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Post here when coaches do something you disagree with (2 Viewers)

You think he spained his foot because he is so small?
I mean, I can't prove exactly what caused his injury. But in general, I think when guys who aren't built to be feature backs get used as if they were, they are more likely to break down. In recent years we've seen it happen to Bernard, Ellington and Hillman (and the latter two also had foot injuries).

 
It was the wrong decision regardless of what SD did with that possession  (and i realize the OP mentioned the result before you did).

2nd and 14 is better than 1st and 17.  If SD wasnt so close to the goal line and acceptiong the penalty made it 1st and 20, then sure.  Those 3 yards were not worth SD getting an extra down.


So that the coach's decision turned out correct in that it resulted in a 3rd and 12, whereas the 4 yd run on the next play would have left SD instead with a 3rd and 10 doesn't influence you that perhaps Kubiak knows his team better than you do and therefore makes better decisions than you would?

How is it that the NFL has not discovered you as the next great coach to lead his team to a dynasty?

.

 
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So that the coach's decision turned out correct in that it resulted in a 3rd and 12, whereas the 4 yd run on the next play would have left SD instead with a 3rd and 10 doesn't influence you that perhaps Kubiak knows his team better than you do and therefore makes better decisions than you would?

How is it that the NFL has not discovered you as the next great coach to lead his team to a dynasty?
I'm surprised you are doubling down on the results oriented angle.  Maybe SD choses a different play on 2nd and 14 and the outcome is completely different.  Anyway, the outcome is 100% irrelevant.

1st and 17 means they have three plays to get a first down (5.6 yards per play)... 2nd and 14 means they have two plays to get a first down (7 yards per play).  The trade off of gaining 3 yards of field position is not offset buy giving SD an extra down.

And I'm not in the NFL because they cant afford me  ;)

 
So that the coach's decision turned out correct in that it resulted in a 3rd and 12, whereas the 4 yd run on the next play would have left SD instead with a 3rd and 10 doesn't influence you that perhaps Kubiak knows his team better than you do and therefore makes better decisions than you would?
Kind of an odd thing to post in a thread filled with 13 pages worth of examples where coaches -- despite the fact that they know their teams (and football in general) better than any of us -- nonetheless make decisions that are provably sub-optimal and hurt their team's chances of winning.

 
Has anyone yet mentioned Ingram's benching?  Yeah - players who fight for extra yards should be punished when the defense makes a great play to knock the ball loose - and to add insult to injury, the plodding replacement gets a workload 35% higher than anything the "feature back" has seen all season.  

I would say this qualifies as dumb coaching. 

 
I don't know if it's "obviously stupid", but I've never understood the rationale behind benching RBs who fumble. Does it motivate them? Are they less likely to fumble if they play scared? It seems like working with them during the week would be more effective.

Also, why only RBs? I can't remember a QB/WR/TE ever getting benched for fumbling.

 
Mike McCarthy had two timeouts during Atlanta's eventual game-winning drive, and he only used one. This left him with 30 seconds and one timeout to try to take the lead. They could've had a full 60 seconds (no timeouts) instead. Not sure how close of a decision that is, but it seemed wrong to me.

 
If I won the toss, I'd elect to kick. No doubt. I'd also do an onside kick. Recovering an onside kick gives you possession and puts the game in sudden-death mode, so a FG wins it without giving the other team the ball.

Failing to recover gives them the ball at about midfield, which will tempt the other coach into playing for the "safe" FG attempt. If you can stop them, it's sudden death, if you hold them to a field goal, you still get a possession.


That's pretty daring but actually very rational. If your D is that bad and you're the underdog in the game, that gamble is not a bad one at all. 
Interesting.  @Walking Boot Has this been verified as the correct ruling by anyone besides media?  Does being the "receiving team" actually meet the criteria of "Each team must possess or have the opportunity to possess the ball " without actually possessing it?  An onside kick is not considered a turnover.  A fumbled kickoff return is and thus easily meets the criteria.  That's one I'd have to hear from the NFL direct if I were a coach making the decision.  Has an NFL personality every verified this publicly?  LIke a Dean Blandino or whoever that other horrible guy was before him?

