Russia's Return (3 Viewers)

[SaintsInDome2006]

Vladimir Putin's heroes: Russian president motivated by writers' messianic view of country's destiny


In 1877, the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire, seeking among other things to reclaim its Crimean Black Sea naval port of Sevastopol.

Soon after, a young mystic poet and philosopher named Vladimir Solovyov gave his first public lecture in Saint Petersburg. A “wild looking” intellectual gadfly with long hair and “fiery” eyes, he expressed a vision of Russian destiny that, a century later, has made him a philosophical hero of the man behind Russia’s latest Crimean adventure, the long-serving autocratic President Vladimir Putin.

“The lecture had a markedly conservative agenda, close to the Slavophile belief in Russia’s divinely inspired historical mission,” according to Solovyov’s biographer, Judith Deutsch Kornblatt. “In it, he criticizes the blind, monolithic power of the East as well as the fragmented power of the West; the former destroys the freedom of the individual, while the latter leads to unchecked egoism and anarchy.”

Solovyov’s argument — still so relevant that Mr. Putin reportedly assigns his political underlings to read him — was that “hope for the future resides only with a third people, the Slavs,” whose national character integrates the other two extremes.

For a man whose motives are often obscured by a brutal pragmatism, the Crimean conflict has offered a rare window into Mr. Putin’s mind, his understanding of Russia’s history and his vision of its rightful future.





As the Polish-American journalist Anne Applebaum wrote this week: “Putin invaded Crimea because Putin needs a war.”

But not just any war.

Mr. Putin is a product of the Soviet Union and sees its collapse as the greatest disaster of the modern era, a view that is rooted in a deeper narrative about Moscow as the “Third Rome,” said Neil MacFarlane, Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford, focused on the politics of the former Soviet Union.

The collapse of Russia under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, further strengthened Mr. Putin’s resolve to restore its former glory, and writers like Solovyov — obscured during Soviet rule, he rose in prominence following the 1980s Glasnost policy of openness — had a “visceral appeal.”

Others Mr. Putin reportedly admires and assigns as required reading for Russian politicos include the philosopher Ivan Ilyin, who died in 1954 and whose remains Mr. Putin had moved from Switzerland to Moscow. Ilyin once described the West as trying to break the “broom” of Russia into “twigs” and “rekindle with them the fading light of their civilization.”

Another is Nikolai Berdyaev, the Kyiv-born anti-authoritarian radical who was exiled from Russia in 1922, the year the USSR was created out of the Russian revolution, and lived another quarter-century in Paris.

What unifies them is a mystical, melodramatic, almost messianic view of Russian destiny.

Berdyaev’s philosophy of history is especially revealing when set against the current Crimean conflict, as it describes a three-step process of historical change, roughly comparable to the ideas of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

In the first, “thought is static” in a “settled historical order,” Berdyaev wrote, as in the pre-revolutionary politics of Ukraine.

In the second, there is a “fateful and menacing schism and disruption, when the foundations of an established order are toppling,” as in the Maidan uprising in Kyiv.


Putin sees the Soviet Union’s collapse as the greatest disaster of the modern era, a view that is rooted in a deeper narrative about Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’



In the third, there is a return to the historical, in an age of enlightenment. This is the moment in which Crimea finds itself, pulled taut along the central Russian tension between East and West, a new Russian reality emerging.

“There is this profound and deep trend in Russian thought about, first of all, distinctiveness, and secondly enlightenment,” in which the West is not only fragmented, but “iniquitous,” Mr. MacFarlane said.

The writers Mr. Putin most admires embody this claim to rightness, which itself has served as an excuse for oppression in a land whose language clearly distinguishes between ethnic Russians and de facto political Russians. “The claim is itself oppressive,” Mr. MacFarlane said.

He has read these same authors and found their language beautiful, but their politics “somewhere between wacko and bad, and those are not mutually exclusive categories.”

“What we don’t know is whether [Mr. Putin] actually believes this stuff or not,” he said.

An autocratic former KGB man with pretensions to intellectuality, whose PhD is under suspicion of plagiarism, Mr. Putin seems to believe his mission is to “gather in the lands,” as in the founding myth of Russia as a great gatherer. This ideal is embodied in the 15th century Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan the Great, known as the gatherer, and in Mr. Putin’s mind may have been spoiled only by the ineptitude of the people most recently in charge.

This is not the expansionist “manifest destiny” of early America. In this view, Mr. Putin’s duty is to pull the old Russia together again.

But there is likely also a narrower, more pragmatic agenda at play, in which grandiose displays on the world stage distract from a bad economy that is getting worse and wrong-foot an opposition that is marginalized and feckless at the best of times.

Mr. Putin, for example, has a habit of handing out passports in other countries, which can then make cross-border aggression seem like defence of his own people, as for example in 2008 in South Ossetia, where 80% of people in the disputed territory held Russian documents.

On this view, Mr. Putin is less the philosopher king off to war, and more like a military man dabbling in a library, finding among the stacks a validation of his own pre-determined vision.

It is a common theme in the reading of such mystical, poetic thinkers. People find what they seek.

As Sergei Bulgakov, the great Russian Orthodox theologian who was expelled by the Bolsheviks in 1922, wrote about Solovyov a decade earlier: “Every person finds his own road to [Solovyov], receives answers to his own questions, distinguishes his or her favourite motif within the sonorous chord.”

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/putins-heroes

 

[Quez]

SaintsDome, have you ever seen the series TThe American?

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Putin's Philosopher



Ivan Ilyin and the Ideology of Moscow's Rule


In the last days of April, Russian television aired a 150-minute documentary about Vladimir Putin’s decade and a half as the leader of Russia. Shown around the anniversary of his first inauguration (May 7, 2000), the movie offered a blunt message: in the 15 years of Putin’s rule, he had saved Russia from the forces of destruction, both internal—Chechnya and the oligarchs—and external—insidious Western influence. He, the movie repeatedly reinforced, is the only thing holding the country together.

According to the film, moreover, Putin is not just a political savior: his leadership has also been important for the spiritual revival of Russia and its people. Fully six minutes of the movie were dedicated to a recounting of his work to repatriate the remains of White Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin.

Ilyin was unknown to the wider public before Russian filmmaker and conservative activist Nikita Mikhalkov brought him back from the abyss in the early 2000s. But ignominy was the best place for Ilyin to hang his historical hat. Never a deep or clear thinker, he was not truly an academic or philosopher in the classical sense, but rather a publicist, a conspiracy theorist, and a Russian nationalist with a core of fascistic leanings.


Ignominy was the best place for Ilyin to hang his historical hat.


His works were first promoted within the Kremlin’s inner circle and then quoted by various state officials throughout the second half of the first decade of the 2000s. Putin’s own interest in Ilyin became apparent after 2006, when he began to feature the philosopher prominently in some of his major addresses to the public. Vladislav Surkov, once known as the “Gray Cardinal of the Kremlin” and as the Kremlin’s chief propagandist, is also fond of quoting Ilyin, whose writings he has used as a tool to promote Putin’s idea of sovereign democracy. Putin assigned his regional governors to read Ilyin’s book Our Mission over the 2014 winter break.

Ilyin has also received a great deal of attention from seemingly polar opposite groups within Russian society. Members of the Russian Orthodox Church have referred to him as a “religious philosopher” and as someone who “preached about the spiritual renewal and rebirth of Russia.” At the same time, Ilyin was quoted by the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov, as someone who “made a very significant contribution to the development of the Russian state ideology of patriotism.” 

So, who is Mr. Ilyin?

FROM ANARCHISM TO FASCISM

Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin was born in 1883 to an aristocratic family in Moscow. After graduating from one of the best schools in the city with honors, he enrolled in a jurisprudence program at Imperial Moscow University (today Moscow State University). While at the university, he favored radical political views such as anarchism, but he eventually moved toward the center-right, becoming a protégé of one of the most active liberals of prerevolution Russia, Pavel Novgorodtsev. Unlike his mentor, he did not join the pro-tsarist White Army in its fight against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. He was nonetheless deported from Russia in 1922 as an enemy of the Bolshevik state, along with 160 other philosophers, historians, and economists who would become collectively known as “White Russians.”

For the ten years after his exile, Ilyin worked in Germany, scribbling anti-Bolshevik manifestoes and becoming deeply involved in the Russian intellectual émigré community. From 1927 to 1930, he edited the émigré journal Kolokol and was a lecturer at Berlin’s Russian Scientific Institute from 1923 to 1934. And like many of his fellow White Russians, Ilyin was interested in the idea of Eurasianism, which looked to geography to try to create an alternative to Bolshevism.

The radical evolution of his political views became noticeable in the 1930s, when he began to praise Hitler and Mussolini. In his 1933 article “National Socialism: ‘A New Spirit,’” he welcomed fascism as a rightful response to Bolshevism, supported Hitler’s right-wing aspirations, and bashed German Jews for their “sympathy” with communism until he was fired from the university under political pressure in 1943 and fled to Switzerland a few years later.

Ilyin argues that the Russian state—by which he meant the old Russian Empire and its geographic descendant, the Soviet Union—is a unique geo-historical entity tied together by the spiritual unity of the Euro-Asiatic nations.

In his view, Hitler’s National Socialism, Mussolini’s fascism, and the Russian White movement were very similar and “spiritually close.” He described them as sharing a “common and united enemy, patriotism, sense of honor, voluntary-sacrificial service, an attraction to dictatorial discipline, to spiritual renewal and the revival/rebirth of their country, and the search for a new social justice.” An opponent of both Soviet communism and Western democracy, Ilyin envisioned a “special” path for Russia, based on the promotion of the Orthodox Church and traditional values that would bring about a spiritual renewal of the Russian people, who at the moment he believed were under the influence of Western political and social constructs.  

Despite the horrors of World War II and the defeat of Germany and Italy, Ilyin did not reject fascist ideology. In 1948, he wrote about the mistakes that Hitler had made, but not about the flaws of his ideology. He still recognized it as a just and healthy national-patriotic idea, voicing his hope that Francisco Franco in Spain and António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal would avoid the mistakes that Hitler had made and succeed in their own quests. 

WHY PUTIN LIKES ILYIN

Starting in the late 1940s, Ilyin refocused exclusively on Russia, its future, and its historic mission, a heady philosophical combination that would find its way to a man—Putin—whom the historian Timothy Snyder described as having “placed himself at the head of populist, fascist, and neo-Nazi forces in Europe.”

In his 1950 essay, “What Dismemberment of Russia Entails for the World,” Ilyin predicted the fall of the Soviet Union and gave instructions on how to save Russia from the evils of the Western world. The 12-point essay seems to have in it every single propaganda cliché that Kremlin TV uses today.

Ilyin argues that the Russian state—by which he meant the old Russian Empire and its geographic descendant, the Soviet Union—is a unique geo-historical entity tied together by the spiritual unity of the Euro-Asiatic nations.

As the Cold War took hold, Ilyin became increasingly convinced that the West was keen to see the destruction of Russia and would do whatever it took to achieve that internal fragmentation. This disintegration, he argued, would cause a long-lasting civil war within Russia whose negative consequences would reverberate around the world. Given the chance, meanwhile, great powers would inevitably try to annex parts of the Russian state and stimulate havoc, disorganization, and decay. Germany, he writes, “would move into Ukraine and the Baltics, England would bite off the Caucasus and Central Asia, Japan will target the Far Eastern shores.”

Once the West, particularly Germany, annexed Ukraine, it would use the territory to undermine the might of the Russian state. Like many other conservatives, he did not believe that there was such a thing as a Ukrainian nation; Ukrainians thus had no right to any form of statehood. Meanwhile, for Russia, the loss of Ukraine would be fatal and lead to the further dismemberment and disintegration of the nation.

As a warning to his fellow countrymen, Ilyin argues that during this process, the West would use the ideas of “democratization,” “federalization,” and “triumph of freedom” against Russia with only one purpose—to make it weak, so that it could be robbed blind. To be sure, he pointed to no specific examples or evidence. Ilyin argued that democracy is impossible in such a huge country as Russia, and the only possible power configuration is a “Russian national dictatorship.” In Ilyin’s eyes, it was impossible to unite the geographic, ethnic, and cultural diversity of Russia without a strong centralized power. It would be not a totalitarian dictatorship but rather an authoritarian one. It would be a state that would teach its people of “freedom” but limit it so that Russia would face not anarchy but order. Based on patriotism, and with a powerful leader at the top, such a system would protect Russia from revolutions and chaos.  

SPIRITUAL RENEWAL

Democracy did not work for Russia; the nation was corrupted by Western values and is under constant attack from those who would seek to dismantle it. And so, as Putin moved to remake Russia, he turned to Ilyin as both justification for and the hopeful promise of the direction in which he strove to take the country. Ilyin was most likely chosen because his works legitimized Putin’s authoritarian grasp on power, justified limitations on freedom, and provided an antidote to all Western criteria of freedoms, rights, and goals of the state. In essence, Ilyin gave a kind of legitimation for handing almost unchallenged power to the national leader—Putin—whose goal would be to strengthen the state and bring about its spiritual revival, promoting conservative values and norms.

In a 2006 speech to Russia’s Federal Assembly, Putin recalled “the famous Russian thinker Ivan Ilyin,” who, “reflecting on the foundational principles on which the Russian state should firmly stand, noted that a soldier has a high and honest calling. . . . We must always be ready to ward off potential external aggression and acts of international terrorism. We must be able to answer any and all attempts to put external political pressure on Russia, including those that aim to strengthen their own position at our expense.”

Always something of a conspiracy theorist, Ilyin introduced the Russian term mirovaya zakulisa (“world backstage”), which he used to describe a conspiracy of Western leaders against Russia. In the broader sense, this term implies that the officially elected leaders of the West are, in fact, puppets of the world’s true rulers: businessmen, Masonic agents, and, often, Jews. These days, that phrase seems omnipresent in Russian discourse and state-controlled media.

