parasaurolophus
Footballguy
the fact that dillon fumbled and chicago got the ball back actually makes it even worse in my opinion. If dillon fumbles at the spot of the missed FG you have the ball back right by the end zone again.
And following your train of 'logic' Grossman's interception is in the endzone and the Bears lose by 7.the fact that dillon fumbled and chicago got the ball back actually makes it even worse in my opinion. If dillon fumbles at the spot of the missed FG you have the ball back right by the end zone again.
THe problem I have with this line of thinking is that your team is GUARANTEED the ball for at least one play. And you are basically 15 yards from scoring. If the average of completing 4th and 6 is 42% and the Pats were allowing a conversion rate of 36%, that still leaves a reasonable probability of 40% of making 6 yards and then having less than 10 yards to go (starting at roughly with 3:30 left on the game clock). That's what we KNOW.What we don't know is what happens once the team DOES NOT have the ball. I suspect that there is a very good possibility that the team gaining possession of the ball would run out the clock by simply getting a single first down and running out the game clock. Had Corey Dillon held onto the ball, that would have been Chicago's fate.In my opinion people are vastly overestimating the odds of converting 4th and 6, and also underestimating how often 2 minute drills convert TDs.
This will be a little slipshod, but here goes:
Since 2002, there have been 84 instances of 4th and 6. 76 passes and 8 rushes (which is why it is 4th and long, to justify my previous smart-### comment).
Out of 84 attempted 4th and 6s, 35 have been converted. Thats 41.7%.
Ok, now 4th downs between 4 and 8 yards to go looks like this:
469 attempts for 194 1st downs= 41.4% conversion rate.
It seems pretty likely you have about a 42% chance of converting that play, all things being equal.
Now lets look at the Patriots on 3rd and 4th down this year:
Between 4 yards and 8 yards to go, there have been 63 attempts for 23 FDs, or 36% chance of converting against the Pats. This is not a friendly opponent to try this with.
I think its a fair conclusion that even if you consider the Bears offense to have been at the NFLs average proficiency at that moment, they had between a 36%-42% chance of converting that play.
I have no idea what the stats look like for scoring a TD in a 2-minute drill, which is the flip side to this coin. But you also have to factor in the odds of winning in overtime on the road, much less stopping Tom Brady from marching down and kicking a FG when the score is tied. Like I said, i think the right way to go is kick the field goal and score later. Its 4th downs that kill you. I'd also like to see how often 2 minute drills are ended with turnovers on downs compared to ints, fumbles, and clock running out. I suspect its a larger number than people think. The great 2 minute QBs alway talk about concentrating on getting 1st downs and not worrying about the clock. My point is I think 4th downs are an absolute killer and should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. 4th and 6 is a very improbable play and should only be tried when you have nothing to lose.
Wait, wait, wait. But Chicago did kick the FG, NE did get a first down, in fact two first downs, and Chicago ended up getting the ball back with a full 2 minutes. Even if Dillon didnt fumble and NE kicks the FG, Bears stand to get the ball back with the opportunity to tie and a good minute and change left in the game.My point is there was actually quite a bit of time left in the game with 3:36 and 3 time outs (including 2 minute warning) plus possesion stoppages when Chicago kicked the field goal. I think its just a bad idea to go for a low probabilty 4th and 6 at that point and risk coming away with nothing. True- there are a lot of unknowns by doing doing this... but that isnt all a disadvantage. The Bears defense and STs are their strength and in fact NE did end up turning the ball over. That field goal put them in a position to win the game and end it with no time on the clock, which against a clutch team like NE in Foxboro is important. In my opinion it may be more 'comforting' to take the low percentage shot when you have the ball in your hands, but if you take the long view the angles may indicate biding your time and looking for a better hand to go all in with.I suspect that there is a very good possibility that the team gaining possession of the ball would run out the clock by simply getting a single first down and running out the game clock. Had Corey Dillon held onto the ball, that would have been Chicago's fate.
The other thing that is getting glossed over is it's hard to run the 2 minute drill without the ball, and by the time you'd get the ball back it would be more of a 1 minute (or less) drill with no timeouts and having to go 75 yards.
By the time this thread dies we'll have another Bear's game to discuss. But a few points if I may:First, the Bears only had 2 Time outs + the 2 minute warning. They burned one earlier in the 4th quarter when Rex doofishly let the play clock run out.Wait, wait, wait. But Chicago did kick the FG, NE did get a first down, in fact two first downs, and Chicago ended up getting the ball back with a full 2 minutes. Even if Dillon didnt fumble and NE kicks the FG, Bears stand to get the ball back with the opportunity to tie and a good minute and change left in the game.My point is there was actually quite a bit of time left in the game with 3:36 and 3 time outs (including 2 minute warning) plus possesion stoppages when Chicago kicked the field goal. I think its just a bad idea to go for a low probabilty 4th and 6 at that point and risk coming away with nothing. True- there are a lot of unknowns by doing doing this... but that isnt all a disadvantage. The Bears defense and STs are their strength and in fact NE did end up turning the ball over. That field goal put them in a position to win the game and end it with no time on the clock, which against a clutch team like NE in Foxboro is important. In my opinion it may be more 'comforting' to take the low percentage shot when you have the ball in your hands, but if you take the long view the angles may indicate biding your time and looking for a better hand to go all in with.I suspect that there is a very good possibility that the team gaining possession of the ball would run out the clock by simply getting a single first down and running out the game clock. Had Corey Dillon held onto the ball, that would have been Chicago's fate.
