timschochet
Footballguy
Good point Bentley. So I suppose then that FDR was the second President to do this.
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From Wiki:The basesAntigua, British West Indies A Naval Air Station at Crabbs Peninsula [2] An Army Air Force airfield (Coolidge Army Airfield (later AFB) (closed 1949) British Guiana An Army Air Force airfield (Atkinson Aerodrome (later AFB)) (closed 1949) A Naval seaplane base near Suddie. Jamaica An Army Air Force airfield (Vernam Army Airfield (later AFB)) (closed 1949) A Naval Air Station (Little Goat Island) and a Naval facility at Port Royal Saint Lucia, British West Indies An Army Air Force airfield (Beane Army Airfield (later AFB)) (closed 1949) A Naval Air Station (Gros Islet Bay) Bermuda An Army Air Force airfield (Fort Bell Army Airfield (later Kindley AFB)) (transferred to U.S. Navy 1970, then closed 1995) Newfoundland and Labrador Several Army Air Force airfields Pepperrell Airfield (later AFB) (closed August 1961) Goose Bay Army Airfield (later AFB) (turned over to Canadian Forces, July 1976) Stephenville Army Airfield (later AFB) (closed December 1966) McAndrew Airfield (later AFB) (transferred to U.S. Navy, 1955) A Naval Air Station Naval Station Argentia (closed 1994) Multiple Marine and Army Bases and detachments in support of the above. Trinidad, British West Indies Two Army Air Force airfields Waller Army Airfield (later AFB) (closed 1949) Carlsen Army Airfield (later AFB) (closed 1949) A Naval Operating Base, a Naval Air Station, blimp base, and a radio stationI'm not sure what became of these bases after the war. Perhaps somebody knows?
This is a fascinating question, and the answer is a disturbing one for anyone who believes that a democratic republic is the best form of government. I noticed you didn't mention Woodrow Wilson, who also exceeded his powers in a way similar to Lincoln and George W. Bush. All three men, in time of war, chose to prosecute their wars at the expense of individual liberties. This is very troubling. FDR did not do this (to the best of my knowledge); what he did instead was to become the first President to attempt to usurp war making powers away from Congress and to the executive branch. Other presidents have followed his lead, and as a result we have been involved in undeclared wars all over the globe, Vietnam being the most obvious example.How come some of our greatest Presidents, like Lincoln and Roosevelt, exceeded their powers?
Here is the essential question: can a free democratic republic make the quick decisions that are necessary in wartime? Or is the executive forced to make dictatorial decisions time and again on behalf of the electorate? Honestly, I don't have a good answer.
But I do think that when we contemplate the idea of possibly putting the Bush Administration on trial for breaking the law, we really ought to consider the historical examples of Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt.
http://www.asianamericanmedia.org/jainternment/President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the mass incarceration of over 110,000 Japanese Americans during World War II.
Two-thirds were American citizens. Over half were children or infants.
Their "crime": their Japanese ancestry.
Japanese Internment?I see Christo beat me to it.All three men, in time of war, chose to prosecute their wars at the expense of individual liberties. This is very troubling. FDR did not do this (to the best of my knowledge);How come some of our greatest Presidents, like Lincoln and Roosevelt, exceeded their powers?
Very good question. Is Mothra going to show up for the Allies?How would the Japanese have fared if Godzilla was on their team?
I just downloaded the first three parts of this and am planning to start listening to it while I'm mowing the lawn tonight.For any non-WWII experts like myself, FWIW Dan Carlin's Hardcore History podcast is in the middle of a 4 part segment entirely devoted to the Russia/Germany WWII front. Three of the four parts are already out so you could get them immediately, not sure when the 4th is due. Good stuff.
I've actually thought of doing a daily War Between the States update during the sesquicentennial.Solid thread. When you do the Civil War one, let me know
There are a few Japanese americans that would probably disagree.ETA - bunch of people beat me to itThis is a fascinating question, and the answer is a disturbing one for anyone who believes that a democratic republic is the best form of government. I noticed you didn't mention Woodrow Wilson, who also exceeded his powers in a way similar to Lincoln and George W. Bush. All three men, in time of war, chose to prosecute their wars at the expense of individual liberties. This is very troubling. FDR did not do this (to the best of my knowledge); what he did instead was to become the first President to attempt to usurp war making powers away from Congress and to the executive branch. Other presidents have followed his lead, and as a result we have been involved in undeclared wars all over the globe, Vietnam being the most obvious example.How come some of our greatest Presidents, like Lincoln and Roosevelt, exceeded their powers?
