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SC, Antonin Scalia says employers may NOT discriminate against Muslims (1 Viewer)

timschochet

Footballguy
http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/06/01/justices-rule-for-muslim-denied-job-over-headscarf

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruled Monday for a Muslim woman who did not get hired after she showed up to a job interview with clothing retailer Abercrombie & Fitch wearing a black headscarf.

The justices said that employers generally have to accommodate job applicants and employees with religious needs if the employer at least has an idea that such accommodation is necessary.

Job applicant Samantha Elauf did not tell her interviewer she was Muslim. But Justice Antonin Scalia said for the court that Abercrombie "at least suspected" that Elauf wore a headscarf for religious reasons. "That is enough," Scalia said in an opinion for seven justices.

The headscarf, or hijab, violated the company's strict dress code for employees who work in its retail stores.

Elauf was 17 when she interviewed for a "model" position, as the company calls its sales staff, at an Abercrombie Kids store in a shopping mall in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 2008. She impressed the assistant store manager with whom she met. But her application faltered over her headscarf because it conflicted with the company's Look Policy, a code derived from Abercrombie's focus on what it calls East Coast collegiate or preppy style.

Abercrombie has since changed its policy on headscarves and has settled similar lawsuits elsewhere.

The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit on Elauf's behalf, and a jury eventually awarded her $20,000.

But the federal appeals court in Denver threw out the award and concluded that Abercrombie & Fitch could not be held liable because Elauf never asked the company to relax its policy against headscarves.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately to agree with the outcome, but not Scalia's reasoning. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

The case is EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 14-86.
 
The ending of the movie Neighbors, when Zac Efron and Seth Rogen were standing in front of A&F doing their modeling thing, that was a feel good scene.

The fat out of shape old guy and young guy became friends and helped the A&F business out, good times.

 
This seems pretty straightforward. It's been illegal to discriminate on the basis of religion for quite a while.

I disagree with anti-discrimination laws, but this was kind of a no-brainer for SCOTUS.

 
"Abercrombie has since changed its policy on headscarves and has settled similar lawsuits elsewhere."
So this is pretty much a non-story then?
No, because when the SC makes a decision, that's a precedent for all employers.
This seems like a pretty narrow ruling. The only thing that this ruling decided is whether the employee has to ask to be accommodated or whether a company has to be proactive in providing accommodations.

 
"That is enough," Scalia said in an opinion for seven justices.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented
trouble in paradise?
The story I read said that Thomas dissented in part and concurred in part. That's often something along the lines of "I agree with the result, but my reasoning is different."

Edit: Actually, it probably would have been scored as 9-0 and not 8-1 if that was the case, so who knows.

 
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"That is enough," Scalia said in an opinion for seven justices.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented
trouble in paradise?
The story I read said that Thomas dissented in part and concurred in part. That's often something along the lines of "I agree with the result, but my reasoning is different."

Edit: Actually, it probably would have been scored as 9-0 and not 8-1 if that was the case, so who knows.
Sort of. The bolded really means what a "concurring" opinion means. So, this particular justice agreed with the outcome, but not the reasoning.

If a justice "dissents in part" then he disagrees with both the the reasoning and holding of a specific issue. So, it'd still be scored 8-1, but my guess would be that there may have been multiple issues to be decided in this case (I have not read the opinion).

 
"That is enough," Scalia said in an opinion for seven justices.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented
trouble in paradise?
The story I read said that Thomas dissented in part and concurred in part. That's often something along the lines of "I agree with the result, but my reasoning is different."

Edit: Actually, it probably would have been scored as 9-0 and not 8-1 if that was the case, so who knows.
Sort of. The bolded really means what a "concurring" opinion means. So, this particular justice agreed with the outcome, but not the reasoning.

