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Stupid to go for two (1 Viewer)

Should Shanahan have gone for two, down 38-37 with 24 seconds left?

  • yes

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • no

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    0
ChromeWeasel said:
timschochet said:
I say it's stupid to go for two in that situation. Sure, it's gutsy, but it's also stupid. Kick the extra point, go into overtime. What say you?
Odds at successfully converting 2 pts are over 50% (I believe its closer to 60% actually).
No. As pointed out in the thread, the historic rate is about 44-48%, with a some years creeping over 50% (but no years coming close to 60%).
Odds at kicking 1 pt, taking the game to OT, calling the coin flip, and scoring before your opponent are far less than that.
The only reason you don't do it is if you're ignorant of the true odds
Indeed.
All of you guys claiming you know what the "true odds" are is laughable.
 
I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw in the deep middle, which risks an INT or a sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that a tied SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.

 
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I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw deep risks an INT or sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.
So good offenses can skew the results because they'll convert more? Shocking. Wouldn't you say Denver is a pretty good offense?
 
This is from Peter King's cnnsi article today where he interviewed Shanny:

"I knew with four and a half minutes to go that if we scored and there wasn't much time left on the clock, I'd probably go for two,'' Shanahan said. "Just a gut feeling. I looked at my defense. They were spent. I figured I didn't want overtime to come down to a coin flip where we might not see the ball again if we lost [the coin toss.]''"You don't make that kind of call unless you've got 100 percent confidence in your quarterback, which I do,'' he said. "In a case like that, you're prepared for what comes, and I knew I'd get killed if it didn't work. It goes with the territory. I knew it was the right call.''
 
I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw deep risks an INT or sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.
So good offenses can skew the results because they'll convert more? Shocking. Wouldn't you say Denver is a pretty good offense?
Top 50% of this season's NFL, sure. As good as the Greatest Show On Turf? Not hardly.Besides being pretty good on offense doesn't mean your good enough to push your odds of converting at better than 50% which is what you get with OT. Saying you've got a better than 50% chance of scoring a TD on one play from a couple of yards out is pretty bold.

My point was that in a smaller sample size, an unnusually good offense can push the % higher than it would otherwise appear and create that spike...especially if that offense attempts an unnusually large number of them.

Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.

 
I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw deep risks an INT or sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.
So good offenses can skew the results because they'll convert more? Shocking. Wouldn't you say Denver is a pretty good offense?
Top 50% of this season's NFL, sure. As good as the Greatest Show On Turf? Not hardly.Besides being pretty good on offense doesn't mean your good enough to push your odds of converting at better than 50% which is what you get with OT. Saying you've got a better than 50% chance of scoring a TD on one play from a couple of yards out is pretty bold.

My point was that in a smaller sample size, an unnusually good offense can push the % higher than it would otherwise appear and create that spike...especially if that offense attempts an unnusually large number of them.

Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
:confused:
 
I'm surprised nobody has pointed out Peter King's article which includes a conversation he had last night with Shanahan.

MMQB

Shanahan:

"I knew with four and a half minutes to go that if we scored and there wasn't much time left on the clock, I'd probably go for two,'' Shanahan said. "Just a gut feeling. I looked at my defense. They were spent. I figured I didn't want overtime to come down to a coin flip where we might not see the ball again if we lost [the coin toss.]''

So basically he had this in mind as soon as they got the ball for that last drive. Those stats on the 2-point conversion success rate are very interesting - that's it's actually over 50% recently. Throw in that this this is a game where neither team could stop the other - and it starts to get more clear this was the right move.

As for those who say "if it hadn't worked, the poll would be 80/20 against" - that's kind of irrelevent to what the right call is. Sounds like some people who think they are following the statistical approach are both ignoring the more recent stats and discounting the specifics of the game.

 
Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
The rest of what he said, after the 'gut' comment? Legit football reasons, that have been mentioned here already. This isn't a guy throwing his mortgage payment on a random number at a casino.What I like about the odds argument is that no one considers the situation, and the situations of other teams that have had to go for two. Most were teams in worse situations that the Broncos were in yesterday.
 
As unconventional and risky as it seemed, Shanahan had the statistical advantage when he chose to go for two.

here is why i say this:

Had Shanahan gone for XP and went into Overtime, the Broncos would have had at BEST at 50/50 shot at winning game.

