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*** Official Russia vs. Ukraine Discussion - Invasion has begun *** (5 Viewers)

Ukraine provides ideal ‘testing ground’ for western weaponry

Artillery including US M777 howitzers, German Panzerhaubitze 2000s, French Caesars and Polish Krabs that are more accurate than Russian canon, have been softening the ground for Ukraine’s infantry and repelling Russian advances.
A western artillery system is like a “Mercedes-Benz” compared with a Russian Soviet-era car, but Nato-grade weaponry has also shown its own shortcomings, according to Petro Pyatakov, an arms industry consultant and retired colonel.
“It has become apparent during operations that these systems were not intended for such intense warfare” in which Russia’s artillery machine fires nonstop and indiscriminately. “All of them require a break . . . after two or three minutes of firing at maximum speed, which is not the case with Soviet guns,” Pyatakov said.

Pyatakov confirmed that there was an “active interest from western artillery manufacturers in receiving feedback from Ukrainian gunners . . . to eliminate shortcomings”.
“It’s not just the Ukrainians who are learning how to fight a modern, high-intensity war. The Russians are as well,” said a western defence adviser.
“There is a risk that [the west] will get left behind when it comes to battlefield tactics unless we absorb the lessons to be learnt with some urgency,” the adviser said.

GPS-guided munitions for artillery, as well as multiple-launch rocket systems such as the US Himars, were “highly accurate.” But, Reznikov added, Russia’s strong radio-electronic systems were finding ways to jam them.
“The Russians come up with a countermeasure, we inform our partners and they make a new countermeasure against this countermeasure,” Reznikov said.

The same approach is deployed to improve the performance of surveillance and strike drones, which are being used on an unprecedented scale but are also frequently jammed.
“It’s like a constant pendulum. This is a war of technology,” Reznikov said.
Jack Watling, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think-tank, said the west had learnt a great deal about how Russian systems operated “at a tactical level, and they have observed the impact of [drones] and other systems on broad-scale combat operations”.
“On the other hand, the west has exposed a lot of its own capabilities to Russia and China, and therefore will have to change the ways that some of its equipment work in order to retain competitive advantage,” Watling said.

Li Hui, China’s special representative for Eurasian affairs, was visiting Kyiv in mid-May, by which time Ukraine had allegedly downed several Kinzhals. However, Ukrainian diplomats said the Chinese envoy did not believe that US-made Patriots had intercepted Russia’s hypersonic missiles.
“I proposed that if there are doubts, we are ready to provide proof,” Reznikov said.
Li left Kyiv without viewing the evidence, Reznikov added.
There is a LOT being learned in Ukraine.

From tech to tactics to theory. We have not seen a war like this.... basically since WWII really.... where you had opposing forces of bulk using "modern" weapons. There has been a wealth of equipment that we have been able to get our hands on to take apart and figure out how it works. Then this article points out that even though NATO equipment is superior to Russian, it does not mean that there are weak points or areas to improve.

No doubt that there will be new weapon systems developed out of what is learned in this.

And the Russian military export industry is dead.
But isn't the reverse true? If our equipment is so much more superior, when some of it falls into Russian hands there is a lot more to be lost than when we come upon some of their equipment.
A lot of the stuff we’re sending over is old enough that not much sensitive stuff would be lost, and we already know it’s weaknesses, so even if they do manage to make a copy, we can deal with it. Also, their ability to replicate tech isn’t that great in the first place
 
Ukraine provides ideal ‘testing ground’ for western weaponry

Artillery including US M777 howitzers, German Panzerhaubitze 2000s, French Caesars and Polish Krabs that are more accurate than Russian canon, have been softening the ground for Ukraine’s infantry and repelling Russian advances.
A western artillery system is like a “Mercedes-Benz” compared with a Russian Soviet-era car, but Nato-grade weaponry has also shown its own shortcomings, according to Petro Pyatakov, an arms industry consultant and retired colonel.
“It has become apparent during operations that these systems were not intended for such intense warfare” in which Russia’s artillery machine fires nonstop and indiscriminately. “All of them require a break . . . after two or three minutes of firing at maximum speed, which is not the case with Soviet guns,” Pyatakov said.

Pyatakov confirmed that there was an “active interest from western artillery manufacturers in receiving feedback from Ukrainian gunners . . . to eliminate shortcomings”.
“It’s not just the Ukrainians who are learning how to fight a modern, high-intensity war. The Russians are as well,” said a western defence adviser.
“There is a risk that [the west] will get left behind when it comes to battlefield tactics unless we absorb the lessons to be learnt with some urgency,” the adviser said.

GPS-guided munitions for artillery, as well as multiple-launch rocket systems such as the US Himars, were “highly accurate.” But, Reznikov added, Russia’s strong radio-electronic systems were finding ways to jam them.
“The Russians come up with a countermeasure, we inform our partners and they make a new countermeasure against this countermeasure,” Reznikov said.

The same approach is deployed to improve the performance of surveillance and strike drones, which are being used on an unprecedented scale but are also frequently jammed.
“It’s like a constant pendulum. This is a war of technology,” Reznikov said.
Jack Watling, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think-tank, said the west had learnt a great deal about how Russian systems operated “at a tactical level, and they have observed the impact of [drones] and other systems on broad-scale combat operations”.
“On the other hand, the west has exposed a lot of its own capabilities to Russia and China, and therefore will have to change the ways that some of its equipment work in order to retain competitive advantage,” Watling said.

Li Hui, China’s special representative for Eurasian affairs, was visiting Kyiv in mid-May, by which time Ukraine had allegedly downed several Kinzhals. However, Ukrainian diplomats said the Chinese envoy did not believe that US-made Patriots had intercepted Russia’s hypersonic missiles.
“I proposed that if there are doubts, we are ready to provide proof,” Reznikov said.
Li left Kyiv without viewing the evidence, Reznikov added.
There is a LOT being learned in Ukraine.

From tech to tactics to theory. We have not seen a war like this.... basically since WWII really.... where you had opposing forces of bulk using "modern" weapons. There has been a wealth of equipment that we have been able to get our hands on to take apart and figure out how it works. Then this article points out that even though NATO equipment is superior to Russian, it does not mean that there are weak points or areas to improve.