Electing to kick though would set off all kinds of alarms, making an onside kick much riskier.  I think I could only call for it if the other team chose to receive.  I do love it though if the ruling is correct, especially if you trust your D.

 
Straight from the horse's mouth:

http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d827ee2c0/article/nfl-overtime-rules

So if you try an onside kick and succeed, it's sudden death, field goal wins it, and you have the ball at midfield. If you fail, even if you touch it, you still get your own opportunity to possess as long as you don't give up a touchdown.
So (if you do this more than once) you get a 20% chance to have the ball at your own 40, vs. an 80% chance of giving the other team the ball at your 40 yard line instead of their own 20.

No thanks.

 
So that the coach's decision turned out correct in that it resulted in a 3rd and 12, whereas the 4 yd run on the next play would have left SD instead with a 3rd and 10 doesn't influence you that perhaps Kubiak knows his team better than you do and therefore makes better decisions than you would?

How is it that the NFL has not discovered you as the next great coach to lead his team to a dynasty?

.
Oof. 

Posts like this make me think we need a "post here when fbg's posters post something obviously stupid" thread. 

 
Straight from the horse's mouth:

http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d827ee2c0/article/nfl-overtime-rules

So if you try an onside kick and succeed, it's sudden death, field goal wins it, and you have the ball at midfield. If you fail, even if you touch it, you still get your own opportunity to possess as long as you don't give up a touchdown.
Wow fail, I read that article (and even copied a quote from it in my post) and didn't scroll down far enough to read the appendices.  Thanks!

 
Kind of an odd thing to post in a thread filled with 13 pages worth of examples where coaches -- despite the fact that they know their teams (and football in general) better than any of us -- nonetheless make decisions that are provably sub-optimal and hurt their team's chances of winning.


Interesting that you feel that way. I would consider some of what you consider to be "fact" in supporting the comments to be debatable at least, and also that some of the comments are at a minimum questionable. 

Its easy to coach using 20/20 hindsight from the comfort of an arm chair or bar stool. it doesn't necessarily make that type of coaching qualified or educated. 

 
Bronco Billy said:
Interesting that you feel that way. I would consider some of what you consider to be "fact" in supporting the comments to be debatable at least, and also that some of the comments are at a minimum questionable. 

Its easy to coach using 20/20 hindsight from the comfort of an arm chair or bar stool. it doesn't necessarily make that type of coaching qualified or educated. 
Ah, the old "If you haven't been a coach, you have no right to criticize" chestnut. In that case, why even have a forum like this? Coaches could just post explaining their logic (Dan Quinn: "So that's why it made sense to kick a FG on 4th and goal down 4 with 3:00 left in the fourth") and we could all just nod knowingly and say, "Well, if Coach says it, it must be true."

Seriously, I think most of us understand that there are often additional factors at play that we may not be aware of. For example, after Rodgers completed the Double Hail Mary in the divisional round last year, the numbers suggested McCarthy should have gone for two to win the game in regulation, but I later read an account that said he discussed it with Rodgers and they decided their WRs were so banged up they didn't feel like they had a go-to play they could call.

But surely even you recognize there are times when coaches make these calls not because they have some sort of secret knowledge, but rather because they don't spend enough time thinking about it. They don't go for it on fourth down nearly as often as they should. Or to cite my favorite example, the numbers couldn't be clearer that, if you're down 14 in the fourth quarter and score a TD, you should go for two. It adds, on average, 10% to your win probability. That's huge. And yet the number of coaches who have used that strategy is basically zero. Do you think that in every situation where they had that decision to make, there were extenuating circumstances known only to the coach that explained their decision? Or do you think they did it because coaches are inherently conservative and "that's how things have always been done"?