Substitute “Jews” with “gays” and “Masonic agents” with “foreign agents,” and Ilyin’s views synchronize perfectly with Putin’s propaganda narrative: the collapse of the Soviet Union was hardly just, and Russians had been duped to believe in the promises of democracy that resulted in a decade of poverty, humiliation, and political impotency. Democracy did not work for Russia; the nation was corrupted by Western values and is under constant attack from those who would seek to dismantle it. The same is true for Ilyin’s distrust of democratic governance. The reasons that Ilyin gives as explanation for the West’s supposed hatred of Russia are voiced daily on Russian television: the West does not know or understand Russia, and it fears it. Most important, perhaps, it rejects Russian Orthodox tenets.

Like many of Russia’s current leaders, Ilyin promoted spiritual renewal under the auspices of the Orthodox Church. Although not particularly religious himself, Ilyin saw religion as intricately connected with politics and was horrified at the Soviet Union’s attempts to destroy it: “Demagoguery and deceit, expropriation and terror, the destruction of religion and life—were all done to bring about a ‘national flourishing’ of the Russian minorities, and in the West, the gullible and corrupt correspondents sang about the ‘liberation of nations.’” He believed that traditional values could guide the Russian nation to a successful future by uniting it into a more cohesive unit.





Putin, likewise, has spoken of the need for religious revival and the valuable role that the Orthodox Church plays. Says Putin: “The Russian Orthodox Church plays an enormous formative role in preserving our rich historical and cultural heritage and in reviving eternal moral values. It works tirelessly to bring unity, to strengthen family ties, and to educate the younger generation in the spirit of patriotism.”

Putin has thus forged ahead with giving Russians something to believe in, and he has turned again to Ilyin: “Freedom for development in economics, in the social sphere, in community initiatives—this is the best answer to the external restrictions, as well as to our internal problems. And the more actively citizens participate in the arrangement of their own lives . . . the greater is Russia's potential.” Ilyin, of course, was not a fan of personal choice. For him, the word “freedom” meant something else. To explain, Putin continued, “In this regard, a quotation: ‘He who loves Russia should wish for her freedom; first of all for the freedom of Russia proper, her international independence and self-sufficiency; freedom for Russia—as the unity of [ethnic] Russians and all the other national cultures; and, finally, freedom for the Russian people, freedom for all of us; freedom of belief, the search for truth, of creativity, work, and ability.’"

SPIN IT






Whether Putin and his team personally believe the ideas they so actively propagate does not truly matter. As they have done time and again, the Kremlin’s spin doctors have simply expropriated someone else’s works for their own propaganda purposes. Through Ilyin, the Kremlin transmits what it sees as a proper ideology for today: a strong cocktail of uncompromising hatred for the West, denial of the European nature of Russian civilization, favor of dictatorial methods of governing, rabid nationalism, and a dash of conspiracy theory. The truth has become malleable, yet Russians understandably err on the side of believing the information their government gives them. For example, despite mountains of evidence to the contrary, only five percent of Russians believe that their country or the Donetsk People’s Republic had anything to do with the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.

Russia’s citizens have been fed this toxic brew for years. When Putin’s regime eventually does come to an end, he has ensured that the rebuilding of Russia’s relations with Western, liberal countries will be a difficult task.


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-09-20/putins-philosopher

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

SaintsDome, have you ever seen the series TThe American?

Hey Quez, no I haven't, I've seen the commercials and always mean to record it, I just don't think the network is on my usual rotation. (edit) I will look it up and check it out. Thanks.

 

[Quez]

Hey Quez, no I haven't, I've seen the commercials and always mean to record it, I just don't think the network is on my usual rotation. (edit) I will look it up and check it out. Thanks.

With your great interest in Russia, I think you would enjoy it.  Just don't get roped in and fall in a rabbit hole thinking we are still in the heat of the Cold War

 

[Doctor Detroit]

Whatever happened to the OP kblitz?  Dude was cool, Danish or German guy IIRC? 

 

[Aerial Assault]

With your great interest in Russia, I think you would enjoy it.  Just don't get roped in and fall in a rabbit hole thinking we are still in the heat of the Cold War

Second the rec.  One of the best-written series on TV.  Four seasons in the can and fully available everywhere, two more to go before it wraps. 

 

[moleculo]

Why Vladimir Putin Hates Us

an interesting article for a couple reasons:

1. breakdown of some strategic moves Russia has recently made:

He’s done it again. The honey badger in the Kremlin just moved more advanced missiles into position on Russia’s most westerly fringe to own the Baltic Sea. This week Moscow admitted it has deployed cutting-edge Bastion anti-ship missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave, north of Poland, plus equally advanced S-400 air defense systems to shoot down aircraft and missiles as far as 250 miles out.

With this move, the Kremlin has established control over the Baltic Sea, most of Poland and the Baltic republics—NATO members all. Russia now can exert anti-access and area denial—what the Pentagon calls A2AD for short—at will, meaning that any NATO aircraft or ships entering the region can be hit long before they get close to Kaliningrad. For Western military planners, this is nothing short of a nightmare, since Moscow can now block NATO reinforcements headed east to counter, say, Russian military moves on the vulnerable Baltic republics.

That scenario, wherein Moscow’s forces overrun a Baltic republic or two before NATO can meaningfully respond, is judged alarmingly plausible by Alliance planners, yet nobody should be surprised that Vladimir Putin has done this. One month ago, when he moved nuclear-capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles into Kaliningrad last month, initiating a Baltic version of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Obama’s response was…nothing.

The outgoing commander-in-chief decided that he needed to appease the Kremlin one more time before leaving the White House, to the horror of our allies who live close to Russia. “We’re on our own until January 20, and maybe much longer,” was how a senior Alliance defense official in that neighborhood explained the reality of what Obama has done through his inaction.

For good measure, this week the Russian defense ministry indicated that the deployment of Iskander-M systems to Kaliningrad, which Moscow has said was merely part of a military exercise, will be staying there permanently. Since those missiles can launch nuclear or conventional warheads as far as 300 miles with stunning accuracy, Russia now holds a powerful military advantage over NATO in the Baltic region.

Predictably, the Kremlin maintains that moving state-of-the art missiles into Kaliningrad is a response to American ballistic missile defenses which have been deployed in Eastern Europe. As usual, Moscow depicts all its military moves, even ones which are destabilizing to regional security, as cosmically defensive, so great is the Western threat to Russia.

2. some interesting background on Russia's motives.  With the feminism and LGBTQ stuff that Hillary promoted, no wonder Putin felt she was such a threat.  In Trump, they see a business man and not an idealogue, someone they can deal with without having foreign morals pushed down their throats.

Putin has talked warmly about what he calls “spiritual security“—which means keeping versions of Christianity other than Russian Orthodoxy out of the country—even stating that Russia’s “spiritual shield” is as important to her security as its nuclear shield. His inspiration for this comes from Orthodox thinkers, above all Ivan Ilyin, who hated the West with vigor and passion. This anti-Western worldview seems strange and even incomprehensible to most Americans, its reference points are utterly foreign to us, yet is grounded in centuries of Russian history and spiritual experience.

In this viewpoint, which I have termed Orthodox Jihadism, the West is an implacable foe of Holy Russia with whom there can be no lasting peace. For centuries—whether led by the Catholic Church, Napoleon, Hitler or the United States—the West has tried to subjugate Russia and thereby crush Orthodoxy, the one true faith. This is the Third Rome myth, which became very popular in 19thcentury Imperial Russia, postulating that it is Russia’s holy mission to resist the Devil and his work on earth.

Putin has reinvigorated such throwback thinking, making the Russian Orthodox Church—the de facto state religion—the ideological centerpiece of his regime. After Communism fell, the country needed a new ideological anchor, and Putinism found it in a potent amalgam of religion and nationalism which has far greater historical resonance with Russians than Communism ever did.

...

The anti-Western animus of this ideology would be difficult to overstate. There are rational-sounding complaints—for instance, Russian harping on NATO expansion up to their borders—but much of it boils down to depictions of the post-modern West as Satan’s project designed to subvert traditional religion and family life. These complaints sound a lot like what hardline Muslims say about the West. Just like Islamists, Kremlin ideologists claim that, since the West is spiritually attacking Russia and Orthodoxy with feminist and LGBT propaganda, all of Moscow’s responses—including aggressive military moves—are therefore defensive.

...

It would be wise to counter Russian adventurism before it causes a major, perhaps nuclear war. Deterrence works, when applied properly. It would be even wiser to stop ignoring what Moscow says about its worldview—they probably mean it. Above all, stop provoking the Russians needlessly. This week, Senator John McCain rehashed his line that “Russia is a gas station run by the mafia masquerading as a country,” omitting that it’s a country with several thousand nuclear weapons. For this reason, Russian remains an existential threat to the United States in a manner that jihadists simply are not, no matter what Islam-alarmists say. A first step to dealing wisely with Putin would be actually understanding what makes his regime tick.

 

[moleculo]

by the way:  from Kaliningrad, Russia now has short range nuke capability within striking distance of Berlin, Warsaw, Copenhagen, and all of the Baltics.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Why Vladimir Putin Hates Us

Moleculo, thanks for the post in the thread. It would be nice if interested people try to keep this academic if anyone jumps. I'm interested in this subject and would prefer no bs.

Fwiw I posted this further up... a couple thoughts:

Deterrence works, when applied properly. It would be even wiser to stop ignoring what Moscow says about its worldview—they probably mean it. Above all, stop provoking the Russians needlessly. This week, Senator John McCain rehashed his line that “Russia is a gas station run by the mafia masquerading as a country,” omitting that it’s a country with several thousand nuclear weapons. For this reason, Russian remains an existential threat to the United States in a manner that jihadists simply are not, no matter what Islam-alarmists say.

Russia is a more important and more dangerous foe than ISIS, just is. That is one of the things that bothers me about the new PE.

Putin has talked warmly about what he calls “spiritual security“—which means keeping versions of Christianity other than Russian Orthodoxy out of the country—even stating that Russia’s “spiritual shield” is as important to her security as its nuclear shield. His inspiration for this comes from Orthodox thinkers, above all Ivan Ilyin, who hated the West with vigor and passion.

I posted a piece on Ilyin further up if anyone is interested.

Putin has reinvigorated such throwback thinking, making the Russian Orthodox Church—the de facto state religion—the ideological centerpiece of his regime.

Can't stress this enough. There is a massive conception that Russia is not ideological now, they most definitely are. Anyone who has ever read anything about Tsarist Russia will 'get' this. Essentially White Russian revanchism and Christian-Orthodoxy as a leg of the state/empire is back.

The anti-Western animus of this ideology would be difficult to overstate. There are rational-sounding complaints—for instance, Russian harping on NATO expansion up to their borders—but much of it boils down to depictions of the post-modern West as Satan’s project designed to subvert traditional religion and family life. These complaints sound a lot like what hardline Muslims say about the West. Just like Islamists, Kremlin ideologists claim that, since the West is spiritually attacking Russia and Orthodoxy with feminist and LGBT propaganda, all of Moscow’s responses—including aggressive military moves—are therefore defensive.

> Important.

And whether it's cynical manipulation of the poor Russian people, or whether it is truly believed ideology, the West's culture is viewed as a threat - and they may very well be right. Democracy is just a part of that whole thing.

 

[moleculo]

Moleculo, thanks for the post in the thread. It would be nice if interested people try to keep this academic if anyone jumps. I'm interested in this subject and would prefer no bs.

Fwiw I posted this further up... a couple thoughts:

Russia is a more important and more dangerous foe than ISIS, just is. That is one of the things that bothers me about the new PE.

I posted a piece on Ilyin further up if anyone is interested.

Can't stress this enough. There is a massive conception that Russia is not ideological now, they most definitely are. Anyone who has ever read anything about Tsarist Russia will 'get' this. Essentially White Russian revanchism and Christian-Orthodoxy as a leg of the state/empire is back.

> Important.

And whether it's cynical manipulation of the poor Russian people, or whether it is truly believed ideology, the West's culture is viewed as a threat - and they may very well be right. Democracy is just a part of that whole thing.

lol, I thought I had just found it.  I was in the process of editing my post to ref yours - I guess I had missed it the first time around.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

by the way:  from Kaliningrad, Russia now has short range nuke capability within striking distance of Berlin, Warsaw, Copenhagen, and all of the Baltics.

Vexes me to no end why FDR allowed Stalin to keep this toehold after WW2 and why the west did not demand its freedom after the end of the Cold War. It should have been released like the Baltics. It's East Prussia aka Koenigsberg aka Germany.

 

[Sinn Fein]

While the world warily eyed Donald Trump’s inauguration on Friday, Russia and Syria signed a long-term basing agreement giving Russian ships and planes access there for 50 years, a major commitment that underscores Russian President Vladimir Putin’s years-long effort to restore Russia’s once-powerful role in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Putin continues to play chess while the world is playing checkers. 

Very quickly, and relatively quietly, Russia has locked down relationships/ports with Crimea, Syria and Turkey.  Russia has closed off most avenues towards anyone else providing Europe with natural gas - essentially locking down choke points.  And, as we have seen with Ukraine, Russia is not above holding its customers hostage over its natural gas.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Another Reset with Russia?


LONDON – The question of the West’s relationship with Russia has been buried by media stories of hacking, sex scandals, and potential blackmail. The dossier by former British spy Christopher Steele about US President Donald Trump’s activities in Moscow some years ago may turn out to be as credible as the claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction – or it may not. We simply don’t know. What is clear is that such stories have distracted attention from the task of bridging the diplomatic chasm now dividing Russia and the West.

It’s hard for a Westerner, even one of Russian ancestry like me, to warm to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. I hate the way his government has used the “foreign agent” law to harass and effectively close down NGOs. I hate its human-rights abuses, assassinations, dirty tricks, and criminal prosecutions to intimidate political opponents.


What seems indisputable is that today’s anti-liberal, authoritarian Russia is as much a product of the souring of relations with the West as it is of Russian history or the threat of disintegration that Russia faced in the 1990s.
This souring is rooted in Russia’s perception, underpinned by a large dose of paranoia and a misreading of post-communist history, that the West – and the United States, in particular – has aggressive designs on it. It is simply not true that Russia willingly gave up its empire to join the democratic West, only to be rebuffed by it. The Soviet Union had become too decrepit to hold on to its post-World War II gains or even its pre-war frontiers. The peoples of Eastern Europe, and those absorbed by the Soviet Union, were delighted to be free of Kremlin control.