No doubt that there will be new weapon systems developed out of what is learned in this.

And the Russian military export industry is dead.
But isn't the reverse true? If our equipment is so much more superior, when some of it falls into Russian hands there is a lot more to be lost than when we come upon some of their equipment.
The difference is that the Ukrainians are not being equipped with the best that we have. Much of it is near obsolete like the M113 or older systems in their twilight years such as the M3 Bradley. For most of the 'top of line' equipment like the Leopard II, Challenger II and Abrams are mostly older versions. Another example, the Patriot batteries that the Ukrainians are using are not the same as the Patriots we use. They are an older export version.

But yes, there is a risk. But what we are getting is the top of the line tech the Russians have and we have all the resources to learn from what we capture. Russia is getting older tech and is not as capable to learn from what they do capture. I would not be too worried about Russian industry getting their hands on much of it but I would very much hate the idea of it getting transferred to China.
 
Why does Putin keep saying Russia will fall apart unless the take over Ukraine?

Ukraine was never going to invade Russia, nobody was.
He stayed in power with fearmongering, nobody is going to call him out and stay in the public eye for long there, and he has to try and keep whatever grip he has, even though everyone else outside his country can clearly see that Russia is in a lot of trouble as a country no matter what happens in Ukraine

They were in trouble way before the invasion?
Demographic decline is staring them in the face. Losing tens of thousands of reproductive aged men isn't going to help.
Actually, losing reproductive age men doesn't harm population growth that much. Losing reproductive age women does have a big impact.
How true is that now with women waiting so long to have children?
 
Why does Putin keep saying Russia will fall apart unless the take over Ukraine?

Ukraine was never going to invade Russia, nobody was.
He stayed in power with fearmongering, nobody is going to call him out and stay in the public eye for long there, and he has to try and keep whatever grip he has, even though everyone else outside his country can clearly see that Russia is in a lot of trouble as a country no matter what happens in Ukraine

They were in trouble way before the invasion?
Demographic decline is staring them in the face. Losing tens of thousands of reproductive aged men isn't going to help.
Actually, losing reproductive age men doesn't harm population growth that much. Losing reproductive age women does have a big impact.
How true is that now with women waiting so long to have children?

For review here. I just doubt they can flip the baby machines back on and bounce back in 20-30 years.
 

On a hilltop near the occupied southern Ukrainian town of Polohy, Russian forces set up an observation point that can spot Ukrainian soldiers more than 6 miles away. Four times, Ukrainian forces destroyed the Murom-M surveillance system, said Lt. Col. Oleksiy Telehin, of Ukraine’s 108th Territorial Defense brigade. Four times, the Russians promptly installed a new one.
Ukraine successfully outmaneuvered Russia’s far larger invading forces last year, despite being outmanned, outgunned and vastly overpowered in the air. With a nimble approach, superior knowledge of the terrain and the efficient use of drones and digital technology, its units were able to repel a far larger army that often seemed lumbering and mired in bureaucracy.
That’s all over. Ukraine is now attempting to dislodge an entrenched enemy, one of the most daunting operations any military can undertake. Russian troops have spent months building physical defenses that include bunkers, tank traps and minefields—some more than 15 miles deep.

In this phase of the war, Ukraine’s lack of resources is proving as much of a challenge as the dug-in Russian defenses. Despite the delivery of new Western weapons in recent months—and a promise by the U.S. Friday to send deadly cluster munitions in the future—Kyiv’s effort to push south through Russian territory toward the Sea of Azov has stalled. Though Ukrainian officials say they are making progress, and have reclaimed a handful of villages in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions over the past month, they also acknowledge the herculean nature of their task.
“If we kill a whole unit—100 soldiers—the next day they will bring another unit. And the day after, another,” Lt. Col. Telehin said.

Ukrainian soldiers said the Russians in the Zaporizhzhia region have constructed miles of zigzagging, interconnected trenches, some of them reinforced with concrete, or covered with wood-and-earth roofs so they are difficult to spot using drones. Fields are heavily mined. In at least two cases, Ukrainian soldiers said, the bodies of their killed comrades had been mined as well.
“It’s impossible to completely destroy such a well-prepared position before advancing,” said a 38-year-old rifle unit commander in the 108th brigade, who goes by the call sign Vados. To be able to take it, he said, Ukrainian artillery forces would need to first bombard the area and then advance with armored vehicles to bring in infantry. A shortage of tanks and other armored vehicles has made that strategy hard to execute, he said.

Poland, a staunch ally of Ukraine, recently sent Kyiv about a dozen Soviet-designed Mi-24 helicopter gunships, according to people familiar with the matter, in a transfer not previously disclosed. But Ukraine’s fleet remains small compared with Russia’s, with less sophisticated targeting and defensive systems. Kyiv uses it sparingly to avoid losing aircraft.

The cluster munitions should provide them with more artillery firepower and help against dug in Russian positions. US stocks of other munitions are low, but hopefully this can buy us time until we double monthly production of 155mm shells by end of year.

Kyiv is trying to soften the Russian defenses before sending troops in, but doesn’t have enough ammunition to simply flatten Russian-held villages, as the Russians did in Bakhmut and other parts of eastern Ukraine. Instead, Ukrainian troops usually make artillery strikes only if they have confirmed Russian positions with drones.
Soldiers said a lack of armored vehicles was also slowing their efforts to advance.
Speaking recently from a command post in the Zaporizhzhia region, Vados, the rifle-unit commander, said that his unit had tried to assault a Russian-held village the previous day. As Ukrainian infantry advanced on foot, the Russians moved to surround them.
“If we had more vehicles, we could have brought more infantry to the flanks,” Vados, a lieutenant, said. Instead, the unit retreated without taking the village. In the month since the offensive began, Vados said he hasn’t been part of an operation that successfully seized a well-prepared Russian position.