 
Ah, the old "If you haven't been a coach, you have no right to criticize" chestnut. In that case, why even have a forum like this? Coaches could just post explaining their logic (Dan Quinn: "So that's why it made sense to kick a FG on 4th and goal down 4 with 3:00 left in the fourth") and we could all just nod knowingly and say, "Well, if Coach says it, it must be true."

Seriously, I think most of us understand that there are often additional factors at play that we may not be aware of. For example, after Rodgers completed the Double Hail Mary in the divisional round last year, the numbers suggested McCarthy should have gone for two to win the game in regulation, but I later read an account that said he discussed it with Rodgers and they decided their WRs were so banged up they didn't feel like they had a go-to play they could call.

But surely even you recognize there are times when coaches make these calls not because they have some sort of secret knowledge, but rather because they don't spend enough time thinking about it. They don't go for it on fourth down nearly as often as they should. Or to cite my favorite example, the numbers couldn't be clearer that, if you're down 14 in the fourth quarter and score a TD, you should go for two. It adds, on average, 10% to your win probability. That's huge. And yet the number of coaches who have used that strategy is basically zero. Do you think that in every situation where they had that decision to make, there were extenuating circumstances known only to the coach that explained their decision? Or do you think they did it because coaches are inherently conservative and "that's how things have always been done"?


I think it is because there is a lot more to the game than misleading statistics. That and they know a hell of a lot more about football than most posters here.  Do they very occasionally pull a bonehead move? Wow!  Shocking!  They're actually human?  But it sure isn't as often as portrayed in this thread, which more than anything else shows that some 'exspurts' posting here know a lot less about football than they think they do  

But if thinking you are smarter than every coach who has ever worked in the NFL and thumping your chest about it in front of everyone gets your ego salved, well you just keep deluding yourself. 

.

 
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But if thinking you are smarter than every coach who has ever worked in the NFL and thumping your chest about it in front of everyone gets your ego salved, well you just keep deluding yourself. .
Will do, Joe Morgan. Similarly, if reducing other people's arguments to straw men is the only way you're capable of engaging with what they're saying, you keep deluding yourself as well.

 
Will do, Joe Morgan. Similarly, if reducing other people's arguments to straw men is the only way you're capable of engaging with what they're saying, you keep deluding yourself as well.


So you think you didn't put that forth?  Do you even read what you write?

 
CalBear said:
So (if you do this more than once) you get a 20% chance to have the ball at your own 40, vs. an 80% chance of giving the other team the ball at your 40 yard line instead of their own 20.

No thanks.
Still worth it to onsides. Only need 20 yards to kick for the win vs the other team needing 45-50 to win  

I would not go so far as to choose to kick. The BEST outcome is still receiving imo because possession is the most important factor. The 2nd best is onsides. Worst is kick deep. 

 
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Still worth it to onsides. Only need 20 yards to kick for the win vs the other team needing 45-50 to win  

I would not go so far as to choose to kick. The BEST outcome is still receiving imo because possession is the most important factor. The 2nd best is onsides. Worst is kick deep. 
Is the odds of you getting 20 yards and kicking a 50+ yard field goal four times greater than the odds of the other team scoring a TD from the 40 yard line?

No.

 
Is the odds of you getting 20 yards and kicking a 50+ yard field goal four times greater than the odds of the other team scoring a TD from the 40 yard line?

No.
Close. But even if not I'd do it. You're behind the minute you lost the toss. So you don't necessarily have to prove you're more likely to win than lose for it to be a good strategy. You were already a dog, now a smaller dog. 

 
Close. But even if not I'd do it. You're behind the minute you lost the toss. So you don't necessarily have to prove you're more likely to win than lose for it to be a good strategy. You were already a dog, now a smaller dog. 
It's not close. The baseline stat is that 31.5% of drives starting from the opponent's 40 end in TDs, and 37.5% of drives starting from your own 40 end in TDs or FGs. Even if you're more likely to score in overtime (a dubious proposition), it's nowhere near four times the likelihood.

