three brigades across the river and was expected to make small gains as the Russians have so far been unable to repel them.

“The Ukrainians have seen an opportunity there and taken it,” one official said. “What we’ve not seen is the Russians being able to push them back from that position.”


For months, Ukrainian soldiers have launched incursions into Russian-held territory in an attempt to pave the way for more troops to move across the Kherson region. An Associated Press crew in October witnessed troops setting out in inflatable boats to cross the Dnieper under the cover of fog.

Shelling could be heard in the distance followed by gunfire. At least two of the soldiers in the boats had been shot when they reached the shore.

Ukraine provided no timeline for how long it took to establish its positions across the Dnieper River or why it chose to announce its achievement this week and whether it indicated they had established a more stable foothold.

The gains that could open up a path to Crimea are considered small in the overall ground war, which intelligence officials said was essentially stalled despite a Ukrainian counteroffensive that earlier in the year had been expected to alter the momentum.

“Neither side is currently capable of mounting decisive offensive operations on the land in the foreseeable future,” one official said.


Zelensky’s news of a reduction in U.S. deliveries, meanwhile, comes at a particularly challenging moment for Ukraine as Russia steps up its assaults near Avdiivka, a eastern-Ukrainian city where intense fighting resembles that seen in Bakhmut last winter.

“The situation is quite difficult,” said Ukrainian parliamentarian Yehor Cherniev. “The intensity of heavy shelling from our side is lower and lower because of the lack of ammunition,”


The Latvian president said he’s also worried that the problems in the EU could have an effect on the U.S., where help for Ukraine is also facing political difficulties.

“Where I'm getting a bit concerned when I talk with Americans” is that they are living “under the impression that Europe is not giving enough” even though “we are actually spending more on Ukraine, if we combine both military and all kinds of programs, than the United States,” Rinkēvičs said.

“And that's where I think that if they hear again that Europe is not able to produce enough ammunition or to give enough financial support, then this will have some negative impact also in debate in the United States because there is going to be an argument that ‘look guys, if Europe is not doing enough or if Europe doesn't care, then we shouldn't care.’”
 

Europe's NATO member states have just "five to nine years" to become "war-ready" and prepare for a possible Russian attack on the alliance's territory. This warning comes from Preventing the Next War, a policy brief newly released by the German Council on Foreign Relations.

Authors Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz of the prestigious Berlin think tank Center for Security and Defense concluded that the next war in Europe can only be effectively prevented within a limited time frame. Mölling and Schütz point out that Russia has already switched its arms production to the level needed in a wartime economy as a result of its war against Ukraine.

"Even after nearly two years of combat in Ukraine, the Russian war capability is greater than the current impression suggests. The Russian land forces suffered the greatest losses in terms of personnel and materiel," the study says. Germany and NATO are now in a "race against time" to bolster their own conventional forces to deter a possible Russian attack on NATO member states such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
DGAP security policy expert Mölling based the analysis on information from Germany's intelligence and defense services. It falls in line with new policy guidelines for Germany's armed forces, the Bundeswehr, that Defense Minister Boris Pistoriusunveiled earlier in November. For the first time, Pistorius used the term "war-ready" in his presentation as the objective for rebuilding the Bundeswehr.


"With Putin's brutal attack on Ukraine, war has returned to Europe," Pistorius said as he presented the new guidelines for Germany's armed forces. "That has changed the threat assessment. As the most populous and economically powerful country in the middle of Europe, Germany must be the backbone of deterrence and collective security in Europe."

The study bases its time frame for NATO to beef up its deterrence on the assumption that Russia manages to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, which would buy time for Moscow to rebuild its army. However, few in Berlin's political circles see the Ukraine war stopping any time soon.

"Both sides have further military plans," Russia analyst Nico Lange of the Munich Security Conference told DW. "I think we must assume that it will go on for a while yet."

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander in chief of Ukraine's armed forces, recently pointed out that to date, the military aid for his country from some 50 states under US leadership had only resulted in a "stalemate."
Since it began in June, Ukraine's counteroffensive has barely shifted the front lines in the country's east and south. And Russia has the advantage in a static war, as its now-activated arms industry can supply artillery on a practically unlimited scale, Austrian military analyst Markus Reisner told DW. Ukraine can only win if the conflict again becomes mobile, and it would need the most modern weapons from the West to achieve that next spring, Reisner said.

Several observers of the war have noted that the front line in Ukraine has evolved more and more into an electronic battlefield. They say artificial intelligence is being used to wage war.

"At stake is control of the electromagnetic spectrum, where communications are conducted and drones are directed," said Reisner. Lange also confirmed that Russia can now effectively disrupt Ukrainian weapons systems run by satellite.

That even includes the US-supplied HIMARS rocket launchers that helped Ukraine stretch Russian supply lines as it recaptured large areas last year.

"Russia is very successful at jamming," said Lange, referring to the disruption of enemy satellite, radar and radio signals. This is especially significant because, over nearly two years, the conflict in Ukraine has been conducted more and more through drones. These can themselves be armed or use cameras to help provide a clear picture of the front line when used together with satellite intelligence. Here, too, Russia has made advances, Lange said.

US and EU sanctions have apparently not stopped Russia from maintaining access to microchips and other high-tech products. Russia also runs its own satellite navigation system to direct rocket attacks, Lange pointed out.

The DGAP study says awareness is rising in Berlin that Russia can rapidly rebuild its land army with its up-and-running arms industry — even to the extent that its fighting power would eclipse NATO's present deterrence potential in a conventional war.

"The alliance no longer rules out a Russian attack," said Mölling. "The question for NATO and Germany no longer is whether they will ever need to be able to fight a war against another country, but only when."


Ukraine and the United States will hold a military industry conference in Washington on Dec. 6 and 7, Ukrainian and U.S. officials said on Friday.
Kyiv is ramping up efforts to produce its own weapons amid concerns that supplies from the West might be faltering. It also hopes joint ventures with international armament producers can help revive its domestic industry.
 

A European Union decision next month to launch membership talks with Ukraine is "at risk" and there is no agreement in the bloc to grant Kyiv a further 50 billion euros ($54 bln) in aid, a senior official said on Friday.
The downbeat comments chime with increasing fatigue in Ukraine, which has been struggling to push back against a Russian invasion since February 2022, and a more gloomy mood setting in among Kyiv's Western backers as the war drags on.
From regular reassurances that the EU would stand by Ukraine "as long as it takes", the official said latest discussions in the bloc over further support to Kyiv were a "reality check".
"Leaders... were realizing it's quite expensive," said the official, who is involved in preparing a Dec.14-15 summit in Brussels of the EU 27 member states' national leaders. "How do we pay for this?"

A proposal by the bloc's executive European Commission to revise the bloc's long-term budget to assign another 50 billion euros for Ukraine through 2027 was criticised from several sides, said the official.
The official said a recent budget ruling by the German constitutional court further tightened the room for maneuver for the bloc's biggest financial contributor.
"We cannot allow Ukraine to go bankrupt, it's not an option for us. But it's not easy," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss talks between EU leaders held behind closed doors.
The person further cast doubt on EU starting formal membership talks with Ukraine, saying expectations for a decision at the same summit next month were "at risk".
The official quoted as one reason Hungary's resistance potentially obstructing the unanimity necessary for such a move.
The person also said some EU leaders proposed to return to the topic in March, 2024, after the next assessment promised by the executive European Commission of whether Ukraine met the remaining conditions.
While Hungary was openly calling for a new EU strategy on Russia's war in Ukraine, the official said others in the bloc were also increasingly asking questions about the future of the war following failed hopes for Ukraine's counteroffensive.
"Maybe we have had too high expectations," said the official. "Will we continue to support Ukraine financially, military? Do we have the means to do this? Are we sure that the U.S. will be following us over the coming years?"
"It's not that people have been calling for peace. Individual members have said very clearly that we at some point need an end to this. The consensus is to continue to provide support to Ukraine, but some of those questions are coming."


“Russians have been subjected to propaganda their whole lives,” said Petro Yatsenko, spokesman for Ukraine’s co-ordination headquarters for the treatment of PoWs, during a tour of the camp at an undisclosed location in western Ukraine. “It’s like trying to pull someone out of a religious sect.”

About a third of all PoWs in the camp are former convicts, recruited by the army into the Storm-Z penal military units, according to Yatsenko.
 
Thread: https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1725157813364600855

Using Google Translate here, apologies if it sounds odd:

As I promised, this is how I write. Impressions from over a week's stay in Ukraine. There will be no operational details, but please know that we met with analysts and subunit commanders. The trip was very productive.
Let's start with Załużny's article in The Economist. The word stalmate is used quite awkwardly (more on that in a moment). But it emphasizes that the counteroffensive has ended. Ukraine currently does not have the potential to conduct offensive operations.
Personally, I think that the culmination of the counteroffensive took place in September, when the Ukrainians "broke" the Russian line of fortifications west of Verbowe.
Here, I do not expect any major changes until spring, although I assume that some form of attacks in Zaporozhye will be maintained (team/platoon attacks). This is not Normandy 1944 and no one here is waiting for a magical breakthrough.
I don't know if Załużny used the word "stalemate" on purpose, but unfortunately it has political connotations. I believe that from Zelensky's perspective, a stalemate may lead to a freezing of the front (as in 2015) and a withdrawal of military aid from the West. Hence his immediate comment, countering Z's words.
Ukraine receives less ammunition than in the summer, which affects the intensity of artillery fire. Ammunition also arrives in Ukraine irregularly, which makes planning operations difficult.
Therefore, I expect that Kiev will slowly move to the defensive and focus on expanding its fortification systems. This will allow for a reduction in the forces involved in maintaining the front and for the gradual rebuilding of forces and training of units that have so far taken part in the fighting.
Given the failure to achieve the goals of the counteroffensive, Kiev must rethink its current theory of victory and concept of using force.
It seems that 2024 will be a difficult year for Ukraine. There is no equipment in the West, probably no ammunition either. Some of the holes will be patched by drones (hundreds of thousands produced annually from 2024).
But to recapture the area, combined actions are needed, air attacks (drones??), artillery, tanks and IFVs. The last three will probably be missing. Besides, I already said half a year ago that the peak of supplies of equipment (contracted) to Ukraine had passed. Nothing has changed in this respect.
The Russians conduct reconnaissance of the frontline areas 24/7. A mouse won't slip through, not to mention large amounts of hardware. To put these words in context, we saw what an attempted Russian attack on Ukrainian positions looks like.
30 seconds after detection, the Russian group was covered by mortar fire. After another four minutes, artillery cluster ammunition. It's the same with Russians. These are the realities of this war.


I see changes in your own position over the years. In 2020, you told The New York Times that the biggest challenge for Lithuania was the Suwalki Gap and the Russian minority. In 2023, you said that Kaliningrad was a Russian, not a Lithuanian, problem. What caused this change?

I think Kaliningrad is still an issue for NATO, but the ascension of Finland and the upcoming ascension of Sweden will totally change the setup in the Baltic Sea region. Russia will experience Kaliningrad being surrounded, but it will still be an issue for us because there are capabilities in Kaliningrad. We still need to take this into consideration and make plans for it, but it is now totally surrounded, so Russians need to make plans to reinforce it and have connections to the exclave in wartime. [...]

[The Suwalki Gap] is still a very important territory, as it is NATO’s land link to the three Baltic states. Of course, Finland and Sweden are quite close. Now, Sweden’s Gotland island in the Baltic Sea will be very important as an “unsinkable carrier”, where planes could take off and land in the event of a war in the Baltics, and where essential supplies could be delivered. Nevertheless, we would still need to keep the Suwalki Gap open.

When we talk about the security situation in the region, we cannot ignore Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kyiv counter-offensive is ongoing, but its progress is slower than most people expected. How do you assess the situation on the battlefield?

I think we see a frozen front now where Ukraine is trying to attack just small bits in one area, and Russians are trying to attack in another area. Yes, there are small tactical gains, but the big picture doesn’t really change. It’s important to note that this is the land war we are talking about.

If you look at what’s happening in the sea, the Russian Navy now has difficulties manoeuvring in the Black Sea because of Ukraine’s attacks. They forced the Russian navy away from Sevastopol to the eastern part of the Black Sea, which was a major feat for the Ukrainians.

But winter is coming, and we will see stalled action on land, so we’ll wait for spring. I hope that help from the West will continue to flow in, and that we will help Ukraine to train its forces so that they will be able to win in the end.

Do you think Russia would be willing to go to war against NATO?

Russia will do whatever it can not to start this war because, I think, they know they should not mess with NATO.

The issue is, if we move forward in time and if we – I hope not – allow Ukraine to lose, then other nations will look into this and they will draw their lessons from this. Iran will draw their lessons in relation to Israel, China will draw their lessons in relation to Taiwan. Then the focus of the US would be in the Pacific, and that would leave Russia to the Europeans more or less.

We really need to spend the 2 percent [of GDP on defence] and to even get above that. [...] If we can present that picture to Russia, then, I hope, they will not come. Only the enemy decides if your deterrence is working.
 

Bulgaria's Soviet stockpiles and large defense industry may be key to Ukraine's success​

Story by Asami Terajima

Bulgaria has had to walk a fine line, trying to covertly support Ukraine without provoking Russia.

The Balkan state has been historically influenced by Moscow. Opinions on Ukraine are split among its 6.7 million people, many of whom buy into Kremlin propaganda.

The new coalition government elected in June after two years of political deadlock is now shifting Bulgaria towards Kyiv and the West. Sofia has been quietly shipping ammunition to Kyiv since 2022, but the most recent pledge of 100 armored vehicles was the first package to be announced publicly.

Supporting Ukraine is in Bulgaria's strategic interest for several reasons, Bulgarian Defense Minister Todor Tagarev said in an interview with the Kyiv Independent. Russia "broke all international norms" and is "destroying the international security architecture."

"First, this is a moral obligation to help the victim of aggression," Tagarev said. "But it is also in our strategic interest that Ukraine withholds the Russian aggression and manages to recover its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is key for the stability in Europe – particularly for Eastern Europe in the Black Sea region."

But it will be tough to disentangle from Russia, whose propaganda is influential in Bulgarian politics and among the public. The sitting president, Rumen Radev, is pro-Russian.

Tagarev said there are politicians who oppose giving weapons to Ukraine, claiming that they're trying to achieve peace faster, even though this argument makes no sense.

Bulgaria also heavily depends on Russian oil.

Some Bulgarians still see Russia as the power that liberated their country from the Ottoman Empire in the 1800s. Kremlin narratives are "accepted quite favorably by a significant portion of the population," but this is changing.

A growing number of Bulgarians support Ukraine, he said. Russia's war in Ukraine appeared to be the wake-up call that his country needed.

Read also: Bulgarian Defense Minister: ‘Pro-Russian disinformation weakening Bulgarian army’

Key neighbor​

Bulgaria is a good friend to have, with its abundant Soviet weapon stockpiles and large defense industry.

In his first public visit to Bulgaria in July, President Volodymyr Zelenskyscolded Radev for his opposition to arming Ukraine for what he described as a "conflict."

Radev struck back in July, telling journalists that Kyiv "insists on waging war" while "Europe pays for everything."

The Ukrainian Embassy in Sofia pounced on the comment, calling Radev out for repeating Russian propaganda. Bulgarian Prime Minister Nikolai Denkov also rebuked it, saying it doesn't reflect the position of the EU and NATO – Bulgaria is a member of both.

Tagarev said the president's remarks won't affect support from Bulgaria, which is a parliamentary republic. That means the government is in charge of defense, security, and foreign policy, not the president.

"That's all in our hands – the cabinet, and now the cabinet differs significantly from the president's position," Tagarev said, adding that the government does "not really" discuss with President Radev the military aid it ships to Ukraine.

Getting Bulgaria's aid is important, especially now. American support is imperiled by a deadlock in the House, and pro-Russian prime ministers of Slovakia and Hungaryveto EU support for Ukraine.

