Post here when coaches do something you disagree with (1 Viewer)

[Hot Sauce Guy]

This is an example of disregarding the contrary outcome.

Yes, the fact that they failed to convert the 2-point conversion meant that if New England had gotten in the end zone, they could have tied the game with an XP (~95% chance) instead of a 2-point conversion (~50%) chance. But by going for 2, Seattle had the chance (~50%) of being up 9, which means that New England would not only have had to score a TD and make the XP, but also recover an onsides kick and make a FG (~10% or less). 

I didn't "disregard the contrary outcome" in the slightest. Obviously I can do math & I fully understand what going up 9 means to the outcome in this scenario. 

And then I explained why I think it's dumb to go for 2 anyway, which you suggest is a 50% probability instead of going up by 8 and forcing GB to get a TD and go for 2.

And given the time left in the game, and the  way seattle had been playing defense, it actually proved to be a dumb decision since 1. They failed in their 2 point conversion, and 2. They stopped GB from scoring. Both of which show that had they kicked the PAT they would have been in a far better position to win. 

And as a result of their ineptitude in playcalling and subsequent execution, if they hadn't stopped GB from scoring it would have been a tie game (where they could have lost in what I consider a coin flip) instead of forcing GB to go for 2, requiring 2 scoring plays to tie the game instead of 1 with the highest probability play possible of a PAT chip shot. 

ergo, it was a dumb play call, even considering the contrary outcome, which I did from the getgo.  

 

[CalBear]

I didn't "disregard the contrary outcome" in the slightest. Obviously I can do math & I fully understand what going up 9 means to the outcome in this scenario. 

And then I explained why I think it's dumb to go for 2 anyway, which you suggest is a 50% probability instead of going up by 8 and forcing GB to get a TD and go for 2.

And given the time left in the game, and the  way seattle had been playing defense, it actually proved to be a dumb decision since 1. They failed in their 2 point conversion, and 2. They stopped GB from scoring. Both of which show that had they kicked the PAT they would have been in a far better position to win. 

And as a result of their ineptitude in playcalling and subsequent execution, if they hadn't stopped GB from scoring it would have been a tie game (where they could have lost in what I consider a coin flip) instead of forcing GB to go for 2, requiring 2 scoring plays to tie the game instead of 1 with the highest probability play possible of a PAT chip shot. 

ergo, it was a dumb play call, even considering the contrary outcome, which I did from the getgo.  

If you're going to base your assertion that it was a dumb play call on the game outcome, you have to assert that the play call didn't matter at all, because they stopped them from scoring, so being up 7 vs. 8 vs. 9 (or even vs. 4) was irrelevant.

But that's fallacious. So is comparing the scenario where they failed at the 2-point conversion (up 7) with the scenario where they kicked the PAT (up 8) while ignoring the math of being up 9, which is what you're doing despite your assertion. If they'd been up by 9, they'd have been in a way better position than they were. The fact that they didn't make the 2-point conversion doesn't mean it was a bad decision to go for it.

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

If you're going to base your assertion that it was a dumb play call on the game outcome, you have to assert that the play call didn't matter at all, because they stopped them from scoring, so being up 7 vs. 8 vs. 9 (or even vs. 4) was irrelevant.

But that's fallacious. So is comparing the scenario where they failed at the 2-point conversion (up 7) with the scenario where they kicked the PAT (up 8) while ignoring the math of being up 9, which is what you're doing despite your assertion. If they'd been up by 9, they'd have been in a way better position than they were. The fact that they didn't make the 2-point conversion doesn't mean it was a bad decision to go for it.

How did I ignore the possible outcome of them being up 9?  The entire premise of my post was that it was dumb to attempt to go up 9 with the 2 point conversion.  That's hardly what I call "ignoring it" - it's specifically calling it out. Talk about a fallacy.

And it has nothing to do with hindsight being 20-20 as you assert.  The fact that they failed to convert doesn't influence my assertion that they were dumb to try in the slightest. I thought it was dumb the second they lined up with no prescience of their eminent failure. 

You seem to be ignoring the fact that had they simply kicked the PAT the Pats would have had to score a TD + 2 pt conversion just to tie the game. Which, correct me if I'm wrong here, is much more difficult to accomplish than simply having to score a TD + PAT to tie the game.  Or do you dispute that?

So it would appear that the person "disregarding contrary outcomes" is you. The fact remains that the Seahawks were up, and could have vastly increased their chances of winning by kicking the 95% probability PAT (and taking an 8 point lead) but instead tried (and subsequently failed) in a 2-pt attempt.  The contrary outcome you seem to disregard is the "worst case scenario" in the Seahawks decision making process. Seahawks kicking the PAT, at worst, forces the Pats to score a TD and get a 2 point conversion just to tie the game. It gives Seattle 2 chances to win and, worth noting, none chance to lose since there is no 9 point play. But instead they failed at the 2PA and were only up 7, which in my opinion is a HUGE difference, because a PAT is a 95% probability to convert for both teams. And had the Pack decided to go for 2, Seattle could have lost. 

Ipso facto, a dumb play. We'll have to agree to disagree, because I won't be convinced otherwise. 

Here's a question for you: Had the Patriots scored the TD, would you have approved their going for 2 to win the game instead of kicking the PAT to force OT?  