And if you're behind after losing the toss, it's extremely marginal. Since 2012, the team receiving the kick has won 50.7% of OT games that didn't end in ties. That's about as close to a coin flip as you'll find outside of the actual coin flip.

 
Do you even read what you write?
I do, in fact. For example, I read that I wrote coaches "know their teams (and football in general) better than any of us". I did not write (nor do I think) that I'm smarter than they are. For one thing, I don't think it's a question of intelligence. I'm not the one who gave this thread its title ("obviously stupid"), but if you read my posts you'll see that the word I use most frequently to describe the decisions I disagree with is "sub-optimal". I make no value judgments about the coaches themselves or their intelligence, just their decision-making process in certain instances. (I'm sure if you scoured my posts you could find instances where I used more charged language, but in my defense, it was probably in reference to Gus Bradley or Dan Quinn).

Second, the point isn't that I consider myself smarter, as in I sat on my couch, watched a lot of football, and came to certain conclusions. It's that I've read compelling arguments written by people I do consider smarter than me. Statisticians (or as you no doubt refer to them, "pointy-headed nerds who never played the game") have looked at large amounts of historical data and concluded that coaches don't go for it on 4th nearly as often as the numbers suggest they should, or that they kick the extra point at times when they'd be better off going for two. Psychologists and economists have analyzed cognitive biases (such as loss aversion) that can lead otherwise intelligent people to make sub-optimal decisions. And of course, Eagles and Chiefs fans have watched Andy Reid try to manage the clock.

Furthermore, I've seen this exact dynamic play out in other areas, including baseball, politics, and business (I'm sure CEOs know more about running a business than most economists, but that doesn't mean they're right when they routinely ignore those economists' advice that the vast majority of mergers and acquisitions fail to increase shareholder value). In all those cases, the very fact that insiders knew more about the subject in question is what created the blind spots that led to their over-reliance on outdated conventional wisdom, as well as their resistance to hard data that contradicts that CW.

So it's more than the "very occasional bonehead move". When coaches are questioned on these types of decisions, they'll frequently say stuff like, "Yeah, I know what the numbers say, but it didn't make sense in this case because of ___". But when you look at those decisions collectively, and see how frequently they default to the "conservative" (ie, sub-optimal) decision, it's reasonable to conclude that there's something else going on. (To be fair, that may be starting to change. Anecdotally, it seems like more teams are starting to go for it on fourth down, though I admit I haven't seen any aggregate data. Certainly Ron Rivera provides a nice counter-example to coaches who worry they'll put their jobs at risk if they take too many "risks".)

Anyone who manages to get themselves hired as an NFL head coach is obviously very smart. The number of inputs these guys have to manage on a weekly basis is mind-boggling. That's precisely why I find this notion of cognitive blind spots so fascinating. 

 
Furthermore, I've seen this exact dynamic play out in other areas, including baseball, politics, and business (I'm sure CEOs know more about running a business than most economists, but that doesn't mean they're right when they routinely ignore those economists' advice that the vast majority of mergers and acquisitions fail to increase shareholder value).
I'm pretty sure CEOs know that mergers and acquisitions increase the realized value of the CEO.

(But, good post!)

 
I'm pretty sure CEOs know that mergers and acquisitions increase the realized value of the CEO.

(But, good post!)
Yes, agency theory! I suppose you could analogize that to coaches -- they're more concerned with job security than with maximizing their win percentage (and yes, I'm aware of how paradoxical that sounds). It's a really complex dynamic that, if operating at all, is almost surely going on at a subconscious level. I've said multiple times in this thread that I don't think coaches consciously decide to stick to the CW as much as the coaching profession self-selects for people who are more likely to do so. But it's really impossible to prove conclusively either way.

