RBBC is here (1 Viewer)

[gianmarco]

Here is another example:

Player X had 8 games last year with 20+ touches. This is 1 more 20+ touch game than Adrian Peterson. This includes 5 games with 20+ carries alone.

Based on your conclusion above with ADP, you'd say that this guy is not in a RBBC.

Guess what: This guy was 2nd on his team in total touches to Jamaal Charles. Player X = Thomas Jones and is what you would call the very definition of RBBC as they split it right down the middle.

So, using your data, ADP and Thomas Jones look identical. They had 7 and 8 games of 20+ touches respectively. Yet they couldn't be more different in terms of RBBC as one is the CLEAR lead ball carrier with no RBBC whatsoever and the other guy is in a completely RBBC and was actually 2nd in touches on his own team. And no, it didn't trend differently as the year went on as T. Jones still had 22 carries and 23 carries in weeks 15 and 16.

You're using the above criteria to define RBBC and I've pretty clearly showed how the data doesn't fit that definition based only on the numbers.

You are fixating too much on individual player examples, rather than a summation across all players AND a comparison year-by-year.

I'm not fixating on anything. I'm pointing out that the conclusion being reached based on the data is flawed. Using # of 20+ touch games as an indicator of being or not being in a RBBC is not the best indicator. I showed an example of 2 players with the same data set that are in completely different situations. Thus, how can you use that data to define and conclude what's going on with RBBC when it simply doesn't answer that question?

Let's pick another example:

LeSean McCoy had 285 touches last year and over 200 carries. The next closest guy was Jerome Harrison with 40 carries and 8 receptions. Clearly NOT a RBBC, correct?

McCoy had NINE games under 20 touches and he only played in 15 games. He didn't hit 20+ touches in 60% of the games he played in. Yet, he had almost 300 touches for the year and was absolutely the lead ball carrier. But, using 20+ touches as a measure of being the main ball carrier, he fails pretty miserably.

How many more examples do you need to see that the data isn't answering the question proposed?

Actually, I do think you're either a) fixating, or b) being pedantic.If he rephrased this to say "the day of the bellcow RB is coming to an end" then the data clearly demonstrates this to be true. No?

So rather than fixating on "RBBC", I'm far more interested in whether or not workload is decreasing for RB1 on teams. And again, the data does very clearly demonstrate this. Almost to the point where I would say "who cares whether we call it RBBC - all that matters is that is becoming much more rare for a RB to get a ton of touches - whether in individual games or across a 16-game season."

No, i don't think it clearly demonstrates that because, again, I think the data is not the best way to determine RBBC or not.

Start reading here

The above link is a previous thread with numbers that support that RBBC is LESS prevalent, not more. So which is right? I honestly don't know. Both could be right. Once again, I think we first have to define RBBC and I don't think that's been done yet. Then, once defined, I think there's several ways it needs to be looked at.

I did post above that the # of 250+ and 300+ touch seasons by a RB per year has gone down. But, is it statistically significant, esp. over such a short timeframe and limited sample size? When you're dealing with single digit changes, it could easily just be due to talent level. It could also be due to coaching philosophy and a true shift. I don't know. But I don't think anyone has proven it one way or the other. And the data above certainly doesn't convince me when I can draw 2 different conclusions based on identical data points.

 

[CalBear]

I disagree on the sample size, simply because the RBBC phenomenon really was spurred on after the Colts and Bears showed how successful it can be.

This seems highly questionable. In the Colts' Super Bowl year, they rarely ran (only 439 carries on the year), their backup RB averaged 3.4 yards per carry, and they had no one on the roster who appeared to be capable of being a bell cow RB anyway. The Super Bowl-losing Bears gave Thomas Jones the ball 296 times, and in fact he had nine 20+ carry games that year. Do you really think that teams with potential bell-cow RBs looked at that and thought, "gee, we should completely change our game plan?"