Because IMO that would also be dumb. But since we're analyzing risk/reward and percentage plays, it seems relevant to ask. 

 

[zftcg]

How did I ignore the possible outcome of them being up 9?  The entire premise of my post was that it was dumb to attempt to go up 9 with the 2 point conversion.  That's hardly what I call "ignoring it" - it's specifically calling it out. Talk about a 

And it has nothing to do with hindsight being 20-20 as you assert.  The fact that they failed to convert doesn't influence my assertion that they were dumb to try in the slightest. I thought it was dumb the second they lined up with no prescience of their eminent failure. 

You seem to be ignoring the fact that had they simply kicked the PAT the Packers would have had to score a TD + 2 pt conversion just to tie the game. Which, correct me if I'm wrong here, is much more difficult to accomplish than simply having to score a TD + PAT to tie the game.  Or do you dispute that?

So it would appear that the person "disregarding contrary outcomes" is you. The fact remains that the Seahawks were up, and could have vastly increased their chances of winning by kicking the 95% probability PAT (and taking an 8 point lead) but instead tried (and subsequently failed) in a 2-pt attempt.  The contrary outcome you seem to disregard is the "worst case scenario" in the Seahawks decision making process. Seahawks kicking the PAT, at worst, forces the Packers to score a TD and get a 2 point conversion just to tie the game. It gives Seattle 2 chances to win and, worth noting, none chance to lose since there is no 9 point play. But instead they failed at the 2PA and were only up 7, which in my opinion is a HUGE difference, because a PAT is a 95% probability to convert for both teams. And had the Pack decided to go for 2, Seattle could have lost. 

Ipso facto, a dumb play. We'll have to agree to disagree, because I won't be convinced otherwise. 

Here's a question for you: Had the Packers scored the TD, would you have approved their going for 2 to win the game instead of kicking the PAT to force OT?  

Because IMO that would also be dumb. But since we're analyzing risk/reward and percentage plays, it seems relevant to ask. 

I'll answer that one. I would definitely not have approved the Packers going for two in that game, or really even being on the field at all. 

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

I'll answer that one. I would definitely not have approved the Packers going for two in that game, or really even being on the field at all. 

Dammit - was reading a Packers topic (Michael) and responding to this one. Fixed.    

You have to admit though, that would have been the most amazing play and penalty call in the history of the NFL.  

 

[ghostguy123]

Say NE scored, and then THEY decided to go for 2 and won the game.  Is that scenario factored in?

Barring something weird with the weather or the kicker, kicking the XP to go up 8 would be my call every time pretty easily. 

However, I don't think either decision would be "obviously stupid". 

 

[zftcg]

I just doubt they'd look at an 8 point deficit and think "we have to score quickly and get the ball back."

You know, I was all set to disagree with you, but then I thought back to the Super Bowl, when Seattle drove down to the 1 and Belichick didn't call a timeout. If Butler doesn't intercept the pass, all of the criticism heaped on Carroll would have been directed at him. And maybe it was a mistake. But I read it as Belichick remembering that his team was still winning, and figuring it was better for him to focus on how to keep it that way than to concede the TD and worry about having enough time for a comeback. Basically, by not calling the TO he was engaging in a bit of gamesmanship and trying to get in Carroll's head, which he seemingly succeeded in doing. (I mean, they sent Butler into the game right before the play, and BB had specifically drilled Butler the week beforehand on how to defend that play, all of which suggests he was operating from a position of confidence).

So yeah, maybe you're right that the Pats wouldn't have been thinking in terms of a contingency plan if they scored and missed the 2-pointer. And obviously, there's no way to know for sure. But even given that, I still think Adler's point about not wanting to give NE more information holds.

 

[zftcg]

Say NE scored, and then THEY decided to go for 2 and won the game.  Is that scenario factored in?

I mean, it is Belichick we're talking about, so who knows? But generally, if you're at home you're better off sending the game to OT, since your chances there are likely to be better than 50%.

 

[zftcg]

You seem to be ignoring the fact that had they simply kicked the PAT the Pats would have had to score a TD + 2 pt conversion just to tie the game. Which, correct me if I'm wrong here, is much more difficult to accomplish than simply having to score a TD + PAT to tie the game.  Or do you dispute that?

That's the one part of your argument I don't understand. Yes, it's 50% less likely that they'll get a TD + 2, but it's also 50/50 that Seattle gets the 2 and goes up 9, which increases their win probability dramatically. So isn't the decision to go for two just the equivalent of betting on your offense to get a two-pointer rather than your defense to prevent one?

Again, I think it was wrong for the "information" reason, but I don't understand the "math" argument against it. I see that as a coin flip.

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

That's the one part of your argument I don't understand. Yes, it's 50% less likely that they'll get a TD + 2, but it's also 50/50 that Seattle gets the 2 and goes up 9, which increases their win probability dramatically. So isn't the decision to go for two just the equivalent of betting on your offense to get a two-pointer rather than your defense to prevent one?

Again, I think it was wrong for the "information" reason, but I don't understand the "math" argument against it. I see that as a coin flip.