Nonetheless, as Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, points out, Robert Gates, who headed the CIA in the early 1990s, later conceded that the West, and particularly the US, “badly underestimated the magnitude of Russian humiliation in losing the Cold War.” The spectacle of “American government officials, academicians, businessmen, and politicians” arrogantly “telling the Russians how to conduct their […] affairs” inevitably “led to deep and long-term resentment and bitterness.”

In this context, NATO’s expansion between 1999 and 2004 to include the Baltic states was, in my view, a serious mistake. I remember a leading Russian liberal telling me in the 1990s that a democratic government in Moscow was a much more secure guarantee against Russian adventurism than NATO troops in Vilnius.

Russia’s own overture to join NATO in 2001-2002 was predictably rejected. NATO’s essential post-communist purpose, after all, was to protect Eastern Europe against Russian revanchism. But it was a kick in the face when, at NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008, the Alliance’s then-secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said that Ukraine would “someday” join. Although NATO’s leaders rejected Scheffer’s position at that very summit, many Russians came to believe that wherever Russia’s power receded, it was being replaced by the expanding power of the West, with no middle ground or buffer. Putin called NATO membership for Ukraine “a direct threat” to Russia.

Although Russia and the West each claim to uphold a rules-based international order, both sides have flouted the United Nations Charter when it suits them, accusing the other of hypocrisy. Did no Western policymaker heed the warnings of responsible Russian politicians that NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999 and Kosovo’s subsequent detachment from Serbia – both in violation of international law and the UN Charter – might set a dangerous precedent?

Despite the manifest corruption of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, and his betrayal of his pledge to sign an association agreement with the EU, Russia saw only the West’s hand in the popular uprising that resulted in Yanukovych’s ouster in 2014. The West, in turn, was unanimous in condemning Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea and clandestine military support for a pro-Russian separatist uprising in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.

From the perspective of Realpolitik, Putin’s intervention in Ukraine was a catastrophic error: in addition to the economic sanctions Russia incurred as a result, Russian policy shifted Ukraine decisively into the Western camp. With its links to the US and the European Union fracturing, Russia has looked to a Eurasian alliance with China to bolster its crumbling geopolitical position. But this is neither country’s favored partnership.

Trenin believes that the West should fear Russia’s weakness more than its imperial designs. Russia’s fundamental post-Soviet shortcoming has been its failure to modernize its economy. The Putin-Medvedev governments that have ruled for the last 17 years have failed to overcome the “oil curse.” The state’s continued dependence on resource revenues has entrenched corruption, sustained autocracy, and encouraged foreign-policy adventurism as a substitute for broad-based material prosperity.

The Trump administration is set to make a new effort to build bridges. Trump proposes a “deal” to lift Western sanctions on Russia in exchange for an agreed reduction in nuclear stockpiles. This would be a good confidence-boosting start.

There are at least three positives to build on. First, Putin’s foreign-policy coups, while opportunistic, have been cautious. He talks big, but respects his limits. Having made his point in Georgia and Ukraine, he drew back. He is a gambler, but not for the highest stakes.

Second, the Russian thesis of “multipolarity” offers much to international relations. With American power on the wane and China’s on the rise, a restructuring of international relations is inevitable. The rules of the game forged in the era of US supremacy will have to be revised to accommodate different interests and perceptions. Russia could play a constructive role in this revision, if it does not overestimate its strength.


Finally, Russia has shown – on the nuclear deal with Iran and the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons – that it can work with the US to advance common interests. And, in my view, Putin’s “realism” in providing military support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is preferable to futile Western efforts to orchestrate a “political settlement.” If successful, millions of refugees may be able to return to their homes.


The conflict of values between the two sides will continue. But, provided the West treats Russia and its concerns with respect, there is no reason why a much better working relationship cannot be established.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-reset-relations-with-russia-by-robert-skidelsky-2017-01

 

[Don't Toews Me]

This is a story I haven't been following too closely, but probably should be:

"President Trump's First Foreign Policy Crisis: Balkan War Drums Beat Again." By John Schindler.

In the decade-and-a-half of war in far-flung places since the 9/11 attacks on our country, it’s easy to forget how much time Western spies, soldiers and diplomats spent in the 1990s trying to save the Balkans from themselves. After Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, leaving violence and turmoil in its wake, it fell to NATO, led by the United States, to sort out that ugly mess. Now, a generation later, the temporary solutions Washington crafted are coming apart, and war may be returning to Europe’s unstable Southeast.

First, Bosnia-Hercegovina, which got the lion’s share of media attention back in the 1990s—by no means all of it accurate—has limped along as a half-failed state for the last two decades. Mired in crime and corruption, not to mention a serious problem with Islamic extremism, Bosnia is ailing politically, economically and socially. The strange, jury-rigged arrangement hashed out by President Bill Clinton in Dayton, Ohio, in late 1995 to keep Bosnia together after that country’s terrible civil war, was never meant to be more than a short-term solution.

Yet Bosnia is still stuck with the Dayton system, with its weak state in Sarajevo, and much power devolved to two pseudo-state entities: the mostly Muslim Federation (with a dwindling Croatian minority) and the Serbian Republic—Republika Srpska to the natives. This awkward arrangement leaves nobody content. It’s too much power devolution for Muslims, not enough for Serbs, and the Croats resent not having their own, third entity. Dayton brought short-term peace but assured that nobody’s Balkan porridge would ever be quite right for the long haul.

Now the Republika Srpska’s leadership, after years of frustration, is threatening to pull out of the Dayton arrangement altogether. Its president, Milorad Dodik, who has corruptly run his para-state for most of the last two decades, isn’t hiding his resurgent nationalism. His threats to pull the RS out of Dayton are no longer idle fantasy. Washington recently retaliated by placing sanctions on Dodik for his efforts to sabotage Dayton arrangements. Undeterred, Dodik pronounced the American ambassador in Sarajevo “a proven enemy” of the Bosnian Serbs who was “unwelcome in the Republika Srpska.”

Since the testy relationship between the country’s Serbs and the Muslim-dominated government in Sarajevo is exactly the same issue which plunged the country into civil war and genocide back in 1992, Dodik’s moves demonstrate how depressingly little political progress has been achieved—despite more than two decades of Western political and military intervention and billions of aid dollars spent to make Bosnia less inclined to fratricide.

Even worse is the situation in Kosovo, the former Serbian province which gained independence thanks to a 78-day NATO bombing campaign in 1999 which brought Belgrade to heel. Although most of the world recognizes Kosovo’s independence, Serbia does not. Tensions are on the rise thanks to Belgrade’s mounting provocations. Serbia is pushing for independence for Kosovo’s north, which includes many Serbs (more than nine out of 10 of Kosovo’s 1.9 million people are Albanians, while four percent are Serbs, most of living them in the north around the city of Mitrovica, close to Serbia).

Recently, Belgrade dispatched a train adorned with the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia” in 21 languages to Mitrovica, which Albanians viewed as a wanton provocation. Fortunately, the train turned back before it reached Kosovo, and a full-blown crisis was averted—for now. However, Serbia’s president, a strong nationalist, has threatened to send his country’s military into Kosovo if harm comes to Serbs there, which would restart the ugly interethnic war that NATO tamped down with bombs in 1999.

In response, Kosovo’s leadership has asked the European Union to calm Belgrade before things get out of hand, while some Albanians are talking about resurrecting the Kosovo Liberation Army, the insurgent force which successfully challenged Belgrade’s rule in the 1990s. Since independent Kosovo has no military, only a paramilitary police force—NATO insisted on disarmament to prevent future conflict—any Albanian efforts to rearm will only encourage worse behavior by Serbia. Not to mention that, since hundreds of Muslims from Kosovo have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and jihad veterans are returning home now, there are well-armed Albanians who are itching for war too.

Neither does rising nationalism among Serbs seem to be coincidental. As I noted two years ago, Vladimir Putin has been egging on the Republika Srpska, since the Kremlin’s official ideology of Slavic Orthodox solidarity against the decadent West finds a happy home among many Serbs—above all in Bosnia, which has been under Western military occupation since 1995. Moscow has cultivated Dodik politically and financially while encouraging his mounting challenges to the Dayton system.

Russian inroads into Serbia itself are worrisome. It hardly seems coincidental that the provocative train Belgrade dispatched to Kosovo was manufactured in Russia. The presence of Russia’s intelligence services in Serbia is unusually large and conspicuous, and they have recently established a spy base in the country’s south whose obvious purpose is monitoring Western activities in the region. Two months ago, Russia, Belarus and Serbia conducted joint military exercises on Serbian territory, termed “Slavic Brotherhood,” in a show of anti-NATO force.

Most important, Moscow recently gifted Belgrade modern weaponry, including 60 armored vehicles (half of them T-72 tanks) plus six MiG-29 jet fighters. That doesn’t sound like much, and the MiG-29s are Russian air force surplus, but they’re a game-changer in the region. The arrival of the Russian aircraft, expected this spring, will make Serbia the only ex-Yugoslav country to possess modern jet fighters. Croatia, a NATO member, has a dozen dilapidated MiG-21s, which are generations older than the MiG-29, and thanks to years of neglect no more than a handful of them can get airborne. Without Atlantic Alliance aid to Zagreb, Serbia’s new jets will dominate the region.

The greatest concern right now, however, is the threat to the Balkans posed by clandestine Kremlin spy-games that I’ve termed Special War: espionage, subversion, propaganda and terrorism. Back in November, operatives linked to Russian intelligence attempted to stage a violent coup in Montenegro, the tiny ex-Yugoslav republic on the Adriatic which is seeking NATO membership, and politicians in Belgrade who are less than enthusiastic about getting in bed with Moscow consider such shadowy assassins to be a threat to themselves too. Given Putin’s habit of disposing of people he dislikes in unpleasantly nefarious ways, this appears to be a legitimate worry.

What Putin wants in the Balkans seems plain enough, namely political chaos that will distract the West, which made itself the region’s ward in the 1990s. He will happily risk a local war to achieve that, since it won’t be Russians doing most of the dying. The political solutions crafted by NATO a generation ago are increasingly frail, and Moscow plans to reap its reward. Putin, like many Russians, views Western intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo as an affront to the Slavic Orthodox world, and he plans on revenge.

Right now, NATO is deploying troops in Poland and the Baltics to deter Russian adventurism, as I’ve been counseling for years, but Kremlin saber-rattling in 2017 to test the Alliance’s resolve may instead come in the Balkans, where states are weak and Western control looks shaky. Given how terrifically badly things went the last time Russian intelligence aided and abetted clandestine Serbian machinations in Bosnia, the United States and our European allies need to urgently calm down Southeastern Europe before its problems get out of hand and mass violence returns to that perennially troubled region.

Here's another one:

"Russia Seeking Balkan Crisis, US Expert says."

Russian leader Vladimir Putin plans to take “revenge” on the West in the Balkans by egging on Serbian provocateurs in Bosnia and Kosovo, a US security expert and former US counter-intelligence officer says.

Writing in the online Observer, John Schindler says US-led solutions to the Balkan crisis of the 1990s, only ever intended as temporary fixes, are fast coming apart.

His says this could even lead to a new war as restive Serbs, prodded by Russia, try to reconfigure arrangements in the region’s two weakest spots, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Schindler describes Bosnia as especially ripe for trouble, a “half-failed state for the last two decades. Mired in crime and corruption, not to mention a serious problem with Islamic extremism, Bosnia is ailing politically, economically and socially,” he writes.

Bosnian Serb supremo Milorad Dodik, “who has corruptly run his para-state for most of the last two decades, isn’t hiding his resurgent nationalism. His threats to pull the RS out of Dayton are no longer idle fantasy,” Schindler adds.

“Moscow has cultivated Dodik politically and financially while encouraging his mounting challenges to the Dayton system.”

In Kosovo, he continues, ”tensions are on the rise thanks to Belgrade’s mounting provocations. Serbia is pushing for independence for Kosovo’s north”, noting the recent dispatch of a Russian-manufactured train from Belgrade to Kosovo emblazoned with the slogan “Kosovo is Serbian”.

In Serbia itself, Schindler says Russian activity is increasingly conspicuous.

“The presence of Russia’s intelligence services in Serbia is unusually large and conspicuous, and they have recently established a spy base in the country’s south whose obvious purpose is monitoring Western activities in the region,” he writes.

Schindler says Putin sees independent Bosnian and Kosovo states as an affront to Russia and the Slavic world generally, and is now after “political chaos [in the Balkans] that will distract the West.

 “He will happily risk a local war to achieve that, since it won’t be Russians doing most of the dying. The political solutions crafted by NATO a generation ago are increasingly frail, and Moscow plans to reap its reward.” 

- See more at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-seeking-balkan-chaos-us-expert-says-01-26-2017#sthash.Vl2awXiI.dpuf

Via Fox News from early October:

"Inside Russian 'spy base' in the Balkans."

In the command room there are large surveillance screens, in the warehouse rescue equipment; an unfinished gray concrete building serves as a training site. Is this a Russian-run disaster relief center in Serbia as Moscow claims, or is it an outpost for Kremlin spies in the heart of the Balkans?

Some Western NGOs and military analysts say the Russians have created a thinly disguised military base that is eavesdropping on American military interests in the Balkans. While Serbia is still close to Russia, its neighbors are increasingly distrustful of Moscow's intentions and presence, especially ex-Soviet bloc states like Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, which suffered under iron-fist communist rule for decades after World War II.

If it is a military operation, the base would be the Kremlin's first in Europe outside the former Soviet Union since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s.

The Western analysts say the base — jointly run by the Serbian and Russian governments and located near an airport in the southern Serbian town of Nis — is the Kremlin's response to NATO's expansion in the region. Every country around Serbia is either in the Western military alliance or wants to be.