 

[Aabye]

I disagree on the sample size, simply because the RBBC phenomenon really was spurred on after the Colts and Bears showed how successful it can be. The cat seems to be out of the bag as far as using RBBC, and I don't know that even bell cow caliber RBs will be rode as hard as they once were. Add in that teams want to preserve their assets (not overwork them) along with the data that the FF value / production isn't greatly diminished with fewer touches and involving a second back and the trend may become the norm - at least until a feature back team wins a championship.As for passing / receiving yardage and stats changes, that's a different issue. A rule change (no contact after five yards) significantly opened up the passing game. I don't know of any watershed rules that impacted RBBC.

I'm not seeing this link between the Colts / Bears Super Bowl and RBBC at all. Neither of those teams was good at running the ball, regardless of how you define "good at running the ball." They didn't have a lot of attempts, yards, Y/A, TDs (the Colts did have pretty good rushing TDs, but they also had a really good offense), rushing 1st downs, etc. Neither team was terrible at running the ball but neither team was particularly impressive either.NFL teams would have to be blind to attribute the success of those teams to their employment of RBBC. The Colts were a really good team primarily because they had one of the best players in NFL history playing QB for them. The Bears had a stingy defense, great special teams, and they forced 44 turnovers. It's like saying that the 2000 Ravens showed that you don't need a great QB to win a Super Bowl. Well, yeah, if you have one of the most dominant defenses in NFL history. Similarly, you can make a Super Bowl without a lead back if you have a once-in-a-generation QB or force a million turnovers.

 

[Go deep]

I disagree on the sample size, simply because the RBBC phenomenon really was spurred on after the Colts and Bears showed how successful it can be. The cat seems to be out of the bag as far as using RBBC, and I don't know that even bell cow caliber RBs will be rode as hard as they once were. Add in that teams want to preserve their assets (not overwork them) along with the data that the FF value / production isn't greatly diminished with fewer touches and involving a second back and the trend may become the norm - at least until a feature back team wins a championship.As for passing / receiving yardage and stats changes, that's a different issue. A rule change (no contact after five yards) significantly opened up the passing game. I don't know of any watershed rules that impacted RBBC.

I'm not seeing this link between the Colts / Bears Super Bowl and RBBC at all. Neither of those teams was good at running the ball, regardless of how you define "good at running the ball." They didn't have a lot of attempts, yards, Y/A, TDs (the Colts did have pretty good rushing TDs, but they also had a really good offense), rushing 1st downs, etc. Neither team was terrible at running the ball but neither team was particularly impressive either.NFL teams would have to be blind to attribute the success of those teams to their employment of RBBC. The Colts were a really good team primarily because they had one of the best players in NFL history playing QB for them. The Bears had a stingy defense, great special teams, and they forced 44 turnovers. It's like saying that the 2000 Ravens showed that you don't need a great QB to win a Super Bowl. Well, yeah, if you have one of the most dominant defenses in NFL history. Similarly, you can make a Super Bowl without a lead back if you have a once-in-a-generation QB or force a million turnovers.

 

[gianmarco]

I disagree on the sample size, simply because the RBBC phenomenon really was spurred on after the Colts and Bears showed how successful it can be. The cat seems to be out of the bag as far as using RBBC, and I don't know that even bell cow caliber RBs will be rode as hard as they once were. Add in that teams want to preserve their assets (not overwork them) along with the data that the FF value / production isn't greatly diminished with fewer touches and involving a second back and the trend may become the norm - at least until a feature back team wins a championship.As for passing / receiving yardage and stats changes, that's a different issue. A rule change (no contact after five yards) significantly opened up the passing game. I don't know of any watershed rules that impacted RBBC.

I'm not seeing this link between the Colts / Bears Super Bowl and RBBC at all. Neither of those teams was good at running the ball, regardless of how you define "good at running the ball." They didn't have a lot of attempts, yards, Y/A, TDs (the Colts did have pretty good rushing TDs, but they also had a really good offense), rushing 1st downs, etc. Neither team was terrible at running the ball but neither team was particularly impressive either.NFL teams would have to be blind to attribute the success of those teams to their employment of RBBC. The Colts were a really good team primarily because they had one of the best players in NFL history playing QB for them. The Bears had a stingy defense, great special teams, and they forced 44 turnovers. It's like saying that the 2000 Ravens showed that you don't need a great QB to win a Super Bowl. Well, yeah, if you have one of the most dominant defenses in NFL history. Similarly, you can make a Super Bowl without a lead back if you have a once-in-a-generation QB or force a million turnovers.