Had the Chargers won the coin toss than the Broncos would have been even less likely to win game, so in order to get the statistical advantage the Broncos would have had to hit XP, hold Chargers AND win coin toss just to be a statistical favorite to win.

NOW, by going for two the NFL league success rate (i have seen some places say 42-45 %) but they showed the statistic as 49% in the game yesterday.

So they were basically 50/50 in a normal two point conversion, BUT Shanahan knew the Chargers didnt have a timeout to prepare for such a sudden move which he exploited so you have to figure the success rate was more like 60/40 just based on the fact that they had them off guard.

And even had they missed it there was still a 10-20% chance of recovering onside and attempting another FG.

All in all had they gone the normal rout they were 50/50 at BEST, by going for two they had the clear statistical edge

 
Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
The rest of what he said, after the 'gut' comment? Legit football reasons, that have been mentioned here already. This isn't a guy throwing his mortgage payment on a random number at a casino.What I like about the odds argument is that no one considers the situation, and the situations of other teams that have had to go for two. Most were teams in worse situations that the Broncos were in yesterday.
;) Too small of a sample size and WAY too many variables for any of these geniuses to know what the true odds of converting were.
 
I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw deep risks an INT or sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.
So good offenses can skew the results because they'll convert more? Shocking. Wouldn't you say Denver is a pretty good offense?
Top 50% of this season's NFL, sure. As good as the Greatest Show On Turf? Not hardly.

Besides being pretty good on offense doesn't mean your good enough to push your odds of converting at better than 50% which is what you get with OT. Saying you've got a better than 50% chance of scoring a TD on one play from a couple of yards out is pretty bold.

My point was that in a smaller sample size, an unnusually good offense can push the % higher than it would otherwise appear and create that spike...especially if that offense attempts an unnusually large number of them.

Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
I'm just going to bold all the irrelevant items in your post.
 
In my opinion this was the right choice for this team, against SD. But that said, I think the circumstances clearly vary from team to team and from year to year. Teams with a good offense and a bad defense should probably make the call the Shanny made here, and I think the way his defense was getting rolled (particular in the second half where the Chargers scored 20 straight) he really HAD to make the choice.

If a defense has been playing very well and had been continually stopping the other team but had offensively not done much, I would say the opposite would be true.

 
from a purely statistical standpoint, its better to go for 2 every time you get the chance because the odds of getting a 1pt convert are about 95% (ish) whereas a 2pt convert is about 50%. SO, in the long term, you would be ahead going for 2 every time (2-1 reward, less than 2-1 risk)

having said that, coaches will get fired over botched 2pt calls, so the pressure is immense.

sorry if this is a repeat of prev. post - didnt read 200 prev. posts

 
I see a lot of different numbers in this thread. PFP 2007 has an article on 2-point conversions. One of the first things they did was throw out messed up XP snaps that then get recorded as 2 point conversions. Here's what they came up with:1998 98 attempts, 41%1999 77 attempts, 39%2000 78 attempts, 45%2001 84 attempts, 48%2002 93 attempts, 51%2003 62 attempts, 47%2004 77 attempts, 50%2005 50 attempts, 54%2006 35 attempts, 60%When I look at those stats and consider the context of the game (lots of good points in this thread, like inability of SD to stop those kinds of passing plays, the inability of denver's defense to stop SD, the inexperience of their kicker, etc.), I think it seems pretty clearly the right call.
Assuming those stats are correct, then the NFL needs to push the 2 point conversion line back. What is even more odd is that so many people say how can you question coaches who know way more than "me" about the game...well if you look at how poor they manage the clock (this is without debate) and you look at these stats, how in the world would attempts continue to go down when the stats tell you you should always go for 2? Are the coaches stupid?(rhetorical question)...The success rate should be around 40% for the 2 point line to make sense IMO.
IMO just using the league wide stats is not effective here. Look at the past 2 years - the highest conversion rates by a decent margin, but also the lowest number of attempts by a decent margin. It could be that in the past two years the conversion rate went up because the teams that aren't very good at it stopped trying it. :confused:IMO it would be more instructive if we had numbers like the success rate for teams with top 5 passing offenses, or just top 5 offenses, over the past n years. Or top 10, wherever we feel Denver's offense/passing offense would slot in. I would expect the conversion rates for such teams to be higher than the average.
 