Danger in the Black Sea​

The Black Sea has always been a key stage of Moscow's imperial aggression.

From contaminating the sea with hundreds of mines at the beginning of the all-out war to conducting regular and unpredictable naval exercises, Russia has posed a considerable threat to Ukraine's Black Sea neighbors.

Bulgaria now faces two concerns about the Black Sea – Russia's ongoing firing drills that threaten the Balkan state's territorial integrity and the floating mines.

Ever since exiting the Black Sea Grain Initiative deal in July, Russia has usednaval exercises to block Ukrainian exports of grain. With Russia's ongoing training nearby, part of Bulgaria's economic zone in the Black Sea remains partially blockaded.


"So it's one thing that it is practically blocking traffic because it communicates, 'it's dangerous, we do live fire here, so don't cross,'" Tagarev said.

"That's an established practice if it goes for a few days, maximum. But Russia has been closing that area of the Black Sea for now, really three months already, which is obviously unacceptable."

In August, a Russian warshipfired,brokered%20grain%20deal%20last%20month.) warning shots at a cargo ship in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, past Ukraine.

Bulgaria hassaid it was discussing with NATO allies about Russia's continued partial blockade of its economic zone but has not issued a solution yet. Despite the provocation, Tagarev said it's still "not a direct threat to the territory or for aggression against a member of the NATO alliance, but there are a variety of risks."

"All these are risks that may bring casualties, and we need to deal with that – these are significant risks," Tagarev said. "So we are not so worried that Russia will dare to attack a NATO ally. But we are worried that some of those risks may materialize in either material damage or casualties."


The Turkish Defense Ministry in Octoberannounced a trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria and Romania to deal with the mines but did not elaborate in detail.

Tagarev said the goal is to clear mines "on a systematic, more rigorous basis within the joining forces of the three countries." This is unlikely to affect Ukraine's waters.

"We want to make the navigation safer, but we do not want to give a reason for escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea," Tagarev said, adding that it would still be beneficial for Ukraine's export perspective.

After Russia pulled out of the grain corridor, Kyiv is stillexporting – though in much lower volumes.

Read also: Not backing Ukraine is ‘disastrous for Slovak security,’ says former defense minister

Modernizing the army​

Tagarev returned to his defense minister office after 10 years to find his neighbor engulfed in war and the Black Sea region in peril.

"It's much more challenging, of course," said Tagarev, who last had the job for two months as part of then Prime Minister Marin Raykov's caretaker government in 2013.

One of his key priorities is modernizing the army. The country had had five elections in two years, meaning there is a large backlog of work to be done.

Pro-Russian disinformation is also hitting Bulgaria hard, with Tagarev recently saying that it "seriously affects the army's ability to fight."

As the poorest country in the EU, gathering sufficient funding to modernize its armed forces to NATO standards has been difficult. The country's inventory is pretty close to what it had in 1980,according to Dutch open-source defense analyst site Oryx. Political instability made it worse.

"Now the budget is being increased, we are getting more money, we need more armament, we need people, training, infrastructure and all that," Tagarev said, adding that there are now more opportunities and demand for a speedy modernization of Bulgaria's armed forces.

When asked about Bulgaria's plans for how it plans to supply its Soviet-era weapons to Ukraine, the defense minister said, "We are doing what's possible," mainly supplying small arms, light weapons, and ammunition.

"As government policy, we provide opportunities for companies to sell, and it's up to the companies to sign contracts, find ways to deliver their products to Ukraine," the minister said, adding that most defense companies in Bulgaria are privately-owned.

Tagarev said that Bulgaria's industrial production and exports doubled or tripled last year "for a billion or more euros." He hinted that "the assumption is that, in large part, that is due to the export of ammunition and material from Bulgarian companies."

According to a Guardian report citing Bulgarian officials, Sofia supplied 30% of Ukraine's Soviet ammo needs last spring after Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited in secret.

"The defense industry is working 24/7, and that's the most important support that Ukraine gets," Tagarev said.
 

(1/5) Over the last week, the most intense ground combat has been taking place in three areas:
(2/5) on the Kupiansk axis, in Luhansk Oblast; around Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast; and on the left bank of the Dnipro river in Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead.
(3/5) Neither side has achieved substantial progress in any of these areas. Russia continues to suffer particularly heavy casualties around Avdiivka.
(4/5) Eyewitness reports suggest small uncrewed aerial vehicles and artillery (especially cluster rounds) continue to play a major role in disrupting the attacks of both sides.
(5/5) As colder winter weather sets in earnest in eastern Ukraine, there are few immediate prospects of major changes in the frontline.


“What the war [in Ukraine] has shown us: be innovative in the battlefield. You have to be innovative.” -Estonian Minister of Defence @HPevkur, on lessons learned on innovation from the war in Ukraine.


The result has been a broad shift in the world’s attention away from Ukraine to the fighting in Gaza — a trend that worries many Ukrainians. They fear that a combination of global fatigue, competing political agendas and limited resources will result in less aid for their military, hurting the country’s ability to sustain its confrontation with Russia.
“The longer we talk about our war, the less interest it holds for people,” said 21-year-old Ivan Mahuriak, who lives in Lviv in western Ukraine. Like many other Ukrainians, he feels as if the world stopped paying attention to the war in Ukraine even before the Hamas attack on Israel.

Millions of Ukrainians are burdened by the realization that the war Russia initiated in their country won’t end any time soon.

“No matter how frightening it may sound, I am preparing myself for the fact that this war will last my entire life,” said Zoya Krasovska, a 34-year-old resident of Lviv, who says her greatest fear is that allies will divert resources to other conflicts.

“It’s akin to receiving a diagnosis of an incurable illness, where you don’t stop living because of it, but you live with the awareness that it is with you forever,” Krasovska said.


Unlike 2022, when morale was high despite power outages, disrupted water service and blackouts, this year Ukrainians face the frustration of the slow counteroffensive and shortages of sophisticated weapons. Domestic politics have become a greater focus.

Postoiuk, a Netherlands-based development manager for the Way to Ukraine fund, said the team expected a decline in donations, but not to this extent. Since the Israel-Hamas war broke out, it takes at least twice as long to raise enough money to buy a car for the army — usually $8,000 to $14,000.

Through their work, they have collected nearly $147,000 — money that supported 13 brigades and provided vehicles that included 15 pickups, three SUVs, an ambulance and a drone.

For the first time in the history of the fund, donations from within Ukraine have exceeded those from abroad, he said.


Russian drones hit infrastructure facilities in Ukraine in an overnight assault that caused power outages in more than 400 towns and villages in the south, southeast, and north of the country, Ukrainian officials said on Saturday.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy congratulated the air force for shooting down what it said were 29 out of 38 Iranian-made Shahed drones in several Ukrainian regions between 8 p.m. (1800 GMT) on Friday and 4 a.m. on Saturday.


Ukraine's largest private energy company DTEK is ready for another winter and Russian attacks, but its power plants need more missile defence systems to operate safely, Chief Executive Officer Maxim Timchenko told Reuters.
Since Russia's February 2022 invasion, Europe, including members of the Soviet Union and the ex-Communist bloc, have supplied hundreds of transformers, miles of cables and thousands of diesel generators needed to light and heat the country in winter, when temperatures fall well below freezing.
But the experience of the past 12 months has prompted Ukraine to seek more air defence systems to protect its critical infrastructure.
"We need more Patriots, more IRIS systems. We cannot protect ourselves against ballistic missiles if we don't have air defence systems," Timchenko told Reuters in an interview in Warsaw.
"I know that our president and our government have been doing everything that they can to bring the message that we need this equipment to protect our energy system."
 

A Bulgarian arms magnate who survived two Russian assassination attempts has raised the alarm about a sabotage campaign that he says Moscow has been waging for years as it tries to disrupt crucial weapons supplies to Ukraine.
Emilian Gebrev, whose company, Emco, produces much of the Bulgarian output of Soviet-standard bullets and tank shells shipped to Kyiv, told the Financial Times that Russian saboteurs have actively targeted his factories and depots — including after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.
“The Russian threats [mean] a new set of measures should be undertaken at a national level, as well as the level of the alliance,” he wrote in emailed answers to questions. He was referring to Nato, of which Bulgaria has been a member since 2004.
The arms manufacturer said Russian military intelligence (GRU) operatives who tried to kill him twice in 2015 “obviously acted on orders from a very high level in Moscow”, but said it remained unclear why Russia “would use subversive methods on defence-related sites and [against] individual lives on Nato and EU soil”.

Experts have pointed out that Emco is one of just a few companies making Soviet-standard 125mm tank shells outside Russia, which Ukrainian forces still use for their old fleet of tanks. Such specific capabilities may be among the reasons why the Bulgarian manufacturer is the target of sabotage attempts.
“Russians are very interested in our facilities and the people manning them,” said a Bulgarian official who requested anonymity. “The question is how Bulgarian authorities can protect the industry and individuals, owners of the industry. Botched investigations, destroyed evidence — this is a problem. Who investigates the prosecutors?”

The new government is counting on the country’s arms industry to spur economic growth in the EU’s poorest member. Bulgarian exports jumped by more than €1bn in 2022 compared with the previous year — and a “good portion of that is due to ammunition production”, defence minister Todor Tagarev told the FT.
Bulgarian officials estimate that as much as 40 per cent of the bullets and shells used by Ukraine in its war against Russia are manufactured in Bulgaria.


The Ukrainian army said on Sunday that it had pushed Russian forces back “three to eight kilometres” from the banks of the Dnipro River, which if confirmed would be the first meaningful advance by Kyiv’s forces months into a disappointing counteroffensive.

“Preliminary figures vary from three to eight kilometres, depending on the specifics, geography and landscape design of the left bank,” the army spokesperson Natalia Gumenyuk told Ukrainian television, without specifying whether Ukraine’s military had complete control of the area or if the Russians had retreated.

“The enemy still continues artillery fire on the right bank,” she said, estimating that “several tens of thousands” of Russian troops were in the area.

“We have a lot of work to do,” she added.


Russia launched several waves of drone attacks on Kyiv early on Sunday for the second night in row, stepping up its assaults on the Ukrainian capital after several weeks of pause, the city's military administration said.
"The enemy's UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) were launched in many groups and attacked Kyiv in waves, from different directions, at the same time constantly changing the vectors of movement along the route," Serhiy Popko, head of the Kyiv's military administration, said on the Telegram messaging app.
"That is why the air raid alerts were announced several times in the capital."
Ukraine's Air Force said its air defence systems destroyed 15 of 20 Russia-launched Shahed kamikaze drones over Kyiv, Poltava and Cherkasy regions.
There had been no initial reports of "critical damage" or casualties, Popko said earlier. He also said that close to 10 of the drones were downed over Kyiv and its outskirts.
 

(1/6) Russia is likely considering bringing the Soviet-era M-55 MYSTIC B high altitude reconnaissance aircraft back into service.
(2/6) With an operating ceiling of over 70,000 feet, the aircraft has been recently employed as an earth-sciences research platform. However, it has been observed carrying a military reconnaissance pod, developed for employment on Russian fighter aircraft.
(3/6) A critical flaw in Russian procurement strategy has been its failure to establish an adequate Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability.
(4/6) This is critical for the timely and accurate prosecution of targets by air, sea, and ground forces.
(5/6) There is a realistic possibility that the M-55 will return to frontline service to bolster Russia’s limited ISTAR capabilities over Ukraine. Operating at high altitudes enables the sensors to work at considerable stand-off range.
(6/6) It is almost certain that the aircraft will conduct missions against Ukraine from the relative safety of Russian airspace.

Longer read here on Ukrainian recruitment efforts with some interviews with Ukrainian people: https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/19/europe/ukraine-difficulties-in-military-recruitment-intl/index.html


The drones began crashing on Ukraine’s front lines, with little explanation.
For months, the aerial vehicles supplied by Quantum Systems, a German technology firm, had worked smoothly for Ukraine’s military, swooping through the air to spot enemy tanks and troops in the country’s war against Russia. Then late last year, the machines abruptly started falling from the sky as they returned from missions.
“It was this mystery,” said Sven Kruck, a Quantum executive who received a stern letter from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense demanding a fix.
Quantum’s engineers soon homed in on the issue: Russians were jamming the wireless signals that connected the drones to the satellites they relied on for navigation, leading the machines to lose their way and plummet to earth. To adjust, Quantum developed artificial intelligence-powered software to act as a kind of secondary pilot and added a manual option so the drones could be landed with an Xbox controller. The company also built a service center to monitor Russia’s electronic attacks.
“All we could do is get information from the operators, try to find out what wasn’t working, test and try again,” Mr. Kruck said.
A battle is raging in Ukraine in the invisible realm of electromagnetic waves, with radio signals being used to overwhelm communication links to drones and troops, locate targets and trick guided weapons. Known as electronic warfare, the tactics have turned into a cat-and-mouse game between Russia and Ukraine, quietly driving momentum swings in the 21-month old conflict and forcing engineers to adapt.
“Electronic warfare has impacted the fighting in Ukraine as much as weather and terrain,” said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, a think tank in Washington, adding that every operation in the conflict now has to take into account enemy moves in the electromagnetic spectrum.

Good read^
 

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a fresh package of US military aid to Ukraine worth $100 million (approximately €91.38 million), during a surprise visit to Kyiv.

The State Department said the new package includes three million rounds of small-arms ammunition and equipment for the HIMARS precision rocket launchers.

The US has supplied Ukraine since the start of the war with some $40 billion worth of security assistance, which has proved integral in Kyiv's fight against Moscow.


Ukraine sacked two senior cyber defence officials on Monday, a government official said, as prosecutors announced a probe into alleged embezzlement in the government's cyber security agency.
Yurii Shchyhol, head of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP), and his deputy, Viktor Zhora, were dismissed by the government, senior cabinet official Taras Melnychuk wrote on Telegram.

Melnychuk, the cabinet's representative to parliament, did not mention the reasons for the dismissals. Neither man nor their lawyers could be reached for comment.
The SSSCIP is responsible for securing government communications and defending the state from cyber attacks.
News of the firings came less than an hour before anti-corruption prosecutors said they were investigating the head and deputy head of the SSSCIP over their alleged roles in a six-person plot to embezzle 62 million UAH ($1.72 million) between 2020 and 2022.
Authorities suspect the officials of buying software at an inflated price from two companies allegedly under their control in a sale that had been closed to other bidders, Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau said.
Prosecutors did not name either official. In a statement on Telegram, the SSSCIP said it was cooperating with investigators and that all agency procurement had been carried out legally.
Ukraine has stepped up efforts to curtail corruption as it pursues membership in the European Union, which has made the fight against graft a key prerequisite for negotiations to begin.
Recent targets for investigation have included a billionaire former patron of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the ex-head of Ukraine's Supreme Court. Both have denied wrongdoing.
In September, Shchyhol told Reuters that Russian spies are using hackers to target computer systems at law enforcement agencies to identify and obtain evidence related to alleged Russian war crimes.


“We live every day between hope and belief. Because when we are stronger, we believe in our victory. We believe that we will be supported. If the situation is a little bit more difficult, we hope,” said Andriy Kostin, Ukraine’s prosecutor general. “Russia is weaponizing time.”

Next to him, Gen. Robert Brieger, an Austrian who currently serves as the chairman of the EU military committee, said that the EU has rapidly increased production of new military equipment, for both EU members and Ukraine.

“The ambition is to produce one million 155mm artillery ammunition rounds by spring next year,” Brieger said. “Probably we will not fully reach this ambition.”
The Austrian general was sober to the point of sullenness in his remarks, acknowledging that June’s baby coup by Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin had not weakened Putin to the extent many were hoping.

“I consume the open resources, and my impression is that despite this Wagner incident last summer, the regime is stable,” he said.

Moreover, Brieger acknowledged that historic sanctions on the Kremlin had not eliminated Russia’s ability to continue its campaign against Ukraine.