Here is the essential question: can a free democratic republic make the quick decisions that are necessary in wartime? Or is the executive forced to make dictatorial decisions time and again on behalf of the electorate? Honestly, I don't have a good answer.
But I do think that when we contemplate the idea of possibly putting the Bush Administration on trial for breaking the law, we really ought to consider the historical examples of Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt.
Anyone who wants to read an entertaining fictionalized version of these events should pick up Wilbur Smith's Cry Wolf.North Africa Part One
Britain's Middle East Command encompassed all of unoccupied North Africa on the West to Persia on the East. This was the vital supply line in which England received all of her oil, and it was second only in importance to England herself. Cut off the Suez Canal, capture Egypt and then Persia- and the British Empire is lost.
In command of this theatre was General Sir Archibald Wavell, who is considered by many historians to be Britain's finest soldier in the entire war. He was a quiet, dapper, patrician, and very patient- in fact, his patience would soon get on Churchill's nerves as we shall see.
To defend this vast area of 2000 miles, Wavell had a ragtag army of less than 40,000 men, 64 field guns, and an armored division far below strength. Realizing the main threat came from the Italian forces in North Africa, Wavell sent 30,000 men, his armor, and his best field general, Richard O' Connor to defend. There they faced an Italian army of 300,000, ten times their number.
O'Connor was bold and unorthodox, called the Little Terrier because of his short size and tenacity. The man opposing him was Marshall Rodolfo Graziani.
Graziani was considered the "hero of Ethiopia"; he had displayed a great skill at using a mechanized army to conquer men with spears. Against the British, however, he hesistated. And hesitated. And hesitated some more. Throughout the fall of 1940 Mussolini urged him to attack, but Graziani insisted the risk was too great, even though he was aware that he outnumbered the enemy in men and equipment by 10-1. Then Graziani wrote an amazing letter to Il Duce informing him that it would only be safe to attack the British "once England had been occupied by Germany"!!
In exasperation, Mussolini replied that unless the Italians attacked within 48 hours, Graziani would be replaced, flown back to Rome, and executed for treason. This got the Marshall moving.
About 100,000 men attacked behind a heavy artillery barrage, which fell on empty British frontier posts. O'Connor had retreated skillfully into the desert, leaving little behind. Squads of British would appear suddenly and attack the Italian flanks, and then vanish as quickly as they appeared. Graziani adavance 8 miles into Egypt (still 80 miles from O' Connor) and halted at Sidi Barrani. There, he radioed back to Rome of his "glorious victory" and instructed the locals to make a monument in his honor. They had not quite completed this when the British shocked them by attacking.
Thanks for the link. Great stuff. On part 3 now.I just downloaded the first three parts of this and am planning to start listening to it while I'm mowing the lawn tonight.For any non-WWII experts like myself, FWIW Dan Carlin's Hardcore History podcast is in the middle of a 4 part segment entirely devoted to the Russia/Germany WWII front. Three of the four parts are already out so you could get them immediately, not sure when the 4th is due. Good stuff.
And you may remember this, from the movie Patton:"Now I want you to remember that no ******* ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb ******* die for his country. Thirty years from now, when you're sitting around your fireside with your grandson on your knee and he asks you, "What did you do in the great World War II," you won't have to say, "Well... I shoveled #### in Louisiana."Wow. That is one great story, Ozyandius, and I've never heard it before. Thank you!
50 billion dollars may seem trivial in today's world. But if you just take inflation into account it was the equivalent of 600 billion dollars. A huge amount, given the fact that the USA had less than 50% of today's population.Lend-Lease
A month after Roosevelt's re-election, he received a letter from Winston Churchill. Churchill later termed it "the most important letter I have written in my life." In this letter, Churchill basically laid out England's financial problems. He told FDR that England could no longer afford to pay for the war materials they need, and that the U-Boats were strangling their ability to deliver them. Churchill concluded:
If, as I believe, you are convinced, Mr. President, that the defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is a matter of high consequence tot the people of the United States and to the Western Hemisphere, you will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose.