I'll explain my reasoning then: 

Going for 2 is a coin flip. (I actually disagree with that because it assumes league average, rather than against "X team", and the Seahawks' pass defense is well above league average, but I'll throw the propeller heads a bone here and ignore that logic fail) 

Kicking the PAT and going up 8 is a 95% certainty. (which again is considering league average, not how totally money Hauschka has been with chip shot PATs - I'd put it closer to 99%, but ok, I concede to the propeller heads yet again, and will allow guys like Blair Walsh to drag down the #s and dictate what % of success Hauschka would have based on league ave)

There aren't 2 possible outcomes here, there are 4.  

1. Kick the PAT and go up by 8, forcing a TD+2 point attempt

2. Miss the FG and be up 7, a TD+PAT ties the game  This has been described as a 5% chance

3. Convert the 2 pt attempt and go up 9, effectively salting away the game

4. Converting the 2 pt attempt and failing, up 7, a TD+PAT ties the game, a TD+2 pt attempt wins the game for the Pats (not unprecedented, Oakland did so earlier this year) 

Scenario #1 would have been a 95% certainty, resulting in the outcome where the Pats had to score a TD, then convert a 2 point attempt, to result in a tie. So again, and not without merit, the worst case scenario here is the Patriots tie the game. And that's identifying this scenario as having the highest probability of success for the Seahawks to convert (95%, 99%, whatever you believe) 

Scenario #2 is essentially the same result as scenario #4, so unless you lack confidence in your kicker / ST (see: AZ Cards, MIN Vikes, etc) then the PAT is pretty well a lock. 

Scenarios #3 & #4 in fact reduces the Seahawks chances of success by 45% to convert points after the TD, (while of course increasing their chances of winning the game if successful). However, a failure to convert keeps the game spread at 7, and actually opens the door for a possible outcome of NEP scoring 8 and winning the game on that final drive. So here the worst possible scenario is that you give up a TD and 2 point conversion and actually lose the game. So while it increases the chance to win, the odds of success are cut by ~half, and the worst case scenario goes from 0% chance to lose to a % chance to lose equal to the size of BB's nutsack if he should decide to go for 2. (note: I doubt BB would go for 2 to win, but you never know, and some % chance to lose > none % chance to lose)

Sure, the upside to converting the 2 point attempt is that you're a lock to win, but that's a 50-50 chance compared to going up 8, which still makes it substantially harder for the Pats to tie than a PAT, had the Pats scored. 

So all things considered, and given the percentages of success for each possible approach, it certainly seems like the scenario that gives the Seahawks the best chance of winning (and with none chance of losing) would be to kick the PAT, be up by 8, and force the Pats to drive down the field and convert two offensive plays with worst case scenario avoided, in that even if BOTH were successful the worst thing that happens is tie game/overtime. 

I'm not sure how that's a coin flip. Maybe someone better at math can educate me.

 

[zftcg]

I'll explain my reasoning then: 

Going for 2 is a coin flip. (I actually disagree with that because it assumes league average, rather than against "X team", and the Seahawks' pass defense is well above league average, but I'll throw the propeller heads a bone here and ignore that logic fail) 

Kicking the PAT and going up 8 is a 95% certainty. (which again is considering league average, not how totally money Hauschka has been with chip shot PATs - I'd put it closer to 99%, but ok, I concede to the propeller heads yet again, and will allow guys like Blair Walsh to drag down the #s and dictate what % of success Hauschka would have based on league ave)

There aren't 2 possible outcomes here, there are 4.  

1. Kick the PAT and go up by 8, forcing a TD+2 point attempt

2. Miss the FG and be up 7, a TD+PAT ties the game  This has been described as a 5% chance

3. Convert the 2 pt attempt and go up 9, effectively salting away the game

4. Converting the 2 pt attempt and failing, up 7, a TD+PAT ties the game, a TD+2 pt attempt wins the game for the Pats (not unprecedented, Oakland did so earlier this year) 

Scenario #1 would have been a 95% certainty, resulting in the outcome where the Pats had to score a TD, then convert a 2 point attempt, to result in a tie. So again, and not without merit, the worst case scenario here is the Patriots tie the game. And that's identifying this scenario as having the highest probability of success for the Seahawks to convert (95%, 99%, whatever you believe) 

Scenario #2 is essentially the same result as scenario #4, so unless you lack confidence in your kicker / ST (see: AZ Cards, MIN Vikes, etc) then the PAT is pretty well a lock. 

Scenarios #3 & #4 in fact reduces the Seahawks chances of success by 45% to convert points after the TD, (while of course increasing their chances of winning the game if successful). However, a failure to convert keeps the game spread at 7, and actually opens the door for a possible outcome of NEP scoring 8 and winning the game on that final drive. So here the worst possible scenario is that you give up a TD and 2 point conversion and actually lose the game. So while it increases the chance to win, the odds of success are cut by ~half, and the worst case scenario goes from 0% chance to lose to a % chance to lose equal to the size of BB's nutsack if he should decide to go for 2. (note: I doubt BB would go for 2 to win, but you never know, and some % chance to lose > none % chance to lose)

Sure, the upside to converting the 2 point attempt is that you're a lock to win, but that's a 50-50 chance compared to going up 8, which still makes it substantially harder for the Pats to tie than a PAT, had the Pats scored. 