 

[gianmarco]

To be clear - the debates with gianmarco are healthy. He knows that I'm not picking on him, nor is he on me (at least I think not).

I truly enjoy these discussions with Jeff P. Whether or not I agree with him, I always appreciate what he brings. And I'm definitely not picking on him just bc I don't agree with parts of what's being said.

 

[menobrown]

I disagree on the sample size, simply because the RBBC phenomenon really was spurred on after the Colts and Bears showed how successful it can be. The cat seems to be out of the bag as far as using RBBC, and I don't know that even bell cow caliber RBs will be rode as hard as they once were. Add in that teams want to preserve their assets (not overwork them) along with the data that the FF value / production isn't greatly diminished with fewer touches and involving a second back and the trend may become the norm - at least until a feature back team wins a championship.As for passing / receiving yardage and stats changes, that's a different issue. A rule change (no contact after five yards) significantly opened up the passing game. I don't know of any watershed rules that impacted RBBC.

I'm not seeing this link between the Colts / Bears Super Bowl and RBBC at all. Neither of those teams was good at running the ball, regardless of how you define "good at running the ball." They didn't have a lot of attempts, yards, Y/A, TDs (the Colts did have pretty good rushing TDs, but they also had a really good offense), rushing 1st downs, etc. Neither team was terrible at running the ball but neither team was particularly impressive either.NFL teams would have to be blind to attribute the success of those teams to their employment of RBBC. The Colts were a really good team primarily because they had one of the best players in NFL history playing QB for them. The Bears had a stingy defense, great special teams, and they forced 44 turnovers. It's like saying that the 2000 Ravens showed that you don't need a great QB to win a Super Bowl. Well, yeah, if you have one of the most dominant defenses in NFL history. Similarly, you can make a Super Bowl without a lead back if you have a once-in-a-generation QB or force a million turnovers.

I'd agree that it's an oversimplification to think it has to do with the Colts and Bears success that season. Now I will add I think it impacted the way the Colts go about their business. Before that season in 6 playoff elimination games they saw Edgerring James average 58 yards a carry and only break 100 once. Probably due in some part, maybe a large part, to him being worn out. The year they won the SB was easily the best they ever ran the ball and it was the year they had fresh backs. So I do think their season impacted their future strategy I'm not sure it impacted the league as a whole.

 

[cobalt_27]

Other trends that could explain your data:- more passing, less running

This is quickly squashed by the fact that in 2004, the split between pass:rush was 51:49 percent. In 2010, it was 53:47 percent. This reflects only about 4.5% uptick in passing over baseline. That, alone, cannot explain the enormous shift in RB carry load.Now, whether this reflects a move to RBBC or not, depends on what your operational definition of "RBBC" is. While I think the data likely would support the idea that the RBBC concept has, indeed, become more prevalent, I don't think the "analyses" performed by the OP really address this issue the way he thinks it does. Again, I imagine he's right. But, I don't think the data presented here actually address that issue directly. We first need to agree on what the definition of "RBBC" is, and then apply the data accordingly.I'm not saying these data aren't interesting or revealing. They are. They just don't disprove the null hypothesis.

 

[DawnBTVS]

I'm not nearly as statistically savvy but is there any evidence/support/deconstruction of the "rise" of the 3rd Down RB, often utilized more as a receiver than the main bellcow type RB (e.g. Kevin Faulk in NE or Norwood/Snelling to Turner in Atlanta).

I'm more curious if there's evidence that the backup/second RB on teams are really cutting into the main RB touch wise more through receptions than through carries or is there a somewhat equitable split? It seems lately that a selection of a RB with any receiving ability tends to cause outcry that said RB will immediately be a factor in the passing game as a rookie at the very least and suddenly makes a team a potential RBBC situation. See C.J. Spiller getting 24 catches to the 31 catches by the "main" RB in Fred Jackson for the Buffalo Bills last year, despite Spiller only getting 74 carries to Jackson's 222.

