Post here when coaches do something you disagree with (2 Viewers)

[Instinctive]

I would love to see the math and an actual study. I think you are splitting your 4s my friend.

I liken knowing to perfect competition in economics. When everybody knows everything, there is no advantage. It just becomes a relentless march of time at that point—time that isn’t on your side. Your opponent will be whistling in the dark happily when you miss your two-point conversion to leave the game at nine, and you’ll be whistling past the graveyard.

Take note of games like this one and think of me when they happen, GB. You’ll see what I’m talking about.

The arrogance reeking here is hilarious. Take notes GB

Have a good one.

 

[Brunell4MVP]

Hey Matt Eberflus, you do realize teams get three TOs per half, not two, right?

ETA: That was mostly on Caleb waiting to snap the ball, but at some point Eberflus has to realize it’s taking too long and call a timeout

Or Williams throwing the previous pass into the dirt to a wide open receiver with a chance to score.

I'm sure it'll be mostly on Eberflus and he bears responsibility as well. But that's a tough way to lose.

Williams bears some responsibility here, but he's a rookie. Eberflus has no excuse.

William's bears all the responsibility.
It takes around 17 seconds of chaos to get your offense off the field and your kicking team on the field to set up for a field goal. It is not an ideal situation to put yourselves in and a lot of things can break down. With 3rd and 25 you are just looking for around 5-7 yards to get back into field goal range.
If the coach doesn't call an immediate timeout, you need to have some concept of what needs to be done. I would think that someone that has played the game his whole life would understand this.

Please, this is ALL on the CHI coaches. Bad plays happen. RTs whiff. QBs miss throws. They are ill prepared for anything.

- On first down w 43 seconds left CHI took a TO after a DET penalty because they couldn't get a play call in fast enough. WTF. There's the worst thing. Wasting a TO.
- Then with 32 seconds left, Williams gets sacked when the RT whiffs. That IMMEDIATELY becomes a TO situation. The WRs are 35 yards downfield. Which is another thing. WTF play call was that. A QB draw? I don't think all the OL was blocking the right scheme whatever it was. Call a TO with 32 secs left then you can do anything. Run play, quick out, anything. The FG team is ready to run on.
- So with no TO called, they don't even have a play called the play before in the huddle. Like, if the clock is running we do X. Heck, it doesn't appear the coaches have a clue about any play call. Total confusion. They are actually switching out players I think. WTF. For what it's worth, Williams said after the game that it took 20 seconds for the play call to come in. And if you doubt him, just look at point #1. They couldn't get a play call in after a dead ball at 43 seconds left. .
- Clock runs down to 6 seconds. Well at least call a TO there. Nope ... I called a down the middle route where the clock will run out 100% of the time even if he catches it because the D is just gonna hold him up until the clock ends.

Eberflus is a dork. Wiliams had better coaches in HS. I'd guess most of the team did

I agree that if a T.O. is called right away, it will allow you to throw on any part of the field and still get on )that is on the coaches). But once the clock gets down to 20 seconds you are hoping that the QB has enough sense to run a play. You could even do a run and try and pick up 5 yards. Once the initial time out isn't called, I would hope that my QB would have the sense to know what is going on. At some level he must have practiced 2 minute drills? Would this happen to any other QB in the league? I hope not.

I think it happens quite a bit after QB sacks late in the game. Been there at the HS level as a QB. On the field it's total panic. And that's at any level. Everything starts to move super fast.

To me all you have to see is CHI took a TO on a dead ball with 43 seconds left to avoid a delay of game. really ... a dead ball. Can't make this up. That play should be called with a full play clock. It appears to have been called with 14 seconds on the clock. And no, Caleb doens't get them moving fast enough. But that is the game. Burning a TO that was needed. That's on the coaching staff. What are they doing. Drawing up plays in the dirt?

 

[rockaction]

I would love to see the math and an actual study. I think you are splitting your 4s my friend.

I liken knowing to perfect competition in economics. When everybody knows everything, there is no advantage. It just becomes a relentless march of time at that point—time that isn’t on your side. Your opponent will be whistling in the dark happily when you miss your two-point conversion to leave the game at nine, and you’ll be whistling past the graveyard.

Take note of games like this one and think of me when they happen, GB. You’ll see what I’m talking about.

The arrogance reeking here is hilarious. Take notes GB

Have a good one.

Perhaps a poor attempt at humor. Thank you for humoring me during this discussion.

 

[IvanKaramazov]

Hey Matt Eberflus, you do realize teams get three TOs per half, not two, right?

ETA: That was mostly on Caleb waiting to snap the ball, but at some point Eberflus has to realize it’s taking too long and call a timeout

Or Williams throwing the previous pass into the dirt to a wide open receiver with a chance to score.

I'm sure it'll be mostly on Eberflus and he bears responsibility as well. But that's a tough way to lose.

Williams bears some responsibility here, but he's a rookie. Eberflus has no excuse.

William's bears all the responsibility.
It takes around 17 seconds of chaos to get your offense off the field and your kicking team on the field to set up for a field goal. It is not an ideal situation to put yourselves in and a lot of things can break down. With 3rd and 25 you are just looking for around 5-7 yards to get back into field goal range.
If the coach doesn't call an immediate timeout, you need to have some concept of what needs to be done. I would think that someone that has played the game his whole life would understand this.

Please, this is ALL on the CHI coaches. Bad plays happen. RTs whiff. QBs miss throws. They are ill prepared for anything.

- On first down w 43 seconds left CHI took a TO after a DET penalty because they couldn't get a play call in fast enough. WTF. There's the worst thing. Wasting a TO.
- Then with 32 seconds left, Williams gets sacked when the RT whiffs. That IMMEDIATELY becomes a TO situation. The WRs are 35 yards downfield. Which is another thing. WTF play call was that. A QB draw? I don't think all the OL was blocking the right scheme whatever it was. Call a TO with 32 secs left then you can do anything. Run play, quick out, anything. The FG team is ready to run on.
- So with no TO called, they don't even have a play called the play before in the huddle. Like, if the clock is running we do X. Heck, it doesn't appear the coaches have a clue about any play call. Total confusion. They are actually switching out players I think. WTF. For what it's worth, Williams said after the game that it took 20 seconds for the play call to come in. And if you doubt him, just look at point #1. They couldn't get a play call in after a dead ball at 43 seconds left. .
- Clock runs down to 6 seconds. Well at least call a TO there. Nope ... I called a down the middle route where the clock will run out 100% of the time even if he catches it because the D is just gonna hold him up until the clock ends.

