Unleash the FranchiseDoes the Colts’ offensive scheme get in the way of Andrew Luck leading the team to victory?
by Bill Barnwell on August 15, 2014
... the reviews are certainly mixed. The Colts scored 34 more points in 2013 than they did in 2012 under Bruce Arians, but a seemingly endless string of runs for no gain from newly acquired halfback Trent Richardson unquestionably left some Colts fans wondering whether they left a better offense on the cutting-room floor. Indianapolis seemed at its best when the Colts were behind and Hamilton turned things over to the passing attack, most memorably in the comeback victory over the Chiefs in the wild-card round. Even Hamilton seems to recognize that he’d gone a bit too far; this offseason, the rhetoric has shifted, with the coordinator now describing his offense as a
“score-first team.”
So, was Hamilton’s run-heavy approach a failure? The answer is somewhere between yes and no. There are important takeaways from 2013, both good and bad, and they should influence what we see from the Colts and their star quarterback in 2014.
... ex-Steelers offensive coordinator Bruce Arians accepted an offer from former Ravens rival Chuck Pagano to take over as Colts OC. The Colts then re-signed Reggie Wayne before drafting Andrew Luck with the first overall pick, giving Arians one path to a competent offense. He proceeded to install a vertical attack designed to take advantage of Luck’s abilities, and while Arians was forced to take over head coaching duties while Pagano battled leukemia, his offense got the job done. Luck was admittedly inconsistent, but the Colts scored 357 points (18th in football) with Luck averaging 10 yards in the air per pass (according to ESPN Stats & Information), more than anybody else in football.
... What Hamilton ended up installing was a version of the West Coast offense with plenty of
traditional, old-school running plays built in. Why would Hamilton go away from the vertical passing scheme that propelled the Colts into the playoffs? Best I can figure, five reasons:
1. It would play to Luck’s strengths as a passer.
... His average throw in 2013 traveled just under 8.0 yards in the air, dropping him from the longest throws in the league all the way to 23rd. But with that came improved accuracy, as Luck’s completion percentage rose from 54.1 percent to 60.2 percent. It naturally led to a drop in yards per attempt, but Luck lost only three-tenths of a yard per pass, falling from 7.0 yards per attempt in 2012 to 6.7 last year. Luck was a more productive passer under the new scheme on a per-play basis, especially because the new scheme would …
2. Reduce turnovers. Indianapolis’s biggest problem on offense in 2012 came with turning the ball over; the Colts were 22nd in
turnover rate in 2012, with Luck throwing 18 interceptions while also
leading the league in dropped interceptions. Some of that was due to a young quarterback trying to make plays, but Arians’s scheme and those long passes lent themselves to a higher chance of interceptions, as passes that travel 15 yards or more in the air
are nearly four times as likely to be intercepted as passes that travel fewer than 15 yards in the air. With even the typical
passing play more than four times as likely to produce a turnover than
a typical running play, more runs and shorter passes would suggest a dramatic reduction in Indy’s turnover rate.
That’s exactly what happened. After throwing interceptions on 2.9 percent of his passes as a rookie, Luck’s interception rate dropped to 1.6 percent during his 2013 campaign. Indy also enjoyed some fumble luck, as its offense put the ball on the turf 16 times, but lost only four of those fumbles.
2 In all, the Colts turned the ball over on just
7.3 percent of their drives in 2013, the best rate in the league.
3. Keep Andrew Luck from getting killed. Even as early as 2012, the Colts knew they were doing their star quarterback an injustice in pass protection. Luck dropped back 668 times during his rookie season and was sacked or knocked down to the ground, per Football Outsiders, on 122 of those plays, producing a hit rate of 18.3 percent. For reference, the second-most-hit quarterback in football in 2012 was Aaron Rodgers, who was knocked down 93 times. With shorter, quicker passing plays and a dollop of balance from the rushing attack, Hamilton undoubtedly thought he could keep opposing defenses from teeing off on Luck quite so frequently.
This worked, if not very much. Luck was still the most hit quarterback in football, but this time, he was hit only 115 times. That’s technically better! The gap between him and the next most battered quarterback, Matt Ryan, was a mere 12 hits. Unfortunately, if you consider the hits on a per-drop-back basis, Luck was knocked down 19.1 percent of the time he went back to pass, which was actually an increase of his 2012 hit rate.
4. It fit at least some of Indianapolis’s personnel. While I’m sure there was plenty of discussion about how they wanted to build their offense, the Colts invested heavily in offensive linemen during the 2013 offseason. They gave a big-money contract to right tackle Gosder Cherilus while also adding 305-pound Patriots guard Donald Thomas. The team already had tight end Dwayne Allen, who profiled as
one of the league’s best blocking tight ends after his rookie season. Nobody could have known this as Hamilton installed his scheme over the spring and summer, but the Colts would even trade for Trent Richardson, the best running back prospect since Adrian Peterson, in mid-September. That’s not enough to have the Colts turn Luck into a handoff machine, but you can see the components of a good power-running game there if things break right.
Injuries dramatically affected those plans. Allen suffered a season-ending injury in Week 1, as did incumbent starting halfback Vick Ballard, which led to the Richardson trade. Thomas tore his quadriceps a week later, ending his season. (He tore the quadriceps again in July and will miss all of 2014, as well.) Richardson wasn’t injured, but he sure hurt. Whatever it might have seemed like in August, the people who suited up for the Colts as the season went along weren’t a great fit for a power-running scheme.
5. It would open up the play-action pass. There’s nothing a coach loves more than the play-action pass. You get to justify smashmouth football and put one over on the opposing coaches all at once. If the Colts could complete short passes and establish the run, the play-action pass would be the final piece of the triangle, allowing Luck to take advantage of overstretched defenses and retain his vertical streak from the Arians days.
That didn’t go very well at all. Here’s Luck’s QBR (with rank among quarterbacks in parentheses) on play-action and non-play-action passes in 2012 and 2013: