I mentioned up earlier that the State Department was the entity that actually classified those emails and they did it after the fact (after they reviewed them later). IOW, the originator who sent them to Clinton did not classify them either and they weren't sent on the proper network. So it isn't just Clinton who is at fault here, imo. She just happened to be the SoS who should have known better to discuss certain things on a nonsecure network. Again, lackadaisical culture. It wasn't just her.
If the information originated at State, went past Hillary's eyes, and Hillary didn't classify then it wasn't classified! Only the president can overrule this. And Congress, if they dared might try to impeach -but they didn't.
Being classified later for the purpose of FOIA requests, especially with respect to Foreign Government Information which doesn't necessarily fit into our classification system doesn't offer any insight into Hillary's judgment calls. Comey and the FBI didn't seem to even consider these for the investigation beyond confirming that no other agency "owned" the information. The only items that mattered per Comey's remarks were the 55 or so pieces of information in 113 or so emails that was "owned" by other agencies. My problem with these is that all of the ones which have been reported on are problematic being classified.
For example the North Korea information you mentioned was supposedly sent to Hillary from a private citizen who was not working for or with the government or a government contractor which creates issues claiming that Hillary forwarding the information back into the government systems represents Hillary removing it from proper custody. There is also the supposed news paper article discussions - both of the CIA drone program and that brother of some president who was a CIA informant (and eventually assassinated). Then there were supposedly the emails about potential CIA drone strikes which don't actually mention the program, or the target, or the time, or anything meaningful at all. Lastly there were names of people who were exposed as intelligence officer which would be terrible -
especially if it was the FOIA request that did the exposing. So I know you are security conscious but as of now from what has been shared, or more appropriately speculated about those 55 pieces of information there is nothing to be upset about - except possibly the FOIA security review process itself putting lives and/or careers in danger.
5 FAM 482.6 Foreign Government Information
(CT:IM-117; 06-16-2011)
a. For the Department and the Foreign Service, the most important category of national security information is foreign government information (FGI). FGI is defined in E.O. 13526 as:
(1) Information provided to the United States by a foreign government or an international organization of governments or any element thereof with the expectation that the information, its source, or both are to be held in confidence; or
(2) Information produced by the U.S. under an international arrangement requiring that the information or the arrangement be held in confidence.
b. FGI may be included in diplomatic notes, aide memoires, non-papers, memcons, telegrams, emails, or other documents reporting conversations with foreign government officials. When in the form of a diplomatic note or other written communication from a foreign government official, it may well not bear any foreign government security classification. It may, nevertheless, require protection and, therefore, require a U.S. security classification to appropriately protect the information. For how FGI should be identified and marked, see
5 FAM 482.10 paragraph f, below.
c. As provided in section 1.1. (d) of E.O. 13526, the unauthorized disclosure of FGI is presumed to cause damage to the national security.
d. Recipients of FGI must provide a degree of protection for that information at least equivalent to that required by the foreign government or the international organization that provided the information. When adequate to achieve the required protection, FGI may be handled under standards that are less restrictive than the safeguarding standards that ordinarily apply to U.S. Confidential information, including modified handling and transmission and allowing access to individuals with a need-to-know who have not otherwise been cleared for access to
classified information or executed an approved nondisclosure agreement. Questions about this aspect of E.O. 13526 should be addressed to DS/SI/IS or the Office of the Legal Adviser (L).
e. Foreign government information provided pursuant to an existing treaty, agreement, bilateral exchange, or other process may require protection in addition to that established for U.S.
classified information. For example, the release or disclosure of foreign government information to any third-country entity may require the prior consent of the originating government.
with no specifics with regard to Dallas. Then they moved onto the mental gymnastics of the email fiasco 