As unconventional and risky as it seemed, Shanahan had the statistical advantage when he chose to go for two.here is why i say this:Had Shanahan gone for XP and went into Overtime, the Broncos would have had at BEST at 50/50 shot at winning game.Had the Chargers won the coin toss than the Broncos would have been even less likely to win game, so in order to get the statistical advantage the Broncos would have had to hit XP, hold Chargers AND win coin toss just to be a statistical favorite to win.NOW, by going for two the NFL league success rate (i have seen some places say 42-45 %) but they showed the statistic as 49% in the game yesterday.So they were basically 50/50 in a normal two point conversion, BUT Shanahan knew the Chargers didnt have a timeout to prepare for such a sudden move which he exploited so you have to figure the success rate was more like 60/40 just based on the fact that they had them off guard.And even had they missed it there was still a 10-20% chance of recovering onside and attempting another FG.All in all had they gone the normal rout they were 50/50 at BEST, by going for two they had the clear statistical edge
Not your main point, but I don't think Denver would have had a 10-20% chance of recovering an onsides kick if they failed on the 2 point conversion.
 
As unconventional and risky as it seemed, Shanahan had the statistical advantage when he chose to go for two.here is why i say this:Had Shanahan gone for XP and went into Overtime, the Broncos would have had at BEST at 50/50 shot at winning game.Had the Chargers won the coin toss than the Broncos would have been even less likely to win game, so in order to get the statistical advantage the Broncos would have had to hit XP, hold Chargers AND win coin toss just to be a statistical favorite to win.NOW, by going for two the NFL league success rate (i have seen some places say 42-45 %) but they showed the statistic as 49% in the game yesterday.So they were basically 50/50 in a normal two point conversion, BUT Shanahan knew the Chargers didnt have a timeout to prepare for such a sudden move which he exploited so you have to figure the success rate was more like 60/40 just based on the fact that they had them off guard.And even had they missed it there was still a 10-20% chance of recovering onside and attempting another FG.All in all had they gone the normal rout they were 50/50 at BEST, by going for two they had the clear statistical edge
Not your main point, but I don't think Denver would have had a 10-20% chance of recovering an onsides kick if they failed on the 2 point conversion.
I don't have the stats but I recall that a 25% recovery rate for the kicking team is a conservative estimate.
 
As unconventional and risky as it seemed, Shanahan had the statistical advantage when he chose to go for two.here is why i say this:Had Shanahan gone for XP and went into Overtime, the Broncos would have had at BEST at 50/50 shot at winning game.Had the Chargers won the coin toss than the Broncos would have been even less likely to win game, so in order to get the statistical advantage the Broncos would have had to hit XP, hold Chargers AND win coin toss just to be a statistical favorite to win.NOW, by going for two the NFL league success rate (i have seen some places say 42-45 %) but they showed the statistic as 49% in the game yesterday.So they were basically 50/50 in a normal two point conversion, BUT Shanahan knew the Chargers didnt have a timeout to prepare for such a sudden move which he exploited so you have to figure the success rate was more like 60/40 just based on the fact that they had them off guard.And even had they missed it there was still a 10-20% chance of recovering onside and attempting another FG.All in all had they gone the normal rout they were 50/50 at BEST, by going for two they had the clear statistical edge
Not your main point, but I don't think Denver would have had a 10-20% chance of recovering an onsides kick if they failed on the 2 point conversion.
I don't have the stats but I recall that a 25% recovery rate for the kicking team is a conservative estimate.
:tinfoilhat:
 
As unconventional and risky as it seemed, Shanahan had the statistical advantage when he chose to go for two.here is why i say this:Had Shanahan gone for XP and went into Overtime, the Broncos would have had at BEST at 50/50 shot at winning game.Had the Chargers won the coin toss than the Broncos would have been even less likely to win game, so in order to get the statistical advantage the Broncos would have had to hit XP, hold Chargers AND win coin toss just to be a statistical favorite to win.NOW, by going for two the NFL league success rate (i have seen some places say 42-45 %) but they showed the statistic as 49% in the game yesterday.So they were basically 50/50 in a normal two point conversion, BUT Shanahan knew the Chargers didnt have a timeout to prepare for such a sudden move which he exploited so you have to figure the success rate was more like 60/40 just based on the fact that they had them off guard.And even had they missed it there was still a 10-20% chance of recovering onside and attempting another FG.All in all had they gone the normal rout they were 50/50 at BEST, by going for two they had the clear statistical edge
Not your main point, but I don't think Denver would have had a 10-20% chance of recovering an onsides kick if they failed on the 2 point conversion.
I don't have the stats but I recall that a 25% recovery rate for the kicking team is a conservative estimate.
:thumbup:
Hey, did you know that 43% of all statistics are made up on the spot?
 