So all things considered, and given the percentages of success for each possible approach, it certainly seems like the scenario that gives the Seahawks the best chance of winning (and with none chance of losing) would be to kick the PAT, be up by 8, and force the Pats to drive down the field and convert two offensive plays with worst case scenario avoided, in that even if BOTH were successful the worst thing that happens is tie game/overtime. 

I'm not sure how that's a coin flip. Maybe someone better at math can educate me.

Here was my thinking in calling it a coin flip, using very simplified percentages because I'm too lazy to do the full calculations (OK, that's a lie. Even if I were motivated, I probably wouldn't know how to do them):

• Chance of converting XP: 100%
  
• Chance of converting two-pointer: 50%
  
• Seattle win probability up 9: 100%
  
• Win probability if the game goes to OT: 50%
  

So in that situation, as Seattle decides whether to go for two, and assuming NE will score a TD on their drive (since if they don't, none of this matters), here are the win probabilities:

• Kick the XP: NE needs to convert its two-pointer (50%), then win in OT (50%), so their WP is 25% and Seattle's is 75%
  
• Go for two: If you make it, your WP is 100%. If you don't, NE scores and can send the game to OT, where your WP is 50%. Since there's a 50% chance of either scenario occurring, overall WP is 75%.
  

It's true, as you point out, only being up 7 gives NE a chance to win in regulation. But that doesn't really change the WP, since the odds of them converting are about the same as them winning in OT. Actually, if you assume the average 2PT converts at slightly less than 50%, and that the chance of a home team winning an OT game is slightly more than 50%, you would *want* BB to go for two in that situation (and yes, I'm playing loosey-goosey with the math again, but I'm just making the point that giving NE the chance to win in regulation doesn't automatically hurt Seattle's WP).

By the way, the other reason I think it's OK to use simplified math is because these percentages are all inexact anyway. Knowing that the league average on 2PT conversions is 47% doesn't necessarily mean that Seattle's chance of converting that specific 2PT is 47%. I would guess that the margin of error is probably 5-7% in either direction, depending on other factors. When Del Rio went for two at the end of the OAK-NO game in Week 1, the numbers said it was like 54/46 against going for it. IMO, that means that it's close enough that you should feel free to consider additional factors (in JDR's case, challenging his players and setting a tone for the year).

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

Here was my thinking in calling it a coin flip, using very simplified percentages because I'm too lazy to do the full calculations (OK, that's a lie. Even if I were motivated, I probably wouldn't know how to do them):

• Chance of converting XP: 100%
  
• Chance of converting two-pointer: 50%
  
• Seattle win probability up 9: 100%
  
• Win probability if the game goes to OT: 50%
  

So in that situation, as Seattle decides whether to go for two, and assuming NE will score a TD on their drive (since if they don't, none of this matters), here are the win probabilities:

• Kick the XP: NE needs to convert its two-pointer (50%), then win in OT (50%), so their WP is 25% and Seattle's is 75%
  
• Go for two: If you make it, your WP is 100%. If you don't, NE scores and can send the game to OT, where your WP is 50%. Since there's a 50% chance of either scenario occurring, overall WP is 75%.
  

It's true, as you point out, only being up 7 gives NE a chance to win in regulation. But that doesn't really change the WP, since the odds of them converting are about the same as them winning in OT. Actually, if you assume the average 2PT converts at slightly less than 50%, and that the chance of a home team winning an OT game is slightly more than 50%, you would *want* BB to go for two in that situation (and yes, I'm playing loosey-goosey with the math again, but I'm just making the point that giving NE the chance to win in regulation doesn't automatically hurt Seattle's WP).

By the way, the other reason I think it's OK to use simplified math is because these percentages are all inexact anyway. Knowing that the league average on 2PT conversions is 47% doesn't necessarily mean that Seattle's chance of converting that specific 2PT is 47%. I would guess that the margin of error is probably 5-7% in either direction, depending on other factors. When Del Rio went for two at the end of the OAK-NO game in Week 1, the numbers said it was like 54/46 against going for it. IMO, that means that it's close enough that you should feel free to consider additional factors (in JDR's case, challenging his players and setting a tone for the year).

I disagree with your %s. 

 

 

[CalBear]

How did I ignore the possible outcome of them being up 9?  The entire premise of my post was that it was dumb to attempt to go up 9 with the 2 point conversion.  That's hardly what I call "ignoring it" - it's specifically calling it out. Talk about a fallacy.

And it has nothing to do with hindsight being 20-20 as you assert.  The fact that they failed to convert doesn't influence my assertion that they were dumb to try in the slightest. I thought it was dumb the second they lined up with no prescience of their eminent failure. 

You seem to be ignoring the fact that had they simply kicked the PAT the Pats would have had to score a TD + 2 pt conversion just to tie the game. Which, correct me if I'm wrong here, is much more difficult to accomplish than simply having to score a TD + PAT to tie the game.  Or do you dispute that?

So it would appear that the person "disregarding contrary outcomes" is you. The fact remains that the Seahawks were up, and could have vastly increased their chances of winning by kicking the 95% probability PAT (and taking an 8 point lead) but instead tried (and subsequently failed) in a 2-pt attempt.  The contrary outcome you seem to disregard is the "worst case scenario" in the Seahawks decision making process. Seahawks kicking the PAT, at worst, forces the Pats to score a TD and get a 2 point conversion just to tie the game. It gives Seattle 2 chances to win and, worth noting, none chance to lose since there is no 9 point play. But instead they failed at the 2PA and were only up 7, which in my opinion is a HUGE difference, because a PAT is a 95% probability to convert for both teams. And had the Pack decided to go for 2, Seattle could have lost. 