Where is the line drawn in terms of what makes a team a RBBC situation? If Spiller suddenly gets 2-3 more carries per game but keeps those reception totals, does that equate to more of a RBBC approach or is there still a weight on X Carries or X % of carries? He'd shoot up to between 112 carries just by going up to 7 carries a game average even though Jackson could still be seen as the main "bellcow" RB with 12-13 carries a game average.

 

[Alex P Keaton]

No, i don't think it clearly demonstrates that because, again, I think the data is not the best way to determine RBBC or not.

Start reading here

The above link is a previous thread with numbers that support that RBBC is LESS prevalent, not more. So which is right? I honestly don't know. Both could be right. Once again, I think we first have to define RBBC and I don't think that's been done yet. Then, once defined, I think there's several ways it needs to be looked at.

I did post above that the # of 250+ and 300+ touch seasons by a RB per year has gone down. But, is it statistically significant, esp. over such a short timeframe and limited sample size? When you're dealing with single digit changes, it could easily just be due to talent level. It could also be due to coaching philosophy and a true shift. I don't know. But I don't think anyone has proven it one way or the other. And the data above certainly doesn't convince me when I can draw 2 different conclusions based on identical data points.

In my post you replied to, I said nothing about RBBC. Just to be specific with language.As a general rule, I share your view on sample size, statistical significance, etc. That said, is there really any point in doing fantasy football analysis then, if that will always be your comeback? We could take essentially any study and say either "oh, but the sample is too small" or "oh, but the sample is old, thus it's no longer relevant" or "oh, but the data isn't homogeneous enough." So really, if that is your major beef, why bother doing any analysis?

But again, very interesting analysis from you and Jeff.

 

[CalBear]

As a general rule, I share your view on sample size, statistical significance, etc. That said, is there really any point in doing fantasy football analysis then, if that will always be your comeback? We could take essentially any study and say either "oh, but the sample is too small" or "oh, but the sample is old, thus it's no longer relevant" or "oh, but the data isn't homogeneous enough." So really, if that is your major beef, why bother doing any analysis?

Part of doing the analysis is questioning the results. This is particularly true if someone is doing a statistical study to prove something he already believes. Why were those endpoints chosen? Was there a fundamental change at those endpoints, or are they chosen just to fit the hypothesis to the result? The 370-carry article is the classic example, but I think we're seeing it in this discussion, too.

 

[Jeff Pasquino]

I disagree on the sample size, simply because the RBBC phenomenon really was spurred on after the Colts and Bears showed how successful it can be. The cat seems to be out of the bag as far as using RBBC, and I don't know that even bell cow caliber RBs will be rode as hard as they once were. Add in that teams want to preserve their assets (not overwork them) along with the data that the FF value / production isn't greatly diminished with fewer touches and involving a second back and the trend may become the norm - at least until a feature back team wins a championship.As for passing / receiving yardage and stats changes, that's a different issue. A rule change (no contact after five yards) significantly opened up the passing game. I don't know of any watershed rules that impacted RBBC.

I'm not seeing this link between the Colts / Bears Super Bowl and RBBC at all. Neither of those teams was good at running the ball, regardless of how you define "good at running the ball." They didn't have a lot of attempts, yards, Y/A, TDs (the Colts did have pretty good rushing TDs, but they also had a really good offense), rushing 1st downs, etc. Neither team was terrible at running the ball but neither team was particularly impressive either.NFL teams would have to be blind to attribute the success of those teams to their employment of RBBC. The Colts were a really good team primarily because they had one of the best players in NFL history playing QB for them. The Bears had a stingy defense, great special teams, and they forced 44 turnovers. It's like saying that the 2000 Ravens showed that you don't need a great QB to win a Super Bowl. Well, yeah, if you have one of the most dominant defenses in NFL history. Similarly, you can make a Super Bowl without a lead back if you have a once-in-a-generation QB or force a million turnovers.