Roosevelt pondered the letter for a week, and then came up with Lend-Lease, according to history all by himself. As he explained it to the American public in a Fireside Chat (radio broadcast):
Suppose my neighbor's house catches on fire and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it to his hydrant, I may help him put out the fire. Now, I don't say to him before that transaction, "Neighbor, my hose cost me fifteen dollars; you have to pay me fifteen dollars for it." No! I don't want fifteen dollars- I want my garden hose back after the fire is over.
This is brilliant propaganda but of course it was completely absurd. First off, if your neighbor is having a fire, you don't just hand him your water hose and then stand there and watch him try to put out the fire, you help him do it. Second, weapons, tanks, and airplanes are not water hoses. Finally, and most important, of course you're not going to get the equipment back. In fact, FDR was not proposing to lend or lease anything; he was proposing a complete giveaway. There was never any expectation of returned items or payment. In this sense, Lend-Lease was a fraud.
Lend-Lease was a brilliant idea, and it probably saved the world. It was, in my humble opinion, FDR's greatest achievement, far greater than his domestic accomplishments of the previous decade, and even slightly greater than his stewardship of the war. It turned America into the world power we are today. It was not seen that way at the time by isolationists, who predicted that "Lend-Lease will plow under every fourth American boy". It was also, rather ironically, opposed by the American Communists and far left on orders from Moscow. This is ironic because Russia would become one of the greatest beneficiaries of the program, along with China and the rest of the Allies.
It is interesting that the bill passed by Congress gave the President sole authority to decide to give war material to "any government whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." This gave the Executive Branch more power, at the expense of Congress, than it had ever had before, and it would set the stage for American presidents taking the powers of war away from Congress.
Eventually, Lend-Lease would take 14 cents out of every dollar spent by the government during the war years. The total cost was roughly in excess of 50 billion, making it one of the most expensive government programs anywhere. But it transformed the nation. Overnight, small shipyards and factories which had been stagnant since the start of the Depression were given government contracts. Unemployment, which was still around 8 million even in 1940, now became a thing of the past. Yet FDR faced a new problem- how to give the stuff to England without seeing it sunk to the bottom of the sea by the U-Boats? The obvious answer was for American ships to convoy. Yet, isolationists argued that if we did that, it would be tantamount to war just as it was in 1917. FDR hesistated, and for the time being would not commit himself to convoys.
It really raises the disturbing fact that war is excellent for economic prosperity.50 billion dollars may seem trivial in today's world. But if you just take inflation into account it was the equivalent of 600 billion dollars. A huge amount, given the fact that the USA had less than 50% of today's population.
Tim, looks like you've fallen for that old saw."Such naive reactions to spending due to war and natural disasters are perfect examples of what the great French economist Frédéric Bastiat described as the broken-window fallacy. Bastiat asks his reader to imagine a delinquent boy throwing a rock through a store window, about which some presumptuous onlooker comments that it might indeed be good for the economy. The glazier will make money replacing the window, which he will use to buy bread from a baker, who in turn will buy a new pair of shoes.The economic activity will snowball and lead to greater general prosperity. (In modern times, Keynesian economics has favorably referred to this as “the multiplier effect.”) What this ignores, as Bastiat explains, is the unseen costs: what the storeowner could have done with that money had he not had to spend it on the glazier, but rather on something he would value higher had his window been left intact.With government spending, the same principles apply. Money seized from the private sector — from those who know how to make productive, profitable economic decisions — and transferred to government programs does indeed produce jobs, but to focus on this ignores what the wealth could have been used for had it not been forcibly transferred. As the humorist Dave Barry so succinctly put it,"See, when the government spends money, it creates jobs; whereas when the money is left in the hands of taxpayers, God only knows what they do with it. Bake it into pies, probably. Anything to avoid creating jobs."But let's not turn this into a political thread. It's about WW2.It really raises the disturbing fact that war is excellent for economic prosperity.50 billion dollars may seem trivial in today's world. But if you just take inflation into account it was the equivalent of 600 billion dollars. A huge amount, given the fact that the USA had less than 50% of today's population.