Eberflus is a dork. Wiliams had better coaches in HS. I'd guess most of the team did

I agree that if a T.O. is called right away, it will allow you to throw on any part of the field and still get on )that is on the coaches). But once the clock gets down to 20 seconds you are hoping that the QB has enough sense to run a play. You could even do a run and try and pick up 5 yards. Once the initial time out isn't called, I would hope that my QB would have the sense to know what is going on. At some level he must have practiced 2 minute drills? Would this happen to any other QB in the league? I hope not.

If you're the HC and you just stand there and let the clock run because you assume your rookie QB knows best, I would fire you the next day. That's just professional misconduct.

 

[BobbyLayne]

Hey Matt Eberflus, you do realize teams get three TOs per half, not two, right?

ETA: That was mostly on Caleb waiting to snap the ball, but at some point Eberflus has to realize it’s taking too long and call a timeout

Or Williams throwing the previous pass into the dirt to a wide open receiver with a chance to score.

I'm sure it'll be mostly on Eberflus and he bears responsibility as well. But that's a tough way to lose.

Williams bears some responsibility here, but he's a rookie. Eberflus has no excuse.

William's bears all the responsibility.
It takes around 17 seconds of chaos to get your offense off the field and your kicking team on the field to set up for a field goal. It is not an ideal situation to put yourselves in and a lot of things can break down. With 3rd and 25 you are just looking for around 5-7 yards to get back into field goal range.
If the coach doesn't call an immediate timeout, you need to have some concept of what needs to be done. I would think that someone that has played the game his whole life would understand this.

Please, this is ALL on the CHI coaches. Bad plays happen. RTs whiff. QBs miss throws. They are ill prepared for anything.

- On first down w 43 seconds left CHI took a TO after a DET penalty because they couldn't get a play call in fast enough. WTF. There's the worst thing. Wasting a TO.
- Then with 32 seconds left, Williams gets sacked when the RT whiffs. That IMMEDIATELY becomes a TO situation. The WRs are 35 yards downfield. Which is another thing. WTF play call was that. A QB draw? I don't think all the OL was blocking the right scheme whatever it was. Call a TO with 32 secs left then you can do anything. Run play, quick out, anything. The FG team is ready to run on.
- So with no TO called, they don't even have a play called the play before in the huddle. Like, if the clock is running we do X. Heck, it doesn't appear the coaches have a clue about any play call. Total confusion. They are actually switching out players I think. WTF. For what it's worth, Williams said after the game that it took 20 seconds for the play call to come in. And if you doubt him, just look at point #1. They couldn't get a play call in after a dead ball at 43 seconds left. .
- Clock runs down to 6 seconds. Well at least call a TO there. Nope ... I called a down the middle route where the clock will run out 100% of the time even if he catches it because the D is just gonna hold him up until the clock ends.

Eberflus is a dork. Wiliams had better coaches in HS. I'd guess most of the team did

I agree that if a T.O. is called right away, it will allow you to throw on any part of the field and still get on )that is on the coaches). But once the clock gets down to 20 seconds you are hoping that the QB has enough sense to run a play. You could even do a run and try and pick up 5 yards. Once the initial time out isn't called, I would hope that my QB would have the sense to know what is going on. At some level he must have practiced 2 minute drills? Would this happen to any other QB in the league? I hope not.

I think it happens quite a bit after QB sacks late in the game. Been there at the HS level as a QB. On the field it's total panic. And that's at any level. Everything starts to move super fast.

To me all you have to see is CHI took a TO on a dead ball with 43 seconds left to avoid a delay of game. really ... a dead ball. Can't make this up. That play should be called with a full play clock. It appears to have been called with 14 seconds on the clock. And no, Caleb doesn't get them moving fast enough. But that is the game. Burning a TO that was needed. That's on the coaching staff. What are they doing. Drawing up plays in the dirt?

Burned two dead ball timeouts on the final drive because the play clock was running down. Used the first one on 3rd and 7 from the 4.

Two timeouts solely because they didn't handle the detail of getting the play called in a timely manner.

We should be talking about Caleb Williams taking his team from their own 1 all the way down the field with 3-1/2 minutes left. Yet here we are.

Play-By-Play

• 1st & 10, CHI 1
  3:31 4th
  C. Williams passed to K. Allen to the right for 6 yard gain, tackled by B. Niemann. Chicago committed 3 yard penalty (Unsportsmanlike Conduct)

• 2nd & 9, CHI 2
  3:18 4th
  C. Williams incomplete pass down the middle intended for R. Odunze

3:14 4th
Chicago timeout

• 3rd & 7, CHI 4
  3:14 4th
  C. Williams passed to D. Moore down the middle for 25 yard gain, tackled by K. Dorsey

3:06 4th
Injury Timeout

• 1st & 10, CHI 29
  3:06 4th
  C. Williams sacked by A. Muhammad for 5 yard loss

• 2nd & 15, CHI 24
  2:32 4th
  C. Williams passed to D. Moore to the left for 14 yard gain, tackled by K. Vildor

• 3rd & 1, CHI 38
  2:25 4th
  D. Swift rushed up the middle for 12 yard gain, tackled by K. Joseph

2:00 4th
Two-minute warning

• 1st & 10, Midfield
  2:00 4th
  C. Williams sacked by E. Turner and Z. Smith for 7 yard loss

• 2nd & 17, CHI 43
  1:26 4th
  C. Williams rushed up the middle for 13 yard gain, tackled by B. Branch