“Russia has an enormous potential to ramp up production capacity, and they proved it during World War II. This is a big economy,” he said. “Probably not the high-end products, but vast numbers of material and big numbers of human resources—not well-trained, not very motivated—but still a factor on the battlefield.”


When the war broke out, Kyiv relied on Soviet-era S-300 and Buk M1 medium-range anti-missile systems — a problem as replacement missiles are largely made by Russia.

Those defenses have now been beefed up by short-range Gepard systems from Germany and Avenger Short-Range Air Defense from the U.S. to knock down drones and cruise missiles. At medium range, Ukraine is using MIM-23 Hawks from the U.S. made by Raytheon; NASAMS, developed by Raytheon and Norway's Kongsberg; and Germany's IRIS-T SLM. Long-range defenses are provided by the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and the Eurosam SAMP/T supplied by France and Italy.

Ukrainian air defense troops have shown they are capable of integrating modern systems with Soviet ones, Serhiy Popko, head of Kyiv's military administration, told POLITICO.

"We continue to expect support from allies and partners. We need more air defense. Diverse. And not only for the capital but also for every Ukrainian city. Each anti-aircraft missile complex is worth its weight in gold," Popko said.
 

Ukrainian forces were engaged in containing increasing Russian attacks on Monday around the shattered eastern town of Bakhmut, military officials said.
The officials said Ukraine's troops had also achieved some success after crossing to the east bank of the Dnipro River in southern Kherson region.

Volodymyr Fityo, a spokesperson for Ukrainian ground forces, said Russian troops focused attacks on Klishchiivka, a nearby village on heights retaken by Ukrainian forces in September.

"Russian occupying forces have brought in the necessary reserves and gone on the attack," Fityo told national television.
"Eleven attacks have been repelled in the past 24 hours. The enemy is trying to dislodge our men from defensive positions around Klishchiivka."

Fighting in the east has also centred on the equally devastated town of Avdiivka, still in Ukrainian hands 20 months into the war and after more than a month of Russian assaults.
Military analyst Serhiy Zgurets, writing on the Espreso TV media outlet website, said Russian forces were trying to launch a new offensive on the town, known for its vast coking plant.
"To be truthful, enemy's attempts to surround Avdiivka have resulted in significant losses for them," Zgurets wrote.
Maksym Morozov, an Interior Ministry major, told Espreso that recent rains had left the ground soft and unsuitable for enemy equipment near the town, where 1,500 residents remain from a pre-war population of 32,000.
Another military spokesperson, Andriy Kovaliov, said Ukrainian forces had "carried out several successful and effective actions" on the east bank of the Dnipro nearly a week after military officials acknowledged their presence there.
Russian forces were making up to 10 daily attempts to dislodge Ukrainian forces from positions on the eastern bank and were drafting in reserves, he told national television.


The number of troop losses Russia has incurred in the war so far have been significantly greater than those suffered by Ukraine, said Col. Janno Märk, head of planning for the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) Headquarters. Speaking on ETV show "Ukraina stuudio," Col. Märk said that there have been no significant changes to the front line in Ukraine over the past week.

Russian troops are still actively attacking in the Donetsk Oblast in the vicinity of Avdiivka and Marinka, and have made some progress in the industrial areas to the north and southeast of Avdiivka. They are also attacking around Bakhmut, both to the north and south. However, according to Col. Märk, Russian troops have not made much progress in those areas. They are also attacking along the Kupiansk, Svatove and Kreminna lines.

While Ukraine has carried out localized attacks near Bakhmut, the front line has not moved. Ukraine has also continued localized attacks in the Verbove region of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, but also without much success.

Märk added that, on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, where Ukrainian troops began their operations more than a month ago, Ukraine has managed to expand its bridgeheads. "So far, around 30 kilometers northeast of the city of Kherson, the river crossing is around two to three kilometers, and 15 kilometers southeast of Kherson, the river crossing is up to four kilometers. The immediate objective of this operation is to push the Russian Federation forces out so that they do not extend their artillery systems to the city of Kherson and the surrounding settlements. The 152mm artillery system, which is the one mainly used by the Russian troops, has an effective range of 25 kilometers," the colonel explained.

Märk said that the Russian troops have been working hard to prevent Ukraine gaining control of more bridgeheads over the Dnipro River and from bringing additional troops there. Russian troop losses there are also very high, he said. "The losses during this four-week period are estimated to be in the region of 3,500 Russian soldiers, including both wounded and killed. And that has already forced the Russian command to redirect units from other fronts to this area," the colonel said.

Ukraine claims that Russia has lost more than 300,000 troops since the full-scale invasion began last February. The Economist estimates that around 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 120,000 injured. According to Col. Märk, it is difficult to speculate on the precise number of casualties, though the losses for both sides are very high. However, he added, the losses suffered by the aggressor are higher.

"Obviously, the losses on the Ukrainian side are high and on the Russian side they are much higher. It is the attacking side that has suffered the greatest losses. And that is partly down to the choice of tactics. The armed forces of the Russian Federation do not count human lives, while for the Ukrainian forces, human life is very important. There are certainly differences in tactical behavior as a result of that too. Ukraine's losses are definitely several times lower than those of the Russian Federation," he said.

Märk said that Ukraine's counter-offensive, which has now been going on for around five months, has not brought the success that had been hoped for, with Ukrainian troops aiming to have reached the edge of the Crimean Peninsula by now.

According to Col. Märk, there are several reasons for the delay.

"The war has entered a phase of static positioning and attrition warfare. This is also the biggest risk, as outlined by Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi (Commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces) (in The Economist), that if war of attrition like this, a static war, continues for years, it will eventually exhaust not only the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but the entire country," Märk said.

"There are a number of reasons why we are in this situation. One is certainly Western military assistance, which has perhaps been sufficient to keep Ukraine at war, but not to achieve decisive success. The second, which Zaluzhnyi points out, is the development of technology. He cites drones and intelligence tools in particular, which have created a situation where the Ukrainian side knows exactly what the enemy is doing and the enemy knows exactly what Ukraine is doing. It is very difficult to concentrate and mobilize large units, because the enemy can see it and they will call in indirect fire. It's more about small units, and that's part of the problem," Märk explained.

"Another big part of the problem is that the Russian Federation continues to have a very large level of superiority in terms of weaponry, equipment, missiles, ammunition and manpower. All these factors combined have turned this war into a kind of static positional war. This situation is certainly not good from Ukraine's perspective and is more advantageous to the Russian Federation," he added.
 

The Ukrainians stuck in the Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine testify to the daily fear they experience from the occupying power. The new authorities are destroying their identity, pushing those who do not have Russian passports out of their homes and threatening to take away their children. Soviet symbols also serve this purpose.


Most people recognise that as long as Vladimir Putin is in the Kremlin, there is not likely to be any lasting peace, and any pause in the fighting would be used by Russia to rearm. Surveys show that the majority of Ukrainians oppose negotiations with Russia, especially if they would involve acknowledging lost territory.

At the same time, the exhaustion of those who have been at the front since the start of the conflict, the difficulty in mobilising new recruits and the failure of this summer’s counteroffensive to take back territory have led to some cautious voices suggesting that a change of tack is required.

“The choice is very simple. If we are ready to send another 300,000 or 500,000 lives of Ukrainian soldiers to capture Crimea and liberate Donbas, and if we get the right number of tanks and F16s from the west, we can do this,” Omelyan said. “But I don’t see the 500,000 more people ready to die and I don’t see the readiness of the west to send the type and quantity of weapons we would need.”


Meet 🇺🇦 Backfire: a powerful drone that flies up to 35 km behind enemy's positions and causes colossal losses. Main feature of UAV: powerful GPS antenna, resistant to Russian jamming. The drone is being prepared for serial production. Another tech supported by @BRAVE1ua


Illustrations from the Russian MOD's Main Armored Directorate on the protection of equipment from FPV drones and quadcopter munitions drops. Lots and lots of cages...


Brief update south of Bakhmut:

Russia is trying to improve its tactical situation from Bakhmut to Kurdyumivka. No signs of a large-scale operation yet, but the situation is still developing. The enemy likely aims to regain the strategic initiative across the frontline.


F-16s: Addressing Challenges and Creating Opportunities

Introduction


There have been many developments on the frontlines, including the increased presence of guided aerial bombs, that turn old dumb bombs into more precise and deadly weapons. This poses a significant threat, allowing russians to engage targets anywhere around 60 km away, placing them outside the effective range of most air defense systems.
This war is heavily dependent on artillery, leading to two significant challenges for both sides - shortages of ammunition and barrel wear, along with the straightforward combat loss of artillery. In attempts to address these issues, both sides seek foreign assistance, while alternative methods, to a limited extent, such as FPV and aerial bombs serve as partial compensatory measures

Problem

The increasing use of guided aerial bombs by russians is an increasing problem due to their capacity to carry a much larger payload than conventional artillery shells or kamikaze drones like the Shahed. Russia's aerial bombs typically carry explosives ranging from 100 to 700 kg. With the adoption of the UMPK kit, russian jets gained the capability to transform dumb bombs into gliding munitions, allowing them to target locations from approximately 50 - 65 km away.

This places them beyond the effective range of most if not all, frontline air defense (AD) weaponry. While Ukraine does possess a limited number of AD systems capable of reaching jets deploying gliding bombs, these systems are primarily tasked with protecting more strategically significant installations located farther from the frontline.

In practical terms, this presents a problem of a systematic character. The number of existing AD systems is insufficient to consistently counter the threat posed by jets launching gliding bombs.
Advancement of this technology, coupled with the recent utilization of the RBK-500 cluster bomb by Russians demonstrates the potential for future problems if russia successfully organizes an industrial-level deployment of these bombs, particularly when boosted by the UMPK kit.

Solution

In my view, deploying F-16s armed with AIM-120D missiles, with an operational range of approximately 100 km (with claims that the range is actually much longer), could effectively mitigate this problem. This capability will allow Ukraine to engage Russian jets carrying guided bombs without flying into the frontline, thus avoiding most russian air defense systems like TOR or BUK. It is crucial to remember that Ukraine needs not just F-16s but also the appropriate AMRAAM missiles to effectively target air threats with air-to-air missiles.
Furthermore, this solution has the potential to not only mitigate the issue with glide bombs but also address concerns related to russian helicopters. Ka-52 and Mi-28 NM helicopters, operating 8-12 km away from their targets and deploying Vikhr and/or LMUR missiles, currently remain outside the effective range of Ukraine's Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems.

Summary

I remain skeptical about either side achieving aerial supremacy in this war, given the saturation of air defense (AD) systems that would impede dominance, and russia still operates fighters capable of deploying air-to-air missiles. A good retrospective example is the early stage of the war, where, despite having a larger russian air force and experienced pilots, they failed to establish control over Ukrainian skies. This occurred even with the advantages of surprise and a massive missile barrage against Ukrainian AD and radar sites, long before any serious AD systems from the West were brought to Ukraine.

Given this, the F-16's value lies in its potential to substantially impede Russian air capabilities rather than provide air dominance, possibly attaining favorable local air situations or temporary air superiority during offensive operations. This could offer a crucial window of opportunity for maneuvering. Realizing this potential would likely necessitate a considerable deployment of F-16s equipped with appropriate weaponry, including AIM-120, AGM-158 JASSM, and AGM-154 JSOW.

 

A months-long, mind-boggling investigation into the endless "volunteer" groups fighting for Russia in Ukraine. As @lizafokht, @seriozha_s, @oivshina found, they're all basically part of two structures – the MOD's BARS and the GRU's Redut, the new Wagner:

That is a long article in Russian that you will likely need to use Google translate for. Some quotes:

According to the BBC's calculations, Russians who went to war from civilian life (volunteers, conscripts and prisoners) now account for 41% of all losses of Russian forces. Back in February 2023, the share of dead people who got to the front from civilian life was one and a half times lower - 25%.

At the very beginning of the invasion, Russia used its most combat-ready formations for the main strikes. In the course of assaults and amphibious operations, these small, but most trained and equipped units suffered huge losses.

Thus, according to open sources alone, in the first two months of the war, Russia lost at least 600 paratroopers, 227 marines and 175 soldiers of the special forces of the Russian Guard killed. Even the losses of the GRU special forces, which are publicly known, are several times higher than the losses of these units during the 10 years of war in Chechnya. The real death toll is likely higher.

Casualty figures in this text are based on a list of confirmed dead Russian servicemen, which the BBC maintains in conjunction with Mediazona (recognized as a "foreign agent media" in Russia) and a team of volunteers based on open sources.

Taking into account the wounded and missing, by May, the elite detachments of the Russian army had only a quarter of their February strength in the ranks (based on expert estimates and the published number of detachments).
Since March 2022, Russia has been luring people from civilian life into service in order to somehow compensate for the losses of the most combat-ready units. Both veterans of past conflicts and those who had never been associated with the army before were recruited. People were offered salaries that were 5-6 times higher than the average earnings in this region, social guarantees and benefits for both the recruits themselves and their families.

As a result, tens of thousands of men have been recruited into the paramilitaries. According to BBC statistics, most often these are people aged 39 to 47 living in the Urals or in the regions of eastern Siberia. The oldest volunteer to die was 71 years old.


From 1 May to the end of September, the BBC estimated that volunteers were the fastest-growing category of casualties. During this period, at least 841 fighters of volunteer units were killed at the front. Only motorized rifle units lost more, in absolute numbers.


Discussing Russia and high technology these days may seem counterintuitive given the images from Ukraine of the Russian army in disarray, in trenches, using primarily massive artillery rather than ultramodern weapons with a high degree of autonomy. Likewise, the typical Russian tendency for overblown rhetoric has created unrealistic expectations among the broader public of what Russia was ready to deliver on the battlefield. Yet, the war is also providing a testing ground for new weapons systems on both sides. Mounting troubles notwithstanding, Russia continues to prioritise AI and selected emerging and disruptive technology (EDT) programmes not merely despite, but because of the weakening of its conventional forces and the growing capability gap with the West.
 

From the opening of 10 embassies to the intervention of special forces in Sudan and the establishment of several economic and military partnerships, Ukraine is trying to catch up with its Russian enemy on the African continent. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is becoming an important issue for Kyiv as it realizes that resistance to Russian invasion will be a long-term process.


Every day, groups of Russian infantry attack the tree lines and pockmarked fields east of this village, which block their push to surround the city of Avdiivka. Every day, Ukrainian troops cut most of them down.

But more Russians keep coming. Depleted Ukrainian units can’t shoot them all.

“Step by step, they take our positions,” said Lt. Oleksandr Shyrshyn, deputy commander of an understrength battalion of Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade that is defending a kilometer-long stretch of the front.

The battle for Avdiivka could mark the beginning of many months on the defensive for Ukraine. With the U.S. in the grip of partisan paralysis and Europe struggling to boost military production, the uncertain supply of Western ammunition limits what Kyiv’s army can now attempt. Meanwhile, Moscow smells weakness.

Russia’s first attacks on Avdiivka in October failed. Columns of tanks and armored troop carriers fell prey to mines, drones and artillery. The Russians changed tactics, sending waves of infantry forward in small groups. The shift echoed Ukraine’s own switch to foot tactics in its summer offensive after losing too many armored vehicles.
Both armies are struggling to maneuver on open, mined terrain beneath skies buzzing with drones. The difference: Russia, with a population nearly four times Ukraine’s, can afford to lose untold thousands of soldiers for small gains.

Russia’s massive losses in the nearly two-year war have left its ground forces reliant on old vehicles and poorly trained conscripts, limiting its offensive potential, for now, to grinding assaults on small cities. Russia lost tens of thousands of men in the 10-month battle for Bakhmut, its last notable victory.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is struggling to replace its infantry losses in the summer counteroffensive and the costly defense of Bakhmut. Ukrainian casualty numbers are a tightly kept secret, but fresh graves and full hospitals around the country testify to the heavy toll.