As unconventional and risky as it seemed, Shanahan had the statistical advantage when he chose to go for two.here is why i say this:Had Shanahan gone for XP and went into Overtime, the Broncos would have had at BEST at 50/50 shot at winning game.Had the Chargers won the coin toss than the Broncos would have been even less likely to win game, so in order to get the statistical advantage the Broncos would have had to hit XP, hold Chargers AND win coin toss just to be a statistical favorite to win.NOW, by going for two the NFL league success rate (i have seen some places say 42-45 %) but they showed the statistic as 49% in the game yesterday.So they were basically 50/50 in a normal two point conversion, BUT Shanahan knew the Chargers didnt have a timeout to prepare for such a sudden move which he exploited so you have to figure the success rate was more like 60/40 just based on the fact that they had them off guard.And even had they missed it there was still a 10-20% chance of recovering onside and attempting another FG.All in all had they gone the normal rout they were 50/50 at BEST, by going for two they had the clear statistical edge
Not your main point, but I don't think Denver would have had a 10-20% chance of recovering an onsides kick if they failed on the 2 point conversion.
I don't have the stats but I recall that a 25% recovery rate for the kicking team is a conservative estimate.
:goodposting:
Hey, did you know that 43% of all statistics are made up on the spot?
I didn't make it up, I actually did read it somewhere. The actual percentage has been 12 though.
 
I don't have the stats but I recall that a 25% recovery rate for the kicking team is a conservative estimate.
I didn't make it up, I actually did read it somewhere. The actual percentage has been 12 though.
:headbang:So you didn't make it up but the % dropped by 13 points in about an hour?
The first percentage was American standard...the second was converted to European metric... :headbang:
 
The success rate for surprise onside kicks is very high... like 70% or more. Non-surprise onside kicks (like a hypothetical Denver onside kick) is very low. Let me look it up.

 
I don't have the stats but I recall that a 25% recovery rate for the kicking team is a conservative estimate.
I didn't make it up, I actually did read it somewhere. The actual percentage has been 12 though.
:headbang:So you didn't make it up but the % dropped by 13 points in about an hour?
No, after posting, I googled to link a source and found the actual number. I also found the article that erroneously gave the 25% number.
 
I see a lot of different numbers in this thread. PFP 2007 has an article on 2-point conversions. One of the first things they did was throw out messed up XP snaps that then get recorded as 2 point conversions. Here's what they came up with:1998 98 attempts, 41%1999 77 attempts, 39%2000 78 attempts, 45%2001 84 attempts, 48%2002 93 attempts, 51%2003 62 attempts, 47%2004 77 attempts, 50%2005 50 attempts, 54%2006 35 attempts, 60%When I look at those stats and consider the context of the game (lots of good points in this thread, like inability of SD to stop those kinds of passing plays, the inability of denver's defense to stop SD, the inexperience of their kicker, etc.), I think it seems pretty clearly the right call.
Assuming those stats are correct, then the NFL needs to push the 2 point conversion line back. What is even more odd is that so many people say how can you question coaches who know way more than "me" about the game...well if you look at how poor they manage the clock (this is without debate) and you look at these stats, how in the world would attempts continue to go down when the stats tell you you should always go for 2? Are the coaches stupid?(rhetorical question)...The success rate should be around 40% for the 2 point line to make sense IMO.
IMO just using the league wide stats is not effective here. Look at the past 2 years - the highest conversion rates by a decent margin, but also the lowest number of attempts by a decent margin. It could be that in the past two years the conversion rate went up because the teams that aren't very good at it stopped trying it. :cry:IMO it would be more instructive if we had numbers like the success rate for teams with top 5 passing offenses, or just top 5 offenses, over the past n years. Or top 10, wherever we feel Denver's offense/passing offense would slot in. I would expect the conversion rates for such teams to be higher than the average.
I agree that the number of attempts going down could be a cause of the high numbers in 2005 and 2006. It could also mean nothing or it could mean something else. If attempts are going down and coaches are really conservative and predictable about when they go for it (the article shows this), that could also be a reason for the success rate to go down, not up.Still, you've got about a 5-year period there where the success rate is about 50%, in fact a little higher. In this case, that's enough for me to get the result massraider wants: since the averages don't really show a clear right or wrong answer one can just read from a chart, I'd look to the context of the game, etc. and probably trust the coach, especially one with Shanahan's track record.
 