Ipso facto, a dumb play. We'll have to agree to disagree, because I won't be convinced otherwise. 

Here's a question for you: Had the Patriots scored the TD, would you have approved their going for 2 to win the game instead of kicking the PAT to force OT?  

Because IMO that would also be dumb. But since we're analyzing risk/reward and percentage plays, it seems relevant to ask. 

If the Pats have a greater than 48% chance to score a 2-point conversion, absolutely they should go for 2 instead of kicking the PAT. 

Being ahead and having the other team tie you at the end of regulation is not the same as losing. Being behind and catching up to sent it into OT isn't the same as winning. Both scenarios are going from a win/loss to a coin flip. If you have a probability that's greater than a coin flip to win, you should absolutely take it in preference to sending the game into OT.

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

Chip Kelly, in a game where the SF bench was already cited with an unsportsmanlike for coming out onto the field, comes out on the field with1/2 his coaching staff for an automatic 15 yard penalty for a 2nd infraction. 

God that was dumb. 

 

[zftcg]

Don't know all the details (turned on the game right after it happened) but it sounds like Fisher's decision to kick a FG up 10 midway through the 4th quarter was highly questionable at best (and not just because they missed it and lost the game). I'd be curious to see the win probability calculations on that one. 

 

[flapgreen]

Pretty much everything fox does 

 

[JaxBill]

Chip Kelly, in a game where the SF bench was already cited with an unsportsmanlike for coming out onto the field, comes out on the field with1/2 his coaching staff for an automatic 15 yard penalty for a 2nd infraction. 

God that was dumb. 

So did Chip get ejected for 2nd personal foul?

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

So did Chip get ejected for 2nd personal foul?

No - 15 yard penalty on the 2nd.

it's taunting that's the automatic ejection under the new rules. 

 

[lod001]

Yesterday, watching the games, Seattle PR, I believe it was, stands on the 10, runs forward calling for fair catch. (He knows it's going to fall inside the 10) Ball sails over his head inside the 10 and bounces into EZ. Taken out to 20. That's good coaching. It's been taught that way forever.

Craptastic team, (can't remember which one) PR drops back and calls for FC inside the 10. It's a weekly occurrence.

 

[davearm]

Bill O'Brien punting the ball on 4th and 5 with ~3:15 remaining, one TO and down 7 was really bad IMO.

Kudos to Jack Del Rio for converting on 4th and 1 to ice the game a few minutes later.

 

[davearm]

Yesterday, watching the games, Seattle PR, I believe it was, stands on the 10, runs forward calling for fair catch. (He knows it's going to fall inside the 10) Ball sails over his head inside the 10 and bounces into EZ. Taken out to 20. That's good coaching. It's been taught that way forever.

Craptastic team, (can't remember which one) PR drops back and calls for FC inside the 10. It's a weekly occurrence.

It seems pretty clear to me that the guys that are fair-catching punts inside the 10 are being coached to do that.  Rugby-style punting has made it less likely that the ball bounces forward and into the EZ.  

A decade or so ago, 9-10% of punts in the NFL resulted in touchbacks, but it's been more like 7-8% in recent years.  Last year it was 6.5%.  Punters have become more proficient at avoiding touchbacks, and so the coaches and return men have adjusted by moving back their FC zone to inside the 10.

Data here:

http://www.espn.com/nfl/statistics/team/_/stat/punting

 

[Sabertooth]

I should post in here every single week that Mike McCarthy has once again not fired Dom Capers.  So obviously stupid, it's going to cost him his own job.  

 

[lod001]

It seems pretty clear to me that the guys that are fair-catching punts inside the 10 are being coached to do that.  Rugby-style punting has made it less likely that the ball bounces forward and into the EZ.  

A decade or so ago, 9-10% of punts in the NFL resulted in touchbacks, but it's been more like 7-8% in recent years.  Last year it was 6.5%.  Punters have become more proficient at avoiding touchbacks, and so the coaches and return men have adjusted by moving back their FC zone to inside the 10.

Data here:

http://www.espn.com/nfl/statistics/team/_/stat/punting

Regardless, it makes no sense. If you fair catch there is NO WAY it goes into the endzone and you start where you caught it. If you run away, IT CAN GO INTO THE EZ and you start at the 20. Weak teams are coaching the stupidity. How many actually get stopped inside the 1? Not many. No one knows where it's going to bounce.

 

[ghostguy123]

The fair catch inside the 10 thing could maybe be changed to the 9 yard line.  For me, a fair catch inside the 9 is completely idiotic.

Even if the ball does happen to bounce perfectly for the punting team those guys more often than not are so jacked up and stupid that they will mess it up anyway

 

[Ignoratio Elenchi]

I don't necessarily agree that Belichick and the Patriots would have approached the endgame differently down 8 instead of down 7.

Specifically, I don't think he/they would have felt pressure to try and score quickly, then score again if the deficit was 8.