Ukrainian front-line units are commonly 20% to 40% below full strength, said Ihor Romanenko, a military analyst and retired Ukrainian lieutenant general. “Because of the shortage of infantry, those remaining are tired,” he said. There is little scope for rest or rotation.


Avdiivka has long been a thorn in the side of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine. The fortified town forms a salient north of Donetsk city, limiting Russian control of the region. Ukrainian troops have held off Russian attacks here since 2014, when Moscow launched a covert invasion of Ukraine’s east. Only around 1,400 residents remain in Avdiivka, once home to more than 30,000.

Russian troops have surrounded Avdiivka on three sides and have taken the only high ground in the area, a broad slag heap to the northeast, using it to keep Ukrainian armor at bay with antitank missiles. Waves of Russian infantry are trying to assault Avdiivka’s sprawling coke plant and have entered the city’s southeastern outskirts.
“We’re still motivated, but we’re exhausted,” said Pvt. Oleksandr Siergeichikov, who has been defending Avdiivka since the spring of 2022 with Ukraine’s 110th Mechanized Brigade. He described how Russian infantry took the slag heap by crawling over the bodies of their comrades until the Ukrainian defenders ran out of firepower.

The Russians’ plan is to push further past Avdiivka to the north and south, then cut off its supply roads. Avdiivka’s lifeline has shrunk to a gap of less than 4 miles between the jaws of the Russian advance.


The attacking Russian infantry are mostly poorly trained, often bunching up and making easy targets, say Ukrainian soldiers fighting here.

“They come like zombies. Some wear headlamps—a happy moment for any machine-gunner,” said Pvt. Bohdan Lysenko, who mans the 25 mm automatic cannon on a U.S.-made Bradley Fighting Vehicle with the 47th Brigade.

Drone images show fields littered with the bodies of Russian infantry hit by artillery, including U.S.-supplied cluster munitions. But the Russians keep coming.

“They’re not stupid. It’s a strategy,” said Cpl. Mykhailo Kotsyurba, a Bradley commander in the same company as Lysenko. “They look for weak points, then go there. We don’t have enough ammunition, but they have enough people.”

Some Russians give themselves up rather than continue with near-suicidal assaults. They often say they walked into Ukrainian positions by accident. Voluntary surrender is a crime in Russia.

“Our commanders, despite the circumstances, are given orders to take positions that are impossible to hold. That’s why we have such losses among the ordinary soldiers,” said Andrei Bednyaev, an infantryman from Russia’s 114th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. “They treat us as waste material.”

Bednyaev, who volunteered to speak to The Wall Street Journal in a makeshift Ukrainian holding facility, said he was captured while disoriented after an exploding drone blasted a brick wall at him.

The 47th Brigade, formed to take part in Ukraine’s counteroffensive, was trained by U.S. troops in Germany, armed with Bradleys and German-made Leopard 2 tanks, and thrown at Russia’s densely mined lines in the southern Zaporizhzhia region this summer. The slow pace of Western arms deliveries had given the Russians many months to prepare their defenses. Poor planning, reconnaissance and coordination also cost the Ukrainians, say troops who fought in the offensive. In August, the 47th took part in the capture of Robotyne, the only breach in the Russian’s main fortified line. But the brigade was exhausted and needed rebuilding.

In October, the 47th was sent to shore up the defense of Avdiivka. When the Russians saw their Bradleys and Leopards, they moved more drone units to the area to counter them.

Lt. Shyrshyn’s battalion, once made up of highly motivated volunteers, now relies mostly on briefly trained conscripts. The unit compensates by using its Bradleys in a mobile defense. “Here you can use the potential of Bradleys more effectively than in Zaporizhzhia, where it was impossible to maneuver.”

The 47th tries to cancel Russian advances with counterattacks. Their tactics, ordered from on high, often rely on costly frontal assaults. Kotsyurba and Lysenko’s unit was ordered to retake a lost tree line with six Bradleys, each carrying six infantrymen. Reconnaissance on the Russians’ numbers was limited. The enemy also held a perpendicular tree line, so that the Ukrainian assault would be under fire from the flank. “I told the general the plan was unrealistic,” said Kotsyurba.

Lysenko judged from experience that the attack would end in a slaughter. He refused to take part and was fined a month’s salary and bonus. “I paid 120,000 hryvnias for my life,” he said of the sum, equivalent to $3,300.

The assault went ahead regardless, with the Bradleys unloading their troops at the tree line under heavy fire. The trenches contained far more Russians than expected. Their machine guns and grenades killed 17 of the Ukrainian infantry. The rest escaped in Bradleys that bore scars from rocket-propelled grenades.

Kotsyurba and Lysenko’s company began the summer with 120 men. It’s now down to around 20, including replacements. The rest are dead, wounded or have been transferred away from assault duties. The new faces are mostly over 40 years old, some in poor health.

Many veterans of the 47th blame Ukraine’s struggles this year on Soviet-style commanders whose rigid tactics have thinned their Western-trained ranks.

“We don’t have a chance playing war-of-exhaustion with Russia,” said Lysenko. “We need a fundamental change in our army.”
 

Between the 18-19 November 2023 Russia launched around 50 Iranian-designed Shahed one way-attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, primarily towards Kyiv. These were launched in waves on two axes – from the Kursk to the east, and from Krasnodar to the south-east. (1/4)
One of Russia’s objectives was likely to degrade Ukraine’s air defences, to shape the battlespace ahead of any concerted winter campaign of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. (2/4)
Russia has now refrained from launching its premier air launched cruise missiles from its heavy bomber fleet for nearly two months, likely allowing it to build up a substantial stock of these weapons. (3/4)
Russia is highly likely to use these missiles if it repeats last year’s effort to destroy Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure. (4/4)


Germany on Tuesday announced €1.3 billions ($1.4 billion) more in military gear for Ukraine, including four further IRIS T-SLM air defense systems as well as artillery ammunition.

The package was unveiled by Defense Minister Boris Pistorius after talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Rustem Umerov in Kyiv.

Germany is the second biggest contributor of military equipment to Ukraine. The IRIS-T systems are highly sought after by Ukraine to shoot down Russian drones and missiles.

The latest four pledged by Germany mark the third batch of IRIS-T systems that Berlin is offering to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.

Three IRIS-T systems from the first batch have already been delivered, and a fourth will follow in this winter. A second batch of four will arrive in 2024.

This pizza box-sized equipment could be key to Ukraine keeping the lights on this winter

Staring down another frigid winter and desperate to keep the lights on, Ukraine’s power grid operator has surreptitiously imported custom-built equipment designed to withstand Russian electronic warfare attacks with the help of US officials, CNN has learned.

Engineers at US tech giant Cisco spent weeks building and stress-testing the new gear in a lab in Austin, Texas, and delivered a prototype to Ukraine in the spring with the help of a US Air Force plane carrying humanitarian aid, according to Cisco.


After Ukraine’s state-owned grid operator, Ukrenergo, quietly confirmed the new equipment worked despite Russian attacks on its GPS systems, Cisco shipped dozens of the pizza box-sized hardware kits worth an estimated $1 million to Ukraine, where they were installed across the country, Ukrenergo executives told CNN.

The new equipment, which has not been previously reported, could offer a crucial lifeline to Ukraine’s electricity grid, which remains a key target of Russian attacks as the Kremlin’s war enters its second full winter. Russian missile and drone strikes over the last two years have destroyed about 40% of the power substations and related equipment that Ukrenergo operates across the country, the grid operator told CNN.
 

Russia appears to be employing a known hybrid warfare tactic to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish border. Finnish authorities closed four border checkpoints on Finland’s southeastern border with Russia on November 18 after the Finnish Border Guard reported that an influx of about 300 asylum seekers, mostly from Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, had arrived at the Finnish border from Russia since September 2023.[1] Finnish Border Guards recorded 89 migrant crossings during a two-day period between November 7 and 14 — a sharp increase from the 91 crossings recorded from mid-July to November 12.[2] Four checkpoints currently remain open on Finland’s northeastern border with Russia with only two open for asylum applicants.[3] Reuters reported on November 19 that dozens of migrants arrived at the closed Finnish Nuijamaa and Vaalimaa crossings on November 18 and gathered around a campfire in sub-zero temperatures.[4] Finnish outlet Iltalehti reported on November 20 that Finnish authorities are considering closing the entire border with Russia on the night of November 21.[5] Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated on November 14 that Russian border guards are escorting or transporting migrants to the Finnish border, and the Finnish government stated on November 16 that there are indications that “foreign authorities or other actors” have played a role in helping people illegally cross the border.[6] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on November 19 that Jouko Kinnunen, head of the Finnish Vartius checkpoint that currently remains open, stated that Russian border guards pushed migrants to the Finnish side of the barrier and then closed the Russian border barriers behind them.[7] It is unlikely that these migrants would continue to remain at the Finnish border in sub-zero temperatures of their own volition after Finnish border authorities denied their entrance into Finland, suggesting that Russia is likely involved in the situation in some way.

Russia’s apparent hybrid warfare tactic on the Russian-Finnish border is similar to Russia’s and Belarus’ creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 and is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin enabled, or possibly directly controlled, Belarus’ artificial creation of a migrant crisis on its border with Poland in 2021, when Belarusian security personnel aided thousands of Middle Eastern migrants in crossing the Belarusian border to Poland.[10] The Kremlin exploited the manufactured crisis in 2021 to falsely accuse NATO of aggression against Belarus.[11] Peskov responded to Finland’s accession into NATO on April 4, threatening that Russia would take any “countermeasures [deemed necessary] to ensure [Russia’s] own security.”[12] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs similarly stated on April 4 that Russia will be “forced to take retaliatory measures” and that Finland’s accession to NATO “cannot but have a negative impact on Russian-Finnish bilateral relations.”[13] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may be attempting to set information space conditions to destabilize the NATO states on Russian borders and distract from the war in Ukraine.[14] ISW has also consistently assessed that one of Putin’s goals in launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was to break up NATO – a goal he continues to pursue.[15]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly started public recruitment for the Russian “Africa Corps” aimed at subsuming Wagner Group operations in Africa after alleged failed MoD attempts to directly recruit former Wagner personnel. A Russian milblogger posted an advertisement for contract service in the Russian “Africa Corps” on November 20.[21] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD decided to form the Russian “Africa Corps” in Libya after Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Libyan National Army Commander Marshal Khalifa Haftar, likely referencing their August 22 meeting.[22] The milblogger claimed that the formation of the Russian “Africa Corps” in Libya is part of wider Russian-Libyan agreements established at the Moscow International Security Conference and Army-2023 Forum.[23] The milblogger claimed that the starting salary for “Africa Corps” personnel is 280,000 rubles (about $3,160), significantly higher than the salaries that the Russian MoD reportedly offered former Wagner fighters and that the Wagner Group offered recruits for its operations in Africa in 2023.[24] ISW previously observed a Russian insider source’s claim that the Russian MoD unsuccessfully attempted to recruit former Wagner Group personnel to Russian MoD operations in Africa.[25] The need to publicly advertise recruitment into the Russian “Africa Corps” supports the insider source’s claim that the MoD's attempt to directly recruit former Wagner personnel for operations in Africa were largely unsuccessful.
 

Just ahead of Austin’s trip, a Ukrainian official told ABC News that U.S. deliveries of NATO-standard artillery shells to Ukraine have fallen "by more than 30%" since Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza began last month.

155mm artillery shells are arguably the most important munition for Ukraine in its fight against invading Russian forces, and some U.S. stocks, which were designated for Ukrainian forces, have been diverted to Israel.

U.S. officials have claimed, on several occasions in recent weeks, that the supply of munitions to Israel would have no impact on the war in Ukraine.

"They (U.S. officials) were telling us it wouldn’t influence the commitments (from the U.S.), but it did," a Ukrainian official said.

The official, who spoke to ABC News on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter, said supplies of these vital artillery shells make up "about 60-70% of Ukraine’s overall supply."
A senior U.S. defense official, however, said the reduction in munitions has "absolutely nothing to do with what's happening in Gaza." Presidential drawdown authority packages "start to get put together weeks in advance, so there is no link between what's happening in Gaza to what’s happening in Ukraine," the official said.

However, the Ukrainian official who spoke anonymously to ABC News expressed real concern about U.S. weapons supplies in light of the disagreement in Congress.

"We’re in big trouble … basic munitions are not coming," the official said.

The official warned that Ukraine risked losing its position on the battlefield "at a very high price."


Ukraine’s defence minister, Rustem Umerov, has said no decision had been taken to dismiss two senior military commanders, according to Reuters.

Umerov made the comment at a joint news conference alongside his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius.

He was being asked about reports that joint forces commander Serhiy Nayev and Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, chief of Ukraine’s “Tavria” military command, could be fired.

“I must say that the decision has not yet been made, but we are doing everything possible to improve efficiency,” he told reporters.


Listening to @KofmanMichael on slowdown of war. “The level of fighting has gone to a place where the individual tree lines all have a name … tree lines have become critical objectives.”
@RALee85 says 2-3 weeks ago Ukr daily fire rate fell, Ru now has shell & FPV drone advantage.
 

The U.S. fears Iran is preparing to provide Russia with advanced short-range ballistic missiles for its military campaign in Ukraine, U.S. officials said Tuesday.

Iran has already provided Russia with armed drones, guided aerial bombs and artillery shells, U.S. officials said.

But U.S. concern that the military cooperation between the nations may further expand grew when Iran showed its Ababil and Fateh-110 missiles to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu when he visited Tehran in September.

“We are therefore concerned that Iran is considering providing Russia with ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine,” a spokesman for the National Security Council said.


As I work on a project mapping changes in russian military infrastructure, I see a troubling trend — new factories, training sites, hospitals, bases, and supplies from NK and Iran. Yet, our allies seem unaware of the gravity of the issue. No, the problem will not resolve itself


Artillery ammunition availability has been one of the most important factors in this war. There is no quick way of increasing artillery production capacity at this point; however, NATO countries can help Ukraine produce more FPVs and munitions for them to partially compensate.

Link to podcast with Kofman: https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/adaptation-at-the-front-and-the-big-picture-in-ukraine/

Video segment here:


Another video:

 
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As the first snow of the season fell on the eastern front, Ukrainian troops fighting with the 21st Mechanised Brigade took shelter in dugouts carved three metres deep into the earth.
A long and difficult winter is expected in the villages around Lyman. Ukrainian forces have held the line here against Russia’s continued offensive, but there are growing concerns about their ability to match the enemy’s firepower in the months ahead.
President Zelensky has said that deliveries of American 155mm howitzer shells have “really slowed up” since the conflict in the Middle East began, with supplies being diverted to Israel.
Speaking to The Times at a rest spot eight miles from the Russian lines, one of the senior commanders of the 21st brigade said that they were feeling the effects of their benefactors’ divided attention.
“Hopefully Israel will be able to complete its task in the near future,” said the commander. “Our situation is critical, because we are not getting enough munitions. We are well covered with small arms but we are in extreme need of artillery shells, explosives, anti-tank weapons and mines.
“The Russians know that we are lacking in long-range artillery and so keep their positions out of range. We try to use drones to attack them instead of munitions but that requires people who are specifically trained to use them.
“It’s becoming a problem for us. We have been fighting against the Russians since 2014 so we should have created our own munitions production. We cannot simply rely on our foreign allies to help us because our allies are becoming exhausted.”

The United States has been supplying 155mm shells to Ukraine from the War Reserve Stockpile Ammunition-Israel, or WRSA-I, a huge cache of munitions in Israel that was established in the 1990s to ensure that the US military has a ready supply in case of need in the Middle East.
Since the start of the Israeli offensive in Gaza, prompted by the massacre of 1,200 civilians in the surprise attack by Hamas on October 7, the Pentagon has delivered on Israel’s requests for laser-guided missiles for its Apache gunship fleet, in addition to 155mm shells, night-vision devices, bunker-buster munitions and new army vehicles.

