Statiscally, shouldn't you always go for 2? (1 Viewer)

[Softball 3:16]

NFL conversion rate on two-point try's is 51.9%. NFL conversion rate on one-point trys is 98%2 * .519 = 1.041 * .980 = .9801.04 > .980 = Go for two.Thoughts?

 

[Ozymandias]

So you scored a td and you're up 31-28 with 1:00 left in the game. Do you go for 1 or 2?No brainer...you go for one.So, you shouldn't always go for two.

 

[Twisters]

Didnt someone bring this up awhile ago?Dumb Idea

 

[set57hike]

The variance of going for two is approximately 1. The variance of going for the 1 point try is about .02.In other words, the higher expected value of going for 2 comes with much higher risk. It is definitely a reasonable argument if you have high risk tolerance.

 

[SSOG]

http://forums.footballguys.com/forum/index...6&hl=conversion

First off, the chances of converting a 2pc are about 43%, while the chances of converting the extra point at the NFL level are about 99%. Therefore, in terms of long-run scoring potential, teams should kick the extra point every time.That said, there are several times when the 2pc becomes the higher percentage play. There's the aforementioned Rams/Falcons game in 2000 when Jeff Wilkins was hurt on the opening kickoff and the Rams had a ridiculously good offense. They scored 6 TDs. Wilkins kicked the XP after the first, but then came out of the game. They went for the 2 every time after that, converting an NFL-record 4 attempts. Additionally, the Rams went for it on 4th down three times in Falcons territory, since they couldn't kick field goals. They converted a 4th-and-2 and a 4th-and-15. Then there's the situation where a coach has nothing at all to lose. An example of this was in 2002, when the 4-9 Vikings scored a TD with 5 seconds left in the game. They eschewed the game-tying extra point and went for the win in regulation because... well, they were 4-9 and had nothing to lose.In addition, several articles have pointed out that when a team is down by 14 points late in the game, and they score a TD, they're much better off going for a 2pc rather than kicking the XP. If they fail the 2pc, they attempt another 2pc after the next score for the tie. If they convert the 2pc, then they kick the XP after the next TD for the win. A breakdown of this strategy can be read about here, although the numbers are slightly flawed. In the NFL, kickers convert about 99% of extra points, not 94% like the article claims. Still, his conclusions remain valid.Other than those very specific instances, the 2pc is not a very smart play.

Read my post again. The two points conversion is only successful 43% of the time in the NFL. If you score 50 TDs, and go for the 2pc every time, then you're going to get 50 x 2 x .43 or 43 points. Meanwhile, the extra point is 99% likely, so if you go for the XP every time, you'll score 50 x 1 x .99 or 49.5 points. Clearly, 49.5 is greater than 43, so in order to maximize long-range scoring, coaches should kick the XP every single time.Then, too, there's the fact that while an NFL team might score 50 TDs a season, they are NOT going to score 50 a game. In many games, they'll only score one or two TDs. What happens if a team scores first, goes for the two, fails (which is more likely than succeeding), and never scores again? Suddenly, a single TD is enough to beat them. Even if the 2pc was 49.5% likely (which would make it as good of a play as the extra point in terms of long-term scoring), going for the XP on the first TD might still be the smart play, because then it places the onus on the other team. If they score, they have to decide if they want to kick for the tie, or go for the 2pc for the lead and risk trailing instead.So even if the 2pc was 49.5% likely, which is the break even point with the extra point, there would still be a lot more strategy involved. Good offensive teams would go for the 2pc more often, because they always expect to score again. Great defensive teams would kick the extra point to put the burden of scoring on the other team.Then, too, one would have to consider that NFL coaches tend to be very risk-adverse. If they gamble and fail, either going for the 2pc or a 4th down conversion, and lose the game as a result, they will get castigated by the media, and often fired by the owner. Consider **** Vermiel going for the TD and the win against the Raiders. The media kept praising him for making such a gutsy call, but if that call fails, the media would roast him for passing up a sure chance at overtime. Vermeil made the right call, but it would have been the right call even if it wasn't successful. However, if a gutsy call like that fails and costs a game, owners are going to be much more likely to fire a coach.Another great example of this is winning the overtime coin toss. I'm sure a lot of people remember when Marty Morninwheg was the head coach of the Detroit lions, and his team won the coin toss and, rather than asking for the ball, they elected to kick it away. The other team marched down the field, kicked a figgie, and the Lions never got their hands on the ball. The media went into a frenzy, calling Marty an idiot and making all sorts of jokes, and the owner fired him shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, what I'm sure not many people at all remember is that the Denver Broncos made a similar decision in 1998. They went into OT, won the toss, and opted to kick it away. They got a quick stop, drove a short field, and won the game, and nobody made a sound. As you can see, taking risks is only a bad decision in the media's mind if the risk does not succeed.This is the reason why I love the fact that Denver's owner has said that Mike Shanahan will not be going anywhere for any reason at all. It enables Mike to take risks that other owners with questionable job security are too afraid to take, such as going for it on fourth and short.