Ukrainian officials have declined throughout the war to discuss casualty figures. But soldiers on the southern front say that a unit can sometimes lose dozens of men in one assault.
A 19-year-old combat medic, who goes by the call sign Bald, said he made three runs to pick up injured comrades during a recent assault, transporting eight men to stabilization points. Earlier in the summer, a mortar hit his car during an evacuation. Another vehicle came to pick up the growing number of wounded.
“We had to evacuate the evacuation team,” he said.

Ukrainian forces have shot down some of Russia’s helicopters in recent weeks. One soldier from an antiaircraft unit near the border of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions said Russian choppers sometimes fly within 5 miles of Ukrainian troops. The proximity improves Russian attackers’ accuracy, but also leaves them vulnerable. The soldier said he shot down two in one week last month, using Soviet-era antiaircraft systems.
Still, infantry say the aircrafts remain a menace.
“We don’t have proper air defense systems to deal with the threat,” said Dmytro, a 40-year-old platoon commander in the 108th brigade. “When we’re warned that an enemy plane has taken off, the only way to deal with it is to take cover.”

The region of mostly flat, open fields separated by thin treelines offers little protection. In the spring, some troops who fought in the area questioned whether an offensive could succeed here, given the landscape.

The difficulty of the task hasn’t been a surprise, Lt. Col. Telehin said.
“We knew that to be able to move forward against such well prepared defenses,” he said, “we’d need experience, resources and surprise.”
 
Why does Putin keep saying Russia will fall apart unless the take over Ukraine?

Ukraine was never going to invade Russia, nobody was.
He stayed in power with fearmongering, nobody is going to call him out and stay in the public eye for long there, and he has to try and keep whatever grip he has, even though everyone else outside his country can clearly see that Russia is in a lot of trouble as a country no matter what happens in Ukraine

They were in trouble way before the invasion?
Demographic decline is staring them in the face. Losing tens of thousands of reproductive aged men isn't going to help.
Actually, losing reproductive age men doesn't harm population growth that much. Losing reproductive age women does have a big impact.
How true is that now with women waiting so long to have children?
I have no idea.... after WWII US population exploded after losing a 400K (not broken down by men and women but obviously the vast majority of those dead would have been men). The service men came home and grabbed a girl and started baby making.

I think social-economics play a big role into that. People tend to not want children when things are hard, depressing and the future looks bleak. And likewise, people are more willing to have children in good times with hope in how the future will be better.

Russia is going to come out of this a broken country (even more than it was before) not matter how this ends. Alcoholism is running rampant in their society. It is hard for me to see them all of a sudden reversing the trend after years of them doing a ton. One thing that started trying is offering a Hero's medal to women who have 10 kids and pay them 1 million rubles.
 

It was basically a big middle finger from Erdogan to Putin
 
Ukrainian counteroffensive: ‘We take their trenches – but they take them back

Good read here on the differences between the situations near Neskuchne and more to the west of that near Novodarivka.

What’s slowing Ukraine’s counteroffensive? Russia is fighting smarter

Galeotti is a keen Russian observer. He addresses a lot here in the piece above while still acknowledging that it's extremely early and Ukraine retains the initiative.

Ukrainian forces advance in south, hold 'initiative,' says Zelenskiy

Some video here of retired Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt and WSJ breaking down the counteroffensive and what to look for next:
Why Ukraine Is Struggling to Puncture Russia’s Formidable Defenses

I believe the link above demonstrates why RUSI previously stated that "Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military."

None of this means anything in terms of what will ultimately happen with the counteroffensive. Only time will tell. Difficult operation.
 
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Ukraine pushes to reclaim Bakhmut fighting on fallen city’s flanks

Everything was set for a nighttime mortar attack by a Ukrainian special forces team close to the Russian front line.
A four-man squad assembled a fire base in the blasted remains of a kindergarten in a village near here, about 18 miles south of Bakhmut, while another reconnoitered nearby.

The moon was up. The night was still. The sky was clear — all excellent conditions to pinpoint a mortar strike or float a drone so close to Russian front lines that incoming Ukrainian artillery could be heard whistling on the ride down.
“We will find them with the drone, and we will hit them,” said Lisnyk, the Ukrainian special forces team leader, who requested to be identified by his call sign in keeping with military protocol. “If we don’t find them, we’ll look elsewhere.”

But the team’s first drone to go up went missing, perhaps lost to Russian jammers, and they decided not to risk another — the second time within two days that bad weather or bad luck slowed their effort to reclaim the eastern city of Bakhmut in an inch-by-inch battle on its flanks.

So goes the grinding Ukrainian counteroffensive on a small but important sector of the 600-mile front. The fight in villages around Toretsk, where some battle lines have hardly budged since 2014, reflects the difficulty Ukraine faces in breaking a stalemate when the only real air power to speak of comes from drones.

Now, with Ukraine mounting its long-awaited counteroffensive, the battle has shifted to the destroyed city’s flanks. “We are trying to pin as many Muscovites as possible around Bakhmut,” said Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow with Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies.
To the north, the Ukrainians have pushed toward Yagidne and Berhivka. To south, they’ve been moving on Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka amid a landscape dotted with abandoned coal mines and giant slag piles grown over with trees.
Ukrainian troops have also encountered Wagner Group’s successors for the first time — a force known as Storm Z that is under the control of Russia’s Defense Ministry and includes a mix of reservists, conscripts and convicted criminals.
By the end of June, Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade eliminated a Russian bridgehead on the western bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas canal, its commander reported on Telegram.
The canal is a key source of water for the Russian-occupied parts of Donetsk region. Securing the waterway also means controlling high ground southwest of the city, said Gerych, the leader of a mortar company in 3rd Assault Brigade located two kilometers or less from the waterway.

Some good commentary in that piece from a couple Ukrainian soldiers
 

Russia's top general, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, was shown ordering subordinates to destroy Ukrainian missile sites in a video released on Monday, his first appearance in public since a failed June 24 mercenary mutiny.
The footage indicates that President Vladimir Putin has kept his two most powerful military men, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gerasimov, in their posts despite demands from mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin to sack them over alleged incompetence in running military operations in Ukraine.