The Russian partner in the center is its Ministry for Emergency Situations, a powerful semi-military outfit whose activities do include disaster relief, but it also carries out jobs for Russia's security services. The ministry has long played a role in Serbia, including de-mining and clearing of unexploded ordnance from the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia.

At the center's opening ceremony in 2012, Sergei Shoigu — then Russia's emergency minister, now its defense minister — said the longstanding speculation that Russia wants to create a military installation in Serbia is "a pure fabrication."

NATO officials have refused to comment on the nature of the base, only saying they are not too worried about its role, whatever it is. EU officials have said that if Serbia becomes a member of the bloc, as it wants to, it will have to join the EU's emergency relief programs and ditch the Russian ones.

During a recent visit to the so-called "Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center" there was little visible evidence that the site was used for anything else but fighting floods, forest fires or other natural disasters. The images on the video screens in the command rooms shown to AP reporters were largely from surveillance cameras located throughout the installation. The warehouse contained an ambulance, a Russian-made Lada Niva jeep, packet tents, rubber boats and mostly firefighting equipment.

"Look at that James Bond technology," joked the base's Russian co-director, Viacheslav Vlasenko, as screens came rolling down for a video presentation of the center's recent activities. Outside, Russian instructors were training Serbian firefighters.

Vlasenko said the center is far from equipped for spying on neighboring Romania, where U.S. anti-ballistic missile interceptors were recently installed, or Kosovo, where NATO peacekeeping troops and an American base are located.

"Those are only rumors," Vlasenko said, adding: "It is not possible to change this center into a spy center. It is very small; we have a staff of only three Serbian citizens and five Russians and nothing more ... and the building is not even ours."

He complained that neighboring countries, such as NATO- and EU-member Croatia, or aspiring members Macedonia and Bosnia, have been reluctant to accept Russian help even during major natural or humanitarian disasters such as the recent refugee crisis, which last year saw nearly 1 million people cross the Balkans.

Vlasenko said the Croatians have, "without any explanation," refused to let in giant Russian firefighting planes during recent major forest fires on the Adriatic coastline, and even rejected tents offered during the refugee crisis. Bosnia has not responded to an offer to sign an "agreement of understanding" that would spell out terms of joint action in case of natural disasters, he said.

"It's only politics," Vlasenko said. "They say Vladimir Putin is bad, Russia wants to dominate. ... The political motivation should get out of humanitarian aid."

Serbia — a traditional Russian Slavic ally — also wants to join the EU, but straddles the line between Russia and the West and has refused to participate in U.S.-EU sanctions against Moscow over Russia's actions in Ukraine. Russia strongly opposes Serbia's possible NATO membership.

The U.S.-led 1999 bombing of Serbia turned its people strongly against the West and toward Russia. The residents of Nis — which suffered heavy casualties during a cluster bomb strike — were divided when asked what they think of the Russian presence in their town.

"I would rather see our (Russian) brothers in our town than that Western scum," said Radovan Mihajlovic.

Petar Jovanovic shared widespread local suspicion about the role of the base.

"There's a lot of talk about (the Russian base) but the public does not know the whole truth," he said. "I think there is something happening there which the public doesn't know."

Last one:

"Why the Balkans may be the Trump administration's first foreign policy test."

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

The Beginning of the End of Russia’s Power Vertical


Instead of consolidating in the run-up to the 2018 presidential election, Russian elites have started making the structures they manage more autonomous. Uncertain about the future of the system, governors, directors of state-run enterprises, and heads of state bodies are carving out their own personal empires. Once centripetal, the Russian political system is now governed by centrifugal forces.
While the Russian power vertical has never been a fully unified construct, its members have always publicly pledged loyalty to the center: delimiting one’s territory and interests and creating alternative axes of power has traditionally been seen as an attack on the power vertical.

Until recently, only two people—Rosneft President Igor Sechin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov—had the right to carve out their own spheres of interest. The rest had to play by the rules and refrain from chipping away at the vertical. Key political and economic players did have some freedom to maneuver, but only within the framework set by the center; the whole took precedence over its constituent parts.

Now, however, many system players have started making the structures they manage more autonomous, cordoning off their spheres of influence and setting their own rules there; deference to the Kremlin is being replaced by deference to local leaders.

This new autonomization can be seen in the State Duma: its new speaker, former deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration Vyacheslav Volodin, has already revamped the body to his own liking. The lower house of parliament has long been an instrument of approval for the Kremlin’s domestic policy decisions. Parliament members had the ability to affect small things, aligning themselves with interest groups they could stand up for if need be—the defense industry, agribusiness, retailers, and alcohol manufactures, for example, have always had representation in the Duma. But on the whole, the Duma was a dependent structure.

Now, however, Volodin has imposed much stricter control over the Duma’s procedural rules, making parliament members directly dependent on the speaker and his staff. Legislative work has also been brought under his control: proposed legislation must now be screened by expert committees, to which Volodin’s loyal associates have been appointed.

Indeed, the speaker has installed a new order in the Duma, delimited his territory, and even begun expanding it: parliament members have started talking about coordinating new legislation with him, and it’s increasingly complicated for officials from the presidential administration to gain access to parliamentary leaders’ meetings.

Andrei Vorobyev, the governor of Moscow Oblast, is also carving out his own fiefdom. He is consolidating his region’s municipalities into so-called “city districts”; cities and villages are being eliminated along with their administrations and legislative bodies. The system of governance is becoming simplified and more rigid. Vorobyev is trying to both minimize the risk of losing elections in any given municipality (there will be just a few dozen of them now, as opposed to a few hundred in the past) and bring the governance of the region more firmly under his control as federal interest groups vie to gain control of the region’s expensive resources through local elections.

Vorobyev’s personnel appointments support this goal: he picks loyal carpetbaggers as the heads of new municipal districts. These people are strangers to their district, feel uncomfortable there, and have frequent run-ins with locals, but as a result, Andrei Vorobyev is the only remaining force in the region; Moscow’s suburbs have become the governor’s personal territory.

Other regional leaders are also seeking greater independence and freedom, and some are taking a page out of Kadyrov’s book, protesting loudly enough to get the federal government to change its mind on certain issues. Tatar president Rustam Minnikhanov openly criticized the federal government for “siphoning” money from donor regions. “We have to support the recipient regions, but not at the expense of making the situation worse. Next year, we will have eight billion less, relative to this year…They probably report to the president of Russia that it is painless. But how is it painless? It is painful. We have to voice our opinion. This is wrong,” said an outraged Minnikhanov.

Kaluga Governor Anatoly Artamonov spoke out in support of Minnikhanov’s position at the Gaidar Economic Forum in the middle of January and, what’s more, proposed transferring some federal powers to the regions. The head of Ulyanovsk Oblast, Sergey Morozov, went even further, recommending that Moscow essentially relinquish its control over local branches of federal agencies to the regions. Regional leaders, it seems, want to control everything in their territories—and aren’t afraid to say so.

Meanwhile, Igor Sechin isn’t just strengthening his Rosneft dominion—he is vigorously expanding it. As expected, Rosneft recently acquired Bashneft and last year, for the first time ever, the government allowed Rosneftegaz state holding, which manages Rosneft’s and Gazprom’s assets, not to publish its financials. Then came the arrest of Economic Development Minister Alexey Ulyukaev, who opposed the acquisition of Bashneft (Ulyukaev was accused of extorting money for the deal from Igor Sechin), indicating the tremendous influence that Sechin wields.

One of Putin’s closest associates, Rostec president Sergey Chemezov, is in the same league as Sechin. The state-run corporation that he heads owns several defense industry enterprises—among them are Russian Helicopters, JSC, and the United Engine Corporation. The defense industry is a profitable business that feeds off government contracts and exports. But until last year, armored vehicle manufacturers were still outside of Chemezov’s sphere of influence. At the end of last year, however, Rostec assumed control over all of them, meaning that Rostec and its head now influence all spheres of the defense industry.

The power vertical has always coalesced around the chosen presidential candidate in the run-up to presidential elections. Invariably, it’s been Vladimir Putin, except for 2012, when Dmitry Medvedev ran for office. Putin has always personified the system. “If we have Putin, we have Russia,” Vyacheslav Volodin famously used to say. To be more precise, if Putin is in power, other participants of the vertical retain their bits of power and access to resources. Russian politics was governed by centripetal forces. The man on the very top guaranteed the preservation of the regime, and the centripetal motions intensified as elections neared. You had to campaign passionately for Putin, and there was absolutely no room for public displays of autonomy.

But we are witnessing a completely different kind of politics now. Centrifugal forces are taking over the Russian political scene. The players who control resources are trying to secure their grip on them. They try to get Moscow to cede to them what they need to have full autonomy. They take away their neighbor’s share if they can.

“Personal” ownership of a resource is becoming increasingly important: the Duma goes to Volodin, Rosneft to Sechin, and the Moscow suburbs to Vorobyev. Those who control resources are gradually becoming feudal lords, establishing new laws for their domains. As their fiefdoms grow bigger, their relationship with the state will begin to change—old checks and balances will disappear, and the constituent parts will begin to be able to have a say over the form of the whole.

http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=67848

- This sounds almost like the old Boyar system under the old tsars.

- One of Putin's "innovations" was recentralizing Russian power back directly to the Kremlin, it's an interesting development if power is now being cycled back out...

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Alexei Navalny: Russian opposition leader found guilty


Russia's main opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, has been found guilty of embezzlement and handed a five-year suspended sentence.

It bars him from running for president next year against Vladimir Putin.

But Mr Navalny has vowed to take part in the race regardless. He denies the charges and says he will appeal against the verdict.

His conviction came in a retrial after the European Court of Human Rights ruled the first trial to be unfair.

Reacting to the sentence, Mr Navalny said: "We don't recognise this ruling. I have every right to take part in the election according to the constitution and I will do so."

The outspoken critic of President Putin also said the sentence in the case, which he claims is politically motivated, was a sign that the Kremlin considered him to be too dangerous.

In addition to the suspended sentence, he and a co-defendant were both handed a 500,000 rouble ($8,500; £6,700) fine.


Who is he?


Mr Navalny, 40, is known for his anti-corruption campaign, which targeted senior officials close to the Kremlin. He says the case against him is an effort to keep him out of politics.

He had recently stepped up his political activity after announcing plans last year to run for the presidency in 2018. Mr Putin is allowed by the constitution to run for a second consecutive six-year term, but he has not said yet if he plans to do so.

Mr Navalny's rise as a force in Russian politics began in 2008 when he started blogging about alleged malpractice and corruption at some of Russia's big state-controlled corporations.

He described the president's United Russia as "the party of crooks and thieves", a phrase that stuck among many in Russia.

He stood for Moscow mayor in 2013 and got more than a quarter of the vote, a surprise to many.

What are the accusations?

In the first trial, in 2013, Mr Navalny was found guilty of heading a group that embezzled timber worth 16m roubles ($500,000; £330,000) from the Kirovles state timber company while working as an adviser to Kirov's governor, Nikita Belykh.

He was then given a five-year suspended sentence. The verdict was widely condemned by the European Union and the US, with opposition supporters clashing with police in Moscow, St Petersburg and other cities.

But the verdict was overturned by the Russian Supreme Court last year following a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that said he was not given a fair hearing at the first trial.

The ECHR also said the original trial had failed to address allegations that it was politically motivated.

And last week, the ECHR ordered Russia to pay him more than €63,000 (£54,000; $67,000) in compensation, saying his right to peaceful protest had been violated multiple times, in cases dating back to 2012.

At the start of the verdict, judge Alexei Vtyurin said the court had established that Mr Navalny had "organised" the theft.

Under Russian law, he is banned from running for office for 10 years after being convicted of a serious crime.


What has the reaction been?


Mr Navalny is vowing to press ahead with his election campaign despite the conviction.

"I will continue to represent the interests of people who want to see Russia a normal, honest and non-corrupt country," he told reporters after the judge announced the sentence.

Mr Navalny had earlier said during a break in the judge's reading that the judgment was a replica of the first trial:

"So far the new verdict and old verdict are 100% comparable, including all the commas, spelling mistakes and even the order in which they put out testimonials. Everything was taken from the old verdict."

Asked if Mr Navalny's absence from the presidential race would undermine the legitimacy of the election, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters before the verdict session: "We believe any concerns about this are inappropriate."

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38905120?ns_mchannel=social&ns_campaign=bbc_breaking&ns_source=twitter&ns_linkname=news_central

More here:

Navalny wins European human rights payout

I don't think I've posted on Alexei Navalny, who is (was) running for office vs Putin, yet. I suppose I did not because his candidacy seemed so quixotic. He's a sort of blend of the 'democratic' Russian who was running for office in the 90s. Youngish, hopeful, seemingly stuck with this idea that the fetal democratic Russia might eventually be birthed. He came to prominence by helping organize the pro-democracy protests in 2011.... which led to Putin's blaming the US and Hillary Clinton, and which tied in with Putin's and the nationalists' paranoia about the events at Madan, all led to the return of Putin and the revanchism and extreme Novorossiya driven aggressiveness we see today. Like Sakharov, people like Navalny seem so meek and harmless that westerners have to ask what the big deal is.

- Anyway a couple months or so ago Navalny announced he would run for president. He had zero chance, given everything he was facing.

- But hey so what, Putin took him out regardless.

- The ridiculous thing is that the whole Russian economic system is  honey-trap for the state. If you're a Russian citizen and want to work for any sizeable enterprise you're going to get your hands dirty in some dirty government-corporate dealing, and thus you will always be subject to exposure and prosecution any time the state sees fit.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Vladimir Putin Meets with Members the Valdai International Discussion Club. Transcript of the Speech and Beginning of the Meeting


Vladimir Putin took part in the final plenary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. The theme of the club’s anniversary session is Russia’s Diversity for the Modern World.

PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA VLADIMIR PUTIN: Good afternoon, friends, ladies and gentlemen,

I hope that the place for your discussions, for our meetings is well chosen and that the timing is good. We are in the centre of Russia – not a geographical centre, but a spiritual one. [Novgorod Region] is a cradle of Russian statehood. Our outstanding historians believe and have analysed how the elements of Russian statehood came together right here. This is in the light of the fact that two great rivers – the Volkhov and Neva – acted as natural means of communication, providing a natural linkage at the time. And it was here that Russian statehood gradually began to emerge.