I know I'm way late to this party but I think that's the point.  Being down by 8 is a situation where they probably should try to score quickly, because there's such a substantial chance that they won't convert the 2-pt attempt following a TD.  If you think they would approach an 8-point deficit suboptimally (relative to a 9-point deficit, where they would know exactly what they needed to do), that would arguably push things slightly in favor of taking the 8-point lead as opposed to trying for the 9-point lead, no?

 

[davearm]

Regardless, it makes no sense. If you fair catch there is NO WAY it goes into the endzone and you start where you caught it. If you run away, IT CAN GO INTO THE EZ and you start at the 20. Weak teams are coaching the stupidity. How many actually get stopped inside the 1? Not many. No one knows where it's going to bounce.

A ball that lands on the 20 YL could go into the endzone too, but you don't see coaches telling players to let it bounce inside the 20.  It's all a risk/reward analysis.  Letting a punt bounce at the 20 in hopes of a TB doesn't pass that risk/reward analysis.

Once upon a time, letting a punt bounce at the 10 YL did pass the test.  Now it doesn't.  Things have changed.  Believe it or not, punters have better control of the ball now, given changes in technique.  There's probably new thinking on the downside of beginning a drive within a few yards of the goalline as well.

It does make sense.  Just not to you (apparently).

 

[ghostguy123]

A ball that lands on the 20 YL could go into the endzone too, but you don't see coaches telling players to let it bounce inside the 20.  It's all a risk/reward analysis.  Letting a punt bounce at the 20 in hopes of a TB doesn't pass that risk/reward analysis.

Once upon a time, letting a punt bounce at the 10 YL did pass the test.  Now it doesn't.  Things have changed.  Believe it or not, punters have better control of the ball now, given changes in technique.  There's probably new thinking on the downside of beginning a drive within a few yards of the goalline as well.

It does make sense.  Just not to you (apparently).

We are seeing guys fair catch it on the 5 yards line.  That is NOT a smart idea under any circumstance.

 

[ghostguy123]

I know I'm way late to this party but I think that's the point.  Being down by 8 is a situation where they probably should try to score quickly, because there's such a substantial chance that they won't convert the 2-pt attempt following a TD.  If you think they would approach an 8-point deficit suboptimally (relative to a 9-point deficit, where they would know exactly what they needed to do), that would arguably push things slightly in favor of taking the 8-point lead as opposed to trying for the 9-point lead, no?

Say the Pats scored fast and also got the 2, that would mean Seattle would have had some time left at the end to score also.

Again, IMO, barring trash weather or an injured kicker, I take the XP and go up 8.

 

[jdkapow]

Bill O'Brien punting the ball on 4th and 5 with ~3:15 remaining, one TO and down 7 was really bad IMO.

Kudos to Jack Del Rio for converting on 4th and 1 to ice the game a few minutes later.

That was an astonishingly bad decision. Whether you go for it and fail or punt, the Raiders only need one first down to ice the game. At that point, as long as they're ten yards out of reasonable FG range, it doesn't matter where on the field the Raiders get the ball. And going for it has the added advantage of, you know, maybe having a chance at winning the game.

 

[zftcg]

Let's talk about Fowler's decision to score with 3 minutes to play. You could put that on the player, but given that the Broncos were deliberately taking a shot downfield, the coaches should probably have warned Fowler to take a knee at the one if he broke free (and for all we know, maybe they did and he just got excited, a la Bradshaw in SB 45).

Assume he goes down at the 1, the Broncos kneel three times and then kick a FG. That leaves the Chiefs down 4 with no TOs and ~30 seconds left. There is simply no way that doesn't give Denver a higher WP than being up 8 with 3 minutes left.

 

[davearm]

Let's talk about Fowler's decision to score with 3 minutes to play. You could put that on the player, but given that the Broncos were deliberately taking a shot downfield, the coaches should probably have warned Fowler to take a knee at the one if he broke free (and for all we know, maybe they did and he just got excited, a la Bradshaw in SB 45).

Assume he goes down at the 1, the Broncos kneel three times and then kick a FG. That leaves the Chiefs down 4 with no TOs and ~30 seconds left. There is simply no way that doesn't give Denver a higher WP than being up 8 with 3 minutes left.

I love the "don't score, go down then run out the clock" move, but it really is only defensible when you can actually run out the clock with kneel-downs.  

That was obviously not possible here.

 

[MattFancy]

I love the "don't score, go down then run out the clock" move, but it really is only defensible when you can actually run out the clock with kneel-downs.  

That was obviously not possible here.

Agreed. And still, the defense let KC drive right down the field and then get the 2pt conversion too.

If anything, we need to be talking about Kubiak's decision to not go for 2 after that score and then his decision to try a 62yd FG in OT.

 

[davearm]

Agreed. And still, the defense let KC drive right down the field and then get the 2pt conversion too.

If anything, we need to be talking about Kubiak's decision to not go for 2 after that score and then his decision to try a 62yd FG in OT.

I don't mind either of those choices.  The 2 pt thing has been discussed for a few pages, and the consensus seems to be that kicking the PAT to go up 8 is the smarter play.

I also like him giving his kicker a chance to win the game, even though it didn't work out.  Punting there seems like a "playing not to lose" move.  Trying the FG is the "playing to win" move.

