A few examples from
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Swedish financial transaction tax (1984 - 1991)
Sweden is an early example of introducing a tax on equity securities, fixed income securities and financial derivatives. In January, 1984, Sweden introduced a 0.5% tax on the purchase or sale of an equity security. Hence a round trip (purchase and sale) transaction resulted in a 1% tax. In July, 1986, the rate was doubled, and in January, 1989, a considerably lower tax of 0.002% on fixed-income securities was introduced for a security with a maturity of 90 days or less. On a bond with a maturity of five years or more, the tax was 0.003%. Analyst Marion G. Wrobel prepared a paper for Canadian Government in July, 2006, examining the international experience with financial transaction taxes, and paying particular attention to the Swedish experience.[29]
The revenues from taxes were disappointing; for example, revenues from the tax on fixed-income securities were initially expected to amount to 1,500 million Swedish kroner per year. They did not amount to more than 80 million Swedish kroner in any year and the average was closer to 50 million.[30] In addition, as taxable trading volumes fell, so did revenues from capital gains taxes, entirely offsetting revenues from the equity transactions tax that had grown to 4,000 million Swedish kroner by 1988.[31]
On the day that the tax was announced, share prices fell by 2.2%. But there was leakage of information prior to the announcement, which might explain the 5.35% price decline in the 30 days prior to the announcement. When the tax was doubled, prices again fell by another 1%. These declines were in line with the capitalized value of future tax payments resulting from expected trades. It was further felt that the taxes on fixed-income securities only served to increase the cost of government borrowing, providing another argument against the tax.
Even though the tax on fixed-income securities was much lower than that on equities, the impact on market trading was much more dramatic. During the first week of the tax, the volume of bond trading fell by 85%, even though the tax rate on five-year bonds was only 0.003%. The volume of futures trading fell by 98% and the options trading market disappeared. On 15 April 1990, the tax on fixed-income securities was abolished. In January 1991 the rates on the remaining taxes were cut in half and by the end of the year they were abolished completely. Once the taxes were eliminated, trading volumes returned and grew substantially in the 1990s.
Effect on volatility
Proponents of the tax assert that it will reduce price volatility. In a 1984 paper, Lawrence Summers and Victoria Summers argued, “Such a tax would have the beneficial effects of curbing instability introduced by speculation, reducing the diversion of resources into the financial sector of the economy, and lengthening the horizons of corporate managers.”[46] It is further believed that FTTs “should reduce volatility by reducing the number of noise traders”.[47] However most empirical studies find that the relationship between FTT and short-term price volatility is ambiguous and that “higher transaction costs are associated with more, rather than less, volatility”.[47]
A 2003 IMF Staff Paper by Karl Habermeier and Andrei Kirilenko found that FTTs are “positively related to increased volatility and lower volume.”[48] A study of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges says the FTT created “significant” increases in volatility because it “would influence not only noise traders, but also those informed traders who play the role of decreasing volatility in the stock market.”[49] A french study of 6,774 daily realized volatility measurements for 4.7 million trades in a four year period of index stocks trading in the Paris Bourse from 1995 to 1999 reached the same conclusion “that higher transaction costs increase stock return volatility.” The French study concluded that this volatility measures “are likely to underestimate the destabilizing role of security transactions since they – unlike large ticks – also reduce the stabilizing liquidity supply.”[50]
A study of the UK Stamp Duty in 1997 found no significant effect on the volatility of UK equity prices.[47]
Effect on liquidity
In 2011 the IMF published a study paper, which argues that a securities transaction tax (STT) "reduces trading volume, it may decrease liquidity or, equivalently, may increase the price impact of trades, which will tend to heighten price volatility.”[51] A study by the think tank Oxera found that the imposition of the UK’s Stamp Duty would “likely have a negative effect on liquidity in secondary markets.” Regarding proposals to abolish the UK’s Stamp Duty, Oxera concluded that the abolition would “be likely to result in a non-negligible increase in liquidity, further reducing the cost of capital of UK listed companies.”[52] A study of the FTT in Chinese stock markets found liquidity reductions due to decreased transactions.[49]:6
Effect on price discovery
An IMF Working Paper found an FTT impacts price discovery. The natural effect of the FTT’s reduction of trading volume is to reduce liquidity, which “can in turn slow price discovery, the process by which financial markets incorporate the effect of new information into asset prices.” The FTT would cause information to be incorporated more slowly into trades, creating “a greater autocorrelation of returns.” This pattern could impede the ability of the market to prevent asset bubbles. The deterrence of transactions could “slow the upswing of the asset cycle,” but it could also “slow a correction of prices toward their fundamental values.”[51] :16,18,21
Habermeier and Kirilenko conclude that “The presence of even very small transaction costs makes continuous rebalancing infinitely expensive. Therefore, valuable information can be held back from being incorporated into prices. As a result, prices can deviate from their full information values.”[48]:174 A Chinese study argrees, saying: “When it happens that an asset’s price is currently misleading and is inconsistent with its intrinsic value, it would take longer to correct for the discrepancy because of the lack of enough transactions. In these cases, the capital market becomes less efficient.”[49]:6
Revenues
Revenues vary according to tax rate, transactions covered, and tax effects on transactions.