Halfway through part 2. Carlin's style is pretty interesting. I'm definitely going to have to get more of his podcasts.TwinTurbo said:Thanks for the link. Great stuff. On part 3 now.Joseph said:I just downloaded the first three parts of this and am planning to start listening to it while I'm mowing the lawn tonight.For any non-WWII experts like myself, FWIW Dan Carlin's Hardcore History podcast is in the middle of a 4 part segment entirely devoted to the Russia/Germany WWII front. Three of the four parts are already out so you could get them immediately, not sure when the 4th is due. Good stuff.
I'd imagine you're getting to it, but the encirclement strategy was important to understanding how brutal this front became. The Germans rule of engagement vs the Soviets stated that any man found behind enemy lines with a weapon was considered a "partisan" and would not be treated as a typical POW would be. This meant that once the encircling forces got past the enemy, the German army could slaughter russians that were attempting to surrender. As the campaign went on, the definition of "partisans" expanded and the battles got bloodier.Operation Barborossa - Prelude Germany
Anyone who has studied WWII and Hitler knows that Hitler’s ultimate goal was always to gain “Lebensraum,” which made war inevitable with Russia. The Wehrmacht in 1941 was at its height of its power and while they had set backs including the Battle of Britain such defeats had been minor compared to the vast swaths of territory they had captured.
As early as December 1940, Hitler had approved plans for the invasion of Russia to begin in May 1941 and amassed 152 German divisions, including 19 panzer and 15 motorized divisions for the invasion. Supporting these were about 30 divisions of Finland and Romania. The force consisted of approximately 3,300 tanks, 7,200 artillery pieces and 2,700 aircraft. It is of note that other than the panzer and motorized division the invading army would dependent on the horse and foot for transportation. The panzer and mechanized forces were divided into 4 panzer groups.
The German primary plan was focused on the Red Army rather than on specific terrain or political objectives such as Moscow. The hope was that the Red Army would collapse along with the Soviet government. To meet this end, German forces were divided into 3 Army groups (Army group North, Central and South). Army Group North would strike towards the Baltics with its ultimate goal being Leningrad; Army Group South would strike into the Ukraine seizing Keiv and then into the Russian Steppe and the oil rich resources Caucus.
The main thrust would be made by Army Group center which also held the two of the fourth 4 panzer groups - the 2nd (Guderian) and 3rd (Hoth). Guderian and Hoth’s initial thrusts would be to Minsk from two different jumping off points with the goal to encircle much of the Red Army massed at the border. After, encircling the Russians, they would drive on to Smolensk and then towards Moscow. The belief being that the Red Army would be crushed before Moscow and they could drive right in...
Link to general map of the plan - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Operatio...cted_border.png
Yes, but..."With the Italian force in North Africa as good as neutralised, the British were faced with numerous crises all over the world. Singapore and Greece were about to be attacked and the location of the next German assault in the Middle East was unknown. When Winston Churchill decided to send forces to assist the Greeks in their defence against the German force about to attack, Sir Alan Brooke, the Home Forces Commander, noted that "our hands were more full at the time in the Middle East and Greece could only result in the most dangerous dispersal of force". Brooke was certainly proved right as the Eighth Army collapsed in disarray when Rommel attacked for the first time in March 1941, but in all fairness it has to be said that the troops were sent to Greece for sound political reasons; so as to show that the Allies would back anyone wishing to stand against the Nazi`s, not to mention that the German propaganda machine would have had a field day if the British had abandoned Greece."Churchill's great error
(Turns out I'm around this morning and wanted to get this post in before I have to leave.)
Winston Churchill was a superb orator and a great prime minister who saved England's spirit. He was flawed, however, as a war strategist. In 1915 the British suffered a major defeat at Gallilopi. This was not Churchill's fault, but the whole project was probably unwise to begin with, and it had been his idea. I have already related how, during the German invasion of Norway, Churchill had impulsively divided the troops bound for the recapture and helped to doom the mission. Now, in January of 1941, he was about to make the same essential mistake on a much larger scale.
Churchill was excited at how the Greeks had easily defeated the Italians. This made him imagine that a Balkan front could be formed against Germany. Once again, as in the case of the Dardanelles, Churchill was looking for a peripheral way to assault Germany from a possible point of weakness. He really hadn't changed at all in 30 years, nor would he ever; as we shall see, he also would propose the Balkans as an alternative to invading France when the time came. Churchill called upon Metaxas and offered his aid in the form of British troops.