 

[zftcg]

I love the "don't score, go down then run out the clock" move, but it really is only defensible when you can actually run out the clock with kneel-downs.  

That was obviously not possible here.

Why is that the standard? Running the clock almost all the way down and kicking the FG for a 4pt lead would give them something like a 99.9% WP (and that's not even taking into account that KC would be trying to complete a Hail Mary with Checkdown Charlie at QB). 

 

[MattFancy]

I don't mind either of those choices.  The 2 pt thing has been discussed for a few pages, and the consensus seems to be that kicking the PAT to go up 8 is the smarter play.

I also like him giving his kicker a chance to win the game, even though it didn't work out.  Punting there seems like a "playing not to lose" move.  Trying the FG is the "playing to win" move.

A 62yd FG isn't something I would want to try in OT with plenty of time left though. You miss it and they have great field position to win the game. You punt, you make them have to at least put together some sort of drive to get into FG range.

 

[Spike]

Pats-Jets game on Sunday.

In the first quarter the Jets, on 3rd down and 10, get a holding call on a play during which they have an incomplete pass.  Bill decides to NOT push the Jets out of field goal range and the Jets kicker nails a 51-yard field goal.

 

[zftcg]

I don't mind either of those choices.  The 2 pt thing has been discussed for a few pages, and the consensus seems to be that kicking the PAT to go up 8 is the smarter play.

I also like him giving his kicker a chance to win the game, even though it didn't work out.  Punting there seems like a "playing not to lose" move.  Trying the FG is the "playing to win" move.

Yeah, didn't bring up the 2pt thing because it's been talked to death. If anything, the choice is even clearer here, since Kubiak's choice boiled down to, "Who do I trust more on a two-point conversion? My defense to stop one or Trevor Siemian to score on one?"

As for the FG attempt, I'm still working through my thought process on that one. I think kicking was probably sub-optimal, and there's a case for going for the first down, but I also think there are a lot of other factors to consider (including the value of a tie in a three-way race for the division).

 

[davearm]

Why is that the standard? Running the clock almost all the way down and kicking the FG for a 4pt lead would give them something like a 99.9% WP (and that's not even taking into account that KC would be trying to complete a Hail Mary with Checkdown Charlie at QB). 

That's not even close to correct on the win probability:

4th Quarter, 0:30 remaining, trailing by 4,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 15.29%

When KC got the ball back down 8:

4th Quarter, 3:00 remaining, trailing by 8,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 8.43%

 

[lod001]

A ball that lands on the 20 YL could go into the endzone too, but you don't see coaches telling players to let it bounce inside the 20.  It's all a risk/reward analysis.  Letting a punt bounce at the 20 in hopes of a TB doesn't pass that risk/reward analysis.

Once upon a time, letting a punt bounce at the 10 YL did pass the test.  Now it doesn't.  Things have changed.  Believe it or not, punters have better control of the ball now, given changes in technique.  There's probably new thinking on the downside of beginning a drive within a few yards of the goalline as well.

It does make sense.  Just not to you (apparently).

It makes no sense and most people know it. You are in some sort of total dream world if you think a punter can punt a ball and instruct the gunners as to how it's going to land and then bounce.   I you were even remotely correct, the gunner would just run right to a spot as directed by the punter. That does not happen.

I can't even believe you mentioned the 20 yard line as a starting point. There is a reason they stand at the 10. The punt can quickly bounce into the endzone from the 10. It cannot from the 20. A punt to the 15 gets fielded because it has a shot at going inside the 10 or 5.

 

[zftcg]

That's not even close to correct on the win probability:

4th Quarter, 0:30 remaining, trailing by 4,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 15.29%

When KC got the ball back down 8:

4th Quarter, 3:00 remaining, trailing by 8,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 8.43%

Really? Where are you getting those numbers? I went on Pro Football Reference and entered those scenarios, and it said 99.99% for the first, 99.32% for the second. (I didn't enter the Vegas line, but since the Broncos were favored, that probably would have pushed both up). 

Just eyeballing it, 15% seems way high for a team to go 75 yards in 30 seconds with no TOs. Wasn't there some story earlier this year after Stafford drove the Lions down to tie the Vikes in regulation just how rare that kind of drive was (and that was only for a FG)?

Of course, those numbers do somewhat undercut my argument that kneeling was obviously the correct call, but it does still seem to be the optimal decision.

[ETA: Never mind, just realized I had to enter negative numbers. Though I do notice it doesn't account for how many TOs a team has, which would seem to be especially relevant with 30 seconds left.]

 

[davearm]

Really? Where are you getting those numbers? I went on Pro Football Reference and entered those scenarios, and it said 99.99% for the first, 99.32% for the second. (I didn't enter the Vegas line, but since the Broncos were favored, that probably would have pushed both up).

Just eyeballing it, 15% seems way high for a team to go 75 yards in 30 seconds with no TOs. Wasn't there some story earlier this year after Stafford drove the Lions down to tie the Vikes in regulation just how rare that kind of drive was (and that was only for a FG)?

Of course, those numbers do somewhat undercut my argument that kneeling was obviously the correct call, but it does still seem to be the optimal decision.

I got the probabilities from Pro Football Reference as well.  No idea how you're getting 99.xx%.