The Swedish experience with transaction taxes in 1984-91 demonstrates that the net effect on tax revenues can be difficult to estimate and can even be negative due to reduced trading volumes. Revenues from the transaction tax on fixed-income securities were initially expected to amount to 1,500 million Swedish kroner per year but actually amounted to no more than 80 million Swedish kroner in any year. Reduced trading volumes also caused a reduction in capital gains tax revenue which entirely offset the transaction tax revenues.[31]
An examination of the scale and nature of the various payments and derivatives transactions and the likely elasticity of response led Honohan and Yoder (2010) to conclude that attempts to raise a significant percentage of gross domestic product in revenue from a broad-based financial transactions tax are likely to fail both by raising much less revenue than expected and by generating far-reaching changes in economic behavior. They point out that, although the side effects would include a sizable restructuring of financial sector activity, this would not occur in ways corrective of the particular forms of financial overtrading that were most conspicuous in contributing to the ongoing financial crisis. Accordingly, such taxes likely deliver both less revenue and less efficiency benefits than have sometimes been claimed by some. On the other hand, they observe that such taxes may be less damaging than feared by others.
Increased cost of capital
Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University, and formerly Chief Economist at the IMF, argues that there are ample reasons to be angry at financiers, and real change is needed in how they operate.[58] However, he concludes, "the FTT financial transaction tax, despite its noble intellectual lineage, is no solution to Europe’s problems – or to the world’s."
"Over the long run, the tax burden would shift. Higher transactions taxes increase the cost of capital, ultimately lowering investment. With a lower capital stock, output would trend downward, reducing government revenues and substantially offsetting the direct gain from the tax. In the long run, wages would fall, and ordinary workers would end up bearing a significant share of the cost. More broadly, FTTs violate the general public-finance principle that it is inefficient to tax intermediate factors of production, particularly ones that are highly mobile and fluid in their response."
Would the tax be progressive or regressive?
An IMF Working Paper finds that the FTT “disproportionately burdens” the financial sector and will also impact pension funds, public corporations, international commerce firms, and the public sector, with “multiple layers of tax” creating a “cascading effect.” “[E]ven an apparently low-rate [FTT] might result in a high tax burden on some activities.” These costs could also be passed on to clients, including not only wealthy individuals and corporations, but charities and pension and mutual funds.[51]:25,37
Other studies have suggested that the financial transaction tax is regressive in application—particularly the Stamp Duty in the UK, which includes certain exemptions only available to institutional investors. One UK study, by the Institute for Development Studies, suggests, “In the long run, a significant proportion of the tax could end up being passed on to consumers.”[47]:3 Another study of the UK Stamp Duty found that institutional investors avoid the tax due to intermediary relief, while short-term investors who are willing to take on additional risk can avoid the tax by trading noncovered derivatives. The study concluded, therefore, “The tax is thus likely to fall most heavily on long-term, risk-averse investors.”[51]:36