But the Greek dictator did not want British help. He was fearful (correctly as it turns out) that any British presence in Greece would force the Germans to rescue the Italian effort and invade. Metaxas knew that, as well as his soldiers had performed against Italy, they could not hope to hold out for long against the Nazis. However, Metaxas died unexpectedly at the end of January. Churchill pressed his aid upon his successor, and it was accepted. At once the order was given: 75% of Richard O' Connor's victorious armies in Libya and Egypt would be transhipped to Greece.
O'Connor protested, Wavell protested. Churchill did not listen. O'Connor reluctantly moved his headquarters back to Egypt. Churchill wasn't especially worried, however. He was aware that the Germans had sent some troops and armor to reinforce the Italians in Libya, but he calculated it would be months before they would try to attack. Before that time, he would find troops from elsewhere to reinforce Wavell. And anyhow, the new German commander taking over for the Italians was unknown, some low level general named Erwin Rommel. Surely he would be cautious and not realize the temporary British weakness. Churchill was quite positive North Africa was pretty much already won, thanks to O'Connor's brilliant victories. Nothing of consequence would occur there now.
This one decision by Churchill was his greatest strategic blunder. He managed to not only guarantee disaster in Greece, but also paved the way for two more years of struggle in North Africa.
I will let the timeline play out for those other events which you can cover better then I before I start the actual battles. However, I think it makes sense to do those prelude posts now since the decision to invade Russia was made in the end of 1940 and much of the first six months of 1940 were also used to prep for the conflict by Germany so while we talk about Greece, North Africa, etc... people should realize that Germany was building a huge force to invade Russia and Russia was getting ready for the strike.Also, I don't think I can keep up with you so if I don't write this stuff now it will fall far behind.Redwes, I'm going to let you handle the invasion of Russia in detail since you know so much about it. It's jumping slightly ahead of the timeline however. I've still got to cover, Rommel, Greece, Crete, Yugoslavia, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Bismarck, and Rudolph Hess: basically, the first 6 months of 1941 which are crowded with events. It's up to you if you want to jump forward, of course, but it might be better to wait until the timeline gets there...
I don't want to turn this into a WWI debate, but you can't let Chrichill off the hook so easily regarding the Dardenelles Campaign and the Gallipoli landings. The idea was his, he forced it through the War Council and he persisted in sending men and material (mostly ANZAC troops (see the early Mel Gibson movie Gallipoli)) despite horrific losses and horrible conditions. When the campaign failed, he was forced to resign as First Lord of the Admiralty and had to leave the government. IIRC, he went to France to command a regiment as a way of doing penance for his blunders, but didn't see action or saw very little. But nevertheless, you can't brush this aside. His fixation with the Balkans and the "soft underbelly of Europe" would later bedevil FDR, Marshall and Ike in planning for Overlord. Churchill kept wanting other landings in the Balkans that would have siphoned off resources that should be going into Overlord or the Pacific.Winston Churchill was a superb orator and a great prime minister who saved England's spirit. He was flawed, however, as a war strategist. In 1915 the British suffered a major defeat at Gallilopi. This was not Churchill's fault, but the whole project was probably unwise to begin with, and it had been his idea. I have already related how, during the German invasion of Norway, Churchill had impulsively divided the troops bound for the recapture and helped to doom the mission. Now, in January of 1941, he was about to make the same essential mistake on a much larger scale.