Score Differential: -8

Quarter: 4

Time remaining: 3:00

Field: Own

Yard Line: 25

Down: 1

To Go: 10

Win Probability = 8.43%

 

[rick6668]

I got the probabilities from Pro Football Reference as well.  No idea how you're getting 99.xx%.

Score Differential: -8

Quarter: 4

Time remaining: 3:00

Field: Own

Yard Line: 25

Down: 1

To Go: 10

Win Probability = 8.43%

I think you got that 15% from the example line at the top.

Entering this:

Game Situation 
Vegas Line

0
Score Differential

4
Quarter

Time Remaining

00
:
30
Field

Yard Line

25
Down

1
To Go

10

Gives this:

Win Probability 
4th Quarter, 00:30 remaining, leading by 4,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 

Expected Points: 0.607

Win Probability: 99.99%

 

[zftcg]

I think you got that 15% from the example line at the top.

Entering this:

Gives this:

Win Probability 
4th Quarter, 00:30 remaining, leading by 4,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 

Expected Points: 0.607

Win Probability: 99.99%

No, he was right. You have to enter a negative number for score differential. I still think 15% makes no intuitive sense. You're telling me one out of every seven teams that finds themselves down 4 with 30 seconds left will drive 75 yards for a game-winning TD?

 

[rick6668]

No, he was right. You have to enter a negative number for score differential. I still think 15% makes no intuitive sense. You're telling me one out of every seven teams that finds themselves down 4 with 30 seconds left will drive 75 yards for a game-winning TD?

You are correct. I goofed that up.  But 15% makes no sense.  I have a hard time believing that.

Something is wrong here.  I changed it to 4 seconds left 

Win Probability 
4th Quarter, 00:04 remaining, trailing by 4,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 

Expected Points: 0.607

Win Probability: 12.15%

No way is that correct.

At your own one yard line with one second left and still a 5.37% chance of winning.

4th Quarter, 00:01 remaining, trailing by 4,ball at team 1, 1st down & 10 to go: 

Win Probability: 5.37% 

 

[davearm]

It makes no sense and most people know it. You are in some sort of total dream world if you think a punter can punt a ball and instruct the gunners as to how it's going to land and then bounce.   I you were even remotely correct, the gunner would just run right to a spot as directed by the punter. That does not happen.

I can't even believe you mentioned the 20 yard line as a starting point. There is a reason they stand at the 10. The punt can quickly bounce into the endzone from the 10. It cannot from the 20. A punt to the 15 gets fielded because it has a shot at going inside the 10 or 5.

You're certainly right that for a long time, coaches instructed their returners not to field any punt inside the 10.

It's pretty clear that many coaches don't use that rule of thumb anymore.  Why is that?  Your explanation, "because they're all stupid" might not be correct.

 

[RUSF18]

Continue to start an old, expensive, subpar QB in a dead season when there are two completely unknown* young QBs on the roster.

(* - I use "unknown" liberally re: Hack, as I am confident he's #### but I certainly feel for Jets fans)

 

[Pip's Invitation]

Continue to start an old, expensive, subpar QB in a dead season when there are two completely unknown* young QBs on the roster.

(* - I use "unknown" liberally re: Hack, as I am confident he's #### but I certainly feel for Jets fans)

Doesn't matter, Jay Cutler will be their QB next year. It's the most Jets thing to do.

 

[Hot Sauce Guy]

can I again mention that it's dumb for Payton to keep giving Hightower more touches every week than Ingram? I don't feel like it's a repeat if the results are continuing proof that it's stupid. 

Ingram once again did substantially more on less opportunities than Hightower - and while I'm rarely the "if such and such play didn't happen" guy, I have to point out that had Snead not thrown a 50 yard TD to Hightower on a trick play while up multiple scores, Hightower would have had a really sub-par day. 

And more importantly, looking at yards per touch, it stands to reason that Ingram would have had an even more productive day had 1/2 of Hightower's touches gone his way. 

I know I'm beating the same drum, but that's because it's still dumb. 

 

[zftcg]

You are correct. I goofed that up.  But 15% makes no sense.  I have a hard time believing that.

Something is wrong here.  I changed it to 4 seconds left 

Win Probability 
4th Quarter, 00:04 remaining, trailing by 4,ball at team 25, 1st down & 10 to go: 

Expected Points: 0.607

Win Probability: 12.15%

No way is that correct.

At your own one yard line with one second left and still a 5.37% chance of winning.

4th Quarter, 00:01 remaining, trailing by 4,ball at team 1, 1st down & 10 to go: 

Win Probability: 5.37% 

That's a good way to test the system. You're right, something's off. 

I did realize one thing: If the chances of scoring with 30 seconds left down 4 is X%, and the chance of scoring with 3:00 left down 8 is Y%, then Y needs to be more than 4X for it to make sense for Fowler to kneel at the one. That's because any score down 8 requires two additional coin flips (2pt conversion + OT victory) before KC can win, so the chance that you'll win after scoring a TD down 8 is 25% of the chance you'll win after scoring a TD down 4.

Again, it makes intuitive sense that Y would be significantly higher than 4X, but that's the standard by which to judge the situation.

 

[BobbyLayne]

Using your last challenge on a 2 yard catch with 17 minutes is a curious decision. Even when you win it.