I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw deep risks an INT or sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.
So good offenses can skew the results because they'll convert more? Shocking. Wouldn't you say Denver is a pretty good offense?
Top 50% of this season's NFL, sure. As good as the Greatest Show On Turf? Not hardly.

Besides being pretty good on offense doesn't mean your good enough to push your odds of converting at better than 50% which is what you get with OT. Saying you've got a better than 50% chance of scoring a TD on one play from a couple of yards out is pretty bold.

My point was that in a smaller sample size, an unnusually good offense can push the % higher than it would otherwise appear and create that spike...especially if that offense attempts an unnusually large number of them.

Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
I'm just going to bold all the irrelevant items in your post.
You ask a question and then say the answer is irrelevent. :loco: Man, you are a smart one, aren't you! :lmao: :shrug: :bag:

 
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Further, the stats I had seen are that the chances of making 2 points over a 5 year period were less than 44%, however I had seen that recently the numbers were higher. if the numbers were at 50% more teams would go for 2 all the time.
First off, if everyone went for the 2 all the time, the conversion rates would drop again. The 2 is effective because offensive save their "best plays" for situations like that- plays that the other defense hasn't had a chance to prepare for, and which are unusually effective. Go for the 2 all the time and the defense sees all of your money plays, and suddenly they're a little less money.Also, coaching is a risk-adverse profession. Coaches don't always maximize their chances to win, they minimize their chances to get fired. When you look at the coaches with job security (Belichick and Shanahan foremost among them) you see a lot more risky, controversial, unconventional calls (the intentional safety, the 2 to win, Shanahan electing to kick after winning the toss in OT, etc). This suggests that aggressive calls really ARE the correct play more than they're really called, but few coaches feel secure enough to call them.
 
I don't understand your argument about the 24 seconds left. FG's are worth 3 points, so it doesn't matter if the game is tied or denver up by 1, a FG wins it for SD.
The argument is that if SD is tied and is starting a drive in their own territory with only 24 seconds left, they won't try to get into FG position because they will likely have to throw deep risks an INT or sack and fumble. An INT or fumble on your end of the field would likely allow Denver an opportunity to kick a FG and win outright. So the argument goes that SD is more likely to let time run out and accept overtime if Denver had of kicked the XP...which still gives Denver a 50-50 chance of winning based upon the coin toss.As for the recent trend in 2 point conversions...note that one of the high % years had about half of the attempts of the peak years. I imagine that with fewer attempts overall, a strong team that is attempting 2 point conversions (Didn't the Rams do that one season when Wilkins got hurt?) can skew the results.
So good offenses can skew the results because they'll convert more? Shocking. Wouldn't you say Denver is a pretty good offense?
Top 50% of this season's NFL, sure. As good as the Greatest Show On Turf? Not hardly.

Besides being pretty good on offense doesn't mean your good enough to push your odds of converting at better than 50% which is what you get with OT. Saying you've got a better than 50% chance of scoring a TD on one play from a couple of yards out is pretty bold.

My point was that in a smaller sample size, an unnusually good offense can push the % higher than it would otherwise appear and create that spike...especially if that offense attempts an unnusually large number of them.

Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
I'm just going to bold all the irrelevant items in your post.
Please be way more cool to other posters here if you want to keep posting here. TIA.J

 
First off, if everyone went for the 2 all the time, the conversion rates would drop again. The 2 is effective because offensive save their "best plays" for situations like that- plays that the other defense hasn't had a chance to prepare for, and which are unusually effective. Go for the 2 all the time and the defense sees all of your money plays, and suddenly they're a little less money.
Well, with a success rate of less than 50%, I'm skeptical that teams are holding back their "best plays" which are "unusually effective" for 2pnt conversions. And if a play is that good, it would be used in any key situations where the team is in a high reward position....like on 3 and 3 in week 10 when a conversion keeps you in the playoff hunt.
Also, coaching is a risk-adverse profession. Coaches don't always maximize their chances to win, they minimize their chances to get fired. When you look at the coaches with job security (Belichick and Shanahan foremost among them) you see a lot more risky, controversial, unconventional calls (the intentional safety, the 2 to win, Shanahan electing to kick after winning the toss in OT, etc). This suggests that aggressive calls really ARE the correct play more than they're really called, but few coaches feel secure enough to call them.
Um, the best way to not get fired is to win.If going aggressive produced more wins, it would also be more condusive to not getting fired...so coaches that are worried about their jobs would be more aggressive.Arguing that a coach with job security will be more likely to see the glass as half full and thus is more likely to disregard the ramifications if he's wrong is probably a fair statement. But then arguing that this somehow means the aggressive play is therefore the more correct call does not logically follow.It's a copycat league. If it works, everyone tries to do it.
 
It's funny to me the argument over the odds. When I started this thread, I didn't look at the odds, I simply looked at the number of opportunities, and I think people have been overlooking this:

When you go for 2, you're giving yourself one opportunity to win, and one opportunity to lose. It either works or it doesn't, and this magnifies the risk.

If you kick the extra point, you're giving yourself SEVERAL opportunities to win. No matter how bad things get in the next 24 seconds and in overtime, you still have a chance to pull it out. I say you take the wider number of opportunities.

There is an American trait, which has served us well in making decisions of this kind, to cut the Gordian knot, and to be aggressive in all situations. A Robert E. Lee would have gone for it. However, a Ulysses S. Grant would have kicked the extra point. General Patton and Admiral Halsey would go for 2. But Eisenhower and Admiral Spruance (who won the Battle of Midway by being conservative) would have kicked the extra point. There are different ways to think about this. Lee, Patton, and Halsey are famous, and romanticized for their gut and instincts. But Grant, Eisenhower, and Spruance were more successful and won more battles.

 
It's funny to me the argument over the odds. When I started this thread, I didn't look at the odds, I simply looked at the number of opportunities, and I think people have been overlooking this:

When you go for 2, you're giving yourself one opportunity to win, and one opportunity to lose. It either works or it doesn't, and this magnifies the risk.

If you kick the extra point, you're giving yourself SEVERAL opportunities to win. No matter how bad things get in the next 24 seconds and in overtime, you still have a chance to pull it out. I say you take the wider number of opportunities.
If you kick the extra point, you're also giving yourself SEVERAL opportunities to lose. Haven't we already been over this?
 
Besides, when Shanny says he was just following his gut, that pretty much settles the matter for me. He gambled. He won. That just measn he beat the odds this time. The odds win over the long haul.
The rest of what he said, after the 'gut' comment? Legit football reasons, that have been mentioned here already. This isn't a guy throwing his mortgage payment on a random number at a casino.What I like about the odds argument is that no one considers the situation, and the situations of other teams that have had to go for two. Most were teams in worse situations that the Broncos were in yesterday.
Really? All the teams obviously just scored a TD and Denver hadn't score in their previous 3 possessions and even this last possession they had just turned it over.Again, I am fine with the decision, but people are making claims that...
 
