This article on Protrade.com does an excellent job of breaking down some the big plays from each of the Divisonal Round games in terms of their impact on each team's probability of winning. Reading the article, one thing is clear to me: Marty Schottenheimer does not help his team win big games because of his poor decisions and lack of actual coaching. I'll use some of the analysis from the article to make my point:
1st quarter, 5:21, Tied at 0, Schottenheimer elects to go for it on 4th and 11 from the Patriots' 30 yard line.
SD's Win Probability if goes for it: 55%
SD's Win Probability if kicks FG: 58%
SD's Win Probability if punts: 57%
Impact (of decision) -3%
- In perhaps an attempt to shed the "too conservative in the playoffs" label, Marty makes a very curious call early in the game. Don't get us wrong - we think teams need to go for it more on 4th down, but 4th-and-11 is not one of those situations. Fourth downs of that distance can only be expected to be converted into first downs 20% of the time, while 48-yard field goals (which this would have been) are made in the NFL at a 63% clip.
4th quarter, 6:25, Marlon McCree intercepts Tom Brady, but fumbles on the return, which is recoverd by New England.
SD's Win Probability at start of play: 77%
SD's Win Probability after interception, but before fumble: 81%
SD's Win Probability after fumble: 71%
Impact (of fumble) -9%
- Good coaches would inform their players before the beginning of this play to knock down a pass because it is fourth down. Now let's give McCree a break for making the pick in the heat of the moment... at least he should have fallen on the ball, not tried to return it. Again, I blame the coaching here. Marty doesn't even call the plays, so the least he could do is give a little coach speak before each play, right?
4th quarter, 6:25, Schottenheimer challenges McCree's fumble
SD's Win Probability at start last drive (1:05 on clock): 9.2%
SD's Win Probability if they start the drive with 1:40 on clock : 12.3%
Impact (of lost time out) -3%
- Schottenheimer made a bad situation worse when he decided to challenge McCree's fumble. On replay, it was very clear the play was a fumble. The challenge had very little chance to succeed. It did cost the Chargers a timeout, though. In hindsight, the lost timeout was expensive. They most likely would have used the timeout on defense during the Pats' last drive, which would have left approximately 35 extra second on the clock for their last drive. Those 35 extra seconds were worth a 3% swing at the start of the drive. If you take it one step further and add those 35 seconds at the end of the drive, the Chargers' chances would have jumped from 32% to 43%.
I have heard a lot of talk about how Marty doesn't call the plays, but none of these examples have to do with the actual play calling.
I also thought it was interesting that Andy Reid's decision to punt on 4th-and-15 wasn't such a bad call...
4th quarter, 1:56, Andy Reid elects to punt on 4th-and-15 from the Philadelphia 39 yard line
Philadelphia's Win Probability if go for it: 17.6%%
Philadelphia's Win Probability if punt: 17.1%%
Impact (of decision) -0.5%
The author insists he should have gone for it, which I agree with, but I didn't realize that it really only changed the Eagles chances of winning by half of one percent.
1st quarter, 5:21, Tied at 0, Schottenheimer elects to go for it on 4th and 11 from the Patriots' 30 yard line.
SD's Win Probability if goes for it: 55%
SD's Win Probability if kicks FG: 58%
SD's Win Probability if punts: 57%
Impact (of decision) -3%
- In perhaps an attempt to shed the "too conservative in the playoffs" label, Marty makes a very curious call early in the game. Don't get us wrong - we think teams need to go for it more on 4th down, but 4th-and-11 is not one of those situations. Fourth downs of that distance can only be expected to be converted into first downs 20% of the time, while 48-yard field goals (which this would have been) are made in the NFL at a 63% clip.
4th quarter, 6:25, Marlon McCree intercepts Tom Brady, but fumbles on the return, which is recoverd by New England.
SD's Win Probability at start of play: 77%
SD's Win Probability after interception, but before fumble: 81%
SD's Win Probability after fumble: 71%
Impact (of fumble) -9%
- Good coaches would inform their players before the beginning of this play to knock down a pass because it is fourth down. Now let's give McCree a break for making the pick in the heat of the moment... at least he should have fallen on the ball, not tried to return it. Again, I blame the coaching here. Marty doesn't even call the plays, so the least he could do is give a little coach speak before each play, right?
4th quarter, 6:25, Schottenheimer challenges McCree's fumble
SD's Win Probability at start last drive (1:05 on clock): 9.2%
SD's Win Probability if they start the drive with 1:40 on clock : 12.3%
Impact (of lost time out) -3%
- Schottenheimer made a bad situation worse when he decided to challenge McCree's fumble. On replay, it was very clear the play was a fumble. The challenge had very little chance to succeed. It did cost the Chargers a timeout, though. In hindsight, the lost timeout was expensive. They most likely would have used the timeout on defense during the Pats' last drive, which would have left approximately 35 extra second on the clock for their last drive. Those 35 extra seconds were worth a 3% swing at the start of the drive. If you take it one step further and add those 35 seconds at the end of the drive, the Chargers' chances would have jumped from 32% to 43%.
I have heard a lot of talk about how Marty doesn't call the plays, but none of these examples have to do with the actual play calling.
I also thought it was interesting that Andy Reid's decision to punt on 4th-and-15 wasn't such a bad call...
4th quarter, 1:56, Andy Reid elects to punt on 4th-and-15 from the Philadelphia 39 yard line
Philadelphia's Win Probability if go for it: 17.6%%
Philadelphia's Win Probability if punt: 17.1%%
Impact (of decision) -0.5%
The author insists he should have gone for it, which I agree with, but I didn't realize that it really only changed the Eagles chances of winning by half of one percent.