As winter arrives, the importance of artillery will grow all the more acute as the trees become bare and positions become more exposed.
There is little prospect of much change to the positions held by either army on the front between now and the spring, the commander said. The aim would instead be to exhaust the Russians as much as possible so that, come next year, the Ukrainians can take advantage of their fatigue.
“In winter, the biggest problem is engineering and logistics,” he said. “You don’t necessarily have to kill a whole company. Instead you can tire them out by destroying their excavators so that they have to dig all their trenches in the hard earth by themselves.”
The Russians were better disciplined this winter than last, when they were mostly drawn from the ranks of Wagner mercenaries, he said. Now they were conscripts whose commanders had the right to shoot them if they disobeyed orders.
The problem of desertion, likely to grow in the harsh winter months ahead, is not limited to Russia’s forces, however. An officer with the 21st brigade told The Times that of his company of 114 men, 20 had absconded, although some had later returned.
“Deserters are currently only being dealt with by a body that investigates soldiers as if they were state officials,” said the commander. “There needs to be a special military prosecutor for these cases and more severe consequences to discourage people from leaving.”

The 5,000-strong 21st Brigade is among the newest in the Ukrainian army, having been raised at the start of this year and dispatched to the front in June. Its commanders were trained last spring in Sweden and it is supplied with 30 Swedish-made Stridsvagn 122 tanks.
Here, however, where the terrain is undulating and boggy, tanks have been less easily manoeuvred than in the flat plains of the south where Ukraine has been conducting its counteroffensive since the summer.
The distance between the two trenches that marks the front line of each army is so narrow at one point — barely 250m — that the Ukrainian soldiers can make out the sound of the Russians talking, according to a company commander with the call sign Neo.
All day long the crackle of rifle fire resounds along the line as both sides take potshots at the other.
“Occasionally the enemy sends over a small reconnaissance party of six to eight men, who try to crawl through the long grass towards their position,” the 48-year-old former engineer from Odesa said.
“For the most part though the line is static and the fighting is between artillery, like the First World War. Even if we did storm their front line, we wouldn’t be able to hold it as we would immediately come under heavy fire from their second line, about a kilometre away, where they have artillery and tanks. That’s why heavy weaponry is so important.”
Artillery munitions are not all that the brigade is in need of. Over a lunch of borscht and herring, at one of the brigade’s bases further away from the front lines, a battalion commander said that they were using British-donated Bulldog armoured personnel carriers (APC) that dated from the 1960s.

APCs are used to transport soldiers on the battlefield and are of crucial importance at this time of year when heavy rains and snow turn the roads to slush.
“They are better than walking and we are very grateful to be given them, but really this is not the sort of technology to be going on the offensive with,” said a commander with the call sign Wind, who served with the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the Eighties.
“Russia has been building up its weaponry not only in the last few years but since Soviet times. And so of course for us we have catching up to do.”


The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian officials are struggling to subdue Russian hysteria around Ukrainian operations in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian MoD Collegium on November 21 and claimed that Russian forces prevented all Ukrainian attempts to conduct successful “amphibious operations in the Kherson direction.”[6] Shoigu further claimed that Russian forces are inflicting “colossal” losses on Ukrainian forces.[7] Shoigu’s statement is likely an attempt to downplay some Russian milbloggers’ concerns over Russia’s inability to decisively repel Ukrainian attacks on the east bank of the Dnipro River but is unlikely to calm the ever-growing complaints in the Russian information space.

Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge a Ukrainian presence in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and complain that Russian forces are unable to suppress Ukrainian operations in the area.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Ukrainian forces killed an entire Russian assault group near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[9] A Russian insider source claimed on November 17 that a Ukrainian strike killed 76 Russian personnel in the 1st Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) attempting to conduct a “distraction maneuver” in Skadovskyi Raion, east bank Kherson Oblast on November 10.[10] A Russian soldier reportedly in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Krynky claimed in a video amplified on November 21 that the Russian military is forcing personnel who are still recovering from wounds to conduct assaults and that there are three Ukrainian drones for each Russian soldier operating in the Krynky area.[11] A Russian milblogger published a letter purportedly from a Russian soldier operating near Krynky on November 21 who claimed that Russian forces in the Krynky area lack reconnaissance drones, slowing their movements and putting them at risk of Ukrainian attacks.[12] The purported Russian soldier claimed that Russian forces in the Krynky area also lacked fire support because artillery and mortar units quickly changed locations after firing “a few shots” in order to evade counterbattery fire.[13] The Russian soldier claimed that his unit has practically no interaction with other Russian units operating nearby and that the Russian command headquarters in the Kherson direction devises unsuccessful plans because the headquarters receives incorrect and delayed information.[14] The Russian soldier also claimed that the Russian command in the Kherson direction had failed to implement changes resulting in increased Ukrainian attacks.[15] A milblogger claimed that some Russian Telegram channels are unsuccessfully attempting to focus criticism of Russian operations in the Kherson direction toward Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[16] The milbloggers do not appear to be responding to Shoigu’s claims nor has ISW observed any significant changes in Kherson Oblast that would prompt these milblogger complaints.
 
Ridiculous that Israel is sucking up ammunition. They should make their own if they want to level Gaza.
If they wanted to level Gaza, then Gaza would be a smoldering pile of ash. That would be "easy" for them.

Most of what Israel is getting is precision weaponry aimed at trying to avoid civilian casualties even while Hamas hides among its own people and actively creates civilian deaths for PR purposes.

The 155 shells are mostly being used along the border with Lebanon in exchange of shelling with Hezbollah.
 

Russian automotive giant in trouble. Not even China can help​


AvtoVAZ, the largest automotive company in Russia, is grappling with significant difficulties following the implementation of new sanctions. Even the company's leadership concedes that their circumstances are grim and the future of the company appears uncertain. The United States is largely to be blamed for this turn of events.

AvtoVAZ was established in 1966 partially due to Fiat's involvement and has since been a trailblazer in popular automotive production. The 2008 Renault investment in its Togliatti facility near Samara seemed optimistic. Over time, modern models influenced by French engineering designs were introduced. However, Russia's assault on Ukraine radically changed everything. Western companies, including Renault, withdrew from Russia.

Though the Kremlin reassured its citizens that these changes would boost the Russian economy by cultivating independence from external suppliers, Russia's most prominent automotive company swiftly depleted its parts supply. Production had to be suspended, and when resumed, only specific outdated technological models were brought back. Additionally, their equipment is compared to European cars from three decades prior, reflecting the imported components' shortage.

In the ensuing months, Russian companies were able to negotiate with Chinese conglomerates, which started supplying Russia with components necessary for car production. Business operations resumed, and a semblance of normality was restored to the production process. However, it wasn't without setbacks. From May 29 to June 19, 2023, AvtoVAZ announced a "corporate vacation", a euphemism for a halt in operations due to a hurdle in transporting components from overseas. Now, they are up against even more significant challenges.

In September 2023, AvtoVAZ was added to the US SDN sanctions list, practically branding them as international financial pariahs. "This resulted in numerous new rejections from foreign suppliers, financial institutions, banks... Foreign banks obstruct our outgoing and incoming payments to AvtoVAZ, particularly on exported goods. This issue is not confined to hostile territories; it permeates almost all foreign banks," said Maksim Sokołow, the director of AvtoVAZ, as quoted by autostat.ru.

This situation highlights a fact that has been speculated upon for a long time: Russian automotive production heavily relies upon imported parts from ostensibly allied nations, with China topping the list. Several Chinese automotive companies aim to expand beyond their domestic markets. Those contemplating operations in Europe or the US will be compelled to sever ties with Russian outfits or at least avoid transactions involving the international financial system.

If other Russian companies encounter similar difficulties, the consequences could be staggering. The impracticality of swiftly balancing accounts could effectively deter foreign partners. Is this an insurmountable roadblock? Probably not. Though circumventing the sanctions may be risky and expensive, it's not impossible. However, it may prove unprofitable for several companies providing parts to Russian enterprises.


On the bright side, this situation may boost those Chinese companies that manufacture or sell entire vehicles in Russia. These companies may deem the risk associated with sidestepping American sanctions worthwhile. Advanced plans are already in place. Soon, the new model, Lada X-cross 5, is expected to hit the Russian market. It's a rebranded version of the Chinese FAW Bestune T77. The relaunched Moskvich brand also manufactures Chinese cars from JAC company under its banner. China's brands are also experiencing growth, with Geely reportedly selling 3.6 times more SUVs and crossovers in Russia in the first nine months of 2023 than in the comparable period of 2022.

Despite the unfolding scenario, sanctions spell bad news for Russian automotive companies. Undeniably, the Kremlin is bound to put forth a strong front.
 

“I don’t know that Ukraine can survive until February of 2024,” Sen. ⁦@ChrisMurphyCT (D-Conn.) said. “My sense is they start to run short on ammunition in the next several weeks.”


(1/5) In southern Ukraine, fighting has continued around the village of Krynky where Ukrainian marines maintain a bridgehead on the east bank of the Dnipro River.
(2/5) The ground fighting has been characterised by confused, dismounted infantry combat and artillery exchanges in complex, wooded terrain.
(3/5) Ukraine has made particularly effective use of small attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, while the Russian Air Force is conducting significant numbers of sorties in support of frontline troops, predominantly launching munitions from beyond the range of Ukraine’s air defences.
(4/5) The fighting around Krynky is on a smaller scale than some major battles of the war but will be considered highly unfortunate by Russian leaders.
(5/5) Russia withdrew from the west bank of the Dnipro River a year ago, almost certainly aiming to hold Ukrainian forces west of the river, keep the sector quiet, and free up Russian forces elsewhere.


Everything the US sends to Ukraine comes from Congressionally-appropriated funds, including ammunition, and the US provides the vast majority of Ukraine's artillery ammunition. We are also running into stockpile issues, but the immediate problem is stretching remaining funding.

Netherlands election: https://twitter.com/PjotrSauer/status/1727425474060775428

Very very early days, but a government led by PVV would mean bad news for Ukraine. Wilders, who has previously defended Putin, has been vocal in his opposition to deliver arms to Ukraine

Long combat video here from what appears to be Avdiivka: https://twitter.com/Mike_Eckel/status/1727359226803323228


Today, the “20 days in Mariupol” documentary becomes available online in the U.S. I was one of the translators who worked on this film, and it’s the most important work I’ve done in my life that I wish I didn’t have to.
Please, watch it: https://youtube.com/watch?v=gvAyykRvPBo&ab_channel=FRONTLINEPBS|Official

Video segment here:



Various Russian milbloggers report that a Ukrainian HIMARS missile hit a venue in the village of Kumachove which hosted a concert for Russian servicemen. Singer Polina Menshikh and an unknown number of soldiers were killed. This is allegedly the moment of impact.


Finland will close all but the northernmost crossing point on its border with Russia from midnight on Friday in a bid to halt a flow of asylum seekers to the Nordic nation, Prime Minister Petteri Orpo said on Wednesday.
Since the beginning of the month, more than 600 people without valid travel documents to the European Union have come to Finland via Russia, prompting Helsinki to shut several crossings and accuse Moscow of funnelling migrants. The Kremlin denies the charge.
 

Growing worries that the EU will fall short of its pledge to supply a million artillery shells to Ukraine by March is forcing France to do an about-face on its earlier insistence that the ammunition should only be sourced in Europe.

However, before resorting to foreign suppliers, the EU needs to actually miss the March target, a senior French diplomat told POLITICO.

“As long as we haven't come to that conclusion, we won't do it [buy abroad], but if we have to adjust, we'll adjust," they said.

That’s a significant shift from France’s traditional position of encouraging national governments to buy European arms and ammunition.
“We need European preference, because if we don't encourage companies [to produce], we won't get out of the cycle. But we know how to be flexible to help Ukraine,” the senior diplomat said.


Lithuania has handed over 3 million rounds of ammunition, remote detonation systems, and winter equipment to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Defence Ministry said on Wednesday.


Estonia is helping support Ukraine's energy infrastructure and its reconstruction with digital solutions and advice, said Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna (Eesti 200) at a G7+ meeting on Tuesday.


Ukrainian troops face "difficult" defensive operations on parts of the eastern front with bitter winter cold setting in, but forces in the south are still conducting offensive actions, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Wednesday.
Russian troops launched offensives on different sections of the front line in Ukraine's east this autumn, trying to advance on the devastated town of Avdiivka and in the northeast between the towns of Lyman and Kupiansk.
"Difficult weather, difficult defence on the Lyman, Bakhmut, Donetsk and Avdiivka fronts. Offensive actions in the south," Zelenskiy said on Telegram messenger.

Operations could be complicated by cold weather, with daytime temperatures of minus 5 degrees Celsius (23 degrees Fahrenheit) expected to dip as fighting moves to an attritional phase.
Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and now controls nearly a fifth of its territory. A Ukrainian counteroffensive, under way since June, has made no major breakthrough.
The front line has changed little in Avdiivka since fighting erupted in 2014 between Kyiv and Russian-backed militants, but the town has faced waves of attacks since mid-October, followed by temporary lulls, according to the Ukrainian military.
After one such lull the day before, the head of the "Tavria" military command said on Wednesday that Russian troops had "dramatically increased" the number of assaults and airstrikes.
"Our defenders are steadfastly holding the defence in the Avdiivka direction," Commander Oleksandr Tarnavskyi said on Telegram. Ukrainian forces continued the offensive on the southeastern Melitopol front, he added.

In its evening report, Ukraine's General Staff said 22 Russian attacks had been beaten back in and around Avdiivka.
Military analyst Oleksandr Musiyenko told NV Radio that Ukrainian forces had launched counterattacks near Avdiivka in the past week and "managed to push the enemy back from previous positions".


Officially, the Ukrainian General Staff claims to be carrying out these actions to keep Moscow's forces away from Kherson, which had a pre-war population of some 280,000 and has been regularly targeted by Russian artillery since its evacuation in autumn 2022. On Monday, the shelling of a parking lot there left two people dead and two wounded, according to the regional administration. "The further the Russians are from the river, the less they'll be able to use their observation drones and the less accurate their artillery will be," confirmed Audrand.
But these bridgeheads could also be used for larger-scale operations. Unlike the southern and eastern fronts, where Russia has built up extensive fortification systems (trenches, minefields, etc.) which are stalling the counter-offensive Ukraine launched in June, the left bank of the Dnipro is poorly defended.
"Russian fortified positions are more likely to be found on the Crimean isthmus, which is vital to Moscow, and therefore more heavily defended," said Thibault Fouillet, scientific director at the Institute for Strategy and Defense Studies. In other words, if the Ukrainians managed to break through at this point, they could more easily advance into enemy territory, and even turn back the Russian lines on the southern front.

Whether Kyiv's troops have what it takes remains to be seen. Exploiting a breakthrough requires not only men, but above all heavy equipment, such as tanks, and the logistics to supply them with fuel and ammunition. It has become very difficult to transport these supplies, as the bridges have all been cut. "Barges are not enough to get heavy systems across such a wet cut-off quickly and with a high mass. You need a hardened or mobile bridge," said Fouillet.
The West has indeed delivered such equipment to Ukraine. In particular, France has supplied motorized floating bridges, some 30 units of which are in its arsenals. But there's no guarantee that there will be enough of them, or that the Ukrainians will know how to use them, especially if they come under enemy fire. "There is no army in Europe today capable of crossing a river like the Dnipro," said a French officer.
Although these Ukrainian operations are unlikely to result in any major breakthroughs in the short term, analysts point out that they are nevertheless of real military interest. Establishing new bridgeheads in different parts of the region forces the Russians to send reinforcements, which relieves pressure on other fronts. In this respect, Kyiv's use of marine troops – members of the 35th, 36th, 37th and 38th marine infantry brigades have been spotted – to carry out these crossings is a cause for concern for Moscow: These are battle-hardened units, with more demanding recruitment than conventional ground forces, and are capable of carrying out complex operations.
 