 
SD converted a 3rd and 12 immediately after that penalty.  If they don't take the penalty, SD would have had been in a 3rd and 10 situation. So your claim is that SD converted the 3rd and 12 but wouldn't have converted the 3rd and 10?

With DEN's D, yeah I make the other team cover more real estate in that situation. Kubiak is a HC who thoroughly understands field position. 
???  That 3rd down that they converted would have been 4th down.  Accepting the penalty gave them three plays to get the first rather than 2. 

So, yeah, he screwed up, and your looking pretty silly attempting to sound right here.

 
Credit where it's due: Packers scored a TD to make it 31-19 and McCarthy went for two (over the protestations of Phil Simms).

Meanwhile, Titans scored to make it 43-34 and Mularkey kicked the XP.

Both teams lost, but only one had the right decision-making process.

 
Credit where it's due: Packers scored a TD to make it 31-19 and McCarthy went for two (over the protestations of Phil Simms).

Meanwhile, Titans scored to make it 43-34 and Mularkey kicked the XP.

Both teams lost, but only one had the right decision-making process.
I was thinking about that, but there was only like 2:45 left in the game, right?  When is it too late to do that?

 
As a Lions fan I'd like to thank the Vikings coaching staff for not using as much time as possible before snapping the ball on their final scoring drive.

Not sure if it was coaching or injury but why did Gurley only get like 4 touches in the 2nd half of a 7 point game?

 
I was thinking about that, but there was only like 2:45 left in the game, right?  When is it too late to do that?
I don't know, but with less than three minutes left, it sure would be nice to know as soon as possible whether you need one score or two. Might affect how you play.

Oh, one more (and I'm just going to keep on beating this horse until the day it becomes accepted practice): Steelers scored late to make it 21-13 and didn't go for two, which is the completely counterintuitive move that every team should absolutely do in that situation.

 
I don't know, but with less than three minutes left, it sure would be nice to know as soon as possible whether you need one score or two. Might affect how you play.

Oh, one more (and I'm just going to keep on beating this horse until the day it becomes accepted practice): Steelers scored late to make it 21-13 and didn't go for two, which is the completely counterintuitive move that every team should absolutely do in that situation.
Thanks for posting that article, good info.

As an aside - the Steelers kicker (C. Boswell) needs to work on his onside kick execution... if you haven't seen how terrible it was you gotta check it out on YouTube... it literally travel like 6 inches before he stepped on it causing an illegal touch :lmao: :wall:

 
Thanks for posting that article, good info.

As an aside - the Steelers kicker (C. Boswell) needs to work on his onside kick execution... if you haven't seen how terrible it was you gotta check it out on YouTube... it literally travel like 6 inches before he stepped on it causing an illegal touch :lmao: :wall:
Yeah saw that. I mean, I kind of get it. Your chances of successfully executing an expected onside kick are really low (I think around 10%). So you can't blame him for trying something different to improve his odds. The execution, tho ...

 
Atlanta trailing late and Eagles with the ball in FG position.  Dan Quinn used last timeout with 201 left after 3rd down. Eagles kicked FG to salt game away and 2 minute warning coincided with the scoring timeout.

Also Doug Pederson temporarily lost his mind during this sequence and left offense out there on 4th and short before calling timeout and going for the sealing FG.

 
Preemptive Strike here.

White shoes, white sideline. No clear evidence. After all these plays standing any coach that doesn't force their players to wear white shoes is an idiot. 

 
Preemptive Strike here.

White shoes, white sideline. No clear evidence. After all these plays standing any coach that doesn't force their players to wear white shoes is an idiot. 
Well it all depends if the player was originally ruled out or not. Could still be unfavorable 

 
Yeah saw that. I mean, I kind of get it. Your chances of successfully executing an expected onside kick are really low (I think around 10%). So you can't blame him for trying something different to improve his odds. The execution, tho ...
The best part of this play was that in frustration he kicked it a 2nd time and sent it down field.  Everytime I think of it I start laughing.