If a justice "dissents in part" then he disagrees with both the the reasoning and holding of a specific issue. So, it'd still be scored 8-1, but my guess would be that there may have been multiple issues to be decided in this case (I have not read the opinion).
I haven't read his dissent, but from I read Thomas said its not discrimination as long as their policy barred all scarves and headwear.

 
The ending of the movie Neighbors, when Zac Efron and Seth Rogen were standing in front of A&F doing their modeling thing, that was a feel good scene.

The fat out of shape old guy and young guy became friends and helped the A&F business out, good times.
You made it to the end?

 
"That is enough," Scalia said in an opinion for seven justices.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented
trouble in paradise?
The story I read said that Thomas dissented in part and concurred in part. That's often something along the lines of "I agree with the result, but my reasoning is different."

Edit: Actually, it probably would have been scored as 9-0 and not 8-1 if that was the case, so who knows.
Sort of. The bolded really means what a "concurring" opinion means. So, this particular justice agreed with the outcome, but not the reasoning.

If a justice "dissents in part" then he disagrees with both the the reasoning and holding of a specific issue. So, it'd still be scored 8-1, but my guess would be that there may have been multiple issues to be decided in this case (I have not read the opinion).
I haven't read his dissent, but from I read Thomas said its not discrimination as long as their policy barred all scarves and headwear.
Yup. Basically said that the only existing causes of action under Title VII are intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) and disparate impact. Basically says that Abercrombie refusing to change its headscarf policy for her wasn't intentionally discriminatory because it doesn't treat her worse than other employees. It may have been a disparate impact claim, but that doesn't allow the monetary damage award to stand - the majority allowed the claim to stand as intentionally discriminatory.

 
I'm confused. Did the Court say that the company can't have a policy in place prohibiting a head scarf? Or are they saying there wasn't a universal policy in place and that they applied the restriction in this one instance? The company should have the right to mandate that all sales associates dress a certain way.

 
I'm confused. Did the Court say that the company can't have a policy in place prohibiting a head scarf? Or are they saying there wasn't a universal policy in place and that they applied the restriction in this one instance? The company should have the right to mandate that all sales associates dress a certain way.
The Court, in effect, said that an employer has to make reasonable accommodations for religious practices as long as they don't cause the employer undue hardship, even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious - the employer's suspicion that a religious accommodation would be required, when deciding not to hire someone, is enough to trigger Title VII.

 
Nice slippery slope we've created here. Can't wait for the first case of a Christian suing the NFL claiming that he's not allowed to work on Sunday.

What a country.

 
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Nice slippery slope we've created here. Can't wait for the first case of a Christian suing the NFL claiming that he's not allowed to work on Sunday.
How would you rule on such a case as judge if you had to be consistent with the precedent from the case this thread is about?

 
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I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?

 
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.

Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.

 
I don't know enough about the case or the law, but I'll give you my non-legal gut opinion on the issue. It feels like the allowance of a hijab for an image conscious retailer targeting a certain look does get close to something that fundamentally changes the performance of the job. In short, a clothing retailer should be able to require a standard uniform. I'm still trying toget my arms around how a hijab or a beard is required as part of religious observance.

 
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
 
I'm confused. Did the Court say that the company can't have a policy in place prohibiting a head scarf? Or are they saying there wasn't a universal policy in place and that they applied the restriction in this one instance? The company should have the right to mandate that all sales associates dress a certain way.
The Court, in effect, said that an employer has to make reasonable accommodations for religious practices as long as they don't cause the employer undue hardship, even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious - the employer's suspicion that a religious accommodation would be required, when deciding not to hire someone, is enough to trigger Title VII.
The Should Have Thought Police?