The other thing that is getting glossed over is it's hard to run the 2 minute drill without the ball, and by the time you'd get the ball back it would be more of a 1 minute (or less) drill with no timeouts and having to go 75 yards.
JUst my opinion.
Come on man, after all this analysis you honestly think i dont realize that 3 points doesnt equal 7? I dont have any problem with people disagreeing with me and citing their own rational for why i am totally off base, but give me an ounce of credit.Third, it seems that what MB is failing to grasp is that a FG at that point had 0% chance of winning or tieing the game.
True, entirely true. But that doesnt make them situationally identical. A team sitting on a 4 point lead behaves differently than a team tied and driving down to kick a game winning field goal. As i said, NE is probably the one team in the league wise enough to try to treat both situations identically, but even they are going to run the ball more when they are sitting on a lead.If you don't convert and stop NE (NOTE: Stopping NE is NOT a variable - it is a constant, as it needs to happen in either situation) you get A SECOND CHANCE TO TIE/WIN.
You are mixing going for it on 4th and 6 with scoring a TD. They are 2 very different elements. I didnt present any statistics on scoring a TD on 4th and 6, but assumedly they are significantly less than converting the 1st, even in the red zone. There is every probably you throw to the sticks on that play assuming the defense will have to respect the TD threat.The point for most, seems to be that if you go for a TD with 3:36 left, you will at least create TWO TD opportunities - having to make 1 of the 2.
Again, true, but you are ignoring the more difficult scenario of stopping NE from either driving down the field at the end of the game or in OT. AT BEST, going for it on 4th and 6 you score and give NE the ball back to drive with 3 TOs, plus the 2 min warning, and OT to fall back on. In other words you give perhaps the most clutch QB in history the ball to end the game.Very likely- you turn the ball over on downs, and then have to stop the Pats at least TWICE more. By kicking, you have to stop the Pats ONCE, then you have the last 2 minutes to drive the field and hopefully score with less than a minute on the clock. Thats the point, and everything went perfectly up until the final drive. But everything hinged on Grossman being able to get it done. He SHOULD have had 2 minutes and as many downs as he could grab to convert the TD. Instead you want to essentially give him 1 shot at it. I would say your ratio's are off.Instead of forcing yourself to be a perfect 1 of 1 (and have to drive more than 14 yards for that 1). Of course, if scoring a TD the first time down, you would only need a FG (not as long a drive).
Okay - first off I promise to let this thread go after this replyCome on man, after all this analysis you honestly think i dont realize that 3 points doesnt equal 7? I dont have any problem with people disagreeing with me and citing their own rational for why i am totally off base, but give me an ounce of credit.Third, it seems that what MB is failing to grasp is that a FG at that point had 0% chance of winning or tieing the game.
An interesting point, but, if they did convert without scoring a TD I would guess (and admittedly it would be a guess w/o "goal to go" in must score a TD situations stats at hand) that the chances of scoring a TD starting at 1st and goal from the 8 (worst case scenario) are fairly good. Especially if you consider that "settling" for the field goal is not an option (i.e. you have 4 downs to work with).Another point you have completely overlooked (especially with your closing argument about having to stop NE twice - assuming failure to convert) is the option of a 2 point conversion. With the success the Bears had had running the ball and the use of their TEs near the goal line in similar circumstances, it would have been an interesting option to say the least.You are mixing going for it on 4th and 6 with scoring a TD. They are 2 very different elements. I didnt present any statistics on scoring a TD on 4th and 6, but assumedly they are significantly less than converting the 1st, even in the red zone. There is every probably you throw to the sticks on that play assuming the defense will have to respect the TD threat.
Had the Bears gone ahead and kicked a FG and somehow managed to win, IMO that does not necessarily mean that it would have been the right decision.Like going all in pre-flop on a 2-6 off suit and catching a straight on the flop. Sure, you can still win, but that doesn't make it a great bet.In all of the scenarios at the end of the game, they all basically involved stopping the Patriots and getting the ball back, so that was universal in all the outcomes.Basically, the Bears needed 6 yards on one play and then 4 plays near the end zone to score (with time not being a factor). If that worked, there was a chance to get the ball back and move the ball on offense for a game winning FG.If they didn't make it on 4th down, they still could get the ball back and then try for a game tying TD (and still be in the game by going to OT).By MAKING the FG, that left the ball in the hands of the Pats, with CHI still needing a TD. So pretty much the same situation as NOT making it on 4th down (except scoring a TD would win).Bottom line, I am not a fan of giving away the ball when you are losing.While I realize that hindsight is 20/20, the fact is the Bears made the choice to settle for the FG...and lost. Certainly not the most compelling of the reasons given to go for the TD, but one to add to the list.