I'd agree that it's an oversimplification to think it has to do with the Colts and Bears success that season. Now I will add I think it impacted the way the Colts go about their business. Before that season in 6 playoff elimination games they saw Edgerring James average 58 yards a carry and only break 100 once. Probably due in some part, maybe a large part, to him being worn out. The year they won the SB was easily the best they ever ran the ball and it was the year they had fresh backs. So I do think their season impacted their future strategy I'm not sure it impacted the league as a whole.

Interesting that a few of you think this. That's not how I remembered it, so I went back and looked at 2006 to see what the stats tell me (I'll be the first to admit that I don't remember things perfectly).In 2006, the Colts were a committee of Joseph Addai and Dominic Rhodes. Addai had 266 touches, Rhodes 223. Only 3 other touches went to another RB (probably a good trivia question) - so essentially Addai and Rhodes were the running game (and RB receiving game). Addai was in his rookie season but became a big contributor right away.The Bears were similar, but not quite as extreme. Thomas Jones and Cedric Benson split a heavy workload. TJ had 332 touches while Benson had just 165. Entering 2006 Benson was a second-year player coming off a forgettable first season (injured I think). He came on stronger as the year wore on, eating into TJ's workload - but both backs really had plenty of work down the stretch as both backs had 10 or more touches in all four final regular season games and the first two playoff games (Jones dominated the workload in the Super Bowl).A breakdown of each in the "<10 / 10-14 / 15-19 / 20-24 / 25+ touch" breakdown for the year:Addai: 1-5-5-4-1Rhodes: 4-3-7-1-1Benson: 5-6-4-0-0 (and note 3 of the 4s were the final four games of the year)Jones: 0-5-0-6-5 (with 3 of the 5 games under 15 carries in the final four games of the year)So both teams shared the backfield and created a decent running / RB receiving game. Stellar? No - but it was enough for both teams to get all the way to the Super Bowl. To me this was when the NFL and GMs started to think that a featured RB wasn't mandatory any more and a committee approach could be successful.

 

[CalBear]

In 2006, the Colts were a committee of Joseph Addai and Dominic Rhodes. Addai had 266 touches, Rhodes 223. Only 3 other touches went to another RB (probably a good trivia question) - so essentially Addai and Rhodes were the running game (and RB receiving game). Addai was in his rookie season but became a big contributor right away.

Indianapolis definitely had RBBC that year, but I don't think anyone would think that Indianapolis was successful because they had RBBC. They had RBBC because they didn't have a great running back.

To me this was when the NFL and GMs started to think that a featured RB wasn't mandatory any more and a committee approach could be successful.

This speculation really makes no sense when you look at the facts. 2008-2010 still has less RBBC than any time prior to 1998. So you're implying that GMs did not think a featured RB was mandatory from 1960-1997, then suddenly thought it was mandatory from 1998-2006, then suddenly decided they were wrong again. It doesn't pass the smell test; a much more plausible explanation is that a number of reliable bell cow backs happened to have showed up in the league around the same time, so more teams had reliable bell cow backs. And there are still more of them than there were in 1990-1997.

 

[Aabye]

So both teams shared the backfield and created a decent running / RB receiving game. Stellar? No - but it was enough for both teams to get all the way to the Super Bowl.

To me this was when the NFL and GMs started to think that a featured RB wasn't mandatory any more and a committee approach could be successful.

I am still completely confused. The NFL may be a copycat league but they're not going to just copy everything from a championship caliber team. In 2000, the Ravens and Giants played in the Super Bowl. Both of those teams had middling offenses and middling QB play. Did NFL teams decide that feature QBs weren't necessary? In 2008, both the Steelers and Cardinals had a terrible time running the ball. Did NFL clubs learn the lesson that you can win Super Bowls even if you can't run the ball?Not to belabor the point, but I can look back at the Super Bowl teams from just the past 10 seasons and glean any "lesson" I want from it. Run a 3-4. Run a 4-3. You can win without a great QB. You can win without great RBs. You can win without great WRs. You can win without a good defense. Kickers matter. Kickers don't matter. Etc.

I feel like you need stronger support than the mere fact that the teams in the Super Bowl happened to have two-back systems combined with the unsubstantiated claim that NFL GMs subsequently had this collective epiphany to abandon their prior emphasis on feature backs.

I think you're being way too hasty in drawing your conclusions.

You've shown, and admirably so I should add, that 20+ and 25+ games are down sharply in the last few seasons. Based on some of the other proposals and ideas, I'd say that there is not a consensus as to how that data should be interpreted. gianmarco and I don't see the definitive link between touches-per-game and RBBC (he did all of the legwork) and both of us offered possible alternative explanations. ZWK offered two possible explanations as well, one of which was disproven. CalBear doesn't think there are more RBBCs at all, so he thinks you're trying to explain an event that never even happened. And when it comes to Hypothesis 2, there's even less consensus that Super Bowl XLI had anything at all to do with RBBC.

I'm by no means stating that you're wrong or any of that, but I don't think you can reasonably conclude that your hypotheses have been proven.

 

[Jeff Pasquino]

I appreciate the contributions to this discussion, but I don't have a ton of time today to do some research.

Here's my thoughts as to RBBC really picking up steam after the Colts/Bears SB.

The previous several seasons had numerous successful teams that had a feature back. I'd like to look at which teams made the postseason / had success with just one back. My thoughts are that the teams prior to 2006 were more one-back teams and those with studs fared better.

 

[CalBear]

I appreciate the contributions to this discussion, but I don't have a ton of time today to do some research.Here's my thoughts as to RBBC really picking up steam after the Colts/Bears SB.The previous several seasons had numerous successful teams that had a feature back. I'd like to look at which teams made the postseason / had success with just one back. My thoughts are that the teams prior to 2006 were more one-back teams and those with studs fared better.

2005Wildcard losers:Tampa Bay (Williams 290 carries)Jacksonville (RBBC)NYG (Barber 357 carries)Cincinatti (Johnson 337 carries)Divisional losers:New England (RBBC)Washington (Portis 352 carries)Chicago (Jones 315 carries)Indianapolis (James 360 carries)Championship losers:Carolina (RBBC)Denver (RBBC)Super Bowlittsburgh (RBBC)Seattle (Alexander 370 carries)I think it's highly unlikely you're going to find anything compelling in these data.

 

[Cawbird]

Other trends that could explain your data:- more passing, less running

This is quickly squashed by the fact that in 2004, the split between pass:rush was 51:49 percent. In 2010, it was 53:47 percent. This reflects only about 4.5% uptick in passing over baseline. That, alone, cannot explain the enormous shift in RB carry load.Now, whether this reflects a move to RBBC or not, depends on what your operational definition of "RBBC" is. While I think the data likely would support the idea that the RBBC concept has, indeed, become more prevalent, I don't think the "analyses" performed by the OP really address this issue the way he thinks it does. Again, I imagine he's right. But, I don't think the data presented here actually address that issue directly. We first need to agree on what the definition of "RBBC" is, and then apply the data accordingly.I'm not saying these data aren't interesting or revealing. They are. They just don't disprove the null hypothesis.

We have a winner! Being a Six Sigma "geek", you have to establish the operational definition before you can do your data analysis and prove or disprove the null hypothesis. There are other statistical areas that might need to be considered. Instead of getting stuck on the 20+ carry rule, you may need to set up some pivot tables to include % of running plays compared to total plays in the game log. There could be other outliers causing the apparent RBBC shift. Defenses could have been better in the last few years which caused less offensive plays in general; if you add that in to the small shift upwards in passing plays vs running plays, that gives you even a smaller population of running plays in a game log.But I am intrigued with some of the data that shows that today's RBs may be doing more with less. Need to look deeper into that data!Great discussion thread and this is definitely swaying me to go WR-WR-WR-WR-QB-WR-WR.

 

[JamesTheScot]

Several people have questioned the validity of the alleged trend of the NFL going to a Running Back By Committee (RBBC) approach to team backfields. They've argued the total carries or touches for a season - which I believe is intrinsically flawed.

Here's the best way to prove my point.

Fact 1: Teams put in a game plan for a given week / opponent. They will call plays and personnel based on that game plan. That means substitutions are scripted / planned for that contest.