1:08 4th
Detroit timeout

• 3rd & 4, DET 44
  1:08 4th
  C. Williams incomplete pass down the middle intended for K. Allen

• 4th & 4, DET 44
  1:04 4th
  Chicago committed 10 yard penalty (Pass Interference)

• 4th & 14, CHI 46
  0:56 4th
  Detroit committed 29 yard penalty (Pass Interference)

• 1st & 10, DET 25
  0:46 4th
  C. Williams incomplete pass down the middle intended for D. Moore

0:43 4th
Chicago timeout

• 2nd & 10, DET 25
  0:43 4th
  Chicago committed 10 yard penalty (Illegal Use of Hands)

• 2nd & 20, DET 35
  0:36 4th
  C. Williams sacked by Z. Smith for 6 yard loss

• 3rd & 26, DET 41
  0:06 4th
  C. Williams incomplete pass to the right intended for R. Odunze

​

On the second dead ball timeout (0:43) the ball was snapped as the officials was coming in from the side. Caleb toss the ball on to the turf, clearly frustrating - they were going to get the play off, he had to be thinking "what are they doing - we had it under control." Second time that happened on the final drive.

Not defending Eberflus, he should have been fired long ago, but I think those two incidents contributed to his brain paralysis on the final play. He was like a single thread processor stuck on the one task in front of him:

• we're going to rerack, run the play, call the timeout, kick the FG.
  
  It's like he couldn't process the new information:
  
  
• the QB got sacked, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the QB is slow getting up, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the offensive guard is gesturing frantically to get Caleb's attention to hurry things up, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the quarterback is gesticulating wildly trying to get his team back, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the TE and Slot receiver can't sort out who is on the line who is off the line, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the ball is floating incomplete, why does the clock say 0:00?

 

[Chaz McNulty]

​

On the second dead ball timeout (0:43) the ball was snapped as the officials was coming in from the side. Caleb toss the ball on to the turf, clearly frustrating - they were going to get the play off, he had to be thinking "what are they doing - we had it under control." Second time that happened on the final drive.

Not defending Eberflus, he should have been fired long ago, but I think those two incidents contributed to his brain paralysis on the final play. He was like a single thread processor stuck on the one task in front of him:

• we're going to rerack, run the play, call the timeout, kick the FG.
  
  It's like he couldn't process the new information:
  
  
• the QB got sacked, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the QB is slow getting up, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the offensive guard is gesturing frantically to get Caleb's attention to hurry things up, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the quarterback is gesticulating wildly trying to get his team back, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the TE and Slot receiver can't sort out who is on the line who is off the line, we need to call timeout [blocked]
• the ball is floating incomplete, why does the clock say 0:00?

I didn't watch the game and was only aware of the last play. I didn't know how the other two timeouts were wasted. That is awful.

 

[Bottomfeeder Sports]

I would love to see the math and an actual study. I think you are splitting your 4s my friend.

A bit dated now, but the case in question down 9 with the conversion attempt pending is (or was at the time?) only the tiniest bit better to go for two rather than kick. I'd like an update to this now that a few coaches have caught on to the down 8 decisions.

When to go for 2 - for real

 

[Chaka]

Analytics are a lie.

 

[rockaction]

I would love to see the math and an actual study. I think you are splitting your 4s my friend.

A bit dated now, but the case in question down 9 with the conversion attempt pending is (or was at the time?) only the tiniest bit better to go for two rather than kick. I'd like an update to this now that a few coaches have caught on to the down 8 decisions.

When to go for 2 - for real

That doesn’t take game theory into account at all. It’s a raw study and they conclude that the EXP WP is the same. In fact, they say it twice in the article. I get you’re saying that there’s a move from 3.3 to 2.9, but I’m not sure they found it significant. Actually, they explicitly say it’s about the same.

And it doesn’t take into consideration that your opponent gets to possess the ball at least once sandwiched around your scoring drives.

It also hinges on the accuracy of the quant methods behind EXP WP, which I don’t believe can ever be fully accounted for.

And that assumes you convert 2 point-conversions at a fifty percent rate while XPs are at 95%. Both of those numbers are fine by me, so really the only thing is that the other team gets to hold the football twice.

Brian Burke is the one who talked about “knowing what you need” and for as useful his work is, he’s discounting the aspect of the other team also knowing and also possessing the ball and adjusting accordingly.

 

[rockaction]

This article articulates very quickly what I’ve been trying to say. From Tony Dungy (yes, I know).

Going for two when down nine doesn't make sense

Not long ago, NFL coaches resisted doing the unconventional thing because doing the unconventional thing and failing resulted in the kind of criticism that can get a guy fired.

www.nbcsports.com

 

[rockaction]

From the analytics department of ESPN from 2023. Again, not taking into account the other teams’ mindset. This is based on pure probability and they find no difference to a “certainly small” one.

NFL game management cheat sheet: Guide to fourth downs and 2-point conversions

Curious about a fourth-down or 2-point conversion decision? ESPN's recommendation model can help.

www.espn.com

Down nine points: This actually is not so clear cut. Logically, it makes sense to go for two late, though the advantage is smaller than you might think. The idea is to find out now if you are down one score or two scores rather than finding out later, because it can affect your future decision-making. Our win probability model doesn't always see it this way, however. If you were asking me: I'd go for two, but the advantage gained is certainly small.

 

[rockaction]

Chase Stuart weighs in from 2012 with this exact question and urges people to go for two. I disagree. You don’t go for one because “I don’t wanna know!!,” you go for one because you don’t want the other coach to know!

Trailing by 15 in the middle of the 4th quarter, teams are foolish to not go for 2 after touchdowns

Let’s start with the obvious: your odds of winning when trailing by 15 in the 4th quarter are really, really low. From 1994, the first season the two-point attempt was introduced to the NFL, to 2011, 68 teams have entered the 4th quarter trailing by exactly 15 points. Only one of those teams...

www.footballperspective.com

 

[Bottomfeeder Sports]

I would love to see the math and an actual study. I think you are splitting your 4s my friend.