Ukraine is in a bloody slugfest with Russia. It wasn’t supposed to become an ugly war of attrition—when Russian forces invaded last year, almost nobody expected Ukraine to hold out so long, much less hold its own. In less than two years, Western governments have provided over $80 billion of military aid to Ukraine. Along with training, that material support aimed to build a modern Ukrainian force that could conduct dynamic combined arms maneuver, which requires the close coordination of armor, infantry, artillery, and airpower.

But some of the Western military training is not working. The US military, in particular, as the leading provider of support to Ukrainian forces, is repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of adapting training methods and objectives to the battlefield realities in Ukraine, the US bureaucracy acts as though the Ukrainians are fighting an American-style conventional war.

There is growing acknowledgement that this training is inadequate. Our observations, including at training facilities in Europe and on the ground in Ukraine’s combat zones as part of a US Department of Defense-funded Minerva research project, point to a more basic flaw: NATO and particularly US trainers tend to train Ukrainian soldiers to fight like American soldiers. The Ukrainian soldiers we interviewed find value in US training and combat drills but are frustrated by US military doctrine and training assumptions biased toward maneuver. Ukraine’s armed forces fight in a context of Russian (and now Ukrainian) continuous defense in depth that is beyond the experience of most US trainers.

An experienced British Army officer contrasted the American approach with his own: “Our training courses are more effective because we started listening and collaborating with the Ukrainians. . . . They’ve forced us to update our own doctrine, training, and manuals on how to fight a modern war.” The British officer accepted the fact that most Ukrainian soldiers he trains have extensive experience in trench warfare and have faced artillery and armor without the protection of air superiority—battlefield experience that not a single US soldier has today. Such listening and flexibility by British military personnel is not new. Our past fieldwork and interviews across Africa have shown that most infantry prefer to be trained by the British because they listen to their concerns and are flexible in teaching drills and military exercises that simulate the army they have, instead of forcing them to emulate a British template.

Observing Ukrainian soldiers, both at US and NATO training sites and near the front lines in Ukraine, it’s becoming apparent that US training programs are often ineffective. Many American training programs teach the Ukrainians how to fight in the most advanced styles of combined arms warfare. This way of fighting is about concentrating firepower at decisive points on the battlefield to execute a series of dynamic thrusts against enemy positions and create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

Current training approaches teach useful skills and outline sound tactics and maneuvers for battlefield success. But the Ukrainian troops often tell us time is wasted with absurdly long PowerPoint presentations containing useless information. They don’t want training for an ideal military situation. Ukrainians need advice and skills specific to their own military limits (e.g., lack of airpower) and the realities of their battlefield context (e.g., proliferation of drones, jamming, etc.).
Russian forces have constructed 800 kilometers of defensive lines with an “insane” amount of mining of up to “5 mines per square meter,” which per a RUSI report “included the laying of two anti-tank mines together—one atop the other—compensating for reduced density by ensuring that vehicles are immobilised by single mine-strikes.” This has impeded the ability of the Ukrainians to rapidly advance because of demining operations under fire, leading to an average daily advance of ninety meters.

Frustration abounds—as one Ukrainian general asked us in an interview, “How do you expect us to conduct a successful counteroffensive when your [US] military does not have the doctrine or experience for what our army is facing?” An elastic defensive posture enables Russian forces to absorb Ukrainian advances that break through initial lines. Moreover, our observations along the contact line point to the difficulty of massing forces for maneuver. Heavy artillery coupled with drone-assisted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requires dispersal of forces on both sides but does not destroy defensive lines. That ground-level deadlock, combined with mobile air defenses that deny ground force significant air support, drives Ukrainians to adapt to decentralized decision processes down to the platoon level. Advances in electronic warfare make communication even at that level more challenging. Higher-level combined arms maneuver in this environment would depend on tactical and technological innovation.

Ukrainian complaints remind us of problems we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans are good at training soldiers to be like us, turning them into foreign versions of American soldiers. But in doing so we build “Fabergé egg armies.” For instance, Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade committed dozens of American-made armored Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and German-produced Leopard tanks to the fight by Mala Tokmachka in early June and promptly lost twenty-five vehicles and tanks. The Ukrainians conducted NATO-styled maneuvers in a battlefield environment where they seized territory, but did not have airpower to defend their newly acquired positions against a flexible Russian defense that quickly enveloped the area.

One Ukrainian soldier posted on social media describing his unit’s frustration while training with American forces in Germany. The US reconnaissance training program ignored their combat experience and trained them on rudimentary US Army standards even though they requested help with integrating DJI Mavic drones and digital maps into their combat operations. This frustration matches observations made by our research team. American security assistance programs often rigidly promote the American way of fighting. Some Western military instructors prefer the status quo instead of updating and streamlining training programs based on Ukrainian feedback about their military conditions. Many of the Ukrainians soldiers we have spoken to increasingly view American assistance as lacking urgency due to a “business as usual” attitude.

More at link. Interesting read. From couple weeks ago, just seeing it now.
 

Ukraine is in a bloody slugfest with Russia. It wasn’t supposed to become an ugly war of attrition—when Russian forces invaded last year, almost nobody expected Ukraine to hold out so long, much less hold its own. In less than two years, Western governments have provided over $80 billion of military aid to Ukraine. Along with training, that material support aimed to build a modern Ukrainian force that could conduct dynamic combined arms maneuver, which requires the close coordination of armor, infantry, artillery, and airpower.

But some of the Western military training is not working. The US military, in particular, as the leading provider of support to Ukrainian forces, is repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of adapting training methods and objectives to the battlefield realities in Ukraine, the US bureaucracy acts as though the Ukrainians are fighting an American-style conventional war.

There is growing acknowledgement that this training is inadequate. Our observations, including at training facilities in Europe and on the ground in Ukraine’s combat zones as part of a US Department of Defense-funded Minerva research project, point to a more basic flaw: NATO and particularly US trainers tend to train Ukrainian soldiers to fight like American soldiers. The Ukrainian soldiers we interviewed find value in US training and combat drills but are frustrated by US military doctrine and training assumptions biased toward maneuver. Ukraine’s armed forces fight in a context of Russian (and now Ukrainian) continuous defense in depth that is beyond the experience of most US trainers.

An experienced British Army officer contrasted the American approach with his own: “Our training courses are more effective because we started listening and collaborating with the Ukrainians. . . . They’ve forced us to update our own doctrine, training, and manuals on how to fight a modern war.” The British officer accepted the fact that most Ukrainian soldiers he trains have extensive experience in trench warfare and have faced artillery and armor without the protection of air superiority—battlefield experience that not a single US soldier has today. Such listening and flexibility by British military personnel is not new. Our past fieldwork and interviews across Africa have shown that most infantry prefer to be trained by the British because they listen to their concerns and are flexible in teaching drills and military exercises that simulate the army they have, instead of forcing them to emulate a British template.

Observing Ukrainian soldiers, both at US and NATO training sites and near the front lines in Ukraine, it’s becoming apparent that US training programs are often ineffective. Many American training programs teach the Ukrainians how to fight in the most advanced styles of combined arms warfare. This way of fighting is about concentrating firepower at decisive points on the battlefield to execute a series of dynamic thrusts against enemy positions and create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

Current training approaches teach useful skills and outline sound tactics and maneuvers for battlefield success. But the Ukrainian troops often tell us time is wasted with absurdly long PowerPoint presentations containing useless information. They don’t want training for an ideal military situation. Ukrainians need advice and skills specific to their own military limits (e.g., lack of airpower) and the realities of their battlefield context (e.g., proliferation of drones, jamming, etc.).
Russian forces have constructed 800 kilometers of defensive lines with an “insane” amount of mining of up to “5 mines per square meter,” which per a RUSI report “included the laying of two anti-tank mines together—one atop the other—compensating for reduced density by ensuring that vehicles are immobilised by single mine-strikes.” This has impeded the ability of the Ukrainians to rapidly advance because of demining operations under fire, leading to an average daily advance of ninety meters.

Frustration abounds—as one Ukrainian general asked us in an interview, “How do you expect us to conduct a successful counteroffensive when your [US] military does not have the doctrine or experience for what our army is facing?” An elastic defensive posture enables Russian forces to absorb Ukrainian advances that break through initial lines. Moreover, our observations along the contact line point to the difficulty of massing forces for maneuver. Heavy artillery coupled with drone-assisted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requires dispersal of forces on both sides but does not destroy defensive lines. That ground-level deadlock, combined with mobile air defenses that deny ground force significant air support, drives Ukrainians to adapt to decentralized decision processes down to the platoon level. Advances in electronic warfare make communication even at that level more challenging. Higher-level combined arms maneuver in this environment would depend on tactical and technological innovation.

Ukrainian complaints remind us of problems we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans are good at training soldiers to be like us, turning them into foreign versions of American soldiers. But in doing so we build “Fabergé egg armies.” For instance, Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade committed dozens of American-made armored Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and German-produced Leopard tanks to the fight by Mala Tokmachka in early June and promptly lost twenty-five vehicles and tanks. The Ukrainians conducted NATO-styled maneuvers in a battlefield environment where they seized territory, but did not have airpower to defend their newly acquired positions against a flexible Russian defense that quickly enveloped the area.

One Ukrainian soldier posted on social media describing his unit’s frustration while training with American forces in Germany. The US reconnaissance training program ignored their combat experience and trained them on rudimentary US Army standards even though they requested help with integrating DJI Mavic drones and digital maps into their combat operations. This frustration matches observations made by our research team. American security assistance programs often rigidly promote the American way of fighting. Some Western military instructors prefer the status quo instead of updating and streamlining training programs based on Ukrainian feedback about their military conditions. Many of the Ukrainians soldiers we have spoken to increasingly view American assistance as lacking urgency due to a “business as usual” attitude.

More at link. Interesting read. From couple weeks ago, just seeing it now.
I have seen this elsewhere. I think the major issue with the NATO training is that is based on capabilities that the Ukrainians do not have and will not have. For example, air superiority is a major precept for the war that we fight which is why so much is spent in developing and maintaining an Air Force (and Naval aviation as well) that is capable of gaining air superiority and even air supremacy within the opening stages of a war. Whether large formations or small squad sized maneuvers become extremely dangerous. Further, our ability to move large quantities of forces in force quickly is unmatched. Think Desert Storm and the 'left hook' which saw massive amounts of men and material moved over vast distances in ways that the Iraqi's thought were fantasy. Our airlift capability, fixed wing and rotary, dwarfs every other nation and is essential to the core western doctrine. Our allies have forces that are comparable though not in numbers. The huge numbers of armored transport with 6K+ IFV, 6K+ M113's, and 4K+ Styker not to mention the untold number of Humvees can move a lot of men quickly in force. Ukraine simply does not have these capabilities.
 

Per Sergey Korotkov, the Designer General & Deputy CEO of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), MiG-35s are being used in the war with Ukraine. Not surprising if true given that it allows the Russians to evaluate the aircraft under real combat conditions.


Last October, Russia began relentless waves of attacks on critical infrastructure that lasted for months and left millions of people without heating, electricity or water for parts of the winter.
This year, there have been only sporadic such attacks so far, but many fear that Moscow is merely waiting for the onset of sub-zero temperatures, in order to cause maximum disruption and distress.
“It has been a warm autumn and Russia postponed these attacks, but they will come for sure. We are preparing,” said Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine’s national security council, in an interview in Kyiv.
Danilov said he had recently returned from an unpublicised visit to London, where he met various security and military officials including Sir Tim Barrow, the UK’s national security adviser, and Adm Sir Tony Radakin, the chief of the defence staff. Although he did not go into detail about the discussions he had in London, Danilov said strategies for protecting Ukraine from winter infrastructure attacks had been one of the key topics.
“Our friends, including the ones from Great Britain, help us to solve these extremely difficult issues,” he said.


Germany and France are leading a new ground-based air defense coalition designed to bolster Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian missile and drone threats.

The 20-nation coalition was announced Wednesday as part of the 17th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), an organization of some 50 nations gathering to provide Kyiv with what it needs to keep fighting Russia.

“I appreciate the leadership of Germany and France in organizing this important initiative,” U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Wednesday before the virtual meeting. Combined, UDCG members have provided Ukraine with more than $80 billion in security assistance since early 2022.


A Ukrainian Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus (MAGURA) V5 uncrewed surface vessel (USV) has been captured intact by Russia in western Crimea, Russian milbloggers are reporting on Telegram. Images of the drone boat sitting totally intact onshore seem to support this claim.


Iran has officially presented a new version of its notorious Shahed ‘kamikaze drone,’ now powered by a jet engine rather than the previous piston-propeller arrangement. The Shahed-238 was also shown with new guidance systems, with radar and electro-optical/infrared guidance now apparently being offered in addition to earlier Shahed versions, which primarily employed a combination of inertial and GPS navigation to hit fixed targets.

The existence of the jet-powered drone was first revealed back in September.

Developed on the basis of the Shahed-136 drone, which has been widely employed by Russia in Ukraine, three examples of the Shahed-238 were on display, representing the three different guidance options. One of these is thought to feature an anti-radiation seeker. Although this remains unconfirmed, a similar seeker is thought to be available for the Shahed-136. If correct, this version of the Shahed-238 would be intended to home in on hostile radio-frequency transmitters, especially air defense radars, allowing it to be used for the suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) missions.

An active radar seeker is also possible. This would be a major technological boost, but the actual capabilities of it are not clear. If this is indeed an active radar seeker, it could theoretically allow the drone to hit moving targets in all weather, although how it would initially find the right target after flying a significant distance from its launch to its target area is unknown. Some sort of autonomous target recognition would be needed. Perhaps this would be most valuable for anti-surface/anti-ship applications which eliminates some of these challenges.
The operating mode of the version with electro-optical/infrared guidance is unclear. Some reports suggest this uses a passive infrared sensor to autonomously home in on heat sources, while others describe a man-in-the-loop system, with an operator using video fromt the sensor to guide the missile to its target. This would also likely impose a range restriction, based on the need to maintain a link between the drone and operator throughout the engagement.

It remains the case that we don’t know for sure what kinds of guidance modes are actually used and to what degree they have been tested, let alone whether they are currently available. However, these guidance systems have already been fielded on other Iranian missiles and drones, so it’s clearly a possibility.

Recent podcast here with Sam Bendett: https://www.cnas.org/publications/podcast/sam-bendett-on-russia-ukraine-byron-callans-week-ahead

Adjunct Senior Fellow Samuel Bendett joins the Defense & Aerospace Report podcast to discuss Ukraine’s latest attack on Moscow, an update on the war, new sanctions on Russian non-governmental organizations helping the country’s military as well as unmanned ground vehicle maker, as well as the changing role of the country’s social media arms.


1/3 Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (OAK) "has not decided if its sixth generation fighter will be manned or unmanned, since this question is also undecided within the global aviation community. (Next) sixth gen combat aircraft will be integrated with... other systems."
2/3 "The next direction for long-term development of aviation technology is the improvement of flight and technical characteristics, the possibility of adaptation with other combat control and defeat systems, high maneuverability, multi-functionality, and optional piloting."
3/3 "In the future, sixth-gen fighters will operate within a single reconnaissance contour with drones. We must be able to solve the problems of aviation stealth and the survivability of the aviation complex. We also clearly understand the need for group action with UAVs."
 

Europe’s largest fund manager Amundi expects the Russian economy to grow three times faster than the eurozone’s in 2024, its chief investment officer said today, stressing the ineffectiveness of sanctions levied over Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Amundi expects Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) to grow by 1.5% in 2024 and by 2% in 2025, compared with 0.5% and 1.2% for the euro zone. “It means that the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia – the major developed countries – are unable to sanction a country effectively,” Amundi’s CIO Vincent Mortier said at a news conference in Paris on the fund manager’s 2024 outlook. “That’s what it means. We can deplore it, but it’s a reality.”

The impact of the sanctions was visible in terms of asset-freezing for a certain number of people, Mortier said, but not so much on Russia’s imports and exports.