As has already been pointed out, this year the [Valdai] club has brought together an unprecedented list of participants: more than 200 Russian and foreign politicians, public and spiritual leaders, philosophers and cultural figures, people with very different, original and sometimes opposing views.

You have already been conferring here for a few days now, and I'll try not to bore you unduly. But nevertheless, I will allow myself to state my views on subjects that you have touched on during these discussions in one way or another. I am not only thinking about analysing Russian historical, cultural, and governance experiences. First and foremost, I am thinking of general debates, conversations about the future, strategies, and values, about the values underpinning our country’s development, how global processes will affect our national identity, what kind of twenty-first-century world we want to see, and what Russia, our country, can contribute to this world together with its partners.

Today we need new strategies to preserve our identity in a rapidly changing world, a world that has become more open, transparent and interdependent. This fact confronts virtually all countries and all peoples in one form or another: Russian, European, Chinese and American – the societies of virtually all countries. And naturally, including here in Valdai, we strive to better understand how our partners are attempting to meet this challenge, because we are meeting here with experts on Russia. But we proceed from the fact that our guests will state their views on the interaction and relationship between Russia and the countries that you represent.

For us (and I am talking about Russians and Russia), questions about who we are and who we want to be are increasingly prominent in our society. We have left behind Soviet ideology, and there will be no return. Proponents of fundamental conservatism who idealise pre-1917 Russia seem to be similarly far from reality, as are supporters of an extreme, western-style liberalism.

It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination. Without this we will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges, nor we will succeed in global competitions. And today we see a new round of such competitions. Today their main focuses are economic-technological and ideological-informational. Military-political problems and general conditions are worsening. The world is becoming more rigid, and sometimes forgoes not merely international law, but also basic decency.

[Every country] has to have military, technological and economic strength, but nevertheless the main thing that will determine success is the quality of citizens, the quality of society: their intellectual, spiritual and moral strength. After all, in the end economic growth, prosperity and geopolitical influence are all derived from societal conditions. They depend on whether the citizens of a given country consider themselves a nation, to what extent they identify with their own history, values and traditions, and whether they are united by common goals and responsibilities. In this sense, the question of finding and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia.

Meanwhile, today Russia’s national identity is experiencing not only objective pressures stemming from globalisation, but also the consequences of the national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we experienced the collapse of our state two different times. The result was a devastating blow to our nation’s cultural and spiritual codes; we were faced with the disruption of traditions and the consonance of history, with the demoralisation of society, with a deficit of trust and responsibility. These are the root causes of many pressing problems we face. After all, the question of responsibility for oneself, before society and the law, is something fundamental for both legal and everyday life.

After 1991 there was the illusion that a new national ideology, a development ideology, would simply appear by itself. The state, authorities, intellectual and political classes virtually rejected engaging in this work, all the more so since previous, semi-official ideology was hard to swallow. And in fact they were all simply afraid to even broach the subject. In addition, the lack of a national idea stemming from a national identity profited the quasi-colonial element of the elite – those determined to steal and remove capital, and who did not link their future to that of the country, the place where they earned their money.

Practice has shown that a new national idea does not simply appear, nor does it develop according to market rules. A spontaneously constructed state and society does not work, and neither does mechanically copying other countries’ experiences. Such primitive borrowing and attempts to civilize Russia from abroad were not accepted by an absolute majority of our people. This is because the desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national character. Incidentally, such approaches have often failed in other nations too. The time when ready-made lifestyle models could be installed in foreign states like computer programmes has passed.

We also understand that identity and a national idea cannot be imposed from above, cannot be established on an ideological monopoly. Such a construction is very unstable and vulnerable; we know this from personal experience. It has no future in the modern world. We need historical creativity, a synthesis of the best national practices and ideas, an understanding of our cultural, spiritual and political traditions from different points of view, and to understand that [national identity] is not a rigid thing that will last forever, but rather a living organism. Only then will our identity be based on a solid foundation, be directed towards the future and not the past. This is the main argument demonstrating that a development ideology must be discussed by people who hold different views, and have different opinions about how and what to do to solve given problems.

All of us – so-called Neo-Slavophiles and Neo-Westernisers, statists and so-called liberals – all of society must work together to create common development goals. We need to break the habit of only listening to like-minded people, angrily – and even with hatred – rejecting any other point of view from the outset. You can’t flip or even kick the country's future like a football, plunging into unbridled nihilism, consumerism, criticism of anything and everything, or gloomy pessimism.

This means that liberals have to learn to talk with representatives of the left-wing and, conversely, that nationalists must remember that Russia was formed specifically as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country from its very inception. Nationalists must remember that by calling into question our multi-ethnic character, and exploiting the issue of Russian, Tatar, Caucasian, Siberian or any other nationalism or separatism, means that we are starting to destroy our genetic code. In effect, we will begin to destroy ourselves.

Russia’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are unconditional. These are red lines no one is allowed to cross. For all the differences in our views, debates about identity and about our national future are impossible unless their participants are patriotic. Of course I mean patriotism in the purest sense of the word.

Too often in our nation's history, instead of opposition to the government we have been faced with opponents of Russia itself. I have already mentioned this; Pushkin also talked about it. And we know how it ended, with the demolition of the [Russian] state as such. There is virtually no Russian family that completely escaped the troubles of the past century. Questions about how to assess certain historical events still divide our country and society.

We need to heal these wounds, and repair the tissues of our historic fabric. We can no longer engage in self-deception, striking out unsightly or ideologically uncomfortable pages of our history, breaking links between generations, rushing to extremes, creating or debunking idols. It's time to stop only taking note of the bad in our history, and berating ourselves more than even our opponents would do. [Self-]criticism is necessary, but without a sense of self-worth, or love for our Fatherland, such criticism becomes humiliating and counterproductive.

We must be proud of our history, and we have things to be proud of. Our entire, uncensored history must be a part of Russian identity. Without recognising this it is impossible to establish mutual trust and allow society to move forward.

Another serious challenge to Russia's identity is linked to events taking place in the world. Here there are both foreign policy and moral aspects. We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan.

The excesses of political correctness have reached the point where people are seriously talking about registering political parties whose aim is to promote paedophilia. People in many European countries are embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliations. Holidays are abolished or even called something different; their essence is hidden away, as is their moral foundation. And people are aggressively trying to export this model all over the world. I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis.

What else but the loss of the ability to self-reproduce could act as the greatest testimony of the moral crisis facing a human society? Today almost all developed nations are no longer able to reproduce themselves, even with the help of migration. Without the values embedded in Christianity and other world religions, without the standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, people will inevitably lose their human dignity. We consider it natural and right to defend these values. One must respect every minority’s right to be different, but the rights of the majority must not be put into question.

At the same time we see attempts to somehow revive a standardised model of a unipolar world and to blur the institutions of international law and national sovereignty. Such a unipolar, standardised world does not require sovereign states; it requires vassals. In a historical sense this amounts to a rejection of one’s own identity, of the God-given diversity of the world.

Russia agrees with those who believe that key decisions should be worked out on a collective basis, rather than at the discretion of and in the interests of certain countries or groups of countries. Russia believes that international law, not the right of the strong, must apply. And we believe that every country, every nation is not exceptional, but unique, original and benefits from equal rights, including the right to independently choose their own development path.

This is our conceptual outlook, and it follows from our own historical destiny and Russia's role in global politics. Our present position has deep historical roots. Russia itself has evolved on the basis of diversity, harmony and balance, and brings such a balance to the international stage.

I want to remind you that the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the agreements made at Yalta in 1945, taken with Russia’s very active participation, secured a lasting peace. Russia’s strength, the strength of a winning nation at those critical junctures, manifested itself as generosity and justice. And let us remember [the Treaty of] Versailles, concluded without Russia’s participation. Many experts, and I absolutely agree with them, believe that Versailles laid the foundation for the Second World War because the Treaty of Versailles was unfair to the German people: it imposed restrictions with which they could not cope, and the course of the next century became clear.

There is one more fundamental aspect to which I want to draw your attention. In Europe and some other countries so-called multiculturalism is in many respects a transplanted, artificial model that is now being questioned, for understandable reasons. This is because it is based on paying for the colonial past. It is no accident that today European politicians and public figures are increasingly talking about the failures of multiculturalism, and that they are not able to integrate foreign languages or foreign cultural elements into their societies.

Over the past centuries in Russia, which some have tried to label as the "prison of nations", not even the smallest ethnic group has disappeared. And they have retained not only their internal autonomy and cultural identity, but also their historical space. You know, I was interested to learn (I did not even know this) that in Soviet times [authorities] paid such careful attention to this that virtually every small ethnic group had its own print publication, support for its language, and for its national literature. We should bring back and take on board much of what has been done in this respect.

Along with this the different cultures in Russia have the unique experience of mutual influence, mutual enrichment and mutual respect. This multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity lives in our historical consciousness, in our spirit and in our historical makeup. Our state was built in the course of a millennium on this organic model.

Russia – as philosopher Konstantin Leontyev vividly put it – has always evolved in "blossoming complexity" as a state-civilisation, reinforced by the Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s other traditional religions. It is precisely the state-civilisation model that has shaped our state polity. It has always sought to flexibly accommodate the ethnic and religious specificity of particular territories, ensuring diversity in unity.

Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions are an integral part of Russia’s identity, its historical heritage and the present-day lives of its citizens. The main task of the state, as enshrined in the Constitution, is to ensure equal rights for members of traditional religions and atheists, and the right to freedom of conscience for all citizens.

However, it is clearly impossible to identify oneself only through one’s ethnicity or religion in such a large nation with a multi-ethnic population. In order to maintain the nation’s unity, people must develop a civic identity on the basis of shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, and a sense of responsibility for their homeland’s fate, without losing touch with their ethnic or religious roots.

There are broad discussions on how the ideology of national development will be structured politically and conceptually – including with your participation, colleagues. But I deeply believe that individuals’ personal, moral, intellectual and physical development must remain at the heart of our philosophy. Back at the start of the 1990s, Solzhenitsyn stated that the nation’s main goal should be to preserve the population after a very difficult 20th century. Today, we must admit that we have not yet fully overcome the negative demographic trends, although we have veered away from a dangerous decline in the national potential.

Unfortunately, throughout our nation’s history, little value was given at times to individual human lives. Too often, people were seen simply as a means, rather than a goal and a mission for development. We no longer have that right and we cannot throw millions of human lives into the fire for the sake of development. We must treasure every individual. Russia’s main strength in this and future centuries will lie in its educated, creative, physically and spiritually healthy people, rather than natural resources.

The role of education is all the more important because in order to educate an individual, a patriot, we must restore the role of great Russian culture and literature. They must serve as the foundation for people’s personal identity, the source of their uniqueness and their basis for understanding the national idea. Here, a great deal depends on the teaching community, which has been and remains a highly important guardian of nationwide values, ideas and philosophies. This community speaks the same language – the language of science, knowledge and education, despite the fact that it is spread out over an enormous territory, from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. In this way, the community of teachers, the educational community overall, in the broad sense of the word, binds the nation together. Supporting this community is one of the most important steps on the path toward a strong, flourishing Russia.

I want to stress again that without focussing our efforts on people’s education and health, creating mutual responsibility between the authorities and each individual, and establishing trust within society, we will be losers in the competition of history. Russia’s citizens must feel that they are the responsible owners of their country, region, hometown, property, belongings and their lives. A citizen is someone who is capable of independently managing his or her own affairs, freely cooperating with equals.

Local governments and self-regulated citizens’ organisations serve as the best school for civic consciousness. Of course, I’m referring to non-profits. Incidentally, one of the best Russian political traditions, the country council tradition, was also built on the principles of local government. A true civil society and a true, nationally-focused political elite, including the opposition with its own ideology, values and standards for good and evil – their own, rather than those dictated by the media or from abroad – can only grow through effective self-governing mechanisms. The government is prepared to trust self-regulating and self-governing associations, but we must know whom we are trusting. This is absolutely normal global practice, which is precisely why we have passed new legislation to increase the transparency of nongovernmental organisations.

Speaking of any kind of reforms, it is important to bear in mind that there is more to our nation than just Moscow and St Petersburg. In developing Russian federalism, we must rely on our own historical experience, using flexible and diverse models. The Russian model of federalism has a great deal of potential built into it. It is imperative that we learn to use it competently, not forgetting its most important aspect: the development of the regions and their independence should create equal opportunities for all of our nation’s citizens, regardless of where they live, to eliminate inequalities in the economic and social development of Russia’s territory, thereby strengthening the nation’s unity. Ultimately, this is a huge challenge because these territories’ development has been very unbalanced over the course of decades and even centuries.

I would like to touch on another topic. The 21st century promises to become the century of major changes, the era of the formation of major geopolitical zones, as well as financial and economic, cultural, civilisational, and military and political areas. That is why integrating with our neighbours is our absolute priority. The future Eurasian Economic Union, which we have declared and which we have discussed extensively as of late, is not just a collection of mutually beneficial agreements. The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world. Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.

I want to stress that Eurasian integration will also be built on the principle of diversity. This is a union where everyone maintains their identity, their distinctive character and their political independence. Together with our partners, we will gradually implement this project, step by step. We expect that it will become our common input into maintaining diversity and stable global development.

Colleagues, the years after 1991 are often referred to as the post-Soviet era. We have lived through and overcome that turbulent, dramatic period. Russia has passed through these trials and tribulations and is returning to itself, to its own history, just as it did at other points in its history. After consolidating our national identity, strengthening our roots, and remaining open and receptive to the best ideas and practices of the East and the West, we must and will move forward.

Thank you very much for your attention.

http://web.archive.org/web/20150314065719/http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html

- I just wanted to post this because this 2013 speech by Putin is considered one of the foundations of the new nationalist philosophy driving events in Russia and now elsewhere, including the US.