 
For those (like me!) who nerd out on these in-game decisions, Bill Barnwell has had former Jags quant guy Daniel Adler on his podcast each of the past two weeks, and they've spent a fair amount of time critiquing coaches' decisions. Most interesting point to me was a discussion last week about the Panthers-Rams game, where LA went for it on 4th and goal down 10 (and scored a TD). Barnwell pointed out that one reason to go for it is that you could score two TDs and win the game. Adler, who was clearly on the losing side of a lot of these arguments when he was in Jacksonville, said coaches really don't think like that. If they're down 10, their focus is on tying the game up and going to OT, even though that just gets them back to a coin flip.

Adler also had an interesting argument against Seattle going for two after scoring to go up 31-24 against NE. It was basically the same logic as the "Should you go for two when you're down nine?" debate we've had many times in this thread. Adler's point was that by going for two, Seattle was giving NE valuable information (do they need to score once or twice?) And that made a difference when NE drove down to the goal line on the final drive and knew they could take their time. If Seattle had been up 8, the Pats would have had to hurry up as a hedge against not getting the 2-pointer after scoring.

 
For those (like me!) who nerd out on these in-game decisions, Bill Barnwell has had former Jags quant guy Daniel Adler on his podcast each of the past two weeks, and they've spent a fair amount of time critiquing coaches' decisions. Most interesting point to me was a discussion last week about the Panthers-Rams game, where LA went for it on 4th and goal down 10 (and scored a TD). Barnwell pointed out that one reason to go for it is that you could score two TDs and win the game. Adler, who was clearly on the losing side of a lot of these arguments when he was in Jacksonville, said coaches really don't think like that. If they're down 10, their focus is on tying the game up and going to OT, even though that just gets them back to a coin flip.

Adler also had an interesting argument against Seattle going for two after scoring to go up 31-24 against NE. It was basically the same logic as the "Should you go for two when you're down nine?" debate we've had many times in this thread. Adler's point was that by going for two, Seattle was giving NE valuable information (do they need to score once or twice?) And that made a difference when NE drove down to the goal line on the final drive and knew they could take their time. If Seattle had been up 8, the Pats would have had to hurry up as a hedge against not getting the 2-pointer after scoring.
I was just coming in to ask what folks thought of Carroll going for 2 with a 7 point lead, so thank you for sharing that. 

interesting, but I still feel it was insanity. 

Going up 8 gives you two chances to win if the Pats successfully drive. One by stopping the TD, the other by stopping the 2 pt attempt. 

The risk of failing to convert takes one of those chances away, leaving the Pats free to pay for the tie at home. 

I cannot think of any reason to say what Carroll did was a good coaching decision.  The theory you posted from Adler is plausible, but still seems incredibly dumb in practice.

 
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I was just coming in to ask what folks thought of Carroll going for 2 with a 7 point lead, so thank you for sharing that. 

interesting, but I still feel it was insanity. 

Going up 8 gives you two chances to win if the Pats successfully drive. One by stopping the TD, the other by stopping the 2 pt attempt. 

The risk of failing to convert takes one of those chances away, leaving the Pats free to pay for the tie at home. 

I cannot think of any reason to say what Carroll did was a good coaching decision.  The theory you posted from Adler is plausible, but still seems incredibly dumb in practice.
To clarify, Adler was arguing against going for two. His point was that regardless of outcome, NE has valuable info. If Seattle makes it, Pats know they need to score twice. If they miss, they know they only need to score once. But if the Seahawks had gone up 8, there would have been ambiguity. NE would have felt the need to score as quickly as possible in case they missed the two-pointer after they score. That means that even if they do tie it up, Seattle is more likely to have time for a final drive. 

Strictly by the numbers, I don't think it's obviously dumb to go for it. If you assume the chances of any team scoring a two-pointer (relative to an XP) are 50%, it's basically just betting on your offense over your D. Maybe they had a play they thought would work. Maybe they didn't want the outcome in Brady's hands. So I was viewing it as a coin flip. But Adler's argument convinced me it was the wrong move. 