Major emerging economies under the Brics umbrella (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as countries such as Turkey and Kazakhstan, benefited from the sanctions as Russia managed to move its exports away from western countries, Mortier said.

“It’s a reality check. In the end, if we take stock of the war in Ukraine: Europe has suffered directly and strongly; for the United States [the impact is] neutral; but Turkey, central Asia and Asia more generally have benefited,” he said.


Finland has temporarily closed all but one of its eight passenger crossings to Russia in response to an unusually high inflow of migrants for which the Nordic country accuses Moscow.
More than 700 migrants from nations including Afghanistan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, have in the past few weeks entered Finland via Russia. Helsinki says Moscow is funnelling them to the border, a charge the Kremlin denies.
Having last week closed four border stations, Finland overnight closed all remaining passenger crossings except its northernmost one, Raja-Jooseppi located in the northern Arctic region, for a month.
Raja-Jooseppi opened its gates for traffic at 0800 GMT on Friday and will continue to accept asylum applications during its four daily opening hours, the Finnish Border Guard said.
On Thursday, 92 illegal migrants arrived at the Salla and Vartius border crossings before they shut but no migrants turned up overnight outside opening hours, it added.
Separately, the Finnish Border Guard said on Friday it expects dozens of officers from the European Union's Frontex border agency to help patrol the 1,340 km (833 mile) border with Russia from next week.
"Their task will primarily be to patrol the land border under the supervision of the Finnish Border Guards and to support them," Border Security Expert Arttu Maaranen told Reuters.
He said the border guards were preparing for all scenarios, including one in which migrants attempted to cross into Finland through forests spanning the frontier.


(1/6) Russian forces in Ukraine continue to suffer mass casualties from Ukrainian long-range precision strikes well behind the front line.
(2/6) On 10 November 2023, likely over 70 Russian troops were killed in a strike on a convoy of trucks 23km behind the front line in the village of Hladkivka, Kherson Oblast.
(3/6) Subsequently, on 19 November 2023, a strike on Russian troops attending an award ceremony or concert in Kumachove, 60km inside Russian-controlled territory, likely caused tens of casualties.
(4/6) Ukraine has also suffered similar incidents: a Russian ballistic missile killed 19 members of Ukraine’s 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade at a medal ceremony on 3 November 2023.
(5/6) Deployed soldiers are typically well aware of the ranges of their adversary’s weapons systems. However, faced with the reality of very long combat deployments, commanders face an acute dilemma.
(6/6) They must balance the best practice of keeping the troops dispersed, and less vulnerable to strikes, and the day-to-day requirement to gather units together to conduct administration and to maintain morale.


Finland is prepared to close all its border crossings with Russia if necessary and has warned that Moscow could try to smuggle soldiers or war criminals into the EU among the migrants it is deliberately sending across the frontier.
Elina Valtonen, Finland’s foreign minister, told the Financial Times that if Russia intensified its operation of allowing migrants from countries such as Yemen, Iraq and Syria to cross without documents, her country could restrict the filing of asylum applications to Helsinki airport — and so exclude its checkpoints along the land border.
Finland says Russia is using the migrants to put a kind of pressure on Helsinki that falls short of outright hostilities, a method sometimes known as “hybrid” warfare or operations.
Finland first closed its busiest four crossings with Russia a week ago and was due to close three more on Friday, leaving just its northernmost border point with Russia open and processing asylum seekers.
“We have taken this step by step in order to signal to Russia that we can’t accept this hybrid operation taking place,” she added.
Valtonen endorsed a Finnish government warning that as the people crossing the border did not have documents, Russia could use the opportunity to smuggle across soldiers or those who have committed war crimes.
“It’s more of a philosophical question — we cannot have Russia decide which people come to the border, and which people come over,” she said, adding that the lack of documents complicated the process of checking people’s identities.


Putin has pardoned an honest to God cannibal. Denis Gorin murdered at least four people and ate parts of his victims. Now he's recuperating at a hospital after being wounded in Ukraine. Where he isn't: in prison for his crimes.


Separate from issues of quality, potential buyers have very real concerns that Russia will not deliver on its contracts. This perception will take a long time to change.
 

A third wave of Russian forces is attacking the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka and systematically shelling the center of the industrial hub, a local Ukrainian official said.

"The third wave [of assaults] began. They are attacking from all directions, from the flanks of the south and north, as they did before. They are attacking the industrial zone," Vitaly Barabash, the head of the town, said.

Avdiivka has been on the front line since 2014 and is part of the Donetsk region, which the Kremlin has claimed to have annexed along with three other regions. This fall, Russia intensified its attack on Avdiivka.

"They are attacking from all sides, using a lot of infantry. Machinery went to the industrial zone, because the asphalt surface allows them to do so," Barabash told state media.

Barabash said 1,350 residents were remaining in the town which had a pre-war population of around 30,000 people. Some 102 people had been evacuated over the last week.


With weather conditions deteriorating, fighting on the ground Ukraine is expected to subside. However, this will make soldiers' morale all the more important, said Col. Ants Kiviselg, head of the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) Intelligence Center.

"The situation on the Ukrainian front line has not changed very much over the last week. The overall intensity of fighting has decreased when compared to previous weeks, with one exception. In the Avdiivka region, the number of attacks by the Russian Federation has been increasing," Col. Kiviselg said at the Estonian Ministry of Defense's weekly Friday briefing.

The reasons for the decline in combat activity are mostly related to changes in the weather, he said. "Increased rainfall, combined with temperatures continuing to be above zero, make the ground muddy and difficult for machinery to negotiate. Rain showers and low cloud cover also discourage the use of air assets, especially drones," the colonel added.

Russia pushing for success in Avdiivka

Col. Kiviselg said the main focus for Russian forces is in the Avdiivka region, where the most active fighting in recent weeks has been taking place. A build-up of armored vehicles on the Russian side has also been detected in that area, indicating continued attempts to force a breakthrough.


Avdiivka falling into Russian hands would certainly make it more complicated for Ukrainian units to hold fire on targets in Donetsk, including railways and logistics routes used by Russian forces. "Therefore, Russian Federation units are trying to create a buffer zone to protect Donetsk," Kiviselg said.

"It is likely that the intensity of the current offensive activity in the direction of Avdiivka and one of the objectives of a possible deployment is to break the Ukrainians' fighting spirit," the EDF intelligence chief added.

Ukraine more successful in the south

In the southern section of the front, however, Ukrainian forces have been able to hold on to the areas they have re-captured, especially on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River, Kiviselg said.


The Ukrainian forces' two main objectives in the area are to gain control the left bank of the Dnieper and to push Russian units southwards, thereby sparing the city of Kherson from indirect Russian fire, the EDF colonel said.

"The Ukrainians' aim is also certainly to expend Russian armed forces units south of Kherson and put the Russians in a position where they will need to redeploy units and bring in additional ones to defend their southern front. This would then mean a reduction in Russian pressure elsewhere," Kiviselg said.

"Over the coming weeks, it is unlikely that the Russian Federation will achieve an operational breakthrough in Ukraine. This [possibility] will be limited by weather and also the balance of forces. With the onset of the winter frost, the likelihood of there being Russian Federation attacks against Ukraine's critical infrastructure will continue to rise," he added.

"In terms of the bigger picture, you could say, that the offensive on the Russian side is beginning to show signs of waning, due to the worsening weather. If mobility is restricted, armored vehicles are inhibited and the trenches are filling up with water, then what will start to emerge will be more of a battle of wills. And there is no doubt that Ukraine will have a much greater will to win these battles as it defends of its own country," Kiviselg said.


Kyiv is set to receive another Patriot missile defense system from Germany, which will be deployed during the winter to help protect the country's energy infrastructure against potential Russian attacks, German Ambassador to Ukraine Martin Eger said in an interview with Ukrinform on Nov. 24.


1/ Russia's Rybar Telegram channel is again mapping out an alleged recent drone attack on Crimea: "Overnight, the Ukrainian military once again attacked the Crimean peninsula: 13 drones in three groups were launched from the Kherson region, with 12 shot down..."
2/ "...by Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in the vicinity of Dzhankoy, and another one by border service units near Cape Kartkazak southwest of Krasnoperekopsk. Judging by the UAV flights, the target was Dzhankoy - either a railway station or a military airfield in the city."
3/ "The small number of Ukr. drones used is noteworthy. Typically, such attacks are designed to determine the location of air defense forces before launching a larger missile strike. Theoretically... we can expect raids on the northern regions of Crimea in the coming days..."
4/ The Russian MOD noted on its own Telegram channel that along with the 13 drones allegedly shot down, three more were supposedly shot down over Volgograd region. Once again, no video or imagery proof of downed drones was presented.
 

The reality for Ukraine is that the front line in the war has barely shifted in a meaningful way for a year. Europeans are faltering in their effort to ship badly needed artillery ammunition, while there are increasing signs of political fatigue, particularly in the US, Ukraine’s most important backer.
The concern is that waning or insufficient aid could prematurely force Zelenskiy to enter peace talks from a position of weakness — or worse, enable Russia to break through Ukrainian lines and give Putin no incentive to negotiate.
That’s a prospect that terrifies some leaders in Eastern Europe, who have amplified their warnings of Vladimir Putin’s intentions going back years. They say that Russia will not stop at Ukraine’s borders and that some in the West still don’t fully grasp what’s at stake.
The risk is that Ukraine’s allies are giving the signal that they aren’t taking defense seriously enough, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, whose country borders Russia and used to be part of the Soviet Union, said before an EU summit last month. Gabrielius Landsbergis, foreign minister of Baltic neighbor Lithuania, said the lack of urgency might force Ukraine into negotiations with Russia it doesn’t want.
“I have concerns about our collective ability to contribute to victory when I see that new tanks, new missile systems and even ammunition are not being supplied, that solutions are not being found, how the European Union’s decisions are taking months,” Landsbergis told broadcaster LRT on Wednesday. When compared with Russia getting help from North Korea, “it looks comical.”

With the exception of a relatively small amount of artillery ammunition, Israel’s requests from the US for military aid have little overlap with the weapons systems Ukraine wants.
But that could change, especially if the war expands, potentially endangering supplies, another senior European official said. Zelenskiy complained last week the supply of 155-millimeter shells has decreased after Israel asked for some.
The worry is that a lack of continued weapons assistance would give leverage to Putin, the EU diplomat said. And doing a deal with Russia isn’t an alternative, according to Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, another Baltic state that has been among the most vocal in rallying support for Ukraine. Any ceasefire would risk Russia coming back stronger, he said.
“We simply must keep on and we have to work on a more long-term or structural support system for Ukraine, understanding that Russia at the same time is also mobilizing its economy, its forces and it is prepared for some long effort,” he said in an interview in Brussels on Nov. 16.
The political machinations in the US are putting more of the onus on the EU. European diplomats say they’ve been preparing for a scenario where American support may decrease. While the EU can offer Ukraine financial support, it can meet only a fraction of what the US offers in terms of weapons aid, according to Liana Fix, a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Both sides are using more ammunition than they can supply. But unlike in Europe or the US, Moscow’s economy is on a war footing, allowing industry to pump out shells, drones and other weapons more consistently.
“Replacing even a major part of the military support of the Americans will be just impossible because Europeans just don’t have the stocks to draw,” Fix said. “That’s why it’s so important that the US gets funding for Ukraine going again.”

The worry in Kyiv is that the next big strike will be on its energy infrastructure again just as the mercury plunges. Russian forces are stockpiling missiles and are waiting until the cold sets in to attack power and energy grids, people familiar with the matter said, raising concerns the attacks could overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses despite its additional systems.
Faced with a long war, Russia sees momentum shifting in its favor, according to people in Moscow familiar with the matter. In their view, Putin has two options: keep grinding away to wear down his opponent and its allies or try to mount a major new push in the spring. The latter would likely require unpopular mass mobilization.

Zelenskiy may not be thinking about his negotiating strategy for peace talks just yet. However, polls show a small, but growing minority of Ukrainians is coming around to the idea that territorial concessions to Russia might be an inevitable price for peace.
Ukraine is frustrated that some allies did not fully realize the scale of the battlefield and underestimated the strength of Russian defense lines that bogged down the counteroffensive. Expectations were too high, according to one of Zelenskiy’s closest aides.

Russia itself doesn’t have enough munitions to mount a significant offensive this year, and despite mobilizing its defense industry, it’s still failing to meet the huge demand, a senior NATO official said. Instead, it’s concentrating on seizing locations in the eastern Donetsk region and retaking parts it lost last year around Kharkiv, according to people familiar with the matter.
And while key sectors of Russia’s economy are adapting to international sanctions, Putin’s government is draining its resources to maintain state spending, something he can’t do indefinitely after an exodus of foreign investors and skilled labor.
Even for some inside Russia, the situation on the ground looks bleak for Moscow. The Russian government’s belief that it can “wait out” the West is a dangerous self-delusion, according to Mikhail Barabanov, a defense expert at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow.
“A long war could cement the role of Ukraine as a critical ally for the United States, similar to that of Israel and such a development would be a severe geopolitical defeat for Moscow,” he said.
 
Russian and Chinese executives discuss Russia-Crimea tunnel project

Russian and Chinese business executives with government ties have held secret discussions on plans to build an underwater tunnel connecting Russia to Crimea in hopes of establishing a transportation route that would be protected from attacks by Ukraine, according to communications intercepted by Ukraine’s security services.
The talks, which included meetings in late October, were triggered by mounting Russian concerns over the security of an 11-mile bridge across the Kerch Strait that has served as a key logistics line for the Russian military but has been bombed twice by Ukraine and remains a vulnerable war target.

The negotiations underscore Russia’s determination to maintain its grip on Crimea, a peninsula that it annexed illegally in 2014, as well as Moscow’s growing dependence on China as a source of global support.
Constructing a tunnel near the existing bridge would face enormous obstacles, according to U.S. officials and engineering experts who said work of such magnitude, probably costing billions of dollars and taking years to complete, has never been attempted in a war zone.
But despite questions about the viability of the plan, experts said, Russia has clear reasons for pursuing it. Having failed to achieve a decisive victory in the war, said Alexander Gabuev, an expert on Moscow-Beijing relations at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Russia “faces [the] risk that Ukraine will try to disrupt the Kerch bridge for many years to come.”

The project would also pose political and financial risks for China, which has never officially recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and whose companies could become ensnared in economic sanctions that the United States and the European Union have imposed on Moscow.
Nevertheless, intercepted emails indicate that one of China’s largest construction companies has signaled its willingness to participate. The messages were provided to The Washington Post by Ukrainian officials hoping to expose the project and China’s potential involvement. The authenticity of the messages was corroborated by other information separately obtained by The Post, including corporate registration files showing that a Russian-Chinese consortium involving individuals named in the emails was recently formed in Crimea.
Emails circulated among consortium officials in recent weeks mention meetings with Chinese delegates in Crimea. One dated Oct. 4 describes the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation, CRCC, as “ready to ensure the construction of railway and road construction projects of any complexity in the Crimean region.”
CRCC, a state-owned company, built many of the largest road and rail networks in China and has established substantial ties to Russia in recent years through projects including an extension of the Moscow subway system that was completed in 2021. The company did not respond to requests for comment.
 