Sitting in a military command centre on a white leather seat chairing a meeting with top generals, Gerasimov, 67, asked for and then listened to a report by Viktor Afzalov, deputy in the aerospace forces to General Sergei Surovikin, who has not been since in public since the mutiny.
The defence ministry said the footage showed Gerasimov at a meeting on Sunday. It described him as chief of the general staff of Russia's armed forces and commander of Moscow's forces in Ukraine, the positions he held before the mutiny.

In the footage released on Monday, the faces of most of the participants in the video call were blurred out, though Surovikin's deputy, Afzalov, was shown.
The whereabouts of Surovikin, who before the rebellion was deputy commander of Russia's forces in Ukraine and who was repeatedly praised by Prigozhin, were unclear.
Nicknamed "General Armageddon" by the Russian media for his reputed ruthlessness, Surovikin is formally commander in chief of the aerospace forces.
Colonel-General Sergei Rudskoi and Colonel-General Alexei Kim, two of Gerasimov's subordinates, were shown in the same video.
 

The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey. Russian ultranationalists have been consistently criticizing the Kremlin’s decisions to free Azovstal defenders in other prisoner exchanges because the Kremlin had portrayed these Ukrainian fighters as “Nazis” during the Battle of Mariupol.[18] One Russian milblogger observed that the release of Azovstal defenders undermines Russia’s aim to ”denazify” Ukraine, while another milblogger implied that Russia should not have trusted Turkey to uphold the deal given that Turkey is Russia’s ”historical enemy.”[19] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russia could have avoided this release by not organizing the initial prisoner of war (POW) exchange in 2022, and another Russian milblogger stated that Russia was once again misled because Russian officials irresponsibly prioritized the release of Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk - who is a godfather to one of Putin’s children - from Ukrainian captivity.[20] Another milblogger stated that the news of the Azovstal commanders’ release had upset Russian military personnel on the frontlines and urged people to reevaluate the reasons for Wagner Group’s armed rebellion – implying that the rebellion’s goals of changes within the Russian military command and information space are still needed in Russia.[21] The milblogger added that this incident is one of many incidents since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that are dividing Russian society.[22]

Interesting leak here:

Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization. The document, dated May 1, 2014, commits Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner Group commander Dmitry Utkin to follow a set of rules for their new private military company’s participation for combat in eastern Ukraine.[37] Prigozhin’s duties as “director” include the responsibility to provide weapons and funding; provide guarantees for the killed and wounded; provide permanent work; protect personnel against criminal charges for mercenaryism (article 359 of Russia’s Criminal Code); resolve all issues “collegially”; participate in person; and not go against the Russian nation.[38] Utkin’s responsibilities as “commander” were to select and train personnel; get rid of deserters; prohibit alcohol and drugs; resolve issues “collegially”; implement lessons learned and complete tasks to the end; not go against “VVP” (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin); and not lie or deceive and always tell the truth as it is.[39] It is unclear who leaked this document or why. Russian law enforcement, which raided Prigozhin’s home, and pro-Prigozhin actors likely had access to the document.[40] The leak may be part of an effort to rehabilitate Wagner’s image following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion. The document reiterates that Wagner’s founding principles are to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine in loyal service to Russian President Vladimir Putin and “the Russian nation.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position. It remains unclear who benefits from the leak of Wagner’s alleged founding document as the document makes the Wagner Group look professional and appealing in comparison with the regular Russian military. Wagner is still reportedly recruiting within Russia while the Russian MoD is reportedly conducting a competing effort to recruit Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the MoD.[41] Putin’s decision to not dispose of the Wagner Group – previously Russia's most combat capable force – is making it difficult for Putin and other Russian power players to know how to interact with the Wagner Group and its leaders and fighters.
 

To break the defence line, Ukrainian artillery is critical for suppressing Russian indirect and direct fire, thereby enabling Ukrainian troops to assault Russian trenches. Not only does Ukraine field fewer artillery pieces than the Russian military, but finite stocks of ammunition and replacement howitzer barrels among Ukraine’s international partners are a major constraint on how long Ukraine can maintain a high tempo of operations. Maximising the efficiency of Ukrainian artillery fire is, therefore, a critical factor in determining the outcome of the conflict.

DPICMs for 155mm howitzers and multiple launch rocket systems greatly multiply the efficiency of artillery fire against entrenched troops. As an example, according to US Army data on engagements during the Vietnam War, the number of conventional high-explosive (HE) 155mm rounds fired for each enemy soldier killed in combat was 13.6, compared to only 1.7 for DPICM shells. When fired against Russian defensive fortifications in Ukraine, a conventional artillery shell has a very low probability of killing Russian troops unless it lands directly in a trench. Even if an HE round does land in a trench, it will only spread shrapnel in the trench sector within line of sight of the point of detonation. A DPICM round, by contrast, spreads 72 submunitions over a significant area. This greatly increases the chances of multiple submunition blasts directly impacting troops in trenches, providing much greater lethal and suppression effects.

The increased effectiveness of each artillery shot, however, is not even the most significant logical driver for providing Ukrainian forces with DPICMs from a military point of view. Rather, the most significant driver is the operational impact on Ukrainian artillery ammunition stockpiles and barrel life. With each barrel having a life of around 1,800 rounds, giving Ukraine DPICMs will mean it has to fire fewer total rounds for a given battlefield effect, allowing it to sustain the fight for significantly longer. It also makes a large amount of currently unused munitions in the stockpiles of Ukraine’s international partners available, and would reduce the consumption rate of increasingly stretched conventional HE 155mm stocks – buying crucial time as NATO countries struggle to expand munitions production. This is vital given Russia’s current strategy of attempting to dig in and prolong the conflict – a strategy specifically designed to exhaust Western capacity to supply the AFU with sufficient munitions and equipment to keep fighting. Russia, by contrast, is already mobilising its defence industry and has an existing capacity for large-scale munitions manufacture.

HRW argues that because some DPICM submunitions will fail to explode, they are inherently indiscriminate. The problem with this argument is that a significant proportion of other munitions also fail to explode. In fact, up to one in five of Russia’s munitions stocks are assessed by the Russian military to be unsafe due to their age and poor condition, and yet these are routinely fired at Ukraine. HRW’s unexploded ordnance argument is one that would apply equally to a wide range of explosive weapons already in use in the conflict, and it is therefore illogical as a reason to specifically reject the provision of DPICMs.
 