I think the points about Christianity are very important as part of this.

Another key speech was Putin's speech to the Duma about the invasion and annexation of Crimea.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

 

Despite Kremlin’s warning, defiant Putin critic Alexei Navalny to hold ‘illegal’ rally


MOSCOW — When police break up your meeting because of a false bomb threat, that could be just bad luck. When someone glues your office door shut, that could be just a misunderstanding about the rent. And when a stranger comes up to you in the street and dumps green guck all over your face, that could be just a random act of hooliganism.

When this kind of thing happens to you every day, that means you’re Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most prominent anti-corruption crusader and a declared candidate for next year’s presidential election — the mother of all uphill battles, given that your likely opponent is Vladi­mir Putin. And if you’re Alexei Navalny, there’s a good chance you’re going to wake up Monday in jail. 

Authorities have preemptively banned a rally Navalny has organized for central Moscow on Sunday, as well as others planned across Russia. The demonstrations were called to protest what he claims is rampant corruption in the Kremlin. Putin’s spokesman has said that even urging people to take part is illegal.

And Alexander Gorovoi, a senior Russian police official, warned Friday that authorities will “bear no responsibility for any possible negative consequences” for people who do show up. That could mean that if something is started by pro-government activists who routinely interfere with Navalny’s campaign stops, officers might stand aside and let it happen.

Navalny, who has been arrested several times over the years, said the rally will go on. 

“The Kremlin sees us as their enemy, but what should I do?” he said Thursday in his Moscow headquarters. “I’m not going away. I live here. I’m going to live here.”

What Navalny has done to provoke official enmity is issue frequent statements alleging instances of top Kremlin officials amassing huge fortunes. Most recently, he released a report and a 50-minute video detailing allegations that Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has funneled more than $1 billion in bribes through companies and charities run by his associates to acquire vineyards, luxury yachts and opulent mansions.

The Russian government has barely acknowledged those accusations. One lawmaker in the State Duma, a Communist, asked for an inquiry into Navalny’s report. Otherwise, the only palpable reaction has been that when the activist appears in public, eggs are tossed in his face, activists from the pro-government National Liberation Movement shout down his speeches and occasionally he is doused with a green, Soviet-era topical antiseptic known as zelyonka.

But that is shaping up to change Sunday when Navalny and his supporters — he anticipates tens of thousands — plan to challenge the bans on their rallies in Moscow and across the country.

In the interview Thursday, during a rare stop in Moscow, Navalny argued that staging the protests is worthwhile, despite the likelihood he will be arrested, because it will signal the breadth of the support for his message — that Russia needs to rid itself of what he sees as a kleptocratic and authoritarian regime. People in 100 Russian cities have indicated they will turn out Sunday, he said, and more than 10 million people have watched the YouTube video about Medvedev.

“I know that I represent millions of people, I know that my positions are supported by the people, and if it were an honest election, I’d win,” he said, noting that he is denied access to state-run television coverage as well as the right to legal assembly.

 
 Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, dismissed the idea of an official campaign against Navalny. 

“This issue has nothing to do with us or our agenda,” he said in a text message, referring to Navalny’s candidacy and perceptions of harassment.

Technically, Navalny is barred from running for president because of a February conviction and a five-year suspended sentence in an embezzlement case. The verdict echoed the one returned in a 2013 trial on the same charges and overturned after the European Court of Human Rights declared it “prejudicial,” saying that Navalny and his co-defendant were denied the right to a fair trial.

Even if Navalny were allowed to run, he would be a decided underdog to Putin, who has enjoyed an approval rating above 80 percent for the past three years. Lev Gudkov, director of the Moscow-based Levada Center, which tracks Putin’s rating, said in a recent interview that Navalny could probably win about 15 percent.

That’s not much of a threat, except when you consider that Russian Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and the ultranationalist Vladi­mir Zhirinovsky are likely to run, splitting something like 20 percent of the vote between them, Gudkov said. 

According to Gudkov and other analysts, the Kremlin is thought to be looking for at least 70 percent of the vote as a validation of Putin’s continued rule. 

“The elections will be more like a plebiscite of confidence in Putin,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, who suggested that anything more than 60 percent would be pushing the upper limits of Putin’s real electoral rating.

Unlike the support for Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and the probable liberal candidate, Grigory Yavlinsky, who have all been running for president since the mid-1990s, the wave of political activity that Navalny is creating “makes him more of a danger for the Kremlin,” Kolesnikov said.

Being a threat to the establishment has been a hazardous profession in Russia; Ukrainian officials called the shooting of a Putin critic in Ukraine on Thursday “state terrorism.” In Russia, opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was gunned down in 2015 outside the walls of the Kremlin, one of a list of prominent critics who died suddenly.

The Kremlin has strongly denied involvement in any of those deaths. 

Navalny says he understands the danger of his position. He said he used to have a bodyguard but decided there was no point — if someone powerful wanted him dead, a bodyguard wouldn’t be enough to save him.

“It doesn’t guarantee your safety,” he said. “It’s an arms race I can’t win.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/despite-kremlins-warnings-defiant-putin-critic-alexei-navalny-to-hold-illegal-rally/2017/03/24/fd712f60-0fa4-11e7-b2bb-417e331877d9_story.html?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.f266a8fc5bb2

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Russia dismisses sweeping corruption allegations against Medvedev

That same pollster, the Levada Center, in February reported that 47 percent of 1,600 Russians surveyed had heard of Navalny, but only 10 percent said they might vote for the 40-year-old whistleblower.

- This is Navalny's piece on Medvedev Corruption, it's gotten a lot of attention....

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Shaun Walker‏Verified account @shaunwalker7 3h3 hours ago

Ekho estimates 60,000 people protested in 82 cities across Russia. Pretty significant numbers/spread, especially given threat of arrest.

Tanya Lokot‏ @tanyalokot 5h5 hours ago


Russia protest latest: over 600 detained in Moscow, Navalny's FBK team charged with extremism, no criminal charges against Navalny himself.

Alexey Kovalev‏ @Alexey__Kovalev 7h7 hours ago


Central Moscow on lockdown, thousands of riot cops, helicopters. Top news on national newswire: 'U.S.cow escapes cops in a dramatic chase'.

Carl Rempel ️??‏ @CarlRempel 8h8 hours ago


Today. Opposition leader arrested while 10,000 people in St. Petersburg chant, "No war!" http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39398305 … #RussiaProtests

Christo Grozev‏ @christogrozev 1h1 hour ago


131 persons arrested at anti-Putin rally in St. Petersburg today.

Kevin Rothrock Retweeted Рубанов Роман


The raid on Navalny's office is reportedly part of a hate-crimes investigation. That's serious stuff in Russia, with major penalties.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Leonid Ragozin‏ @leonidragozin 7h7 hours ago


Leonid Ragozin Retweeted Tatiana Marshanova


St Petersburg rally moves to Winter Palace. Days after the 100-year anniversary of February revolution.

- Symbolic import here.

Some photos of today's events.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Winter Palace 2017

Winter Palace 1917

Crazy.

You can hear it.

X Soviet‏ @XSovietNews 8h8 hours ago

People are chanting "Putin's a thief!" outside the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. They want to overthrow the tsar. #RussiaProtests

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Benjamin Ross‏ @BenRossTransit 1h1 hour ago

Crowd in front of the Winter Palace today chanting "Down with the Czar"

- Guarantee you Vlad heard this one in Moscow.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Anton Barbashin‏Verified account @ABarbashin

Duma proposes to ban political protests "for a while" because of the terrorist attack in SpB

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

More protests.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

 

Kaliningrad: Baltic Hong Kong No Longer


So what’s happened to Kaliningrad Oblast? With the fall of the USSR, it was initially supposed to become a bridge of cooperation, a Russian gateway to Europe, or even a Baltic Hong Kong. Well that didn’t happen, did it. Instead, the enclave deteriorated into a rusty military bastion that’s long been dependent on handouts from Moscow. And what about now? As Sergey Sukhankin sees it, the oblast has become nothing less than a “Russian embarrassment.” Here’s why.

Kaliningrad Oblast—the westernmost Russian region physically separated from the Russian mainland—is a unique case study in post-Soviet transformation. The post-1991 oblast had all of the elements necessary for a success story: proximity to Europe, a liberal governor, peace, relative stability, and absence of other negative factors. Many parts of the Russian Federation were not endowed with these qualities, but Kaliningrad was. Initially deemed a “bridge of cooperation,” the “Russian getaway to Europe,” and the “Baltic Hong Kong,” the exclave turned out to be one of the greatest disappointments that post-Soviet area has seen.




Not only did Kaliningrad fail to become a site of cooperation and dialogue between Russia and the European Union, it deteriorated into a “military bastion,” dependent on hand-outs from the central government. The Baltic Hong Kong became Russia’s Baltic Corregidor—a military base with the capability of cutting off other countries’ access to the Baltic Sea.  Moreover, the once hoped for cooperation with the West is being mercilessly destroyed through implementation of the “Russian World” project and the elimination of the region’s German historic-cultural legacy.








From Soviet “Military Bastion” to the “Russian Embarrassment”

After it was annexed in 1945, Kaliningrad became a Soviet military outpost on the Baltic Sea. To keep it afloat, Moscow allocated enormous financial resources to prop up the local economy as a form of “compensation” for its adverse location. Kaliningrad elites quickly learned the lesson that they could extract resources from the central government for their own benefit.

Everything, however, changed in 1991 when the USSR collapsed. In addition to vast opportunities and great expectations, the post-Soviet world introduced a new challenging reality. Kaliningrad could have become Russia’s response to Hong Kong and serve a “bridge” between Europe and Russia. Yet, for Kaliningrad to take this path, local elites and the Kremlin needed a “road map” for the region’s development. Equally important, however, was the local population’s willingness to accept a new reality, in which competition is a pre-requisite for progress, prosperity, and success. Neither of these came to pass. Instead of prosperity and Europeanization, Kaliningrad became a Russian backwater region. Instead of being known for the birthplace of Kant and Bessel, the oblast was associated with an HIV/AIDS epidemic, smuggling, and widespread criminality.

“Stability for Tranquillity” or Everything Comes at a Price

Transition from a somewhat privileged Soviet city into a backwards region shocked the local population, and led them to welcome promises of stability, whatever the source. Vladimir Putin’s accession as president of the Russian Federation in 2000 had crucial and far-reaching implications for Kaliningrad. This shift became clear in 2005, during celebrations of 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad. From this point, Moscow identified its determination to choose the path of development for Kaliningrad: during elaborate anniversary celebrations, Georgy Boos, who had been handpicked by Putin, was presented as the next governor of the oblast. Similarly, the Kremlin suggested that legislation passed in 2006 giving Kaliningrad tax breaks as part of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was to become the backbone of the local economy.

Yet, it soon became clear that both changes were designed to increase dependence on Moscow. For instance, the new SEZ gave priority to big businesses, primarily from Moscow, restricting foreign companies’ access to the local market. Moreover, prioritizing large enterprises over small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) did not take into account the limited size of the local market and the lack of resources that were to be transported from the Russian mainland. In practice, this meant the local economy was to be artificially supported by financial subsidies from the central government. By refocusing Kaliningrad’s economy toward hand-outs from the central government, the Kremlin restarted policies that had been pursued by the Communist regime before 1991. The main outcome—skyrocketing corruption and further reliance on federal support—must have been expected by the Kremlin as an antidote against excessive independence and forging external contacts.

The Unsuccessful Revolt: Is Something Rotten in the Oblast of Kaliningrad?





This model functioned relatively well for several years before it first encountered serious challenges. The outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008 showed how brittle and one-sided the Russian economy was. The federal centre could no longer provide the enclave with the same level of subsidies, urging the governor to raise funds from Kaliningrad itself. The local government increased taxes and levied utility charges on one of the most profitable local businesses, the transportation of vehicles from the European Union to Russia. At the same time, the government tolerated spending cuts on medical facilities. These tax increases and medical clinic closures inspired a wave of public discontent that broke into mass protests, eventually known as the “Tangerine Spring” in late 2009 – 2010. As a result, Georgy Boos was practically evicted from the oblast. Slogans, such as “United Russia go to Russia!” and “Down with Boos, down with Putin!” resonated far beyond the tiny enclave. The Kremlin watched these developments with a growing sense of alarm.

Influenced by events in the westernmost Russian region, many external and domestic observers rushed to celebrate the victory of Kaliningrad democracy, calling Kaliningrad the “Russian Gdansk,” a reference to the Polish city that led protests against that country’s communist rulers in 1989. Unfortunately, they celebrated too quickly. The locals revolted not because of values but because of their economic situation: the Kremlin was not providing the promised funding. The truth is that Kaliningrad could not have become Gdansk. Its Soviet legacy still shapes the outlook of a sizable part of the local community. The “Kaliningrad identity” is based solely on Soviet nostalgia.

Kaliningrad in the Vanguard of the “Russian World:” What is the End Game?

Another milestone occurred in 2008 when Patriarch Kirill became the head of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). As the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, this powerful figure became the main advocate of Kaliningrad Oblast in Moscow. His accession had a profound effect on the “Russian World” project, with the church playing a larger role in Russian foreign policy. In this regard, Russia’s westernmost enclave was to acquire a new identity based on enormous transformation. No longer on the periphery, now Kaliningrad was described as the beacon and citadel of the “Russian World” in Europe. This new image was pronounced by the Patriarch in 2015 during his visit to Kaliningrad.



In the meantime, there were some disturbing aspects to this transformation. First, local authorities allied with the church launched another crusade against remnants of the German cultural legacy (which Kirill called “old stones,” referring to German churches). If this trend continues, soon, little will remain of Kaliningrad’s rich historical and cultural traditions from its German past.

Second, Russian authorities keep trying to cut Kaliningrad’s links with the outside world. In addition to cancelling short-term visa free access for foreigners, the oldest local NGO “The German – Russian House,” which had opened in the early 1990s, was labelled a “foreign agent” and was forced to close.