Why is that significant? Well, if you believe that Fact 1 is true (I stand on that point) then there should be a reflection - positive or negative - on the RBBC trend in the NFL. Looking at the data on a per game basis eliminates the issues of RB injury (a player sidelined in the middle of the year) which often happens and skews annual data.

Hypothesis 1 - If there is indeed a trend towards RBBC, RB touches per player per game will be trending downward.

To prove (or disprove) the above Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), I just went through the Game Logs for 2004-2010 (thanks to the Game Log Dominator) and broke down the number of games per season where a RB had 15, 20 and 25 touches in each contest. If there is no trend towards RBBC, then those numbers should be pretty steady. If there is indeed a trend to RBBC, there will be a definitive rolloff / dropoff at either 20 or 25 touches per game.



Please note that I consider touches a better measure than carries, given that some RBs are used more as receivers than rushers. If there is a feature back trend, however, then the usage of touches vs. carries shouldn't matter.

Hypothesis 2 - The NFL went to a copycat system of Chicago and Indianapolis after each went to the Super Bowl in 2006 (Feb. 2007). Starting in 2007, RBBC became much more prevalent.

Again by looking at the same set of data, we should see the dropoff / rolloff starting in 2007 and continuing through 2010.

Now let's look at some numbers:

YEAR / # of games for a RB with 15+ touches / 20+ touches / 25+ touches2004 / 457 / 304 / 1712005 / 445 / 290 / 1452006 / 466 / 305 / 1522007 / 446 / 290 / 1492008 / 442 / 259 / 1102009 / 426 / 241 / 1012010 / 425 / 238 / 101Analysis: There is indeed a rolloff between 2007 and 2008 at both the 15+ touches/game and 20+ touches/game level. That rolloff is significant. The dropoff is bigger in 2009 and nearly the same in 2010. The difference at 15+ touches/game is over 20% at 15+ touches and almost 33% at the 20+ touches level for all three seasons.Conclusion: Hypothesis 1 is correct. The NFL is in full-blown RBBC mode, with only about 100 games a year with "feature back" 20+ touch usage, a huge decrease from 2004-2007. That dropoff is almost the same rate at the 15+ touch range over the same period.

Hypothesis 2 is nearly correct, except the trend really kicked in two seasons after the Bears-Colts Super Bowl, not one. I can understand that as it might have taken some teams two seasons to develop their RBBC approach and acquire their second (or both) backs.

It's interesting information. But I'm not sure it proves what you think it does. Isn't it possible that this decrease in touches could just as easily be caused by the shift to an emphasis on the passing attack to the detriment of the rushing attack? When a certain percentage of running plays become passing plays, it's not like the RB gets all of those "new" passes...some of them inevitably go to the WR's and TE's. But it's possible that the total pie has gotten larger as well.RBBC is a term that defines the RB's role in relation to the other RB's on his team is it not? So the touches per RB can only prove RBBC if those touches are put into the context of the total touches that all RB's on that team have.

By way of example...if the team only runs the ball 17 times in a game and doesn't pass to the RB's much, if a RB gets 13 of those carries and a couple of passes, he was clearly the lead back was he not? But either an emphasis on the passing game or a stout defensive opponent pushed his total touches down. But if another team rushed 33 times and 2 RB's got 13 carries each and each added two catches, then you clearly have a RBBC because each back was used as extensively as the other. But all three backs would show up in your stats as 15 touch RB's and seem to support your premise when in reality only one situation was an actual RBBC.

I think to prove your contention, you'd have to look at the distribution of total RB touches in a game rather than to look just at total touches per RB in isolation.

Now, it's very possible that a smaller piece (percentage wise) of a much larger pie can mean your piece of pie is still bigger than someone else's big piece of a different, smaller pie. But that doesn't mean that the RBBC member isn't in a RBBC situation. If the question is whether we are seeing more RBBC now than ever before, that can only be judged in the context of a RB's share of his team's RB touches.

 

[JamesTheScot]

As a general rule, I share your view on sample size, statistical significance, etc. That said, is there really any point in doing fantasy football analysis then, if that will always be your comeback? We could take essentially any study and say either "oh, but the sample is too small" or "oh, but the sample is old, thus it's no longer relevant" or "oh, but the data isn't homogeneous enough." So really, if that is your major beef, why bother doing any analysis?