Also, the threat to Ukrainians, on Ukrainian land, from unexploded cluster munitions is many orders of magnitude less than the threat to Ukrainians, on Ukrainian land, from invading Russians.

The "Human Rights" argument suffers from the same flaws. First, the US, Russia and Ukraine did not sign the no-cluster-munitions treaty.

Second, Russians can avoid 100% of the devastation these weapons inflict by going home. And the Ukrainians can make their own decision about whether using them IN UKRAINE makes sense or not.

Third, the Russians continue to use these weapons in Ukraine.

Saying Ukraine shouldn't use these weapons against the Russians in Ukraine is a stupid argument IMO.
 

 
Also, the threat to Ukrainians, on Ukrainian land, from unexploded cluster munitions is many orders of magnitude less than the threat to Ukrainians, on Ukrainian land, from invading Russians.

The "Human Rights" argument suffers from the same flaws. First, the US, Russia and Ukraine did not sign the no-cluster-munitions treaty.

Second, Russians can avoid 100% of the devastation these weapons inflict by going home. And the Ukrainians can make their own decision about whether using them IN UKRAINE makes sense or not.

Third, the Russians continue to use these weapons in Ukraine.

Saying Ukraine shouldn't use these weapons against the Russians in Ukraine is a stupid argument IMO.
Plus, they are pretty damned effective against defensive positions.
 
This is what I was saying above, that Ukraine is probably pretty happy to just kill Russians indefinitely as long as they can do it disproportionately, with a large enough ratio:
So there are six ways Russia might turn the war around. All are unlikely, and three rely on foreign behavior – over which Putin has little control – dramatically changing.

My own sense is that Ukraine will win the war in time by simply outlasting the Russians. That is, this war is more like an insurgency. The insurgent wins by not losing, by waiting for the aggressor to tire. At some point, the exhausted, frustrated aggressor finds it cheaper to just throw in the towel and go home. This is how the Vietnamese beat the US in the 1970s, and how the Afghan mujahidin beat the Red Army in the 1980s.

The current Ukrainian offensive may not succeed dramatically – the critics may be right – but that misses the point. Ukraine is committed; it will fight on and on. Crucially, Russia needs to do more than just hang on against Ukraine. It needs to win, decisively, to force Ukraine to bargain, to end this thing and stop the bleeding. Ukraine, by contrast, just needs to endure, which it has shown it can and will.
 

Stanislav Rzhytsky, deputy head of the department for mobilisation, was shot dead in the city of Krasnodar, Russia. According to media reports, he was involved in missile attacks on Ukraine.

Source: Russian RBC referring to a comment from the administration of Krasnodar; anonymous Telegram channels

Details: Anonymous pro-Russian Telegram channels have reported that 42-year-old Stanislav Rzhytsky went for a run at eight o'clock in the morning. He was ambushed near the Olimp sports complex by an unknown person who shot Rzhytsky four times in the back and chest and then fled the scene. The victim died on the spot from his injuries.
 
BREAKING Turkey Agrees to Advance Sweden’s NATO Bid, Stoltenberg Says

10 July 2023 at 21:14 CEST Turkey agreed Monday to ask its parliament to advance Sweden’s bid for membership in the NATO alliance after receiving assurances on key demands, including Stockholm’s approach to supporters of Kurdish separatists operating in its territory, according to a Turkish official.

A Turkish official said there was also progress toward meeting their demands to lift defense-related sanctions and that EU officials agreed to speed up their membership negotiations, including on joining the customs union and allowing visa-free travel for its citizens.

 
This is what I was saying above, that Ukraine is probably pretty happy to just kill Russians indefinitely as long as they can do it disproportionately, with a large enough ratio:
So there are six ways Russia might turn the war around. All are unlikely, and three rely on foreign behavior – over which Putin has little control – dramatically changing.

My own sense is that Ukraine will win the war in time by simply outlasting the Russians. That is, this war is more like an insurgency. The insurgent wins by not losing, by waiting for the aggressor to tire. At some point, the exhausted, frustrated aggressor finds it cheaper to just throw in the towel and go home. This is how the Vietnamese beat the US in the 1970s, and how the Afghan mujahidin beat the Red Army in the 1980s.

The current Ukrainian offensive may not succeed dramatically – the critics may be right – but that misses the point. Ukraine is committed; it will fight on and on. Crucially, Russia needs to do more than just hang on against Ukraine. It needs to win, decisively, to force Ukraine to bargain, to end this thing and stop the bleeding. Ukraine, by contrast, just needs to endure, which it has shown it can and will.
Ukrainians largely see this as an existential battle for them with a crap ton of history (not good) between them and Russia. They are committed to it. They are willing to suffer the pain of loss to fight on.

The average Russian on the street is not nearly as committed. Supposed polls show Russian support for the war and government but then during the mutiny it sure looked like your average Russian was neutral at best and some celebrating the change of power with the same for security forces essentially waiving Wagner troops right past them.

As long as the Ukrainians are supplied then they will fight. Russia has no ability to launch any serious offenses. They can't win the war in battle. On the other side, Ukraine is threatening to break their lines. If they do and cut the land bridge to Crimea, it is basically game over and the Ukrainians win.

The longer this goes on with it's military and economy degradation- the more that Russia becomes a glorified North Korea that is firmly within the Chinese sphere of influence and command.
 
erdogan waited till after the election to do this.
I didn't realize there were elections now. I read something recently (not sure if posted here or found elsewhere) how a lot of Edogan's being a PIA has to do with internal politics pulling the far left and right of his supporters that apparently both hate the US into their sphere. Also explains why the Turks have kept the S-400's even though it kicked them out of the F-35 program even though they can't even use the S-400's.
 

Q3: Why does Ukraine want cluster munitions?