 
To clarify, Adler was arguing against going for two. His point was that regardless of outcome, NE has valuable info. If Seattle makes it, Pats know they need to score twice. If they miss, they know they only need to score once. But if the Seahawks had gone up 8, there would have been ambiguity. NE would have felt the need to score as quickly as possible in case they missed the two-pointer after they score. That means that even if they do tie it up, Seattle is more likely to have time for a final drive. 
Right - sorry I phrased that last part poorly...I am in agreement with Alder's disagreement of the decision. :)  

Strictly by the numbers, I don't think it's obviously dumb to go for it. If you assume the chances of any team scoring a two-pointer (relative to an XP) are 50%, it's basically just betting on your offense over your D. Maybe they had a play they thought would work. Maybe they didn't want the outcome in Brady's hands. So I was viewing it as a coin flip. But Adler's argument convinced me it was the wrong move. 


 I think the former (thought they had a play that would work) was the more likely....also, this:

 
I don't necessarily agree that Belichick and the Patriots would have approached the endgame differently down 8 instead of down 7.

Specifically, I don't think he/they would have felt pressure to try and score quickly, then score again if the deficit was 8.

 
Hot Sauce Guy said:
I was just coming in to ask what folks thought of Carroll going for 2 with a 7 point lead, so thank you for sharing that. 

interesting, but I still feel it was insanity. 

Going up 8 gives you two chances to win if the Pats successfully drive. One by stopping the TD, the other by stopping the 2 pt attempt. 

The risk of failing to convert takes one of those chances away, leaving the Pats free to pay for the tie at home. 

I cannot think of any reason to say what Carroll did was a good coaching decision.  The theory you posted from Adler is plausible, but still seems incredibly dumb in practice.
This is an example of disregarding the contrary outcome.

Yes, the fact that they failed to convert the 2-point conversion meant that if New England had gotten in the end zone, they could have tied the game with an XP (~95% chance) instead of a 2-point conversion (~50%) chance. But by going for 2, Seattle had the chance (~50%) of being up 9, which means that New England would not only have had to score a TD and make the XP, but also recover an onsides kick and make a FG (~10% or less). 

 
This is an example of disregarding the contrary outcome.

Yes, the fact that they failed to convert the 2-point conversion meant that if New England had gotten in the end zone, they could have tied the game with an XP (~95% chance) instead of a 2-point conversion (~50%) chance. But by going for 2, Seattle had the chance (~50%) of being up 9, which means that New England would not only have had to score a TD and make the XP, but also recover an onsides kick and make a FG (~10% or less). 
Exactly. Mathematically speaking, they're just trading the possibility that they could stop NE on a two-pointer for the possibility that NE could stop them. In a specific situation, you can look at factors that might make those possibilities different, but in aggregate, the decision is a wash (ignoring for the moment Adler's "information" argument).

 
I don't necessarily agree that Belichick and the Patriots would have approached the endgame differently down 8 instead of down 7.

Specifically, I don't think he/they would have felt pressure to try and score quickly, then score again if the deficit was 8.
Why not?

 
Atlanta trailing late and Eagles with the ball in FG position.  Dan Quinn used last timeout with 201 left after 3rd down. Eagles kicked FG to salt game away and 2 minute warning coincided with the scoring timeout.
This was the dumbest timeout I've ever seen. 

 
This was the dumbest timeout I've ever seen. 
Man, there have been sooooo many poorly used timeouts by trailing teams late in games.

The one that seems to happen the most is when the other team runs a play, the coach will use their last timeout with something like 2:43 left.  So of course, the team with the ball will run a play, and by the time the play is over and the ball is spotted, the play clock is at 35 while the game clock is something like 2:32.  Total waste of a timeout. Happens all too frequently.

I did not see or even know about that Dan Quinn timeout.  If that is true, wow, that is damn near a fireable offense. 

 

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