A bit dated now, but the case in question down 9 with the conversion attempt pending is (or was at the time?) only the tiniest bit better to go for two rather than kick. I'd like an update to this now that a few coaches have caught on to the down 8 decisions.

When to go for 2 - for real

That doesn’t take game theory into account at all. It’s a raw study and they conclude that the EXP WP is the same. In fact, they say it twice in the article. I get you’re saying that there’s a move from 3.3 to 2.9, but I’m not sure they found it significant. Actually, they explicitly say it’s about the same.

And it doesn’t take into consideration that your opponent gets to possess the ball at least once sandwiched around your scoring drives.

It also hinges on the accuracy of the quant methods behind EXP WP, which I don’t believe can ever be fully accounted for.

And that assumes you convert 2 point-conversions at a fifty percent rate while XPs are at 95%. Both of those numbers are fine by me, so really the only thing is that the other team gets to hold the football twice.

Brian Burke is the one who talked about “knowing what you need” and for as useful his work is, he’s discounting the aspect of the other team also knowing and also possessing the ball and adjusting accordingly.

A "tiniest bit better" is not suggesting there was a significant difference between going for one or two. And it isn't rebutted by anything in the article. This is a debate that will go one because the differences at this level are insignificant. And quoting from the same article at a different link is hardly a rebuttal.

 

[rockaction]

I would love to see the math and an actual study. I think you are splitting your 4s my friend.

A bit dated now, but the case in question down 9 with the conversion attempt pending is (or was at the time?) only the tiniest bit better to go for two rather than kick. I'd like an update to this now that a few coaches have caught on to the down 8 decisions.

When to go for 2 - for real

That doesn’t take game theory into account at all. It’s a raw study and they conclude that the EXP WP is the same. In fact, they say it twice in the article. I get you’re saying that there’s a move from 3.3 to 2.9, but I’m not sure they found it significant. Actually, they explicitly say it’s about the same.

And it doesn’t take into consideration that your opponent gets to possess the ball at least once sandwiched around your scoring drives.

It also hinges on the accuracy of the quant methods behind EXP WP, which I don’t believe can ever be fully accounted for.

And that assumes you convert 2 point-conversions at a fifty percent rate while XPs are at 95%. Both of those numbers are fine by me, so really the only thing is that the other team gets to hold the football twice.

Brian Burke is the one who talked about “knowing what you need” and for as useful his work is, he’s discounting the aspect of the other team also knowing and also possessing the ball and adjusting accordingly.

A "tiniest bit better" is not suggesting there was a significant difference between going for one or two. And it isn't rebutted by anything in the article. This is a debate that will go one because the differences at this level are insignificant. And quoting from the same article at a different link is hardly a rebuttal.

Where did I quote from “the same article” as a rebuttal? The only rebuttal was Tony Dungy and Florio (PFT talk). That was a totally different article. The quote from ESPN rebuts nothing. I put that there for the reader. Same with the Chase Stuart article, which contradicts my own position. I did that in the interest of full disclosure. If anything, I went out of my way so the reader had the position contra mine.

Sleight of hand indeed!

 

[Bottomfeeder Sports]

Chase Stuart weighs in from 2012 with this exact question and urges people to go for two. I disagree. You don’t go for one because “I don’t wanna know!!,” you go for one because you don’t want the other coach to know!

In general, I think the usefulness of knowledge positively correlates with the recipient of that knowledge. So, I guess about half the time you have a point.

That being said I find it funny that Chase "was disappointed but not surprised that Mike McCarthy decided to go for 1" and Tony Dungy is criticizing "coach Mike McCarthy, for going for two". Which "McCarthy’s decision paid off despite itself"?

Psychology is and always will be the water’s edge of analytics. Numbers and formulas and percentages have their place. They can’t, won’t, and never will factor intangible realities like the mindset of a team up by one score versus the mindset of a team up by two scores.

The 1984 Baseball Abstract has an article called "Outsiders Baseball" where Bill James pretty much addresses things that insiders consider that doesn't actually have any analytical evidence of existing. Seems to apply to the above.

ETA: But ultimately, the degree that psychology and other intangible factors do have an impact beyond random noise, with enough samples that impact is going to be baked into the math. It is not an excluded factor. It is not overlooked.

 

[Bottomfeeder Sports]

Where did I quote from “the same article” as a rebuttal? The only rebuttal was Tony Dungy and Florio (PFT talk). That was a totally different article. The quote from ESPN rebuts nothing. I put that there for the reader. Same with the Chase Stuart article, which contradicts my own position. I did that in the interest of full disclosure. If anything, I went out of my way so the reader had the position contra mine.


Sleight of hand indeed!

All right my bad. After a few hours between posts these were close enough to be the exact same to me rather than just the same, and after seeing the same numbers and text regurgitated in multiple 2017(?) articles that said the same thing I took

The ESPN quote

Down nine points: This actually is not so clear cut. Logically, it makes sense to go for two late, though the advantage is smaller than you might think. The idea is to find out now if you are down one score or two scores rather than finding out later, because it can affect your future decision-making. Our win probability model doesn't always see it this way, however. If you were asking me: I'd go for two, but the advantage gained is certainly small.

The 539 quote-

• When down 9 points late-ish, there’s a case that you should go for 2, because being down 8, you would have to go for 2 to draw even eventually anyway, and it’s better to know whether you converted your attempt earlier so you can make tactical adjustments. Although this logic seems sound, the data doesn’t suggest the effect is very significant (if it exists at all).

being the exact same. They were merely the same conclusion.

 

[CalBear]

Chase Stuart weighs in from 2012 with this exact question and urges people to go for two. I disagree. You don’t go for one because “I don’t wanna know!!,” you go for one because you don’t want the other coach to know!