A3:
Ukraine wants cluster munitions because they are highly effective against area targets such as infantry, artillery, and vehicle convoys. Indeed, cluster munitions got the nickname “steel rain” because of their intense and widespread effects. Because cluster munitions spread bomblets out over a wide area, a single munition can cover the same area as many unitary projectiles. Thus, to get the same effect, the Ukrainians would need to fire multiple projectiles with unitary warheads, reducing stockpiles and exposing the firing batteries to Russian counterfire for a longer time.

Analysis of cluster munition use during the Vietnam War found it to be eight times as effective in producing casualties as standard high explosive projectiles. In peacetime testing against vehicles, cluster munitions were 60 times as effective.

Cluster munitions do not have increased effectiveness against all targets. Unitary warheads are more effective against point targets like buildings.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is now one month old, and although it is still moving forward, it has not achieved the rapid advance hoped for. Thus, adding a weapon with this additional combat power might help sustain the offensive.

Q5: Are there alternatives to cluster munitions?

A5:
Yes, but none that are readily available. For cannon artillery, an alternative is a standard high explosive projectile with a proximity fuze that causes it to detonate in the air. That airburst spreads effects over a wide area, like a cluster munition. However, the supply of regular high-explosive projectiles is low, and the effect of airbursts, while substantial, is not as great as that of a cluster munition.

For MLRS rockets, the alternative is the alternative warhead. When the United States was unable to produce cluster munitions with an acceptable dud rate, it took a different approach. The alternative warhead explodes in the air and spreads a pattern of 160,000 preformed tungsten fragments. This gives it a shotgun-like effect. Because these are fragments, not bomblets, there is no dud problem. The airburst and large number of fragments provide an area effect similar to a cluster munition, though not covering as large an area. However, this warhead only went into full-rate production in 2019, so there are probably about 5,000-10,000 now available. It appears that many of these have been sent to Ukraine already.

Q8: Will cluster munitions be a "game changer"?

A8:
Unfortunately, no single weapon or munition will bring victory. Ukrainian victory will result from the cumulative effect of the weapons and munitions provided by the United States, NATO, and global allies, training provided to the Ukrainian troops, and the determination of the Ukrainian people. That said, cluster munitions are very effective against certain targets and will add to Ukrainian military capabilities.
 

Some interesting notes here on the Ukrainian combat engineers:

Ukraine changed tactics in the early days of the counter-offensive. An unsuccessful attack southwards from Mala Tokmachka on June 7th saw much of its most capable Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment bogged down—then targeted—in minefields. Now Ukraine throws sappers forward first in small groups of four or five, on foot, in the hope they go undetected; infantry then follows. It is a departure from NATO-standard doctrine, which emphasises the role of armour as protection. “This war is making us do non-standard things,” says “Beaver”, who commands the engineering regiment providing sappers to Ukraine’s attack brigades. “We don’t have air cover or plentiful Western equipment, so we risk our people. Small group tactics, like the Finns used in the winter war [of 1939-40].” Surprise tactics were the only way to breach an obstacle course like no other built since the second world war, he said.

The work could not be more dangerous. Much of it is done at dawn. The Ukrainians have night-vision goggles provided by Western partners and local volunteers, but the optics are not perfect. “A sapper’s main weapon is his eye,” says Sleepless. So the engineers move forwards in the early morning at a snail’s pace, eight to ten metres from each other, probing at 45 degrees until they hit metal. All the while, drones hover above, and the sappers are at constant risk of triggering a barrage of artillery. Rain and cloud offer the best conditions, since they reduce visibility from the drones. But in southern Ukraine’s scorching summer, where sunstroke has become a common war affliction, such protection is rare.

The exhausted sappers have to deal with a range of what are known in the profession as “surprises”. These include the entire inventory of Soviet anti-personnel and anti-tank mines; the OZM-72 “toad” mine that jumps out of the ground and releases shrapnel into the midriff; and booby-traps disguised as cigarette packs or attached to corpses. One of the Ukrainian dead in the failed Mala Tochmachka offensive in June was mined, for instance. Three soldiers sent out on an evacuation mission were badly injured when they moved the body. The mission was abandoned.
Much of the Russian engineering work is crafty, reports Tsar. “You can stumble on a trip-wire that would cause an explosion right at the spot your group is following behind you.” But there were examples of shoddy workmanship, too. “Quite often they forget to put a detonator in, or they short-circuit wires.”

Very smart:

Ukrainians are also applying new technological know-how. Drones equipped with heat sensors are the latest weapons. These seek out Russian mine positions by looking for heat signatures in the 30-60 minutes before sunset, when the metal mines have heated up just enough.
 
Grain of salt, but appears at a glance to be true:
  • Russian sub, Krasnodar, fires missiles into Ukraine cities from the Black Sea, killing civilians.
  • Sub is captained by Stanislav Rzhitsky, also the Deputy Chief of Mobilization in Krasnodar, Russia.
  • Stanislav Rzhitsky posts his running route in Krasnodar, Russia on Strava.
  • Stanislav Rzhitsky is shot dead in Krasnodar, Russia by a presumed assassin during a subsequent run.
 
Grain of salt, but appears at a glance to be true:
  • Russian sub, Krasnodar, fires missiles into Ukraine cities from the Black Sea, killing civilians.
  • Sub is captained by Stanislav Rzhitsky, also the Deputy Chief of Mobilization in Krasnodar, Russia.
  • Stanislav Rzhitsky posts his running route in Krasnodar, Russia on Strava.
  • Stanislav Rzhitsky is shot dead in Krasnodar, Russia by a presumed assassin during a subsequent run.
Not a bright idea on his part
 
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Should have upgraded his subscription.
 
This is what I was saying above, that Ukraine is probably pretty happy to just kill Russians indefinitely as long as they can do it disproportionately, with a large enough ratio:
So there are six ways Russia might turn the war around. All are unlikely, and three rely on foreign behavior – over which Putin has little control – dramatically changing.

My own sense is that Ukraine will win the war in time by simply outlasting the Russians. That is, this war is more like an insurgency. The insurgent wins by not losing, by waiting for the aggressor to tire. At some point, the exhausted, frustrated aggressor finds it cheaper to just throw in the towel and go home. This is how the Vietnamese beat the US in the 1970s, and how the Afghan mujahidin beat the Red Army in the 1980s.

