I finally got around to reading this.
Regarding the title, I think it's appropriate to have sympathy for Luddites as people, but not for Luddism as policy. When some form of technology reduces the demand for certain types of labor, there are real hardships for the displaced workers. But I hope it's obvious that the best solution isn't to outlaw that technology. (For present purposes, I would consider
international trade to be a form of technology as well.) I don't know what the best solution is; I just know it's not that.
As an initial aside, I'd point out that what's bad for American laborers is not necessarily bad for humanity. Krugman notes that "the nature of rising inequality in America changed around 2000. Until then, it was all about worker versus worker; the distribution of income between labor and capital — between wages and profits, if you like — had been stable for decades. Since then, however, labor’s share of the pie has fallen sharply." But the key phrase there is "in America." Worldwide, labor's share of the pie has not fallen. In third-world countries, wages have been going up by about 7% per year compounded, meaning that they're doubling every ten years. Outsourcing has been bad for American labor, but good for worldwide labor, and it's not clear to me why the first should be more important than the second. (It's clear why it's more important to American politicians, but it's not clear why it should be more important to neutral observers behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.)
American laborers are used to earning a lot more than third-world laborers. Historically, the reason they've earned so much more is because they have been much more productive. Probably the most important reason that they've been much more productive is that there's been so much more capital investment in the U.S. than there has been in third-world countries. I can make a lot more widgets per hour operating my American employer's expensive widget-making machinery than a Malaysian can make by hand. Because labor has been more productive in America, it has been paid more.
But that is changing. Countries all over the world are becoming more suitable for foreign capital investment. I can now open a factory in plenty of third-world countries without going through miles of red tape, and without fear that it will be confiscated by those countries' governments, or that it will be taken over by organized crime, or that I'll never be able to get my profits from it back to America, etc.
As other countries become decent options for capital investment in competition with the U.S., the wages in those countries will increase while the demand for American labor will decline.
Actually, that last sentence needs some further explanation. As I've pointed out plenty of times in the past, importing goods from other countries does not necessarily reduce demand for American goods. (It's international
trade; not international
gift-giving. When we trade domestic wheat for foreign cars, it decreases the demand for domestic cars, but it increases the demand for domestic wheat by the same amount.) The same reasoning tells us that outsourcing jobs to other countries does not necessarily reduce the demand for American labor. It's all part of the trade calculus, and ultimately, at least as a rough approximation, imports = exports.
But just because something is not
necessarily true does not mean that it's not true in a specific case. Right now, I do think that outsourcing jobs is reducing the demand for American labor, and that's largely because of technological progress (which is nonetheless a very good thing, and should not be stifled).
Imports = exports
as measured in dollars. But we can export a billion dollars' worth of computer software while importing a billion dollars' worth of textiles, furniture, and manufactured electronics, and if we measure the trade balance in terms of hours of labor rather than dollars, imports and exports won't be nearly equal. We can produce a billion dollars worth of computer software with a small fraction of the man-hours needed to produce a billion dollars' worth of manufactured goods. While international trade will still benefit the U.S. as a whole, the income-centric benefits will be fairly concentrated among a relatively small percentage of the population, like the owners and managers of software companies (who are already very well-to-do). Technological progress is making it possible for the entrepreneurial elites to produce greater value with fewer man-hours of work; that's generally a good thing, but it has income-concentration effects that can distort the foreign trade calculus.
If, dollar for dollar, our exports are a lot less labor-intensive than our imports, as is almost certainly the case, many American workers will be harmed by the globalization (and technologization) of the economy.
Exactly what to do about that is a hard question. I agree with Krugman that a decent social safety net is part of the answer, but I don't think it can ever be the dominant part. It's politically unfeasible and undesirable to have a relatively small working class support a relatively large non-working class. It's also an economic disaster to have a high rate of involuntary unemployment. Publicly supporting people without jobs, or with very low-playing jobs, isn't going to work in the long term unless it's combined with providing widespread opportunities for people to get highly productive jobs that they are qualified for.
But how do we do that? More education sounds like a good idea in the abstract. But in practice, education in America is kind of stupid in a lot of ways. I mean, college is an awful lot of fun, but it's generally not a very efficient way to become usefully skilled or learned. And high school education fails far too often even to ensure basic functional literacy.
If there's an easy answer to the problem, somebody else needs to point it out, because I'm not seeing it.