Teams reserve their super-special, top-secret, sure-fire plays for 2pcs. They use the "best play in the playbook". I don't think any team has ever demonstrated that it is particularly better than league average at converting 2pcs. Even if a team WAS better than league average, however, the rate would drop over time. Unless a team has 50 different "best plays in the playbook", then after the first 5-10 2pcs the future opponents will have enough film to breakdown that they'll be able to better prepare, and the team's success rate on 2pcs will inevitably drop. Then, worst of all, if they're ever in a situation where they genuinely NEED a 2pc, they've already tipped the league off to all of their best plays.Don't get me wrong. I'm always one of the first people to say that teams need to become a little bit more creative with the 2pc- for instance, when down by 14 very late in the game I think it makes a lot more sense to go for the 2 after the first score. However, going for the 2 point conversion every single time you score a touchdown is NOT a very wise strategy, regardless of how much confidence a coach has in his offense. And even if it WAS a good strategy, it would never be employed in a career as risk-adverse as coaching in the NFL.Now, if you want to start talking about risky propositions that coaches should gamble on more frequently, I'd be more than happy to discuss the fourth down conversion with you. I think coaches should go for it on fourth down FAR more often than the majority of them do.

I think that's about all I have to say on the subject.

 

[AB in DC]

NFL conversion rate on two-point try's is 51.9%

 

[P Boy]

Classic risk/reward analysis.As a HC, do you take less points knowing that there is an outrageously high percentage that you will score the points (point, I know...); or do you go for more points knowing that there is a much lower probability of scoring those points.Even though there is a statistical edge for going for 2 points, I think you'll find that the reason that guys become HCs in the NFL is that they aren't huge fans of taking risks if they can help it.It's kind of the same scenario with running the football/passing the football. If a team runs the football @ 3.6 ypc, and they throw the football at 7.8 ypa, if you ask the coach which he'd rather do, he'll tell you to run the football. A lot less risk of having a zero gain/negative play even though passing the football actually produces better yardage overall.Kick the 1.

 

[KnowledgeReignsSupreme]

NFL conversion rate on two-point try's is 51.9%

Yes that seems high. Everytime I read it, it's ~40% from 2 yards out and ~60% from 1 yard out.Give footballcommentary.com a perusal.

 

[Lehigh98]

Remember the Rams 2-point-conversion-fest game?Anyone remember how many they went for and made?

 

[AhrnCityPahnder]

NFL conversion rate on two-point try's is 51.9%

Yes that seems high. Everytime I read it, it's ~40% from 2 yards out and ~60% from 1 yard out.Give footballcommentary.com a perusal.

They threw this out there as a stat during the PIT/IND game. I think they were just referring to this year, which is an anomoly. I've always thought it to be in the low 40% range.

 

[bagger.]

NFL conversion rate on two-point try's is 51.9%. NFL conversion rate on one-point trys is 98%

2 * .519 = 1.04

1 * .980 = .980

1.04 > .980 = Go for two.

Thoughts?

It's not really enough of a significant edge for it to overrule other in-game strategic decisions.It's more than just pushing a 0.06 point edge.

 

[dudaman]

It didn't work out too well for the Panthers in the SB two years ago (0 for 2) - put them in a tough spot later in the game.

 

[BigTex]

2pt conversion chart

http://www.normhitzges.com/thechart.htm

 

[KnowledgeReignsSupreme]

It didn't work out too well for the Panthers in the SB two years ago (0 for 2) - put them in a tough spot later in the game.

So you are basing that on what exactly? How the score happened to end up? It can't be known what the exact score will be at the end of the game. You can only go by probability and a feel for what you think your team can do right now. If the correct decision is "go for two if you feel you have a 35% chance of success" and you feel your team has a 35% chance of success, you do it.In addition, the fact that they failed the conversion does not weigh in on whether or not it was the correct decision. If they are down by 2 with 0:00 remaining in regulation, does that mean it was wrong to go for 2 if they failed?

 

[KnowledgeReignsSupreme]

2pt conversion chart

http://www.normhitzges.com/thechart.htm

Better 2pt conversion charthttp://www.footballcommentary.com/twoptchart.htm

 

[P Boy]

So you are basing that on what exactly? How the score happened to end up? It can't be known what the exact score will be at the end of the game. You can only go by probability and a feel for what you think your team can do right now. If the correct decision is "go for two if you feel you have a 35% chance of success" and you feel your team has a 35% chance of success, you do it.In addition, the fact that they failed the conversion does not weigh in on whether or not it was the correct decision. If they are down by 2 with 0:00 remaining in regulation, does that mean it was wrong to go for 2 if they failed?