I see a lot of different numbers in this thread. PFP 2007 has an article on 2-point conversions. One of the first things they did was throw out messed up XP snaps that then get recorded as 2 point conversions. Here's what they came up with:1998 98 attempts, 41%1999 77 attempts, 39%2000 78 attempts, 45%2001 84 attempts, 48%2002 93 attempts, 51%2003 62 attempts, 47%2004 77 attempts, 50%2005 50 attempts, 54%2006 35 attempts, 60%When I look at those stats and consider the context of the game (lots of good points in this thread, like inability of SD to stop those kinds of passing plays, the inability of denver's defense to stop SD, the inexperience of their kicker, etc.), I think it seems pretty clearly the right call.
Assuming those stats are correct, then the NFL needs to push the 2 point conversion line back. What is even more odd is that so many people say how can you question coaches who know way more than "me" about the game...well if you look at how poor they manage the clock (this is without debate) and you look at these stats, how in the world would attempts continue to go down when the stats tell you you should always go for 2? Are the coaches stupid?(rhetorical question)...The success rate should be around 40% for the 2 point line to make sense IMO.
IMO just using the league wide stats is not effective here. Look at the past 2 years - the highest conversion rates by a decent margin, but also the lowest number of attempts by a decent margin. It could be that in the past two years the conversion rate went up because the teams that aren't very good at it stopped trying it. :shrug:IMO it would be more instructive if we had numbers like the success rate for teams with top 5 passing offenses, or just top 5 offenses, over the past n years. Or top 10, wherever we feel Denver's offense/passing offense would slot in. I would expect the conversion rates for such teams to be higher than the average.
Your point is logical, but I am not so sure, it just seems like the coaching fraternity have all adopted the rule that you don't go for 2 unless it is the 4th quarter and the situation dictates to go for 2. If the success rate is over 50% teams should go for 2 almost every time unless the situation dictates otherwise late in the game. My point is that the 2 point play needs to be harder to convert for the purity of a TD to be just a little more than 2 FG's. IMO, 40% success rate should be the highest making the 2 point play work. I think the same thing with the 3 point line in basketball. moving the line in for pros was a bad idea and shotting 3's every time should not be a viable and statistical advantage.
 
SSOG said:
Further, the stats I had seen are that the chances of making 2 points over a 5 year period were less than 44%, however I had seen that recently the numbers were higher. if the numbers were at 50% more teams would go for 2 all the time.
First off, if everyone went for the 2 all the time, the conversion rates would drop again. The 2 is effective because offensive save their "best plays" for situations like that- plays that the other defense hasn't had a chance to prepare for, and which are unusually effective. Go for the 2 all the time and the defense sees all of your money plays, and suddenly they're a little less money.Also, coaching is a risk-adverse profession. Coaches don't always maximize their chances to win, they minimize their chances to get fired. When you look at the coaches with job security (Belichick and Shanahan foremost among them) you see a lot more risky, controversial, unconventional calls (the intentional safety, the 2 to win, Shanahan electing to kick after winning the toss in OT, etc). This suggests that aggressive calls really ARE the correct play more than they're really called, but few coaches feel secure enough to call them.
Agreed with the 2nd paragraph as sad as it is. Who was the Detroit coach that got killed for kicking off in OT??? I remember this because the truth is he made the right move, but it didn't work. In that game there was a heavy wind and every single score went from the side with the wind. Also, with people incorrectly thinking it was a huge advantage to win the toss (even though the stats have showed that it was a TINY advantage) it was the absolute correct call, but it didn't work. Of course Bill Parcells did the same thing in a key game late in the season and the Giants won taking the wind so nobody said anything...As for the 1st part, teams see so many plays from inside the 5, I am not sure it would be so different. I mean Denver just ran the same exact play didn't they?
 
timschochet said:
It's funny to me the argument over the odds. When I started this thread, I didn't look at the odds, I simply looked at the number of opportunities, and I think people have been overlooking this:When you go for 2, you're giving yourself one opportunity to win, and one opportunity to lose. It either works or it doesn't, and this magnifies the risk.If you kick the extra point, you're giving yourself SEVERAL opportunities to win. No matter how bad things get in the next 24 seconds and in overtime, you still have a chance to pull it out. I say you take the wider number of opportunities.
If you take a hundred dollars into a casino and must either double it or lose it all by making one or more 2 to 1 bets (with the house having some edge) is it a better play to make one big bet or a bunch of smaller ones? Now read what Shanahan said and it is pretty clear that he believed all other options gave a bigger or at least equivalent "house edge" to the Chargers. One all or nothing bet minimizes the accumulative effect of that house edge.
 