Part of doing the analysis is questioning the results. This is particularly true if someone is doing a statistical study to prove something he already believes. Why were those endpoints chosen? Was there a fundamental change at those endpoints, or are they chosen just to fit the hypothesis to the result? The 370-carry article is the classic example, but I think we're seeing it in this discussion, too.

Exactly. If RBBC is really more prevalent today than it has been in years past, you should be able to look at the % of the team's RB touches an individual RB gets and see a decreasing % over recent years. I don't see how that isn't the definitive proof to this question.On a per game basis, did the RB with the most touches for that team account for a larger or smaller % of the team's total RB touches relative to seasons prior? That's how you prove or disprove RBBC. If it's a 15 touch pie, then 15 touches is the whole damn pie, not a portion of the pie. Alternatively, if it's a 34 touch pie, then 17 touches is still just half the pie even though that half of the pie is larger than the 15 touch pie.

 

[JamesTheScot]

Other trends that could explain your data:- more passing, less running

This is quickly squashed by the fact that in 2004, the split between pass:rush was 51:49 percent. In 2010, it was 53:47 percent. This reflects only about 4.5% uptick in passing over baseline. That, alone, cannot explain the enormous shift in RB carry load.Now, whether this reflects a move to RBBC or not, depends on what your operational definition of "RBBC" is. While I think the data likely would support the idea that the RBBC concept has, indeed, become more prevalent, I don't think the "analyses" performed by the OP really address this issue the way he thinks it does. Again, I imagine he's right. But, I don't think the data presented here actually address that issue directly. We first need to agree on what the definition of "RBBC" is, and then apply the data accordingly.I'm not saying these data aren't interesting or revealing. They are. They just don't disprove the null hypothesis.

Rather than define RBBC, which will always have some arbitrary cut-off, why don't we just determine what % the lead RB got of his teams' RB touches?If there's a trend that shows that RB workload (total touches, regardless of the number) is being more widely distributed amongst the RB's on a given team, then we don't need to define what constitutes RBBC.If in 2000 the lead back on NFL teams got 60% of the RB touches for his team and in 2010 he got 49%, and there's a declining trend in between, then that tells me what I need to know. I don't need to have RBBC strictly defined.

 

[ZWK]

I looked at the numbers back to 1988 using PFR's play index. There was a relatively steady increase in workload for RBs from 1992 to 2004, and then a relatively sharp drop from 2004-2010 which still hasn't quite gotten RB workloads down to where they were 20 years ago.

Looking only at rushing (not all touches), here are the number of games where a player had 35+/30+/25+/20+ carries in each of the past 23 seasons:

35+ 30+ 25+ 20+1988 3 14 42 1171989 4 13 46 1311990 2 8 27 991991 2 12 52 1201992 2 12 46 1221993 5 21 59 1481994 4 25 71 1611995 3 18 62 1791996 1 16 80 1921997 10 28 73 1711998 5 29 97 2291999 5 22 73 1872000 10 34 85 2072001 3 23 87 2082002 5 26 83 2032003 6 36 101 2282004 8 44 110 2382005 3 22 100 2222006 4 26 90 2262007 1 18 73 2092008 1 11 58 1822009 4 12 62 1642010 1 11 51 155And here's a graph, which shows the average number of 30+/25+/20+ games per team (I divided by the number of teams to account for the increase from 28 to 32 teams). Green shows 20+ carry games, red shows 25+, and blue shows 30+. For instance, in 1988 there were 117 games with 20+ carries and 28 carries, which is 117/28 = 4.2 20+ carry games per team, so the first green dot is at 4.2.I used the average over the first 5 years (1988-1992) as a baseline, which I included in the graph as a straight line. As you can see, we're not quite down to the baseline yet for 20+ or 25+ carry games. But the past 3 years were all below the baseline for 30+ carry games, which speaks in favor of the "pitch count" hypothesis as at least part of what's going on. 35+ carry games have also become even less common than they were 20 years ago, with only 7 in the past 4 seasons (and 3 of those came from Cedric Benson).