Okay, I officially am the proud owner of a headache after reading this.Could some rational person please translate this for me?

 

[BigTex]

2pt conversion chart

http://www.normhitzges.com/thechart.htm

Better 2pt conversion charthttp://www.footballcommentary.com/twoptchart.htm

Your superiority has been proven.

 

[SSOG]

Remember the Rams 2-point-conversion-fest game?

Anyone remember how many they went for and made?

5 of 6, if I recall correctly.

It didn't work out too well for the Panthers in the SB two years ago (0 for 2) - put them in a tough spot later in the game.

You can't point to a place where it failed as conclusive proof that it's bad strategy. I could point out every team that ever lost by 1 point and say that if they'd just gone for and made some 2pcs, they would have won. Would that mean that suddenly going for two is a GOOD strategy?Strategy decisions are not good decisions if they succeed and bad decisions of they fail, despite what the media says. A strategy decision can be good even if it fails, and bad even if it succeeds.

 

[AB in DC]

It didn't work out too well for the Panthers in the SB two years ago (0 for 2) - put them in a tough spot later in the game.

So you are basing that on what exactly? How the score happened to end up? It can't be known what the exact score will be at the end of the game. You can only go by probability and a feel for what you think your team can do right now. If the correct decision is "go for two if you feel you have a 35% chance of success" and you feel your team has a 35% chance of success, you do it.In addition, the fact that they failed the conversion does not weigh in on whether or not it was the correct decision. If they are down by 2 with 0:00 remaining in regulation, does that mean it was wrong to go for 2 if they failed?

All dudaman said was that it didn't work out too well -- can't argue with that.And I think it was the wrong call from the start. You don't know until late in the game whether that second point is really important, and the first two-point try was either late third or early fourth -- plenty of time remaining in a game where 24 points were scored in a five minute span. Fox thought it would be more important to be down by 3 than by 4 -- but Carolina ended up scoring the next touchdown, so that difference wasn't important. Going for two there is only good if you think that neither team will be scoring much for the rest of the game.

 

[SSOG]

So you are basing that on what exactly? How the score happened to end up? It can't be known what the exact score will be at the end of the game. You can only go by probability and a feel for what you think your team can do right now. If the correct decision is "go for two if you feel you have a 35% chance of success" and you feel your team has a 35% chance of success, you do it.

In addition, the fact that they failed the conversion does not weigh in on whether or not it was the correct decision. If they are down by 2 with 0:00 remaining in regulation, does that mean it was wrong to go for 2 if they failed?

Okay, I officially am the proud owner of a headache after reading this.Could some rational person please translate this for me?

Let's say a coach thinks he has a 50% chance of making a conversion, and if he makes the conversion, he thinks he has a 75% chance of winning the game. Meanwhile, he thinks that he has a 100% chance of making the XP, and if he makes the XP, he thinks he has a 50% chance of winning the game.Therefore, the team's chances of winning are .50x.75, or 37.5% if he goes for two. Meanwhile, their chances are 1.0x.5, or 50%, if he goes for one. The correct decision, assuming that the coach's reasoning is sound, is to kick the extra point. Now, if the coach loses by a single point, then the media would be all over him, saying that he made a mistake in kicking the extra point... but that's because hindsight is 20/20. He made the CORRECT DECISION going for the 1, based on the information that he had at the time.

Now let's apply this to the Panthers in the SB. Just because the final outcome says that if he'd gone for the 1, he would have had a better chance of winning... DOESN'T mean that going for the two was the wrong idea. Again, hindsight is 20/20. Basically, John Fox said "Unless the next series of scores goes FG-TD-TD+2-FG-TD, then going for 2 is the best idea". It just so happened that, in that game, the next series of scores wound up being FG-TD-TD+2-FG-TD (or whatever they really were, I'm just making an example).

 

[jeff_eaglz]

2pt conversion chart

http://www.normhitzges.com/thechart.htm

Better 2pt conversion charthttp://www.footballcommentary.com/twoptchart.htm

Good lord that second chart would never get used by a head coach - unless some statistician color coded it for him ("Green is go for it, coach").Secondly, the first link above (normhitzges) has a mistake.

If you trail by 13 you should not go for 1. The proper decision would be to go for 2.

Kicking the 1 puts you down by 12, which is still 2 TDs. Getting 2 points puts you down by a FG and a TD+2.