JamesTheScot said:
Um, the best way to not get fired is to win.If going aggressive produced more wins, it would also be more condusive to not getting fired...so coaches that are worried about their jobs would be more aggressive.
This might be true if all coaches were allowed to coach for 1,000 games before they were evaluated, so that there would be no sample size bias. They don't- some coaches are gone after as few as 20 games. Even if something improves your odds of winning from 50% to 51%, that's such a small improvement that it won't increase your expected wins by so much as a single win. If taking that gamble and failing attracts undue criticism, then no sane coach would take that gamble, because the net gain in job security from the fraction of an extra win over his coaching career is far offset by the net loss in job security from the steady stream of criticism. Owners today are more and more prone to knee-jerk reactions to satisfy the fan base.Just look at this thread. It's pretty clear that, statistically speaking, going for 2 was the right move. Conversion rates for an average offense are already over 50%. Denver had an above average offense, so their conversion rate should be even higher. Denver's chances of winning in overtime were under 50%, based on the way the game had played out so far (Denver had more punts and turnovers to that point, and they had a rookie kicker). 2pc = >50% chance to win, XP = <50% chance to win, simple math. And yet, despite this, a majority of people in this poll currently believe that going for 2 was the WRONG move- and this was after the 2 was successful! If the 2 had failed, the howls of outrage would be DEAFENING. Going for 2 is, in this case, a call that increases your chances of winning... but greatly decreases your chances of remaining gainfully employed as a head coach in the NFL.
SSOG said:
Further, the stats I had seen are that the chances of making 2 points over a 5 year period were less than 44%, however I had seen that recently the numbers were higher. if the numbers were at 50% more teams would go for 2 all the time.
First off, if everyone went for the 2 all the time, the conversion rates would drop again. The 2 is effective because offensive save their "best plays" for situations like that- plays that the other defense hasn't had a chance to prepare for, and which are unusually effective. Go for the 2 all the time and the defense sees all of your money plays, and suddenly they're a little less money.Also, coaching is a risk-adverse profession. Coaches don't always maximize their chances to win, they minimize their chances to get fired. When you look at the coaches with job security (Belichick and Shanahan foremost among them) you see a lot more risky, controversial, unconventional calls (the intentional safety, the 2 to win, Shanahan electing to kick after winning the toss in OT, etc). This suggests that aggressive calls really ARE the correct play more than they're really called, but few coaches feel secure enough to call them.
Agreed with the 2nd paragraph as sad as it is. Who was the Detroit coach that got killed for kicking off in OT??? I remember this because the truth is he made the right move, but it didn't work. In that game there was a heavy wind and every single score went from the side with the wind. Also, with people incorrectly thinking it was a huge advantage to win the toss (even though the stats have showed that it was a TINY advantage) it was the absolute correct call, but it didn't work. Of course Bill Parcells did the same thing in a key game late in the season and the Giants won taking the wind so nobody said anything...
It was Marty Morninwheg, and he was absolutely crucified. I never knew that Parcells took the wind, though- as far as I knew, the only three coaches in NFL history to win the toss and take the wind were Hank Strom in the 60s, Shanahan vs. Buffalo in 1998, and Morninwheg in Detroit.For what it's worth, coaches who win the toss and elect to take the wind win 66% of the time in overtime. :mellow:
 
As for the 1st part, teams see so many plays from inside the 5, I am not sure it would be so different. I mean Denver just ran the same exact play didn't they?
Denver did run the exact same play, except reversed. This supports my side more than your side, though- the first time the play was run, it was clear SD wasn't prepared for it. SD didn't have a timeout, so Shanahan just reversed the play and ran it again, knowing full well that the defenders on the other side of the field would be equally unprepared for that play without a timeout to talk things over.
 
Bottomfeeder Sports said:
timschochet said:
It's funny to me the argument over the odds. When I started this thread, I didn't look at the odds, I simply looked at the number of opportunities, and I think people have been overlooking this:

When you go for 2, you're giving yourself one opportunity to win, and one opportunity to lose. It either works or it doesn't, and this magnifies the risk.

If you kick the extra point, you're giving yourself SEVERAL opportunities to win. No matter how bad things get in the next 24 seconds and in overtime, you still have a chance to pull it out. I say you take the wider number of opportunities.
If you take a hundred dollars into a casino and must either double it or lose it all by making one or more 2 to 1 bets (with the house having some edge) is it a better play to make one big bet or a bunch of smaller ones? Now read what Shanahan said and it is pretty clear that he believed all other options gave a bigger or at least equivalent "house edge" to the Chargers. One all or nothing bet minimizes the accumulative effect of that house edge.
Wrong. It just increases your variance, which is what you want in this scenario.
 

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