Third, various “patriotic” and paramilitary groups have gained popularity. These range from Cossacks to the notorious Yunarmia movement, an initiative of the Russian Ministry of Defence aimed at fostering a bond between the army and the young generations of Russians. Moscow is pursuing a policy of militarization of the public consciousness. Finally, Kaliningrad has become a mechanism by which Moscow generates anti-Baltic sentiments. An ugly incident in Vilnius, Lithuania at the end of 2016 when the Russian Embassy was implicated in dissemination of highly provocative anti-Lithuanian leaflets summoning the locals to move to Kaliningrad is a recent example.

Scenarios for Future Development

Growing disappointment with the new U.S. administration among Russian ruling elites, continuing sanctions, and worsening economic conditions will push Moscow to increase its anti-Western sentiment. Over the 26 years of post-Soviet development, Kaliningrad Oblast has worked as a litmus test of Russian relations with the West. For the oblast, the new anti-Western trend means greater isolation and further military build-up on its territory. In other words, Kaliningrad is returning to its pre-1991 status. In the meantime, in dealing with Kaliningrad today, Moscow is haunted by the same curse from 25 years ago: the absence of a strategy for economic development beyond distributing subsidies from the central government. The main proof—the abrogation of the Special Economic Zone status in April 2016 and the government’s failure to offer an alternative—showed that the old model does not work, and a new model does not exist.

Despite this situation, the Kremlin is determined to pursue its current course of dealing with the oblast, which is reflected in the growing military build-up. Therefore, the current model—economic support in exchange for loyalty—will continue to dominate Moscow’s relations with Kaliningrad.

http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/c6c46654-c046-469e-9d80-d8c6bea1b946?platform=hootsuite

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

The first major western article on Putin when Yeltsin surprisingly named him Prime Minister.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Arrest of Russian theatre director raises fears of clampdown on dissent

Kirill Serebrennikov detained over accusations of embezzling government funds, but supporters claim case is political

Russian investigators have arrested one of the country’s most prominent theatre directors for fraud, in a case that many in the arts world fear is part of a crackdown on dissenting voices.

Kirill Serebrennikov stands accused of embezzling 68m roubles (£900,000) of government funds. He was questioned by investigators on Tuesday and denied the allegations, Russian agencies reported. The director will spend the night in prison and a court will decide on Wednesday whether he should be remanded in custody or put under house arrest.

Serebrennikov, known for his work on stage and screen, is the director of the Gogol Centre, a progressive, experimental theatre frequented by liberal Muscovites. The theatre is known for contemporary productions that often deal directly with political or sexual themes rarely seen on stage in Moscow.

Serebrennikov was first detained by investigators in May and questioned as a witness in the fraud case. That led to an outpouring of support for him from the Moscow theatre world and protestations that the pressure was political.

However, the investigators did not stop there. A number of Serebrennikov’s former colleagues were detained and, according to Russian media outlets, some have given evidence against him.

The director has previously described the case against him and his former colleagues as “absurd and schizophrenic”, and insisted that all the government money had been spent on theatre productions. In one Facebook post, he referred to a production of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, which was performed more than 15 times and nominated for awards. “Now the investigators tell us that it doesn’t exist and never did,” he wrote.

Sources in the Moscow theatre world said the allocation of state funds for theatres was a notoriously murky process, but they found it hard to believe the director could be guilty.

Serebrennikov revealed in an interview this month that his passport had been confiscated while the investigation continued. A statement on the website of the Russian investigative committee on Tuesday morning announced that the director had been arrested for fraud. He was detained in St Petersburg overnight and brought to Moscow to be charged.

Serebrennikov has had a difficult year, with an eagerly awaited premiere of a ballet about the dancer Rudolf Nureyev pulled from the Bolshoi theatre’s stage at the last minute in July. Officially, the reason was because the performance was not ready, but there were rumours that the theatre had come under pressure to shelve the ballet owing to Serebrennikov’s reputation and the open portrayal of homosexual relationships in his production.

As well as opera, theatre and ballet, Serebrennikov has also directed films, and his 2016 movie The Student won accolades at the Cannes film festival. Before the arrest he had been shooting a film about the 1980s Soviet singer Viktor Tsoi. “I was on set with him on Saturday in St Petersburg and he was in high spirits and enjoying himself,” said Michael Idov, who co-wrote the screenplay.

It is unclear whether the director will be able to finish work on the film or fulfil other artistic commitments. He was due to direct an opera in Stuttgart, Germany, next month.

There was a fresh outpouring of support for Serebrennikov on Tuesday, as members of the art world reacted with horror to the arrest. Vladimir Urin, the director of the Bolshoi theatre, said Serebrennikov was a “gifted and talented man” and a “great artist”.

Shortly after the initial questioning of Serebrennikov in May, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was asked about the incident by an actor at a Kremlin reception. He responded: “Fools”, apparently referring to the investigators. This was seen by some as a sign from the Kremlin to stop the campaign against the director; instead, Russian authorities have intensified it.

“There was an implicit understanding that there are certain elite safe spaces where you can do the kind of things that Gogol Centre was doing,” said Idov. “However, this agreement seems to be fraying recently.”

The writer Boris Akunin wrote on Facebook that the arrest could not have happened without Putin’s approval, and said it signalled a “new stage of existence with new rules” in the country.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Russia Contemplates Constitution Changes as Putin Faces Term Limits

The speaker of Russia’s parliament raised the possibility of changing the constitution as speculation grows that the Kremlin is considering ways to allow President Vladimir Putin to remain in power beyond the end of his current term, when current law requires him to step down.

“This is about the transfer of power,” said Gleb Pavlovsky, a political analyst and former Kremlin aide. “Putin encourages this game, dropping ambiguous hints.

The comments from Vyacheslav Volodin, speaker of the State Duma and a top member of the ruling party, at a scripted Kremlin meeting with Putin late Tuesday were vague and didn’t mention succession. But analysts said they showed the authorities already are preparing the ground for changes before the end of Putin’s current term in 2024.

“There are questions in society, esteemed Vladimir Vladimirovich,” Volodin said, addressing Putin in the respectful form, according to a Kremlin transcript. “This is the time when we could answer these questions, without in any way threatening the fundamental provisions” of the constitution, he added. “The law, even one like the Basic Law, isn’t dogma."

Putin Cautious

The current constitution was drafted 25 years ago, Volodin noted. “That was a very difficult time. A time when the state stood on the edge of collapse, when social obligations weren’t fulfilled, when our citizens lost faith in the authorities.” He proposed involving Constitutional Court judges and other legal experts in an effort to look at “how the Constitution and the norms of development of the Constitution suit the tenets that were passed."

The official transcript doesn’t include any mention of Putin’s response to Volodin’s proposal. The Kremlin’s tight control over the political system would make it easy to approve constitutional changes if Putin backed them.

“There’s no position on this issue yet” at the Kremlin, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday when asked about Volodin’s comments, adding that no work is underway on possible amendments at the moment.

When he was reelected to his current six-year term in March, Putin said, “At present I don’t plan any constitutional reforms.” He brushed off a question about whether he might run again in 2030, as allowed by current law. “What am I going to do, stay until I’m 100 years old? No."

But speculation over the possibility of amendments continues. Earlier this month, Putin said the constitution is “not some fossilized legal construct but a living, developing organism.” At his annual press conference last week, Putin said any changes to the Basic Law are “a matter for broad civic discussion,” though he wasn’t specifically asked about amendments to allow him to remain in power.

Term Limits

Political analysts and government insiders have been discussing the possibility of constitutional changes for months as the focus on the end of Putin’s term grows. Putin, now 66 years old and apparently healthy, has suggested he doesn’t plan to stay beyond that time, but few see a suitable replacement for the man who has ruled Russia virtually unchallenged for the last 18 years.

“The general sense is that there’s no one to replace Putin as the guarantor of the system,” said Valery Solovei, a political scientist at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. “None of the potential candidates is in a position to maintain the ‘sacred ties’ to the people. So the best option is seen as a change in the configuration of the government to ensure Putin remains the center of decision making."

Among the hypothetical possibilities would be to elevate an advisory body called the State Council to become the supreme authority with Putin at its head, according to analysts. The presidency could remain, but stripped of many of its powers, Solovei said. Other options also are possible, he noted, saying the process of amending the constitution could begin in 2020.

 

[NFL2DF]

So one theory now ongoing is that Putin and his state media have created such an atmosphere of hate and conspiracy laden accusation that the opposition is now officially treated as traitorous, and that there are enough nationalist (fascist/fascistic) groups running around with freedom to act with impunity that any number of groups or people could have offed Nemtsov, which would actually be scarier than if Putin had ordered the hit.

No idea why this thread was bumped, I am only on page one. 

1. It is interesting that there is a 2000+ page thread here and 24/7 coverage by the MSM on Russia Russia Russia. Meanwhile countries like China, Mexico, and Venezuela are far worse in terms of freedom, censorship, killing political opponents and we don't hear boo about them. Is it because they have brown skin and you are not allowed to criticize people with brown skin? Is it because the MSM doesn't tell you constantly that they are evil so it doesn't cross your mind? Is it because you actually think Russia is unique, our greatest enemy, the major evil in this world?

2. The quoted text above is pretty ironic. We currently have a situation in the US where the state media (CNN, MSNBC, Facebook, Twitter, etc) have created an atmosphere of hate and conspiracy laden accusation that the opposition is now officially treated as traitorous (many on this board have called the President and his supporters traitors, among other things like racists and rapists. And that there are enough fascist (under the doublespeak name of Antifa) groups running around with freedom to act with impunity inflicting hate and violence on anyone that disagrees. Even harassing political and media opponents at their homes, in restaurants, and their place of work. They have even attempted to assassinate the leadership of the GOP at a baseball practice. (not with fake bombs but real bullets)

Day by day the anti-Trump crowd is becoming more and more like those they claim to despise (communists, Nazis, Russians). It is truly fascinating to watch this unfold. 

 

[NFL2DF]

I'll give Saints credit where it is due, he was obsessed with Russia long before CNN and Hillary Clinton told him they were the bad guys.

 

[sho nuff]

No idea why this thread was bumped, I am only on page one. 

1. It is interesting that there is a 2000+ page thread here and 24/7 coverage by the MSM on Russia Russia Russia. Meanwhile countries like China, Mexico, and Venezuela are far worse in terms of freedom, censorship, killing political opponents and we don't hear boo about them. Is it because they have brown skin and you are not allowed to criticize people with brown skin? Is it because the MSM doesn't tell you constantly that they are evil so it doesn't cross your mind? Is it because you actually think Russia is unique, our greatest enemy, the major evil in this world?

2. The quoted text above is pretty ironic. We currently have a situation in the US where the state media (CNN, MSNBC, Facebook, Twitter, etc) have created an atmosphere of hate and conspiracy laden accusation that the opposition is now officially treated as traitorous (many on this board have called the President and his supporters traitors, among other things like racists and rapists. And that there are enough fascist (under the doublespeak name of Antifa) groups running around with freedom to act with impunity inflicting hate and violence on anyone that disagrees. Even harassing political and media opponents at their homes, in restaurants, and their place of work. They have even attempted to assassinate the leadership of the GOP at a baseball practice. (not with fake bombs but real bullets)

Day by day the anti-Trump crowd is becoming more and more like those they claim to despise (communists, Nazis, Russians). It is truly fascinating to watch this unfold. 

They are labeled those things because of their actions...not their opposition.  Yiur take couldn’t be any further off from truth. And calling other media state media and not Fox is laughable.

”They attempted to assassinate”?  Again...why are blatant falsehoods like this posts kept around?

Yiur last paragraph again is just so outlandish and wrong and projection of the Trump side...it’s really bad.

 

[sho nuff]

I'll give Saints credit where it is due, he was obsessed with Russia long before CNN and Hillary Clinton told him they were the bad guys.

He heard and saw what was happening (he was also someone who wasn’t pro Hillary).

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Paula Chertok ‏ @PaulaChertok

#NemtsovMarch 10,000+ people marched thru central Moscow in memory of Boris #Nemtsov & his life's work for a free democratic #Russia. Feb 27 will be the 4th anniversary of the shocking assassination of the anti-Kremlin politician at the foot of the Kremlin. photos @EvgenyFeldman

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

aneesa‏ @neesaxanim Feb 17

The State Duma Committee approved the draft statement on the revision of the assessment of the introduction of the USSR troops in Afghanistan

"The State Duma considers it necessary to recognize the moral and political condemnation of the decision to bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, expressed in the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR of December 24, 1989, .... noncompliant with the principles of historical justice," the document says. Deputies are planning to declare that "the tragic events of the military conflict in Afghanistan should be considered based on considerations of political impartiality and historical truth"

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Putin to U.S. - I'm ready for another Cuban Missile-style crisis if you want one

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia is militarily ready for a Cuban Missile-style crisis if the United States wanted one and threatened to place hypersonic nuclear missiles on ships or submarines near U.S. territorial waters.

The Cuban Missile Crisis erupted in 1962 when Moscow responded to a U.S. missile deployment in Turkey by sending ballistic missiles to Cuba, sparking a standoff that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

More than five decades on, tensions are rising again over Russian fears that the United States might deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as a landmark Cold War-era arms-control treaty unravels.

Putin’s comments, made to Russian media late on Wednesday, follow his warning that Moscow will match any U.S. move to deploy new missiles closer to Russia by stationing its own missiles closer to the United States or by deploying faster missiles or both.

Putin detailed his warning for the first time, saying Russia could deploy hypersonic missiles on ships and submarines which could lurk outside U.S. territorial waters if Washington now moved to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

“(We’re talking about) naval delivery vehicles: submarines or surface ships. And we can put them, given the speed and range (of our missiles)... in neutral waters. Plus they are not stationary, they move and they will have to find them,” Putin said, according to a Kremlin transcript.

“You work it out: Mach nine (the speed of the missiles) and over 1,000 km (their range).”

TREATY VIOLATIONS

The State Department dismissed Putin’s earlier warning as propaganda, saying it was designed to divert attention from what Washington alleges are Moscow’s violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

It referred queries about Putin’s latest remarks to the Pentagon, which did not immediately respond.