This is reflected in the more complicated second link where the number in the box for a 13 point deficit is 0.10. The chart is basically telling you to "go for 2" when the number is 0.40 or lower. I know that some have said the number is 0.43, but for the sake of argument (and a simplified one) let us stick to 40%.

With that said, it is interesting to compare the two charts.

The first chart only goes to 20 points, ahead or behind, so I'll stick to that.

Both charts say to go for it when AHEAD by:

1

5

12

19

And BEHIND by:

2

5

10

16

18

The first chart recommend to go for it in these situations:

Lead by 4 - The second chart says NOT to go for this, even with 3 minutes or less to go. That's crazy. Go for 2 every time. If you make it you are up by a TD and have a chance to block the extra point and send the game into OT if the other team comes back. Don't make it and the other team still has to score a TD. Kicking 1 to go up by 5 is absolutely meaningless. Advantage - first chart.

Lead by 11 - The second chart says to go for 2. Don't buy this one either. Kick 1 and your opponent needs 2 TDs to win. Go for 2 and you're up by 13 - and your opponent needs 2 TDs to win (assuming the extra points). The bigger issue is if you miss the 2, you give a little momentum to your opponent, especially the D which needs it, and now they only need a FG and an 8 PT TD to tie, not 2 TDs. Advantage - first chart.

Behind by 17 - The second chart recommends this at 0.41, so it very close to both saying "go for 2". Making 2 puts you down by 15, two scores. Missing it puts you down by three. That is a tough call and not a clear decision. Before you scored the TD you were down by 23, so you need 8, 8, and 7 to tie. When do you try for the 8s is the question. If you go for the 8 on the first one and miss, you are now down by 3 scores which lowers the chances of winning. I subcribe to the (1) go for it later due to a tired D, (2) use the game momentum (hopefully) of two unanswered scores to go for it after the 2nd and 3rd D, and (3) keeping hope alive that you are only 2 scores down after getting 7 to start the comeback effort. Advantage - Even.

The "better" chart says to go for it a LOT more if you are behind. Every number between 8 and 20 is a go for it except 14 and 17, which barely misses the cut at 0.41.

Behind by 8 - Going for 2 is an agressive call. If you miss you need an 8 point TD just to tie. Make it and an easier 7 point TD gives you a win. I would kick the 1 and defer the aggressive behavior until later, deciding to go for the victory later in the game or settle for a tie. Advantage - Even.

Behind by 9 - Similar to 8, but this one you should do. Go for 8 to put you within 8.

Advantage - second chart.

Behind by 11 - Going for 2 is another agressive call, but I don't like this one. Going for 2 you are down by 9, and you still need two scores to win (TD and FG). Miss and you are down by 11 and you still need a TD and a FG, but now you need to go for 2 on the TD AND get 2 just to tie. If you kick 1, you need a regular TD and FG to tie, and have the option of going for 2 if the second score is a TD if you want to go for the win. Bad suggestion to go for 2 here. Advantage - first chart.

Behind by 12 - Exactly 0.40 on this one so it is borderline, but by the definition of going for it every time the chart says 0.40 or under, it says go for 2. Make it and you trail by 10, a regular TD and a FG to tie. Miss and you need two TDs. Kick the extra point and you need the FG and TD still, but now you need a 2-point conversion after the TD to tie. Given that the TD and FG should be easier, I would go for 1 down by 12, but it is a valid argument. Advantage - Even.

Behind by 13 - It says to go for it with a convincing 0.10 number. Make it and you are down by an 8 and a 3 to tie. Miss and you need 2 TDs to win. Kick 1 and you still need 2 TDs to win. Going for it does make sense and the first chart looks wrong. Advantage - Second chart.

Behind by 15 - Going for 2 is an agressive call, just like at 8. Similar argument. 40% percentage, so really a judgment call. Advantage - Even.

Behind by 19 - Going for 2 here puts you down by 18 at best. That is still three scores, even with a FG, 7 and 7. Missing and you are down by 8, 8, and 3. Kicking the one and you trail by 8, 7, and 3. I would think the logic here is that if you make it, you have two easy TDs to tie and have the chance to win if you decide on it later. However, I would argue that the miss would make take a lot of the air out of the team's sails and their new found momentum would take a hit. Getting a FG and two 8 point TDs would be asking a lot. I'd kick the 1 and make the call after the next score at either down 16 or down by 12. Advantage - First chart, not by much.

So I have the first chart doing better than the second chart, 4-2-4. I would change the first chart's answers for down by 9 and 13 and go for it, then make the "evens" a judgment call (question marks at behind by 8, 12, 15, and 17).

 

[wannabee]

 

[jeff_eaglz]

Bump for any possible discussion......... and to squeeze in between Manning and referee threads....