Well, yes you can. Yes, the campaign was a disaster, but Churchill kept pushing General Hamilton to go inland, and he kept waiting until he had more reinforcements. In the meantime, the Turks brought up more troops, and it became a meatgrinder. The geographical intelligence was faulty; it looked like just a few miles, but it was miles of wooded ridge after wooded ridge. But I think it is true that Churchill always felt that the campaign was a good idea, poorly executed. And he may have been looking for some vindication.I don't want to turn this into a WWI debate, but you can't let Chrichill off the hook so easily regarding the Dardenelles Campaign and the Gallipoli landings. The idea was his, he forced it through the War Council and he persisted in sending men and material (mostly ANZAC troops (see the early Mel Gibson movie Gallipoli)) despite horrific losses and horrible conditions. When the campaign failed, he was forced to resign as First Lord of the Admiralty and had to leave the government. IIRC, he went to France to command a regiment as a way of doing penance for his blunders, but didn't see action or saw very little. But nevertheless, you can't brush this aside. His fixation with the Balkans and the "soft underbelly of Europe" would later bedevil FDR, Marshall and Ike in planning for Overlord. Churchill kept wanting other landings in the Balkans that would have siphoned off resources that should be going into Overlord or the Pacific.Winston Churchill was a superb orator and a great prime minister who saved England's spirit. He was flawed, however, as a war strategist. In 1915 the British suffered a major defeat at Gallilopi. This was not Churchill's fault, but the whole project was probably unwise to begin with, and it had been his idea. I have already related how, during the German invasion of Norway, Churchill had impulsively divided the troops bound for the recapture and helped to doom the mission. Now, in January of 1941, he was about to make the same essential mistake on a much larger scale.
Like I said above, those little "adventures" of Churchill's may have caused Hitler to overreach instead of concentrating on his primary target.Crete
If Germany could seize the island of Crete, the Luftwaffe could defend Greece and strike at British shipping attempting to supply Libya and Egypt. Aware of this, Churchill had placed Victoria Cross holder Major General Sir Bernard Freyberg of New Zealand in overall command, one of the most highly decorated offficers in the entire British army. He had about 27,000 British and Anzac troops (most of these having fled from Greece) along with two Greek divisions. He had fine antiarcraft guns, but less tha a dozen tanks. Freyburg did not not believe the Germans could assault Crete from the sea, and of course an airborne assault would be unlikely. He assured Churchill the island was well-defended.
In Berlin, General Karl Student, the paratroop commander who had served Germany so well in Belgium, now convinced Hitler that he could take Crete from the air. Hitler was doubtful, but finally gave the Student the go-ahead once the Greeks had surrendered. Student was given a force of 3,500 paratroops for the attack. Most of these were killed. The Anzac and Greek soldiers took a fearful toll, while some fell into the sea and drowned. Others, dangling helplessly from trees, were picked off by sharpshooters. Despite losses of over 70%, the paratroops managed to capture an airfield. Once this was done, the battle was effectively won, because Freyberg could not stop the Luftwaffe. Once again the British troops were forced backwards. Once again they were forced to evacuate from Crete, just like Dunkirk, just like Athens. This time too, the Royal Navy was scourged by the Luftwaffe, losing three cruisers, six destroyers, and 29 smaller vessels. In Athens, the Greeks were ordered to lower the Greek flag from the Acropolis, and replace it with a Swastika. A lone Greek soldier obeyed; then he wrapped himself in the flag of his homeland and deliberately fell to his death.
In England, the population was stunned. Here was yet another defeat, after Greece, and at the same time as Libya (I will get to that shortly.) May of 1941 seemed worse than May of 1940. The Nazis appeared invunerable, victorious everywhere. But Germany had suffered a terrible price taking Crete: over 17,000 casualties, and the destruction of the German paratroopers. Karl Student's men would no longer be a force in the war.
Not quite correct. To misquote Patton:No war led to economic prosperity by breaking your own windows and then paying to repair them. They lead to economic prosperity when you break the other poor dumb *******'s windows and then made him break his own bank to pay you to fix it.Or another way to put it:If you assume the delinquent boy is also a glazier, then his act of breaking your window and then getting you to pay him to fix it does in fact increase the boy's economic prosperity.Tim, looks like you've fallen for that old saw."Such naive reactions to spending due to war and natural disasters are perfect examples of what the great French economist Frédéric Bastiat described as the broken-window fallacy. Bastiat asks his reader to imagine a delinquent boy throwing a rock through a store window, about which some presumptuous onlooker comments that it might indeed be good for the economy. The glazier will make money replacing the window, which he will use to buy bread from a baker, who in turn will buy a new pair of shoes.The economic activity will snowball and lead to greater general prosperity. (In modern times, Keynesian economics has favorably referred to this as “the multiplier effect.”) What this ignores, as Bastiat explains, is the unseen costs: what the storeowner could have done with that money had he not had to spend it on the glazier, but rather on something he would value higher had his window been left intact.