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Having the ball on your own 25 has an EPA of about zero, meaning that the other team is about as likely to score the next points as you are. If you make a field goal, the other team gets a chance to try to match it...but then, you kick off, and they will (on average) be in a position with an EPA of about zero (meaning you're about as likely to score as they are).
??? Um, yeah. The scoring part of it is a rather good reason to elect to receive. Maybe read the post again
You do realize that the "scoring part of it" is the whole reason to have the discussion in the first place, don't you?
Ok, now factor in that the 3rd possession is now sudden death. I think I would rather have the ball there. Not a very close decision for me.
It's only statistically as close as it is because the models assume that coaches play-call optimally in a given situation.
Receiving the kick;
Re-read what CalBear wrote - a team taking possession on its own 25 has an EPA of roughly zero. So even if the first two possessions end with an exchange of punts (which is the most likely scenario), the receiving team will most often begin that third possession in an EPA-neutral situation.
The models are based on actual results of actual game scenarios, so coach's decision-making is already built into them.
Not that I doubt their claims - but realistically, how can they be, when they have so few data points (NFL OT games played under the existing rules) to work with?
Do you have stats on this stuff from ONLY overtime possession?? That would be much more relevant than possession from the first 3 quarters of games.
There is somewhat limited data on the specific scenario of play-calling during the first possession of OT under the new rules, but it's not a tiny amount; there have been 72 OT games with a first possession since 2012. The average start line was the 22.8 yard line, the average drive length was 36.3 yards, and the result was:
Obviously providing stats isn't going to do anything to change your mind, so I'm done.
Probably not in this case with this team, no.
Are you saying a gusty wind isn't a huge factor when blowing right at you? Cause it is. Just sayin. So in that case he didn't particularly elect to kick first, he elected to defend with a huge wind at his back, and then gave the other team the choice to kick or receive. Not really a shocker that coach chose to receive.
If I had the Chiefs offense, I might push them back those 21 yards as well knowing that with a 22 point lead they are bound to be conservative on 3rd and 24. It's not a terribly wise decision, but I wouldn't say it's in the realm of worst coaching decisions made on a weekly basis.
But you also have the Chiefs defense which has already been burned for 22 points.
Agree that it's typically an unwise decision, even if there's value to be gained (I.e. 21 yards is probably more than the Chiefs longest pass play on the season).
That's not a bad decision at all. Being up 20 means the other team has to score three touchdowns. If you go for 2 and miss it, a 19-point lead means the other team can tie with a FG, two touchdowns and two 2-point conversions. Smarter to kick the extra point and go up 20, especially when your D is as good as Denver's.
It's not an exact science. For example, that chart says go for 2 when you are up 5, but if you are trailing 7-6 early in the 2nd quarter and score a touchdown to go up 12-7, should you go for 2 there as the chart says? I would guess most coaches would do the smart thing and kick the extra point since there is still a lot of game to be played.
It was developed for the college game, which is obviously a bit different than the pro game (different style offenses, far less reliable kickers, etc.).
I recall reading something in the aftermath of the Seattle-Atlanta game that ran the numbers on this and determined scoring 2 TDs + 2-pointers and one FG was less likely than three TDs. I can't find the exact percentages, but it basically came down to this: All other things being equal, your chances of two TDs plus two 2pt conversions is ~25% vs. your chances of two TDs with extra points. So while there's obviously a higher probability of the third drive ending in a FG than a TD, it's not enough to overcome the discrepancy between conversion tries.
I was following the Gamecast and not watching at that point. It was such a puzzling call that I just assumed there must have been something going on, like Sturgis tweaking something and telling Pederson he didn't think he could make it from 54. Did Michaels and Collinsworth discuss it at all on the broadcast?
Nope. Just Doug being scared. I think Chris was too excited to see Dak again to notice we only gained 26 yards on the punt vs trying to kick a FG to put us up 2 scores.
I've been bar-hopping and not fully paying attention to the game, so do please enlighten.
It was the wrong decision regardless of what SD did with that possession (and i realize the OP mentioned the result before you did).