Trailing by 15 in the middle of the 4th quarter, teams are foolish to not go for 2 after touchdowns

Let’s start with the obvious: your odds of winning when trailing by 15 in the 4th quarter are really, really low. From 1994, the first season the two-point attempt was introduced to the NFL, to 2011, 68 teams have entered the 4th quarter trailing by exactly 15 points. Only one of those teams...

www.footballperspective.com

The question is, will the other team behave differently when up by 8 vs. up by 7 or 9? I mean, they might be slightly more likely to care about first downs but the decision tree isn't affected nearly as much for the team that's ahead.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

College edition: I’m more of a Michigan fan than a CFB fan, which means the only time I see Ohio State is during The Game. It’s such a pleasant surprise each year to be reminded of how terrible a coach Ryan Day is. Like a nice little pre-Christmas gift.

This year he did actually manage to go for it on a couple fourth and shorts, but he also completely mismanaged the substitutions coming out of a timeout on the most important third down of the game, gifting Michigan a first and goal. And then he tried to call a second timeout, which would have been a penalty if the refs hadn’t already called a 12-men penalty. The net result is that Michigan managed to burn an extra minute (and force OSU to use their final timeout).

I really hope they never fire that guy

 

[BobbyLayne]

Analytics are a lie.

Troy Aikman burner acct

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Not watching SEA-NYJ, but is there any extenuating circumstance that would explain the Seahawks punting on 4th and 1 from midfield?

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Steelers trying to run out the clock late. Najee Harris gains three yards on 2nd and 7, but there's an offensive holding call. Zac Taylor declines the penalty. I get the logic of not giving your opponent an extra down, but your priority in that situation has to be getting the ball back, and I can't imagine 2nd and 17 doesn't make that more likely than 3rd and 4, especially since with that far to go, Pittsburgh would likely get conservative and run it a couple times before punting

Instead, Fields bootleg for the first down. Game over

 

[zed2283]

Siriani kicking the extra point to go up 9 instead of going for 2.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Note to analytics hipsters: Talking about how teams should go for two after scoring to cut their deficit to 8 is sooooo 2021. The new hotness is "teams shouldn't kick a FG late to go up 6".

Arizona did that on Sunday, and the craziest part is that not only did kicking the FG backfire, it backfired in the exact way that the theory predicts.

Background: Cards had 4th and goal on the 4 with 3:20 left, up 19-16. Gannon elects to kick the FG. Vikings get it back and drive down to the Arizona 33, where they face 4th and 5 with 2:10 left. In a three-point game, they may well have kicked the 51-yard FG there to tie it up, which would have given Kyler plenty of time to try to engineer a game-winning drive. Instead, they had to go for it. Twelve-yard completion to Jefferson, and three plays later they score the game-winning TD

 

[Zow]

Note to analytics hipsters: Talking about how teams should go for two after scoring to cut their deficit to 8 is sooooo 2021. The new hotness is "teams shouldn't kick a FG late to go up 6".

Arizona did that on Sunday, and the craziest part is that not only did kicking the FG backfire, it backfired in the exact way that the theory predicts.

Background: Cards had 4th and goal on the 4 with 3:20 left, up 19-16. Gannon elects to kick the FG. Vikings get it back and drive down to the Arizona 33, where they face 4th and 5 with 2:10 left. In a three-point game, they may well have kicked the 51-yard FG there to tie it up, which would have given Kyler plenty of time to try to engineer a game-winning drive. Instead, they had to go for it. Twelve-yard completion to Jefferson, and three plays later they score the game-winning TD

I can say as a Vikings fan I was happy in the moment (though I concede I wasn't calculating anything in my head) when the Cards kicked the FG.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Was thinking about Campbell's decision to go for it on 4th down at the end of last night's game, and realized he was doing the thing that anti-analytics folks always say they want coaches to do: Not just follow the numbers and consider game-specific factors.*

Strictly by the numbers, the nerds said that kicking the FG was the right move there. Even just thinking of the situation logically, it would make sense that converting a 4th and inches is a high-probability event, but preventing a scoring drive when your opponent has 30 seconds and no timeouts is a higher probability.

But when you consider how Detroit's banged-up defense had had trouble stopping the Packers the entire second half, it makes more sense to put the game on their o-line to get enough push. (Someone in the game thread mentioned that they seemed to catch the Packers by surprise, presumably because they expected the Lions were only lining up to try to draw them offsides).

Of course, I doubt you'll see many anti-analytics folks making that argument today. Because it's long been obvious that the argument isn't made in good faith; rather, it's a way for people to criticize EV+ decisions that run counter to their traditionalist, long-held beliefs. And there aren't many beliefs that are more tradtional or long held than "Take the points."


* To be fair, I don't actually think that was how Campbell made his decision. I think it's more that his gut tells him to go for it more than your average coach, and his thinking was probably just "Get a yard, win the game."

 

[Leroy Hoard]

Note to analytics hipsters: Talking about how teams should go for two after scoring to cut their deficit to 8 is sooooo 2021. The new hotness is "teams shouldn't kick a FG late to go up 6".

Arizona did that on Sunday, and the craziest part is that not only did kicking the FG backfire, it backfired in the exact way that the theory predicts.

Background: Cards had 4th and goal on the 4 with 3:20 left, up 19-16. Gannon elects to kick the FG. Vikings get it back and drive down to the Arizona 33, where they face 4th and 5 with 2:10 left. In a three-point game, they may well have kicked the 51-yard FG there to tie it up, which would have given Kyler plenty of time to try to engineer a game-winning drive. Instead, they had to go for it. Twelve-yard completion to Jefferson, and three plays later they score the game-winning TD

I can say as a Vikings fan I was happy in the moment (though I concede I wasn't calculating anything in my head) when the Cards kicked the FG.

Yes, as soon as the Cards turtled up and kicked the field goal I knew the Vikings were going to win the game.

 

[IvanKaramazov]

Was thinking about Campbell's decision to go for it on 4th down at the end of last night's game, and realized he was doing the thing that anti-analytics folks always say they want coaches to do: Not just follow the numbers and consider game-specific factors.*

Strictly by the numbers, the nerds said that kicking the FG was the right move there. Even just thinking of the situation logically, it would make sense that converting a 4th and inches is a high-probability event, but preventing a scoring drive when your opponent has 30 seconds and no timeouts is a higher probability.