The current Ukrainian offensive may not succeed dramatically – the critics may be right – but that misses the point. Ukraine is committed; it will fight on and on. Crucially, Russia needs to do more than just hang on against Ukraine. It needs to win, decisively, to force Ukraine to bargain, to end this thing and stop the bleeding. Ukraine, by contrast, just needs to endure, which it has shown it can and will.
Ukrainians largely see this as an existential battle for them with a crap ton of history (not good) between them and Russia. They are committed to it. They are willing to suffer the pain of loss to fight on.

The average Russian on the street is not nearly as committed. Supposed polls show Russian support for the war and government but then during the mutiny it sure looked like your average Russian was neutral at best and some celebrating the change of power with the same for security forces essentially waiving Wagner troops right past them.

As long as the Ukrainians are supplied then they will fight. Russia has no ability to launch any serious offenses. They can't win the war in battle. On the other side, Ukraine is threatening to break their lines. If they do and cut the land bridge to Crimea, it is basically game over and the Ukrainians win.

The longer this goes on with it's military and economy degradation- the more that Russia becomes a glorified North Korea that is firmly within the Chinese sphere of influence and command.
Russian mentality is to always support whoever is the strongest. That will be Putin till he isn't. The temidness seen during the "mutiny" was people waiting to see who was stronger.

Maybe I'm over simplifying things, but it's based on experience and current statements from some Russians.
 

Some interesting notes here on the Ukrainian combat engineers:

Ukraine changed tactics in the early days of the counter-offensive. An unsuccessful attack southwards from Mala Tokmachka on June 7th saw much of its most capable Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment bogged down—then targeted—in minefields. Now Ukraine throws sappers forward first in small groups of four or five, on foot, in the hope they go undetected; infantry then follows. It is a departure from NATO-standard doctrine, which emphasises the role of armour as protection. “This war is making us do non-standard things,” says “Beaver”, who commands the engineering regiment providing sappers to Ukraine’s attack brigades. “We don’t have air cover or plentiful Western equipment, so we risk our people. Small group tactics, like the Finns used in the winter war [of 1939-40].” Surprise tactics were the only way to breach an obstacle course like no other built since the second world war, he said.

The work could not be more dangerous. Much of it is done at dawn. The Ukrainians have night-vision goggles provided by Western partners and local volunteers, but the optics are not perfect. “A sapper’s main weapon is his eye,” says Sleepless. So the engineers move forwards in the early morning at a snail’s pace, eight to ten metres from each other, probing at 45 degrees until they hit metal. All the while, drones hover above, and the sappers are at constant risk of triggering a barrage of artillery. Rain and cloud offer the best conditions, since they reduce visibility from the drones. But in southern Ukraine’s scorching summer, where sunstroke has become a common war affliction, such protection is rare.

The exhausted sappers have to deal with a range of what are known in the profession as “surprises”. These include the entire inventory of Soviet anti-personnel and anti-tank mines; the OZM-72 “toad” mine that jumps out of the ground and releases shrapnel into the midriff; and booby-traps disguised as cigarette packs or attached to corpses. One of the Ukrainian dead in the failed Mala Tochmachka offensive in June was mined, for instance. Three soldiers sent out on an evacuation mission were badly injured when they moved the body. The mission was abandoned.
Much of the Russian engineering work is crafty, reports Tsar. “You can stumble on a trip-wire that would cause an explosion right at the spot your group is following behind you.” But there were examples of shoddy workmanship, too. “Quite often they forget to put a detonator in, or they short-circuit wires.”

Very smart:

Ukrainians are also applying new technological know-how. Drones equipped with heat sensors are the latest weapons. These seek out Russian mine positions by looking for heat signatures in the 30-60 minutes before sunset, when the metal mines have heated up just enough.
not sure if true, but I've heard that our more advanced optics can detect mines due to temperature variance
 
An interesting report on Ukrainian tactical adaptation, from @olliecarroll, in the operations by the Ukrainian armed forces to breach the Surovikin Line. 1/11 🧵 #FollowTheSapper
 

France has sent some longer-range missiles to Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron announced Tuesday, as he arrived for the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.

“In view of the situation and the counter-offensive being led by Ukraine, I have decided to increase deliveries of arms and equipment to give the Ukrainians the capacity to strike further, while maintaining the clarity and coherence of our doctrine, i.e. enabling Ukraine to defend its territory,” Macron said earlier Tuesday.
“I think what's important for us today is to send a message of support for Ukraine, of NATO unity, and of determination that Russia cannot and must not win this war,” he added.

A few hours after Macron delivered the announcement at the NATO summit in Vilnius, a spokesperson for the Elysee Palace told CNN that some SCALP missiles — also known as "Storm Shadow" by their UK name — have already been delivered to Ukraine.

The spokesperson also confirmed to CNN that the SCALP missiles will be fired from Ukrainian aircraft.
 

Some interesting notes here on the Ukrainian combat engineers:

Ukraine changed tactics in the early days of the counter-offensive. An unsuccessful attack southwards from Mala Tokmachka on June 7th saw much of its most capable Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment bogged down—then targeted—in minefields. Now Ukraine throws sappers forward first in small groups of four or five, on foot, in the hope they go undetected; infantry then follows. It is a departure from NATO-standard doctrine, which emphasises the role of armour as protection. “This war is making us do non-standard things,” says “Beaver”, who commands the engineering regiment providing sappers to Ukraine’s attack brigades. “We don’t have air cover or plentiful Western equipment, so we risk our people. Small group tactics, like the Finns used in the winter war [of 1939-40].” Surprise tactics were the only way to breach an obstacle course like no other built since the second world war, he said.

The work could not be more dangerous. Much of it is done at dawn. The Ukrainians have night-vision goggles provided by Western partners and local volunteers, but the optics are not perfect. “A sapper’s main weapon is his eye,” says Sleepless. So the engineers move forwards in the early morning at a snail’s pace, eight to ten metres from each other, probing at 45 degrees until they hit metal. All the while, drones hover above, and the sappers are at constant risk of triggering a barrage of artillery. Rain and cloud offer the best conditions, since they reduce visibility from the drones. But in southern Ukraine’s scorching summer, where sunstroke has become a common war affliction, such protection is rare.