 
I'm confused. Did the Court say that the company can't have a policy in place prohibiting a head scarf? Or are they saying there wasn't a universal policy in place and that they applied the restriction in this one instance? The company should have the right to mandate that all sales associates dress a certain way.
The Court, in effect, said that an employer has to make reasonable accommodations for religious practices as long as they don't cause the employer undue hardship, even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious - the employer's suspicion that a religious accommodation would be required, when deciding not to hire someone, is enough to trigger Title VII.
The Should Have Thought Police?
No, the "did think" police. It's a reversal of a decision that abercrombie was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff couldn't prove that abercrombie knew it was a religious issue. Plaintiff can prove that abercrombie had a belief that it was.
 
I'm confused. Did the Court say that the company can't have a policy in place prohibiting a head scarf? Or are they saying there wasn't a universal policy in place and that they applied the restriction in this one instance? The company should have the right to mandate that all sales associates dress a certain way.
The Court, in effect, said that an employer has to make reasonable accommodations for religious practices as long as they don't cause the employer undue hardship, even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious - the employer's suspicion that a religious accommodation would be required, when deciding not to hire someone, is enough to trigger Title VII.
The Should Have Thought Police?
No, the "did think" police. It's a reversal of a decision that abercrombie was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff couldn't prove that abercrombie knew it was a religious issue. Plaintiff can prove that abercrombie had a belief that it was.
even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious

 
I'm confused. Did the Court say that the company can't have a policy in place prohibiting a head scarf? Or are they saying there wasn't a universal policy in place and that they applied the restriction in this one instance? The company should have the right to mandate that all sales associates dress a certain way.
The Court, in effect, said that an employer has to make reasonable accommodations for religious practices as long as they don't cause the employer undue hardship, even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious - the employer's suspicion that a religious accommodation would be required, when deciding not to hire someone, is enough to trigger Title VII.
The Should Have Thought Police?
No, the "did think" police. It's a reversal of a decision that abercrombie was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff couldn't prove that abercrombie knew it was a religious issue. Plaintiff can prove that abercrombie had a belief that it was.
even where the employer doesn't have actual knowledge that the practice is religious
I feel like you didn't read what I typed.
 
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.

 
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I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.
Was there any evidence that the customers here would have an issue with her religion?

 
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.
Was there any evidence that the customers here would have an issue with her religion?
No idea. I'm just arguing against the hypothetical. If you think that "pushing away sales" is a good exception to the law, then you have to be willing to bite that bullet when it comes to race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. too.

 
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.
This was exactly Woolworth's argument in the 1960s when they refused to desegregate their lunch counters. The corporate office insisted that the Civil Rights Act would have to be passed- the company could not voluntarily do it because they would lose business.

 
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The ruling is that motive, not actual knowledge, is the material issue.
And that's nuts. They didn't know. She didn't tell them.
Interesting.

If I wore a yarmulke and Hasidic dreadlocks, would you need me to tell you I was Jewish before you made an assumption about it? What if I wore a large cross?
I would not necessarily expect one to know that your garb was religious, as opposed to cultural.

 
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.
Was there any evidence that the customers here would have an issue with her religion?
No idea. I'm just arguing against the hypothetical. If you think that "pushing away sales" is a good exception to the law, then you have to be willing to bite that bullet when it comes to race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. too.
It should be noted that A&F refers to employees as "models" rather than just plain old 'employees'. Much like Disney refers to theirs as "cast members". My interpretation of that is they were attempting to carve out some sort of looks-based hiring policies.
You don't say

 
IvanKaramazov said:
General Tso said:
Henry Ford said:
Maurile Tremblay said:
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.
I get that. And I would never argue against race or gender being protected - that's a no brainier. And I also support protection for religion, sexual identity, and age. But where I have trouble is the degree to which we extend those protections. A person has the right to maintain their religion, but do they have the right to impose their style of dress on their employer or their customers? I'd like to think you can still be a Muslim without wearing a hijab. And it's not necessarily a racist thing either. There is something very off-putting about seeing a young woman all concealed like that. If nothing else it is totally at odds with the free, open lifestyle that Abercrombie is trying to convey.
 