But when you consider how Detroit's banged-up defense had had trouble stopping the Packers the entire second half, it makes more sense to put the game on their o-line to get enough push. (Someone in the game thread mentioned that they seemed to catch the Packers by surprise, presumably because they expected the Lions were only lining up to try to draw them offsides).

Of course, I doubt you'll see many anti-analytics folks making that argument today. Because it's long been obvious that the argument isn't made in good faith; rather, it's a way for people to criticize EV+ decisions that run counter to their traditionalist, long-held beliefs. And there aren't many beliefs that are more tradtional or long held than "Take the points."


* To be fair, I don't actually think that was how Campbell made his decision. I think it's more that his gut tells him to go for it more than your average coach, and his thinking was probably just "Get a yard, win the game."

I supported Campbell's decision, and I didn't of that as being "anti-analytics." Obviously I don't how Campbell himself viewed it -- maybe he's irrationally biased toward going for it the same way that dinosaur coaches were irrationally biased toward punting. But the way I thought about it was basically what you said. "I know the statistics probably say that they should kick the FG, but I think this is one of those situations where the statistics are off, and I think that for very specific reasons -- this Detroit team absolutely excels on offense in general and in situations like in particular, but their defense is highly suspect because of injuries that 'the numbers' can't account for. That makes this decision closer than it appears."

I see that reasoning as a smart application of analytics.

 

[Pip's Invitation]

Was thinking about Campbell's decision to go for it on 4th down at the end of last night's game, and realized he was doing the thing that anti-analytics folks always say they want coaches to do: Not just follow the numbers and consider game-specific factors.*

Strictly by the numbers, the nerds said that kicking the FG was the right move there. Even just thinking of the situation logically, it would make sense that converting a 4th and inches is a high-probability event, but preventing a scoring drive when your opponent has 30 seconds and no timeouts is a higher probability.

But when you consider how Detroit's banged-up defense had had trouble stopping the Packers the entire second half, it makes more sense to put the game on their o-line to get enough push. (Someone in the game thread mentioned that they seemed to catch the Packers by surprise, presumably because they expected the Lions were only lining up to try to draw them offsides).

Of course, I doubt you'll see many anti-analytics folks making that argument today. Because it's long been obvious that the argument isn't made in good faith; rather, it's a way for people to criticize EV+ decisions that run counter to their traditionalist, long-held beliefs. And there aren't many beliefs that are more tradtional or long held than "Take the points."


* To be fair, I don't actually think that was how Campbell made his decision. I think it's more that his gut tells him to go for it more than your average coach, and his thinking was probably just "Get a yard, win the game."

I supported Campbell's decision, and I didn't of that as being "anti-analytics." Obviously I don't how Campbell himself viewed it -- maybe he's irrationally biased toward going for it the same way that dinosaur coaches were irrationally biased toward punting. But the way I thought about it was basically what you said. "I know the statistics probably say that they should kick the FG, but I think this is one of those situations where the statistics are off, and I think that for very specific reasons -- this Detroit team absolutely excels on offense in general and in situations like in particular, but their defense is highly suspect because of injuries that 'the numbers' can't account for. That makes this decision closer than it appears."

I see that reasoning as a smart application of analytics.

Yep. It was actually shocking they got stuffed on third and inches. That wasn’t going to happen twice in a row.

 

[rockaction]

Of course, I doubt you'll see many anti-analytics folks making that argument today

But they’re not arguing that. They’re arguing that he shouldn’t have gone for it for other reasons. Very few are looking at EV and saying, “he should have gone by EV in this case.” The real anti-analytics folks don’t trust EV. They’re not all of the sudden holding it up as the gold standard for when and when not to go for it.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Was thinking about Campbell's decision to go for it on 4th down at the end of last night's game, and realized he was doing the thing that anti-analytics folks always say they want coaches to do: Not just follow the numbers and consider game-specific factors.*

Strictly by the numbers, the nerds said that kicking the FG was the right move there. Even just thinking of the situation logically, it would make sense that converting a 4th and inches is a high-probability event, but preventing a scoring drive when your opponent has 30 seconds and no timeouts is a higher probability.

But when you consider how Detroit's banged-up defense had had trouble stopping the Packers the entire second half, it makes more sense to put the game on their o-line to get enough push. (Someone in the game thread mentioned that they seemed to catch the Packers by surprise, presumably because they expected the Lions were only lining up to try to draw them offsides).

Of course, I doubt you'll see many anti-analytics folks making that argument today. Because it's long been obvious that the argument isn't made in good faith; rather, it's a way for people to criticize EV+ decisions that run counter to their traditionalist, long-held beliefs. And there aren't many beliefs that are more tradtional or long held than "Take the points."


* To be fair, I don't actually think that was how Campbell made his decision. I think it's more that his gut tells him to go for it more than your average coach, and his thinking was probably just "Get a yard, win the game."

I supported Campbell's decision, and I didn't of that as being "anti-analytics." Obviously I don't how Campbell himself viewed it -- maybe he's irrationally biased toward going for it the same way that dinosaur coaches were irrationally biased toward punting. But the way I thought about it was basically what you said. "I know the statistics probably say that they should kick the FG, but I think this is one of those situations where the statistics are off, and I think that for very specific reasons -- this Detroit team absolutely excels on offense in general and in situations like in particular, but their defense is highly suspect because of injuries that 'the numbers' can't account for. That makes this decision closer than it appears."

I see that reasoning as a smart application of analytics.

I would pay to read a first-hand account of how teams make these types of in-game decisions (feels like something Peter King might have done back in his MMQB days). My understanding is that teams are not allowed to make real-time calculations and provide them to the HC. Which would mean the viewer at home watching Amazon or NBC showing a graphic estimating the WP% has more information than the HC.

Assuming that is the case, my guess is that the way it works is teams come up with general rules of thumb beforehand ("If it's 4th and less than X yards to go and we're on the Y yard line, go for it") and then coaches use that as a general guide. I would also imagine that it varies greatly among coaches how much the analytics folks have input on setting those guidelines, and how much the coach even considers it in real time.