Thread: https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1728104580448473183

I've largely drawn the opposite lesson from this war. I think tracked armored vehicles and tanks are still indispensable in a large-scale conventional land war, and any army that relies too heavily on wheeled vehicles assumes serious risks if they find themselves in one.
For 6-8 weeks every fall and spring, the ground conditions are quite poor in Ukraine. It is more difficult to operate heavy wheeled vehicles offroad than vehicles with tracks. Old MT-LBs are still useful as a result. 2/
The ground along the front line is littered with metal fragments and detritus. Armored wheeled vehicles often lose one or more wheels at the front even when they aren't struck, and artillery or AP mines are a greater problem for wheels than tracks. 3/
Passive armor on tanks is still critical. Ukrainian assaults still often include a pair of tanks in the lead before less protected IFVs/APCs advance. The presence of tanks can be the difference in tactical engagements. 4/
There is a selection bias problem when we see strikes on tanks. Tanks often survive Lancet, FPV, and ATGM strikes, but we are more likely to see videos of catastrophic kills posted on social media. ERA (and screens) has still proven to be effective. 5/
Tanks remain very useful in urban combat, both in offense and defense. In order to use them in close confines within RPG range, greater armor is critical. Their combination of armor, fire power, and mobility makes them useful in various situations. 6/
French AMX-10 RC proved to be too lightly armored for use in direct assaults this summer. Nicholas is right that mobility is key for survivability, but wheeled vehicles don't provide greater mobility in combat situations when wheels get punctured. 7/
The threat posed by UAVs is serious, but I think we'll see a similar adaptation for future tanks with EW jammers on each vehicle as we saw with MRAPs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kamikaze drones present a threat to all vehicles, not just tanks, but tank armor is an advantage. 8/
Wheeled vehicles are cheaper and easier to maintain, so it will make sense for most armies to maintain a mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles. Tanks may be less useful in other theaters than Ukraine, but any army that divests from them will assume important risks. 9/

Thread: https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1728171185790443845

Despite dense cloud cover blocking satellite, drone, and optical surveillance of the Avdiivka battlefield, our team continued the analysis using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems. Here is what we learned about the current situation. 🧵Thread:
2/ Before we move further, let's clarify what Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is. It's a technology that employs radar to generate images of the Earth's surface. By capturing and processing reflected waves, SAR provides detailed imagery regardless of weather conditions or daylight
3/
We combined SAR data with on-the-ground testimonials and open-source video materials to gain comprehensive insights.

Some Key Observations

- Vehicle Reduction: In contrast to the initial month of assaults, russian forces are employing fewer vehicles in smaller numbers.
4/
- Tactical Shift: There's a notable increase in the use of small tactical groups, consistently moving in the same areas despite prior losses.

- Guided Aerial bombs: There is a consistent uptick in the use of guided aerial bombs by Russian forces.
5/
As we correctly predicted, worsened weather conditions have hindered russian overextended logistics routes. Consequently, this limitation made it difficult to develop initial successes, particularly in the northern sector of Avdiivka, notably around Berdychi.
6/
Following an initial success north of Avdiivka, Russian forces extended their assaults for over a month. Despite tactical successes, they failed to establish persistent footholds in the AKHZ plant.
7/
Recently, russians seized control of parts of the industrial zone south of Avdiivka. These gains were primarily attributed to continuous infantry assaults, posing potential challenges for Ukrainian defenders in the coming weeks
8/
Russian forces persist in deploying small tactical groups, despite a high mortality rate. This sustained tactic, where one group follows another, has the potential to exhaust Ukrainian troops and compromise their positions over time
9/
The deployment of cluster bombs, as well as 250-1500kg bombs equipped with the UMPK kit poses a significant problem. Despite them being inaccurate, they are still dangerous due to the big explosive charge, particularly problematic in urban areas, leading to severe destruction
10/
In simpler terms, facing substantial losses and challenging weather, russians ramped up offensives using readily available resources—infantry, artillery, and aerial bombs.
11/
They shifted their focus to AKHZ, Berychi, and the southern industrial zone, reducing the emphasis on the initial plan to encircle Avdiivka with mechanized forces—a development we anticipated.
12/
Predicting future developments is challenging, hinging on russia's ability to persist with deploying infantry without adequate cover. This attritional approach, aimed at wearing down defenders, makes it hard to provide any solid estimates.
 

As winter cold sets in across Ukraine, concerns are growing that Russia will soon resume large-scale attacks on the power grid, repeating a tactic it used last year to try to break the will of Ukrainians by plunging them into cold and darkness.
Those fears are compounded by what Ukrainian experts and current and former officials say is an energy system that is more fragile than it was a year ago. In interviews, they described power plants still hobbled by Russian attacks last winter, unfinished repairs to substations and shortages of critical equipment like transformers. And snow has already begun to fall.
The Ukrainian authorities declined to provide detailed data on the current state of the power grid, saying it was sensitive information in wartime. But experts say the situation has improved only marginally since a United Nations report published this summer estimated that Ukraine’s total generation capacity had fallen to half of its prewar level by late April.
“Not a lot has changed since then,” Victoria Voytsitska, a former lawmaker and senior member of the Ukrainian Parliament’s energy committee, said in an interview. “We’re in a much worse situation than last year.”

The situation looks particularly grim for thermal power plants, which are fired by coal or gas and are a key element in Ukraine’s energy mix to meet demand during peak consumption periods, the experts say.
Ukraine’s government says the plants will supply 4.5 gigawatts of power this winter, a third of the country’s prewar output, according to the United Nations. That is the same capacity that the organization estimated this summer, suggesting that there has been little progress in repair work since then.
To be sure, Ukraine has sharply increased its ability to shoot down Russian missiles and drones before they get close to the power grid. It now has powerful air defense systems, and Ukrainian officials say fortifications have been erected around critical energy facilities.
“From one side we are more vulnerable,” said German Galushchenko, Ukraine’s energy minister. “From the other side we are more prepared.”
But some experts and lawmakers say the fortifications are untested and note that in the event of successful attacks, the country’s energy system will have little backup in terms of supply and equipment, making it more likely to break down.

Volodymyr Kudritskyi, the head of Ukrenergo, said the country had rehabilitated the “low-hanging fruit” — the facilities that have suffered the least damage — but that several power units were only partly repaired.
A major challenge has been finding transformers, which transmit electricity from power stations to people’s homes, he said. Last winter, Russia damaged or destroyed nearly half of Ukraine’s high-voltage transformers, according to the United Nations.
Ukrenergo has hunted for transformers around the world. But they can take up to a year to produce — meaning that only a limited number are likely to have been delivered so far.
Mr. Kudritskyi declined to say how many new transformers his company had received. But he acknowledged in an interview last week that “the safety margin, or safety buffer, is smaller this year if we speak about equipment that is in operation.”
The transformers are so vital that some have been stored beyond Ukraine’s borders, in allied countries, to avoid being targeted by Russia before winter, according to Inna Sovsun, a member of Parliament’s energy committee.
Another challenge facing Ukraine’s power grid is the state of its thermal power plants. While the bulk of the country’s electricity is produced by nuclear power, the thermal plants provide the extra generation capacity needed to meet peak demand.
All of Ukraine’s thermal power plants were damaged by Russian strikes last year, according to the United Nations. Repair work has lagged, several experts said in interviews, partly because Ukraine has struggled to find investors willing to finance plants that are highly polluting.

Roman Nitsovych, research director of DiXi Group, a Ukrainian think tank focusing on the energy sector, said he estimated that the repair work had restored a fifth of the plants’ capacity lost to damage or Russian occupation.
Figures provided by Ukraine’s energy ministry suggest a slightly more critical situation. Although the ministry says it has exceeded its repair targets, only 1.3 gigawatts of capacity has been restored to thermal power plants, about 15 percent of the total loss.
Ukraine’s generation capacity appears crippled to the point that some analysts wonder whether the country will be able to avoid blackouts this winter, even if Russia does not attack.


A Ukrainian sea drone attack on Russia's Crimean bridge in July had "overturned" naval operations and forced Moscow to resort to ferries to move weaponry, the head of Ukraine's main intelligence agency said in a video broadcast on Friday.
Vasyl Maliuk, head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), said the second of two major attacks in August had seriously disrupted operations on the 19-km (12-mile) bridge, Europe's longest, and dented the notion of Russian invincibility.
"We have practically overturned the philosophy of naval operations," Maliuk said in the first of a series of televised documentaries entitled "SBU, the Special Operations of Victory."
"We have destroyed the myth of Russian invincibility. The country is a fake. The bridge is doomed. Plenty of surprises lie ahead and not just the Crimean bridge."
Maliuk outlined how the attack, endorsed by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, involved five "Sea Baby" seaborne drones -- remotely controlled from Kyiv, 1000 km (600 miles) to the north.
 

Russia was throwing "waves" of soldiers towards the embattled Ukrainian city of Avdiivka, suffering massive losses in their attempt to capture strategically important territory on the eastern front lines, Ukrainian soldiers say.

Sitting in an indent -- surrounded on almost three sides by Russian forces -- Avdiivka has become a symbol of a grinding war in which neither side has made a decisive breakthrough in more than a year.

But despite having suffered steady losses in troops and equipment, Russia was showing no signs of abandoning its attempt to capture the former coal hub in Ukraine's industrial east.

"The fields are just littered with corpses," Oleksandr, a deputy of a Ukrainian battalion in the 47th mechanised brigade, told AFP.

"They are trying to exhaust our lines with constant waves of attacks," he said, without providing his full name for security reasons.


The city has been destroyed by relentless Russian artillery and aerial bombardments in some of the most intense fighting of the 21-month war.

But around 1,500 of the 30,000 pre-war residents have remained -- mainly pensioners living in their basements and relying on special food convoys to bring in supplies.

The city briefly fell to Russian-backed separatists in 2014, and Ukraine has spent the last nine years building defences and trenches to protect the city.

Fortifications to the south lie just five kilometres (three miles) north of Donetsk, the Russian-controlled capital of one of four regions Moscow claimed to have annexed from Ukraine.

Throwing huge numbers of soldiers towards the city marks a change in Russia's tactics in the battle for Avdiivka.

In October, Moscow launched a massive attack to try to encircle Avdiivka with hundreds of armoured vehicles.

"Columns of tanks and armoured personnel carriers were advancing," said a 29-year old drone operator who gave his call-sign as "Trauma".

"But they fell into minefields, were hit by drones and anti-tank missiles."

A Western official said the Russian army lost more than 200 armoured vehicles in that failed attack.

Now Moscow has "switched to infantry tactics," said Oleksandr -- "advancing solely at the expense of human resources."

Russian soldiers typically advance at night, in groups of five to seven fighters, Trauma told AFP.

"Then early in the morning, they launch their attack."


Ukraine responds with a barrage of heavy weaponry -- artillery, mortars, grenades, drones and cannons fired from US-supplied Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

"Some die, others keep on coming. It's like a zombie movie," Trauma added.

In throwing hundreds of men at the city, Russia's latest assault on Avdiivka resembles its campaign for Bakhmut earlier this year.

Some 50 kilometres to the north, that city was eventually captured by Russia in perhaps the bloodiest single battle of the war so far.

At Bakhmut, Russia deployed tens of thousands of men -- mainly convicts recruited from prisons by Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner Group -- in "storm brigades" as it tried to overrun Ukrainian positions.

Prigozhin regularly described the city as a "meat grinder," and after its capture said Russia's losses exceeded 20,000.

A similar story is now playing out in Avdiivka, Ukrainian soldiers say.

The Russians "see many corpses, but they don't give up," Oleksandr told AFP.

For Moscow, progress may have been slow and costly, but they have made small gains.

Ukraine's general staff said Thursday it had repelled 30 separate Russian attacks over the last 24 hours.

Russia controls territory to the south and east of the city, while Ukraine has held on to an eight-kilometre wide strip of land running from Avdiivka to the northwest.

Russian forces have also recently closed in on a giant coking plant in the northeast of the city as well as the village of Stepove.

From those positions, they are just two kilometres away from Berdychi -- another small settlement, from where the last Ukrainian-held access road into Avdiivka runs.

"That road is vital. If they cut it, it will complicate entry, evacuation, supplies," said deputy commander Oleksandr.

"And it doesn't mean they'll stop there. They're looking for a chance to take the city."

Although "half surrounded," Ukraine has enough troops to carry on defending Avdiivka, Oleksandr said.

"There is no reason to withdraw and give up the city."
 

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on November 23 that Russian forces launched a “third wave” of assaults as part of the Russia offensive operation in the Avdiivka direction, and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that this “third wave” began on November 22.[1] Shtupun reported a 25 to 30 percent increase in Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka on November 22 and stated that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian columns of roughly a dozen armored vehicles in total during assaults.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 50 Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction on November 23 and 24.[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations on Avdiivka’s northern and southern flanks but did not characterize any Russian assaults as heavily mechanized.[4] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance north of Avdiivka and made further gains in the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka but did not make any territorial claims consistent with a successful renewed large-scale Russian offensive push.[5]

Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian tanks and seven armored fighting vehicles on November 22, suggesting that Russian forces are currently conducting a smaller set of mechanized assaults than in October.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces lost 50 tanks and 100 armored vehicles in renewed assaults on Avdiivka on October 19 and 15 tanks and 33 armored vehicles during the initial large, mechanized assaults on October 10.[7] Russian forces have lost a confirmed 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles in offensive operations near Avdiivka since October 9, and the Russian military appeared to spend the end of October and all of November preparing for a wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults to compensate for these heavy-equipment losses.[8] Large infantry-led ground assaults will likely pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces defending in the Avdiivka direction but will not lead to a rapid Russian advance in the area.

European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders. The Finnish government announced on November 22 that Finland will close three more checkpoints on the Finnish-Russian border from November 23 to December 23, leaving only the northernmost checkpoint open.[31] Norwegian Prime Minister Johan Gahr Store stated on November 22 that Norway would also close its border to Russia “if necessary.“[32] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated on November 23 that an increased number of migrants have also arrived at the Estonian-Russian border and that Russia is organizing the arrivals as part of an effort to “weaponize illegal immigration.”[33] Reuters reported on November 23 that the Estonian Interior Ministry stated that Estonia has undertaken preparations to close its border crossings with Russia if “the migration pressure from Russia escalates.”[34] Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina stated on November 24 that Latvia has experienced a similar influx of migrants on its border with Russia, and Silina and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated that these are Russian and Belarusian “hybrid attacks.”[35] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Finland on November 22 of “stirring up Russophobic sentiments” and interrupting border services that were an integral part of Russian–Finnish cooperation.[36] ISW previously assessed that Russia is employing a known hybrid warfare tactic similar to Russia’s and Belarus’s creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 that is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO.[37]


Figures from the state statistical service Rosstat released on Nov. 1 show a huge spike in prices for some foods compared with 2022 — 74% for cabbage, 72% for oranges and 47% for cucumbers.

The Russian parliament has approved a 2024-2026 budget that earmarks a record amount for defense spending. Maxim Blant, a Russian economy analyst based in Latvia, sees that as an indication that prices will continue to rise sharply.

“It is simply impossible to solve the issue of inflation in conditions ... when the military-industrial complex receives unlimited funding, when everything they ask for is given to them, when the share of this military-industrial complex in the economy grows at a very rapid pace,” he told The Associated Press.

The central bank’s rate hikes have slightly cooled the ruble’s exchange rate slide — the rate is now about 88 to the U.S. dollar from more than 100 earlier. But that’s still far higher than in the summer of 2022, when it was about 60 to the dollar.

That keeps the cost of imports high, even as import possibilities shrink because of Western sanctions.


“The high number of [asylum] applicants also makes it possible to deliberately send individuals or groups that threaten national security to Finland. It is probable that the phenomenon will cause insecurity in society,” the memo reads.

More than 700 asylum applicants have crossed the eastern border into Finland between August and November. The memo points out that the number of arrivals has increased sharply particularly in recent weeks, with the weekly total jumping from only 32 for 6–12 November to 527 for 13–19 November.

“The current rate of weekly arrivals would translate to around 15,000–20,000 asylum seekers entering the country across the eastern border on an annual basis. It is also noteworthy that weaponisation increases the risks associated with the arrivals. This is not a case of an external factor causing genuine and spontaneous flow of migrants.”

The government identified three factors that have contributed to the phenomenon: the kind of international crime that is typically linked to illegal immigration, active marketing on social media, and active and permissive facilitation by Russian authorities.

“That the phenomenon is underpinned by organised crime and corruption by Russian authorities does not mean that the phenomenon has not been simultaneously harnessed for Russia’s broader foreign-policy purposes,” the memo reads.
 
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