This is the sort of thing that would normally be posted in May or June rather than in November. But here it is.
(1) You know that there's a 50% turnover rate among top ten fantasy RBs from year to year. (I.e., half of the top ten RBs in 2008 will also be top ten RBs in 2009.) Does that mean your projected top ten RBs for 2009 should have five RBs in it who were top ten in 2008?
(2) In any given week, you think that Vincent Jackson is 75% likely to outscore Ted Ginn in your fantasy league. Does that mean you should start Vincent Jackson 75% of the time and Ted Ginn 25% of the time?
Here's a relevant passage from Robyn Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World:
"Many psychological experiments were conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s in which subjects were asked to predict the outcome of an event that had a random component but yet had base-rate predictability - for example, subjects were asked to predict whether the next card the experiment turned over would be red or blue in a context in which 70% of the cards were blue, but in which the sequence of red and blue cards was totally random.
In such a situation, the strategy that will yield the highest proportion of success is to predict the more common event. For example, if 70% of the cards are blue, then predicting blue on every trial yields a 70% success rate.
What subjects tended to do instead, however, was match probabilities - that is, predict the more probable event with the relative frequency with which it occurred. For example, subjects tended to predict 70% of the time that the blue card would occur and 30% of the time that the red card would occur. Such a strategy yields a 58% success rate, because the subjects are correct 70% of the time when the blue card occurs (which happens with probability .70) and 30% of the time when the red card occurs (which happens with probability .30); .70 * .70 + .30 * .30 = .58.
In fact, subjects predict the more frequent event with a slightly higher probability than that with which it occurs, but do not come close to predicting its occurrence 100% of the time, even when they are paid for the accuracy of their predictions... For example, subjects who were paid a nickel for each correct prediction over a thousand trials... predicted [the more common event] 76% of the time."
It's a human tendency to think we're better guessers than we really are."Always start your studs" is better advice than we often think it is. Sure, we might sit LT and feel like geniuses if he is held in check that week. But more often than not, we'll make the wrong decision by outguessing ourselves.
(1) You know that there's a 50% turnover rate among top ten fantasy RBs from year to year. (I.e., half of the top ten RBs in 2008 will also be top ten RBs in 2009.) Does that mean your projected top ten RBs for 2009 should have five RBs in it who were top ten in 2008?
(2) In any given week, you think that Vincent Jackson is 75% likely to outscore Ted Ginn in your fantasy league. Does that mean you should start Vincent Jackson 75% of the time and Ted Ginn 25% of the time?
Here's a relevant passage from Robyn Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World:
"Many psychological experiments were conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s in which subjects were asked to predict the outcome of an event that had a random component but yet had base-rate predictability - for example, subjects were asked to predict whether the next card the experiment turned over would be red or blue in a context in which 70% of the cards were blue, but in which the sequence of red and blue cards was totally random.
In such a situation, the strategy that will yield the highest proportion of success is to predict the more common event. For example, if 70% of the cards are blue, then predicting blue on every trial yields a 70% success rate.
What subjects tended to do instead, however, was match probabilities - that is, predict the more probable event with the relative frequency with which it occurred. For example, subjects tended to predict 70% of the time that the blue card would occur and 30% of the time that the red card would occur. Such a strategy yields a 58% success rate, because the subjects are correct 70% of the time when the blue card occurs (which happens with probability .70) and 30% of the time when the red card occurs (which happens with probability .30); .70 * .70 + .30 * .30 = .58.
In fact, subjects predict the more frequent event with a slightly higher probability than that with which it occurs, but do not come close to predicting its occurrence 100% of the time, even when they are paid for the accuracy of their predictions... For example, subjects who were paid a nickel for each correct prediction over a thousand trials... predicted [the more common event] 76% of the time."
It's a human tendency to think we're better guessers than we really are."Always start your studs" is better advice than we often think it is. Sure, we might sit LT and feel like geniuses if he is held in check that week. But more often than not, we'll make the wrong decision by outguessing ourselves.