All of which is to say that it's highly unlikely Campbell had any idea whether going for it was EV+ in that situation, and probably used the kind of logic we're discussing here about trusting his offense to get a yard and win the game

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Of course, I doubt you'll see many anti-analytics folks making that argument today

But they’re not arguing that. They’re arguing that he shouldn’t have gone for it for other reasons. Very few are looking at EV and saying, “he should have gone by EV in this case.” The real anti-analytics folks don’t trust EV. They’re not all of the sudden holding it up as the gold standard for when and when not to go for it.

Of course they aren't. I'm just saying that if you took them at their word, Campbell ignoring EV calculations due to context would be something they would praise. But the argument was never made in good faith.

By the way, one of my long-time hobby horses is that "analytics" are usually just statistical evidence in support of logic. To take an extreme example, if you have the ball on the 10 yard line with 1 second left in a tie game, analytics would suggest that you kick the FG rather than trying to score a TD. But of course, any idiot with half a brain would look at that situation and realize that you have to kick.

Where there are points of contention are the cases where the statistical case feels counterintuitive. That's why going for two when you're down eight took so long to catch on. But once you overcome that intuitive bias, it makes perfect sense. I could make the case for going for two without using any math whatsoever

 

[rockaction]

Where there are points of contention are the cases where the statistical case feels counterintuitive.

I agree with you about this. “Analytics,” when used as a pejorative, is usually referring to these instances where the logical, rational decision doesn’t seem right.

I had no idea that teams weren’t allowed to provide their coaches WP calculations in real time. That makes . . . no sense. Are you sure that’s true?

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Where there are points of contention are the cases where the statistical case feels counterintuitive.

I agree with you about this. “Analytics,” when used as a pejorative, is usually referring to these instances where the logical, rational decision doesn’t seem right.

I had no idea that teams weren’t allowed to provide their coaches WP calculations in real time. That makes . . . no sense. Are you sure that’s true?

I can't remember where I saw that, but I think it's of a broader piece where the rule is that the staff can communicate with each other, but not with the outside world, including other people and the Internet. That was why the Browns GM got in trouble a few years back for calling the coach on the field during games.

But I may be misremembering it , so you should by no means take this as Gospel. I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

 

[rockaction]

I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

If you do indeed find the time, thank you.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

If you do indeed find the time, thank you.

OK did a quick Google search and couldn't find anything conclusive, but this article from The Athletic about how teams use analytics seems like the dog that didn't bark. There's a whole section on in-game decisions that never mentions crunching real-time data and does talk about what I was saying in an earlier post -- trends and rules of thumb and such. At the same time, it would be kind of weird if an article like this didn't mention the real-time ban, so who knows?

 

[rockaction]

I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

If you do indeed find the time, thank you.

OK did a quick Google search and couldn't find anything conclusive, but this article from The Athletic about how teams use analytics seems like the dog that didn't bark. There's a whole section on in-game decisions that never mentions crunching real-time data and does talk about what I was saying in an earlier post -- trends and rules of thumb and such. At the same time, it would be kind of weird if an article like this didn't mention the real-time ban, so who knows?

Amazing how two people can read the same article and come away with a very different opinion about what is unspoken. I’ll post it below, but I took the in-game section to mean that they absolutely could relay this information down to the field. If they can be in the coach’s ear, what’s to stop them from relaying WP of different situations? That would seem to be impossible to police. But I could be wrong. Thanks for the link.

From the Athletic, and I would say that the “many facets beyond fourth-down decisions” means that they are indeed in the coach’s ear about fourth-down WP. But again, I could be assuming too much. Here’s the money quote and section:

________________________________________________________

In-game

Many head coaches and coordinators have game managers in their ears on gameday who help them in many facets beyond fourth-down decisions. For example, when talking to a defensive coordinator, a game manager could discuss potential situations on the next drive as far as time, the opposing team’s timeouts and generally what to watch out for next, and to relay reminders to certain players. (Example: “Let’s keep them in bounds here.”) The analytics department could also have very specific information, like what an opposing coach likes to do in very specific situations.

 

[Tau837]

I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

If you do indeed find the time, thank you.

OK did a quick Google search and couldn't find anything conclusive, but this article from The Athletic about how teams use analytics seems like the dog that didn't bark. There's a whole section on in-game decisions that never mentions crunching real-time data and does talk about what I was saying in an earlier post -- trends and rules of thumb and such. At the same time, it would be kind of weird if an article like this didn't mention the real-time ban, so who knows?

I expect every team has its own model for when to go for it on 4th down, where every team's model might differ somewhat from other teams' models. I further expect that every team tailors its model to each weekly opponent during the week, and they provide the data (perhaps some kind of chart) to the coaching staff before the game. Of course, that is an input, and a smart coach will use it as such, along with other inputs like injuries not known before the model was created, weather, how the game is going on offense/defense, etc.

If my expectations are correct, there is no need for accessing the internet, etc. to do real-time number crunching.

 

[Tau837]

I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

If you do indeed find the time, thank you.

OK did a quick Google search and couldn't find anything conclusive, but this article from The Athletic about how teams use analytics seems like the dog that didn't bark. There's a whole section on in-game decisions that never mentions crunching real-time data and does talk about what I was saying in an earlier post -- trends and rules of thumb and such. At the same time, it would be kind of weird if an article like this didn't mention the real-time ban, so who knows?

Amazing how two people can read the same article and come away with a very different opinion about what is unspoken. I’ll post it below, but I took the in-game section to mean that they absolutely could relay this information down to the field. If they can be in the coach’s ear, what’s to stop them from relaying WP of different situations? That would seem to be impossible to police.

"In-game

Many head coaches and coordinators have game managers in their ears on gameday who help them in many facets beyond fourth-down decisions. For example, when talking to a defensive coordinator, a game manager could discuss potential situations on the next drive as far as time, the opposing team’s timeouts and generally what to watch out for next, and to relay reminders to certain players. (Example: “Let’s keep them in bounds here.”) The analytics department could also have very specific information, like what an opposing coach likes to do in very specific situations."