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IvanKaramazov said:
General Tso said:
Henry Ford said:
Maurile Tremblay said:
I have no idea how Title VII claims might be affected by collective bargaining agreements.

Would it have made a difference if the employees of Abercrombie had collectively bargained over the dress code through their union, and agreed that no headwear would be allowed?
Only if someone can show that it would be an undue hardship to make an exception.Employment law is, by and large, contract law. So is collective bargaining.
What if the undue hardship is that they'll cause a reduction in sales? Playing devil's advocate here, what if the person here worshipped the Occult, and his brand of religion required the tattoing of some horrible stuff on his face. If that expression is such that it causes people not to want to even come in the store, why wouldn't the company be within it's right to tell that person they don't think he'd be a good fit for the role?
What if an employer refuses to hire blacks not because he's racist personally, but because his business is in a racist part of the country and having black people behind the counter will cause a reduction in sales?

That's not hyperbole. There's a ton of economics literature arguing that that's a major source of racial and gender discrimination. If you think it should be illegal for an employer to cater to the preferences of his racist customers, then I'm not sure why the Abercrombie case is substantially different.

Edit: To reiterate, I think firms should be able to hire or fire whoever they want for whatever reasons they want, including racist, sexist, or other noxious reasons. I just don't think it's helpful to push "undue hardship" too far unless you're willing to go all the way with it.
I get that. And I would never argue against race or gender being protected - that's a no brainier. And I also support protection for religion, sexual identity, and age. But where I have trouble is the degree to which we extend those protections. A person has the right to maintain their religion, but do they have the right to impose their style of dress on their employer or their customers? I'd like to think you can still be a Muslim without wearing a hijab. And it's not necessarily a racist thing either. There is something very off-putting about seeing a young woman all concealed like that. If nothing else it is totally at odds with the free, open lifestyle that Abercrombie is trying to convey.
Not an obstacle for my imagination.

 
From the EEOC website:

The laws enforced by EEOC prohibit an employer or other covered entity from using neutral employment policies and practices that have a disproportionately negative effect on applicants or employees of a particular race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), or national origin, or on an individual with a disability or class of individuals with disabilities, if the polices or practices at issue are not job-related and necessary to the operation of the business.
The key phrase being "if the polices or practices at issue are not job-related and necessary to the operation of the business."So the heart of question is this - is the practice here (dress code for a retail clothing store) job-related and necessary to the operation of the business?

 
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Christo said:
Henry Ford said:
The ruling is that motive, not actual knowledge, is the material issue.
And that's nuts. They didn't know. She didn't tell them.
Why is that nuts? If I refuse to hire people wearing a hijab because I assume (correctly in this case) that it's for religious reasons and I don't want to have accommodate them, it seems pretty clear that that should be actionable under a Title VII if you start from the presumption that religious accommodation would be required. It's like refusing to hire people with Jewish sounding last names because you presume they are Jewish and will request Saturdays off. You don't know for sure that they're observant Jews as they haven't requested the accommodation, but that's your motivation for refusing to hire them. This seems like a pretty uncontroversial opinion. From http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/01/supreme-court-abercrombie_n_7464534.html :

Justice Samuel Alito, a member of the court's conservative wing, signaled his leaning on the case during oral arguments in February, when he raised a hypothetical situation that, by his own admission, sounded "like a joke."

"So the first is a Sikh man wearing a turban. The second is a Hasidic man wearing a hat. The third is a Muslim woman wearing a niqab. The fourth is a Catholic nun in a habit," Alito said. "Now, do you think ... that those people have to say, 'We just want to tell you, we're dressed this way for a religious reason. We're not just trying to make a fashion statement'?"

Alito said there were ways for an employer to address the issue without directly asking a job applicant about his or her religion. In the hypothetical case of someone who appears to be Middle Eastern and who wears a long beard, he asked, "Why can't the employers just simply say, 'We have a "look policy" that doesn't permit beards. Can you comply with that policy?'"
 
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