The INF pact bans Russia and the United States from stationing short- and intermediate-range land-based missiles in Europe. Washington announced on Feb. 1 it will withdraw from the treaty in six months unless Moscow ends its alleged violations.

Analyst Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association think tank said Putin may be seeking to signal that Russia can keep up with the United States, to distract from its internal problems or to deflect blame for the parlous state of the INF treaty.

“He may also be trying to send the message that, look, neither side should want this world (of a new arms race) so we should sit down and resume discussions,” Reif said.

Putin has said he does not want an arms race but would have no choice but to act if Washington deployed new missiles in Europe, some of which he says could strike Moscow within 10 to 12 minutes.

The United States does not currently have ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles that it could place in Europe but could develop and deploy them if the INF treaty collapses.

Putin said his naval response to such a move would mean Russia could strike the United States faster than U.S. missiles deployed in Europe could hit Moscow because the flight time would be shorter.

“It (the calculation) would not be in their favour, at least as things stand today. That’s for sure.” said Putin.

Relations between Moscow and Washington were strained, he added, but the tensions were not comparable to those of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

“They (the tensions) are not a reason to ratchet up confrontation to the levels of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 1960s. In any case that’s not what we want,” said Putin. “If someone wants that, well OK they are welcome. I have set out today what that would mean. Let them count (the missile flight times).”

Separately, Washington said on Thursday that it was carrying out an observation flight over Russia under the Open Skies Treaty, the first one since 2017.

In a statement, the Pentagon said an unarmed OC-135B aircraft was being used and Russia was aware of the flight.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

New Internet Bill May Foster Censorship, Isolation

Russia Redacted: New Internet Bill May Foster Censorship, Isolation

The adoption in the first reading of a draft law on the “sovereign Internet” by the State Duma, the lower parliamentary chamber in Russia, occurred earlier this week. The bill has the potential to isolate the country from the global community and would surely foster censorship.

The legislators’ rationale behind the adoption of the law sounded rather innocuous: relations between the West and Russia have been sour for years, so Russia could be cut off the global web any time and should be prepared to run its own intranet.

This explanation may go down well with the majority of domestic internet users who either don’t care about politics or are susceptible to the government’s anti-Western propaganda. It sounds like a reassurance that people will be still able to use Internet the same way they’ve been using it for years even if the “evil” West cuts Russia off.

Some people, however, may wonder if the threat that Russia could be cut off from the global web is real in the first place.

The possibility was mentioned during the first months following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsular region from Ukraine in March 2014, which triggered the current standoff with the West. But, again, the cut-off threat then was mentioned by local senior officials and legislators rather than coming directly from the West.

Why at this specific point should Russia be concerned about being cut off from the global internet? Over the last couple of years, Russian officials have been unhappy with how Russia is portrayed in Western media. They have been unhappy with Western tech giants, such as Google, Facebook ,and Twitter, which have been reluctant to comply with Russia’s law on personal data stipulating that all personal details of Russian citizens should be stored within Russia.

So far, Russian authorities have not cracked down on those companies, but smaller Western companies have fallen prey to the nation’s personal data law, like for instance the recruiting network LinkedIn, which has been banned in Russia since late 2015.

Meanwhile, the concept of “sovereign Internet” is set to give Russia’s communications watchdog, Roskomnadzor, huge control over what Internet traffic could enter the country and from where, substantially increasing opportunities for online censorship.

China’s Great Firewall as a Model

The draft, portrayed as a protective measure, could easily be used as a powerful censorship tool, evoking the China’s Great Firewall, also built on the concept of “internet sovereignty.”

However, there is one huge difference between the two countries. These days, China remains a Communist totalitarian state. Even though it has embraced a capitalistic economic model over the last couple of decades and opened up to global collaboration, its citizens never enjoyed much freedom at home.

Conversely, Russia saw a decade of unprecedented freedom of speech, media and expression following the collapse of the Communist system in 1991. And the arrival of the internet in the second half of the 1990s was viewed as part of that freedom.

Since the election of president Vladimir Putin in 2000, Russia has been gradually becoming more and more authoritarian, with rampant censorship and numerous restrictions on freedom of speech and internet use coming naturally as part of that path.

Some might be skeptical about Russian authorities’ technical capabilities to install something similar to China’s Great Firewall, and there might be reasons for that skepticism.

Russians have been successfully using VPNs to circumvent blockings of web sites, such as LinkedIn. Roskomnadzor’s attempt last year to block popular encrypted messaging service Telegram, which refused to collaborate with the country’s secret services, were similarly unsuccessful.

However, this time around, Russian authorities are likely to be more serious, and it’s alarming.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Police Detain Over 1000 in Crackdown on Moscow Elections Protest

Video1

Video2

Video3

Spoiler

Saturday’s demonstration came after a wave of arrests of opposition candidates barred from the ballot.

or two weeks, the authorities had allowed Russia’s political opposition to vent frustration in the capital’s streets over the decision of election officials to bar anti-establishment candidates from running in upcoming local elections.

But after some 22,500 people turned out for a protest in central Moscow last weekend that was approved by city officials — the largest showing at an opposition-led rally in recent years — the authorities decided that enough was enough. 

“Attempts to give ultimatums and organize riots will not bring anything good,” Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin wrote on Twitter Saturday morning, issuing a rare warning in advance of a follow-up protest. “Order in the city will be ensured in accordance with the law.”

sparked by dissatisfaction over declining living standards that has led to falling ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the ruling United Russia party.

Called by opposition leader Alexei Navalny to take place outside of City Hall, just a stone’s throw away from the Kremlin, the demonstration demanded that opposition candidates be allowed on the ballot in September’s Moscow State Duma elections.

Election officials had barred more than a dozen candidates this month, including Navalny allies Ilya Yashin, Lyubov Sobol and Ivan Zhdanov, for allegedly failing to collect the necessary number of signatures from voters to qualify for the ballot. The candidates, in turn, said they had been unfairly excluded despite meeting all of the formal requirements, in what they called an attempt by authorities to quash dissent against pro-Kremlin forces in the capital.

Earlier this week, the authorities signaled that they would no longer tolerate the public discontent. 

After Russia’s Investigative Committee opened a criminal investigation on Wednesday into the recent protests, Navalny was detained and handed a 30-day sentence for calling people to attend the demonstrations. That night, police conducted night-time raids on the apartments of four leading opposition candidates, seizing their computers and bringing them in for questioning. 

Then, on the eve of Saturday’s protest, police again raided the apartments of the opposition candidates, detaining nearly all of them.

Yet despite the absence of the opposition leaders, protesters turned out in droves to voice their discontent on Saturday afternoon. 

“What else can we do?” said Margarita Roschenko, 63, when asked outside City Hall if she was worried about getting detained. “We have to fight for our rights somehow.” 

Moscow police estimated 3,500 had attended the demonstration, including 700 registered journalists and bloggers. Activists said the number was likely much higher, adding that it was difficult to estimate accurate numbers because the authorities prevented a mass crowd from forming in any one location. 

Police cordoned off the street in front of City Hall and had detained some 200 demonstrators before the protest even kicked off at 2 p.m. local time. By the time most of the protesters had dissipated on Saturday evening, police had detained 1007, the OVD-Info police monitoring group reported, listing cases of violent arrests.

Police also stormed Navalny’s headquarters, where his aides were streaming live footage of the protest, as well as the studios of the independent Dozhd television channel. The outlet’s editor-in-chief was then summoned for questioning in connection with the criminal investigation into the protests. 

Protesters didn’t back down easily, however. At times, they broke through police barricades and clashed with riot police, who used batons and, at least in once instance, tear gas to disperse them. 

By evening, hundreds of the leaderless protesters had been split up into individual groups by the police and marched around the city center chanting “Russia will be free” and “Russia without Putin.” They also blocked a main thoroughfare.

Meanwhile, as police clashed with the protesters in Moscow on Saturday afternoon, state television showed Putin descending in a submersible to the seabed in the Gulf of Finland.

“There are lots of problems on Earth,” he told state media after the dive. “You have to go to high places and you have to go underwater so that there are fewer of them.” 

For their part, Sobol, Yashin and Zhdanov — three of the most prominent activists in the protests this month — were released later on Saturday from court. Soon after being released, they called for the protesters to reconvene at Trubnaya Square in central Moscow at 7:40 p.m local time to continue the demonstration.

“I’m free and I’m returning to central Moscow!” Sobol, who is on the 14th day of a hunger strike in protest of being barred from the elections, wrote on Twitter.

“I see this as the achievement of all those people who came out [to protest] today!” she added. 

Soon after arriving at the square, however, Sobol and Zhdanov were detained for a second time, along with dozens of other protesters.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Protests continued today in Moscow, more mass arrests, Internet was turned off in the city.

Video.

Video2 - warning graphic.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

The arms race key component of the Cold War has been put back in place with the cancellation of the INF. 

 

[Osaurus]

Intel ?

 

[Long Ball Larry]

The arms race key component of the Cold War has been put back in place with the cancellation of the INF. 

To be fair, Russia supposedly hasn’t been following it and China has been stockpiling, so the US may need to adjust its practices regarding nuclear weapons.

 

[ren hoek]

https://twitter.com/SharkNewsWires/status/1158407170926530560?s=20

News Update : Explosions rocked an ammunition depot near the city of Achinsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region of Russia this morning. Thousand's have been evacuated from the area. #Achinsk #Russia

 

[saintfool]

Bloomberg News: Putin Warns U.S. of New Arms Race After Nuclear Deal’s Collapse; Russia will deploy new missiles if U.S. does, Putin warns

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Additional detail on the Krasnoyarsk explosion here.

- RU is claiming 1 person is dead, which seems really hard to believe considering the neighboring town of 16,500 has been evacuated.

 

[Mister CIA]

Additional detail on the Krasnoyarsk explosion here.

- RU is claiming 1 person is dead, which seems really hard to believe considering the neighboring town of 16,500 has been evacuated.

That's how you kill 30-50 feral hogs.

 

[Van Dyman]

This seems to be getting worse.

Residents of Nyonoksa, a village near the site of the suspected Skyfall nuclear missile explosion, have been told to evacuate, according to a state-run media report, citing a local official (link: https://cnn.it/2YYVuo4) cnn.it/2YYVuo4

Not good.

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Germany Says Russia Is Suspected in Berlin Assassination

Germany’s federal prosecutor took over an inquiry into the murder of a former commander of Chechen separatists, and the authorities expelled two Russian diplomats.

The German authorities declared on Wednesday that Russia was suspected of being behind the daylight assassination in Berlin this summer of a former fighter with Chechen separatists, and also expelled two Russian diplomats, adding new strains to relations with Moscow.

The announcement deepened concerns about Russian contract killings in Europe, after last year’s nerve agent poisoning of Sergei V. Skripal, a former Russian spy who was living in Britain. German lawmakers called for a joint European response to the killing in Berlin.

Peter Frank, Germany’s federal prosecutor, said he would take over the case, months after investigators identified the killer as Vadim Krasikov, who is believed to be a Russian contract killer. The suspect has been in custody since August; he was detained by the police hours after witnesses said they had seen him ride a bicycle up to the victim and shoot him once in the torso and twice in the head before fleeing the scene.

Although the authorities initially considered Russian involvement, it was only in recent weeks that sufficient evidence was gathered to back those suspicions, Mr. Frank said in a statement. The additional evidence elevated the killing of the former fighter, a Russian-Georgian citizen identified by prosecutors only as Tornike K., from a simple murder case to a state security threat.

“There are sufficient, real indications that the killing of Tornike K. was carried out either on orders by the officials in the Russian Federation or those in the autonomous Chechen Republic, as part of the Russian Republic,” Mr. Frank’s office said in a statement.

The victim was previously identified by the German authorities as Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a former commander of a Chechen separatist force whom the Russian state news media has depicted as a terrorist.

The prosecutor cited photographs of the suspect that matched images of a Vadim K. who had been sought by the Russian authorities over a 2013 murder in Moscow that was also carried out by an assassin on a bicycle. The Russian authorities later withdrew the warrant, although the investigation remained open, German prosecutors said.

Immediately after the announcement, the foreign ministry in Berlin ordered two diplomats stationed at the Russian Embassy expelled, citing Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with the investigation.

The Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow pledged to take measures responding to the expulsion. Russian lawmakers said they expected a ###-for-tat response. The Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, denounced what she called Germany’s “politicized approach” to the murder investigation. ...

 

[SaintsInDome2006]

Russia’s proposed reforms could give Putin power until 2036

President sees potential changes to constitution as part of his legacy

Russia’s parliament has proposed resetting President Vladimir Putin’s term limits as part of sweeping constitutional changes, allowing him to remain in office potentially until at least 2036. Valentina Tereshkova, a member of Mr Putin’s United Russia party, suggested the move on Tuesday before lawmakers voted on the constitutional amendments. The Kremlin then said Mr Putin would address the Duma, the lower house, ahead of the vote. Lawmakers are planning to vote on early parliamentary elections for this autumn.

Mr Putin has framed the changes — the most significant since Russia adopted the current constitution in 1993 — as a transition to a parliamentary republic he says will be his political legacy for “30 to 50 years”. “For now, stability and the steady development of the country are more important but, later, when the country is surer of itself, has more resources — flab around the waist, as they say — then we should absolutely ensure a transfer of power,” Mr Putin said last week.

But the amendments, which are expected to pass through three parliamentary votes this week, would strengthen Mr Putin’s grip on power to the point where he could remain as president. Mr Putin last week ruled out switching to head the State Council, an obscure body he plans to grant extensive new powers to, on the grounds that it would be “destructive” for Russia.

- This would put Putin in power until 2086, when he's 84, whereupon of course he can change the Constitution again. He runs the Duma, the press, the elections, protests, social media, the courts, local elections and local governments.

This will be the longest reign in Russian history, exceeding Stalin. Catherine ruled 34 years so if he makes then he will be longer than her as well. This guy was once a 2-bit ex-KGB thug skimming product off the top of deliveries into St. Petersburg.

he may also become the oldest ruler. Brezhnev was 79.