I agree with this take, as I just posted. I think @ignatiusjreilly was making reference to not being able to consult with people not viewed as "in game staff" for lack of a better phrase.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

I'll do some digging and see if I can figure out what the exact rules are.

If you do indeed find the time, thank you.

OK did a quick Google search and couldn't find anything conclusive, but this article from The Athletic about how teams use analytics seems like the dog that didn't bark. There's a whole section on in-game decisions that never mentions crunching real-time data and does talk about what I was saying in an earlier post -- trends and rules of thumb and such. At the same time, it would be kind of weird if an article like this didn't mention the real-time ban, so who knows?

Amazing how two people can read the same article and come away with a very different opinion about what is unspoken. I’ll post it below, but I took the in-game section to mean that they absolutely could relay this information down to the field. If they can be in the coach’s ear, what’s to stop them from relaying WP of different situations? That would seem to be impossible to police. But I could be wrong. Thanks for the link.

From the Athletic, and I would say that the “many facets beyond fourth-down decisions” means that they are indeed in the coach’s ear about fourth-down WP. But again, I could be assuming too much. Here’s the money quote and section:

________________________________________________________

In-game

Many head coaches and coordinators have game managers in their ears on gameday who help them in many facets beyond fourth-down decisions. For example, when talking to a defensive coordinator, a game manager could discuss potential situations on the next drive as far as time, the opposing team’s timeouts and generally what to watch out for next, and to relay reminders to certain players. (Example: “Let’s keep them in bounds here.”) The analytics department could also have very specific information, like what an opposing coach likes to do in very specific situations.

Certainly could be, or could be "In these types of 4th down situations, you should go for it". Maybe the lesson is that we should consider this article inconclusive and the issue of real-time analytics a still-open question

 

[rockaction]

Maybe the lesson is that we should consider this article inconclusive and the issue of real-time analytics a still-open question

Probably the safest conclusion to draw. I’m nodding in agreement with this.

 

[Chaka]

Maybe the lesson is that we should consider this article inconclusive and the issue of real-time analytics a still-open question

Probably the safest conclusion to draw. I’m nodding in agreement with this.

Confirmed

 

[rockaction]

Confirmed

My browser won’t link to what you’ve linked to.

Dunno why.

 

[Chaka]

Confirmed

My browser won’t link to what you’ve linked to.

Dunno why.

Don't worry about it. You're not missing much.

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Note to analytics hipsters: Talking about how teams should go for two after scoring to cut their deficit to 8 is sooooo 2021. The new hotness is "teams shouldn't kick a FG late to go up 6".

Arizona did that on Sunday, and the craziest part is that not only did kicking the FG backfire, it backfired in the exact way that the theory predicts.

Background: Cards had 4th and goal on the 4 with 3:20 left, up 19-16. Gannon elects to kick the FG. Vikings get it back and drive down to the Arizona 33, where they face 4th and 5 with 2:10 left. In a three-point game, they may well have kicked the 51-yard FG there to tie it up, which would have given Kyler plenty of time to try to engineer a game-winning drive. Instead, they had to go for it. Twelve-yard completion to Jefferson, and three plays later they score the game-winning TD

Hey, Sean McVay -- who for all his genius, is not usually at the cutting edge of analytically based decisions -- did the right thing today vs. the Bills!

The scene: Rams leading 38-35, face a 4th and 5 at the Buffalo 35 with just under four minutes remaining. Maybe it was more a function of not trusting his kicker from 53, but instead of trying to go up six and giving Allen the ball back, Rams went for it and converted. Three plays later, they iced the game with a TD.

(Sorry for not posting this in the "Post here when coaches do something you agree with" thread)

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Maybe the lesson is that we should consider this article inconclusive and the issue of real-time analytics a still-open question

Probably the safest conclusion to draw. I’m nodding in agreement with this.

Confirmed

Are you saying analytics sits on a throne of lies?

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

Helpful reminder that, unlike the Lions on Thursday, the Jets “took the points” today and it came back to bite them

 

[BobbyLayne]

71 seconds left, 1st & goal from the 1, BUF had all 3 of their timeouts

Bills ran a sneak, stopped, use a timeout

it’s 2024

how can teams still be this bad at situational awareness?

if they don’t use their timeout, they can get the ball back with 40-45 seconds left after a 3 n out - down by 2

instead they never get another offensive snap

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

71 seconds left, 1st & goal from the 1, BUF had all 3 of their timeouts

Bills ran a sneak, stopped, use a timeout

it’s 2024

how can teams still be this bad at situational awareness?

if they don’t use their timeout, they can get the ball back with 40-45 seconds left after a 3 n out - down by 2

instead they never get another offensive snap

Shades of Campbell in the NFCCG. Running the ball on third down was maybe a mistake, but calling a TO definitely was

 

[ignatiusjreilly]

71 seconds left, 1st & goal from the 1, BUF had all 3 of their timeouts

Bills ran a sneak, stopped, use a timeout

it’s 2024

how can teams still be this bad at situational awareness?

if they don’t use their timeout, they can get the ball back with 40-45 seconds left after a 3 n out - down by 2

instead they never get another offensive snap

For the record, I also disagree with the Bills decision to only have nine men on the field for the final play of the game, making it impossible for them to either block the punt or execute a return

 

[Instinctive]

71 seconds left, 1st & goal from the 1, BUF had all 3 of their timeouts

Bills ran a sneak, stopped, use a timeout

it’s 2024

how can teams still be this bad at situational awareness?

if they don’t use their timeout, they can get the ball back with 40-45 seconds left after a 3 n out - down by 2

instead they never get another offensive snap

For the record, I also disagree with the Bills decision to only have nine men on the field for the final play of the game, making it impossible for them to either block the punt or execute a return

WOULD LOVE TO HAVE A LAUGH REACTION HERE. That is gold haha