The exhausted sappers have to deal with a range of what are known in the profession as “surprises”. These include the entire inventory of Soviet anti-personnel and anti-tank mines; the OZM-72 “toad” mine that jumps out of the ground and releases shrapnel into the midriff; and booby-traps disguised as cigarette packs or attached to corpses. One of the Ukrainian dead in the failed Mala Tochmachka offensive in June was mined, for instance. Three soldiers sent out on an evacuation mission were badly injured when they moved the body. The mission was abandoned.
Much of the Russian engineering work is crafty, reports Tsar. “You can stumble on a trip-wire that would cause an explosion right at the spot your group is following behind you.” But there were examples of shoddy workmanship, too. “Quite often they forget to put a detonator in, or they short-circuit wires.”

Very smart:

Ukrainians are also applying new technological know-how. Drones equipped with heat sensors are the latest weapons. These seek out Russian mine positions by looking for heat signatures in the 30-60 minutes before sunset, when the metal mines have heated up just enough.
not sure if true, but I've heard that our more advanced optics can detect mines due to temperature variance

I feel like I have read something similar to that before.

This was an interesting article on the work of a team from Binghamton University on mines in Afghanistan
 

Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have taken control of unspecified heights around Bakhmut, allowing Ukrainian forces to establish fire control over Bakhmut itself.[2] Ukrainian officials have recently signaled that Ukraine seeks to trap Russian forces within the city, and it appears that Ukrainian operations in the Bakhmut area in recent days have been intended to slowly envelop Russian troops in Bakhmut and on its flanks.[3] ISW was previously conservative when assessing claims of Russian fire control and general interdiction of Ukrainian lines of communication in and around Bakhmut as Russian forces gradually took control of the settlement, but Ukrainian claims of establishing fire control may be more credible. [4] Both Ukrainian and Russian sources have indicated in recent days that Ukraine is gaining ground in the Bakhmut area and on its southwestern flanks including specific terrain features that can give Ukrainian forces fire advantage. The fear of Ukrainian fire control and imminent threats to Bakhmut is also permeating the Russian information space, and Russian milbloggers have repeatedly expressed fear over Ukrainian forces encircling Russian forces in Bakhmut.[5] Russian sources claimed at least since February that Russian forces maintained fire control over critical Ukrainian GLOCs around Bakhmut, while Ukrainian officials and sources did not express concern over these Russian claims, in contrast, and withdrew their forces in good order in the face of the Wagner Group‘s expensive frontal assaults.[6] The persistent signaling of Ukrainian officials about Ukrainian operational intent in Bakhmut, alongside the clear concern of milbloggers over exactly what this intent may be, suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in this direction may be credibly threatening the Russian hold on Bakhmut, although it is far too early to forecast the liberation of the city.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10. Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian troops continued offensive actions in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated four square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction over the past week, and a total of 24 square kilometers since starting counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut direction (likely around early June).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops advanced up to one kilometer in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions, and a total of 8.6 kilometers since Ukrainian troops initiated counteroffensive operations in these directions.[9] Since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4, ISW has calculated based on its own control of terrain data that Ukrainian forces recaptured approximately 253 square kilometers of territory. (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.) Russian forces have captured a total of 282 square kilometers in the entire theater since January 1. In five weeks, Ukrainian forces have liberated nearly the same amount of territory that Russian forces captured in over six months.
 

The Kremlin is willing to let Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group keep some of its extensive operations in Africa, according to two people with knowledge of the discussions, as Russia scrambles to retain its influence in the resource-rich continent in the aftermath of his attempted mutiny.
The deal includes Wagner’s operations in the Central African Republic and has the support of President Vladimir Putin, one of the people said, asking not to be identified because the matter is sensitive.

Beyond CAR, Putin was assessing his options but would likely end up leaving Wagner in charge of operations that pay for themselves while bringing activities more directly dependent on Moscow under its direct control, according to another person close to the Kremlin.

Some interesting details in there about Wagner in Sudan too. They're basically betting on both sides there.
 

The move puts additional pressure on the United States and other allies, such as Germany, to provide Ukraine with longer-range weapons that could hit command centers, weapons depots and other military infrastructure in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.
The Biden administration is still deliberating whether to transfer to Ukraine the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which has a range of some 190 miles, weighing the risks of a possible Russian reaction. Germany, so far, has rejected a Ukrainian request for its Taurus cruise missiles.

The French Scalp missiles, manufactured by the MBDA conglomerate, are nearly identical to the Storm Shadow cruise missiles that the U.K. started providing to Ukraine in May. Their range of more than 300 miles is significantly longer than that of any weapon supplied to Ukraine by Washington so far.
Russian air defenses have proved unable to intercept most of the Storm Shadows. Kyiv in recent weeks successfully struck several valuable military targets that Russia had moved outside the range of U.S.-provided weapons—and had, until now, considered to be safe. They included one of the largest Russian weapons depots in southern Ukraine and several command centers. Ukraine also used the Storm Shadows to hit the main road bridge that links Russian-occupied Crimea with mainland Ukraine, disabling it for more than a week.

Unlike ATACMS, launched by the Himars vehicles that Ukraine already operates to fire shorter-range missiles, the Scalp and Storm Shadow missiles have to be fired from aircraft. That is a much riskier venture considering that Ukraine’s Soviet-era jets are relatively easy prey to Russian air defenses and more modern Russian fighter jets.

Many Western officials are growing concerned that Russia might regain the initiative in the battlefield and launch an offensive thrust of its own if Ukraine doesn’t show significant gains this summer.
There is a growing realization in many NATO capitals that rejecting or slow-rolling Kyiv’s requests for tanks, fighting vehicles and air defenses a year ago has turned out to be a strategic mistake, diplomats say. The debate at the NATO summit is focusing on what could be done in the coming weeks and months to accelerate the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capabilities.
 

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